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What Message Is the Color You're Wearing Sending?
Bored at work? This summer, AOL Jobs will be publishing a career quiz every week to keep you entertained. This quiz was so popular with readers when it originally ran that AOL is republishing it.
You might want to think twice before you fall back on basic black every day. You may believe it looks classic and sophisticated, or maybe you're wearing it because it's just plain easy. But black could also be signaling to your co-workers that you're depressed, unimaginative, dark-spirited and/or lazy.
"The colors you wear in a professional setting are about so much more than mere fashion or style," says Sheila Dicks, professional style coach and founder of the Fashion Expert Network. "Colors send subconscious messages, and can affect your mood, as well as the mood of the workers around you."
"Whether we are conscious of it or not, the colors we choose for our business attire send a strong message," says Lynda Goldman, business communications and etiquette consultant and author of 30 books, including 'How to Make a Million Dollar First Impression.' "The image you project with a beige suit is very different from the way you look in a navy suit," she says. That's why it's absolutely essential to chose the colors you wear on a job interview with great care.
Never blue in blue
What is the one color that absolutely breathes success? Goldman says it's blue. "Studies show that navy blue is the best color for a suit to wear to a job interview, because it inspires confidence. You are more likely to get the job when you wear navy blue to an interview than any other color."
And if you're not applying for a suit-and-tie kind of job? What color then? Still blue, of a strong shade, according to Goldman. "It's the color of the sky, or 'true blue,'" she says. "It's both friendly and powerful. It connotes loyalty. Have you noticed how many companies use blue in their logo and corporate colors?" Think the ultimate friendly and connected company, Facebook. Think IBM. Look at your computer screen right now and notice how many advertisers, programs, websites and platforms use blue as their main color.
What's said about red
Now if you really want to blow away your colleagues, superiors or potential employers, throw in a splash of red. "Red is powerful and strong. It shows you're not afraid to stand out, and it gets attention," says professional image consultant Mary Lin Dedeaux of Wardrobe Perfect. She is a certified professional member of the Association of Image Consultants, Int'l and is often hired to do corporate wardrobe consultations and makeovers for companies like Merrill Lynch, Sony Entertainment, Cushman & Wakefield and Aetna, through the company Corporate Icon.
But beware of too much, or too tight red. It could get you in trouble. A tight red dress says, to put it mildly, "flirt alert." A bright red button down shirt with a dark suit and tie could look too Vegas or Mafia on a man. And while a red suit on a woman is great for politicians and public speakers, in some settings it can be a little bright and intimidating. It can also give the impression that you're flashy, and not a team player.
Blending in: When beige is best
Is there any time on the job when you don't want to stand out -- when a blah beige or dark, neutral colors could be your friends? "I know of a man who works in construction," says Dicks. "He feels that bright-colored clothing would draw too much attention to him." He worried that he would be singled out for additional, undesirable tasks and be razzed by his co-workers if he wore bright colors. It's a little like wearing camo in the military because you don't want to make yourself a target.
Still, according to the all the experts interviewed, it's hard for a male executive to be taken seriously in a beige suit. Even in summer, for the most part, "the darker the color, the more powerful the look," according to Goldman. Whether you're wearing a suit or not, beige as the predominant color in your outfit can make you look drab, dull and milquetoast. Far better to go with ivory than beige.
Here's a quick rundown of what other colors can say about you at work:
If you're wearing all-white it looks like a uniform and employees will be on tenterhooks around you, just waiting for you to explode when you attract the inevitable stain. Unless you're a painter, chef or nurse, stay away from all white.
Darker greens can connote power, class, strength and conservatism. Brighter greens tell people you're sporty, more casual and often cheerful.
Pink is not just for women anymore. Men who wear pale pink or salmon accents tell the world they're confident, daring and independent enough to sport what has previously been considered a feminine color. Women can use it to soften a strong, dark-colored suit and look more approachable. Bright, bubblegum pink or fuchsia from head to toe is just plain annoying and hurts people's eyes.
Dark purple says elegance, authority, class and a regal demeanor. Men can get away with a deep burgundy jacket to give a refined yet highly stylish impression. Women can appear strong, powerful and confident in a deep purple jacket, suit or blouse. A deep purple dressy T-shirt or button down in a very casual work environment says "I'm confident and efficient, yet not stuffy."
Yellow tells people you're casual, playful, cheerful, approachable and not afraid to take risks. Seeing yellow can cheer people up, so you're perceived as having a sunny personality just for wearing it. Watch out for mustard, however, which can make people of almost all complexions look jaundiced or otherwise unhealthy.
You have to be careful with brown. It's been touted this season as "the new black, but unless your brown clothes are fitted properly, it can make you look like a potato, a potato sack, or any of a number of unattractive brown-colored substances. When your brown clothing has the right cut, however, and is accented with blue, pink, beige, yellow, salmon, green or a host of other colors, it's a great substitute for black -- not as severe, formal or depressing.
Go easy on the orange, lest your outfit be mistaken for a caution sign, safety wear, or prison garb. Because of the intensity of most oranges, unless the clothing is extremely well made, it often looks cheap or garish. Peaches are fine and blend well with other colors, but too much bright orange can make your colleagues think you're tacky and craving attention.
So how do those bold souls brave enough to wear (gasp!) prints come across in the workplace? According to Dedeaux, plaids can say you're traditional yet sporty; polka dots can mean you're fun and have a good sense of humor, and animal prints may tell the world you're flirty and sexy. How many times have you heard someone growl or purr when you pass by in that leopard print blouse?
These are all generalizations, of course. A lot depends on the shade, your own hair color and complexion, and the contrasting accents you put with these individual colors. But knowing a hue's psychological effect can put you at an advantage when you're going on a job interview, conducting a meeting, asking for a raise or trying to fit in. And these days, we need all the help we can get.
Don't Miss: Companies Hiring Now
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text: FICO® Scores and Your Mortgage Posted on November 10, 2017 - 10:44 AM by Lev Gililov Years ago, credit scoring had little to do with mortgage lending. When reviewing the credit worthiness of a borrower, an underwriter would make a subjective decision based on past payment history. Then things changed. Lenders studied the relationship be... Read more

subset: commoncrawl


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I bought your new cd last Saturday to help me to prepare for my talk at New Beginnings tonight. I've listened to it about 5 times!! I love it!! Thank you for sharing your wisdom and insight. I really was struck by the eclipse analogy and the puzzle story!! Also, I love the idea and wholeheartedly agree that many times answers come from experience!!!
I drive for a living and consume a lot of audio materials. Always anxious for Brother Bytheway's next work. "Ask of God" is everything I've come to expect from him. His humor and entertaining presentation makes it fun, while providing insights that are timely and profound.
With all the confusing messages church members face in these times, this talk provides ideas for cutting through some modern 'mists of darkness'.
I highly recommend this CD for any age, but especially the youth or anyone that works with youth.
I knew going in that I would probably enjoy this talk quite a bit. I've listened to talks and presentations given by John Bytheway before and thoroughly enjoyed them. And I did indeed really enjoy listening to this approximately hour long talk about seeking answers from God. I loved the way that Bytheway divided his talk into a discussion of three types of questions: gotcha questions, Google questions, and golden questions. "Gotcha" questions are those designed to manipulate others into giving you what you want. Several scriptural examples of individuals doing this to the Savior and his prophets. People who use these sorts of questions don't really want a legitimate answer, and in fact may already know the answer. Google questions are information questions that the Google browser can provide answers to, but it's just information, no wisdom is provided to help use the information gathered. Golden questions are the sorts of questions that people really, sincerely desire an answer to and can be answered through the gospel and God himself. But as Bytheway points out, society has trained people to want answers to "Golden" questions, in the same amount of time as Google provides answers, and many times, the answers don't come that way. Using stories, quotes, and scripture references, Brother Bytheway explains the importance of prayer and how it is for our good to use it the way the Lord designed it to work. He also points out the important of having faith in God, and being willing to 'wrestle' to find the answers we seek, especially when they don't come right away. This is an inspiring talk that is aimed at youth, but that has great advice and reminders for anyone who cares to listen. Highly recommended.


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RoboForm 2017 full offline installer setup for PC 32bit/64bit.
RoboForm makes logging into Web sites and filling forms faster, easier, and more secure. RoboForm memorizes and securely stores each user name and password the first time you log into a site, then automatically supplies them when you return. RoboForm 's Logins feature eliminates the manual steps of logging into any online account. With just one click RoboForm will navigate to a Web site, enter your username and password and click the submit button for you. Completing long registration or checkout forms is also a breeze. Simply click on your RoboForm Identity and RoboForm fills-in the entire form for you.
You no longer need to remember all your passwords. You remember one Master Password, and RoboForm remembers the rest. This allows you to use stronger passwords, making your online experience more secure. RoboForm uses strong AES encryption for complete data security.
How It Works RoboForm.
Install RoboForm Take the plunge and download RoboForm. There is nothing to lose- it's free and you'll be able to see what all the excitement is about. There's no credit card required and no strings attached.
Choose Your Master Password Your Master Password is the one password you ll need to remember. This password will encrypt and secure all of your RoboForm data.
Remember Your Passwords There's no start-up time with RoboForm-just surf the web as you normally would. When you login to a website, RoboForm automatically offers to save your Login information. It s that simple.
Simplify Your Logins Now that RoboForm has remembered your login information, simply click on that Login and RoboForm will take you to that site and log you in automatically. It's as easy as using Bookmarks or Favorites. You'll never need to remember or type another password again.
Access RoboForm Everywhere Access your RoboForm Logins and Identities on all of your computers and devices. RoboForm runs on Windows, Mac, Linux, and Windows USB drives. Also have apps for most popular mobile phone platforms including iOS, Android, and Windows Mobile. Use RoboForm Everywhere (Online) service to synchronize and back up your data to the cloud, which lets you enjoy secure, one-click access from everywhere.
Fill Forms Fast Use RoboForm Identities feature to securely store your name, address, email, credit cards, and all your other information. Just click on your RoboForm Identity to fill entire web forms automatically. Save yourself hours of needless typing.
Generate Strong Passwords Since you no longer need to remember or type your passwords, you can use RoboForm to generate strong, unique passwords for each of the sites that you visit.
Note . 30 days trial version. Limited functionality.
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text:
U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission
Retaliation Followed Harassed Employee to Her New Job, Says EEOC
SAN JOSE, Calif. – The Holiday Inn Express Mountain View-Palo Alto violated federal law when a supervisor there sexually harassed a female employee and retaliated against her, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charged in an employment discrimination lawsuit filed today.
According to the EEOC's investigation, Beatriz Garcia, who worked as a front desk clerk at the hotel, faced sexual harassment by one of her supervisors, including unwelcome touching, sexual comments and threats in response to complaining about the harassment. The EEOC asserts that, after Garcia notified management about the harassment, as well as about discrimination against Mexican workers, the company retaliated by firing her. More retaliation occurred after Garcia filed an EEOC charge, says the agency, when a member of Holiday Inn's management called Garcia's manager at her new place of work in an attempt to warn him about Garcia and to obtain her contact information.
"I came to this country to work hard and achieve the American dream. At the Holiday Inn Express, I found a great job but I also found sexual harassment and retaliation," said Garcia. "Soon after being promoted, I realized that the promotion came at a price I did not want to pay. I could not continue to work where I was being treated as a sexual object. So instead I decided take a stand against sexual harassment and retaliation, for anyone who like me has suffered from harassment at work."
Sexual harassment and termination as retaliation for speaking out about it violate Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC filed this suit (CV-10-4254 HRL in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California) only after first attempting to reach a voluntary settlement through conciliation. The suit seeks monetary damages, training on anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation laws, posting of notices at the work site and other injunctive relief.
"All workers have the right to work in an environment free from sexual harassment and retaliation," said EEOC San Francisco Regional Attorney William Tamayo. "By law, employers must protect their workers and take responsibility for the actions of their supervisors."
EEOC San Francisco District Director Michael Baldonado noted that the number of retaliation charges filed with the EEOC in fiscal year 2009 (33,613) was more than double the number of sexual harassment charges filed (12,696).
"When an employee comes to you with concerns about harassment, take this as an opportunity to protect your human resources," said Baldonado. "Send a clear message that sexual harassment will not be tolerated in your workplace."
The EEOC enforces federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination. Further information about the EEOC is available on its web site at www.eeoc.gov.


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TripleHead2Go Digital
TripleHead2Go Digital SE
TripleHead2Go DP Edition
TripleHead2Go Digital SE
See more. Do more. Be more productive.
The Matrox TripleHead2Go Digital SE external multi-display adapter adds up to three DVI monitors to your laptop or desktop computer. It connects to the video output of your system and uses the system's existing GPU to provide high-quality, uncompressed graphics and video across all monitors. Ideal for professionals requiring more desktop space for maximum productivity, Pro A/V specialists looking to create unique multi-screen setups, and gamers wanting a totally immersive experience—this little black box lets you run different applications on each display or view one application across multiple monitors.
- Lets you connect up to three monitors to the single DisplayPort or Mini DisplayPort video output, or Thunderbolt port1, of your system
- Creates a stretched desktop with a maximum resolution of 5760x1080 (3x 1920x1080)2,3 across three displays or 3840x1200 (2x1920x1200)3 across two
- Uses your system's existing GPU to deliver a solid platform for office, 3D design, multimedia and digital signage applications
- Open an application on each display or span one across multiple screens
- HDCP compliance for protected content playback
- Works with displays and projectors
- Experience Surround Gaming by expanding supported 3D games across three monitors to achieve a much wider in-game field of view
- Matrox Bezel Management compensates for monitor bezel gaps to bring realism to gaming and digital signage (Available under Windows only)
- Quick and easy to install—there's no need to open the computer case or insert components
- Spans taskbar across monitors for easy access to all your open applications
- Runs in clone mode and shows the same content on all displays
- Includes Matrox PowerDesk software to easily manage your desktop configuration
- External device that won't void your system warranty
- Expand your Windows desktop further by connecting a second TripleHead2Go Digital SE to your graphics hardware to support up to six monitors at a time4
- PC and Mac compatible
For more information about other TripleHead2Go models visit our GXM Series page.
1 Thunderbolt port connectivity is currently supported only with Mac systems. Windows support coming soon.
2 This mode runs at 50Hz which may be incompatible with some displays. Verify with your display vendor for compatibility.
3 Operating System and GPU dependent; please see system compatibility information to verify the maximum resolution supported by your system.
4 Certain conditions apply. Visit the Multi-GXM support page for further details.
|Part number
|Maximum DVI Resolution 1
|5760x1080 (3x 1920x1080)2
3840x1200 (2x 1920x1200)
|Input connector
|1 x DisplayPort input
|Output connectors
|3 x DVI-D outputs
|USB for power
|5.25" x 2.5" x 1.1" (LxWxH)
|Clone Mode
|Stretched Desktop Support
|Surround Gaming
|Matrox Monitor Bezel Management
|Yes – Available under Windows only
|PowerDesk Software
|Hardware included
|Multi-unit support
|Yes – Available under Windows only
|System Requirements
|Supported Operating Systems
|Microsoft® Windows® 10 (32/64bit), Windows 8 (32/64bit), Windows 7 (32/64bit), Windows Vista® (32/64bit), Windows XP (32/64bit), Windows Server® 2012 (32/64bit), Windows Server 2003/2008 (32/64bit), macOS Sierra (10.12), Mac® OS X® El Capitan (10.11), Mac OS X Yosemite (10.10), Mac OS X Mavericks (10.9), Mac OS X Mountain Lion (10.8), Mac OS X Lion (10.7), Mac OS X (10.6) and Linux® 3
|Optional Accessories (Sold Separately)
|Power Supply Kit (Part # GXM-PSKIT-IF)
1 Maximum resolution is system, monitor type and OS dependent - please see the system compatibility information.
2 This mode runs at 50Hz which may be incompatible with some displays. Verify with your display vendor for compatibility.
3 Contact Matrox for tested versions of leading Linux distributions.
List of Supported Resolutions
TripleHead Resolutions
|Refresh Rate
|1920 x 480 (3 x 640 x 480)
|2400 x 480 (3 x 800 x 480)
|2400 x 600 (3 x 800 x 600)
|3072 x 768 (3 x 1024 x 768)
|3840 x 720 (3 x 1280 x 720)
|501, 60Hz
|3840 x 768 (3 x 1280 x 768)
|3840 x 800 (3 x 1280 x 800)
|3840 x 960 (3 x 1280 x 960)
|3840 x 1024 (3 x 1280 x 1024)
|4080 x 768 (3 x 1360 x 768)
|4098 x 768 (3 x 1366 x 768) 2
|4200 x 1050 (3 x 1400 x 1050) 2
|4320 x 900 (3 x 1440 x 900) 2
|4800 x 900 (3 x 1600 x 900) 2
|5040 x 1050 (3 x 1680 x 1050) 2
|5760 x 1080 (3 x 1920 x 1080) 2
DualHead Resolutions
|Refresh Rate
|1600 x 600 (2x 800 x 600)
|2048 x 768 (2x 1024 x 768)
|2048 x 1536 (2x 1024 x 1536)
|2560 x 720 (2x 1280 x 720)
|501, 60Hz
|2560 x 768 (2x 1280 x 768)
|2560 x 800 (2x 1280 x 800)
|2560 x 960 (2x 1280 x 960)
|2560 x 1024 (2x 1280 x 1024)
|2560 x 1536 (2x 1280 x 1536)
|2560 x 1600 (2x 1280 x 1600)
|2560 x 2048 (2x 1280 x 2048)
|50Hz 1
|2720 x 768 (2x 1360 x 768)
|2800 x 1050 (2x 1400 x 1050)
|2880 x 900 (2 x 1440 x 900)
|3200 x 900 (2x 1600 x 900)
|3200 x 1200 (2 x 1600 x 1200)
|3360 x 1050 (2 x 1680 x 1050)
|3840 x 1080 (2x 1920 x 1080)
|502, 60Hz
|3840 x 1200 (2 x 1920 x 1200)
|501, 60Hz
|4096 x 1152 (2 x 2048 x 1152) 2
1 The 50Hz and 58Hz modes may be incompatible with some displays. Verify with your display vendor for compatibility.
2 These modes are not available under any Mac OS X operating system.
Supported resolutions are GPU dependent. Please see the system compatibility information to verify the maximum resolution supported by your system. All displays attached to TripleHead2Go must run at the same resolution.
System Compatibility
TripleHead2Go Digital SE is compatible with a wide range of notebooks and desktop computers. Please see the system compatibility information for more details.
Take advantage of Matrox PowerDesk to fully benefit from your TripleHead2Go Digital SE adapter. PowerDesk enhances your PC or Mac computing experience and productivity with a vast array of customizable options. Now you can personalize your desktop to get the most out of your displays and make the most of your time.
Window Management:
Set the behavior of your apps, such as where windows should open up and maximize, or even on which display a PowerPoint slide show will run. You can view a presentation across multiple displays, or only on one depending upon your needs.
Desktop Divider:
Customize your desktop's layout and split it up into different sections. Either spread one application across your entire desktop or devote one display to each. Alternatively go even further and create multiple partitions on a single monitor and open an application in each section.
Mode Management:
Select the optimal multi-display settings for your setup, with regard to resolution and refresh rates.
Swap Displays:
Swap Displays spares you the hassle of reconnecting cables or physically moving around incorrectly hooked-up monitors. Switch your displays' on-screen content as a quick and easy troubleshooting fix.
Conveniently load your saved multi-display setup to accommodate ever-changing workplace needs or your personal preferences.
Bezel Management:
Makes your digital signage more pleasing to the eye or adds realism to your gaming experience. Bezel Management compensates for that unnatural gap created by the monitor's bezels and three seemingly disjointed pictures displayed on your displays can be easily converted into one seamless image.
Keyboard Shortcuts:
Use a keyboard shortcut to quickly locate the mouse cursor or move your active window from one display to another; an easy way to access PowerDesk features.
Unattended Install:
Easily install Matrox PowerDesk across many systems without any user interaction — a must–have tool for any IT administrator for corporation-wide deployments.
Desktop Divider:
Customize your desktop's layout and split it up into different sections. Either spread one application across your entire desktop or devote one display to each. Alternatively go even further and create multiple partitions on a single monitor and open an application in each section.
Swap Active Window and Maximize:
Efficiently organize your desktop at the press of a button by moving a given window from one display to the next and maximizing it to fit the entire screen.
Move Dock Position:
Further customize your Mac work space by moving the dock onto any of your screens.
(Not available with Mac® OS X® Yosemite 10.10)
Mode Management
Select the optimal multi-display settings for your setup, with regard to resolution and refresh rates.
PowerDesk Quick Setup:
Quick setup helps install your TripleHead2Go product and makes sure that you are up and running in no time. It detects any hook-up problems and guides you through the setup process.
Business Productivity
|Working with more than one monitor allows you to see more, do more, and be more productive. Use the extra screen space to spread applications across your desktop, much like you would spread printed documents across your desk. For specialized applications, such as financial services or day trading programs, viewing data across multiple monitors provides the ability to see critical information at all times for quick decision making and streamlined workflow.
Digital Signage
|Drive three HD displays from a single player PC to create digital signage canvases of up to 6 million pixels. Unique in its ability to support three 1920x1080 monitors at 50Hz, the Matrox TripleHead2Go supports a variety of widescreen resolutions for the display of high-quality, uncompressed digital content across multiple monitors.
And if three displays aren't enough? Connect two TripleHead2Go units to create a cost-effective, six-screen setup. TripleHead2Go units can be used to improve and simplify digital signage applications such as digital menu boards, terminal and concourse information displays, shopping mall kiosks, and ambience-enhancing installations—to name a few.
Media Creation & DCC
|As an artist or digital content creator, you need multiple palettes, menus, bins, controls, and toolbars in your applications. Spread out your projects, work more comfortably, and increase your productivity with a Matrox TripleHead2Go-powered multi-monitor setup. The extra screen space will allow you to view more layers of video on the timeline, increase the size of your video scopes and frame viewers, as well as customize your entire workspace to improve your workflow.
CAD Design & GIS
|Take advantage of increased desktop space when using CAD software. Work on your design drafts, architectural models, or plans across multiple monitors. Expand your perspective and arrange application windows so you can complete your work more quickly and efficiently. Add two or three monitors to your notebook computer for a full surround 3D design experience.
|Benefit from panoramic images and visuals by integrating Matrox TripleHead2Go into your ProAV installations. TripleHead2Go works collaboratively with additional hardware (LCDs, CRTs, projectors, video wall controllers) to deliver impressive visual experiences in a variety of environments, including:


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CARSON CITY – Nearly 1.3 million Nevadans are registered as active voters as of the end of November, the Secretary of State's office said today.
The increase of more than 41,000 active voters since the close of registration for the general election was due in large part to the number of inactive voters who cast ballots on Nov. 6 and automatically became active voters according to federal and state law.
Of the 1,299,126 active registrants statewide, 42.1 percent (546,903) are Democrats, 34.4 percent (447,406) are Republicans, 17.5 percent (227,151) are non-partisans, 4.7 percent (60,590) are members of the Independent American Party, and the remaining 1.3 percent (17,076) are members of the Libertarian or other minor parties.
At the close of registration on Oct. 16 for the general election, 1,257,621 Nevadans were active registered voters.


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Carnitas , a crispy Mexican style pulled pork, can be used in a number of different dishes and sometimes simple is best, especially when you want to experience the carnitas in all their glory, and tacos fit the bill perfectly. My initial thought for tacos is almost always to simply throw some diced sweet onion and cilantro in along with the meat but carnitas and salsa verde are such a great combo that I cannot resist adding them to the mix. For carnitas tacos I very often go with the simple combination of carnitas, salsa verde, pickled red onions and the cilantro with an optional touch of crumbled cotija and this combo shows off the carnitas nicely.
Throw some cool and creamy avocados into the mix if you like.
These tacos are so simple and yet so addictively good!
Carnitas Tacos
Tasty moist and crispy carnitas tacos with salsa verde, pickled red onions, crumbled cotija and cilantro.
- 12 small corn tortillas
- 1 pound carnitas, warm
- 1 cup salsa verde
- 1/2 cup pickled red onions or fresh sweet onions
- 1/4 cup cotija, crumbled
- 1/4 cup cilantro, torn
- 2 avocados, sliced
- Assemble tacos and enjoy.


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Group urges 'no' vote on Kane County tax to help disabled
A group backed by a local elected official is organizing to oppose a property tax increase referendum that would benefit local developmentally disabled residents and appear on March ballots in Kane County.
Allen Skillicorn, an East Dundee village trustee and conservative radio host, said the purpose of his group is not to oppose help for developmentally disabled residents. The group opposes inefficient use of taxpayer money and an ill-timed increase to the local property tax burden, he said.
The referendum would generate about $12 million to improve services for residents with Down syndrome, autism and other disabilities. Some Illinois residents have waited 10 years or longer for services because of a backlog of demand and a shortage of funding. The proposed tax increase would add about $55 a year to the property tax bill on a $200,000 home.
Skillicorn said his group, "Vote NO to the Kane County 377 Tax Hike," believes the plan triggered by an approved referendum question is inefficient.
If the new tax is created, the Kane County Board would form a new commission that would set the actual tax rate to pull in the new funds and distribute the money. But Skillicorn points to the south end of the county where there are seven townships that already impose a tax on residents that, in part, benefits developmentally disabled residents.
There is also an umbrella organization, known as the INC Board, that administers the funds. About 13 percent of the money collected goes to administrative costs. That's a waste of money, Skillicorn said.
"Is creating another level of government the most efficient use of taxpayer money?" Skillicorn said. "Don't Kane County residents already pay enough property taxes? And, unfortunately, once the tax is levied and goes to the (service providers), you can't see where the checks go."
Skillicorn called on the county board and local residents to follow the call put out by county board Chairman Chris Lauzen when he ran for his position.
"The current board chairman ran and said he was not going to raise the tax levy, and that was very popular," Skillicorn said. "We all already pay $5,000 to $10,000 in property taxes every year. This is not just a one-time cost. This will be a recurring cost. The idea behind this referendum is an admirable goal. But we also have to be compassionate with homeowners in a foreclosure crisis and people on fixed income. The timing is not right on this."
Skillicorn said his group is "loosely organized" at the moment. He plans to ratchet up the opposition as the March election approaches.
There is also another potential obstacle to the passage of the tax increase that may come from Kane County officials themselves.
The county recently received a set of recommendations from a volunteer mental health advisory committee that called for the creation of a countywide board that would oversee funding for mental health and substance abuse services, not just developmental disabilities. But Kane County officials have taken no action on that recommendation as of yet.


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It has been precisely a week since I attended the funeral of my friend Becca Rosenthal. Eight days since a last-minute road trip that lasted 17 hours was taken so D.J. and I could say goodbye. Eleven days since I learned about Becca's death, leaving me feeling like someone has sucker punched me. I'm not going to lie. Over this week I've felt like I can't breathe. I can't get enough air to fill my lungs. I am not OK with this.
I was lucky enough to sit next to Becca at work for about two years. We were both lucky enough to have jobs where it was acceptable to obsess about music all day long. We were unlucky in often having to create ways to fake passion for a good deal of music we didn't believe in because that was our job at the time.
Before I met Becca I was so angry with her by no fault of her own. I remember my boss asking me to invite her in for an interview for an open position as a tour publicist. He told me of her impressive background. Her ongoing work with Amanda Palmer, and her work on the True Colors Tour with Cyndi Lauper was amazing. I remember carefully choosing my words. I knew we needed someone with her talent.
After proofreading the email I hit send. I immediately got an undeliverable message. A bounceback! How dare this happen after I spend time planning exactly what to say. I spent about five minutes thinking she was made up because how could a person with this much experience and so young really exist. About 10 minutes later I realized it was my mistake as I didn't spell the 'artificially' in her email correct. After the email successfully went through I silently vowed to be angry with this Becca Rosenthal person.
My anger quickly subsided.
We quickly grew into this little, at times inseparable, unit of the publicity department. One that had a language I'm pretty sure no one else could decipher. I still forward D.J. some of our old emails and have to explain who or what was in the conversation.
Here's an example of us discussing Metric, apparently before they really utilized Twitter:
We had nicknames, secret code names for pretty much everyone around us. We had our inanimate friends brought to life in our fantasies. We had ISBF
my industrial sized baby fan. We'd feed paper into ISBF and talk about how we'd record it and publicize it to be a huge hit. We had trolle
a little troll with pink hair one of our co-workers had discarded. We'd throw trolle against the wall every time something didn't go our way. Like when an editor cut one of our artists, we lost a client or we sent out a press release with a typo. Then we'd go outside and hang out in one of the weird little stoops, our little grottos. Here's Becca taking shelter from the rain in one:
Pretty much every Friday we'd diligently work on our weekly reports to our clients and answer any outstanding questions. Then we'd walk to fetch a bottle of CDR (Côtes du Rhône) for a ritual I'm sure aggravated everyone else around us
Fleetwood Mac Power Hour. We'd finish our work early and listen to this out loud and forget all of our troubles. Forget we had these jobs we were supposed to love but at the same time dreaded.
I eventually quit that job after meeting D.J. and he made me realize the music industry was tanking and we might have better luck in Washington D.C. Becca left less than a year later. We still emailed at times, but it wasn't the same as having her sit right behind me.
What I'll miss most about Becca is her spirit. She inspired me to no end. She helped me realize I should continue helping artists. Instead of dealing with insane musicians I now help those in the DIY community succeed and help spread the message of buying handmade. When I told Becca I was scared I had forgotten to be a publicist, but in this case pitch something I really loved, she emailed me back in what I imagined to be in a Russian accent the words "is like riding bike."
I never got a chance to have her input on what pair of Frye boots to
finally purchase. I never asked her if it's OK to wear Swedish Hasbeens
to my wedding. And now she will not attend my wedding although Becca was the person who knew me the best in that tiny office when D.J. and I met for the very first time.
D.J. confided to me that when he started working with us he had a crush on Becca for about 24 hours. This was before D.J. and I started dating. While we were in Boston last week I told D.J. that his crush was perfectly OK. Everyone had a crush on Becca.


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2005 :: High Peak antics, The 1970's ...
It's not every day when one of your team mates lady has a significant birthday. Since I was sober and armed with a camera I thought it only just to bring you the schizzle when a bunch of riders from High Peak Cycles dressed up like their Dad's used to when they got their first bike!
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|Allegro CL version 10.0
Unrevised from 9.0 to 10.0.
9.0 version
Arguments: stream position
Returns position after modifying it to be the position to which stream has been scrolled relative to the page top left. This is the destructive version of scroll-position.
An application may override the default method of this and several
other generic functions in order to implement a custom scrolling
scheme that scrolls by logical picture objects rather than by
pixels. See the source code of the example entitled 'Scrolling by
arbitrary objects rather than pixels' in the Examples tab of the
dialog for a complete example. More on this point and a list of the
relevant generic functions can be found on the
horizontal-scroll-bar and
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I was giving my friend a tour of the St Mike's library and we were perusing the shelves. Of course, we happen across the entomology section, lined with books on bugs, bees, ants, and the like. It was there, that I discovered this gem:
The Life of the Scorpion, written by JH FAbre, 1923. Jean-Henri Fabre was a French scientist, best known for his studies in entomology. Born to a poor family, Fabre received almost no formal scientific training and was largely an autodidact (self-taught). He experimented, taught and wrote volumes of books on insects during the late 1800s to early 1900s. Many agree that he played an monumental role in popularizing the study of insects and some also consider him the father of modern entomology. Much of this popularity can be attributed to his unique writing style. He tells the stories of the insects he meets in a biographical form, writing in first person, almost like a diary.
As I scan the first couple pages of The Life of the Scorpion, it indeed reads simple and fascinating, like a good story book. To start, Fabre shares with us his first scorpion encounter, when he isout searching for centipedes for his thesis, he comes across a scorpion under a rock and is perplexed by such a formidable creature, it's stinger gleaming up at him. He leaves the scorpion and returns home with his centipedes:
"Science! The witch! I used to come home with joy in my heart: I had found some Centipedes. What more was needed to complete my ingenuous happiness? I carried off the Scolopendrae (centipedes) and left the Scorpions behind, not without a secret feeling that a day would come when I should have to concern myself with them."
Oh yeah, this is going to be good. Stay tuned for more excerpts, the Science Witch has put a spell on me.


text:
Not only are the fed bailouts giving billions to foreign central banks, but the new $700 billion bailout proposal could bail out private foreign banks as well.
Specifically, a Fact Sheet from the U.S. Treasury says:
Participating financial institutions must have significant operations in the U.S., unless the Secretary makes a determination, in consultation with the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, that broader eligibility is necessary to effectively stabilize financial markets.
An article from today in Politico explains
"In a change from the original proposal sent to Capitol Hill, foreign-based banks with big U.S. operations could qualify for the Treasury Department's mortgage bailout, according to the fine print of an administration statement Saturday night."


text:
Alcohol is not for sale to people under the age of 18. By placing an order for alcohol products on this site you are declaring that you are 18 years of age or over. Identification will be requested for anyone looking under the age of 25. Please note, alcohol must be ordered in conjunction with food.
Restaurant notes


text:
Pepperell, Devens and Leominster are among the 16 New England communities chosen to host the World Radiosport Team Championship this summer.
The competition, which will attract 59 two-person amateur radio teams from 38 countries, tasks amateur radio operators with making as many contacts as possible in a simulation of emergency conditions.
"It's kind of like the Olympics of radio contesting," said Roland Guilmet, a spokesperson for the Nashoba Valley Amateur Radio Club. "To be selected and host these radio contesters from around the world is kind of a big deal."
Radio competitions help operators prepare for real-world emergency scenarios, such as hurricanes or situations like the 2013 Boston Marathon, in which radio is often one of the most efficient means of contact, Guilmet said.
"Radio contesting is really all about being able to make contacts with other individuals from around the world in some terrible radio conditions, and doing that in a very efficient way and very quick way to handle the communication traffic. In an emergency or disaster situation it means you're able to get a signal through to another radio station that is requesting aid," Guilmet said.
Members of the NVARC will be assisting with setting up antennas, radio towers, tents and generators for the competition, which will be held July 8 to July 14.
The competition will be held in state parks, town owned land and private properties across the state.
Chairman of WRTC 2014 Doug Grant said that once New England was chosen as the host region, the Heald Street Orchard in Pepperell was one of the first sites chosen. The NVARC uses the orchard for its Field Day every summer.
"Once we had that site in Pepperell, we started looking around for if there were other properties in Pepperell and discovered a number of orchards and farms," Grant said. "We were looking for places with large open spaces of land, and from Pepperell we just moved down the 495 corridor."
Bruce Blain, also of the NVARC, said 59 the sites were chosen in order to ensure a level playing field for all competitors.
"What they don't want to do is give any of the teams an unfair advantage or an unfair disadvantage. If one site is on a hill and another is in a valley, the hill would have an advantage," Blain said.
In addition to being a competition, the event will allow local operators the chance to meet with people they had previously spoken with over their radios.
"We get to see the best of the best, see them locally, meet and interact with them and show them some New England hospitality," Blain said.
In addition to the 118 contestants, the competition will attract dozens of judges, officials and sponsors to the area, Blain said.
This competition, held every four years, is the first in the United States since 1996, when it was based in San Francisco.
Competing teams were chosen over the last three years based on a series of 55 qualifying events. The competition extends over a 24-hour period during which contestants do not sleep, but aim to make contact with as many stations and countries as possible. One judge will be assigned to each site to score the teams.
Other communities selected were Mansfield, Wrentham, Assonet, Berkley, Dighton, East Taunton, Plymouth, Carver, Medfield, Cohasset, Hingham, Norwell and Hollis, N.H.
Follow Chelsea Feinstein on Twitter and Tout @CEFeinstein.


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On Saturday, former vice presidential nominee Sarah Palin brought her folksy charm to the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Maryland with a speech in which she made fun of President Obama for his support of gun control and background checks, reports USA Today.
During her address to the Conservative Political Action Conference, or CPAC, Palin accused Obama of failing to lead, instead maintaining a permanent campaign approach of demonizing the opposition.
True leadership, she said, means "ending the poisonous practice of treating members of different social, ethnic and religious groups as different electorates, pandered to with different promises." If all men are created equal, as the Declaration of Independence states, Palin said, then there are "no Hispanic issues or African-American issues or women's issues — there are only American issues."
The former Alaska governor also mocked Obama's proposals for stricter gun rules, tying the issue to conspiracy theories about the president's own citizenship. "More background checks? Dandy idea, Mr. President — should have started with yours."
Read more at USA Today.


text:
'Nice aluminum design.'
'Fingerprint scanner's location makes it difficult not to swipe the camera lens.'
'excellent display and stellar battery life'
'As with the regular HTC One, image quality is incredibly sharp, while brightness, colour and contrast are all excellent.'
Powerful processor, and a brilliant screen
Huge long-lasting 3200mAh battery
Powerful performance, good low-light camera, brilliant screen
Swift processor, fat battery offset by cheap plastic
Big eye-popping screen and luxurious design
Outstanding battery life
Fast processor and data speeds
Colors are vibrant and the 1,280-by-720 pixel resolution is sharp
Terrific for videos, games, and reading
Deep integrated S Pen features
Smooth UI with plenty of useful touches
Enormous battery, Expandable memory
ReviewGist helps you find the best products to buy by making sense of online reviews.
We are currently aggregating 376,500 reviews
covering over 29,474 products.
© 2019 ReviewGist.com. All Rights Reserved.


text:
No. 92,580
1. When reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, the appellate court determines whether the factual underpinnings of the trial court's decision are supported by a substantial competent evidence standard. However, the ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts is a legal question, requiring the appellate court to apply a de novo standard of review.
2. The State bears the burden of proof on a motion to suppress and must show to the trial court the lawfulness of the search and seizure.
3. Under the holding in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), an officer may stop any person in a public place when there are specific and articulable facts creating a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime.
4. In order for there to be reasonable suspicion justifying the detention of an individual, a law enforcement officer must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. That level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. Probable cause means a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found, and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.
5. In determining the reasonableness of an investigative detention, an appellate court makes a dual inquiry, asking first whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and second, whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.
6. A person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, authorize a Terry stop unless the officer has reasonable suspicion directed specifically at that person.
7. Under the facts of this case, law enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion of drug activity to detain the defendant after the conclusion of the traffic stop. Nevertheless, once the defendant's truck was searched and no drugs were discovered, the officers had no reasonable basis for continuing their detention of defendant. At that point, the continued detention became unlawful.
8. Under the plain language of K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 75-5217(a), a law enforcement officer has the authority to arrest a released inmate for violating any of the conditions of parole, conditional release, or postrelease supervision when that officer is given a written arrest and detain order which sets forth that the released inmate, in the judgment of the parole officer, has violated the conditions of the inmate's release.
9. An oral authorization to arrest a parole violator is not sufficient to provide an officer with the authority to arrest under K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 75-5217(a).
10. A parole violation is not a criminal offense under Kansas law. Therefore, law enforcement officers may not detain an individual under the principles announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1969), based on a suspected parole violation.
11. Under the facts of this case, the officers had no authority to arrest the defendant under K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 75-5217(a) because the officers had not received possession of the written arrest and detain order before making their arrest of the defendant. Moreover, the arresting officers lacked probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed or was committing a criminal offense that would justify the warrantless arrest in this case.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; JOHN J. KISNER, JR., judge. Opinion filed September 16, 2005. Reversed.
Philip R. White, of Ariagno, Kerns, Mank & White L.L.C., of Wichita, for appellant.
Charles L. Rutter, assistant district attorney, Nola Tedesco Foulston, district attorney, and Phill Kline, attorney general, for appellee.
Before GREEN, P.J., HILL and CAPLINGER, JJ.
GREEN, J.: Billy Anderson appeals from his convictions of possession with the intent to sell methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) in violation of K.S.A. 65-4163(a) and failure to affix a tax stamp to a controlled substance in violation of K.S.A. 79-5204. The issue raised by Anderson on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. The State raises two arguments as to why Anderson's motion was properly denied. The State maintains that officers had reasonable suspicion of drug activity to detain Anderson and that suspicion ripened into probable cause to arrest Anderson for illegal drug activity. We disagree. Nevertheless, we do agree that the totality of the circumstances here led the officers to reasonably suspect Anderson of illegal drug activity. As a result, the officers were justified in detaining Anderson after the traffic stop investigation had been completed to further investigate their suspicion of illegal drug activity. Nevertheless, once the officers discovered no evidence or information implicating Anderson in any illegal drug activity, the officers were no longer justified in continuing their detention of Anderson. Any further detention of Anderson at that point could only be justified by probable cause or consent, and the officers had neither.
The State also argues that there was reasonable suspicion to detain Anderson for a suspected parole violation and that the subsequent arrest for the violation was properly based on an arrest and detain order under K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 75-5217(a). We again disagree. A plain reading of K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 75-5217(a) reveals that a law enforcement officer is deputized with the authority to arrest an individual who has allegedly committed a parole violation when that officer has been given the written arrest and detain order detailing the violation. Because the officers in this case had not been given the written arrest and detain order before arresting Anderson, they lacked authority to make the arrest. Moreover, because a parole violation is not a crime, the suspected parole violation would not have furnished to the officers reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop and detention. Because the continued detention and arrest of Anderson was unlawful, the seized evidence should be suppressed in this case. As a result, we determine that the trial court erroneously denied Anderson's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse.
Anderson's convictions in this case stem from events that occurred on July 30, 2003. On that date, Officer Brad Elmore was surveilling a Wichita Amoco station where the cashier, Umanah Smith, had been arrested the year before for possession of cocaine and marijuana. During the past several years, Elmore had made more than 20 drug-related arrests of individuals leaving the Amoco station. Moreover, the police had received numerous complaints about drug activity occurring at the Amoco station.
While Elmore was observing the Amoco station in an unmarked car on July 30, he saw Anderson drive into the parking lot and enter the station. Anderson was wearing red and white which were colors that Elmore knew were worn by Bloods gang members. Elmore thought that Anderson might be contacting Smith because he knew that gang members are commonly involved in drug activity and that Smith was a Bloods gang member who was involved in drug activity. Samuel Cobos, a documented Vato Loco Boy gang member, was with Anderson and went inside the station with him. Elmore's partner had received information in the past that Cobos was involved in drug activity.
While Anderson and Cobos were inside the Amoco station, Elmore ran the tag on Anderson's truck and discovered that it was from Enterprise Leasing. It had been Elmore's experience that individuals involved in drug activity commonly use rental cars to conduct their dealings.
Approximately 5 minutes after Anderson and Cobos entered the Amoco station, they came out, got back inside the truck, and drove out of the parking lot. Elmore noticed that Anderson was carrying a sack when he left the station. Although Elmore stated that it was uncommon to see people leaving with sacks from the Amoco station, he did not find it suspicious. Apparently, the Amoco station was also a convenience store that sold various food items.
When Anderson and Cobos left the Amoco station, Elmore followed them in his unmarked car to the parking lot of an apartment complex. Elmore noticed that four Hispanic men who were standing in the parking lot gathered around Anderson's truck when it stopped. Elmore drove around the parking lot to find a suitable place to park and watch the truck. Nevertheless, the truck was gone by the time Elmore got to the other side of the parking lot. Elmore then saw Anderson's truck exiting the parking lot. Elmore thought that possibly a drug transaction had occurred based on the short amount of time during which the meeting took place, as well as the number of people involved. In Elmore's past experience, a lot of individuals conduct drug transactions in parking lots around other people because it does not look so suspicious and because it is safer than going into someone's home.
After Anderson left the parking lot of the apartment complex, he drove back to the Amoco station. Anderson went inside the Amoco station for a couple of minutes, returned to his truck with a different individual than had been with him the first time, and drove away from the Amoco station. As Elmore was following directly behind Anderson's truck, he noticed that Anderson increased his speed. Elmore's speedometer registered 50 miles per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour zone. In addition, Elmore noticed Anderson's truck cross the solid yellow line and drive on the left side of the line for a "couple" of hundred feet.
Based on his observations, Elmore radioed other officers in the area to stop Anderson for these traffic violations. Officer Eddy Padron, who was traveling in a marked police car, heard Elmore's request and stopped the truck at approximately 10:35 p.m. Officer Daniel McFarren, as well as another officer, arrived shortly thereafter.
Upon approaching the truck, Padron advised Anderson that he was being stopped for a traffic violation. Padron obtained the driver's licenses of both Anderson and the passenger, Cornell Golston. Moreover, Padron obtained the rental agreement from Anderson and determined that everything was in order. McFarren spoke with Golston and asked what he and Anderson were doing. Golston told McFarren that he and Anderson were getting some food. McFarren noticed that Golston was eating crackers and sardines and that there was a white plastic bag containing food in the truck.
While running a warrants check and a driver's license check, Padron was informed that both Anderson and Golston were documented gang members and that Anderson was on supervised release. Nevertheless, the checks revealed that there were no arrest warrants for either Anderson or Golston and that Anderson's driver's license was valid.
Before returning to Anderson's truck, Padron spoke with McFarren who related that he had previously stopped Anderson for traffic violations, that Anderson had denied consent to search, and that Anderson might be involved in drug activity. Actually, McFarren had previously stopped Anderson on two occasions. Approximately 1 week before the July 30 incident, McFarren stopped Anderson for traffic violations. At that time, McFarren had received information from another officer that narcotics detectives were looking into Anderson's activities relating to narcotics trafficking. In addition, McFarren had stopped Anderson several months before the July 30 incident but had not discovered any illegal drugs. During that stop, McFarren learned that Anderson was carrying $4,000 on his person.
After learning the information from McFarren, Padron told McFarren to contact their sergeant to have a drug dog sent to their location. Padron then returned to the truck, asked Anderson to step outside of the truck, and conducted a pat-down search. Padron indicated that he conducted the pat down because he knew that gang members usually carry guns for protection. Padron did not find any weapons on Anderson.
After conducting the pat-down search, Padron had Anderson sign the traffic citation. In addition, Padron returned Anderson's and Golston's driver's licenses. After Anderson signed the citation and was given a copy, Padron then asked Anderson for consent to search the truck. When Anderson denied consent, Padron told Anderson that a drug dog was on its way and directed Anderson to the sidewalk. Padron admitted that Anderson was not free to go at that point.
Padron then asked Golston to step out of the truck. While performing a pat-down search, Padron noticed there was a baggie sticking out of Golston's shoe. When Padron asked Golston about the baggie, Golston replied, "That's just a little bit of weed, man." Padron pulled the baggie out of Golston's shoe and discovered that it contained marijuana. Padron then placed Golston under arrest. During a more thorough search, Padron found narcotics pills in Golston's other shoe, as well as over $1,300 on Golston's person.
A detective eventually arrived with a drug dog which alerted on the truck. The officers then searched the truck but did not find anything of evidentiary value. According to Padron, during the time that the dog and the search were taking place, Officer Faustino Naldoza was attempting to contact a parole officer to determine if Anderson could be arrested for a parole violation. Nevertheless, according to Naldoza, he did not attempt to contact a parole officer until after the search produced nothing of evidentiary value. In fact, Naldoza's report indicated that after nothing was found inside the truck, the officers decided to contact the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) Parole Enforcement to try and obtain an arrest and detain order for Anderson. Naldoza made several phone calls but was unable to contact a parole officer. Padron then contacted Richard Sackhoff who was a special enforcement officer for the KDOC but was not Anderson's parole officer.
Padron explained to Sackhoff that they had stopped Anderson who was on supervised release and was flagged as a gang member and that Anderson had been with Golston who was in possession of marijuana and was also a gang member. According to Sackhoff, he verified that Anderson was on parole and told Padron that he was issuing an arrest and detain order and that officers could take him into custody. Sackhoff told Padron that he would leave a copy of the arrest and detain order in the front door of his home for an officer to pick up. The arrest and detain order introduced at the hearing was dated July 31, 2003.
After Padron received the oral authorization from Sackhoff, the officers decided around 11:48 or 11:49 p.m. on July 30 to take Anderson into custody under the arrest and detain order. When officers approached Anderson and tried to arrest him, Anderson fled. Officers pursued Anderson, found him hiding underneath a truck in a construction area, and arrested him. During the chase, one of the officers saw Anderson trying to get rid of some plastic baggies near a trash dumpster. These baggies contained blue pills and crushed powder. A baggie containing a similar substance was found in Anderson's shoe after he was arrested. Testing indicated that the recovered substance contained MDMA, commonly referred to as ecstasy.
In August 2003, Anderson was charged with possession of MDMA with intent to sell and failure to affix a tax stamp to a controlled substance. In October 2003, Anderson moved to suppress the drug evidence. Anderson argued that the detention after the issuance of the traffic citation violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and was not reasonably related in scope to the traffic violation. Anderson maintained that any evidence discovered by the officers must be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree."
The State responded to Anderson's motion to suppress, arguing that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Anderson after the initial traffic stop because they suspected Anderson possessed narcotics. Moreover, the State contended that based upon the totality of the circumstances, the officers had a particularized and objective basis to believe Anderson was in violation of his supervised release. The State maintained that the search of Anderson followed a lawful arrest and that some of the seized drug evidence had been abandoned by Anderson during the chase.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Anderson's motion to suppress. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that once the warrants checks came back negative, the traffic stop had concluded. Nevertheless, once Padron discovered that Anderson was on parole, he had probable cause to believe that Anderson had violated his parole by being with Golston and Cobos. The trial court noted that although an arrest and detain order did not exist at the time of the traffic stop, it was not unreasonable for Padron to detain Anderson until such an order existed.
Moreover, the trial court found that the duration of the stop was not unreasonable and that the officers proceeded in a diligent and expeditious manner. The trial court noted that once a search of the truck discovered no drugs, the officers tried to contact a parole officer to get an arrest and detain order. The trial court stated that although Sackhoff was not Anderson's parole officer, he had the authority to issue an arrest and detain order based upon the information that was provided. The trial court determined that there was no problem in the law with an oral authorization to arrest and detain. The trial court denied Anderson's motion to suppress.
The case proceeded to a bench trial on stipulated facts. Anderson preserved for appeal the trial court's decision on his motion to suppress. The trial court found Anderson guilty of possession of MDMA with intent to sell and of failure to affix a tax stamp. Anderson was sentenced to a controlling term of 40 months in prison.
Standard of Review
On appeal, Anderson argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress drug evidence that was seized during an unlawful search and seizure. When reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, the appellate court determines whether the factual underpinnings of the trial court's decision are supported by applying a substantial competent evidence standard. However, the ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts is a legal question requiring the appellate court to apply a de novo standard of review. The appellate court does not reweigh the evidence. State v. Vandervort, 276 Kan. 164, 169, 72 P.3d 925 (2003). Moreover, we must remember that the State bears the burden of proof for a suppression motion. It must show to the trial court the lawfulness of the search and seizure. State v. Boyd, 275 Kan. 271, 273, 64 P.3d 419 (2003).
Search and Seizure
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits all searches and seizures that are unreasonable, "'"and it is a cardinal principle that 'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment--subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' [Citation omitted.]"'" State v. Jaso, 231 Kan. 614, 620, 648 P.2d 1 (1982). "The general rule that warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable has five exceptions: (1) consent; (2) hot pursuit; (3) incident to a lawful arrest; (4) stop and frisk; and (5) probable cause to search with exigent circumstances." State v. Boyd, 275 Kan. at 273-74.
State's Theories
The State advances two theories as to why the drug evidence was properly seized by a search incident to a lawful arrest; was abandoned property and not protected under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; or was subject to inevitable discovery by the officers. First, the State maintains that the officers had probable cause to detain Anderson for the suspected parole violation and that the subsequent arrest was properly based on the issuance of a written arrest and detain order under K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 75-5217(a). Alternatively, the State argues that irrespective of any determination of a parole violation, the trial court properly admitted the drug evidence because the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Anderson and that this suspicion ripened into probable cause to arrest Anderson for illegal drug activity. We will address the State's alternative argument first.
Reasonable Suspicion of Drug Activity
It is undisputed in this case that Padron initially stopped Anderson for traffic violations. A traffic stop constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. DeMarco, 263 Kan. 727, 733, 952 P.2d 1276 (1998). Under the holding in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), an officer may stop any person in a public place when there are specific and articulable facts creating a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. State v. Slater, 267 Kan. 694, 696-97, 986 P.2d 1038 (1999). The Fourth Amendment search and seizure principles expressed in Terry have been codified in K.S.A. 22-2402(1). Slater, 267 Kan. at 697.
We recognize that an officer has the right to stop a car whose driver has committed a traffic violation and can briefly detain the occupants of the car for the purpose of enforcing the traffic laws of this state. State v. Schmitter, 23 Kan. App. 2d 547, 551, 933 P.2d 762 (1997). When conducting a routine traffic stop, a law enforcement officer may request the driver's license and car registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation. If no information is found during the computer check, the person must be allowed to leave without further delay. To justify a further detention for questioning on matters unrelated to the initial stop, the officer must have reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit some other crime. Schmitter, 23 Kan. App. 2d 547, Syl. ¶ 5.
Here, the traffic stop concluded once the warrants check came back negative and Padron issued the citation. The question is whether the officers had gained a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity at this point that would justify the continued detention of Anderson. Anderson maintains that he should have been free to leave after he was handed the citation as the officers did not possess reasonable suspicion to further detain him. The State, however, argues that the officers possessed a reasonable and articulable suspicion that drug activity was afoot and, therefore, could have lawfully stopped him based upon those observations. We note that the trial court made no finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion of drug activity to further detain Anderson.
In United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989), the United States Supreme Court stated the following regarding reasonable suspicion:
"The officer, of course, must be able to articulate something more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch."' [Citation omitted.] The Fourth Amendment requires 'some minimal level of objective justification' for making the stop. [Citation omitted.] That level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. We have held that probable cause means 'a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,' [citation omitted] and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause."
Moreover, quoting from Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990), our Supreme Court in Slater, 267 Kan. at 697, set forth the following standard for determining whether reasonable suspicion exists:
"'Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. . . . Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both factors--quantity and quality--are considered in the "totality of the circumstances--the whole picture" [citation omitted] that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.'"
"What is reasonable is based on the totality of circumstances and is viewed in terms as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement." State v. Toney, 253 Kan. 651, 656, 862 P.2d 350 (1993).
In determining "'the reasonableness of an investigative detention, we make a dual inquiry, asking first "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception," and second "whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."' [Citations omitted.]" State v. Mitchell, 265 Kan. 238, 241, 960 P.2d 200 (1998).
In the instant case, at the conclusion of the traffic stop, the officers had the following information: Anderson, along with documented gang member Cobos, had been at the Amoco station where there was suspected drug activity and there had been numerous arrests of individuals leaving the station; the Amoco station's cashier was a documented Bloods gang member and had been convicted the previous year for possession of drugs; after leaving the Amoco station, Anderson went momentarily to the parking lot of an apartment complex where his truck was immediately surrounded by four Hispanic men; Anderson drove back to the Amoco station and then left the station with Golston who was a documented gang member; Anderson was driving a rental car; Anderson was wearing Bloods gang colors and was a documented gang member; Anderson was on parole; Elmore had observed Anderson speeding and driving left of the center line; during a previous stop, McFarren had learned that Anderson was carrying $4,000 on his person; and McFarren previously received information that narcotics detectives were looking into Anderson's activities relating to narcotics trafficking.
We believe that the combination of the above factors would cause an officer to be reasonably suspicious of drug activity in this case and would warrant further detaining Anderson. Importantly, an officer "does not have to know that the defendant committed a crime. Merely pointing to some facts that would cause a reasonable person to be suspicious is enough to conduct a Terry stop." State v. Finley, 17 Kan. App. 2d 246, 251, 838 P.2d 904, rev. denied 251 Kan. 940 (1992). Although the officers had not observed any unlawful conduct by Anderson, they were able to point to several facts which would cause a reasonable person to suspect that possible drug activity was taking place. Therefore, the officers were justified in detaining Anderson after the conclusion of the traffic stop.
Nevertheless, our inquiry does not end there. As discussed above, we must also determine whether the detention "'"was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."' [Citations omitted.]" Mitchell, 265 Kan. at 241. Before Padron even returned to Anderson's truck to issue a citation, the officers decided to summon a drug dog to sniff around Anderson's truck. Such action was appropriate as the officers had suspicions of drug activity, and it was reasonable to call out a drug dog that could sniff around the truck and either dispel or confirm the officers' suspicions quickly. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-88, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 105 S. Ct. 1568 (1985) (stating that in assessing whether detention is too long to be justified as an investigative stop, the court may appropriately examine whether police diligently pursued means of investigation that likely would confirm or dispel suspicions).
Upon returning to the truck, after giving back Anderson's and Golston's identifications and giving Anderson a copy of the citation, Padron asked Golston to step out of the car and patted him down. Padron indicated that he asked Golston to step out of the car because he knew that the detective bringing the drug dog would not want any occupants in the car. Additionally, Padron indicated that he did the pat-down search because he knew that gang members usually carry guns for protection. In State v. Waddell, 14 Kan. App. 2d 129, Syl. ¶ 1, 784 P.2d 381 (1989), this court recognized: "In order to justify a 'stop and frisk' search under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), and K.S.A. 22-2402, a police officer must reasonably believe that his or her personal safety is at risk." Because the traffic stop had escalated to a detention based on reasonable suspicion of drug activity and because Padron knew that Golston was a gang member and might be carrying a gun, it was reasonable for Padron to pat down Golston when he was asked to step out of the car.
After Padron discovered a baggie sticking out of Golston's shoe during the pat-down search, Golston admitted that it contained marijuana. Golston was then arrested, and the officers also found narcotics pills and over $1,300 in cash on his person. Thereafter, the drug dog arrived and alerted to Anderson's truck. The officers then searched Anderson's truck but found nothing of evidentiary value.
At this point, the officers' reasonable suspicions that Anderson was involved in drug activity should have lessened. The officers had pursued a method of investigating the suspected drug activity that did not produce anything which would point to Anderson. The search of the truck did not produce any incriminating evidence. Although officers had discovered drugs and money on Golston, they found no incriminating evidence which would indicate that Anderson could be linked to these items. As noted in State v. Morris, 276 Kan. 11, 25, 72 P.3d 570 (2003), "[a] person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, authorize a Terry stop unless the officer has reasonable suspicion directed specifically at that person." When the officers failed to discover drugs in the truck, the officers had no reasonable basis for continuing their detention of Anderson, and they should have released him. The continued detention of Anderson after the officers failed to discover drugs in the truck became unreasonable. It is apparent that the officers' continued detention of Anderson was based on a hunch. Nevertheless, as stated previously, reasonable suspicion cannot rest upon the hunch of an experienced officer, even if that hunch turns out to be right. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7. As a result, we determine that at that point the officers' continued detention of Anderson became an unlawful detention.
Probable Cause to Arrest Anderson
Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the officers had reasonable suspicion to continue the detention of Anderson, this suspicion never ripened into probable cause giving officers the authority to arrest Anderson.
K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 22-2401(c)(1) authorizes a law enforcement officer to arrest an individual without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that the individual is committing or has committed a felony. "'Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is being committed. [Citation omitted.]'" State v. Abbott, 277 Kan. 161, 164, 83 P.3d 794 (2004) (quoting Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327, 79 S. Ct. 329 [1959]). "In determining whether probable cause to arrest exists, all the information in the officer's possession, fair inferences therefrom, and facts may be taken into consideration that might not be admissible on the issue of guilt." State v. Payne, 273 Kan. 466, Syl. ¶ 4, 44 P.3d 419 (2002).
The State argues that the following circumstances had the effect of ripening the officers' level of suspicion to probable cause to believe that Anderson was involved in drug activity: the drugs and $1,300 discovered on Golston, the drug dog's alert on the truck, Anderson's attempt to abscond from the scene, and Anderson's attempt to throw out the baggies of drugs. The State maintains that at a minimum, there was probable cause to believe that Anderson was aiding and abetting Golston.
We do not endorse the State's attempt to bootstrap Anderson's flight from the officers and his action of discarding the drugs into the factors giving the officers probable cause to believe that Anderson was involved in drug activity. As noted in 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(d) (4th ed. 2005), when a warrantless arrest is made, "the information to be considered is the 'totality of facts' available to the officer at the time of the arrest or search." (Emphasis added.) Here, Anderson did not flee the scene and discard the drugs until after the officers had attempted to arrest him. Therefore, these factors are not relevant in determining whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Anderson.
Thus, the remaining factors that the State argues had the effect of ripening the officers' suspicions to the level of probable cause are: (1) the drugs and $1,300 that were found on Golston; and (2) the drug dog's alert on the truck. Nevertheless, when the search of Anderson's truck did not produce anything, this should have dispelled the officers' suspicions pertaining to the drug dog's alert on the truck. Moreover, if the officers possessed reasonable suspicion of Anderson being involved in drug activity, this suspicion should have been lessened after the search of Anderson's truck produced nothing. It is also important to note that officers did not discover anything during the pat-down search of Anderson. It is inconceivable to determine that after the search of Anderson's truck produced no drug evidence, the officers' reasonable suspicion increased to the level of probable cause.
Furthermore, the fact that Golston had drugs and money on his person does not show that Anderson was guilty of drug activity. Noting that the search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized to that person and cannot be avoided by simply pointing out that there is probable cause to search or seize another person, the United States Supreme Court in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979), stated:
"[A] person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-63, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 88 S. Ct. 1889 (1968). Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person. This requirement cannot be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists probable cause to search or seize another or to search the premises where the person may happen to be. The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the 'legitimate expectations of privacy' of persons, not places. [Citations omitted.]"
Here, there was no incriminating evidence discovered during the detention that would indicate that Anderson had drugs on his person or which would link the evidence found on Golston to Anderson.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 92 L. Ed. 210, 68 S. Ct. 222 (1948), provides further support for the conclusion that the drugs and money found on Golston, a passenger in Anderson's truck, did not give the officers probable cause to arrest Anderson. In that case, an informant told an investigator with the Office of Price Administration that he was going to buy counterfeit gasoline ration coupons from one Buttitta at a designated place. The investigator and a detective followed Buttitta's car to the designated place. The officers found the informant in the back seat holding the counterfeit ration coupons. The informant told the officers that he had bought the coupons from the driver, Buttitta. Di Re was a passenger in the car. The officers arrested all three occupants of the car. At the police station, when Di Re was asked to empty the contents of his pockets and later when he was searched, it was discovered that he had possession of counterfeit ration coupons.
The Di Re Court's opinion turned on whether there was probable cause to arrest Di Re. The Government attempted to defend Di Re's arrest on the theory that there were probable cause to believe he was guilty of conspiracy. Nevertheless, the Court found that the facts of the case did not warrant an inference of participation in conspiracy. The Court noted that there was no evidence establishing that Di Re was in the car when the informant obtained the coupons from Buttitta or that Di Re overheard or participated in any conversation on the matter. The Court further noted that the meeting occurred in a public street in a large city in broad daylight in plain sight of bypassers and that it did not necessarily involve a visibly criminal act. Moreover, the Court stated that "whatever suspicion might result from Di Re's mere presence seems diminished, if not destroyed, when Reed, present as the informer, pointed out Buttitta, and Buttitta only, as a guilty party." 332 U.S. at 594.
Like the facts of Di Re, here there was a singling out or incrimination of the other occupant of the car, Golston, to the exclusion of Anderson. At the time of Anderson's arrest, the officers had no information that would implicate or point to Anderson. Moreover, after the search of the car revealed no incriminating evidence, the officers had nothing to link Anderson to the drugs that were found on Golston, that is, to show that Anderson and Golston were involved in a common enterprise of drug activity. Therefore, the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Anderson.
Parole Violation
We now come to the State's argument that the officers had probable cause to detain Anderson for the suspected parole violation and that the subsequent arrest was properly based on the issuance of a written arrest and detain order under K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 75-5217(a).
In order to address the parties' arguments on this issue, we must interpret K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 75-5217(a), which authorizes the arrest of an individual who has violated a condition of parole, conditional release, or postrelease supervision. "Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and an appellate court's review is unlimited. An appellate court is not bound by the district court's interpretation of a statute. [Citation omitted.]" State v. Maass, 275 Kan. 328, 330, 64 P.3d 382 (2003). Moreover, in interpreting statutes, we note that "[t]he legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the language of the statutory scheme it enacted. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed. [Citation omitted.]" Williamson v. City of Hays, 275 Kan. 300, 305, 64 P.3d 364 (2003).
K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 75-5217(a) states:
"At any time during release on parole, conditional release or postrelease supervision, the secretary of corrections may issue a warrant for the arrest of a released inmate for violation of any of the conditions of release, or a notice to appear to answer to a charge of violation. Such notice shall be served personally upon the released inmate. The warrant shall authorize any law enforcement officer to arrest and deliver the released inmate to a place as provided by subsection (g). Any parole officer may arrest such released inmate without a warrant, or may deputize any other officer with power of arrest to do so by giving such officer a written arrest and detain order setting forth that the released inmate, in the judgment of the parole officer, has violated the conditions of the inmate's release." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, under the plain language of K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 75-5217(a), a law enforcement officer is deputized with the authority to arrest an individual who has violated any of the conditions of release when that officer is given the written arrest and detain order.
In the instant case, the officers had not been given a written arrest and detain order at any time prior to arresting Anderson as required by K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 75-5217(a). Nevertheless, the trial court determined that the oral authorization given by Sackhoff was sufficient and that the officers did not have to be in physical possession of a written arrest and detain order when arresting Anderson.
Anderson argues that a strict construction of K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 75-5217(a) does not allow for an oral order to arrest and detain but requires that the order be in writing and in effect before the arrest. On the other hand, the State contends that a reasonable reading of the "arrest and detain" portion of K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 75-5217(a) suggests that although a written order must be "given" to an officer in order to deputize him or her with the power to make the arrest, the officer is not required to actually possess the written order at the time of the arrest.
In order to support its argument on this issue, the State sets forth the following analogy:
"Just as the law 'gives' citizens the right to vote without them having the law in their physical possession, so too does a written arrest and detain order 'give' an officer in the field the authority to arrest an inmate for parole violations without the officer having the actual order in his physical possession at the time of arrest."
Thus, the State's argument is that if citizens can vote without them possessing the law, then by analogy an officer can arrest a parole violator without possessing the arrest and detain order. The State's analogy can be illustrated in the following manner:
|Officer arresting a parole violator
|Possession of law not required
|Actual possession of arrest and
detain order not needed
The strength of this analogy depends on the resemblances and the differences. The resemblances must be essential, and the differences unessential. Does a voter exercising the right to vote resemble an officer arresting a parole violator? No. Although the officer may be a voter, the officer in performing the duties of arresting parole violators does not resemble a voter in any important way. Moreover, are there any important differences? Yes. Although voters do not have to carry the law with them to the voting polls, they are generally required to register prior to voting. If their names are not listed among the properly registered voters, their ballots may be rejected. Moreover, when voters exercise their right to vote, they are engaging in a very important political function. On the other hand, when officers arrest suspects for a crime, the officers are required to have a valid reason or a warrant to justify the arrest. Victims of an improper arrest may have a damage action against the officers for false arrest. Moreover, police officers are engaged in the business of protecting society. There is a difference between removing someone from public office and placing someone in jail. In terms of results produced, there is a significant difference between voters and police officers. Because voting and arresting a parole violator are quite different, the State makes a strained analogy.
Interestingly, to support its view that a deputized officer need not be in possession of the arrest and detain order, the State points to the definition of the word "give." Quoting from Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 486 (1976), the State defines "give" as follows: "to make a present of; . . . to grant or bestow by formal action; . . . to put into the possession of another; . . . or to commit to another as a trust or responsibility." This definition only serves to support the conclusion that the phrase "by giving such officer a written arrest and detain order," as it is used in K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 75-5217(a), means to put the officer into possession of a written arrest and detain order. We conclude that the officer has the power to arrest a parole violator when that officer has been given the actual written arrest and detain order, not when the officer has been given the oral authorization to arrest the violator. This conclusion is in accord with the language found in State v. Hearst, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1052, 1055, 54 P.3d 518 (2002), that K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 75-5217(a) "requires serving the parolee at the time of arrest with written notice that states the parole violation charges." We note that the relevant language under the current version of the statute, K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 75-5217(a), is identical to the language found in K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 75-5217(a).
We conclude that when the officers attempted to place Anderson into custody, they had no authority to arrest Anderson for the parole violation. As a result, the attempted arrest and later arrest of Anderson were unlawful.
Moreover, the trial court's finding that the officers could detain Anderson past the conclusion of the traffic stop because they had probable cause of the suspected parole violation is erroneous. The detention of Anderson past the conclusion of the initial traffic stop could not be supported by the suspected parole violation as it is not a criminal offense. It is well established that an officer may stop any person in a public place when that officer has reasonable suspicion that such person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime. See K.S.A. 22-2402(1); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968); State v. Pritchett, 270 Kan. 125, 129, 11 P.3d 1125 (2000). Nevertheless, as Anderson points out, a parole violation is not a crime, under Kansas law. See State v. Sullivan, 17 Kan. App. 2d 771, 773, 844 P.2d 741 (1993) (recognizing that violation of parole conditions is not classified as criminal offense under Kansas Criminal Code). Therefore, the officers could not use the parole violation to conduct a Terry stop and detention.
A similar decision was reached in United States v. Santillanes, 848 F.2d 1103 (10th Cir. 1988). There, a detective was with another officer in an airport when he noticed the defendant leave the lobby and boarding area of an airline and enter the main lobby of the airport. The detective recognized the defendant whom he had arrested a month earlier for an offense for which the defendant was under indictment. Although the detective was not aware of the particular terms of the defendant's pretrial release, his impression was that individuals indicted for a felony could not leave the county. In order to determine if the defendant had violated the conditions of his pretrial release, the detective stopped and questioned him. During a later search, the officers discovered heroin on the defendant's person, and the defendant was arrested.
On appeal, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals determined that because a violation of conditions of pretrial release was not a crime, such a violation could not provide the basis for the stop of the defendant at the airport. The Court stated that at the most, the detective should have reported seeing the defendant at the location in the airport. In concluding that the initial stop of the defendant was invalid, the court stated:
"[S]ince there was no crime involved in the possible departure of [defendant] from the jurisdiction the reason advanced by the Government and the detective for the initial stop was not valid, and the initial pat-down and questions were in violation of [defendant's] rights. There would seem to be no serious question but that [the officer] could have properly made the initial inquiry, 'What are you doing here?', had the [defendant's] stop and participation been voluntary, but it was not." 848 F.2d at 1107.
We find the Santillanes holding persuasive. Following the unsuccessful search of Anderson's truck, the only remaining suspicion that the officers had was that Anderson was a parole violator. In focusing on this factor, the trial court stated: "[T]here's probable cause to believe that he's in violation of his parole. But it's really a reasonable suspicion after the traffic stop." Explaining that it was proper for the officers to continue their detention of Anderson, the trial court declared:
"And I find as a matter of law, the fact that there was no order, detain and arrest – arrest and detain order – excuse me – arrest and detain order in existence at the time of the stop does not make it unreasonable for Officer Padron to have held Mr. Anderson until such an order existed.
"And I'll overrule the motion to suppress based on that."
If Anderson's supposed status as a parole violator does not justify reasonable suspicion, the officers' alleged reasonable suspicion topples like a house of cards. Similar to Santillanes, a violation of the conditions of parole does not constitute a crime in Kansas. Therefore, the officers' continued detention of Anderson after his truck had been searched cannot be justified on the ground that the officers suspected Anderson's contact with gang members was a violation of his parole. Moreover, associating with gang members is not a crime and cannot in and of itself provide reasonable suspicion or probable cause of criminal activity. The officers could have reported this information to Anderson's parole officer. Nevertheless, the arresting officers had no reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity, independent of the alleged parole violation, which was not a crime. Therefore, the officers had no reasonable basis to continue their detention of Anderson after the unsuccessful search of the truck.
Moreover, as Anderson points out in his brief, there was no evidence presented at the hearing to establish that Anderson had violated a special condition of his parole by associating with gang members. Padron indicated that he had never been informed by a parole officer that Anderson was prohibited from associating or being in contact with gang members as a condition of his parole. Padron further indicated that based upon his experience and training, parolees who were gang members should not be around other gang members. Nevertheless, the State never introduced any evidence establishing that as a special condition of his parole, Anderson was prohibited from associating with gang members. As stated earlier, the State has the burden of showing the lawfulness of the search and seizure. Without such information, we are unable to conclude that Anderson did in fact violate a special condition of his parole and that the later arrest and detain order was properly issued.
Finally, as discussed above, under K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 75-5217(a), officers have the authority to arrest a parole violator when they are given a written arrest and detain order. Nevertheless, the officers did not have the written arrest and detain order in their possession when they detained Anderson after the traffic stop. Moreover, the written arrest and detain order was not even in existence at the time the officers decided to arrest Anderson. From the above analysis, we may conclude that the officers had no authority to arrest Anderson for the parole violation.
Because the continued detention and arrest of Anderson was unlawful, we determine that the seized drug evidence should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963); State v. Epperson, 237 Kan. 707, 718-19, 703 P.2d 761 (1985).