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LSS Music Room
Sunday, September 15, 2013
5th Grade Chorus
The 5th Grade Chorus has gotten off to a great start with approximately 80 members. Children who wish to belong to both band and chorus, meet Wednesday mornings from 10:15 to 10:40 (they are presently our Alto section). The rest of the chorus meet on Thursday afternoons from 2:00 - 2:45 in the gym. We have begun learning our Holiday Concert music and they are making tremendous progress. The entire fifth grade chorus has been invited to sing at the American Cancer Society "Making Strides Against Breast Cancer" on Sunday morning October 6th. Please fill out the permission slip sent home with the children.
Fifth Grade News
Have you observed your children doing the "cup" game?? This game has been around for many, many years however, it was made famous be the movie "Pitch Perfect". It is a challenging rhythmic game that our fifth graders are mastering. I have discouraged them from doing this at home with a cup full of liquid:) We are also learning to read 2-pt music (soprano and alto) and beginning our study on our National Anthem.
Fourth Grade News
Our fourth graders have been learning a Liberian "Welcome Song" titled "Funga Alaphia". We incorporated a percussion ensemble to accompany the piece along with singing and dancing. We are also learning various rhythm patterns using half, quarter, eighth notes and quarter rests. We wrote a "name" composition and performed it in Rondo Form. Soon we will begin our study on the Instruments of the Orchestra.
Wednesday, September 4, 2013
Third Grade News
Welcome to our LSS Third graders. We have had a wonderful start and are learning to become incredible musicians. We are learning the lines and spaces of the Treble Clef in preparation to receiving recorders in January. We have been performing singing games and learning new songs for our March concerts.
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Somewhere far north of here, in the land of Canada, there is an engineer who wants to share her life with you. She takes the things that happen to her and turns them into colorful, often hilarious sometimes fantastical musings and anecdotes. Allow me to introduce you to the charm and humor of Wasted Talent.
I am also a female engineer, though not Canadian, so I find a lot of Angela Melick's experiences relatable or informative. If you're not an engineer or someone who's ever studied the subject, there's still a lot to enjoy. There are occasional jokes that rely on familiarity with technical terms or practices, but the author steers away from inaccessible humor. Often there's enough context to understand the joke, possibly while learning something new, or the sheer absurdity might be funny and enjoyable on its own.
Wasted Talent covers plenty of subjects outside of engineering. This gives me confidence that non-engineers can enjoy it, because the comics about subjects outside my purview are still accessible to me. I have no experience mountainbiking, but I do enjoy these comics about it.
Reading through every individual comic is not necessary; each installment can typically stand on its own. Since this is a journal comic there's no need to be concerned about spoilers if you jump in at a random point. If you do read the whole archive from the beginning, you can watch the author grow as an artist, not just in skill but also in confidence. The early comics can be pretty hit-and-miss, but there are some gems in there that, for me, make the experience worth it.
If you'd prefer to start reading at a point where the artwork is more solidified, the transition from black and white to color is a pretty good place.
One thing I enjoy about Wasted Talent is the way that Melick and her friends seem to just take ideas and run with them. Sometimes these are just literal interpretations of common phrases of speech, sometimes they are wild dreams for future technologies, and sometimes they are more practical. Not useful in any way, just things that are perfectly achievable with what's available.
And, given that this comic is about events from Melick's life, there are lots of opportunities to vicariously experience the cool, strange or amusing things that happen to her. Sometimes there's a comic about an event that I only heard about, but which Melick actually got to experience. For instance, this bit about when Stephen Colbert was in Vancouver for the Olympics.
Other times the comics depict things that are more low-key, the kinds of chance encounters and random events that you can't control, encourage or predict. This run-in with a strange old man sticks with me, almost as if I had met the old man myself, but I only ever read about it.
Melick gets up to plenty of silliness on her own. Plenty of fascinating things happen to her, but it's her way of looking at them that makes them shine. Reading Wasted Talent is a way not only to see her work her way through the world, but to see the world the way she sees it.
And the things that she chooses to do with her life occasionally make me fall over laughing, like the manner in which she has presented herself waking up her husband.
For me, though, the major appeal of this comic comes from the engineering. It's pretty rare for people to be both engineers and artistic, so it's not a world that I often see represented in media. After all, a convincing portrayal of a profession comes best from those who are in that profession. If engineers don't tell their own stories, then no one will.
Wasted Talent is written and drawn by Angela Melick and updates on Mondays. Fellow engineers: Enjoy reading about people like yourselves! Everyone else: Come laugh at the engineers!

subset: commoncrawl


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A number of printing products and the components will be utilized create the merchandise and to keep up with the high degree of quality. Nonetheless although A corporation provides discount pricing ensure that the banner ads will withstand factors like rain or wind. A company can maintain a top art print resolution, which will show the detail. Quality is critical to individuals that are currently seeing the banner ads. Straightforward tips like the kinds could be a measure to the advertising. Frequently made from eco friendly bamboo substance that adds a Distinctive tropical touch to screen advertisements, creating greater traffic when enjoying a significant part in conserving the entire world. Among the ways Flags that are pre printed is really on a classic flag pole waving directly near the door. This way is Ideal for places like primary where sidewalks cannot accommodate signage, 13, roads or city centers they can be raised up on this building's face.


text: Firefighters and railroad employees faced a dangerous situation on December 30, 2013, after two trains collided near the small North Dakota community of Casselton. Crude oil carried by one train ignited at the scene, causing a major fire and a massive explosion that prompted officials to recommend the evacuation of 2,000 residents of Casselton and the surrounding area due to the risk of smoke and contaminants. The accident occurred after a train loaded with grain derailed; the train carrying crude oil then struck the derailed train cars and ignited, creating 100-foot flames and causing a deafening explosion. Both trains were owned and operated by BNSF Railway, a major carrier in the area. Litigation May Result from Collision While no injuries were immediately reported at the scene, legal action is possible due to the risk of contamination and long-term respiratory problems associated with the smoke plume. Attorneys specializing in railroad work injuries can provide representation for injured railway employees and can help them protect their legal rights in the court setting. Under the provisions of the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), railroad employees and their families can receive compensation for injuries or damages sustained as a result of negligence on the part of their employers. A FELA attorney can provide support for these workers in obtaining settlements in cases like the Casselton collision. Residents and firefighters may also wish to retain the services of a train accident attorney to protect their rights and to ensure adequate compensation for any injuries or respiratory difficulties resulting from this incident. A Pattern of Neglected Safety While the derailment and subsequent explosion near Casselton have not yet been fully investigated by authorities, experts have warned of unsafe steel tank cars in the railroad industry for decades. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has issued warnings on five separate occasions beginning in 1991 regarding the use of the DOT-111 tanker cars used to haul crude oil across the U.S. and Canada. These railroad cars travel through numerous residential centers and populated areas. According to the NTSB, however, the DOT-111 steel tankers still on the rails today were improperly designed and can burst or split from the impact of a derailment or collision. The thin metal walls of these tanker cars can easily create a chain reaction that can cause multiple explosions from a single impact. Since each DOT-111 can hold up to 30,000 gallons, the risks associated with the use of these flawed cars can be catastrophic. To date, the NTSB has not recommended the recall of the DOT-111 steel tank cars despite numerous incidents that would seem to indicate such action is needed. Growing Oil Car Traffic Increases Risks As the focus of the energy industry turns from refining foreign oil and toward developing crude oil reserves closer to home, the amount of oil transported by railway has increased exponentially in recent years. North Dakota transports 70 percent of its oil by rail; most of this crude oil is carried in DOT-111 cars. The tragic train accident that claimed 47 lives in Lac Megantic, Quebec, in July 2013 involved DOT-111 tanker cars. An NTSB report on the 2009 fatality derailment and fire in Cherry Valley, Illinois, indicated that the "inadequate design of the DOT-111" was in large part responsible for the loss of life and extent of damage that occurred as a result of this crash. As more oil trains hit the rails, the risks of catastrophic accidents also increase. For victims of these railroad accidents, seeking competent and experienced legal representation may be the only method available to hold railway companies accountable for their negligence. Train accident lawyers can even the playing field for injured railroad employees, firefighters and residents affected by these accidents and can provide the financial motivation needed to make real change in the railroad industry. This can increase the safety of railway workers, public safety officials and others in the path of these dangerous oil trains.


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Feel that icy chill in the air? It can only mean one thing: there's a hateful hurricane approaching and you can blame it on 'RuPaul's Drag Race' season six winner, Bianca Del Rio.
The drag queen (real name Roy Haylock) is headed to Australia to unleash hell on everyone and everything in her path once again, with a whole new season of 'Drag Race' queens to rip to shreds.
"I hate them all. For me, it all ends up becoming like a live comment section, there's so much to discuss," Bianca says. "I try not to judge the girls just based on the show, I get to meet them in person as well and that's usually where the real shade comes from! Once I know you, it's over."
"People say to me 'do you just pick on the ones that have a sense of humour?' and I'm like 'no... No one is safe'."Bianca's first comedy show post-'Drag Race', 'Rolodex Of Hate', was a hit around the country and the world. She's gone on to star in her own film called 'Hurricane Bianca' and recorded a comedy special for Vimeo, among an impressive list of other accomplishments.
Bianca also reveals an exciting new project she's preparing: a book, with the help of questions sent into her by fans. "It's going to be Bianca giving advice, which is never a good thing. I don't want to write a book about myself, I don't have some sad story, no one gives a shit. I've gotten quite a few chapters done and it's been quite amusing... There are some freaks in this world, I must tell you."
"I never thought I'd be doing this," Bianca admits. "First of all I never thought I'd be a drag queen, much less a comedian. I'm the one person who's always laughing at a funeral. I never knew that was comedy, I just knew that everyone told me I was wrong, which made me a little more defiant and made me want to pursue it."
With her new stand-up show 'Blame It On Bianca Del Rio', one can only wonder what it is we're blaming her for.
"Everything. Everything is usually my fault, I must admit," she laughs, before revealing the real reason for the name.
"I always have fake titles because I usually never know what I'm going to talk about in general and things get in motion ahead of the game. "Blame it on Bianca" was what RuPaul said every time I was on the runway [during 'Drag Race']. I leave it as vague as possible because it gives me the open opportunity to discuss everything."
Bianca says there's always an air of uncertainty when it comes to her craft because of the fine line between a joke and the truth. She's dealt with opinions from both sides but says that when it comes down to it, she's not out to please anyone.
"There's tonnes of people that will say 'I don't like her, I don't like what she has to say' and that's totally fine with me because I'm a 42-year-old man who couldn't give a f***. You don't have to like me. You're going to die anyway."
'Blame It On Bianca Del Rio' looks like it's going to be just as raucous and hysterical as any of her shows but the drag queen comic with the heart of gold wants a little more than to just make people laugh.
"We have so much going on [in the world] that's just absolutely positively insane so you can come and laugh for an hour and realise things are not that bad and that we're better in numbers. It's surprising what you can learn from a clown drag queen!"
9 November – Enmore Theatre (Sydney)
10 November – Queensland Performing Arts Centre
11 November – Comedy Theatre (Melbourne)
13 November – Canberra Theatre Centre
14 November – Thebarton Theatre (Adelaide)
15 November – Astor Theatre (Perth)
Kailei Ginman
What do you do in your day-to-day life? I drink way too much coffee, pat way too many dogs and cats on the street, try and be more of a socially responsible human with each day... and lots of Netflix/time spent goofing around with my partner. I also just bought a fixie so I need to learn how to ride it now that warmer weather is coming.Read more:


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I'm not sure what I think about this yet. What do you think?
"The church, in short, has a role to play only here and now; so if it wants a role model for its operations, it should imitate the kingdom's present, nonjudgmental way of doing business, not its final one. It definitely should not attempt, in this world, to do the kind of sorting out that the kingdom so plainly refuses to do until the next. But alas, beginning right in apostolic time – indeed, beginning even in Scripture itself – excommunication has been one of the church's favorite indoor sports. Second in popularity only to jumping to conclusions about who should be given the heave-ho first. The practice of tossing out rotten types while the net is still in the water has been almost everybody's idea of a terrific way to further the kingdom. Everybody's, that is, except Jesus' — the one who put the church in the business of being fishers of men to begin with. The net result, to use an apt phrase for such ineptness, has been an operation that looks as if it is being run more by his competitors than by his partners" – Robert Capon, Kingdom, Judgment, Grace (128).


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My laptop has been messing up all day – luckily I had this pre-done so at least I can post it.
Today's outfit is for Jo. (You can get her here).
If you follow the link, you'll see I changed the color. The base dress is brown and made of heavier material, but since the pin is really for a "sew it yourself" outfit, I figure changing it is only fair. If I sewed it myself it would be different material, so…
Not that I would sew it myself. Because I don't sew.
Why does she always end up in blue? For some reason blue is just her color. I dunno.
Anyway, have a good night and happy paper dolling!


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Appeal against a visa or immigration decision
Appeal from outside the UK
You can only appeal to the tribunal if you have the legal right to appeal - you'll usually be told if you do in your decision letter.
If you've been refused a tier 1, 2, 4 or 5 visa you may be able to ask for the decision to be reviewed at an administrative review - your refusal letter will tell you if you can.
Talk to a solicitor or a immigration adviser if you're unsure whether you can appeal.
Read the guide on representing yourself if you're not going to have a legal representative.
How to appeal
You have 28 days to appeal after you get your decision. If you have to leave the country before you're allowed to appeal, you have 28 days to appeal once you've left the country.
If you apply after the deadline, you must explain why - the tribunal will decide if it can still hear your appeal.
Apply online if you can - online appeals are quicker than post or fax appeals.
|What you're appealing
|How you can apply
|A decision to refuse a human rights claim for entry clearance
|Online or by post or fax with form IAFT-6
|A human rights or protection refusal (where you can only apply after you've left the country)
|Online or by post or fax with form IAFT-7
|A decision by the Home Office to deport you as a European Economic Area (EEA) National
|Online or by post or fax with form IAFT-5
|Your application for an EEA family permit as a family member of an EEA national was refused by the Home Office under the EEA Regulations
|Online or by post or fax with form IAFT-6
|Certain decisions about applications submitted before 6 April 2015
|Online or by post or fax with the relevant form
If you're appealing by post or fax, download and fill in the relevant form. Send or fax it with copies of the documents that support your appeal to the address on the form.
Ask for an oral hearing
You can ask on your appeal form for a decision to be made either:
- just on the information in your appeal form and any documents supplied to the tribunal
- at a hearing that your representatives can attend
The tribunal can decide to have a hearing even if you do not ask for one. You'll be told if this is the case.
If the tribunal does not hold a hearing, a judge will decide your case based on your appeal form and documents.
Hearings are carried out in public. You can ask for it to be held in private or to attend by video link, but you must have a reason, for example a public hearing would put you in danger.
You can ask for a male or female judge if you think there are issues in your appeal that make it appropriate. The tribunal will decide if it can do this.
Special requirements
Contact the Customer Enquiry Unit before your hearing if any special help is needed, for example someone attending on your behalf needs wheelchair access.
Customer Enquiry Unit
Telephone: +44 (0)300 123 1711
Monday to Friday, 8.30am to 5pm
Find out about call charges
It costs:
- £80 without a hearing
- £140 with a hearing
You may not have to pay if you get legal aid.
Read the tribunal fees guidance for more information.
Contact the tribunal if you're not sure if you have to pay a fee.
First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Telephone: +44 (0)300 123 1711
Find out about call charges
How to pay
You can pay your fee with a credit or debit card when you make your appeal online or by including your details on your appeal form.
If you've already made your appeal you can also pay your fee online.


text: Hi, I was wondering if anyone would be kind enough to proofread/edit or provide some feedback regarding my introduction? Thank you! Hiroshima 8:14 AM. August 6. 1945. The day was still young, yet Japanese life had already reached full pace as it continued on its daily restless saunter. Nothing in the day's dawning gave anything away, yet soon society would be forever scarred; human history battered and bruised by the events of this very day. The monotonous clack of typewriters keys rang out through the personnel department of the East Asia Tin Works. Miss Toshiko Sasaki whispered to the girl at the next desk, "How was dinner last night?" All she got back was a cheeky grin. Typical. Meanwhile, Akihiro Takahashi, a fourteen-year-old student, stood in line with other students at school, waiting for their morning meeting to commence. They joked about the latest antics of their favourite Mr Miyagi, sharing hushed giggles as Fumiko and Yoshiko, the prettiest girls in the school, traipsed past. Just several hundred metres away, over the seven deltaic rivers dividing Hiroshima, Dr. Masakazu Fujii relaxed on the porch of his private hospital fanning through the latest edition of Osaka Asahi. As the gentle sea breeze rolled over the shore, the crashing waves and faint hints of the aromatic cherry blossoms complemented the earthy tones of his Oolong tea. At the Red Cross Hospital on the other side of Hiroshima, Dr. Terufumi Sasaki, a young man determined to make a name for himself amongst the surgical staff wheeled several blood specimens in readiness for Wassermann tests later that afternoon. Down the road, his elderly neighbour stood by her kitchen window, watching the workers across the road tearing down a house in readiness for the bomb shelter to be constructed underground. Several blocks down the main street of Hiroshima, Mamoru Yukihiro had just arrived at the Principal Agricultural Office, having just sent his two young children, Manami and Masami at the Nagisa junior school. Let us not forget the Reverend Kiyoshi Tanimoto, pausing at the door of a rich man's house in Koi, the city's western suburb. He gazed wistfully at his meagre possessions in his handcart, a reminder of a time when money was his friend – know all that had changed. Many like him had evacuated from town, unnerved by the imminent B-29 raid everyone in Hiroshima expected to suffer later that week. 8:15 AM. August 6. 1945. A flash of light. A hundred thousand people were killed by the bomb; the humble six only a handful of survivors that lived to speak for another day. Each step they bear in silence as the voices of the dead ring in their ears. They wonder why they lived when so many others died before them. In the face of death, these few have summoned the courage to live; but by doing so they have demonstrated true character. Each knows that in the act of survival, he lived a dozen lives and saw more death than he ever thought he would see. These few can never anything for granted, and neither should we. Each of them takes small moments of chance of fortuitous circumstance - an extra step taken in time, a decision to go indoors, taking the early streetcar – that spared them. At the time, none of them knew anything, but as the years go by they realise that as they say, 'a human life is heavier that the Earth itself.'


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Wednesday, October 3, 2018
The Eyeball Test And The Thousand Dollar Pills
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed a Superior Court decision overturning professional discipline imposed on two nurses who work in a correctional facility.
The Board of Nursing had found the two had violated professional standards in handling very expensive pills used to treat inmates for hepatitis C.
Twelve of the $1,000 pills had spilled onto the floor while being handled by other nurses, who placed the pills in a waste container. Authorities were notified and the two accused nurses were summoned and shook the container until the pills (and other discarded medical waste) came out.
Along with the pills came some syringes, retractable lancets, and diabetic testing strips. There was additional medical waste in the container that the twelve pills could have touched, but once all twelve pills fell out, the nurses stopped shaking the container, leaving those materials behind. No one knows—or can know—what that waste was. What is known is the sorts of things that can be found in that type of container: saturated wound dressings, items soiled with more than five milliliters of blood or other bodily fluids, items from patients on strict isolation, skin-piercing objects such as needles, disposable scissors, scalpels, and catheters, and other disposable equipment for internal use.
[Nurses] Francis and DeBenedictis wrapped the pills in a paper towel and took them to their office. There, they were met by the on-site pharmacist, and together, they looked at the pills. To the pharmacist, "there did not appear to be anything wrong with [them]"—"they looked like they came out of a bottle." This eyeball test, consistent with the five-second rule some might use to determine whether to eat food dropped on the floor, is not one that any witness testified is a professionally recognized practice...
The pills were later given to the inmate. He suffered no ill effects, but he was not told the pills had been retrieved from a medical waste container until after he had taken them. In other words, no one informed the inmate of what had happened to the pills or gave him a chance to give or deny consent or request that he receive pills not retrieved from a medical waste container.
No one—not the nurses, not the on-site pharmacist, not the head pharmacist, and not the head physician—took responsibility for deciding that the pills were fit for use. Francis, DeBenedictis, and the head physician claimed it had been one of the pharmacists, while the head pharmacist insinuated it had been the head physician. The on-site pharmacist pleaded ignorance.
A whistleblower came forward
When one of the nurses who had disposed of the pills in the waste container learned they had been retrieved and given to an inmate, she reported it to the Delaware Division of Professional Regulation. After an investigation, the State brought disciplinary proceedings against the head physician and the two nurses, and a hearing was held before an administrative hearing officer.
The charge was "unprofessional conduct."
The nurses pleaded reliance on the pharmacist and called expert witnesses to bolster the contention that the pills created no risk to the inmate.
the hearing officer concluded that, contrary to the experts' assumptions, no one examined the contents of the waste container after the pills fell out, so the container's full contents "were and are currently unknown." Because no one could say for sure what the pills may have encountered, the hearing officer found that giving them to the inmate was not a riskless endeavor...
the hearing officer found that disposing of medication that falls on the floor is an accepted standard of the nursing profession and that retrieving those pills from a sharps container and administering them to a patient violated that standard.
As to reliance, the hearing officer found that the nurses were obligated to exercise their own independent judgment.
Before the Board
In two short orders, the Board adopted the hearing officer's conclusions of law, placed the nurses on probation for ninety days, and required them to undergo training in pharmacology and nursing ethics. Despite the hearing officer's invitation for the Board to expound on the "accepted standard" that nurses are expected to follow in this sort of scenario, the Board's order simply adopted the hearing officer's recommendations and offered no further comment.
The nurses appealed to the Superior Court
The Superior Court sided with the nurses, but for a reason neither side had anticipated. After considering the three rules the nurses were found to have violated, the Superior Court concluded that each of them required the State to prove—as an essential element of its case—that the nurses' behavior had caused harm. And the court agreed with the nurses that the record supplied no basis for the hearing officer to have found that the inmate had been harmed.
The court found that proof of actual harm was not required
We...disagree with the Superior Court's apparent finding that unless improper nursing behavior creates actual harm, it is not sanctionable under any of the Nursing Board's rules. And on this record, it is plain from the testimony of the nurses' own witnesses that they engaged in conduct, in concert with others, that put the inmate patient at risk.
The nub
We start by reiterating something that is critical. Both of the nurses testified that they were trained that pills that fall on the floor must be discarded. This is not a small point. Both nurses knew that the risks of contamination from the floor alone justified disposal, and their own expert physician testified that inspecting that floor would be a crucial part of ensuring that the pills had not been contaminated.
The pills' journey did not, of course, end there. They ended up in a sharps container, and contrary to the Superior Court's view, there was evidence in the record—from the nurses' own expert—that giving a patient pills retrieved from an uninspected sharps container is risky. The nurses' expert physician made a point to caution that if pills are to be fished out of a waste container and given to a patient— setting aside, for a moment, the ethical implications—it would be "critical" to examine all of the contents of the container. His opinion that these pills were safe depended on that assumption, and the nurses do not dispute the hearing officer's finding that a full inspection of this container never occurred.
The court also rejected a "just following [pharmacist's] orders" defense. (Mike Frisch)
October 3, 2018 in Comparative Professions | Permalink | Comments (0)
Friday, February 23, 2018
No Stay For Revoked Doctor
The Delaware Superior Court denied a stipulated application for a stay of an order revoking a medical license of a doctor who
Appellant is a physician whose license was revoked by the Board of Medical Practice and Licensure for, in the words of the Hearing Officer, "enabling a criminal drug gang in Pennsylvania by providing them with a regular source of controlled substance prescriptions to be sold on the street." The physician now seeks a stay of the revocation of his license pending the results of this appeal. It is manifest on the face of his application that he has not alleged any substantial issue to be raised on the appeal. Therefore, even though the State has stipulated to a stay, the court will deny it.
The evidence
The State based its case against Dr. Hannan on his treatment of eight patients. The court need not detail the evidence relating to each patient at this point. Suffice it to say, the Board found that the "record of how these patients were treated is deplorable."
Dr. Hannan repeatedly prescribed opioid medications for patients without documenting any justification for doing so. He increased dosages even though there was no report of new symptoms or increase pain, and in at least one case ordered an increase in dosage even though he recorded that the patient reported she was doing well.
Urine drug screens frequently were negative for the opioids he was prescribing, suggesting that the patient might be diverting the medication rather than taking it.
On some occasions Dr. Hannan prescribed Oxymorphone (a drug with twice the potency of Oxycodone) without any justification being apparent from his records...
The board
Dr. Hannan's practices show a clear priority on money-making at the expense of appropriate patient care. There is a real concern for public safety.
The court noted that the doctor is now prescribing drugs in Florida
there are policy considerations which weigh heavily against granting the stay in this case. This court is reluctant to be a party to what is essentially a contrivance (albeit a lawful one) to prevent the Florida authorities from promptly learning of the Delaware Board's disciplinary action. Florida, like all states, relies in part upon information supplied by the National Practitioner Data Bank, and a stay would delay transmission of the Delaware Board's revocation to the Data Center which in turn would delay the Florida authorities from learning of that revocation. This court will not enter a stay for the sole purpose of preventing the Florida Department of Health from learning information which may (or may not be) relevant to the health and safety of the people of that state.
(Mike Frisch)
February 23, 2018 in Comparative Professions | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, January 11, 2018
Doctor Beware
A health care provider may be liable for the release of confidential patient information, according to a decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court
The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant health care provider for, inter alia, negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress in connection with the defendant's allegedly improper release of certain confidential medical records in responding to a subpoena issued in the course of a separate paternity action filed against the plaintiff. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that it was entitled to judgment on the plaintiff's negligence claims because Connecticut's common law did not recognize a cause of action against health care providers for breach of the duty of confidentiality in the course of responding to a subpoena. The trial concluded that this state had not yet recognized a common-law privilege for communications between physicians and their patients, and, accordingly, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff's negligence claims. On the plaintiff's appeal, held that, in light of applicable principles of public policy, case law from other jurisdictions, relevant provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq., and the statute (§ 52-146o) recognizing an evidentiary privilege arising from the physician-patient relationship, a duty of confidentiality arises from the physician-patient relationship and that unauthorized disclosure of confidential information obtained in the course of that relationship for the purpose of treatment gives rise to a cause of action sounding in tort against the health care provider, unless the disclosure is otherwise allowed by law, and that, because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant violated that duty of confidentiality by the manner in which it disclosed the plaintiff's medical records in response to the subpoena, the trial court improperly granted summary judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff's negligence claims; moreover, the defendant could not prevail on its claim that summary judgment should nevertheless be granted in this case because the plaintiff's medical records were disclosed in response to a subpoena and § 52-146o does not require a patient's consent for such a disclosure, as the mere existence of a subpoena does not preclude recovery for breach of confidentiality, the fact that a disclosure is in response to a subpoena does not necessarily ensure compliance with § 52-146o, and the defendant apparently complied neither with the face of the subpoena nor with the federal regulation (45 C.F.R. § 164.512 [e]) governing responses to such subpoenas.
(One justice concurring separately)
Argued May 1, 2017—officially released January 16, 2018
There is a concurring opinion. (Mike Frisch)
January 11, 2018 in Blogging, Comparative Professions | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, June 14, 2017
Self-Medicating Doctor Denied Reinstatement
A doctor's effort to secure reinstatement was denied by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, affirming the order of the Board of Registration in Medicine.
Langan is a board-certified physician in geriatrics and internal medicine. In 2008, after he had tested positive for various controlled substances, he and the board entered into a letter of agreement, under which he agreed to certain conditions in order to continue practicing medicine, including refraining from the use of alcohol and controlled substances without a prescription and submitting to substance use monitoring by Massachusetts Physician Health Services (PHS). The letter of agreement provided that violating its terms would "constitute sufficient grounds for the immediate suspension of [Langan's] license," and that Langan had a right to an adjudicatory hearing as to any violation found by the board.
There were then three positive tests that led to a second agreement
On February 1, 2012, Langan, represented by counsel, signed an addendum to his letter of agreement requiring, in particular, that he "participate in a minimum of three (3) 12-step meetings per week" and "submit proof of said participation to PHS." In October, 2012, PHS reported that Langan had misrepresented attending meetings. In November, 2012, Langan again tested positive for EtS and EtG. Langan entered into a voluntary agreement not to practice and was asked to produce documentation that he had attended all required meetings. He did not do so, and in February, 2013, the board determined, based on all the documentation before it, that Langan was in violation of his letter of agreement for the second time. The board therefore suspended his license.
He was not permitted to challenge the two agreements with the board.
Notably, the court rejected a First Amendment claim
Langan also argues that his rights under the establishment clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated by the requirement that he attend twelve-step support group meetings. Even assuming that such support groups are religiously based, his argument fails for several reasons. Langan voluntarily agreed to attend meetings when he signed the 2012 addendum to the letter of agreement; the requirement was not unilaterally imposed by the board. Langan did not timely challenge the suspension. Moreover, the board's 2015 decision makes it clear that Langan would have been permitted to attend a secular support group if he had so requested. Finally, and most importantly, the 2015 decision, which is the only one properly before us, was not based on Langan's failure to attend meetings, but on his failure to fulfil the conditions of reinstatement.
(Mike Frisch)
June 14, 2017 in Comparative Professions | Permalink | Comments (0)
Friday, June 2, 2017
Practicing Architecture Without A License
The Oregon Supreme Court reversed in part the Court of Appeals and agreed that individuals had practiced architecture without a license
The Oregon Board of Architect Examiners (board) seeks review of a decision of the Court of Appeals that reversed in part the board's determination that respondents (the Washington firm Twist Architecture & Design, Inc., and its principals, Callison and Hansen), engaged in the unlawful practice of architecture and unlawfully represented themselves as architects. ORS 671.020(1).1 The board urges this court to conclude that respondents, who were not licensed to practice architecture in Oregon, engaged in the "practice of architecture" when they prepared master plans depicting the size, shape, and placement of buildings on specific properties in conformance with applicable laws and regulations for a client that was contemplating the construction of commercial projects. The board further urges that respondents' use of the term "architecture" in the logo on those master plans and the phrase "Licensed in the State of Oregon (pending)" on their website violated the law prohibiting unlicensed individuals from representing themselves as architects or indicating that they are practicing architecture. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the board. Accordingly, we reverse in part the decision of the Court of Appeals, Twist Architecture v. Board of Architect Examiners, 276 Or App 557, 563, 369 P3d 409 (2016), and affirm the board's order.
...respondents were paid to plan commercial shopping center buildings for a client who was contemplating the construction of the buildings shown in the plans. Respondents described their services as "architectural design" services and provided their client with master plans that showed details such as the precise size, shape, and placement of the buildings on a specific piece of property in conformance with applicable laws and regulations. In that circumstance, we conclude that respondents "plann[ed]" "buildings" for purposes of ORS 671.010(6), and thus engaged in the "practice of architecture" without licenses to do so in violation of ORS 671.020(1).
In addition to prohibiting the unlicensed practice of architecture, ORS 671.020(1) also prohibits one who is not licensed to practice architecture in Oregon from using "any title, sign, cards or device indicating or tending to indicate, that the person is practicing architecture." Because we have concluded that respondents' preparation of master plans for Gramor constituted the "practice of architecture" under ORS 671.020(1), respondents violated that statute when they used their logo on those plans. That logo included the words "Twist" and "Architecture," indicating that respondent Twist was practicing architecture in the preparation of the plans on which the logo was used.
No refuge in the First Amendment
the false statements about pending licensure on respondents' website, when viewed in conjunction with information on the website about architectural projects in Oregon, could mislead Oregon consumers into believing that respondents were authorized to practice architecture in Oregon. We reject without further discussion respondents' contentions that such speech was constitutionally protected.
(Mike Frisch)
June 2, 2017 in Comparative Professions | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, February 21, 2017
Conduct Unbecoming For A Teacher
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed an arbitrator's favorable rulings in a matter involving termination of a tenured high school teacher.
Count One
Evidence adduced at the arbitration hearing established that defendant used the devices, sometimes during work hours, on the District computer network to send explicit pictures of himself and to seek similar pictures in return from various women on the internet. On the District-issued devices, defendant saved nude pictures and sexually explicit emails, sent and received by defendant, including negotiations for paid sexual services.
Count Two alleged "inappropriate" behavior toward female staff'
In support of the charges, the Board produced physical evidence taken from defendant's Board-issued computer and iPad, as well as testimonial evidence that defendant, in the presence of students, propositioned staff members to date him and commented on the physical appearance of female staff. Notably, defendant's remark about the tight fit of a female teacher's pants prompted a follow-up question by a student who was present when defendant uttered the remark. Defendant also used a student as his personal courier to deliver flowers and "inappropriate" messages to a colleague he was pursuing.
A hearing was held
the Board determined by a majority vote that the evidence supported the charges and warranted dismissal. The Commissioner of Education (Commissioner) reviewed the charges and agreed they warranted termination. The charges were then submitted for review by an arbitrator, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-16. The arbitrator found that the Board had proven the allegations underlying Count I but dismissed Count II with prejudice, reducing the penalty from dismissal to a 120-day suspension without pay.
Before the court
The Board urges this Court to reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division, contending that the arbitrator's hostile work environment analysis was improper. The Board argues that there is a fundamental difference between charges of "unbecoming conduct" and "sexual harassment" and that the arbitrator improperly conflated the two to require the Board to prove a hostile work environment under Lehmann.
In support of the Board's position, the amicus Association maintains that the arbitrator lacked the authority to alter or rewrite the charges. The Association contends that the arbitrator should have limited his analysis to a determination of unbecoming conduct. The Association underscores the practical impossibility of trying to prepare and present appropriate evidence if "arbitrators [have] the ability to unilaterally change the charges presented." Further, the Association asserts that requiring the Board to prove hostile work environment "would be anathema in a school setting." It argues that schools would have no recourse against isolated but abhorrent incidents that would not rise to the level of a hostile work environment, yet would satisfy the standard of unbecoming conduct.
proving hostile work environment is not necessary to satisfy the burden of showing unbecoming conduct. A charge of unbecoming conduct requires only evidence of inappropriate conduct by teaching professionals. It focuses on the morale, efficiency, and public perception of an entity, and how those concerns are harmed by allowing teachers to behave inappropriately while holding public employment. The Court has made it clear that the failure of a school board to prove a different offense does not preclude a finding of unbecoming conduct...
Here, the arbitrator erroneously faulted the Board for failing to prove a charge that it did not bring. The arbitrator erred in his reliance on Lehmann because he imposed a different and inappropriate standard of proof on the Board to sustain its unbecoming conduct in the presence of students claim. The arbitrator "imperfectly executed" his power by misinterpreting the intentions of the Board so significantly as to impose a sexual harassment analysis, when such an analysis was different context -- under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42. wholly ill-suited in this context...
The judgment of the Appellate Division reinstating the arbitrator's award is reversed, and the matter is remanded for arbitration with a new arbitrator to determine whether defendant committed unbecoming conduct, and any appropriate penalty.
The Appellate Division opinion is linked here. (Mike Frisch)
February 21, 2017 in Comparative Professions | Permalink | Comments (0)
Monday, December 12, 2016
The Scene Of The Crime
The Vermont Supreme Court found that a state employee's conduct as a juror in a capital case merited termination, reversing the order reducing sanction by the Labor Relations Board
Grievant worked as an environmental biologist for the Vermont Agency of Transportation (AOT) from 1992 until his dismissal in July 2015. In this position, grievant evaluated the potential impact of proposed transportation projects, created reports, and coordinated with others to apply for and prepare environmental permits. Grievant interacted with numerous other state and federal employees, and it was important that he gain and keep the trust and respect of his peers.
In 2005, grievant served as a juror in the federal criminal trial of Donald Fell and engaged in conduct that eventually led to his dismissal from State employment. Fell was charged with two capital offenses, and prosecutors sought the death penalty. In direct contravention of the federal court's repeated instructions to the jury, grievant and his then-girlfriend traveled to Rutland during trial to view the crime scene and the home and neighborhood where Fell's mother lived. Grievant then shared his observations with other jurors during deliberations. The jury found Fell guilty of all charges, and sentenced him to death on the capital counts.
Five years later, grievant told Fell's post-conviction attorneys about his actions during trial. The attorneys drafted a statement for grievant to sign. Grievant made changes and additions to the statement, and reviewed and initialed each paragraph before signing it. Fell's attorneys then sought to vacate Fell's convictions, alleging juror misconduct. In sworn testimony before the federal court, grievant denied visiting the crime scene during trial, or telling other jurors about his observations.
In a July 2014 ruling, the federal court concluded that grievant violated the fundamental integrity of Fell's trial by deliberately undertaking an independent investigation. The court found this definitively established by grievant's sworn declaration, the testimony of his then girlfriend who traveled with him to the crime scene, and the testimony of a later girlfriend with whom he shared his plans. The court explained that grievant had traveled over two hours to view the crime scenes in knowing violation of the court's orders. While there, he viewed extra-record information that was highly relevant to the aggravating and mitigating factors presented at trial. After breaching his oath as a juror, he returned to the courtroom where he purposely neglected to inform the court of his transgressions. And years later, during a post-trial proceeding convened specifically to assess the fairness of Fell's trial, grievant openly lied to the court about whether he had committed these acts. The court concluded that grievant's "extraordinary and continuous defiance of the [c]ourt's directives . . . tainted the integrity of Fell's trial and violated his constitutional right to an unbiased jury." Despite the significant resources that had been invested in Fell's trial, grievant's behavior required the court to vacate Fell's convictions and schedule a new trial.
A Vermont newspaper reported that the juror was a state employee. He was terminated in 2015.
The Labor Relations Board reversed
Following a hearing, the Board concluded that the State abused its discretion in dismissing grievant. At the outset, it agreed with grievant that the State did not "act promptly to impose discipline . . . within a reasonable time of the offense" as required by the CBA. It found that although AOT became aware of the bulk of grievant's alleged misconduct from an August 2014 newspaper article, it took seven months to complete an investigative report, and several more months elapsed before grievant was dismissed.
The court
First, as the Board found, grievant committed serious misconduct that related to his fitness as a state employee. He defied a federal court's instructions in a capital murder case, conducted an improper outside investigation, informed fellow jurors about his discoveries, and then lied about his actions under oath. He exhibited extremely poor judgment and brazen dishonesty. He refused to admit wrongdoing either to the federal court or to AOT officials. His misconduct and his status as a state employee were well-known throughout AOT and other state and federal agencies that interacted with AOT. Grievant lost the trust of his coworkers and peers, and his actions brought discredit to the State. The facts, as found by both the State and the Board, support the State's conclusion that based on grievant's serious misconduct, his credibility could not be restored and that the State's reputation would be severely undermined absent his dismissal. It was objectively reasonable for the State to conclude on these facts that it had just cause to dismiss grievant.
On delay
The DHR investigator had twenty-six other active investigations, and it took him seven months to complete the report. There is nothing in the record that links this investigative delay with the State's level of concern about grievant...
In sum, the record evidence provided reasonable grounds for AOT's decision not to suspend grievant during the investigation, and reasonable grounds—wholly divorced from AOT's beliefs about the seriousness of grievant's misconduct—why there was a delay in imposing discipline. The Board erred in speculating, contrary to the evidence, that AOT did not actually believe its own rationale for dismissing grievant. As the State points out, moreover, the Board's approach runs contrary to sound public policy. It would essentially require an employer to discipline an employee immediately, even based on incomplete information, in order for it to prove that it had serious concerns about an employee's conduct. This approach would encourage a rush to judgment, with negative repercussions for employees, especially in cases where dismissal results from the conduct.
...the touchstone of the Board's review is the "reasonableness" of the State's decision, and the facts here objectively demonstrate that this standard is satisfied. In light of grievant's extremely serious misconduct and the deference that the Board must afford to the State in exercising its management function, the State's disciplinary decision must be upheld.
The Burlington Free Press reported on the story. Their original story is linked here. (Mike Frisch)
December 12, 2016 in Comparative Professions | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, April 20, 2016
All Things Must Pass
A medical, not legal, malpractice case has resulted in an opinion of the Oklahoma Supreme Court
Patient, who accidentally swallowed a nail, brought a medical malpractice action based, inter alia, upon a claim of lack of informed consent against the hospital's emergency room physician after the physician advised patient to "eat fiber and let the nail pass." The physician did not, however, disclose the alternative medical options which included endoscopic and surgical removal of the ingested nail. Following severe vomiting, the patient proceeded to a different emergency room. Emergency surgery was performed to remove the nail, and the patient was treated for a perforated and infected bowel. The trial court, Honorable Brent Russell, granted partial summary judgment in favor of the physician on the issue of informed consent, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.
Today, this Court emphasizes the doctrine of informed consent applies equally to invasive as well as noninvasive medical treatments and treatment alternatives regardless of a physician's scope of practice. To effectively discharge a physician's duty to disclose, a physician must disclose the medically reasonable alternatives regardless of whether it is the physician's preferred method of treatment. The ultimate decision of what treatment a patient receives rests with the patient, not the physician. The trial court erred in holding that Allen's claim of informed consent was not actionable. Resultantly, this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
(Mike Frisch)
April 20, 2016 in Comparative Professions | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, April 7, 2016
Counselor Who Treated Teen Pregnancy As Confidential Reinstated
A school guidance counselor was improperly dismissed from her employment after protecting the confidentiality of a pregnant 15-year-old student, according to a decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
[Counselor] McKaig suggested that Student A tell her mother about the pregnancy, but Student A refused. Student A and her boyfriend told McKaig that they did not want Student A's mother to know about the pregnancy because they were afraid for their safety. McKaig researched Student A's options and found New Hampshire's parental notification and judicial bypass laws for minors seeking an abortion. See RSA 132:33, :34, II (2015).
After meeting with Student A, McKaig and the other guidance counselor met with the principal and other school staff to discuss the issue of Student A's pregnancy. The principal expressed his view that the school should inform Student A's mother about the pregnancy. McKaig disagreed, asserting that Student A had a right to keep the pregnancy confidential. The meeting concluded without a decision about whether to contact Student A's mother.
After the meeting, McKaig spoke with Attorney Barbara Keshen of the New Hampshire Civil Liberties Union about Student A's situation. McKaig provided Keshen with Student A's initials, age, and grade. McKaig and Keshen also discussed Student A's potential privacy rights. Keshen's opinion was that the judicial bypass law protected the confidentiality of Student A's pregnancy and the fact that she was contemplating an abortion. McKaig relayed this opinion to Student A, and Student A made an appointment with a health center and another attorney to assist her with the judicial bypass proceedings.
On December 3, 2012, the principal instructed the school nurse to meet with Student A to tell her that the school would inform her mother about her pregnancy by December 5. That same day, McKaig told the principal about her conversation with Keshen and urged him to contact Keshen to discuss Student A's rights. The principal did not contact Keshen; however, on December 4, Keshen contacted him. He told Keshen that he had reviewed the parental notification and judicial bypass laws and determined that they did not prevent him from telling Student A's mother about the pregnancy.
Keshen instituted a petition for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the principal in superior court to prevent the principal from contacting Student A's mother. McKaig was named as the petitioner "ON BEHALF OF [Student A]"; she was not named in her individual capacity. The petition did not include Student A's name. It instead referred to Student A by her initials and mentioned her age and grade, and that she was pregnant.
The district board had agreed with the decision not to renew the counselor's employment and appealed the decision of the state board to reinstate her.
The court majority
Apart from the unique circumstances giving rise to this case, there is nothing remarkable about our analysis; rather, it is based upon a reasoned application of legislative enactments, and employs well-established principles of judicial review, according proper deference to the state board's decision. We are disappointed by the tone of the dissent and its incorrect assumptions about our motivations. In contrast, we do not choose to speculate upon the motivations of the dissent; rather, after giving due consideration to the legal points raised by the dissent, we reject its substantive criticisms of our analysis...
We acknowledge, as did the district, that, without the ability to order reinstatement, the state board's authority to reverse a local board's decision not to renew a teacher or, in the instant case, a guidance counselor, would be meaningless. See RSA 189:14-b. We therefore affirm the state board's reversal of the local board's decision, and order that McKaig be reinstated to her former employment. We also remand to the state board the issue of whether McKaig is entitled to additional remedies, which issue should be addressed by the state board in the first instance.
Justice Lynn dissented.
The majority's holding, that the State of New Hampshire Board of Education (state board) could have reasonably concluded that McKaig was not insubordinate, is based upon two flawed premises. First, the holding is based upon the implicit (albeit unstated) determination that the principal's decision to disclose Student A's pregnancy to her parents was in some manner at least arguably unlawful or wrong. Second, it also accepts that, because McKaig disagreed with the principal's decision to tell the parents, she had a right, not simply to advise the student of her disagreement with his decision, but to become an adversary in a court proceeding against him. Neither of these premises, however, can withstand scrutiny. Additionally, the majority allows the state board to impermissibly act as fact finder regarding McKaig's breach of Student A's right to confidentiality per district policy. Had the state board given the required deference to the Farmington School Board's (local board) decision, it would have been required to uphold the decision not to renew McKaig's contract. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent...
although the majority studiously avoids saying as much, the only plausible explanation for its holding is that the majority believes McKaig's action in suing her principal was not insubordinate because the principal's decision to tell Student A's parents about her pregnancy was not simply one with which McKaig disagreed, but was in some way wrongful or unlawful. Stated differently, if the principal was properly within his rights to tell the parents about the student's pregnancy, then it is hard to imagine how the majority could hold that it was not insubordinate for McKaig to participate in a lawsuit against the principal because she disagreed with that otherwise correct decision.
(Mike Frisch)
April 7, 2016 in Comparative Professions | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, April 6, 2016
From Church To The Chatterbox Cafe
A church and its pastors are protected from suit alleging defamation according to a decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, pastors and their church are not liable to former parishioners for defamation or related common-law torts for statements made by the pastors during the course of formal church discipline proceedings when the statements were communicated only to other members of the church and participants in the formal church discipline process.
The allegedly defamatory statements that led to excommunication
The Pfeils were actively involved in slander, gossip, and speaking against Braun and his wife, Behnke, and the St. Matthew Board of Elders.
The Pfeils had intentionally attacked, questioned, and discredited the integrity of Braun, Behnke, and other St. Matthew church leaders.
Other people had observed the Pfeils display anger and disrespect toward Braun.
The Pfeils had publicly engaged in "sinful behavior" inside and outside St. Matthew.
The Pfeils had engaged in behavior unbecoming of a Christian.
The Pfeils had engaged in a "public display of sin."
The Pfeils had refused to meet for the purpose of confession and forgiveness.
The Pfeils had "refused to show respect" toward servants of God and St. Matthew church leadership.
The Pfeils had led other people into sin.
The Pfeils had engaged in slander and gossip and had refused to stop engaging in slander and gossip.
The Pfeils had refused to follow the commands and teachings of God's word.
we agree with respondents insofar as they argue that applying the issue-by-issue approach advocated by the Pfeils to this case would foster an excessive entanglement with religion, unduly interfere with the internal governance decisions of religious organizations, and violate the First Amendment. Ultimately, adjudicating Pfeils' claims would excessively entangle the courts with religion and unduly interfere with respondents' constitutional right to make autonomous decisions regarding the governance of their religious organization. We hold that the First Amendment prohibits holding an individual or organization liable for statements made in the context of a religious disciplinary proceeding when those statements are disseminated only to members of the church congregation or the organization's membership or hierarchy. As a result, the district court properly dismissed the claims brought by the Pfeils against St. Matthew and its pastors.
A dissent from Justice Lillehaug would affirm excommunication but allow a defamation claim
Although religious freedom is, of course, a strong public policy, the court does not demonstrate that the possibility of defamation liability "unduly interfere[s]" with that freedom. Nor does the court discuss why religious organizations cannot procure insurance to protect themselves from defamation liability.
On the other hand, the court concedes that there is "merit" to concerns about injustice to defamation victims. It tries to limit the inoculation from liability it grants with a proviso: the rule of law applies only to statements made "during the course of formal discipline proceedings" and "communicated only to other members of the church and participants." This proviso ignores the reality of how defamation can devastate its victims. Any statement made in a closed meeting of "members" and "participants" is unlikely to stay there. More likely, a vicious falsity uttered in a small-town house of worship will be avidly republished, starting the very next morning during coffee at the Chatterbox Café...
Whether or not the Pfeils accused the minister of theft has little to do with the underlying disciplinary proceeding. I see no reason why a court and jury could not apply neutral principles of law without entanglement to determine whether: (1) the minister made the alleged statement; (2) it was false; (3) it was damaging to reputation; and (4) it was not protected by a qualified privilege.
(Mike Frisch)
April 6, 2016 in Comparative Professions | Permalink | Comments (0)
Friday, April 1, 2016
Death Be Not Filmed
An opinion issued yesterday by the New York Court of Appeals
Defendants' actions in filming a patient's medical treatment and death in a hospital emergency room without consent, and then broadcasting a portion of the footage as part of a documentary series about medical trauma, were not so extreme and outrageous as to support a cause of action by the patient's family members for intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action against the hospital and treating physician for breach of physician-patient confidentiality. Therefore, the Appellate Division order should be modified to reinstate that cause of action against those two defendants.
Mark Chanko (decedent) was brought into the emergency room of defendant The New York and Presbyterian Hospital (the Hospital). He had been hit by a vehicle, but was alert and responding to questions. Defendant Sebastian Schubl was the Hospital's chief surgical resident and was responsible for decedent's treatment. While decedent was being treated, employees of ABC News, a division of defendant American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (ABC), were in the Hospital -- with the Hospital's knowledge and permission -- filming a documentary series (NY Med) about medical trauma and the professionals who attend to the patients suffering from such trauma. No one informed decedent or any of the individual plaintiffs1 -- most of whom were at the Hospital -- that a camera crew was present and filming, nor was their consent obtained for filming or for the crew's presence.
Less than an hour after decedent arrived at the Hospital, Schubl declared him dead. That declaration was filmed by ABC, and decedent's prior treatment was apparently filmed as well. Schubl then informed the family of decedent's death, with that moment also being recorded without their knowledge.
Sixteen months later, decedent's widow, plaintiff Anita Chanko, watched an episode of NY Med on her television at home. She recognized the scene, heard decedent's voice asking about her, saw him on a stretcher, heard him moaning, and watched him die. In addition, she saw, and relived, Schubl telling the family of his death. She then told the other plaintiffs, who also watched the episode. This was the first time plaintiffs became aware of the recording of decedent's medical treatment and death.
(Mike Frisch)
April 1, 2016 in Comparative Professions | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, January 6, 2016
Accounting Malpractice Not Subject To Arbitration
A decision in a case involving allegations of accounting malpractice from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
The defendant, KPMG LLP (KPMG), is an accounting firm that performed annual audits for the plaintiff, Merrimack College (Merrimack). In the underlying action, Merrimack alleges that KPMG committed malpractice when it failed to detect serious financial irregularities that occurred in Merrimack's financial aid office during fiscal years 1998 through 2004. Based on a dispute resolution provision included in a contract the parties executed for fiscal year 2005, KPMG argues that Merrimack waived its right to sue KPMG regarding services it had provided in prior years and was required to arbitrate those claims. In addition, KPMG maintains that whether Merrimack's pre-2005 claims are subject to compulsory arbitration must be resolved by arbitration. In a thoughtful decision, a Superior Court judge rejected such arguments and denied KPMG's motion to compel arbitration. We affirm.
KPMG has not presented clear and unmistakable evidence that Merrimack ever agreed that only arbitrators could resolve whether disputes that arose under prior agreements nevertheless were subject to the arbitration provision in the 2005 engagement letter. Indeed, because Merrimack never agreed that earlier disputes were subject to the new dispute resolution provision (for the reasons set forth supra), it follows that the procedures spelled out in appendix II simply never came into play.
(Mike Frisch)
January 6, 2016 in Comparative Professions | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, December 24, 2015
Faculty Evaluations And Moral Turpitude
The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the conclusion that an arbitrator exceeded his authority in failing to dismiss a University of New Hampshire professor
In 2012, Dorfsman was an Associate Professor and the Chair of the Language, Literature, and Culture Department at UNH. In December of that year, he intentionally lowered the evaluations that students had given a certain lecturer by erasing markings on the evaluations; if the highest ranking had been given, he entered a different and lower rating. In May 2013, UNH terminated Dorfsman's employment for this conduct, which UNH determined constituted an act of "moral turpitude" within the meaning of the CBA. Dorfsman and the Union grieved his termination, and, pursuant to the CBA, the parties submitted to binding arbitration to resolve that grievance.
The acts were bad enough to justify termination
In rejecting UNH's chosen penalty for moral turpitude, "the arbitrator substituted his views of the proper industrial relationships for the provisions of the contract." Id. "The arbitrator may not rewrite the labor contract" in such a way. Id. Because the arbitrator erroneously applied a further just cause analysis to misconduct that was enumerated in the CBA as a proper basis for discharge, the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority.
Seacoastonline has some details.
In December of 2012, Dorfsman altered the student evaluations of his colleague, French lecturer Emilie Taplin, by lowering her student evaluation scores. Court documents state that Dorfsman changed the average scores for every class Taplin taught that semester, as well as her overall average awarded by students. The tampering made it appear that her performance fell below acceptable limits for her department, court documents state.
Taplin's contract for re-employment for the 2013 calendar year was still under consideration and had not been renewed as of the time Dorfsman altered her student evaluations. In January, Dorfsman said he came forward with what he had done.
"Last December I had what I can only say was an emotional breakdown and I did a terrible thing," Dorfsman said in an email sent to colleagues on April 19, 2013. "I lost my judgment and in a moment of great stress I tampered with a colleague's student evaluations."
The Professional Standards Committee of the Faculty Senate terminated Dorfsman in May 2013 due to "moral turpitude" after an investigation. An independent arbitrator, who overturned the termination of Dorfsman in November 2013, stated that his actions put Taplin's visa to remain in the country in jeopardy. UNH filed an appeal of the arbitrator's decision in Strafford County Superior Court in December 2013.
(Mike Frisch)
December 24, 2015 in Comparative Professions | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, December 9, 2015
No Threats Exception
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held
This case requires us to determine whether the therapist-client privilege, which prohibits therapists from disclosing information or opinions in court that they acquired from their clients in a professional capacity, contains an exception for threatening statements. The district court concluded that the privilege does not apply to "statements of imminent threat of harm." The court of appeals reversed, holding that the statute codifying the privilege, Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(g) (2014), does not contain an exception for threats. We agree with the court of appeals that the statute does not contain a "threats exception," but disagree that the privilege extends to third parties.
The story
As a condition of his probation for a prior conviction, respondent Jerry Expose, Jr. was required to attend anger-management therapy sessions with N.M., a mental-health practitioner. During one session, Expose became upset and made a threatening statement about D.P., a caseworker assigned to an ongoing child-protection case involving Expose's children. Expose said that D.P. had told him recently that his continued noncompliance with a requirement of his case plan would delay the commencement of unsupervised visits with his children. Expose then became visibly angry and said that
he felt that [D.P.] was a barrier to him getting his kids back and if court—his future court date did not go the right way that he would break her back, and then if he could not get to her he would call—he'd just have to make a couple phone calls and he can have someone else do it if he couldn't get to her.
N.M. responded to the threatening statement by informing Expose that she was a mandated reporter, to which he replied, "I don't give a f--k." N.M. then "proceeded to help him de-escalate and calm down," but Expose made additional statements about D.P., including that "[e]verybody has to go to their car at some point."
Based on her training, N.M. determined that Expose's statements were not idle threats. Instead, she concluded that Expose had made specific threats of physical violence against an identifiable person that triggered her statutory duty to warn. See Minn. Stat. § 148.975 (2014). To discharge the duty, N.M. reported Expose's statements to her supervisor, D.P., and the police.
N.M. testified at trial. The Court of Appeals reversed the ensuing conviction.
the therapist-client privilege statute lacks a "threats exception," either by implication from the duty-to-warn statute or under our authority to promulgate rules of evidence. The district court therefore abused its discretion when it allowed N.M. to testify about Expose's allegedly threatening statements without his consent.
The court found that the error was not harmless and the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the conviction. (Mike Frisch)
December 9, 2015 in Comparative Professions, Privilege | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, December 1, 2015
I'll Be Doggone
The New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department affirmed the dismissal of a civil case.
Plaintiffs Ullum and French are owners of plaintiff Topaz Siberians Kennel, which breeds and exhibits purebred Siberian Huskies. On December 17, 2010, while attending a show-dog competition sanctioned by defendant the American Kennel Club (AKC), Ullum was accused of poisoning another competitor's dog.
A local Event Committee held a hearing, at which Ullum chose not to testify because criminal charges were pending against him.
The Committee found Ullum guilty of attempting to poison the dog and recommended that he be suspended. AKC denied Ullum's appeal of the suspension and reported the suspension on its website in March 2011. It also reported in its June 2011 newsletter that Ullum "was charged with feeding a dog medication that a veterinarian identified as having the potential to adversely affect the dog's performance and health." After Ullum was acquitted of the criminal charges arising from the incident, he asked AKC to reinstate him, but his request was denied in October 2012. A year later, plaintiffs commenced this action against AKC and its president, defendant Dennis Sprung.
The action was untimely and
Plaintiffs also failed to state a viable cause of action for breach of contract. Plaintiffs' claim is bound by the terms of the entry form, plaintiffs failed to plead that the form prohibited AKC from upholding the local Event Committee's recommendation to suspend Ullum, or that it was obligated to stay Ullum's suspension or grant his request for reinstatement. Moreover, courts are reluctant to interfere with the internal disciplinary affairs of a private voluntary association such as AKC (see Thornton v American Kennel Club, 182 AD2d 358, 358 [1st Dept 1992]), and a breach of contract cause of action is not the proper vehicle for a claim that such an association has failed to fulfill obligations imposed by its internal rules (see Matter of Caso v New York State Pub. High School Athletic Assn., 78 AD2d 41, 45 [4th Dept 1980]; see also James v National Arts Club, 99 AD3d 523, 525 [1st Dept 2012], lv dismissed 21 NY3d 886 [2013]). In addition, there is no allegation that Sprung is a signatory on the entry form in his individual capacity or that he otherwise entered into an agreement with plaintiffs (see Tutora v Siegel, 40 AD3d 227, 228 [1st Dept 2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 808 [2007]).
The Huffington Post covered the acquittal. (Mike Frisch)
December 1, 2015 in Comparative Professions | Permalink | Comments (0)
Friday, October 2, 2015
Remand In Doctor Discipline Appeal
A rather unusual medical discipline matter has led to a decision by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals.
During a disciplinary proceeding against appellee Mark Geier, M.D., the Maryland Board of Physicians publicly disclosed confidential medical information concerning Dr. Geier, his wife Anne, and their son David. David Geier was the subject of a separate disciplinary proceeding at the time of the disclosures.
The Geiers responded to the disclosures by accusing the Board, its 22 members, its administrative prosecutor, and two staff members of abuse of power, invasion of privacy, and acting maliciously and vindictively. They filed suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.
In discovery, the Geiers attempted to uncover why the Board publicly disclosed their confidential medical information.
Dr. Geier is a physician who advocates the theory that certain vaccines cause autism in genetically susceptible children. Dr. Geier's son, David Geier, is not a physician, but has assisted his father in his research concerning that theory. In a case concerning the admissibility of expert testimony, the Court of Appeals has held that "Dr. Geier's genetic susceptibility theory is no more than hypothesis and conjecture, devoid of a generally accepted methodology to support it." Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575, 618 (2009).
In protracted and contentious disciplinary proceedings, the Board has established that Dr. Geier committed numerous violations of the Medical Practice Act, HO §§ 14-401 et seq., in his treatment of autistic children...The Geiers contend that the Board has acted against them out of a desire to punish them and to discredit their research.
There were two appeals at issue. The court dismissed one and remanded the other .
Judge Friedman concurred
we find that the circuit court erred by not evaluating the Board of Physicians' claim of deliberative process privilege by weighing the Board's, and through it the public's, need for the confidentiality of its internal processes as expressed in documents against the Geiers' need to obtain these documents for use in this lawsuit. Maj. Slip Op. at 34-39. In note 23, we give the circuit court some guidance about how to conduct this weighing on remand, directing it to "assess the Board's immunity claims, because the Geiers can establish no 'need for disclosure,' and nondisclosure cannot affect the 'fair administration of justice,' if an immunity insulates the defendants from liability or from suit." Maj. Slip Op. at 39 n.23 (internal citations omitted). I wholeheartedly agree but would go one step further.
I would also direct that the circuit court consider whether every document sought by the Geiers and whose production is sought to be prevented by the Board through a claim of deliberative process privilege, is germane to the appropriate scope of discovery. The Geiers can have no need (and thus they can offer no counterweight to the Board's, and through it, the public's right to confidentiality) for documents that are not relevant, or that are no longer relevant, to their lawsuit. While my brethren prefer to leave that discussion for another day, in the circumstances and given the parties' conduct of discovery so far, I would reach it today.
It is my view that the only documents relevant to this lawsuit are those that are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence related to: (1) the Board's decision to issue the cease and desist order on January 25, 2012; (2) the decision to reveal the Geiers' confidential medical information in that cease and desist order; and (3) the duration of time that the cease and desist order was publicly available. The Geiers are entitled to any non-privileged documents related to those three topics and if they find evidence of malice in them they are entitled to present that evidence to a jury. But that's it.
(Mike Frisch)
October 2, 2015 in Comparative Professions | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, September 15, 2015
Arsenic And Old Records
The Connecticut Supreme Court held that a state agency's mental health records may not be disclosed in a matter involving treatment records of a notorious serial killer
The present case arises from the ruling of the named defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission (commission), that the defendant Ron Robillard was entitled to the disclosure of documents in the possession of the plaintiffs, the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services...We conclude that the plaintiffs had standing to appeal the decision of the commission, and further agree with the plaintiffs that the documents at issue are exempt from disclosure under § 52-146e. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to that court with direction to sustain the plaintiffs' appeal.
Background story
The plaintiffs received a request under the act from Robillard for any records concerning a person named Amy Archer Gilligan for the period of time from 1924 through 1962. Gilligan was a patient at a facility now known as Connecticut Valley Hospital (hospital) following her conviction for second degree murder for the arsenic poisoning of a resident of her nursing home. Gilligan's life is widely considered to be the basis for the play and movie entitled ''Arsenic and Old Lace.'' The plaintiffs provided Robillard with copies of those records pertaining to Gilligan that it deemed were disclosable under the act. Robillard was notified by the plaintiffs that other records, deemed exempt from disclosure under the act, were withheld.
At issue
In the present case, the crux of the disagreement between the commission and the plaintiffs is whether medical and dental records contained within Gilligan's file are exempt from disclosure under § 52-146e. The commission asserts, and the trial court agreed, that these documents were not exempt from disclosure because they were not ''oral and written communications and records thereof relating to diagnosis or treatment of a patient's mental condition between the patient and a psychiatrist, or between a member of the patient's family and a psychiatrist . . . .'' General Statutes § 52- 146d (2). We agree that the medical and dental records are not communications directly between Gilligan and a psychiatrist or between a member of Gilligan's family and a psychiatrist...
...our understanding of the broad veil of secrecy created by the psychiatrist-patient privilege also supports our conclusion that medical and dental records that are created by an inpatient mental health facility during the treatment of a patient are exempt from disclosure under § 52-146e. On the basis of the relevant statutory language, related statutory provisions and prior interpretations of the act, we conclude that the trial court improperly affirmed the commission's determination that Gilligan's medical and dental records were not exempt from disclosure under § 52-146e.
There is a concurring opinion
The majority's resolution of this case yields the detritus of a needless collision between two competing statutory mandates. On the one hand, the legislature has adopted an evidentiary privilege to foster and protect the free flow of confidential information between a patient and her psychiatrist in a therapeutic setting. On the other hand, the legislature has endorsed a broad presumption that all records in the possession of a governmental agency are public records, unless delimited by an applicable, specific, and narrow exception. Rather than charting a path that balances and accommodates both of these statutory priorities, the majority construes one to vanquish the other and, in the process, deviates significantly from critical principles at the core of open government. In my opinion, it is unnecessary to do so.
The records at issue in this appeal and cross appeal concern Amy Archer Gilligan, a notorious serial killer who was perhaps America's deadliest murderess. M. Phelps, The Devil's Rooming House: The True Story of America's Deadliest Female Serial Killer(2010). Historians and others have been focused on her case for decades. Her crimes have inspired several books, articles, plays, and even a major motion picture. Authors remain drawn to the facts and circumstances of her crimes to this day. The complainant in the present case, author Ron Robillard, seeks records from the plaintiff Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (department) relating to Gilligan's thirty-eight year involuntary commitment at the Connecticut State Hospital, now Connecticut Valley Hospital (hospital) following her conviction for murder in the second degree. Robillard seeks the information to shed light on how this state historically has handled its mentally ill convicts.
The concurrence has a lengthy discussion of the psychiatrist- patient privilege.
Connecticut History.org has details on the crimes. (Mike Frisch)
September 15, 2015 in Comparative Professions | Permalink | Comments (0)
Saturday, September 12, 2015
Discipline Of Doctor May Be Enjoined
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed and remanded a district court's denial of injunctive relief to a medical doctor sanctioned for allegedly showing up for surgery in a state of intoxication.
His blood alcohol tested at .06
Respondent Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners found that Dr. Tate had violated NAC 630.230(1)(c) by rendering services to a patient while under the influence of alcohol and in an impaired condition. The Board suspended Dr. Tate's license for six months, issued a public reprimand, ordered him to complete an alcohol diversion program and pay $35,564.44 in investigation and prosecution costs and a $5,000 fine, and to complete continuing medical education on the subject of alcohol.
The court
NRS 630.356(1) grants physicians the right to judicial review of Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners final decisions, while NRS 630.356(2) simultaneously prohibits district courts from entering a stay of the Board's decision pending judicial review. As a matter of first impression, we are asked to determine whether this prohibition violates the Nevada Constitution's separation of powers doctrine. Because we conclude that it does, we reverse the district court's order denying appellant injunctive relief and remand this matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion...
To bar a district court's ability to grant injunctive relief while judicial review is pending effectively "render[s] the appeal a meaningless and merely ritualistic process," Smothers, 672 S.W.2d at 65, as the sanctions imposed will likely have been implemented or completed before the court could judicially review the case. Such sanctions may, among other things, irreparably penalize a physician through loss of patients, income, job opportunities, and/or damage the physician's professional reputation and standing if the court were to later overrule the Board's decision and the sanctions imposed.
Here, Dr. Tate has been sanctioned with, among other things, fees and fines, a public reprimand, and suspension of his license for a six month period. If the district court were prohibited from staying the sanctions imposed until it can determine whether the Board's decision was in error, Dr. Tate may be irreparably penalized thus negating the purpose of his right to judicial review. Moreover, under federal law, these sanctions must be reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank within 30 days of their implementation, 45 C.F.R. §§ 60.5 and 60.8, resulting in the Board's decision and sanctions against Dr. Tate being recorded in a national database before the district court can review the Board's decision. Thus, the statutory prohibition against stays would effectively "eradicate[ ] any practical reason for taking the appeal." Smothers, 672 S.W.2d at 65.
Furthermore, we are inclined to agree with Dr. Tate that public interest militates in favor of injunctive relief when the district court deems it necessary...
(Mike Frisch)
September 12, 2015 in Comparative Professions | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, August 5, 2015
No Property Right To Be Named Emeritus Professor
A North Carolina Central State chemistry professor who had retired after 38 years of teaching expected to be accorded professor emeritus status.
He did not get it.
He sued but lost in an affirmance of the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
In the instant case, at no point before or after retirement did Plaintiff actually acquire the specific benefit of Professor Emeritus status. He was merely "nominated." No alleged facts, even when taken as true, indicate nomination results in automatic approval. To the contrary, Plaintiff's complaint forecasts that conferral of the status is a discretionary university decision; the nomination must pass several stages of approval by multiple committees. Such a discretionary conferral process cannot give rise to more than a "unilateral expectation" of the status.
The professor had no property interest protected by state or federal law
The absence of any record or legal support underlying Plaintiff's claim to a "due process property interest" in Professor Emeritus status compels us to conclude his section 1983 causes of action premised solely thereupon must fail...It is therefore unnecessary to address Plaintiff's contention that the change in NCCU's nomination procedure—which appears now to include a faculty deliberation of a nomination outside of a candidate's presence without a "name-clearing" hearing—deprived him of that alleged interest.
His defamation claim also was dismissed. (Mike Frisch)
August 5, 2015 in Comparative Professions | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, July 23, 2015
Crossing Boundaries
The discipline of a licensed clinical social worker for violation of professional standards was upheld by the New York Appellate Division for the Third Judicial Department.
The court rejected the contention that the attorney for the social worker was improperly disqualified
Petitioner retained Michael Sussman, who was already representing JC in a separate civil rights action against her employer in federal court. [The Office of Professional Discipline] moved to disqualify Sussman from representing petitioner...
To represent petitioner, Sussman would have had to effectively cross-examine JC, who was a key witness in OPD's case against petitioner. His simultaneous representation of her in a pending federal action potentially gave him access to information not otherwise available for use on cross-examination. Moreover, in this proceeding, Sussman would be attempting to diminish her credibility, whereas an opposite result would be pursued in the federal action. There was a sufficient conflict of interest to justify disqualifying Sussman.
The court found sufficient evidence that petitioner had crossed professional boundaries in his "couple therapy" treatment of DC and JC
OPD's expert, David Olsen, testified in detail regarding boundaries that a social worker must maintain, the training social workers receive about boundaries, and the reasons for the boundaries, which include protecting client confidentiality and making the client feel safe. He opined that petitioner had many boundary violations and that his actions deviated from the acceptable practices within the profession. Among other things, petitioner had, during the relevant time and while JC was a client, played golf with DC and JC's father and had eaten meals with JC and DC at their home. Petitioner attempted to explain his presence at JC's home as consistent with a counseling theory advanced by Salvator Minuchin advocating sessions in a client's home as facilitating the therapeutic process. However, petitioner acknowledged that there was no documentation in his notes that he was using Minuchin's techniques in counseling JC and DC. Olsen also testified regarding the many deficiencies in petitioner's records including, but not limited to, the lack of progress notes.
The license is suspended for two years. (Mike Frisch)
July 23, 2015 in Comparative Professions | Permalink | Comments (0)


text:
Today, I had the best lunch ever as far as lunches with no food are concerned. Well, there was food, but not for humans--only for horseys. My friend, MyBelle, has a horse and and me and two of our pals all skipped outta the office at noon and headed out for the pastures of Portola.
We went to feed Summer Sunset her regular food and the bag of carrots I brought her. That girl loves her carrots! But she let the other horseys have some, too, because she's knows it's better to share the love.
Since I can't ride horses anymore--now or maybe ever--because of my motherfucking spine, the next best thing is feeding them treats and petting them silly. I did both.
It was quite fabulous and, also, kinda slobbery.
Behold the equine enchantress, new owner of my heart.


text:
A bed and breakfast spot has been named as one of the best in the country in an industry bible.
The Good Bed and Breakfast Guide lists the Baker's Chest, Hartburn, near Morpeth, as among the top 20 in the country citing its "wonderful location" and friendly hosts.
Owners Richard and Sue Cansdale, both in their 50s, started the business 25 years ago.
They have forged long-standing relationships with many customers and have friends all over the world.
Richard said: "We are tickled pink to be chosen as one of the 20 best. We never sought that sort accolade."


text: Happy Easter – Come and See Us Wishing all of our patrons and visitors a safe and Happy Easter! There is a lot happening in town and we would love to serve you an award winning meal and the largest range of craft beers on tap in the area. Please check out our opening hours over the Easter long weekend.


text:
It might be revealing to compare how the "average person" rates the performance of our 43 U.S. presidents with the methods employed by 238 historians.
When honest, we "average folk" must admit that our judgments are tainted by parental influence, folklore, regional biases and other accidents of personal experience. In addition, we might not have confidence in the claimed objectivity of "egghead" academicians.
Nonetheless, for 28 years, this sizable aggregate of presidential historians has issued five reports in which they rank each president, using 20 criteria on which they judge each of them. Trying to keep 20 values in balance is an awesome task. Family background, imagination, integrity, intelligence, domestic accomplishments, foreign policy accomplishments, leadership ability and avoidance of crucial mistakes, to mention only some criteria of judgment, are enough to indicate the range of values to be considered.
Of importance is the fact that the top 10 presidents have shifted very little in the five surveys taken up to 2010. Franklin Roosevelt, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt and George Washington continue to be ranked as the top five, while Woodrow Wilson, James Madison, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy follow with little variation in placement.


text:
Editor's review
This is a piece of software that lets you create barcodes easily.
Easy Barcode Creator 3.0 lets you make professional, ready-to-print barcode graphics. It does not require the user to know anything at all about the intricacies of the barcodes. A quick and simple barcode label or a custom shaped barcode, it is equally easy to handle with the software tool. It will produce graphics that are ready-to-print vector EPS graphics for use in industry-standard products. Image processing products like Adobe Illustrator, InDesign, and Photoshop will accept the designs for further processing. You could, of course, import into Word or a drawing program. The interface is very nicely designed. A simple layout with a large preview area, large icons for control in the horizontal tool bar across the top is how the interface is. These icons lets you decide the export method; whether to InDesign, Illustrator, Photoshop or a general option like export as a TIFF images or EPS images.
You have a drop down list to select the symbolology, and then some settings organized as basic, output and advanced. For example on the basic tab of the settings you could select "content", "add on" and "text above the barcode". Easy Barcode Creator supports industry standards like EAN, ISBN (Bookland EAN), UPC, I2of5 (Interleaved 2 of 5), Code 39, Code 128, EAN-13, UPC-A, and a lot more! The tool works in both Windows and Mac OS environments. This being such a handy tool, it is good to try out for the codes you use and decide if you want it to be used regularly.