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Main The Unity of Mystical Traditions: The Transformation of Consciousness in Tibetan and German Mysticism..
The Unity of Mystical Traditions: The Transformation of Consciousness in Tibetan and German Mysticism (Studies in the History of Religions, Vol. 107)Randall Studstill
This book argues that mystical doctrines and practices initiate parallel transformative processes in the consciousness of mystics. This thesis is supported through a comparative analysis of Tibetan Buddhist Dzogchen (rdzogs-chen) and the medieval German mysticism of Eckhart, Suso, and Tauler. These traditions are interpreted using a system/cybernetic model of consciousness. This model provides a theoretical framework for assessing the cognitive effects of mystical doctrines and practices and showing how different doctrines and practices may nevertheless initiate common transformative processes. This systems approach contributes to current philosophical discourse on mysticism by (1) making possible a precise analysis of the cognitive effects of mystical doctrines and practices, and (2) reconciling mystical heterogeneity with the essential unity of mystical traditions.
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The Unity of Mystical Traditions Numen Book Series Studies in the History of Religions Edited by W.J. Hanegraaff and P.P. Kumar Advisory Board p. antes ‒ m. despland ‒ r.i.j. hackett ‒ m. abumalham mas a.w. geertz ‒ g. ter haar ‒ g.l. lease m.n. getui ‒ i.s. gilhus ‒ p. morris ‒ j.k. olupona e. thomassen ‒ a. tsukimoto ‒ a.t. wasim VOLUME 107 The Unity of Mystical Traditions The Transformation of Consciousness in Tibetan and German Mysticism by Randall Studstill BRILL LEIDEN • BOSTON 2005 This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Studstill, Randall. The Unity of mystical traditions : the transformation of consciousness in Tibetan and German mysticism / by Randall Studstill p. cm. — (Numen book series, ISSN 0169-8834 ; 107) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 90-04-14319-X (alk. paper) 1. Mysticism—China—Tibet. 2. Mysticism—Germany. I. Title. II. Series : Studies in the history of religions ; 107. BL1802.S74 2005 204'.22—dc22 2005045715 ISSN 0169-8834 ISBN 90 04 14319 X © Copyright 2005 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands For my wife and parents Krishna Roman Kenneth and Charlotte Studstill Neither the mystic nor the philosopher can remain content with an irreducible heterogeneity of mystical experience, the mystic because the ultimate character of the experience implies a universal claim, the philosopher because a diversity of ultimate claims is a challenge not a resting-place. Thus, it is not an uneducated essentialist desire, but religious integrity or philosophical urgency that leads those who no longer find an exclusive claim by any single tradition convincing to seek an underlying unity and to investigate the equivalence of symbols under their diversity. Charles Davis CONTENTS Acknowledgments ...................................................................... Chapter One Introduction: A Mystical Pluralist Theory of Mysticism .............................................................................. The Mystical Pluralist Thesis ................................................ The Method: A Systems Approach to Mind ...................... Mystical Pluralism Compared to other Essentialist Approaches to Mysticism .................................................. Mystical Pluralism and Epistemological Essentialist Approaches ...................................................................... Mystical Pluralism and Process-oriented Approaches ...... Mystical Pluralism and John Hick's Pluralism ................ Robert Forman's Perennial Psychology ............................ Overview of the Book .......................................................... Chapter Two A Critique Of Constructivism ................................ Constructivism: An Outline .................................................. Constructivism as a priori ...................................................... Constructivism and the Phenomenological Content of Mystical Experience ............................................................ Mystical Experience and Mystical Language ...................... Constructivism and the 'Object' of Mystical Experience .... Rationales for Constructivist Epistemology .......................... Philosophical Precedent ...................................................... Mediation as Epistemological Necessity ............................ Empirical Evidence and Constructivism .......................... The Data ............................................................................ Katz's Manet Example .......................................................... Constructivism is Self-contradictory ...................................... Constructivism is Epistemologically Vague .......................... Mystical Traditions Undermine their own Doctrines ........ Similarities among Traditions and Experiences .................. Conditioning as Cause? Failed Mystics and Spontaneous Mystical Experiences .......................................................... xi 1 5 10 19 20 21 24 26 33 35 35 36 39 45 54 60 61 63 65 67 70 71 72 73 74 77 viii contents Mystical Experiences as Novel .............................................. 'Construction' and the Mystical Experience of Unity ........ Katz's Misreading of the Traditions .................................... Final Miscellaneous Problems ................................................ Concluding Remarks on Constructivism .............................. 79 81 81 83 85 Chapter Three An Alternative Methodology: A Systems Approach To Consciousness ........................................................................ Systems Theory: An Overview .............................................. What is a 'System'? ............................................................ Maintenance and Evolution of System Structure ............ Justifying the Systems Approach to Mind ............................ Intuitive Appeal: Mind Appears to be a System ............ Mind Functions Like a Dynamical System ...................... Applicability to a Wider Range of Data .......................... A Systems Approach to Mind .............................................. Mind: Definitions and Structure ...................................... Processes of Mind .............................................................. The Homeostatic Processes of Mind ................................ Evolution through Positive Feedback ................................ Summing Up the Model ........................................................ 87 87 92 93 95 101 103 104 105 106 109 114 121 123 Chapter Four Doctrine and Practice in the Dzogchen Tradition .... Dzogchen's Historical Origins .............................................. Chinese Influence on Dzogchen? ...................................... Dzogchen Origins and Tantra .......................................... Final Remarks on Dzogchen Origins .............................. Dzogchen Doctrine ................................................................ Ultimate and Conventional Reality .................................. The Four Kàyas ................................................................ The Gzhi as Creator .......................................................... The Dzogchen Path .............................................................. Preliminary Practices .......................................................... Dzogchen Practice .............................................................. Systems Theory and Dzogchen ............................................ 125 131 137 143 145 146 147 151 154 160 163 166 169 Chapter Five Doctrine And Practice In German Mysticism .......... The Historical Emergence of German Mysticism .............. German Mysticism and the Nature of God ........................ God's Ineffability ................................................................ 173 175 184 191 contents God's Activity, Creativity, and Relation to Creatures .... The Nature of the Soul ........................................................ Mystical Practice in German Mysticism .............................. 'Releasement' and Self-annihilation .................................. Rejection of 'Ways' ............................................................ 'Birth' and 'Breakthrough' ................................................ Grace and Effort ................................................................ Chapter Six Mystical Pluralism, Systems Theory, and the Unity of Mystical Traditions ................................................................ Dzogchen and German Mysticism: General Comparative Observations ........................................................................ Cognitive Deconstruction through Dzogchen and German Mysticism .............................................................. Systems Theory and Mystical Evolution .............................. Mystical Pluralism vs. Alternative Theories of Mysticism ............................................................................ Conclusion .............................................................................. ix 194 204 206 211 213 219 222 225 226 231 238 240 244 Appendix A Defining 'Mysticism' and 'Mystical Experience' ........ 247 Appendix B Remarks On Essentialist and Typological Approaches to Mysticism .............................................................. 255 Appendix C The Motivational Basis of Cognitive Confirmation .... 271 Bibliography ................................................................................ 275 Index ............................................................................................ 293 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Since this book is a revised version of my doctoral dissertation, my gratitude extends first and foremost to the members of my supervising committee: Richard Payne, Allan Combs, Hilary Martin, and Luke Buckles. I want to especially acknowledge Richard and Allan: Richard, for his careful editing, helpful advice, and for recommending the book to Brill; Allan, for inspiring me with his own systems approach to spiritual transformation, for his generous willingness to serve on the committee as an outside reader, and for his enthusiastic positive feedback. His kind praise after reading the first chapter helped immensely at that daunting, early stage of the project. Among my graduate school mentors, I want to mention and thank Irene Woodward, for her support and encouragement, and her willingness to read and comment on early drafts of some of the initial chapters, and Steven Goodman, who introduced me to Tibetan Buddhism in a way that was both intellectually and spiritually inspiring. I also owe Steve a debt of gratitude for introducing me to the scholarship of Herbert Guenther. More than any other scholar, Guenther's work has shaped my thinking about Buddhism, Dzogchen, systems theory, and the existential predicament and potential of human beings. In addition to Guenther, my debts to the scholarship of others are immense, as the footnotes throughout the book make abundantly clear. There are of course too many individuals to name here, so I single out some of the most influential. My philosophical thinking about mysticism has been particularly challenged and/or inspired by the work of Steven Katz, Robert Forman, Peter Byrne, Michael Stoeber, Philip Almond, Sallie King, and John Hick. My psychological appropriation of systems theory was enriched by the work of Allan Combs, Erich Jantsch, and Ervin Laszlo. In addition to Guenther's work, I am particularly grateful to David Germano and Samten Gyaltsen Karmay for their extraordinary scholarship on Dzogchen. I am also indebted to the work of Geoffrey Samuel. The breadth and comprehensiveness of his scholarship on Tibetan Buddhism was indispensable in giving me a sense of Dzogchen's historical and doctrinal context. The chapter on German mysticism would have xii acknowledgments been more difficult than I care to imagine if I had not been able to refer to the work of Bernard McGinn and M. O'C. Walshe. My intellectual work would have been impossible without the support and generosity of my parents. I find it frustratingly impossible to put into words my sense of gratitude for everything they have done for me—anything I say sounds trivial in the face of a lifetime of encouragement and love. I thank S.Y. for his wisdom, profound guidance, and unconditional faith in me. I thank my beloved wife Krishna Roman, for being one of my greatest teachers and a true companion on the path. I want to thank Joseph Thometz, for his friendship and support. I deeply appreciate the kindness of Arjuna and Tara Arnold, who through much of my graduate program gave me a place to stay and made me feel like I was one of the family. My thanks to Katy Brownfield and Jon Bjornstad who wrote a Perl program that was a great help in the creation of the index. I am grateful to Einar Finstad and John Mason for the illustration. I thank KPIG in Freedom, California for making bearable (even enjoyable) some tedious editing. I am grateful as well to Jerry, Bobby, Phil, Mickey, Bill, Keith, Brent, Donna, and Vince—for nurturing my spirit and being my first teachers of mysticism. CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION: A MYSTICAL PLURALIST THEORY OF MYSTICISM In all of the world's major religions certain individuals experience— directly and vividly—what they believe is ultimate reality. Depending on the religion, they seem to perceive/know (in some cases, merge with) God, Viß»u, ≤ùnyatà, gzhi, the Tao, the (Neoplatonic) One, Brahman, etc. These individuals are referred to as 'mystics,' and their apparent encounters with ultimate reality are 'mystical experiences.' The term 'mysticism' encompasses the experiences, traditions, practices, rituals, doctrines, etc. comprising and associated with their various religious paths.1 Mystical experiences pose significant philosophical problems. Are they veridical or delusional? What criteria could be used to adjudicate their veridicality? If they are veridical (or partially veridical), how is this reconciled with their phenomenological2 heterogeneity? 1 In more precise terms, 'mysticism' designates a set of phenomena that comprises (1) 'mystical experiences,' i.e., experiences whose object or content appears to be ultimate reality (religiously conceived) or some aspect of (or approximation to) ultimate reality, and (2) those aspects of religious traditions (doctrines, practices, texts, institutions, etc.) that promote (intentionally or unintentionally) the occurrence of such experiences. Mystical experiences are religious because of the unique nature of their "objects" (i.e., God, Brahman, etc.). The believer seems to perceive not just a thing in the world, but something both ultimately real and 'other' to the world of ordinary experience. A 'mystic' is usually a religious practitioner who deliberately seeks an experience of ultimate reality (as construed by her tradition) and who realizes a non-ordinary experience that seems to the mystic to be an experience of ultimate reality (I say "usually" because mystical experience is not always a deliberate goal but may occur spontaneously). I would emphasize that this definition of mystical experience is based on identifying a commonality in the apparent epistemic value of a set of religious experiences. It presupposes nothing with regard to the veridicality of those perceptions, the ontological status of any given tradition's 'ultimate reality,' the phenomenological similarity or dissimilarity of mystical experiences across traditions, or the epistemological plausibility of direct, unmediated experience. These are issues best addressed within the context of fully developed theories of mysticism. See Appendix A for an extended discussion of the term, as well as additional remarks on what I mean by 'religious.' 2 Here and throughout this book, the term 'phenomenological' refers to the perceived content of experience. In other words, the phenomenological content of a 2 chapter one How does the content and/or object(s) of mystical experiences—if they have an object(s)—compare across mystical traditions? What epistemological constraints apply to these experiences? Is unmediated experience possible? To what degree are mystical experiences conditioned by the concepts and expectations of the mystic? How do these experiences occur? What is their psychological and/or spiritual significance? How is one to interpret mystical language given persistent claims (by the mystics) that their experiences are ineffable? These questions have inspired a sustained and vigorous philosophical discourse. Two competing theoretical orientations dominate this discourse: essentialism3 and constructivism.4 Essentialism is associated with a variety of approaches and claims. A strong essentialist thesis asserts that all mystical traditions, doctrines, and/or experiences vision of Jesus is the perceived form of Jesus. I use the term in this sense because it has become the convention among scholars of mysticism. This usage, however, is inconsistent with Husserl's philosophical phenomenology and with at least some approaches to the phenomenology of religion (such as Eliade's). Both fields are concerned with identifying background or implicit structures of consciousness. Occasionally I will also use the term 'phenomenal' to emphasize the "qualitative [subjective] feel" of an experience. David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 4, 11. 3 Other terms that are identified or closely associated with essentialism in the philosophical literature on mysticism are ecumenism (or ecumenicalism), the ecumenical thesis, the perennial philosophy, perennial psychology, non-constructivism, postconstructivism, deconstructivism, and decontextualism. In defense of essentialism, Steven Pinker has this to say: "in modern academic life 'essentialist' is just about the worst thing you can call someone. In the sciences, essentialism is tantamount to creationism. In the humanities, the label implies that the person subscribes to insane beliefs such as that the sexes are not constructed, there are universal human emotions, a real world exists, and so on. And in the social sciences, 'essentialism' has joined 'reductionism,' 'determinism,' and 'reification' as a term of abuse hurled at anyone who tries to explain human thought and behavior rather than redescribe it. I think it is unfortunate that 'essentialism' has become an epithet, because at heart it is just the ordinary human curiosity to find out what makes natural things work." Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997), 325–6. 4 Steven T. Katz—the foremost exponent of constructivism—prefers 'contextualism.' (Steven T. Katz, "Mystical Speech and Mystical Meaning," in Mysticism and Language, ed. Steven T. Katz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 34.) I use constructivism here because it is more common in the literature and better reflects the epistemological presuppositions of the approach. Denise and John Carmody describe this approach as "empiricist." This implies (quite erroneously, I would argue) that constructivists (compared to essentialists) place more emphasis on the data and less on interpretation. (Denise Lardner Carmody and John Tully Carmody, Mysticism: Holiness East and West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 8.) See Chapter Two, pp. 36–9, for an extended discussion of the a priori (i.e., non-data based) nature of constructivist epistemology. introduction 3 share a common substantive characteristic or characteristics. Most essentialists make much weaker claims, e.g., that only the most advanced expressions of mysticism (usually, the most advanced experiences) are identical across traditions. Neither the strong or weak essentialist denies the fact that mystical phenomena and experiences vary widely across mystical traditions, or that the form and meaning of mystical phenomena is to some degree a function of historical, cultural, and religious contexts. But they do insist that within or beyond this variation is a universal or non-contextual dimension— a common element uniting mystical paths. The hermeneutical implication of this claim is that the meaning of any given mystical phenomenon cannot be wholly or even primarily reduced to its historical, cultural, and/or religious context.5 How essentialists construe this common mystical essence depends on the type of essentialist analysis: phenomenological, doctrinal, epistemological, cognitive, or therapeutic/soteriological. Briefly, phenomenological essentialism contends that there is some degree of phenomenological identity among mystical experiences across traditions. Usually this identity is limited to one type of mystical experience; few phenomenological essentialists claim that all mystical 5 This is a relatively general description of essentialism, in comparison to others found in the scholarly literature. For example, Michael Stoeber and Denise and John Carmody associate essentialism with the claim that all mystical experiences are phenomenologically identical regardless of variations in mystical reports. (Michael Stoeber, Theo-Monistic Mysticism: A Hindu-Christian Comparison (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 21; Carmody and Carmody, Mysticism: Holiness East and West, 6.) Though this may accurately portray the views of an earlier generation of essentialist scholars, to my knowledge no current essentialist holds this position. Essentialists are more likely to acknowledge that most mystical experiences are indeed phenomenologically heterogeneous, yet also claim that there is a particular type of mystical experience that is identical across traditions. Essentialist approaches to mysticism are closely related to the typological approaches of such scholars as R.C. Zaehner and Richard Jones. Like essentialists, typologists identify cross-cultural similarities in mystical experiences, but rather than focusing on one, universal mystical experience, they argue that there are distinct types of cross-culturally identical mystical experiences. This view requires typologists to hold epistemological presuppositions similar to those of essentialists. Though typologies of mysticism admit a degree of phenomenological variety in mystical experience, the claim that particular types of mystical experience may occur in different traditions necessarily implies the rejection of a purely contextual approach to mystical phenomena and the acceptance of some trans-contextual factor uniting the experiences. The distinction between essentialist and typological approaches is further blurred given that most essentialists limit their claims to a particular type of mystical experience. See Appendix B, pp. 259–70, for additional remarks on typologies of mystical experience. 4 chapter one experiences are phenomenologically identical. Doctrinal essentialism (more commonly, the perennial philosophy) maintains that all religions/mystical traditions teach a common set of core doctrines. Epistemological essentialism asserts that all mystical experiences are oriented toward (and in some way, know) the same divine reality, which may or may not be experienced differently. Cognitive essentialism refers to the view that mystical doctrines and practices produce identical changes in cognitive/psychological functioning. Therapeutic (or soteriological) essentialism is an extension of cognitive essentialism—mystical paths not only initiate identical changes in the consciousness of mystics, but these changes are therapeutic or salvational in character. In other words, all mystical paths effect processes of transformation associated with greater knowledge of reality and enhanced psychological/affective well-being. None of these types of essentialism are mutually exclusive. In practice, two or more are often combined within the framework of broader essentialist theories of mysticism. For example, presentations of the perennial philosophy (doctrinal essentialism) often include forms of phenomenological essentialism since common doctrines are claimed to be derived from common experiences. Likewise, epistemological essentialism tends to overlap both doctrinal and phenomenological essentialism since an encounter with a common object (whether mediated or not) would naturally tend to coincide with similar experiences and similar doctrines. In contrast to these essentialist approaches, constructivists emphasize the contextuality of mystical phenomena. For the constructivist, a mystical phenomenon is a product of its historical, cultural, and religious context. Mystical experiences in particular are constructed according to such contexts. There is nothing universal about mystical traditions, paths, or experiences—they are as varied as the contexts in which they occur. The implication of this view—whether explicitly stated or not—is that the meaning of a mystical phenomenon is likewise determined by its particular historical, cultural, and religious contexts. (I will have much more to say about constructivism in Chapter Two.) Philosophical discourse on mysticism has evolved (or better, devolved) into what appears to be an irresolvable debate between these two approaches. This debate has focused on relatively narrow issues such as the phenomenological content of mystical experiences (i.e., is mystical experience necessarily constructed or is an unconditioned expe- introduction 5 rience possible?) as well as the much broader and more important problem: What is the meaning of mysticism? Is the significance of any particular mystical datum a function of its particular social, historical, cultural context, or is the meaning of mysticism in some way relatable to a trans-contextual, non-contextual, or universal factor? The opposition between constructivist and essentialist answers to these questions has polarized the discourse. Constructivists critique essentialists, and vice versa. But while the scholarly output on both sides has been considerable, no one has been able to formulate an argument sufficiently compelling to persuade anyone but the already-converted. The study of mysticism is at an impasse.6 The Mystical Pluralist Thesis The purpose of this book is to present and support an essentialist theory of mysticism sophisticated enough to break the impasse in the philosophical study of mysticism. I call this theory mystical pluralism7 because of its similarity to John Hick's pluralist interpretation of religion. The theory is essentialist in both the therapeutic and epistemological senses described above. Its thesis is that mystical traditions initiate common transformative processes in the consciousness8 6 This impasse has been noted by a number of scholars, e.g., Michael Stoeber and Bernard McGinn. (Stoeber, Theo-Monistic Mysticism, 15; see Joseph Thometz's comments on McGinn in his Speaking With and Away: A Buddhist-Christian Meta-Dialogue (Ph.D. thesis, The Graduate Theological Union, 2002), 210.) The impasse itself is poignantly reflected in an exchange between Steven Katz, Huston Smith, and Sallie King in "On Mysticism," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 56/4 (1988): 751–61. For an extended discussion and analysis of the perennialist-constructivist debate, see Thometz, Speaking With and Away, 191ff. 7 Throughout this book, I use the term 'pluralism' in John Hick's sense, i.e., a theory of religion that affirms that religious traditions are different yet equally transformational and equally oriented toward the Real. This contrasts with how the term is often used in the philosophical literature on mysticism, where 'pluralism' or the 'pluralist thesis' is identified with the claim that the content of mystical experiences varies across mystical traditions. Mystical pluralism may be distinguished from what Michael Stoeber refers to as a "mystic pluralism," by which he seems to mean any theory of mysticism that (1) constructs a coherent framework relating the variety of mystical experiences, and (2) validates the spiritual authenticity of all those experiences without "dogmatically" privileging any "particular religious theology of philosophy." See Stoeber, TheoMonistic Mysticism, 40. See also 37, 41. 8 The issues that surround the meaning of such terms as 'consciousness,' 'awareness,' 'mind,' etc. are too complex to be addressed here. 'Consciousness' alone has 6 chapter one of mystics. Though mystical doctrines and practices may be quite different across traditions, they nevertheless function in parallel ways— they disrupt the processes of mind that maintain ordinary, egocentric experience and induce a structural transformation of consciousness. been construed in many different ways, even within specific disciplines like cognitive science. See Harry T. Hunt, On the Nature of Consciousness: Cognitive, Phenomenological, and Transpersonal Perspectives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 13ff.; Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Güven Güzeldere, eds., The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 8–9. To get a sense of the unique problems raised by the philosophical study of consciousness, see Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, xi–xii; 3ff. Among cognitive scientists consciousness is variously described as (1) non-existent, (2) "an incidental by-product of computational capacity," or (3) "a formal system or capacity involving the direction, choice, and synthesis of nonconscious processes." (On consciousness as non-existent, see John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992), 4–5, 7. The quotations are from Hunt, On the Nature of Consciousness, 26; see also 59.) Hunt defines consciousness as (among other things) "a capacity for sensitive attunement to a surround" (Ibid., xiii) while for Pinker the real problem of consciousness is the fact of immediate sentience or subjective awareness. (Pinker, How the Mind Works, 135) Echoing Pinker, Allan Combs describes consciousness as "perfect transparent subjectivity" that is (almost) always intentional. Allan Combs, The Radiance of Being: Complexity, Chaos and the Evolution of Consciousness (Edinburgh, UK: Floris Books, 1995), 19–20. My own use of the term comes closest to Pinker's and Combs', i.e., consciousness as sentience or phenomenal, subjective experience, though I think it is helpful to distinguish sentience-as-such—"awareness" as "primary and irreducible" (Hunt, On the Nature of Consciousness, 51)—and sentience as it is expressed according to specific sensory, neural, cognitive, and environmentally conditioned constraints ('consciousness'). In other words, consciousness refers to a specific mode of awareness, supported by an interdependent constellation of factors (the cognitive system). For example, awareness as ordinary consciousness is marked by dualism and the ontic reification of 'self ' and external 'object' or 'other.' This state of consciousness is in turn supported by a system of mutually reinforcing factors (such as externally-oriented attention, unconsciously held beliefs and conditions of worth, attachment, emotional upset, etc.). I would emphasize that consciousness in this sense includes but is not reducible to the moment-by-moment content of experience. Ordinary waking life is an unchanging, dualistic state of consciousness, even though the phenomenal content of experience continuously fluctuates. Hunt claims that "consciousness is not a 'mechanism' to be 'explained' cognitively or neurophysiologically, but a categorical 'primitive' that defines the level of analysis that is psychology." (Ibid., xiii) I agree, though I consider this statement to more properly apply to awareness. It is sentience-as-such that is the true mystery—as Pinker puts it, "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." (Pinker, How the Mind Works, 60) On the other hand, the forms that sentience takes as consciousness can, to some degree, be "explained" by the particular factors that support and maintain them. 'Mind' I will use in the broad sense (more or less synonymously with 'cognitive system') to refer to both the conscious and unconscious aspects of the personality/ego, encompassing "all those inner processes and conditions that shape and color consciousness, producing the unique landscapes of experience that characterize each moment of our lives." Combs, Radiance of Being, 23. introduction 7 The essential characteristic of this transformation is an increasingly sensitized awareness/knowledge of Reality9 that manifests as (among other things) an enhanced sense of emotional well-being, an expanded locus of concern engendering greater compassion for others, an enhanced capacity to creatively negotiate one's environment, and a greater capacity for aesthetic appreciation.10 Mystical pluralism is essentialist11 in the sense that it shares the same orientation to mystical phenomena as other essentialist approaches, 9 I capitalize the 'R' (in 'the Real' or 'Reality') simply to draw a distinction between 'what is actually real' (i.e., the Real) and what appears to be real from the perspective of ordinary experience. This distinction by itself assumes no specific position on the nature of the Real (beyond the claim that it is not what ordinarily appears to be real). In other words, the Real remains open to a variety of religious, philosophical, and/or scientific interpretations. For the purposes of the thesis of this book, it is not necessary to specify the Real's nature beyond its non-identity with ordinary appearances, though I do make some speculative suggestions in Chapter Three (see pp. 108–9) regarding a monist understanding of Reality. This usage of 'the Real' may be contrasted with the explicitly religious meaning John Hick gives the term. As Hick states, the Real refers to "the putative transcendent reality which is affirmed when the different traditions speak of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, or of the Holy Trinity, or Allah, or Vishnu, or Brahman, or the Dharmakaya/Nirvana/Sunyata, and so on." ( John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 10.) Hick is able to justify positing a single Reality as the referent for all these terms (which in some cases reflect quite different conceptions of what is real) based on the distinction between the Real an sich and the Real as experienced by human beings. He argues that the Real is never encountered 'in itself ' but always from the perspective of conditioned human experience, which necessarily introduces variation in how It is conceived. From this perspective, the Real an sich is by definition inaccessible to human experience and therefore unknowable. The distinction between the Real vs. the contingently real or non-real ("reality" ordinarily construed) raises the question of how best to understand the nature of this distinction: is it ontological or epistemological? I take the epistemological view. From this perspective, 'the Real' and 'the real' (from a religious perspective, 'the sacred' and 'the profane') constitute different modes of apprehending the single, ontological Real. The former (the Real/sacred) encompasses relatively transparent modes of apprehension of the ontological Real (in other words, epistemology and ontology collapse), as opposed to the more opaque (and therefore deluded) modes associated with 'the real.' 10 This transformative process resonates with John Hick's definition of salvation/ liberation: "the transformation of our human situation from a state of alienation from the true structure of reality to a radically better state in harmony with reality," expressed as "compassion/love towards other human beings or towards all life," peace, and/or "radiant joy." Hick, Interpretation of Religion, 10, 301–2. See also 36. 11 Hick's religious pluralism as well as the mystical pluralist thesis advocated here are both essentialist, even though they include a constructivist element and a concomitant recognition of mystical heterogeneity (more on constructivism below). Hick, for example, makes the strong constructivist claim that all mystical experiences are 8 chapter one i.e., the affirmation that mystical traditions, doctrines, and/or experiences share some type of common characteristic. As noted above, however, this essentialism is specifically therapeutic and epistemological in nature. The common characteristic posited by mystical pluralism is not a universally shared doctrine(s) (the thesis of doctrinal essentialism) or a universally identical experience (as phenomenological essentialists would maintain), but common transformative processes. These processes may be initiated by different doctrines and practices and may manifest in phenomenologically different forms. In this respect, mystical pluralism is fully compatible with the heterogeneity of mystical doctrines, practices, and experiences. I emphasize this point because the most common critique leveled against essentialist theories of mysticism is that mystical doctrines, practices, and experiences are different across traditions. While it is true that most mystical doctrines, etc. are indeed different, the point is irrelevant to the mystical pluralist position because common transformative processes do not necessarily imply common doctrines12 or phenomenologically identical experiences. The universal processes posited by mystical pluralism are often reflected in cross-culturally similar doctrines, practices, and experiences, but mystical pluralism does not depend on such similarities. On the doctrinal level, it does not need to since it maintains that different doctrines may have common transformative effects,13 while on the experiential level it acknowlmediated by the concepts, images, symbols, etc. brought to the experience by the mystic and are therefore phenomenologically varied. (Hick, Interpretation of Religion, 173, 295) However, his thesis that different paths bring about common processes of transformation in the consciousness of the believer in relation to a common transcendent Reality is a strong essentialist claim and far outweighs the constructivist element of the theory, which is limited to explaining the phenomenological content of experience. In addition, pluralism may take forms in which the constructivist element is relatively weak or deemphasized. For example, one may agree that most forms of mystical experience are constructed yet also maintain (as I do) that some forms are free of construction and that this non-constructed experience constitutes a direct encounter with the Real. 12 As Keith Ward suggests, given the fact of conflicting truth claims any form of essentialism that asserts the soteriological efficacy of different traditions has to abandon the search for common, true doctrines or the idea that salvation depends on true doctrinal beliefs. As he puts it, "the hard pluralist must . . . assert that [doctrinal truth] is irrelevant both to knowledge of the Real itself and to the completion of the salvific process of moving from selfish egoism to the limitlessly better state of 'Reality-centredness.'" Keith Ward, "Truth and the Diversity of Religions," Religious Studies 26 (1990): 5. 13 Steven Katz would dispute this, since he insists that there is a direct correlation between the mystic's beliefs and her experience. Katz, however, fails to realize introduction 9 edges that 'mystical experience' covers a wide range of experiences that are (with the exception of the most advanced stage of mystical realization) more or less mediated by the conceptual belief system of the mystic. Most mystical experiences will be phenomenologically different since most vary according to (1) level of realization and (2) the cultural and religious belief system of the individual mystic. Though mystical pluralism does not depend on universal doctrines and/or experiences, it does affirm the epistemological essentialist thesis, i.e., the claim that phenomenologically different mystical experiences are nevertheless oriented toward a common Reality.14 If this is the case, this Reality must inform the content of experience to some degree, which implies that there must also be some level of phenomenological commonality shared by all mystical experiences. As Steven Katz points out, epistemological essentialism requires that one "have a sufficiently delimiting list of corresponding and agreed predicates that the experienced object possessed in both (or more) cases . . . being compared."15 So even though mystical pluralism does not depend on identical experiences, there do have to be at least some common aspects of mystical experiences across mystical traditions if the theory is true. Constructivist scholars maintain that no such commonalities exist (Katz being the most notable example). Mystical pluralists maintain they do exist, though not necessarily at the level of explicit, formal content (which is the level generally focused on by scholars). For example, a vision of K‰ß»a is phenomenologically distinct from a vision of Jesus. Nevertheless, both experiences may have a similar feeling tone (the sense of being unconditionally loved) that communicates common information about the Real (i.e., the Real is unconditionally nurturing). In general, the comparison of mystical experiences requires a nuanced analysis that not that the relationship between beliefs and experience can be analyzed on both phenomenological and cognitive levels. Beliefs may shape the phenomenological content of mystical experiences (Katz's emphasis), but they may also affect a qualitative shift in the structure and processing of the cognitive system. See also pp. 53–4 below. 14 As Peter Byrne points out, if we take mystical accounts seriously at all, "there is no conceptual room for these varying experiences to yield knowledge of different objects." Peter Byrne, "Mysticism, Identity and Realism: A Debate Reviewed," International Journal for Philosophy and Religion 16 (1984): 241. See also Hick, Interpretation of Religion, 249. 15 Quoted in Charles Davis, review of Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, by Steven T. Katz, ed., in Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 8/1 (1979): 332–3. See also Byrne, "Mysticism, Identity and Realism," 240. 10 chapter one only addresses phenomenological content but also considers (1) the semantic implications of the symbolic content of mystical experiences, and (2) the ways varied symbolic content may represent common information.16 The Method: A Systems Approach To Mind Since mystical pluralists claim that mystical traditions are, on some level, essentially alike, showing that this is the case naturally requires a comparative analysis of the practices, doctrines, and experiential reports associated with mystical traditions.17 Given the immense range and scope of the mystical data, such an analysis will tend to be selective, relying either on small samplings of material from a variety of traditions or more in-depth discussions of two or three. Here I have taken the second approach by focusing on two mystical traditions: the Dzogchen (rdzogs-chen) tradition of Tibetan Buddhism18 and the 16 Hick's remarks on the potential veridicality of symbolic, even hallucinatory, experiences are relevant to this type of analysis. See Hick, Interpretation of Religion, 167–8. 17 It also requires a critique of constructivism, since constructivism poses a direct and serious challenge to the mystical pluralist thesis. This critique is the subject of Chapter Two. 18 Dzogchen, usually translated 'Great Perfection,' is a quasi-tantric tradition of Tibet, considered at least by the Nyingma School to embody the most advanced teachings of Buddhism. Practitioners claim it originated in India while Western scholars tend to locate its origins in 8th–9th century Tibet. Though it has evolved considerably over the centuries, it is still practiced today. It is not exclusively Buddhist, being important in Tibetan Bon as well. Only Buddhist Dzogchen will be examined here. Some scholars would reject the claim that either Dzogchen or German mysticism is a mystical tradition. According to David Kalupahana, Robert Gimello, and Richard Payne (the latter by personal communication) Buddhism is not mystical because nirvà»à, the goal of Buddhism, is not an experience but an insight into the nature of reality. On the other hand, scholars such as Ninian Smart, William Wainwright, and Rupert Gethin all describe Buddhism as mystical. On Kalapuhana's position, see William J. Wainwright, Mysticism: A Study of its Nature, Cognitive Value and Moral Implications (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), 122. For Wainwright's own position on this issue, see Ibid., 34–5. See also Robert M. Gimello, "Mysticism in its Contexts," in Mysticism and Religious Traditions, ed. Steven T. Katz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 78; Ninian Smart, "Interpretation and Mystical Experience," Religious Studies 1 (1966): 81; R.M.L. Gethin, The Buddhist Path to Awakening: A Study of the Bodhi-Pakkhiyà Dhammà (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992), 4. Is Buddhism essentially concerned with insight (and hence, non-mystical) or an experience (and therefore mystical)? The question may be mute since insight into the Real may have profound experiential consequences. Granting the distinction for introduction 11 medieval German mysticism of Meister Eckhart, Henry Suso, and John Tauler. The comparative analysis of these two traditions provides strong support for mystical pluralism as well as a useful context for illustrating its explanatory power. Because the meaning of mystical data is ambiguous, an analysis of mysticism must include an additional element in its methodology: an explicitly formulated theory, model, or set of presuppositions through which the data is interpreted.19 A concern with mystical the moment, however, it seems safe to say that given the complexity and variety of Buddhist traditions both tendencies may be found to varying degrees in the different schools of Buddhism. In the case of Dzogchen, with its strong tantric component, the issue is less ambiguous. The tradition itself places supreme value on experience, and certainly, some of the practices engaged (such as prà»ayama) alter one's state of consciousness. Per Kvaerne, for one, takes for granted the mystical nature of Dzogchen. See Per Kvaerne, "'The Great Perfection' in the Tradition of the Bonpos," in Early Ch'an in China and Tibet, ed. Whalen Lai and Lewis R. Lancaster (Berkeley: Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series, 1983), 367, 385. Though the article is specifically on Dzogchen in Bon, the similarities between Bon and Buddhist Dzogchen make many of his comments on Bon applicable to Buddhist Dzogchen as well. In addition, some of his remarks are intended as general observations on Dzogchen inclusive of both traditions (367). Some scholars have also questioned the existence of a mystical element in Christianity, either by claiming that the qualities of Christian religious experience are not "mystical" (as that term is commonly understood), or by denying any type of experiential concern in the traditions associated with so-called Christian "mystics." Two arguments are made to support the second point: (1) the caution Christian "mystics" often express toward visionary-type experiences, and (2) the claim by some Christian "mystics" that they are not seeking an experience at all. See Jure Kristo, "The Interpretation of Religious Experience: What Do Mystics Intend When They Talk about Their Experiences?" The Journal of Religion 62 (1982): 33–5; Grace M. Jantzen, "Could There Be A Mystical Core of Religion?" Religious Studies 26 (1990): 70; Grace M. Jantzen, "Mysticism and Experience," Religious Studies 25 (1989): 302–8. See also Thometz on Denys Turner's critique of modern interpretations of Christian apophatic traditions as "mystical" (i.e., concerned with experience). Thometz, Speaking With and Away, 29–30. These arguments are unconvincing. Regarding the first, even the most superficial review of Christian mystical literature shows that Christian mystical experience is felt to be profoundly unique and revelatory by the mystic herself. Regarding the two arguments for the second point, both describe views about experience and have nothing to do with whether or not mystical experiences actually occur. The fact that some Christians report having visionary and/or introvertive theistic mystical experiences (e.g., Henry Suso's visionary accounts) demonstrates that there is a mystical aspect of Christianity, regardless of how the tradition may evaluate those experiences. I would add that giving up attachment to or desire for 'an experience' is not necessarily evidence against a mystical component, since such 'letting go' may in fact be the precipitating occasion for the occurrence of mystical experience. 19 In the context of ordinary experience, meaning is constructed according to broader, often unconsciously held, world views or belief systems. The interpretive framework used by the scholar, then, simply makes explicit an epistemological factor present in all ordinary experience. See Hans H. Penner, "The Mystical Illusion," 12 chapter one experience in particular requires a model that is epistemological or psychological in nature. As Bruce Garside observes, "it is necessary to have some general model of experience in order to discuss mystical experience in particular."20 This is perhaps even more the case here, since this book focuses on transformative processes of the mind, effected through the influence of a tradition's doctrines and practices on consciousness. Assessing how a practice might impact consciousness necessarily requires some prior idea of what consciousness is. The psychological model that I will rely on here is based on systems theory. What is systems theory and what constitutes a systems understanding of consciousness? (Since these questions will be addressed in detail in Chapter Three my remarks below are brief.) On the most general level, systems theory refers to those theoretical principles characterized by a common orientation to the study and interpretation of phenomena as systems. It is primarily an umbrella term, encompassing more specialized fields such as cybernetics, chaos theory, and Ilya Prigogine's theory of dissipative structures. A systems approach tends to focus on the holistic, non-summative properties of phenomena, with particular emphasis on structure and process. Structural analysis centers on the organization of system constituents while 'process' refers to how those constituents function and interact to maintain and evolve system structure. Systems theory also focuses on the correlation between system evolution, perturbations (or fluctuations), and boundary conditions. More specifically, perturbations (if exceeding a critical threshold) may degrade a system's structure, which may in turn effect an 'opening up' of its boundaries. This 'opening up' increases the level of matter, energy, and/or information penetration into the system, prompting its evolution toward more complex levels of organization. This systems approach in Mysticism and Religious Traditions, ed. Steven T. Katz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 93. 20 Bruce Garside, "Language and the Interpretation of Mystical Experience," International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 3 (1972): 93. See also Sallie B. King, "Two Epistemological Models for the Interpretation of Mysticism," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 56/2 (1988): 270; Richard Woods Introduction to Understanding Mysticism, ed. Richard Woods (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1980), 4; Fritz Staal, Exploring Mysticism: A Methodological Essay (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 198; Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism," 32; Anthony N. Perovich Jr., "Does the Philosophy of Mysticism Rest on a Mistake?" in The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy, ed. Robert K.C. Forman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 238. introduction 13 has been specifically applied to mind, and used as a guiding metaphor21 in the development of psychological and cognitive theory. While systems-based approaches to mind are a minority position within the field of psychology and cognitive science as a whole, they are being viewed with increasing seriousness by cognitive researchers (especially as problems with the computational model of cognition become more apparent). A systems interpretation of mind has become a viable alternative to mainstream psychological approaches. Because systems theory encompasses a wide range of sub-fields and theories, a systems theory of mind may take a variety of forms on at least three different levels: neurophysiological, cognitive, and phenomenological. In other words, there is not one systems theory of mind but many. The model I will be using here addresses both cognitive and phenomenological levels and emphasizes an understanding of mind as an interdependent network of cognitive factors/events that constrain awareness and determine an individual's experiential attunement to her environment and, ultimately, the Real. These factors/events constitute a system that may itself evolve (or devolve) dependent on the system's boundary conditions (i.e., one's experiential openness to the environment). The evolution of the cognitive system experientially manifests as non-ordinary states of consciousness characterized by increasingly sensitized levels of epistemic/ affective appreciation of life. This model has suggestive implications for understanding mysticism. It indicates that mystical paths may constitute means of breaking down the system of factors stabilizing ordinary dualistic consciousness, thereby 'opening up' the system (consciousness) and prompting its evolution toward 'higher' (more environmentally sensitive and adaptive) states of consciousness. The analysis of Dzogchen and German mysticism below will show how the doctrines and practices 21 The metaphoric character of a systems approach to mind has been discussed in detail by Linda Olds. Among other things, Olds argues that metaphors are an essential component to creative intellectual activity. (Linda E. Olds, Metaphors of Interrelatedness: Toward a Systems Theory of Psychology (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992), 19ff.) Furthermore, because cognitive phenomena cannot be directly observed (at least not in a laboratory setting), most psychological theory tends to rely on metaphors to guide research and model building. For mainstream cognitive science, the guiding metaphor has been the computational processes of the computer. More recently the adequacy of this metaphor has been called into question, and new metaphors proposed in its place—one of which is the dynamical system. See Chapter Three, pp. 97, 103–5, for additional remarks on these issues. 14 chapter one of both traditions function in parallel ways to disrupt the cognitive system and initiate common processes of transformation. A systems approach to mystical experience is well outside mainstream, philosophical discourse on mysticism. What specifically is the justification for interpreting mysticism from a systems perspective? The fact that a significant number of psychologists and cognitive scientists have adopted a systems approach to mind may be justification enough. Given the current impasse in the study of mysticism, any serious approach that offers a new perspective on the data merits consideration by scholars. But are there more specific reasons for using systems theory to interpret mysticism, as opposed to constructivist or other types of essentialist theories? This turns out to be a problematic question because it raises another, more general question: how does one adjudicate among psychological/epistemological theories at all? This question is problematic for two reasons. First, the nature of consciousness itself is problematic. Many of the fundamental questions regarding experience, consciousness, and the limits of human knowing are open.22 There may be strong opinion and even suggestive research favoring certain theories, but the nature of consciousness remains controversial, especially in the case of mystical forms of consciousness—the research that has been done is often based on experimental and/or philosophical studies that rely on the data of ordinary experience. Such studies may be irrelevant to mystical experience, given that mystical experience is often considered (by mystics as well as by a significant number of scholars) fundamentally different from ordinary experience. Second, the process of interpretation tends to be hermeneutically circular. Applying theoretical models to mystical data (which any interpretation of the data necessarily requires) entails that what one 22 See Block, Flanagan, and Güzeldere, The Nature of Consciousness, 2; Hunt, On the Nature of Consciousness, 3ff. Cognitive scientists make a useful distinction between 'information processing' and consciousness or subjectivity. Though cognitive research has apparently clarified a great deal regarding how the mind processes information, consciousness itself remains a mystery. (Pinker, How the Mind Works, 60, 131ff.) Even with regard to information processing, experimental methods have to triangulate on what are completely unobserved phenomena (since one cannot 'see' information being processed in the brain). For this reason, psychological and cognitive theory tends to be heavily dependent on metaphor. The one exception is behaviorism, which avoids metaphor through its exclusive concern with observable behavior, and consequently loses explanatory power. introduction 15 "discovers" is usually23 what one already assumes to be true.24 As the systems theorist Ervin Laszlo puts it, "we perceive what we know, rather than know what we perceive."25 A corollary to this point is that one will tend to choose the model that when applied to the data will confirm one's presuppositions. This means that data generally fails to adjudicate theories of mysticism—a point confirmed by reviewing the flood of books and articles comprising the constructivist-essentialist debate. Both sides cite extensive amounts of data (in some cases, the same data) to support their own claims, but these data are never convincing as evidence because they mean different things depending on epistemological or psychological presuppositions.26 And because these presuppositions are not subject to being proved or disproved, neither side is able to persuade the other—hence the impasse in the philosophical study of mysticism. I raise these issues to show that adjudicating psychological theories—in particular systems theory as opposed to some other approach— is problematic. Because the hermeneutical circle is not completely closed, the texts may still be considered evidence. This evidence, however, is unpersuasive by itself. Adjudicating theories of mysticism requires other criteria. There seem to me to be two criteria that are helpful at this point: (1) the overall logical consistency of a theory, and (2) the range of data a theory is able to accommodate.27 The 23 I do not consider the hermeneutical circle entirely closed. It is possible to learn new things from the data. But the homeostatic tendencies of consciousness tend to dampen this possibility. See Chapter Three, pp. 114–21, for more on this topic. 24 See Russell H. Hvolbek, Mysticism and Experience (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998), 18; Donald Rothberg, "Contemporary Epistemology and the Study of Mysticism," in The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy, ed. Robert K.C. Forman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 193–4. 25 Ervin Laszlo, Introduction to Systems Philosophy: Toward a New Paradigm of Contemporary Thought (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1972), 199. 26 See Huston Smith, "Is There a Perennial Philosophy?" in Revisioning Philosophy, ed. James Ogilvy (Albany: SUNY Press), 251. 27 Some scholars cite as well the evidence of their own mystical experiences. (See L. Short, "Mysticism, Mediation, and the Non-Linguistic," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 63/4 (1995): 660.) Clearly, if one has such experiences they cannot help but influence one's understanding of mysticism. But because of its subjective nature, such evidence is unhelpful in resolving issues among scholars, even while it may completely resolve the issues for the individual who has the experience. On this point it might be added that some scholars maintain that the only way to understand mysticism is through personal experience. (See Staal, Exploring Mysticism, 9, 123ff., 150–4, 198; D. Green, "Unity in Diversity," Scottish Journal of Religious Studies 3/1 (1982): 51; Roger Walsh, "Phenomenological Mapping and Comparisons of Shamanic, Buddhist, Yogic, and Schizophrenic Experiences," Journal 16 chapter one first criterion insists, for example, that whatever epistemological constraints are assumed to apply to the mystic's own experience must apply equally to the scholar's experience (in particular, the scholar's interpretation of mystical texts). The second criterion highlights the fact that the more a theory can account for the better. These criteria, in conjunction with the data, show that constructivism—the most serious theoretical challenge to mystical pluralism—is inadequate.28 It is philosophically incoherent and too limited and simplistic in its account of the mystical data. More importantly, these criteria help answer the question raised above: why systems theory? A systems approach to mysticism is superior to the alternatives because it is both philosophically consistent and able to account for a broader range of the data. A systems-based model of mind goes beyond single epistemological claims29 to present a comprehensive theory of consciousness emphasizing the cognitive processes involved in the maintenance of ordinary, egocentric experience as well as those involved in the evolution (or devolution) of the cognitive system into non-ordinary states of consciousness. Because it is more comprehensive, a systems approach is able to account for both the differences and similarities among mystical phenomena, as well as other neglected issues: the veridicality of mystical experiences (particularly when those experiences conflict), the role of ethical behavior as both a precursor and outcome of mystical experience,30 the of the American Academy of Religions 61 (1993): 740–1, 748.) This is certainly the contention of many mystics, and it is one I am sympathetic to myself. But again, resolving issues among scholars, most of whom have probably not had such experiences, requires recourse to less subjective evidence. 28 See Chapter Two for a critique of constructivism. See Appendix B, pp. 255–8, for a discussion of problems with conventional essentialist approaches. 29 An example is Katz's view that "There are no pure (i.e. unmediated) experiences." Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism," 26. 30 In three overlapping essays, Katz does discuss the relationship between ethics/morality and mysticism. His goals are threefold: (1) showing that morality is an essential component of mystical traditions; (2) showing how mystical traditions understand morality to function on the mystical path (as a means of realizing the mystical goal) and as an outcome of mystical experience; and (3) showing how mystical traditions' understanding of morality is an extension of the larger religious belief system in which the mystical tradition is embedded (supporting Katz's insistence on the conservative character of mystical traditions and experience). This important analysis, however, fails to take into account the existence of a universal level of cognitive functioning and the ways in which ethical attitudes and actions may affect the mind at this cognitive level (independently of the traditions' selfunderstanding). See Steven T. Katz, "Ethics and Mysticism," in Foundations of Ethics, ed. Leroy S. Rouner (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), introduction 17 relationship between visionary and introvertive experiences,31 and perhaps most importantly for this book, the manner in which practices and doctrines affect and transform consciousness. In general, systems theory supplies a more sophisticated and nuanced basis for interpreting the nature of mystical experience as well as the processes leading up to that experience. Adjudicating epistemological/psychological models raises an additional problem. Mystical traditions often have psychological theories of their own. It might be argued that the interpretation of mysticism is better founded on the traditions' own explanations of what mystical transformation and experience involve. A religious tradition's own psychology may be quite sophisticated, and it may even be right—Patañjali≤ explanation of meditation may also be the most accurate explanation of meditation. However, the concern here is general theory about mysticism. Approaching mysticism from a sectarian, confessional perspective is difficult to reconcile with such a concern. According to Wesley Wildman and Leslie Brothers, sectarian accounts are "too narrow in scope, limited by the usually unexamined convictions of the group, uninformed by outside experts, and oblivious to neurological consideration."32 I would emphasize that the very attempt to understand mystical transformation across traditions indicates the need for an explanatory framework outside the traditions themselves.33 184–202; Steven T. Katz, "Ethics and Mysticism in Eastern Mystical Traditions," Religious Studies 28 (1992): 253–67; Steven T. Katz, "Mysticism and Ethics in Western Mystical Traditions," Religious Studies 28 (1992): 407–423. 31 One way of avoiding this issue is simply to limit the term mysticism to a specific type of experience. This strategy may be necessary at a preliminary stage of investigation, but it is ultimately unsatisfactory because it leaves unexplained a wide range of phenomena that are clearly mystical in nature. 32 Wesley J. Wildman and Leslie A. Brothers, "A Neuropsychological-Semiotic Model of Religious Experiences," in Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, eds. Robert John Russell, Nancy Murphy, Theo C. Meyering, and Michael A. Arbib (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory; Berkeley: Center for Theology and Natural Science, Graduate Theological Union, 1999), 396. See also Agehananda Bharati, The Light at the Center: Context and Pretext of Modern Mysticism (Santa Barbara: Ross-Erikson, Inc., 1976), 114–5. 33 Of course, it is possible to interpret all traditions according to the belief system of one of them (e.g., using Buddhism to interpret Christian mysticism or vice versa), but such an approach would still be subject to the problems raised by Wildman and Brothers. These comments do not necessarily apply to explanations of mysticism that are merely theologically inspired, i.e., explanations that use a tradition's own theological 18 chapter one Sectarian/theological explanations of mysticism pose an additional problem. A religious tradition's own theories are of limited usefulness because the evolutionary pressure operative within mystical traditions selects for what is soteriologically effective over what is true. This does not mean that mystical explanations are necessarily wrong. Rather, it means that their veridical status becomes more problematic because, on the level that matters (i.e., transformative value), it is irrelevant. This is not contradicted by the fact that believers themselves maintain that the doctrines of their traditions are true. Ironically, soteriological effectiveness is enhanced (at least up to a certain point) if this is the case, i.e., if the believer really believes the doctrines, cosmologies, etc. of her tradition are literal fact. Part of the soteriological effectiveness of doctrines depends on them not being seen as merely soteriologically effective.34 In the context of modern, Western culture, sectarian explanations may be of limited value at the spiritual level as well. Though mystical experience may ultimately transcend historical and cultural context, mystical doctrine in its traditional form is often couched in archaic language that tends to presume a religious worldview historically and culturally foreign to the modern person. Accessing these traditions as sources of spiritual guidance and inspiration therefore becomes problematic. Soteriological effectiveness may turn out to depend on translating the traditions into more modern—and therefore intelligible—language and concepts. Harry Hunt seems to be saying much the same thing when he states that if the higher spiritual traditions of humanity might actually refer to something important and thus need to be preserved and carried forward in some fashion within our predominantly scientific and utilitarian civilization, then some sort of account of how they could occur as an expression of the structure of the human mind will be necessary.35 and/or soteriological self-understanding as a resource for theorizing about mysticism but translate the tradition's terminology and concepts into more generic, nonconfessional language. Two examples are Robert Forman's interpretation of mystical awakening as a process of "forgetting" (based on Eckhart) and Sallie King's "Buddhistphenomenological" approach that sees "mystical experience . . . [as] a form of awareness in which the experiential sense of a separate subject and object is not present." King, "Two Epistemological Models," 273. See 270ff. for her full presentation of this theory. 34 At more advanced stages on the path this is not the case. At some point, knowing the Real requires transcending all doctrinal formulations, simply because the Real itself transcends them. 35 Hunt, On the Nature of Consciousness, 219. introduction 19 I would add, "human mind" as understood from a modern scientific perspective, since it is "science [that] provides the voice of authority in our culture to an extent that is matched by no other human practice and institution."36 Systems theory is valuable as a theoretical tool because it addresses these problems. It bridges the gap between worldviews by making spiritually intelligible the doctrines and practices of mystical traditions in the context of a modern, scientific discourse. It addresses the question: how do mystical doctrines and practices actually function to change people, and by extension, why are such doctrines/practices necessary for psychological and spiritual maturation? Exploring these questions from a systems perspective has direct implications for anyone trying to integrate mystical values and practices into their lives. Mystical Pluralism Compared to other Essentialist Approaches to Mysticism The mystical pluralist thesis outlined here is in many ways a refinement or elaboration of the theories of other scholars. The idea that mystical traditions are similar in some essential and important way is obviously not new, and neither is the description of this commonality in terms of common transformative processes. In the latter case, however, a theorist's concern with process is not necessarily elaborated into a general theory of mysticism or related to a close analysis of mystical sources.37 This book contributes to the discourse, then, not only by depicting the commonality of mystical traditions in terms of common transformative processes, but by (1) developing this idea into a comprehensive theory of mysticism, (2) supporting and illustrating the theory through a close analysis of two mystical traditions, and (3) situating the theory within the broader philosophical discourse on mysticism.38 That said, a brief discussion of related, essen- 36 Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), xvii. 37 Daniel Brown's work is a notable exception to this remark. See his essay "The Stages of Meditation in Cross-Cultural Perspective," in Transformations of Consciousness: Traditional and Contemplative Perspectives on Development, Ken Wilber, J. Engler, and D.P. Brown (Boston: Shambhala, 1986), 219–84. 38 Much of the theory on the transformative nature of mystical processes has 20 chapter one tialist approaches is helpful in order to illustrate some of the specific ways a systems-based mystical pluralism diverges from those approaches and/or extends, refines, or corrects their interpretations of mysticism. Mystical Pluralism and Epistemological Essentialist Approaches The central epistemological contention of mystical pluralism is that mystical experiences are encounters with the Real. In most cases, these encounters are conceptually mediated. Mystical pluralism, then, combines epistemological essentialism with a moderate form of constructivism ("moderate" because I would argue that unmediated experience is possible and in some cases realized). Mystical experiences have an object that impacts the mystic's consciousness and that conveys information. This epistemological claim plays a central role in explaining the mystical data. The constructivist element of mystical pluralism explains the heterogeneity of mystical experiences. Epistemological essentialism, on the other hand, accounts for aspects of mystical experiences that pure constructivism is unable to explain: phenomenological similarities across mystical traditions, novelty, and the perception of epistemic and soteriological value.39 If mystical experiences have a common referent (the Real) then phenomenological similarity, novelty, etc. make sense. Though the experience of this object may be (and usually is) mediated, it still conveys information (in most cases, symbolically represented) to the mystic. been developed by transpersonal psychologists and consequently ignored by philosophers of mysticism. 39 Some scholars (constructivists in particular) would reject the contention that mystical experiences are ever similar across traditions or that the content of mystical experiences ever includes novel aspects. Subsequent chapters, however, will provide persuasive evidence that the data from mystical traditions supports both claims. Regarding the last two aspects of the data in the list above—veridicality and soteriological value in mystical experiences—it is a fact that mystics at least claim that their experiences have value in both these senses. In other words, the content of mystical experiences is perceived as conveying a deeper understanding of the true nature of things. (See Byrne, "Mysticism, Identity, and Realism," 241; Wainwright, Mysticism: A Study, xii–xiii.) A sense of salvational value is often associated with the experiences as well (though for Christian mystics, this sense conflicts with orthodox Christian theology). Sometimes those around the mystic come to the same conclusion (either consciously or unconsciously) about the value of the mystic's experiences, i.e., the mystic's behavior seems to indicate she has some type of 'privileged access' to the Real as construed by the tradition. (See Hick, Interpretation of Religion, 301–2.) The impression of veridicality and soteriological value may be false, but it is still an aspect of the data to be taken seriously and explained. introduction 21 A number of scholars (e.g., John Hick, Michael Stoeber, and Peter Byrne)40 more or less share the same epistemological outlook. Hick, Stoeber, Byrne and myself agree that mystical experiences are encounters with the Real. Beyond this basic and most important point, our epistemological views vary somewhat. While I would argue that unmediated experiences are experientially possible (however rare they may be), Hick and Stoeber maintain that the mystic's encounter with the Real is always mediated.41 Stoeber would make the additional argument that information conveyed by the Real influences the form of the concepts mediating the mystic's experiences. In other words, even though the mystic's experiences are always mediated by concepts, those concepts are partially formed based on information from the Real (and not just from the mystic's cultural and religious conditioning). From this perspective, the epistemic value of mystical experiences derives from conceptual mediation, not in spite of it. Both Hick's theory and Stoeber's are discussed in detail below.42 Here it need only be noted that a common epistemological thesis may be elaborated into somewhat different theories. For example, though Hick, Stoeber, and myself share important epistemological views, we come to significantly different conclusions regarding the individual's experiential potential and (in the case of Stoeber) the developmental relationship between theistic and monistic experiences. In addition, the mystical pluralist theory advocated here shows in more explicit terms (compared to Hick and Stoeber's approaches) how mystical doctrines and practices bring about mystical states of consciousness. Mystical Pluralism and Process-oriented Approaches The mystical pluralist analysis of mysticism emphasizes transformative processes (as opposed to just doctrines and/or the phenomenological 40 Michael Stoeber, "Constructivist Epistemologies of Mysticism: A Critique and a Revision," Religious Studies 28/1 (1992): 108, 114; Byrne, "Mysticism, Identity, and Realism," 240–1. See also Donald Evans, "Can Philosophers Limit What Mystics Can Do? A Critique of Steven Katz," Religious Studies 25 (1989): 58–9; James Price, "The Objectivity of Mystical Truth Claims," The Thomist 49 (1985): 97. 41 Byrne agrees, though he does not stress the point. His primary concern is to show that an ecumenical interpretation of mysticism does not require the claim that the experiential content of mystical experiences is universally identical (especially since, according to him, this phenomenological essentialist thesis is wrong). 42 See Appendix B, pp. 263–6, for additional information on Stoeber's approach to mysticism. 22 chapter one content of experiences) and compares mystical traditions in terms of these processes. A concern with process is to some degree reflected in the approaches of both Hick and Stoeber.43 For Hick, salvation is a process (i.e., a transformation from self-centeredness to Realitycenteredness) common to diverse religious traditions. An explicit emphasis on process is also reflected in the philosophical analyses of James Price, John Apczyski, and Robert Forman. Price presents a theory of mysticism based on Bernard Lonergan's concept of interiority that shifts the focus of analysis away from "the object or content of consciousness" to "the operations of consciousness."44 According to Price, "this shift . . . is what makes possible a critically grounded, cross-cultural analysis of mysticism."45 Inspired by Polanyi, Apczyski describes mysticism as a "breaking out" from ordinary "human integrative powers" toward realizing "the tacit ground of all our knowledge."46 Forman emphasizes process in the context of a comparative/ typological approach to mysticism. He argues that diverse mystical traditions promote a type of "forgetting" or "emptying" of consciousness potentially leading to a "pure consciousness event" (PCE)47 and/or the "dualistic mystical state" (DMS).48 The PCE in particular is unconditioned, contentless,49 and phenomenologically identical across mystical traditions.50 A process-oriented approach is also central to transpersonal analyses of mystical experience. Theorists such as Daniel Brown, Arthur 43 Stoeber, Theo-Monistic Mysticism, 60. James Price, "Typologies and the Cross-Cultural Analysis of Mysticism: A Critique," in Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J., eds. Timothy P. Fallon, S.J. and Philip Boo Riley (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 185. 45 Ibid. 46 John V. Apczyski, "Mysticism and Epistemology," Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 14/2 (1985): 202. 47 Robert K.C. Forman, "Introduction: Mysticism, Constructivism, and Forgetting," in The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy, ed. Robert K.C. Forman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 8–9. 48 Robert K.C. Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999), 150–1. 49 In philosophical discourse on mysticism, the term 'contentless' is not used in an absolute sense (a completely contentless experience is no longer an experience), but to indicate that the experience is empty of thought, conceptual activity, sensory impressions, and discriminated objects of attention. The experience still retains some form of awareness. 50 Forman, "Introduction: Mysticism, Constructivism, and Forgetting," 39; L. Short, "Mysticism, Mediation, and the Non-Linguistic," 660. 44 introduction 23 Deikman, Ken Wilber, Charles Tart, and Allan Combs all understand mysticism as means of deconstructing ordinary cognitive structures in order to provoke cognitive transformation.51 Wilber, Tart, and Combs explicitly relate this view to systems theory. As Combs explains (using the terminology of chaos theory), if a large enough portion of the elements which form either a state or structure of consciousness are altered, the entire system can be upended and sent looking for a new attractor—a new stable pattern. Here in a nutshell is the process that underlies many techniques for personal and spiritual growth.52 This same theme is reflected in Combs' discussion of catabolic processes, as well as Deikman's description of cognitive deautomization and the cultivation of a "receptive mode" of consciousness through meditative practice.53 These approaches share with mystical pluralism an emphasis on analyzing and comparing mystical traditions in terms of transformative processes and the assertion that mystical processes are similar across traditions. Beyond these common themes, however, process-oriented theories of mysticism may vary considerably, depending on how each answers (or ignores) questions like: What is the nature of mystical processes? What is the nature of the state(s) of consciousness these processes lead to? What is the cognitive status of that state? How do mystical doctrines and practices function to generate such processes? Mystical pluralist responses to these questions are in some cases quite distinct from those of other processoriented approaches. Mystical pluralism is most similar to the systems approaches of certain transpersonal psychologists. However, it tends to go beyond 51 See Charles T. Tart, States of Consciousness (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1975), 70ff.; Brown, "Stages of Meditation," 250–1. See also John Collins, Mysticism and New Paradigm Psychology (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1991), 238. 52 Combs, Radiance of Being, 61. See also Allan Combs, "The Evolution of Consciousness: A Theory of Historical and Personal Transformation," World Futures 38 (1993): 57. 53 Combs, Radiance of Being, 228–32, 251; Combs, "Evolution of Consciousness," 57–8; Arthur J. Deikman, "Deautomatization and the Mystic Experience," in Understanding Mysticism, ed. Richard Woods (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1980), 247–8, 256, 258–9. On Deikman's understanding of the "action mode" vs. "receptive mode" of consciousness, see Paul D. Tyson, "A General Systems Theory Approach to Consciousness, Attention, and Meditation," The Psychological Record 32 (1982): 492. 24 chapter one transpersonal analyses by specifying in precise terms how mystical doctrines and practices of mystical traditions function to effect change. For example, I agree with Wilber that growth involves the "letting go" or "breaking-up" of an old structure.54 But what is the nature of this structure? How is it maintained and reinforced in the context of ordinary experience, and how exactly do mystical practices "break it up"? The systems analysis in this book refines this insight by explaining in more explicit terms how mystical paths destabilize cognitive structures and by relating this analysis to issues raised in current philosophical discussions of mysticism. Mystical Pluralism and John Hick's Pluralism As indicated above, mystical pluralism parallels John Hick's pluralist interpretation of religion in several important respects. First, like Hick's pluralism, mystical pluralism affirms that mystical traditions are therapeutically transformative; mystical traditions function to elicit an experiential encounter with the Real.55 Second, Hick's theory, like my own, is essentialist in both the epistemological and the therapeutic/soteriological sense. On the epistemological level, Hick maintains that there is one Real that is experienced differently depending on the mediating effects of the believer's tradition and historical/cultural context.56 On the soteriological level, Hick asserts that each tradition engages transformative processes marked by a decrease in self-centeredness and an existential attunement to the Real. Hick considers such transformation to be in fact the "function" of religion.57 54 See Ken Wilber, "The Spectrum of Development," in Transformations of Consciousness: Traditional and Contemplative Perspectives on Development, Ken Wilber, J. Engler, and D.P. Brown (Boston: Shambhala, 1986), 80–1, 154. 55 The systems approach presented here does privilege the veridical status of certain doctrinal systems over others. However, it also maintains that doctrines matter only to the extent that they support transformation, not according to how accurately they describe Reality. From a systems perspective, the sole criterion for evaluating traditions is therapeutic/soteriological. Of course, this may provide grounds for arguing that some traditions (or maybe even one tradition) are more therapeutic than others. However, with respect to Dzogchen and German mysticism (and, I suspect, mystical traditions in general) it supports an inclusivist conclusion: different systems of belief and practice are equally transformative. For Hick's reflections on the comparative soteriological value of religious traditions, see Hick, Interpretation of Religion, 301–7. 56 Hick, Interpretation of Religion, 14–5, 245. 57 Ibid., 14. See also 240. introduction 25 Third, the criterion Hick uses for evaluating traditions is transformative/soteriological. Since, according to Hick, no substantive predications can legitimately be applied to the noumenal, ineffable Real,58 the truthfulness of a tradition cannot be gauged by the correspondence of its doctrines with Reality. Rather, "the 'truthfulness' of each tradition is shown by its soteriological effectiveness."59 This of course implies that soteriological effectiveness is independent of the veridicality of doctrinal claims (a point Hick makes explicitly in the context of myth).60 It is not, however, independent of behavior. For Hick, a soteriological "efficacy in leading humans from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness [is] most readily observable by growth in love and compassion."61 Given these correspondences, the central claims of Hick's pluralist theory of religions and mystical pluralism are for the most part identical. For both Hick and myself, mystical traditions (or in Hick's case, religious traditions) are authentic responses to Reality, and the essence of this response is the dissolution of self-centeredness expressed as spontaneous, compassionate behavior toward others. A systemsbased mystical pluralism may be distinguished from Hick's approach in the sense that it makes possible a more explicit account of how the dissolution of self/ego takes place. In this respect, systems theory fills a gap in Hick's pluralism. However, the purpose of this systems approach is to support the pluralist thesis. From this perspective, mystical pluralism may be viewed as a refinement and elaboration of Hick's interpretation of religions. One of the few specific points of disagreement between Hick and myself concerns his insistence that the Real an sich is always and necessarily unknowable. Like Steven Katz,62 Hick maintains that "we always perceive the transcendent through the lens of a particular religious culture with its distinctive set of concepts, myths, historical exemplars and devotional or 58 Ibid., 239, 246–7. Ibid., 248. See also 14; Ward, "Truth and the Diversity of Religions," 11. 60 Hick, Interpretation of Religion, 248. Ward disagrees, but his arguments are unconvincing. See Ward, "Truth and the Diversity of Religions," 14. 61 Ward, "Truth and the Diversity of Religions," 11. See Hick, Interpretation of Religion, 14. 62 In fact, the agreement is partial. Both Hick and Katz maintain that mystical experience is conditioned. Hick, however, makes the additional claim that this conditioned experience has as its "object" the transcendent Real. Katz implies that mystical experiences do have an object(s), but avoids the problem of the ontological status or nature of this object. 59 26 chapter one meditational techniques."63 While I agree that this is true for most experience, even most mystical experience, a systems approach suggests that the transformative processes initiated by mystical practices may culminate in an unconditioned, unmediated experience of the Real. Contra Hick, the noumenal Real can be known.64 Robert Forman's Perennial Psychology In comparing mystical pluralism with other essentialist approaches to mysticism, the problematic nature of some forms of essentialism deserves emphasis. These problems reinforce the need for essentialist theories of mysticism that are more refined and sophisticated in their formulation of interpretive frameworks and in their analyses of mystical data. Here I turn to a closer examination of Robert Forman's work on mysticism in order to illustrate some of these problems.65 I focus on Forman not because his approach is significantly more problematic than others, but because he has become one of the strongest voices in current philosophical discourse on mysticism. Forman's analysis of mysticism is primarily concerned with the PCE (pure consciousness event), though in his more recent work he has broadened his analysis to include the DMS (dualistic mystical state). As its name suggests, the PCE is a state of pure awareness or consciousness:66 a momentary experience of empty, interiorized awareness with no sensory, affective, or epistemic content beyond the knowledge of being aware itself.67 Its lack of content entails that it is also meaningless. According to Forman, whatever meaning the 63 Hick, Interpretation of Religion, 8. See also 166. Hick's insistence that the noumenal Real is unknowable may be partially based on the concern that direct knowledge/experience of the Real would constitute normative criteria for evaluating the veridicality of religious doctrines, which would in turn undermine pluralism's inclusivism. However, I would argue that we can admit that some religious doctrinal systems are more true than others without contradicting the thesis that all traditions are, potentially at least, equally soteriologically effective. 65 See Appendix B, pp. 255–8, for a discussion of the problems with other essentialist approaches. 66 Robert K.C. Forman, "Samàdhi and Peter Wimsey: Mysticism, Reading and Bruce Janz," Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 25/2 (1996): 202, 206–7. 67 Forman describes this as "knowledge-by-identity," as opposed to William James' "knowledge-by-acquaintance" and "knowledge-about." See Robert K.C. Forman, "Introduction: Mystical Consciousness, the Innate Capacity, and the Perennial Psychology," in The Innate Capacity: Mysticism, Psychology, and Philosophy, ed. Robert K.C. Forman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 20–2. 64 introduction 27 PCE has is derived solely from "sociolinguistic factors" imposed on the experience after it has occurred.68 Forman's DMS is dualistic in the sense that two distinct cognitive modes are maintained simultaneously. On the one hand, the intentional processes and experiences of ordinary consciousness continue unchanged. At the same time, ordinary experience is accompanied by an unchanging and permanent interior silence—a "witness" consciousness of pure awareness that remains detached and uninvolved with the sensations, perceptions, and thoughts of intentional consciousness. Forman is careful to emphasize that his discussion of the PCE and DMS is not intended to exhaust the full range of experiences that may be considered mystical. The PCE in particular he considers a rudimentary form of mystical experience, though he suggests it may "indicate certain features of other more complex (perhaps more advanced) mystical phenomena."69 Rudimentary or not, Forman believes that both the PCE and DMS are properly mystical and that his analysis of both plays an important role in understanding mysticism. Forman's typology is problematic. Specifically, the phenomenological content of the PCE and DMS does not seem to match the descriptions of mystical experiences in mystical texts. The PCE and DMS are nothing like the ecstatic, meaning-filled, and life-transforming experiences described by mystics.70 Forman describes his own experience of a PCE as so "unremarkable" that it was hardly noticeable.71 His ongoing experience of the DMS seems to have had only subtle effects on his intellectual and emotional life or the quality of his overall state of being.72 Reading Forman's descriptions of both experiences, one can't help but wonder: what's the point?73 The PCE and DMS experiences seem trivial; mystical experiences as described in traditional sources appear anything but trivial. 68 Short, "Mysticism, Mediation, and the Non-Linguistic," 670. Forman, "Introduction: Mysticism, Constructivism, and Forgetting," 8–9. 70 See, for example, Stoeber's description of monistic mystical experiences in his Theo-Monistic Mysticism (24). W.T. Stace likewise argues that mystical experiences are characterized by both positive qualities (such as creativity, activity, and even personality) and negative qualities (impersonality, inactivity, stasis). See Philip Almond's remarks on this aspect of Stace's thought, in Philip C. Almond, Mystical Experience and Religious Doctrine: An Investigation of the Study of Mysticism in World Religions (New York: Mouton Publishers, 1982), 76. 71 Forman, "Introduction: Mysticism, Constructivism, and Forgetting," 28. 72 Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness, 144–5. 73 This comment does not necessarily apply to the passages he quotes from traditional mystical sources. 69 28 chapter one Forman does attempt to support his classifications with concrete evidence. He cites specific passages from important mystical sources. In addition, he describes his own experience of the PCE and DMS as well as the experiences of several persons he has interviewed. Forman's experiences, and the experiences of those he interviews, seem to confirm that there are experiences that phenomenologically correspond with Forman's descriptions of the PCE and DMS. The problem, however, is the continued discrepancy between the PCE and DMS and the mystical experiences described in traditional, authoritative sources. Mystical texts may refer to "pure consciousness"74 experiences, but it is by no means clear that the "pure consciousness" of the texts is identical to the "pure consciousness" of a PCE. Forman, for example, associates the pure awareness of the DMS with the àtman,75 but in the Upanißads àtman is also identified with Brahman, i.e., absolute Being, Consciousness, and Bliss (sat-citananda). In other words, "pure awareness" in the Upanißads76 is the experience of àtman/Brahman or Being/Consciousness/Bliss and clearly has affective and semantic dimensions far removed from either the DMS or the PCE.77 This interpretation is supported by the fact that the tradition itself views pure consciousness as a solution to fundamental problems of the human predicament. Samàdhi, at least in Advaita Vedanta, is associated with realizing/knowing the ontological Real as the foundation and source of the illusory, phenomenal world (not just the self ). It involves experientially understanding the illusory nature and source of all phenomenal appearances, freedom from all forms of attachment, states of bliss, etc. Ultimately, according to the tradition, it frees one from endless cycles of painful rebirth in saásàra. Regardless of the veridicality of such claims, they suggest that the experience of samàdhi is far richer and more profound than 74 Forman, "Samàdhi," 202. Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness, 144. Elsewhere Forman identifies an "innate capacity" for PCEs with consciousness itself and the àtman. See Forman, "Introduction: Mystical Consciousness, the Innate Capacity, and the Perennial Psychology," 8, 13. 76 Strictly speaking, I should say "some passages" in the Upanißads. Though certain themes stand out as central to Upanißadic thought, the philosophy of the Upanißads is neither consistent nor systematic. 77 Forman could argue that the identification of àtman with Brahman reflects postexperiential interpretation with no correspondence to the phenomenological content of the experience. This interpretation, however, would seem inconsistent with his hermeneutical approach in other contexts (and designed more to confirm his presuppositions than do justice to the data). 75 introduction 29 Forman's PCE. Forman might argue that the PCE is a preparatory stage of experience on the way to this more advanced Upanißadic experience. This may be true, but if so, it needs to be emphasized that it is very rudimenatary and not equatable with àtman/Brahman. Similar problems are raised by Forman's identification of the PCE and the buddha-nature (tathàgatagarbha).78 In East Asian sources especially, the buddha-nature is identified with Ultimate Reality itself (the dharmakàya) and constitutes the essence or true nature of phenomena. Whatever advanced mystical state may be associated with experiencing the buddha-nature, it seems far removed from the localized, intrinsically meaningless PCE. Forman's use of Buddhist sources is problematic in other ways. One of Forman's informants refers to the Heart Sùtra's account of emptiness as an example of a PCE.79 Forman apparently agrees. From this perspective, the negations listed in the text are considered negations of the contents of consciousness, describing a state of consciousness empty of all content. Understanding the concept of emptiness—quintessentially expressed in the Heart Sùtra—has been a problem for both Buddhists and scholars. (From the Mahàyàna perspective, to truly understand emptiness is to be enlightened, so it may be that almost no one understands it.) The difficulties notwithstanding, it is unlikely that the text is describing an interiorized state of pure consciousness. Though emptiness does correspond with a non-conceptual state of consciousness, this state is characterized by insight into the true nature of phenomena (i.e., phenomena are known as lacking inherent existence) and automatic, unconditional compassion for all sentient beings. In other words, the realization of emptiness has an epistemic and ethical value and that the PCE lacks. The problems with Forman's understanding of emptiness are compounded by a consideration of Mahàyàna Buddhism's historical emergence. Mahàyàna Buddhism partially originated as a reaction against the Nikàya schools of Buddhism. Its central philosophical teaching of emptiness arose as a soteriological corrective to the dualism inherent in the Buddhist paths of the Nikàya schools. In Nikàya, saásàra and nirvà»à are distinct and polarized. The path is essentially defined 78 This is implied by Forman's identification of the "innate capacity" (pure consciousness) with the buddha-nature. See Forman, "Introduction: Mystical Consciousness, the Innate Capacity, and the Perennial Psychology," 9–10. 79 Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness, 29–30. 30 chapter one as escaping saásàra in order to realize nirvà»à. To reach the goal the practitioner has to renounce the du˙kha-pervaded world. Reacting against this approach, emptiness expresses the insight that the dualism inherent in Nikàya Buddhism negates the possibility of experiencing the goal—'pushing away' anything in order to be free is itself a form of bondage. Because nirvà»à is nondual (a state in which there is no one going anywhere), the conceptual framework of 'saásàra vs. nirvà»à' and 'practitioner' on the way to a 'goal' thematizes experience in a way that makes nirvà»à impossible to realize. And while this may indeed be non-conceptual (Nàgàrjuna insists as much), it has nothing to do with the presence or absence of sensation or a lack of involvement in the world. From the perspective of the outside observer, the bodhisattva "coursing in the perfection of wisdom" (i.e., cognizing emptiness) is still "in the world" and actively engaged in spontaneous and uncontrived compassionate service. For the bodhisattva herself, however, there is no "self," "world," or "service" being conceptualized—there is no one going anywhere doing anything at all.80 Emptiness in Forman's sense is conditioned, limited to an interior and momentary state of consciousness, and so is fundamentally incommensurable with the Mahàyàna understanding of emptiness. Forman's identification of the DMS with the experience of samàdhi in Hui Neng's Ch'an involves similar discrepancies. Again, the similarities between the accounts are outweighed by the fact that—unlike the DMS—Hui Neng's samàdhi effects a radical shift in the practitioner's state of being. According to Hui Neng, samàdhi is liberation:81 the end of attachment and suffering. The effects of the DMS on consciousness are insignificant in comparison. If the PCE and DMS are that different from the mystical experiences described in the texts, is it legitimate to consider them mystical? Forman would say yes, emphasizing that the PCE is only one type of mystical experience, less complex because of its rudimentary nature. Forman might also argue that the apparent differences between the PCE, the DMS, and the experiences described in the texts reflect 80 This description could be reconciled to Forman's DMS, and Forman himself suggests a connection between the DMS and ≤ùnyatà. (Ibid., 144) But again, the DMS lacks the epistemic and ethical dimensions associated with the realization of emptiness. 81 See Forman's