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tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-145494342018-10-29T03:18:55.046-06:00The Hockey Symposiumspeedshttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-52679657826523196642017-07-21T15:11:00.001-06:002017-07-21T16:32:33.615-06:00The Draisaitl Contract: Part 2b - A Bridge Deal and Cap Management
In addition to more time for player evaluation, a bridge contract would give Edmonton salary cap flexibility they wouldn't have with a long term contract for Draisaitl. Before we get to some of the aspects of cap management to consider, we should take a quick look at what might constitute a reasonable* bridge contract for Draisaitl.

From the perspective of the Oilers, when it comes to a bridge deal, a two year contract probably works best. Such a deal would provide three RFA years post-bridge to fold into a long term deal, while the two year term is also particularly useful in dealing with the combination of potential bonus overages and McDavid's new contract. Kucherov signed a three year bridge contract with a 4.8M AAV. How exactly one wants to allocate that money, from year to year, is maybe a bit of an art form, but most would agree that year 1 is different from years 2 and 3 due to the lack of arbitration rights. So, let's say the breakdown truly is something like 3.9M, 5.0M and 5.5M for each of the 3 seasons? Panarin had a two year bridge at 6M, but had arbitration rights for both years instead of one year like Draisaitl would with a hypothetical two year bridge. Panarin was also older, closer to UFA, and had better production. In looking at those comparables, if the Oilers want a two year bridge deal, is it reasonable to say 4.75M in year 1, 5.75M in year two, for a two year bridge deal at 5.25M AAV? If not, how much more? 5.5M AAV?

Player Management

A bridge deal would allow the Oilers to push back a decision on Nugent Hopkins. If Draisaitl signs a long term deal for 8M vs. a two year bridge at 5.5M, that might mean RNH has to be traded prior to the 2018/19 season, a cap casualty of the combined 20.5M cap hit between McDavid and Draisaitl. But, with a bridge deal, Edmonton can probably keep Nugent Hopkins, using the 2.5M in cap savings for 2018/19. Not only that, but kicking the can down the road might allow a rising cap to create enough room for Edmonton to keep RNH throughout his deal; they would potentially be able to smooth Draisaitl's raise into a cap that has moved twice by 2019/20. If you want to argue that you'd still rather spend the money on someone other than RNH, were it your call, that's fine. The point remains that, whether it's retaining Nugent Hopkins, or Maroon, potentially signing Benning and/or Nurse longer term, acquiring a new player, a bridge to Draisaitl coupled with a likely rise in the cap should help mitigate the cost cutting that has to be done prior to the 2018/19 season. And if the cap rises to even 80M by 2019/20, the very worst of the cap cutting measures could potentially be avoided entirely.

Going For It!!!

McDavid's final ELC year, coupled with a Draisaitl bridge, might provide the best chance over the next couple of seasons for Edmonton to add complementary players and make a run for the Cup. The money saved from a bridge deal could go a long way towards facilitating a signing, or an in-season trade, strengthening the roster for a long playoff run.

Reduced or Eliminated Carryover Bonus Overages

Another advantage stemming from a two year bridge contract would be the potential alleviation of bonus overage concerns for both 17/18 and 18/19, if the Oilers choose to play it that way. The reduction in Draisaitl's cap hit would, all else equal, decrease the likelihood the Oilers incur a carryover bonus overage the following season (by staying further from the cap) while simultaneously making it easier to deal with an overage in 2018/19, should one occur. For argument's sake, say the Oilers decide to "Go for it!" at the 2018 deadline, resulting in a 2M overage for 2018/19. Coupling McDavid's 12.5M with Draisaitl's 8M cap hit, were he to sign long term, such an overage would create a serious cap crunch next season. However, if they have Draisaitl on a two year bridge at 5.5M and incur an overage**, that's a lot easier to handle with McDavid and Draisaitl signed at 18M than McDavid and Draisaitl at 20.5M.

These three, somewhat unrelated, ideas are all connected through the cap. It's not necessarily easy to balance competing factors, but a bridge contract would give the Oilers some useful flexibility to address all three of these issues, to some degree or another, providing additional arguments for a Draisaitl bridge deal.

* One person's reasonable is another person's unreasonable, but bear with me!

**And, just to repeat, with Draisaitl signed to a bridge deal, it's less likely you incur an overage to begin with.speedshttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-24411591875763192172017-07-16T09:33:00.000-06:002017-07-16T10:14:53.677-06:00The Draisaitl Contract: Part 2a - A Bridge Deal and Player EvaluationA long term deal, or a bridge contract? In answering that question for Draisaitl, the Oilers will have a few factors to consider. Throughout this series of posts I will look at some of the advantages and disadvantages of each, concluding with my preference (from the outside looking in) were I in Edmonton's position.

Player Evaluation

Given his age, we know from the outset this contract will be based on projection. Draisaitl is a young player, steadily improving (hopefully, for both the Oilers and Draisaitl himself). He's not playing at an MVP-level like McDavid already, nor is he (likely) going to be paid like one. The advantage of a bridge contract, from an evaluation standpoint, is having the time to answer any lingering questions about Draisaitl's ability to carry a line by himself. We can debate the extent to which Draisaitl benefited from playing with McDavid, but I've yet to hear the argument that he didn't benefit. The Oilers are in an unusual situation with five RFA years for Draisaitl; gathering more information wouldn't hurt the Oilers prior to signing a longer term contract. The issue at hand is the cost of acquiring that information, should the team decline to sign Draisaitl long term this summer. Part of the difficulty in evaluating this situation from the outside looking in is that we are working with incomplete information. Presumably, if Draisaitl were willing to sign Scheifele or Monahan's deal, the contract would already be done. Some speculation puts the number to sign long term around 9M AAV. For argument's sake, let's assume it would actually take 64M over 8 years (8M AAV) to get Draisaitl to sign long term this summer. Forwards in the NHL are largely paid on offensive production. If Draisaitl, at C during even strength behind McDavid, posts solid, but lesser, numbers the next two seasons, it's unlikely the Oilers would have to pay a significant premium (if any) when compared to the current long term cost*; they could potentially even sign him for less long term than it would cost today. If he produces notably more than expected in that role, and Edmonton has to pay him 9M, even 10M, vs. his cost today, maybe that is perfectly fine? Yes, they'd be paying somewhat more than if they'd have signed him long term this summer, but (a) they'd be more sure what Draisaitl is on his own, (b) they'd have gained a cap benefit in the short term (much more detail to follow on the cap benefits in Part 2b) and (c) if they get him signed for 8 years 2 years from now, they would have him under contract until 32, instead of until 30.

One oft-cited comparable is P.K. Subban, who signed a 2 year bridge deal (2.875M AAV) post ELC, followed by an 8 year long term deal with a huge raise (9M AAV). It's easy to quickly glance at the jump between Subban's deals and have some hesitation in bridging Draisaitl, but there are a number of different circumstances that limit the value of the comparison. I would argue that Subban was more "proven" at the time, in terms of being responsible individually for his on-ice success, limiting Montreal's risk had they signed him long term at the outset. Secondly, Subban was rumored to be willing to sign a five year deal worth 5.5M or so at the time of the bridge, a number many felt more than reasonable given Subban's established level of performance. Again, we don't know with certainty the cost of a long term deal, but the numbers floated are notably above his comparable group; very few people would be arguing against an eight year deal for Draisaitl were it carrying a 6.5M cap hit. The other, perhaps largest, issue with the comparison is that while uncertainty exists for Draisaitl over the course of a hypothetical two year bridge, we do know what happened with Subban. He won the Norris trophy in year one, followed by finishing t-6th in scoring amongst D in year two. Even if you expect Draisaitl to perform well, you probably doesn't expect him to have that level of two year performance if he's playing the majority of his time as a 2C behind McDavid on the depth chart.

In terms of player evaluation, more information is clearly better than less. The Oilers have some, but not as much as they'd ideally like, particularly in the lineup spot they presumably have in mind for Draisaitl. Spending two of their five remaining RFA years to evaluate him at that position does not seem to be a terrible idea, given the amount of money at stake. Having said that, we don't know how they plan to use Draisaitl. A two year bridge makes more sense if they plan on playing him at C than if they plan on having him play RW with McDavid, largely due to the projected reduction in offensive output at C vs. RW.

* Long term comparables will be discussed in more detail when we get to Part 3.

Next Up: The Draisaitl Contract: Part 2b - A Bridge Contract and Cap Management

speedshttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-45271422787032041532017-07-06T08:00:00.000-06:002017-07-06T08:02:02.976-06:00The Draisaitl Contract: Part 1 - The "Percentage of the Cap" ArgumentIn the build up towards Connor McDavid signing his 8 year, $100M contract extension, much has made of McDavid's "percentage of the cap", and how it compares to Crosby's when he signed his post-ELC deal*. While I understand the temptation to look at this situation from that perspective, I don't love the "percentage of the cap" argument, even for McDavid. The idea behind it makes some sense, in theory. However, in practice, looking at a percentage from 10 years ago is only an appropriate comparison if the general league wide allocation of salaries is the same. Since Crosby's post ELC contract was signed, the cap has increased faster than the salaries of the highest paid players, as expressed by a percentage of the cap, which in my opinion means that a straight across comparison of percentage wouldn't capture the changing league dynamics.

I particularly don't love the "Kopitar made X percent of the cap, therefore give Draisaitl the same percent of the current cap" argument. With Connor McDavid, you have a notably different situation than with Draisaitl. McDavid is a better player, and there are no good comparables under a recently negotiated contract. The team and player have to come up with some novel method to find an appropriate salary. Perhaps looking at Crosby's (5 years) and Ovechkin's (13 years) deals from 10 years ago isn't ideal, but what can one do but try to piece something together that works as an 8 year deal for McDavid, in today's environment?

In Draisaitl's case, while perhaps none of Barkov ($5.9M), Scheifele ($6.13M), Monahan ($6.38M), Gaudreau($6.75M), or Tarasenko ($7.5M) are absolutely perfect long term comparables, they are reasonably close enough to be roughly used as such when it comes to more standard NHL salary negotiations. Kopitar's extension was signed almost 9 years ago. Even if you agreed that Kopitar is a better fit as a comp (and I'm not saying that's a given), a contract signed that long ago is unlikely to better capture the relative worth of Draisaitl in today's market than the recently signed contracts of a peer group. If I were in Edmonton's position, and Draisaitl's representation was making this argument, it would strike me as an excellent attempt on their part to change the topic of conversation. If his agents don't think those comparables help them to secure Draisaitl the amount of money they are seeking, what can they do besides argue that (a) they aren't good comparables, or (b) try another angle, and argue that Kopitar, for example, is a better fit by style, and then try to shoehorn in a "percentage of cap" argument? I do kind of wonder if, in this hypothetical, Chiarelli and Edmonton's management might have a wry smile to themselves, very much doubting whether Draisaitl's agents would be using a "percentage of cap" argument if it meant that Draisaitl would be receiving less than the recent comparables?

Signing Draisaitl to a long term deal is not an idea entirely without merit. However, if the ask from Draisaitl's agent is unwavering, notably above the market for similar players, and based upon a "percentage of the cap" argument that doesn't accurately reflect Draisaitl's value in the current market, there is no requirement for the Oilers to acquiesce and accept that line of reasoning. There are relatively sound comparables for Draisaitl. Changing the argument might seem like a useful tactic for his representation, but that doesn't necessarily mean the Oilers should deviate from the comparables recently established.

*The percentage of the cap for McDavid's deal turned out to be 16.67% with his 8 year, $100M contract, vs. Crosby's 17.2% (here is a chart from NHLNumbers with numbers for Crosby, Ovechkin, Malkin, and McDavid)

Next Up: PART 2 - The Merits of a Bridge Contractspeedshttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-34138882522411403682016-09-26T10:07:00.001-06:002016-09-26T10:08:39.440-06:00How Much Leverage Should the Flames Exert?Drafting a player as good as Johnny Gaudreau in the 4th round is like finding a $100 bill in your winter coat when the weather turns. Hard to believe, and even harder to believe how happy you are when it happens. There was some angst and consternation for Flames fans during the "Will he/won't he sign an ELC?" saga that was early-2014, but eventually he did sign with the Flames. He scored a goal in his first and only game of the 2013/14 season, and was pretty prolific in the final 2 years of his ELC. Fantastic for the Flames, and for Gaudreau. But, now it is time for the next contract, and negotations haven't gone as smoothly as a Flames fan might have hoped.

Johnny Gaudreau is in a somewhat unusual position for a player who has finished his ELC, in that he's not eligible for an offer sheet. The CBA requires a player his age to have "3 years professional experience", and Gaudreau does not due to his 1 game pro season in 2013/14 not qualifying* as "a year of professional service". With no arbitration rights and no opportunity to sign an offer sheet, he has no way to leverage himself a deal outside of "holding out". Certainly there is an amount of leverage there, but it's not the same as going to arbitration, or signing an offer sheet with another club. Calgary, on the other hand, might think to themselves "You know, we've got a ton of leverage here. We can theoretically say to Gaudreau ' Here are your options. A 1 yr deal at your QO, or an 8 year deal at 6.75M. You can hold out if you want, but we're not moving and if you don't sign this year, you're in the exact same situation next summer. Do you really want to go play in Russia for a couple years just to be in the same place?'"

Are they going to overtly state this to Gaudreau's camp? Probably not - if I were in Treliving's position, I wouldn't count on such a statement to not create hard feelings. Besides, there is no real need to be explicit; they know it, Gaudreau's representation is almost certainly aware of it as well. A reminder probably only agitates the situation at this point; perhaps they feel differently if he's still unsigned on November 15th.

So what do the Flames want to do? The difference between 6.75M and 8M on an 8 year deal is 10M - not the kind the money a businessman would necessarily want to spend on goodwill, particularly if they don't think their offer is unfair, and don't think Gaudreau has a significantly better alternative. I wonder if the Flames and Gaudreau look at a one year deal? The Flames get another year of relatively cheap information before they commit long term, and Gaudreau would have a stronger bargaining position going forward. The Flames would also then have the opportunity to trade for, or sign a guy like Rakell** to an offer sheet, a RH F that would fit well with CGY, while fitting under the cap. When Gaudreau gets a big pay bump in 17/18, they'll have cleared a bunch of cap space via Smid/Engelland/Wideman (~11.7M) to make room for Gaudreau's raise. Is it worth having to deal with the potential of a somewhat higher cap hit for Gaudreau in 17/18 if there is a chance to get a player like Rakell signed long term? Or are they better off trying to get a good long term deal now, while they hold relatively more negotiating clout? Tough questions, and it will be interesting to see how the Flames handle this situation.

* The CBA also defines a year of "professional experience" as a year played under an SPC, which as I understand it would mean that if Gaudreau went to Europe to play this season, he still wouldn't be eligible for arbitration or an offer sheet next summer.

** Or maybe Trouba, with the recent news of his trade request becoming public.

speedshttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-23017002154722835742016-06-21T20:00:00.000-06:002016-06-21T20:43:55.427-06:00Potential Offer Sheet Target - Seth JonesOffer Sheets.

Arguably the most underutilized way for an NHL GM to acquire players.

At this point, I'm sure many are tired of hearing me talk about the lack of offer sheets in the NHL, and my surprise that we don't see more of them. That said, I think there are a confluence of factors this summer that may increase the chances we see an offer sheet, perhaps even involving the Oilers. The UFA pool is lacking in top end RH D, and with a few of the more obvious trade options seemingly, potentially, falling away in the past few days (Hamonic, Barrie, Vatanen), there aren't a lot of quality options for Peter Chiarelli. There are, however, a few teams with promising RFA RH defencemen that might be attractive for a team to acquire via offer sheet, for one reason or another. Ideally a team might prefer to acquire them via trade, but if a deal can't be made, it's not impossible a team looks at the more rare option of an offer sheet. All of Jones, Dumba, Lindholm (LH D, but good enough to be under consideration anyways), Barrie and Trouba are players who may be good acquisitions for the Oilers in the right circumstance, but I'm going to focus on Seth Jones for this article as he probably fits best in terms of being a player of interest to the Oilers while also being part of a team in an unenviable cap situation.

The Blue Jackets salary cap situation has been discussed extensively, in particular Matt Henderson wrote an excellent article regarding a potential Seth Jones offer sheet a few weeks ago. Columbus faces difficulty as a number of their players are too expensive to move and/or have NMC's. This at least creates the appearance of a situation where CLB may have little choice but to walk away from well crafted offer sheet to Seth Jones. Many of the reasons I think the Oilers might look at an offer sheet are the same as those Matt wrote about - they would get a RH D who fits in terms of age with the core group, without moving a F to acquire that player . Further to that, they would not be moving the 4OV pick for a D, which gives them a young, ELC controlled F (assuming they pick a F at 4OV) in the pipeline. So how would a team best design an offer sheet to minimize both the cost as well as the chance of Columbus matching?

I think there are three approaches a team could take:

(1) They could sign Jones to a 7.5M per year, 5 year offer sheet. This would cost a 1st, a 2nd, and a 3rd in 2017 (here's the 2016 compensation chart, thanks to Elliotte Friedman). The reason a team would choose a 5 year term instead of 6 or 7 years is because compensation, for draft pick purposes, is calculated as total compensation divided by the number of years OR 5, whichever is less. This means that a 6 or 7 year with the same AAV as a 5 year deal generally requires more compensation.

(2) They could, knowing full well it would cost more in compensation, design an offer sheet where there's probably a greater chance Columbus matches BUT, if they don't, the acquiring team would be rewarded with Jones on a better contract. As an example, a team could sign Jones to a 7 year offer sheet at 6.6M per year, at a cost of 2-1sts, a 2nd and a 3rd. So they would be giving up an extra first, but if successful would have Jones signed for an extra two seasons and save 0.9M against their cap throughout the course of the contract.

(3) They could sign Jones to a 1 year, 9.3M offer sheet with a 6M signing bonus. First of all, given their cap situation, it would be difficult for Columbus to match that large an offer sheet. Secondly, because the Qualifying Offer for 2017/18 would only be 3.3M in this scenario**, the team retains some negotiating power on the next contract. When 2017 rolls around, the team could negotiate a 7 year contract (8, if they wait long enough) at a more friendly cap number.

This would result in a team owing identical compensation to that of scenario 2, but the team wouldn't quite have the same contract certainty. I think the risk would be worth it as they could potentially get 8 or 9 years of Jones vs. 7, probably at a lower cap hit for all but the first year. However, the possibility still exists that Jones leaves as soon as he's UFA eligible if he's not signed long term. A team may wish to somewhat limit their risk by sticking with an offer sheet in the 1st+2nd+3rd compensation bracket, using this structure as a guide. So, maybe something like 7.5M total on a one year deal, with 3.75M coming via signing bonus, and the other half via salary?

Scenario 3 seems like the best bet to me, when it comes to both actually getting the player and finding the best contract scenario, after year 1. The Oilers would have the cap room to do this, but it would be relatively tight and not allow much room for additional moves unless other salary is shed. Still, it would leave the forwards untouched, 4OV in the system, and address a significant need on RD.

I don't know if the Oilers will want to look at offer sheets, but unless they are able to sign Demers, they may find them to be the best option. Jones presents an interesting possibility, particularly given Edmonton's rumored interest in him earlier this season. If Jones doesn't catch a GM's eye, it's possible any of the scenarios could apply to one of the other aforementioned players, though the details may have to be tweaked. As Lowetide famously says, we wait.

** As far as I can tell, this is an allowable contract under the CBA. If that is not the case, we can throw scenario 3 away. The section re: Qualifying Offers is contained in Article 10.2 of the CBA, and says that a QO for a player in Jones's situation would be 100% of the player's Paragraph 1 Salary from the previous season.speedshttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-29621580658204050402016-02-05T08:55:00.002-07:002016-02-05T14:10:54.388-07:00Performance Bonuses and Their Impact on Edmonton's Deadline TransactionsThis past summer, I wrote an article  about the cap consequences of the Reinhart trade. I thought it might be worth taking a look at how things have played out to this point for the players with bonuses, and how that might impact Chiarelli's thought process heading into the trade deadline. Now, without seeing the actual contracts it's difficult to know exactly which bonuses each player is eligible for, and exactly what the triggers are, but I'll list the bonuses it looks like each player has a reasonable chance at hitting. It's not impossible that others could be hit, but this is a look at those more seemingly attainable at this point in time.

Klefbom - max 350K in performance bonuses: He has a very good chance at hitting the TOI/game threshold provided he gets healthy enough to play in 42 games this year, and a half decent chance to achieve either of the plus minus bonus or the 0.49 points per game bonus. Could potentially max out his 350K, depending which bonuses he's eligible for.

Nurse - max 850K: Has a reasonable chance at plus minus bonuses and TOI. I don't think he would be voted for the all rookie team ahead of Gostisbehere or Parayko. Maybe 425K?

Reinhart - max 2.35M: He is unlikely to receive any performance bonuses.

McDavid - max 2.85M and Draisaitl - max 2.475M: Both of these players are grouped together as they have pretty similar outlooks relating to their bonuses. Both McDavid and Draisaitl look reasonably well positioned to achieve 3 or 4 of their Schedule A bonus triggers, with 4 likely hitting the limit of their 850K . The Schedule B bonuses are of particular interest. The only bonus that either player looks like they have a chance at hitting is top 10 in points per game among forwards BUT both have a decent chance. There is a minimum of 42 GP required, so McDavid in particular has to stay healthy, but McDavid is currently 2nd among forwards in points per game. Draisaitl is 12th and only 0.01 points per game behind 10th (Hall, interestingly enough). It's possible both could hit all their bonuses, which would be 5.325M combined.

There is a reasonable chance 6.1M in bonuses could be earned between the five players. So what does that mean? Well, that means the Oilers are looking at the potential for a significant overage penalty on their 2016/17 cap. According to general fanager, the Oilers are ~2.8M below the cap at the moment, so assuming that to be accurate, that nothing changes on the roster, and that those 6.1M in bonuses are indeed achieved, the Oilers would have a performance bonus overage of ~3.3M for the 2016/17 season. I would argue it doesn't make a lot of sense to keep an unlikely playoff team together if it results in carrying an overage penalty forward into a potential playoff season, so I think it would be a good course of action to dump as much money as they can prior to the deadline to avoid as much of that potential as possible*.

In terms of the deadline, the two players seemingly most likely to be on the potential trading block (making significant money) are Schultz and Purcell. It sounds like Edmonton will look to move Schultz, and assuming no money is retained that will save them some money against the salary cap. There has been some talk of keeping Purcell and signing him to a new contract for less money. In a vacuum I don't think that's a horrible idea, but the potential of a bonus overage charge changes the picture. It's not just choosing between keeping/re-signing Purcell and trading Purcell for a pick. If the Oilers move Purcell now, it probably saves them something like 1.3M against the cap, so keeping him and re-signing him for 2M (not a given he'd sign that, but let's assume he does for the sake of argument) might have an effective cost of 3.3M factoring in the potential bonus overage penalty that could have been reduced by moving him at the deadline. I think that means the best approach would be to move both Schultz and Purcell by the deadline. The earlier they are moved, the more cap space saved, and while retaining money to improve the quality of pick might ordinarily make some sense, I don't see that as being the best option here if either/both player can be moved without retaining salary, even if the quality of return is somewhat reduced.

* It would also save some money to carry 7 defensemen instead of 8. The combination of extra playing and development time in the minors with some cap space saved probably makes it prudent to demote either Nurse or Reinhart.

If money has to be retained in Purcell and Schultz trades, the Oilers might well choose to look at moving other players in addition to those two, at least partially in an effort to reduce potential bonus overages. speedshttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-22564519014661685282015-06-28T11:05:00.001-06:002015-06-28T11:10:50.794-06:00Cap Consequences of the Reinhart TradeOrdinarily, it is an enormous positive for a cap team to have a number of players on Entry Level Contracts (ELC), as their relatively small salaries give the team an opportunity to spend more money elsewhere on the roster. However, an issue arises when a team has a number of players on an ELC with significant performance bonuses. Teams are only allowed to exceed the cap via performance bonuses by a maximum of 7.5% of the Upper Limit, which for the 2015/16 salary cap of 71.4M works out to a 5.355M maximum. The combined bonuses for Nurse (0.85M), Reinhart (2.35M), Draisaitl (2.475M), Klefbom (0.35M), and McDavid, not signed yet, but assuming a max deal (2.85M) total 8.875M. So what does that mean? In a nutshell, should the Oilers start the year with all five of those players on the roster, the team will have an effective salary cap of 67.88M in order to preserve the required room for bonuses.1

 A few thoughts:

The impact this has on Edmonton's summer plans is hard to know, but it may have repercussions for free agent spending.

This is a not really an issue if both Reinhart and Draisaitl are in the minors, as the remaining bonuses wouldn't exceed the overage. If one of them is in the minors at any given time, the Oilers would exceed the overage maximum, but only by about 1M instead of ~3.5M if both are in the NHL.

We don't know exactly what Marincin will cost, but for the sake of argument let's say he signs a one year deal for the same money as Reinhart. In comparing the cap hits head to head, we might ordinarily say they cost the same, while noting that Reinhart has bonuses available that could result in a higher cap hit for the current year if Edmonton were not at the cap, or a cap penalty the following year, if achieved, were the Oilers at the cap - the overage talked about earlier. However, assuming Edmonton would have already used all their overage room on the other four players, Reinhart carries an effective cap hit of the combined 3.21M vs. the 0.86M of Marincin. That is not the case if Draisaitl and Nurse, for example, are in the AHL - only if the bonus overage has already been exceeded.

There is a consideration for Draisaitl that does not exist for Reinhart. If Edmonton leaves either Reinhart or Draisaitl in the AHL all year, an ELC year would be burned. However, with Draisaitl, a year in the AHL vs. a year in the NHL results in him being a UFA in 2023 instead of 2022; Reinhart's UFA status is not impacted by whether or not he plays in the NHL. When you combine that with Draisaitl having an effective cap hit of 3.4M (again, assuming the bonus overage is already maxed out), is it that hard to argue that Edmonton would be better off to sign a UFA W for 2.5M, save some cap space, save a year towards UFA status for Draisaitl, and let him play a full year as the #1C in the AHL?

For 2016/17, the Oilers would need to remain 3.17M under the cap2 once Klefbom's bonuses are off the books, with the potential for a bigger number if other players with bonuses were to crack the roster (for example, Slepyshev).

I don't want to get too far into the weeds here, regarding things like LTIR consequences and "impossible to earn" bonuses - perhaps that will be something to look at as the summer progresses and we get a better sense of any UFA's EDM has added, any trades/buy-outs, the contracts/cap numbers of any RFA's. But the quick takeaway is that the Oilers may not have as much money to spend in free agency as some might have hoped, or been expecting, depending on the number of players with significant ELC bonuses on the roster.

1 The calculations, to the dollar, are pretty complicated and beyond the scope of this article, but what it means, more or less, is that EDM has to stay at least 3.52M below the cap this year if all these players are on the roster.

2 This assumes that the 2016/17 cap is identical to the 2015/16 cap. If the cap increases, so does the size of the bonus cushion.

 speedshttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-58647940291615102032013-07-06T01:38:00.001-06:002013-07-06T01:52:38.577-06:00Front-Loading Ference's Contract?The structure of Ference's contract has yet to be released, but I would not be surprised to discover that the Oilers frontloaded the contract to the fullest extent possible, so as to increase Ference's "tradeability" in the later years, should they so desire. If everything goes to plan three years from now, both Klefbom and Nurse will be in the NHL, and along with Smid still under contract, it very well could be the case that Ference would fit outside Edmonton's top 6D. In that case, front-loading Ference's contract could increase his appeal to an acquiring team for the 2016/17 season.

One of the changes made to the new CBA was designed to limit the front-loading of contracts. Under Article 50.7, front-loaded contracts are only permitted to have the salary decrease, from year to year, by 35% of the 1st year's salary, while no year may have a wage less than 50% of the highest salaried year. The following chart is an example of the front-loading the Oilers could have theoretically* included in Ference's contract, while not running afoul of Article 50.7(a):

Year

Salary

Cap Hit

2013/14

 $ 3,900,000.00

 $ 3,250,000.00

2014/15

 $ 3,900,000.00

 $ 3,250,000.00

2015/16

 $ 3,250,000.00

 $ 3,250,000.00

2016/17

 $ 1,950,000.00

 $ 3,250,000.00

TOTAL

 $13,000,000.00

 $13,000,000.00

As you can see, there is still the potential for a decent sized drop by the time the contract reaches its 4th year. Given that there are benefits for both sides if the contract is front-loaded, I would not be surprised to see Ference's contract arranged something like the table above.

* This table is not perfectly optimized, in terms of the lowest possible 4th year salary allowable to the dollar, but it's close. I didn't have solver, so I derived this table via some quick trial and error, but it's close enough (within $50,000, I believe) to be illustrative of the kind of structure Edmonton could have constructed while complying with the CBA.speedshttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-3366154740731945632013-06-26T01:31:00.001-06:002013-06-26T01:34:16.876-06:00Trading Down From The 7th Overall Pick
Moving down in the draft is viewed with trepidation by some Oilers fans, probably largely related to the Parise/Pouliot move at the 2003 draft. I would argue that trading back can be a reasonable way to extract value, particularly when the player a team likes, and would select at their original position, would still be available at a later position. But given that this is the last time (hopefully) in a while for Edmonton to select a player with a somewhat high probability of being a cornerstone player, it makes sense to me that the Oilers use that opportunity to select whomever of Monahan, Lindholm, or Nichushkin remains. They already have two 2nd round picks to build depth within the system, and if they feel they need even more depth, they could always trade down next year at a time where they are less likely to be giving up an impact player by doing so (assuming they draft 10th-18th or so next season).

If it turns out that, for whatever reason, they aren't going to pick whichever of the remaining consensus top players remains at 7, then I don't mind moving down; in fact, I prefer it. And, in my mind, if Edmonton is going to trade down from 7 to 10 or 11 in this particular draft, they may as well trade down again to 14 or 15; the prospect they'll get at 10/11 isn't worth more than the 2nd rounder they'd likely get in exchange for moving to 14/15.

I would prefer to see Edmonton stay at 7, and take whichever of Lindholm, Monahan, or Nichushkin remains (and in that order, if more than one is available). And I would prefer to see Edmonton trade up to 5, if it costs a 2nd, if that secures Monahan as opposed to sitting at 7 and passing on Lindholm/Nichushkin if they happen to be the player available from that group of 7. However, the option of trading down to 15 (if they aren't going to pick from the top 7 at 7), selecting Petan, and having four 2nd round picks isn't without its appeal either. That would give GM Craig MacTavish a number of options and assets, to be either used in drafting, trading up, or potentially moving a couple of them in trades to pick up a current player or two. It seems kind of obvious to say, but the option of trading down is less appealing if they take a player I don't like as much at 15. I suppose that applies no matter where they pick, be it 5th, or 7th, or 15th, but the dislike would feel magnified if they traded down to 15 only to take a player with (perceived) limited upside, especially given my concerns that they'd be passing on a reasonable chance at a cornerstone player by simply remaining at 7 overall.

As a final note, when it comes to trading the pick outright, I am generally opposed to the idea but it needs to be evaluated on a case by case basis. The 7th overall pick in this draft, in my opinion, carries significant value - the team can't ignore that it's getting 7 years from the player if things work out, and potentially at a big discount relative to the cost of a similar UFA. To give that up, the team needs to receive a significant player back in return, and likely not one under team control for only two or three years. The problem with that is if another team already has that player, they aren't all that likely to give him up for an unproven prospect - it's tough to find a trade partner. speedshttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-78160524672485491212013-05-28T16:41:00.002-06:002013-05-28T16:49:34.361-06:00If Colorado Is Willing To Trade The #1 Overall Pick, How About This?There has been a bit of chatter today hinting that the Avalanche may be willing to move their 1st overall pick. Who knows how seriously they might look at that option, but if they do, I wonder if they might consider the following deal:

To Colorado - Shea Weber

To Nashville - The first overall pick

This trade couldn't technically occur until later this summer, once the one year window relating to Nashville matching Weber's offer sheet has passed. That said, Colorado could simply pick the player Nashville wants at #1, and make the deal official as soon as they are allowed under the CBA.

Why Colorado makes this deal: If the Avalanche are looking to add a #1 defenceman, and plan on drafting Jones to upgrade their D, why not just trade the pick for a mature version of the player you hope Jones will become? Weber will be owed 83 mil over the remaining 13 years of the deal by the time such a trade could actually be registered, meaning COL would effectively be paying him 6.4 mil per year for the remainder of the deal (notably longer than the 7 years for which they would have the rights to Jones), a number they may consider palatable for a #1 defenceman*.

Why Nashville makes this deal: They get themselves away from a long term deal that they might not have really, truly wanted to begin with, if given another choice besides letting Weber go for 4 first round picks. Yes, they matched the offer sheet, but it's possible they did so for off-ice reasons as much as on-ice reasons. Drafting MacKinnon (for example) might replace Weber in terms of marketing, and would help to continue selling the season's tickets they were worried about losing had they not matched the offer sheet for Weber last summer. Acquiring the first overall pick to go along with the 4th overall selection Nashville already possesses, the Predators could draft MacKinnon and Barkov to give them a potentially enviable 1-2 punch at C for a long time.

Any thoughts?

* His cap hit would be a bit higher at 7.9 mil, but if Colorado is not planning to spend to the cap that might not be an issue. And even if they are looking to spend to the cap going forward, it's possible they think he's more than worth that kind of cap charge in any event.speedshttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-82449205575787318082013-05-27T15:52:00.002-06:002013-05-27T15:52:42.864-06:00Trading Up From The 7th Overall PickNot unlike the build up to most Entry Drafts, it seems as though many Oilers fans are clamoring for the team's management to trade up. The only time I can remember the Oilers trading up in the first round was the 2007 draft, when Edmonton traded the 30th (Nick Ross) and 36th (Joel Gistedt) picks to Phoenix in exchange for the 21st pick (Riley Nash). Even though the Oilers haven't moved up all that often in the past, I do think it's reasonable to wonder if Edmonton's at least a little more likely to move up this year based on one of GM MacTavish's answers regarding the upcoming 7th overall pick, given during a season ticket holder's conference call (transcription from that conference call courtesy Dan Tencer).

Our wish list in the draft would be to draft a centerman and/or a defenseman with that pick in that area. The higher end centermen, not to divulge too much about where we're ranking players, but if you look at the public rankings like Red Line or Central Scouting, there are really three very high end centermen available in this draft. Nathan MacKinnon from Halifax, Monahan from Ottawa and also Barkov, who played in the Finnish men's league. I think that those three centermen, relative to some of the public rankings, we would finish just out of the realm of getting one of those three centermen if we didn't move up.
It's hard to know exactly what to make of those kinds of comments, just how much might be gamesmanship, or the truth laced with gamesmanship. I don't doubt that their "wish list" might include a center or a defenceman at 7, but that doesn't necessarily mean they won't draft a winger if the BPA happens to be someone like Nichushkin. It's not that hard to imagine MacTavish, when sitting with the TSN panel a couple minutes after their selection, saying something like "Sure, ideally we would have liked to have picked a center or a defenceman, but when it was our turn to pick we felt the best player available was Drouin/Lindholm/Nicushkin, and by enough that it didn't make sense to pass on him and draft by positional need." I also don't doubt the Oilers have interest in the 3 centers listed, but would be somewhat surprised if they didn't also have interest in C/W Lindholm, conspicuous by his absence in MacTavish's quote. Lindholm seems to, mostly, fit the type of player that MacTavish has talked about adding - high hockey sense, versatile, plays with sneaky grit. I think his absence is telling, in that Edmonton may be more interested in him than they are hinting. However, it's also possible that they see him more as a winger going forward, and that was the reason for his omission in the above quote.

Anyways, enough meandering, back on topic. To my mind, this could be EDM's last shot at landing another elite talent to supplement the core; it makes no sense to trade that opportunity away for more depth picks. If the core performs as expected, depth players will want to sign with the Oilers. Filling in those 3rd and 4th lines should become progressively easier from this point forward, it likely doesn't make sense to pass on an elite talent to add a 2nd round pick or two. I say "likely" because it really depends who they would pick at 7. I would be relatively fine with EDM just sitting at 7 and picking whoever is left. However, IF Edmonton is going to trade down, or pick someone who isn't Nichushkin/Lindholm in the case that Monahan, MacKinnon, and Barkov are all gone before 7, then I would rather them pay the price to move up and secure the player they want. But what is that price?

We can look at past trades to give us a rough guideline. There aren't many trades involving moves up and down within the top 10; just how much we can take from past transactions is open for debate. But it at least represents a starting point, so here are two examples, both from the 2008 draft:

The cost for Toronto to move up from 7th to 5th* was the 68th overall pick plus a 2009 2nd.

The cost for Nashville to move up from 9th to 7th was the 40th overall pick.

Ultimately, the price is dependent on the situation, driven by the tiering of talent and the expectations of the teams involved in the deal. When I write about the "tiering of talent", what I mean is that the price to move from 7 to 5 can be different from one draft to the next. If players 5, 6 and 7 are seen as roughly equivalent, the price to move down is likely to be a bit smaller than usual. If player 5 is seen as significantly better than players 6 and 7, then the price might be inflated (relative to an average year), if not so high that no deal can be agreed upon. If Carolina wants someone at 5 that they wouldn't expect to be available at 7, then the price they would demand is likely considerably higher than if they'd expect that player to still be there at 7. So if they are looking to take a D at 5, or have the 3 remaining forwards likely to be available rated more or less equally, then a 2nd round pick might well be enough for them to move down from 5 to 7. If they are particularly interested in a player, and think that either Edmonton or Calgary would likely take that player before they pick at 7 should they trade down, then they either demand a higher price, or choose to stay at 5.

I would guess the cost for EDM to move up from 7 to 5 would probably be something like the 37th overall pick, or ANA's 2013 2nd along with EDM's 3rd in 2014**. If CAR is asking for more than that, they probably aren't really interested in moving down, and the cost would likely be prohibitive when compared to just sitting at 7 and taking whichever of the top 7 is still available. Personally, I would be willing to move both 2nds, even to only move up to 5, if the alternative is drafting a player not in my top 7 at 7. However, that doesn't mean I prefer that scenario to trading down a couple times from 7 and ending up at 15 or so, ending up with 4 2nd round picks, or 3 2nds and maybe a 3rd and 4th. But we'll get to that in the next post.

Moving up from 7 to 4 (or even higher) would probably cost more than both of Edmonton's 2nds, potentially requiring prospects and/or roster players. This might be heresy to some, but I would consider moving Gagner in such a deal, depending how contract negotiations are going with his agent. Keeping Gagner is likely the goal for the Oilers, it wouldn't be ideal to move a guy just as he's reaching his prime, but the reality is he's gone in a year unless the Oilers sign him to an extension. Without Gagner under contract (not only signed, but signed for reasonable price and term) he's an expendable piece in acquiring a cornerstone player, in my opinion. It's an open question whether or not another team would want to trade for Gagner in such a deal if they have the same issues, but from Edmonton's standpoint I think it's reasonable to consider moving him if we're talking about moving into a position to select one of the top end players in this draft.

Like MacTavish, I don't really believe in untouchables, but there are certain players less likely to be traded than others. I'm not sure I would consider it likely Edmonton would move any of their 1st overall picks for a top 3 pick in this draft. Personally, I would consider moving pretty much anyone else in a deal for a top 3 pick, and if you could strike two deals to land two top 4 picks, I can see the argument for that even though doing so almost certainly means you'd be moving a player like Eberle, Gagner, or Schultz as a part of at least one of the packages. I don't know if that sort of manoeuvring would make the Oilers better in 2013/14, but if the overriding goal is competitiveness over the next ten years, as opposed to competitiveness next season, I can see the argument in favor of being that aggressive at the draft this June.

If I had to guess, I'd consider it more likely that the Oilers trade down than up, but it's hard to tell with a new GM looking to be bold. An aggressive move into the top 5 might represent Edmonton's best chance to balance their forward group***, to add a C in a player like MacKinnon or Barkov (or even potentially Monahan or Lindholm). I'm of the general belief that overpaying for cornerstone, building block talent is acceptable (to some degree), it will be interesting to see if Craig MacTavish is of the same belief. That might be what it takes.

* Actually, as part of the deal the Islanders were given the option between the 60th overall pick and a 2009 3rd, or the 68th overall pick and a 2009 2nd. They chose the latter package.

** I would be pretty reluctant, personally, to include the 2014 3rd in a deal to move up, because it would potentially be needed in the event the Oilers go the offer sheet route this summer. If you need to include that type of value in the deal to make it, that's fine, but not that specific piece if possible.

*** If that's something that matters to them, I'm sure it matters less to me than it does to most fans - I'd have absolutely no problem with EDM moving up and taking Drouin notwithstanding the fact that it would be "another skilled, smaller winger", and even if they didn't make any other trades.

speedshttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-22603477040052998012013-05-17T19:36:00.001-06:002013-05-17T20:05:50.955-06:00Valeri NichushkinLike many Oilers fans, I was checking the reverse standings daily near the end of the season to see where the Oilers might be slotted to pick in the 2013 Entry Draft. At the conclusion of the season (and after the lottery had no impact on Edmonton's selection), the Oilers were slated to choose 7th, a rather fortunate position in my mind since many observers of the draft, myself included, have surmised there to be a tier of 7 prospects at the top of this year's draft. Well, "a tier" is probably the wrong way to put it; most seem to have it organized as a group of 3 followed by another group of 4, or 4/5 players followed by 3/2 players. That group of 7 includes Jones, Drouin, and MacKinnon, who are generally seen as the top 3, followed by some order of C Barkov, C Monahan, C/W Lindholm, and W Nichushkin*. In any case, picking 7th assures that Edmonton will receive one of the players in this "top tier", should they view the draft in the same manner. I would argue that the most likely group of players to be selected in the top 6 is Jones, Drouin, MacKinnon, Barkov, Lindholm and Monahan. That isn't to be confused with a guess that it's more likely than not those 6 players will in fact be the first 6 drafted - maybe they will be, or maybe they won't, I'm only guessing the aforementioned group of 6 players more likely to be the first selected than any other single group of 6 players. I would be a bit surprised to see another player crack the top 6, but at the same time it isn't unusual to see a surprise or two near the top of the draft, like Hickey in 2007, or Fowler, Couturier, and Forsberg sliding in 2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively. If that group of 6 is in fact selected as the top 6, it would leave Nichushkin for the Oilers**. The problem, if you want to call it that, is that some of the circumstances surrounding both the Oilers and Nichushkin might conspire to move him down Edmonton's list. I'm going to attempt to make the case that, in spite of those potential pitfalls, it would be in Edmonton's best interest to draft Nichushkin if he is the player left available from that group of seven, "warts" and all.

One of the arguments against drafting Nichushkin is that he's likely to be a winger at the NHL level, and that the Oilers could use a C or D more than another W. Even if its true that the Oilers could use a center or a defencemen in the prospect pipeline more than a winger (I would agree on the C, but not the D), need is not a good argument for drafting an inferior prospect. By ignoring the Best Player Available (BPA), you are giving up value. You also can't be certain about your needs in a few years, so drafting down a tier to fill a perceived need now might not even fill your actual need by the time the prospect is ready to truly contribute to your team. If you are within a similar tier of talent, I can understand addressing a need when picking between two roughly equivalent prospects. But in this draft, I have seen very few argue that you'd have a better chance of getting an impact player by picking someone other than Nichushkin at 7, among the expected remaining eligible players. The draft is not about drafting players - not really. It's about creating value for your organization. You have a better chance of doing that, in my opinion, by picking the best players available than you do by addressing organizational need. Combining the likelihood a player will work out with his value if he turns out is a better bet than simply picking the best player available at your position of perceived need. Sure, you could just draft a C, and hope that works out, that's the easy thing to do, but in my opinion you would be giving up too much value simply because you question your ability to make a trade at a later date. I understand the NHL trade market isn't as liquid as cash, but it's always preferable to have to make a deal involving a drafted player with value than to have already drafted a player to fit a need who didn't develop into the player you wanted.

Specifically as it relates to the Oilers depth chart, there may currently appear to be a relative surplus of wingers, but that isn't necessarily the case given the timeline for Nichushkin. He's likely not coming over until the 2015/16 season, by which time only 2 Oilers forwards would be under contract: Hall and Eberle. Yakupov's ELC would be up, so even if all 3 are still a part of the Oilers, that would theoretically leave one top 6 F spot if Nichushkin was ready to fill that role as a 20 year old rookie. It's unlikely based on the rumblings now, but it's possible Hemsky might still be around. If so, it would likely be in a reduced role for reduced pay, and wouldn't seemingly conflict with Nichushkin in the lineup. Paajarvi might well still be in Edmonton, and he might potentially be in a top 6 role by that time, which seemingly wouldn't leave a similar role available for Nichushkin. However, it is the rare rookie who is truly ready for a two way, top 6 role. If both he and Paajarvi are capable of playing those minutes, well, great! That's depth! If Nichushkin's ready to play, but not ready to be a two way factor, it would only help that Edmonton could play Nichushkin in an somewhat easier role to start his NHL career. By the time you would have to worry about paying Nichushkin serious money upon expiration of his ELC, Eberle will have one year left on his 6 year extension, Paajarvi will be UFA eligible - I guess what I'm saying is that it's a long time from now until EDM would have to worry about paying Nichushkin, Hall, Yakupov and Eberle big money. It's good to have a mindful eye on the future, but worrying excessively about your cap situation five years down the line in today's age of free agency is not necessarily desirable.

One further point on the potential surplus of wingers, and maybe this is just me, but until you have more than 6 elite wingers, you haven't really reached the point of having too many. I understand the argument that it might not be an optimal use of cap dollars to carry a high number of expensive wingers, but I don't see it as redundant in terms of usage - those aren't quite the same thing. A team needs to fill 120 minutes on the wings and until you can fill all the required ice time with top tier performers, you haven't reached the point of redundancy in the same sense as having an all star caliber back-up goalie (although there are different arguments for that as well) sitting on the bench for 60 games.

The second argument against drafting Nichushkin tends to be some combination of transfer risk and the delayed time frame involved. The likelihood that he'll be unavailable for two seasons post-draft is not terribly alarming to me. No matter which other player you draft at that point, it's not probable the player will crack the NHL in 2013/14 (and even if he did, what are the odds that player is a genuine contributor as opposed to someone relatively replaceable via UFA for a similar cap hit this summer?). I don't even know how probable it would be for that player to play, and genuinely contribute, in 2014/15, although it would be more likely than Nichushkin if he's tied to Russia through 2015. Provided you have little reason to believe he'll re-sign in Russia and stay there beyond the expected two seasons, I don't see the time frame as a big issue. He'll continue to develop playing in Russia, and likely be a more complete player for it when he moves to the NHL. The transfer risk is a potential issue, and needs to be thoroughly examined and assessed to the best of Edmonton's knowledge prior to the draft. I would be willing to gamble a bit more for an elite talent than some others might, but that doesn't necessarily mean you take him at 7 overall, even if he's the BPA, if he were to flat out tell you he isn't interested in coming over to North America until 25, or that he isn't interested in Edmonton specifically, or something like that. I have read nothing that indicates he isn't willing to come over. In fact, I read somewhere (who knows, maybe this is true, maybe it isn't) that he was looking at Tarasenko as a template by playing two years post-draft in Russia before coming to the NHL. Given the lack of information suggesting he isn't be interested in coming to the NHL, I would tend not to worry about it that much, but I'm also not in a position to get the information the Oilers are in. It is in Edmonton's best interest to talk to as many informed people as possible to assess Nichushkin's desire to play in the NHL, to ask him and his representatives at the combine, perhaps bring him to town as they did for some other potential top picks in previous seasons if they think it's something that might help sway him towards North America as soon as possible. If all those background checks don't turn up any information that leads you to believe he's not interested in coming over, then I don't think the transfer risk should be significant enough to dissuade the Oilers from selecting Nichushkin. And if there is some way to get him signed this summer while still respecting his two years in Russia (allowing the slide rule to keep all 3 ELC years while his Russian contract runs to its completion), all the better.

Elite players are worth their weight in gold, and you really can't have too many of them, regardless of position, until the salary cap says otherwise. If Nichushkin represents Edmonton's best chance to select one, I think they should take him even though he's another winger, and even though he'll be unavailable next season. The transfer risk needs to be assessed, but accepting a certain amount of risk is a reasonable gamble to take, in my opinion, for a better chance at an elite player.

* I have seen Nichushkin listed as a C/W in some places, but haven't read too many people suggesting he would likely play C in the NHL.

** If there is a surprise or two before Edmonton's selection, if someone like Nurse or Ristolainen is picked in the top 6, then Edmonton would have a choice between at least two of those top 7 prospects once it's their turn to pick. This post is potentially rendered moot should an unexpected pick occur, since any of the players likely to slide as a result of a surprise selection could potentially both fill a need for Edmonton (likely to be a center) along with meet the criteria of being the BPA. Additionally, if EDM doesn't tier the talent in the same way on their list, or trades the pick away, most of this post is likely also moot. However, I'm operating under the assumption that they do, and they don't, respectively.

speedshttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-23528066707206790592012-08-21T19:42:00.001-06:002012-08-23T00:34:26.751-06:00An Interim Solution?It is unclear just how much dialogue might take place between the NHL and NHLPA prior to September 15th, now that both sides have planted their flags with their initial proposals. I'm sure both Fehr and Bettman would like to use their plan as the basis for further negotiation; we'll see how that goes. Maybe we'll see some sort of hybrid if a deal gets done by October? Something along the lines of no rollback, no change to HRR definition, 54% of revenue to the players in year one with that cap number fixed afterwards until such time as 51% of HRR would result in a higher cap number?

I'm not really expecting to see a deal prior to September 15th, but I have been wondering if there might be a way to play out the 2012/13 season while negotiations continue. The two sides are really only arguing about the money sandwiched between the owners proposal of ~43% (with current HRR definition) and the 57% the players are willing to play for. So, why not lock that 14% of revenue into an escrow account, to be distributed once a deal is made? Keep negotiating throughout the season and actually play the games. In this theoretical agreement**, the teams would continue to pay all the salary currently due to their players, but only ~75% of it would actually go the players - the remainder going into the newly created escrow account, to be dealt with upon the creation of a new CBA.

The NHL may argue that their interest in systemic changes* means they wouldn't want to operate on an interim basis without a CBA. In that respect, this may be something that could only be done for the upcoming season, and not beyond; the NHL and NHLPA could agree that after September 15th, no contracts will be signed for any season beyond 2012/13, and that the 2013 draft wouldn't occur until a new CBA is agreed upon. The contracts for this upcoming season are nearly all signed already, any systemic changes to arbitration, UFA age, contract length, would have virtually no impact on playing games this season.

If either side were going to propose something like this, it would more than likely be the NHLPA doing so. There wouldn't be much downside for them (if there is, please feel free to voice it in the comments), and the worst that could happen is the NHL might say "no". If they do, it provides the NHLPA a chance to craft a statement saying something like (more eloquently phrased than this, I'm sure, but as a quick example):

 While we are, by no means, willing to sign a CBA where the players would be compensated as the NHL indicated in their July proposal, we are willing to play temporarily for that amount at this time, to allow fans a chance to view a full schedule of games in the 2012/13 season. We can't force the NHL to sign this interim agreement and play NHL games this season, but what does it say if they won't even play on an interim basis while paying us the lowball rate of their first offer?***

The NHL may be hesitant to give up some of a perceived bargaining strength by playing games, and paying the players while negotiating. At the same time, from what I've read, the 30 teams combined are making money, so on a net basis they may prefer to play while negotiating (especially if they predict they'll be getting a healthy chunk of that escrow money back when a deal is struck) provided playing doesn't significantly affect their leverage and/or their opportunity to make systemic changes.

If a deal isn't struck by the end of the season, the money continues to sit in escrow and both players and owners will have an incentive to consummate a deal (to get at the money tied up in escrow) for the 2013/14 season, both having had the chance to make some money this year while maintaining whatever marginal fan interest they might be concerned about losing with a lockout. The NHL may have decided they won't lose anyone due to a lockout, in which case this could be moot. That said, it's not impossible that some owners decide that the lack of lost interest from fans last time doesn't mean they can be 100% certain they won't this time, and decide to take a temporary deal.

I don't think this is something that would necessarily come up before the two sides negotiate a little bit over the next two, two and a half weeks; if they are close to a deal now neither side may want to get sidetracked by an interim agreement. But, I'm curious if this might be a way for the two sides to both make a bit of money while continuing to negotiate a new agreement, keeping the fans happy?

* Hard to know how much they are actually interested in making changes to arbitration, free agency, contract length, ELC's, etc, but assume these are serious concerns for the NHL.

** This may be something to discuss in the comments, but I'm just throwing ideas out here, this could be all be up for negotiation in terms of exactly how this would work.

*** I'd imagine the NHL might counter by mentioning that they wouldn't really be paying 43% of revenues, they would argue they are still paying 57% even though only 43% would be going to the owners. I guess we could go back and forth with arguments and counter-arguments for awhile (the players might note that escrow isn't so fun, is it? Both would be "partnered" in escrow, an interesting twist.)
speedshttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-33196545513602459392012-07-26T22:39:00.002-06:002012-07-28T18:22:02.191-06:00The Nashville Decision
"The day you say you have to do something, you're screwed. Because you are going to make a bad deal. You can always recover from the player you didn't sign. You may never recover from the player you signed at the wrong price."
Billy Beane in Moneyball

While it's true that I'm generally an advocate for offer sheets, it's not hard to feel a little sympathy for the Nashville Predators. Building a winning franchise as a budget team cannot be easy; to lose both Suter and Weber in the same summer would have been a pretty bitter pill to swallow for David Poile. That said, retaining a player beyond the point that makes financial sense, simply because he's "your" property, is not necessarily a prudent position to take as the architect of a club. Losing Weber obviously wouldn't have been ideal, but in this case I think it would be less negative than matching Philadelphia's offer sheet.

I think there are a couple of different problems with matching this particular offer sheet. By matching the offer as a non-cap team, Nashville doesn't get the same cap benefit as Philadelphia. Philly is getting a 14 mil player at a cap cost of 7.85 mil, and that's great for them, but those cap savings don't matter to Nashville. Philadelphia can't go to the UFA market and spend 14 mil like NSH can, because they are constrained by the cap. Can Nashville do better with 14 mil by going to the UFA and/or trade markets than by matching Weber's OS? Would Semin*, Rozsival, and Arnott, or another D, help the club more than retaining Weber? Those players would all be on much shorter contracts, so that long term risk would be minimized relative to Weber. You'd also have 4 1sts with which to shop for trades, restock, etc.

Secondly, one of the long term benefits of matching is that, down the road, you might get a player at a deep discount relative to his value, if Weber continues to play, and play well, into his late 30's. Those years could prove extremely valuable, but that requires them to be played. The problem with this deal, however, is that the structure gives him so little pay down the road that he may retire before you get to the cheap years. If he were to retire after 10 years, he'd have received 10.4 mil per season for 10 years, 94.5% of the contract's value over 71.4% of the contract's term. This is something that may not matter to Philly - they may well look at it as a 10 yr, ~100 mil offer that comes with the benefit of a 7.86 mil cap hit. If he feels like playing out years 11-14 of the deal, and is still worth his cap hit, great, PHI has a deal. If not, they can ship him off to a team looking to make the cap floor. But Nashville might be looking at those years as an important part of the appeal in matching, and those benefits may be illusory.

So, from the hockey end, and assuming NSH looks to compete for the Cup immediately, I think Nashville would likely have been better off in years 1-6 by letting Weber go. For years 7-10, there's a pretty good chance they couldn't do better than Weber at the money he's scheduled to make, although there are some mitigating factors**. For years 11-14, again, pretty likely Weber will be worth more than the money he's paid, but only if he actually plays.

Of course, on a deal this big the hockey side of things is only part (a big part, mind you) of the decision. One of the arguments for retaining Weber is that losing him would greatly harm your ticket sales. I can't speak to how accurate that is, and I have no trouble imagining it would hurt sales in the short term. I don't have the detailed financial information at my hands here that Poile did, or whatever market research the Nashville financial side would have gathered on the potential lost ticket sales by losing Weber, and that could well have affected my thoughts on the this topic. That said, I have a hard time believing it would cost anywhere near as much as the $41,000,000 Weber is due by July 1, 2014. Now, even if they had signed Weber to a long term deal on their own it probably would still have been somewhat front-loaded, but they might well have been out only 20 mil by July 1, 2014 in that scenario.

Having read this statement, I do wonder if the Predators gave too much thought to public sentiment. It would be interesting to know how seriously Poile may have been considering a total rebuild had the team decided to pass on Weber. My sense is that fans are less fickle than people generally assume, but perhaps that isn't the case in Nashville? They probably have a bunch of their season ticket money already for 2012/13, so it's a somewhat open question how much it would impact them this season, relative to next season. Had they lost Weber, how bad would they have been? Could they have then moved Rinne***? What sort of sweetener might MTL have given NSH to take on Gomez? Or NYR with Redden? Both of those players see their contracts expire in 2 years, and are owed less money than their cap hit. Could they re-brand and sell some tickets within a year or two if they had landed a couple top 3 picks in the 2013 and 2014 drafts, while saving a bunch of money?

There was a ton to consider here, and as I mentioned earlier, Nashville would have had access to important information that I don't. That said, and this is obviously just my opinion, I think there's a good chance they'd have been better served by staying away from this long term contract. Does that mean they can't compete financially with the big spending teams? Well, not necessarily. They certainly haven't been the last few seasons, but that doesn't necessarily reflect business going forward. Even if they do want to compete financially with other teams going forward, it doesn't mean they wouldn't be better off avoiding this particular deal to retain flexibility going into a new CBA. What I would say, closely related to the Beane quote at the top, is that having the desire for something, and the ability to afford it, doesn't necessarily mean you should buy it at any price.

* I wrote the majority of this post before Semin signed with the Hurricanes. In fact, I wrote a significant chunk of it before Nashville decided to match, but thought I'd wait until after they announced their decision before posting. I don't think it really hurts my argument - if NSH had decided to strongly consider letting Weber go, they could have signed (or, at least tried) all those players before their window to match had lapsed.

** Injury possibility, the player not aging as expected, and the foregone 2013-16 1st round picks that may or may not be starting to contribute had you let Weber go.

*** Rinne does have a NMC, but I'm not sure how much he'd want to stay in NSH if Suter AND Weber were gone?speedshttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-84496394646630291492012-06-21T22:03:00.004-06:002012-06-21T22:34:01.992-06:002012 Top 30, and Some General Draft ThoughtsAs I continue to make these lists, year after year, I get less comfortable with my final rankings. I haven't really decided if that's a good thing or a bad thing. I'm particularly uncomfortable with my list this year - I'm the guy that made it and I'm not sure how much weight I put behind it. This draft is defense heavy, which always makes me nervous; it can be difficult to differentiate between D based on the descriptions available. Additionally, there were numerous injuries and that never helps.

Making a list is an interesting process to me. Being tasked with creating the list doesn't require one to be a great scout - you don't really need to be a scout at all*. The list is all about compiling, evaluating, and assimilating information. As the quality of your information improves, hopefully the quality of your list will improve in turn. For the most part, I think the publicly available information gives us a fairly good picture of a player. The other information that teams gather can potentially be invaluable, and in those cases makes a big difference vs. the generally available information. There is no doubt that, lacking that information, the quality of this list suffers. At the same time, there is generally a tendency in life to overvalue bits of (assumed?) exclusive information. If a team thinks they have unearthed something about a player that no one else has, there may be a tendency to put more weight behind that tidbit than is truly warranted.

In terms of my list, I look at the draft in a way that may be unconventional. I don't see the NHL entry draft as an exercise in picking the best players going forward. I mean, obviously you are picking players, and obviously you'd rather pick good ones than bad ones. But what you're really looking to do through the draft is create value for your team, not pick players. I have a definite tendency to favor forwards. Even given that preference I don't have as many forwards in the first round this year as usual; the quality, relative to the D, is lower than a typical year.

A space between two numbers is used to indicate perceived tiers, however slight the talent gap might be.

Yakupov

Galchenyuk

Grigorenko

Murray

Forsberg

Rielly

Teravainen

Dumba

Trouba

Reinhart

Faksa

Ceci

Maatta

Aberg

Hertl

Lindholm

Girgensons

Koekkoek

Finn

Collberg

Bozon

Gaunce

Pouliot

Bystrom

Pearson

Kerdiles

Thrower

Samuelsson

Severson

Matheson

* That isn't, by any means, to say that a background in scouting would hurt you if you are in charge of creating the list. In fact, that background might well put you in a better position to ask questions, questions that could help to clarify certain issues.

speedshttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-69462851141953082272012-06-10T22:34:00.000-06:002012-06-10T22:34:30.103-06:00Summarizing The Schultz SituationIf you're as interested in the technical, contractual side of hockey as I am, it's not uncommon to become a little exasperated in exploring some of the minutia surrounding the NHL's CBA. Justin Schultz's situation presents one such case where reading the relevant sections of the CBA doesn't fully explain Schultz's impending UFA status. There seems to be an understanding as to why Anaheim loses Schultz's rights, but it's less clear exactly why he avoids draft re-entry only to become a UFA on July 1st. I'll try to provide an overview of the issues involved, and if I'm missing some, feel free to help me flesh this out in the comments.

First of all, specifically, why does Anaheim lose Schultz's rights? As has been covered elsewhere, Anaheim has (or had), Schultz's rights until he either graduates from college, or if he leaves school early, until the fourth June 1st following his draft. To be specific, Article 8.6.c.iv states:

If a Player drafted at age 18 or 19, who had received a Bona Fide Offer in accordance with Section 8.6(a)(ii) above, becomes a bona fide college student prior to the second June 1 following his selection in the Entry Draft and does not remain a bona fide college student through the graduation of his college class, his drafting Club shall retain exclusive rights for the negotiation of his services until the fourth June 1 following his selection in the Entry Draft.
This is a pretty straightforward section to interpret, and explains why the Ducks would lose the rights to Schultz. However, it does not do a good job of clarifying where the reported 30 day window comes from. Within article 8, Article 8.6.d, there is a section that talks about "bona fide offers", and how they remain in effect for a 30 day period. There is nothing specific that seems to mention why Anaheim has a 30 day window to sign Schultz at this point, but some light may have been shed upon that by the excellent interview Jason Gregor conducted on June 7th, with the former GM of the Tampa Bay Lightning, Brian Lawton. Lawton touched on the 30 day window, suggesting that it came into effect post-lockout after Don Waddell, then GM of the Atlanta Thrashers, was incensed that he might lose Jim Slater to UFA without a chance to sign him. Does that mean there is some agreement written that isn't included as part of the CBA, which would explain this 30 day window? Perhaps.

Secondly, a quick reading of the "Eligibility for Claim" section suggests Schultz might well be draft eligible, depending on the date he left college. The eligibility exceptions are listed in Article 8.4 of the CBA :

8.4 Eligibility for Claim.

(a) All Players age 18 or older are eligible for claim in the Entry Draft, except:

(i) a Player on the Reserve List of a Club, other than as a try-out;
(ii) a Player who has been claimed in two prior Entry Drafts;
(iii) a Player who previously played in the League and became a Free Agent pursuant to this Agreement;
(iv) a Player age 21 or older who: (A) has not been selected in a previous Entry Draft and (B) played hockey for at least one season in North America when he was age 18, 19, or 20 and shall be
eligible to enter the League as an Unrestricted Free Agent pursuant to Article 10.1(d); and
(v) a Player age 22 or older who has not been selected in a previous Entry Draft and shall be eligible to enter the League as an Unrestricted Free Agent pursuant to Article 10.1(d).

The only subsection that seems like it would, or could, apply to Schultz is (i), due to the aforementioned 30 day window. This uncertainty has led to the questions concerning his draft eligibility. According to Bob McKenzie's article from May 25th, it appears he left school somewhere between May 21st-25th. It is possible that he would be off the reserve list before the draft, but I find it hard to believe his agent wouldn't have specifically picked a date where he would avoid re-entering the 2012 draft.

Should a team spend a late round pick on Schultz in the hopes he's draft eligible? If the only fall-out is the loss of that selection, it's not hard to imagine a team deciding that's an acceptable risk and attempting to draft Schultz. If it turns out that he's still on ANA's reserve list, and there would be far more serious repercussions for trying to draft him, then maybe the reward isn't worth the risk? Again, I would imagine Schultz and his agent specifically picked the day they did to leave school so as to avoid draft re-entry, but it's hard to know given the lack of specific information available.

This is a long way to go to not find any answers, but here are the unanswered questions as I see them:

Where does the 30 day window come from? League rules?

When, exactly, did Schultz leave school? Is the timing of his defection from college the reason he avoids the 2012 draft? Why does Schultz not go back into the draft?

Are there any questions I've missed, any details that might help fill in the blanks with this situation? I expect we'll hear numerous rumors surrounding impending destinations for Schultz by the time June 25th arrives, but I'm not as sure we'll get a clear and concise explanation of exactly how we arrive there. It would be nice for this situation to be laid out neatly, but failing that I guess a reasonable guess is better than nothing...

speedshttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-12783584122741599072011-10-19T19:44:00.004-06:002011-10-19T20:11:36.221-06:00Consistency and FairnessI was a bit disappointed today to see Jeff Petry assigned to the AHL. Just my opinion, but I thought he's played well enough to deserve regular time in the top 6D for the Oilers, at this point.

That said, I also have no problem understanding the argument that playing 25 min per game in the minors, with significant PP and PK time, does more to develop his long term potential than does 12-14 minutes per game at the NHL level, with little special teams time. I don't know if that is the case, but if it is, it seems like a sensible approach to developing your players.

The problem comes if and when you handle different players differently, because I'm sure players want to feel the organization is being fair, and not playing favorites. If you are looking more towards development than you are to wins, is there just as good an argument for demoting Lander and Paajarvi as there is for Petry? Could both of those players see their long term development assisted by first line PP and PK minutes at the AHL level?

I have a similar position when it comes to the "RNH back to junior" debate. I was of the opinion last year that Hall should probably have been sent back to junior at the 9 game mark, and maybe I was right, maybe I was wrong, who knows? But to me the team has to be consistent, in that if you gave Hall a chance to make the team, provided he can contribute, it's only fair to do the same with Nugent Hopkins. That isn't to say that if the team goals change, the decision can't change; I wouldn't have found it indefensible to have sent Hall back to junior last year, even if he was one of the 12 best forwards, provided you thought development was paramount*, and then keep RNH the following season if the overriding goal that year was to make the playoffs and you were of the opinion that keeping RNH helped you do that.

Obviously there are a lot of different variables in play here, and that makes comparing Petry's situation to that of Lander/Omark/Paajarvi somewhat difficult, but if you were Jeff Petry, might you wonder just why you were sent down and those guys weren't? If the argument is that Petry simply was the 8th best D, well, that's a different story, but I'm not sure that's the argument here.

* And assuming you thought development would have been better served by another season in the OHL.speedshttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-41224948240576956002011-09-17T19:04:00.010-06:002011-09-22T10:31:23.324-06:00Managing MartindaleWhile it's true that Edmonton's selections from the 2010 draft class are looking promising at the moment, that promise loses its meaning if you are unable to get the players under contract. So far the Oilers have signed Hall, Pitlick, Marincin, and Hamilton, the first four picks from the 2010 Oilers draft class - no small feat. However, there are still a few players the Oilers will probably look to keep within the organization, and most of them need to be signed by June 1, 2012 for the Oilers to retain them. Of those players, and for a few reasons, Ryan Martindale is probably the one most important to sign at this moment. The Oilers might really like to have Bunz and Blain under contract, but since neither is AHL eligible nor is either going to play in the NHL to start the season, there is no pressing need to sign the player.

Based on his age, Martindale is AHL eligible, and based on his performance (both last season and thus far at camp) I think one could make a case he's worth serious consideration at the AHL level this season, as opposed to a fifth season in the OHL. The carrot the Oilers can dangle to Martindale, to convince him to sign, is to have him play in the AHL in 2011/12, making 60-70K, instead of nearly nothing in junior, along with burning a year from his entry level contract. If he's assigned to junior, unsigned, those carrots are gone, and the Oilers lose some leverage because they can offer no immediately tangible reason for Martindale as it affects his play for the 11/12 season. The fact that they didn't sign him in the fall would have demonstrated to him that he's a ways down the depth chart, so why would he sign with EDM when he could go back into the draft, potentially go higher, and hopefully go to a team with less forward prospect depth that he'd have to battle for future NHL employment?

It's true that the Oilers could sign Martindale even after they assign him to the OHL, but I think the Oilers would be taking a pretty serious risk by allowing him to return, unsigned, to junior.speedshttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-70834847599761715452011-07-12T09:14:00.001-06:002011-07-12T09:42:07.489-06:00Entry Level Contracts and the "Arbitrary" Slide RuleOne of the more unusual items from Edmonton's 2010 draft class was the number of players eligible to play in the AHL for the 2011/12 season. Ordinarily a team might have 3 or 4 of their 9 players eligible for the AHL the second year after the draft. As it happens, the Oilers have 8 (Hall, Pitlick, Hamilton, Marincin, Martindale, Davidson, Pelss, and Jones) of their 11 2010 draft picks eligible to play in the AHL this coming season. We can be pretty certain that each ofPelss and Jones will be heading back to their teams from last season, and even more certain that Hall will be dressing for the Oilers this coming season.

Early indications would seem to be that Pitlick, Hamilton, and Marincin are, at least tentatively, slated for the AHL next season, based on the fact that they have been signed to their Entry Level Contracts. However, due to the following paragraph, Article 9.1.(d).(i) of the CBA, the "slide rule" appears to only apply to Marincin:

In the event that an 18 year old or 19 year old Player signs an SPC with a Club but does not play at least ten (10) NHL Games in the first season under that SPC, the term of his SPC and his number of years in the Entry Level System shall be extended for a period of one (1) year, except that this automatic extension will not apply to a Player who is 19 according to Section 9.2 by virtue of turning 20 between September 16 and December 31 in the year in which he first signs an SPC. Unless a Player and Club expressly agree to the contrary, in the event a Player's SPC is extended an additional year in accordance with this subsection, all terms of the SPC, with the exception of Signing Bonuses, but including Paragraph 1 Salary, games played bonuses and Exhibit 5 bonuses, shall be extended; provided, however, that the Player's Paragraph 1 Salary shall be extended in all circumstances.

My interpretation of the wording in Article 9.1.(d).(i) suggests the first year of Hamilton and Pitlick's Entry Level Contract (ELC) will be burned without regard to where they play next season, whether that be the WHL, AHL, or NHL. Because of that, I think we can be fairly sure the Oilers are planning (at this time) to have both players play in the AHL. If they were unsure, it might arguably have made sense to leave both players unsigned until after the 2011/12 season, because that way their ELC's would run for three years starting next season, instead of only having 2 seasons left as seems to be the case now*.

Practically speaking, I think this means both Martindale and Davidson are likely slated to return to the CHL next season, unsigned. First of all, the Oilers are very near the contract limit at this time. According to capgeek, the Oilers are currently at 50 contracts and couldn't sign these players to ELC's even if they wanted to**. Secondly, why sign them now if you're going to assign them to CHL anyways, provided it burns one of the 3 ELC seasons to sign them now? Why not just wait until next spring, sign them, and have 3 years remaining on their ELC's starting next fall, instead of signing them now and having only 2 years remaining come next fall?

After all that, the interesting thing to note here (in my opinion), and the "arbitrary" part mentioned in the title, is that next year would be a slide year for Hamilton and Pitlick, according to Article 9.1.(d).(ii), had been signed in the calendar year of 2010, instead of the calendar year of 2011:

In the event that a Player signs his first SPC at age 18 and has had his SPC extended pursuant to Subsection (i), and such Player does not play at least ten (10) NHL Games in the second season under that SPC, then the term of his SPC and his number of years in the Entry Level System shall be extended for one (1) additional year. Unless a Player and Club expressly agree to the contrary, in the event a Player's SPC is extended an additional year in accordance with this Subsection, all terms of the SPC, with the exception of Signing Bonuses, but including Paragraph 1 Salary, games played bonuses and Exhibit 5 bonuses, shall be extended; provided, however, that the Player's Paragraph 1 Salary shall be extended in all circumstances.

This is kind of an odd situation, I'm not entirely sure if this is by design, or just a "flaw", or oversight, that no one caught at the time the CBA was ratified. Why should Hamilton have seen his ELC contract last(after sliding twice) until the end of the 2014/15 season if he signed on Sept. 30, 2010, but only until the end of the 2013/14 season if he signed in April of 2011, provided he plays less than 10 NHL games in the 2011/12 season in both cases? I do understand that the motivation towards that rule as it relates to Sept.16-Dec. 31 born players, but it just seems kind of silly that the same player is treated differently based on when he's signed, even if he's assigned to the same leagues in both situations.

So, why didn't the Oilers sign Hamilton and Pitlick at some point in the calendar year of 2010 instead of waiting for 2011? We don't know for sure, but here are a couple guesses:

(1) The 50 contract limit - I'm not sure exactly how the slide rule works with a player you've already assigned to junior, perhaps they "slide" the second the sign the contract, but maybe that situation is dealt with differently? Part of the reason the Oilers may not have signed Pitlick and Hamilton in the summer/fall of 2010 might be that those players would have counted towards the 50 contracts until they were assigned to junior, and perhaps the Oilers decided that would limit their ability to sign some other players they wanted to sign to NHL contracts? I suppose they could have reached agreements with a couple of players, and formally signed them once Pitlick and Hamilton were returned to junior and opened a couple spots in the 50 contract list.

(2) Both Parties need to be interested in signing. Players have agents, and I'm sure the agents would know about this wrinkle. Why would Pitlick sign a contract in 2010 unless he were about to make the team? It makes more sense for him (and Hamilton) to wait until the 2011 year to sign, precisely because his ELC would end one year sooner if he waits to sign, provided he doesn't play in the NHL in 10/11.

After the 2010 draft, I was idly wondering if it was just coincidence, or if it might be a new strategy of the Oilers to select late birthday players, trying to get their prospects to the AHL as soon as possible. The 2011 draft doesn't prove anything, but does seem to suggest it might have just been the way it worked out with the NA players they selected in 2010, as none of their 2011 NA draftees were born in that Sept.16-Dec.31 window.

NOTE: This was a CBA wrinkle I hadn't heard even mentioned until recently. In doing some research I found this thread at HF which would seem to be support for this interpretation. I can't remember where I first read about this (I think it might have been somewhere where I was first reading about the Flames trying to sign Bartschi), I would (and will) provide a link if I can recall where I first saw this noted.

* It might still have made sense to sign them at that time, even if it potentially burns a year while they are in the WHL, if the team thought returning the player to the WHL could result in the player deciding they are unhappy with the organization and re-entering the draft. The same line of reasoning could apply to Martindale and Davidson, as well.

** That said, the room could potentially be created depending on what happens with Marincin and Nugent Hopkins. Should those players be returned to junior, it would create a contract spot or two for Martindale or Davidson should their play warrant it. This might make more sense for Davidson, should he outplay Marincin in camp, in that Davidson could take the AHL spot that has probably been provisionally kept for Marincin should the Oilers feel Marincin would be better served by another year in the WHL, and Davidson by moving on to the AHL.speedshttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-25035426094788685592011-06-24T07:33:00.003-06:002011-06-24T07:51:47.728-06:002011 Top 31: 1 - 9I don't think I actually look at this tier as 9 more or less equal talents, but it does look murky in the middle. I'd be surprised to see Zibanejad, Hamilton, or Murphy go top 3, or Nugent Hopkins, Landeskog, or Larsson go 7-9, but other than that, I don't know where to break this group into tiers.

9 Zibanejad: Sure sounds like he'll go higher than this, I would like to see a bit more offence but if he had it he'd probably jump way up the list, as close as it seems these top 9 are grouped.

8 Murphy: The ultimate high risk/high reward. Craig Button says he sees a Zubov like player. That would work.

7 Hamilton: Very complete sounding player, with more than enough offensive to potentially play on a top pair at some point down the road.

6 Landeskog: I have him sliding just a little bit because I think his offence might be a little shy of the other forwards.

5 Strome: Not much to say here, I don't really understand why he's not generally ranked a little bit higher, but it's so tight I guess it's not that surprising. Very good numbers, young player for the draft, I think he's a bit underrated.

4 Larsson: I sure wish he'd brought more offence this year. I know he's in a men's league,and apparently moved up the depth chart, but it's still a little bit disconcerting.

3 Huberdeau: He had a fantastic season. I'm not sure how much The Memorial Cup plays into a team's evaluation, but it can't have hurt his ranking in this draft.

2 Couturier: I decided there were just too many scouting reports in favour of RNH to ignore. I don't mind abandoning consensus a little bit when it comes to defencemen like Gudbranson since I think those types of D are generally overrated by NHL teams. But, NHL teams are generally pretty good at assessing forwards. Given that, it's fair to ask why I still have Couturier as high as I do. I think his offensive upside is under-appreciated, and if it's really close between the 4 forwards after RNH, he has the best track record.

1 Nugent Hopkins: Interested to see what he looks like in EDM, I will be more surprised if the Oilers pass on Nugent Hopkins than I would have been last year if the Oilers selected Seguin. Fantastic hockey sense.speedshttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-37536602090470157542011-06-23T21:15:00.000-06:002011-06-23T21:22:10.810-06:002011 Top 31: 10 - 24I have this tier a little bit bigger than most pundits, who generally say the draft drops off around 20. I must say, I'm more comfortable with that assessment having read Dave Shoalts's article, in which Brian Burke suggests he sees it much the same way.

24 Morrow

23 Rattie: Which Rattie is the real one, the guy who seemingly struggled after the arrival of Johansen and Niederreiter, or the guy scoring at a torrid pace before they returned? If Rattie's stats took a dip because the returning players started to receive the PP ice-time that Rattie had been using, he might be undervalued even at this spot.

22 Phillips

21 Beaulieu: I have him a bit lower than most, but within this tier I'm not sure it means all this much. His hockey sense has been questioned, and for me that's a big factor.

20 Siemens*: The perfect argument for a 19 year old draft. How much of his success is due to playing on a powerhouse team with one of the best D in the WHL? I'm not sure, and that's why he's a little lower down the list.

19 Klefbom*

18 Brodin*: Love hockey sense in players, if I rated D as highly as many seem to he'd be higher in my rankings.

17 Puempel

16 Grimaldi: Talk about a tough guy to rank. By the time you get to this point in the draft, you start to have to decide between high risk/high reward vs. lower risk/smaller reward. Grimaldi sounds like he'd be on the higher risk side of the ledger.

15 Scheifele

14 McNeill: Not too much separates McNeill from Scheifele in my rankings. I rate Scheifele just below because I think teams tend to overvalue the U-18's.

13 Oleksiak: This represents a bit of a gamble, but his offensive production in the NCAA is better than one would normally imagine for a 6'7" D.

12 Khokhlachev*: My guess is Khokhlachev won't go this high, and there are sensible reasons to have him lower than this. I'm not sure how relevant the "Russian" factor is, so I'll give it less weight than I'm sure the teams do. He did come over to play in the CHL, so that would seem to suggest he's willing to give the NHL a better chance than some, but one does wonder what his options might look like in two years if he hasn't yet cracked the NHL.

11 Armia

10 Bartschispeedshttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-73401221319663529412011-06-23T08:48:00.002-06:002011-06-23T09:08:53.025-06:002011 Top 31: 25 - 31One of the problems with doing these lists annually is that I know I'm doing so missing some pieces of information that could cause players to move a fair bit. Player X isn't coach-able, Y will do whatever it takes to make it, Z has some personal problem. I think, for the most part, this stuff doesn't make a big difference as to where each player is ranked, but in the cases where it makes a sizable difference, I'm out of the loop and that's going to hurt the quality of the list. I hope that by nicking the types of players I think NHL organizations generally overvalue, I can post a list that at least makes for interesting conversation, but I do so knowing it's not without its drawbacks.

This year, I'm not going to bother with too many comments on the player's game and style. There are a number of lists detailing that information and I'm sure they do a better job than I would. Instead, I'll write some comments regarding particular players of interest and/or players where my ranking is a little different than the general consensus.

I believe 25th overall, more or less, represents the start of the next tier of talent in this draft, but I'm having a difficult time ranking these guys within the tiers, at least below the first tier. It's a bit of a cop out, but depending on the day I can make arguments for different players at different slots. I arbitrarily cut the list at 31, EDM's pick in the 2nd round, but in my mind the difference in player quality from 31 to 40 is somewhere between minimal and non-existent. Players with an * beside their name are the "late birthday" players I mentioned yesterday. I'll have another section tonight, with the top 9 posted Friday morning.

31 Ritchie*: Ritchie is the first of a few players here that I think represent risky picks, but I believe at this point of the draft it makes sense to select a more risky player provided he has enough upside to compensate the increased chance of a miss. I'd happily take 1 top 3/6F and 3 busts vs. 1 top 6/9F, 2 4th line players, and 1 bust, but others may disagree.

30 Nieto: There's a not bad chance that Matt Nieto has fallen a bit further down the rankings he should. The year prior to this, he recorded a team-leading 29 points in 24 games for the NTDP, with a team leading +20. For comparison, some teammates were Brandon Saad (26 pts in 24 games, +15), Nick Shore (20 pts in 26 games, +14) and Rocco Grimaldi (20 pts in 32 games, -19). Nieto recorded 23 points in 39 games for Boston University this past, certainly not stunning offensive totals. A lot can change in a year, perhaps has hasn't developed exactly as planned, but he did jump to college while some of the other US players either went to the CHL or stayed with the NTDP. He might be a bit of a sleeper.

29 Saad

28 Namestnikov

27 Connor Murphy: Murphy is a role of the dice, he offers an intriguing upside for a player this late but he's had such injury problems it's not all that surprising he isn't considered a top 20 pick. His upside may be too enticing to ignore, it'll be interesting to see who takes a gamble.

26 Prince: That is a lot of offense to let slide.

25 Millerspeedshttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-78897401899404231962011-06-22T20:29:00.005-06:002011-06-22T22:33:28.495-06:00The "Late Birthday" AdvantageI have been meaning to post something about the late birthday advantage for awhile, but I had kind of forgotten about that idea until I read this interesting article over at Oilersnation. Cam Charron's piece looks at the July 1st - Sept 15th players from a slightly different perspective than mine, but it's well worth the read for anyone who's interested in the minutia of draft decision making.

The advantage I'm speaking of doesn't refer to the "more upside" angle*, it refers to an edge which is a result of the current CBA. Currently, teams hold the rights to a drafted player for 7 accrued seasons, or until age 27, whichever comes first. The interesting part, as it relates to the draft, is that "Age" is calculated based on a player's age as of June 30th. What this means for 2011 draftees (any year, really) is that two players who reach the NHL 3 years after their draft could be treated differently with respect to UFA age, depending on their birthday. If Connor Murphy (DOB: March 26, 1993) plays 2 years of college hockey followed by one year in the AHL before joining the NHL at the start of the 2014/15 season, he will be eligible for UFA status July 1, 2020. However, should Duncan Siemens (DOB: September 7, 1993) play 2 years of in the WHL followed by one year in the AHL before joining the NHL at the start of the 2014/15 season, he will be eligible for UFA status July 1, 2021.

I think this is a less significant element for players at the top of the draft, because they will be probably be in the NHL early enough that "7 accrued years" will be the determining factor, not the "age 27" option. I would tend to imagine this would be a more significant consideration as you get later in the draft and you don't expect the players to be NHL ready for 3 or 4 years anyways**. By no means am I suggesting a team should pass on a superior prospect because of a birthday, but when you've got a couple guys rated evenly and you're picking at 98 OV, I think it's a factor at least meriting consideration.

Some of the notable players with a late birthday in this draft are:

Ryan Strome, F (July 11, 1993)
Duncan Siemens, D (Sept 7, 1993)
Jonas Brodin, D (July 12, 1993)
Oskar Klefbom, D (July 20, 1993)
John Gibson, G (July 14, 1993)
Alexander Khokhlachev, F (Sept 9, 1993)
Brett Ritchie, F (July 1, 1993)
Jeremy Boyce, F (Aug 28, 1993)
Mario Lucia, LW (Aug 25, 1993)
Myles Bell, D (Aug 19, 1993)
Vincent Trocheck, F (July 11, 1993)
Mike Reilly, D (July 13, 1993)
Xavier Oullette, D (July 29, 1993)
Nick Cousins, F (July 20, 1993)
Sergei Shmelev, F (Aug 28, 1993)
Alessio Bertaggia, F (July 30, 1993)
Jordan Binnington, G (July 11, 1993)
Stephen Michalek, G (Aug 6, 1993)
Jaroslav Pavelka, G (Sept 12, 1993)

* Although, this angle seems to make a lot of sense to me. I've done no investigation, but it "feels right" that a player born Sept 12, 1993 might have more opportunity to grow than a player born Sept 17, 1992.

** Additionally, a somewhat more important factor for D and G in the first and second rounds than it would be for forwards.speedshttp://firstname.lastname@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-2850270494073432772011-06-18T11:15:00.002-06:002011-06-18T11:29:07.589-06:00The Need for Defensive DepthMany fans seem to be of the opinion that the Oilers should, or will, draft a defenseman with their 2nd first round pick should they select Nugent Hopkins. I don't share that sentiment, but I thought I would explore the idea that the Oilers "need" to add to their defensive depth chart in this year's draft.

Before the 2010 draft, the defensive depth chart looked something like:

Peckham

Plante

Petry

Motin

Chorney

Hesketh

Bigos

I'll get to the current depth chart in a bit, but I think everyone would agree that the defensive depth chart at the time of the 2010 draft looked weaker than it does now, prior to the 2011 draft. Even so, the team was so concerned with their depth chart on defence at the 2010 draft that they used 4 of their 1st 5 picks on forwards. If there were ever a time for the Oilers to "draft for need" and address their defense, it was then. But they didn't.

Three drafts have passed since the Oilers named Stu MacGregor their head scout. In that time, the Oilers have had 3 first round picks along with 4 second round picks. They have selected 6 forwards and one defenceman (Marincin). I don't think we should try to read too much into that, but at the same time it probably shows us that the Oilers are willing to take the BPA regardless of position. Unless they are of the same mindset as me, preferring F's unless the BPA is clearly a D or G.

Right now, the Oilers depth chart might look something like:

Petry

Marincin

Peckham

Teubert

Plante

Chorney

Blain

Davidson

Fedun

Motin

Bigos

Hesketh

I think you could make a good argument that the depth chart looks much better now than a year ago. All of the 2010 D draftees (Marincin, Blain, and Davidson) had very good seasons. Petry and Peckham showed better at the NHL level than I, and probably most, were expecting. They added Teubert (and Fedun, no idea where to slot him but I'll go with 9th). Chorney was better than he had been the previous two seasons. The only top prospects on D to apparently stagnate or move backwards were Plante and Motin.

Of course the depth chart could be improved by adding a D at 1,19, and/or 31, but recent history suggests the Oilers won't necessarily draft for need, and even if they are interested in doing so, the "need" isn't as big as it was at the 2010 draft.speedshttp://email@example.com:blogger.com,1999:blog-14549434.post-45904152768065684642011-06-09T09:14:00.004-06:002011-06-09T21:23:25.967-06:00How Much Rebuilding is Too Much?In the old CBA, I was a big proponent of the Oilers rebuilding. I believed the Oilers were stuck in a cycle of finishing 7th-10th in the West and weren't likely to have future success without dropping to the bottom for a couple of seasons. Even with that background, I have not been the most vocal fan of the Edmonton rebuild over the past year and a half. I don't doubt that rebuilding can work in this CBA, but I'm less sure it's worth* all the on-ice losing in a CBA that makes it very difficult for a team to keep its core together over the long term.

Daryl Katz was on "Oilers Lunch" a week or two ago and suggested it's a luxury to own a team in such a sophisticated hockey market. As mentioned, I'm generally not an advocate for rebuilding in this CBA, but if a thing's worth doing, it's worth doing "right". Especially if your market is as savvy as Daryl Katz believes, and will continue to support a 30th place team as long as there is the promise of a future contender.

So, the question becomes, how much rebuilding is too much? How many older player with value should the team trade, if they can get a reasonable return? What follows is an example of what the Oilers may be able to do, and what the roster might look like, if they are willing to jump over the cliff. The trades specifically aren't meant to be perfect assessments of value; if you disagree with the value the Oilers are getting back, or giving, in one of the hypothetical trades by all means mention it and maybe we can fine tune it in the comments, but this post is more directed at the general idea and not so much as the specific players and picks returning.

I chose not to have any players waive NMC's to come to EDM since there's not much reason to think they'd want to play here. But, if it's true that EDM could acquire a guy like Drury in exchange for some valuable picks from NYR, and Drury was willing to waive his NMC (maybe he thinks that's better than being bought out, as has been rumored?), then that might be something to look at as well. Campbell has a NTC, but because the Oilers are first in the waiver claim priority list, they could probably work something out even if he doesn't really want to waive his NTC to go to Edmonton. If he were going to have such a big problem coming to Edmonton you probably wouldn't want to make the deal, so this assumes that you know Campbell would handle the trade or waive as professionally as one could hope. Thanks to capgeek for helping me put together the final roster so easily!

To CHI: Whitney
To EDM: Campbell, Leddy, Frolik, 18 OV, 36 OV, 2012 CHI 1st

To CLB: Gilbert, 31 OV
To EDM: Commodore, 8 OV

To VAN: 61 OV
To EDM: 29/30OV, Ballard

To BOS: Hemsky, 19 OV
To EDM: 9 OV, 2012 BOS 1st

This would leave the Oilers with 6 picks in the first 2 rounds (1st, 8th, 9th, 18th, 29/30th, and 36th picks) of the 2011 draft and 3 picks in the first round of the 2012 draft.

CAPGEEK.COM CAP CALCULATOR

FORWARDS
Taylor Hall ($3.750m) / Shawn Horcoff ($5.500m) / Jordan Eberle ($1.158m)
Magnus Paajarvi-Svensson ($1.525m) / Sam Gagner ($2.275m) / Linus Omark ($0.875m)
Michael Frolik ($2.500m) / Andrew Cogliano ($1.500m) / Ryan Jones ($1.500m)
Teemu Hartikainen ($0.875m) / Colin Fraser ($0.825m) / Gilbert Brule ($1.850m)
/ Anton Lander ($0.880m)

DEFENSEMEN
Kurtis Foster ($1.800m) / Brian Campbell ($7.142m)
Keith Ballard ($4.200m) / Nick Leddy ($1.116m)
Jeff Petry ($1.000m) / Ladislav Smid ($1.300m)
Mike Commodore ($3.750m) / Theo Peckham ($0.550m)

GOALTENDERS
Nikolai Khabibulin ($3.750m) / Devan Dubnyk ($0.800m)

BUYOUTS: Robert Nilsson ($0.416m)

CAPGEEK.COM TOTALS (follow @capgeek on Twitter)
(these totals are compiled without the bonus cushion)
SALARY CAP: $59,400,000; CAP PAYROLL: $50,839,541; BONUSES: $4,262,500
CAP SPACE (23-man roster): $8,560,459

Would it be wise for the Oilers to go in this direction, since they are rebuilding anyways? Do Hemsky and Whitney want to stay? The Oilers certainly have better information than I do, but I wouldn't be surprised if they were willing to take their chances going UFA in the next year or two.

* I'm talking about worth for fans of the team, not the off-ice business for the Oilers organization. As long as people still keep paying to come out, even if the team is terrible, losing money isn't a concern with Edmonton's rebuild.speedshttp://email@example.com