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Agency Coordination and Cross-Sector Collaboration in Fragile States
Summary and Keywords
Despite myriad descriptions and indicators used to define a fragile state, the international community has come to an agreement that a fragile state lacks the ability to maintain physical control of its territorial boundaries, provide basic public services, facilitate economic growth, and interact as a full member of the international community. Fragile states have historically experienced a disproportionate amount of natural disaster-related losses. For example, from 2005 to 2009, more than 50% of those impacted by a natural disaster lived in a fragile state, resulting in over $200 billion in losses. When natural disasters occur in such areas, they exacerbate already weak governance structures and further undermine their governments' capability to respond to the crisis while simultaneously addressing challenges related to poverty and conflict. To remedy these and other complex issues inherent in fragile states, scholars are beginning to recognize the importance of investigating how fragile states can mitigate natural disaster losses through effective agency coordination and cross-sector collaboration. Agency coordination, in the context of natural disaster response, refers to the integration of facilities, equipment, personnel, and communication by public agencies for supporting incident response activities. Cross-sector collaboration refers to the sharing of information and resources by organizations in two or more sectors to achieve an outcome that cannot be produced by organizations in one sector alone. Because forecasts suggest that natural disaster-related losses will only increase in fragile states owing to population growth, urbanization, and climate change, there is a pressing need to understand the ways public organizations not only coordinate before, during, and after a natural disaster, but also how they collaborate across organizational sectors.
Keywords: agency coordination, cross-sector collaboration, fragile states, disasters, Haiti
Despite myriad descriptions and indicators used to define a fragile state, there is consensus across the international community that a fragile state lacks the ability to maintain physical control of its territorial boundaries, provide basic public services, facilitate economic growth, and interact as a full member of the international community (Brinkerhoff, 2007; Fund for Peace, 2016; Mitra & Vivekananda, 2015). Fragile states have historically experienced a disproportionate amount of natural disaster-related losses. For example, from 2005 to 2009, more than 50% of those impacted by a natural disaster lived in a fragile state, resulting in over $200 billion in losses (Ghesquiere, 2016). When natural disasters occur in fragile states, they exacerbate already weak governance structures and further undermine their governments' ability to respond to the crisis, while simultaneously addressing challenges related to poverty and conflict (Ghesquiere, 2016). To remedy these and other complex issues inherent in fragile states, scholars are beginning to recognize the importance of investigating how fragile states can mitigate natural disaster losses through effective agency coordination and cross-sector collaborations.
On one hand, agency coordination refers to the integration of facilities, equipment, personnel, and communication to support incident response activities (Bharosa, Lee, & Janssen, 2010). Cross-sector collaboration, on the other hand, refers to the sharing of information and resources by organizations in two or more sectors to achieve an outcome that cannot be achieved by organizations in one sector alone (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006). In a humanitarian environment, such organizational sectors include international aid agencies, host governments, military, local, and regional nongovernmental organizations, private businesses, and others (Balcik et al., 2010; Cozzolino, 2012). Although some humanitarian organizations and scholars use the terms "coordination" and "collaboration" interchangeably, others differentiate these terms based on the strength of the relationship among the actors involved (Balcik et al., 2010). Thus, the major difference between coordination and collaboration, in the context of humanitarian relief, is that coordination refers to a weaker relationship among response agencies, whereas collaboration refers to a stronger relationship that focuses on building relationships and establishing trust before, during, and after a catastrophic incident. Because forecasts suggest that natural disaster-related losses will only increase in fragile states owing to population growth, urbanization, and climate change (Ghesquiere, 2016), there is a pressing need to understand how fragile states coordinate and collaborate across organizational sectors (Pettit & Beresford, 2009). The concepts of agency coordination and cross-sector collaboration in fragile states are elucidated here, using the 2010 Haiti Earthquake as the empirical setting.
Fragile States
What Is a Fragile State?
Across the international community, myriad descriptions and indicators describe a fragile state. The World Bank (2007), for example, defines a fragile state as a state that faces significant developmental challenges owing to weak institutional capacity, has ineffective governance structures, and remains plagued by political instability. Similarly, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2012) defines a fragile state as one having minimal capacity to provide basic government services and develop meaningful relationships with society. This delineation differs slightly from that of the World Bank, as it suggests that a state's fragility not only connotes the abrasion of a state's authority, but also the importance of their standing within society. The Fund for Peace (2016) argues that a fragile state lacks territorial control, legitimacy, the ability to provide public services, and the capacity to interact with other states as a full member of the international community. Unlike the World Bank and the OECD, the Fund for Peace suggests that a state's fragility also depends on its ability to interact across the international community.
Scholars have also offered several definitions of a fragile state. The Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC) (2006), for example, suggests that a fragile state is one that remains significantly vulnerable to both internal and external shocks as well as domestic and international conflicts. The Centre for Research on Human Inequality, Human Security, and Ethnicity (CRISE) defines a fragile state as one that is failing in authority, legitimacy, and service (Stewart & Brown, 2009). Brinkerhoff (2007) observes state fragility on a continuum, arguing that a failed state remains at one extreme and a vulnerable state remains at the other. A state's fragility along this continuum is measured by its inability to provide basic security, develop and espouse economic opportunities, and garner legitimacy from its citizens. Newbrander, Waldman, and Shepherd-Banigan (2011) also suggest that a state's legitimacy, along with its effectiveness, defines the extent of its fragility. The authors suggest that state legitimacy refers to the government's ability to provide core services and basic security, while effectiveness refers to how well a state is able to provide services and security. The OECD (2008) concurs that legitimacy and effectiveness remain highly correlated, recognizing that when a government is unable or unwilling to meet its constituents' most basic needs (e.g., food, health, safety, shelter), government remains largely ineffective.
In an attempt to incorporate the divergent descriptions, this entry defines a fragile state as one that lacks the ability to maintain physical control of territorial boundaries, provide basic public services, facilitate economic growth, and interact as a full member of the international community (Brinkerhoff, 2007; Fund for Peace, 2016; Mitra & Vivekananda, 2015). It is, however, important to note that the variations in conceptualization by the international community and scholars alike pose significant problems (Brinkerhoff & Johnson, 2009). Specifically, the lack of a singular definition of a fragile state undermines attempts to compare studies and observe trends over time. Similarly, fragile states continually move across trajectories (i.e., a state can move from stable toward fragile and vice versa) (Brinkerhoff, 2007), making it difficult to compare fragile states at any time.
Causes and Measures of State Fragility
Early research suggested that violent conflict remained the sole cause of state fragility (Naudé, Santos-Paulino, & McGillivray, 2011). Contemporary research, however, has neglected this claim, arguing that the causes of state fragility are both multicausal and multidimensional (Mcloughlin, 2012). After systematically reviewing both extant and contemporary literature, Mcloughlin (2012) suggests that the following factors are the main causes of state fragility: structural and economic, political and institutional, social, and international. According to Mcloughlin (2012), structural and economic causes include poverty, income inequalities, violent conflict, lack of natural resources, and urbanization; political and institutional causes comprise illegitimate and unauthoritative governance structures, political transitions, and the repression of political competition; social causes include gender inequality, weak or lack of social capital, and social exclusion; and international causes include the global political economy as well as global economic shocks (i.e., increases in food and oil prices). These causes are even more evident in reports that seek to measure state fragility.
Official development agencies such as the World Bank and other international organizations, including the Fund for Peace and the OECD, have developed tools or have used existing tools as proxies for measuring state fragility. For example, in 2005, the World Bank created the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). The CPIA serves as a diagnostic tool that rates countries using 16 indicators spread across four clusters: economic management (e.g., fiscal policies), structural policies (e.g., trade, private sector, business regulatory environment), social inclusion and social equity policies (e.g., gender equality, building human resources, and equity of the distribution of public resources), and public-sector management institutions (effectiveness, transparency, accountability, etc.) (Woolcock, 2014; World Bank, 2013). Using these 16 indicators, the World Bank rates countries on a scale of 1 (a very fragile state) to 6 (a very stable state). The World Bank takes the average score, and if the score remains at or below 3.2, the state is considered fragile. At its inception, the CPIA did not serve as a tool for measuring state fragility, but later became a proxy for doing so as World Bank analysts found that the CPIA remained highly correlated with other indicators of state fragility (Woolcock, 2014).
In addition to the CPIA, the Fund for Peace (2016) annually publishes the Fragile States Index, a tool that measures a state's fragility based on social (e.g., demographic pressures, natural disasters, violence and discrimination), economic (e.g., poverty, unemployment), and political (e.g., state legitimacy, public services, civil liberties) indicators. Finally, the OECD combines the data gathered by the Fund for Peace's Fragile State Index and the World Bank's CPIA to prepare an annual State Fragility Report (OECD, 2015). Based on these datasets, the OECD identified five indicators of state fragility: peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice, effective and accountable institutions, economic foundations, and resilience (OECD, 2015). Although three tools have consistently provided policymakers with annual reports on what states have moved into and out of fragility, the different variables used to measure state fragility have resulted in different states classified as fragile.
Natural Disasters and Fragile States
A natural disaster refers to an event triggered by a natural hazard that overwhelms local response capabilities and undermines social and economic development in the affected area (UNISDR, 2007). Hence, a natural disaster is not measured by the magnitude of the natural hazard, but by the ability of human systems to respond to its negative effects. Historically, fragile states have experienced a disproportionate amount of natural disaster-related losses. In fact, from 2005 to 2009, more than 50% of people impacted by a natural disaster resided in a fragile state (Ghesquiere, 2016). Furthermore, in 2010 alone, more than 42 million people were displaced by a natural disaster, up from 17 million in 2009 in fragile states (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction [UNISDR], 2015). Numerous examples of natural disasters affecting fragile states abound. The droughts in Chad in 2005 and 2009, for example, affected 1.6 million and 2.4 million, respectively (UNISDR, 2015). The Myanmar cyclone in 2008 killed 138,366 and affected over 2.2 million (UNISDR, 2015), and the 2010 Haiti Earthquake resulted in roughly 316,000 fatalities and over $11 billion in damage estimates (U.S. Department of State, 2012). More recently, the 2014 floods in Bosnia and Herzegovina killed 20 and displaced nearly 90,000 (Ghesquiere, 2016). When natural disasters like these and others occur in fragile states, they exacerbate the states' fragility by increasing their vulnerability to natural disasters, undermining already weak governance structures, and placing additional stress on humanitarian agencies to respond (Mitra & Vivekananda, 2015).
Vulnerability refers to an entity's susceptibility to a natural hazard (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2013). Fragile nations are significantly more vulnerable to the negative effects of natural disasters than stable and developed countries (Phillips, Neal, & Webb, 2011). The susceptibility of fragile states to natural disasters stems from deficits in their built, social, and economic environment. For example, the infrastructure of fragile states, including buildings, homes, and roadways, are often not designed to withstand the impact of a major natural disaster (Phillips, Neal, & Webb, 2011). This weakness can have substantial impacts on the social environment, as these poorly designed infrastructures are more likely to generate higher death tolls when they fail. With widespread loss of human life, communities can then experience greater loss of social capital, a key component of resilience (Phillips, Neal, & Webb, 2011). Finally, from an economic standpoint, large portions of a fragile state's population live in extreme poverty and, as a result, have few financial resources to adopt risk-reducing measures (Phillips, Neal, & Webb, 2011). This lack of individual and household preparedness places additional stress on the host government to provide basic necessities (e.g., food, water, shelter).
Natural disasters can also overburden and undermine the ability of governments of fragile states to respond adequately and effectively, thus fueling grievances among affected communities (Mitra & Vivekananda, 2015). For example, during the 2011 East African drought, poor governance over the distribution of food intensified group grievances, resulting in a humanitarian crisis plagued with violence (Harris, Keen, & Mitchell, 2013). An ineffective and inequitable natural disaster response can also challenge the host government's social contract to support affected communities. The 2006 Kyrgyzstan Earthquake, for instance, revealed how a government's inability to distribute emergency relief equitably across the affected area can spur protests and public demonstrations (Mitra & Vivekananda, 2015). Moreover, natural disasters can weaken state capacity and, in turn, encourage criminal activity and produce power vacuums (Mitra & Vivekananda, 2015). The Afghanistan droughts in 2006 and 2007, for example, caused populations to migrate, with some choosing to join armed groups (Heijmans et al., 2009).
Finally, natural disasters can place a heavy burden on humanitarian relief organizations, causing greater harm than good (Mitra & Vivekananda, 2015). Humanitarian relief organizations play a vital role in natural disaster response, especially in areas plagued by political unrest as they seek to save lives and preserve and restore communities (Mitra & Vivekananda, 2015). However, in rapid-onset natural disasters, humanitarian relief organizations can inadvertently make conditions worse by failing to consider key environmental issues. For example, during the 2010 Haiti Earthquake, United Nations peacekeeping forces failed to treat water sources, sparking the cholera outbreak, a waterborne disease that killed thousands of Haitians (Mitra & Vivekananda, 2015). This oversight prompted riots between protestors and United Nations troops (Mitra & Vivekanada, 2015).
In light of forecasts suggesting that natural disaster-related losses will only increase in fragile states as a result of population growth, urbanization, and climate change (Ghesquiere, 2016), there is a growing need to understand how fragile states can reduce their losses. In an attempt to remedy these issues and others inherent in fragile states, scholars are beginning to recognize the importance of investigating how fragile states can mitigate natural disaster losses through effective agency coordination and cross-sector collaboration.
Agency Coordination
What Is Agency Coordination?
Coordination broadly describes the integration and interaction of various humanitarian relief actors. Agency coordination, in the context of natural disaster response, more specifically refers to the integration of facilities, equipment, personnel, and communication for supporting incident response activities (Bharosa, Lee, & Janssen, 2010). To integrate these resources effectively, governments must establish a coordinated response system consisting of several agencies, spanning across multiple jurisdictions and levels of government (Kapucu, 2009). However, developing such systems remains a considerable challenge for public agencies as these actors maintain different goals, visions, expertise, and resources to respond to a natural disaster (Balcik et al., 2010; Kapucu, 2009). In fact, Rey (2001) argues that a lack of coordination has and continues to be the greatest challenge in humanitarian relief efforts. This weakness can increase operating costs, lengthen response times, duplicate efforts, and, ultimately, increase the number of lives affected and property damage (Balcik et al., 2010).
Agency Coordination in Fragile States
Effective coordination, especially in a humanitarian environment, remains elusive, primarily because of the disparate actors involved in humanitarian relief (Stephenson, 2005). Such actors can be divided into two large categories (Kovács & Spens, 2007). The first category consists of entities that are intrinsically linked to the host government, including the military as well as local, state, and regional response agencies, whereas the second category contains international organizations such as the United Nations, large aid agencies, and nongovernmental organizations with a global reach (Kovács & Spens, 2007). A considerable amount of research has focused on how these disparate actors coordinate response activities through the lens of humanitarian logistics (see Cozzolino, 2012; Kovács & Spens, 2007, 2008; Overstreet et al., 2011; Pettit & Beresford, 2009; Stephenson, 2005; Van Wassenhove, 2006). Humanitarian logistics refers to "the process of planning, implementing, and controlling the efficient, cost-effective flow and storage of goods and materials as well [as] related information, from the point of origin to the point of consumption for the purpose of alleviating the suffering of vulnerable people" (Cooper, Lambert, & Pagh, 1997, p. 1). Kovács and Spens (2007) argue that humanitarian logistics encompasses both continuous aid work and natural disaster relief. Continuous aid work refers to natural disasters that require constant and continuous support (e.g., drought), whereas natural disaster relief is reserved for sudden-onset catastrophes (e.g., earthquakes) and accounts for approximately 80% of response operations (Overstreet et al., 2011). As a result, it is imperative for fragile states and humanitarian relief actors to develop a system for coordinating response efforts.
Unlike relatively stable states, fragile states rely heavily on international organizations to coordinate the natural disaster response and recovery activities (Cozzolino, 2012). The United Nations has historically served as the lead international organization for assisting states lacking the capacity to respond to emergencies and natural disasters. For example, in 1991, the United Nations developed the Emergency Relief Coordinator position and created the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (Cozzolino, 2012). The Emergency Relief Coordinator plays a vital role in natural disaster response by maintaining authority over all emergencies and natural disasters requiring humanitarian assistance. The individual occupying this position also chairs the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, which serves as a forum to discuss coordination, policy development, and decision making among humanitarian actors (Cozzolino, 2012). In 1993, the United Nations General Assembly established the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC). The UNDAC, at the discretion of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, can deploy teams within 12–48 hours to any nation in the world, free of charge to the host government. Soon after, the United Nations established the Department of Humanitarian affairs, which was later reorganized into the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (OCHA, n.d.). As of 2017, OCHA serves as the overall division charged with alleviating human suffering caused by natural disasters and emergencies, and coordinates effective and ethical humanitarian action (OCHA, n.d.). OCHA also plays a key role in advocating for human rights, promoting natural disaster preparedness and prevention efforts, and facilitating sustainable solutions (OCHA, n.d.). Although these and other U.N. actions pioneered early humanitarian efforts, it was not until the Humanitarian Reform of 2005 that the United Nations made one of its most innovative attempts to coordinate humanitarian disaster relief efforts—the development of the cluster system (Altay & Labonte, 2011).
Clusters refer to groups of humanitarian organizations (both U.N. and non-U.N. organizations) that can assist in critical humanitarian sectors (e.g., shelter and health) (OCHA, n.d.). The cluster system serves as the United Nations' coordinating approach for humanitarian emergencies and disasters as it establishes divisions of labor and common operating procedures, and enhances partnerships (Balcik et al., 2010). Currently, the United Nations has identified 11 critical sectors: logistics, nutrition, emergency shelter, camp management and coordination, health, protection, food security, emergency telecommunication, early recovery, education, and sanitation, water, and hygiene (OCHA, n.d.). Each of these clusters contains a primary organization designed to maintain responsibility for identifying and coordinating resources. Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the United Nations' cluster system and the organizations that remain responsible for a particular disaster response function. For example, the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) serves as the lead organization for logistics and emergency telecommunications, whereas the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) leads efforts related to nutrition and education as well as sanitation, health, and hygiene.
Factors Undermining Agency Coordination
Balcik et al. (2010) have identified several factors that significantly undermine agency coordination in humanitarian relief efforts. First, although relief agencies operate under the same general goal (e.g., to help those affected and alleviate suffering), they often differ in their mission, motive, and capacity as well as their geographical, cultural, and organizational policies (Van Wassenhove, 2006). Communication and language differences can also create additional barriers. For example, meetings held in English may unintentionally exclude non-English-speaking organizations. Second, because the humanitarian relief environment remains largely unregulated, no agency has legitimate authority to make organizations engage in a designated coordination system (Seaman, 1999; Stephenson, 2005). Generally, the national government of the affected country will maintain responsibility for relief operations, causing international relief organizations to abide by the laws and policies set forth by the national government. However, when host governments become overwhelmed and dysfunctional, the roles and responsibilities of incoming humanitarian relief become unclear (Seaman, 1999). Third, because donors play a pivotal role in supplying the necessary funds to support natural disaster response efforts, relief actors are often required to view donors as customers rather than as supporters. Donors, for example, can place restrictions on their donations by specifying how to disburse the funding. Similarly, relief organizations often compete for funding. This competition can cause relief organizations to withhold information to maintain a competitive advantage (Stephenson, 2005). Fourth, the timing, location, and magnitude of natural disasters, as well as the political, economic, and social environment of the affected area, are often unpredictable. These uncertainties make it difficult to establish pre-disaster coordinating structures that remain both efficient and flexible. Fifth, relief organizations often struggle to maintain the necessary resources to meet the demand. This lack of financial, human, technological, and informational resources can cause relief organizations to compete for resources, which, in turn, may cause organizations to cease coordinating with other organizations. Such competitions can also transpire into another problem—oversupply. Natural disasters often already generate enormous sums of materials and resources, some of which are unusable or unsuitable. When such supplies arrive, staff must process, store, and disperse the resources as needed, an incredibly time-consuming task. Finally, establishing an effective coordinating system is both timely and costly. For example, organizations must pay personnel salaries and travel costs to the affected area while simultaneously providing funding and resources to meet the host government's needs. Together, these challenges can significantly undermine attempts to establish an effective coordination structure, especially in fragile states.
Cross-Sector Collaboration
What Is a Cross-Sector Collaboration?
Over the past 20 years, there has been a shift toward preparing and responding to natural disasters in a collaborative environment (Cozzolino, 2012). Collaboration refers to "broad and sincere relationships among individuals and organizations to encourage trust, advocate a team atmosphere, build consensus, and facilitate communication" (Blanchard et al., 2007, p. 4). Building on this definition, a cross-sector collaboration refers to formal and informal organizational arrangements involving two or more sectors working collectively to achieve an outcome that cannot be achieved by organizations in one sector alone (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006). In a humanitarian environment, these organizational sectors include international relief entities, host governments, local and regional nongovernmental organizations, private businesses, donors, and others (Balcik et al., 2010). Such actors provide varying levels of expertise, equipment, and other resources to assist in natural disaster response and recovery operations. Collaboration thus allows these disparate sectors to transfer, obtain, and share expertise and resources to better prepare, respond and recover from natural disasters (Barringer & Harrison, 2000).
The literature on cross-sector collaboration has focused extensively on the United States, thus neglecting much of the international community. Several holistic frameworks exist within this literature and, though centered on a stable state, provide important insights into the design and management of cross-sector collaborations (e.g., Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Thomson & Perry, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012; Koschmann, Kuhn, & Pfarrer, 2012). Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2015) provide a thorough review of the major theoretical frameworks and findings related to cross-sector collaboration in recent years. Based on this review, they have identified seven major categories organizational leaders should consider when developing cross-sector collaborations. These categories are general antecedent conditions; initial conditions, drivers, and linking mechanisms; collaborative processes; collaboration structures; intersections of processes and structure; endemic conflicts and tensions; and accountability and outcomes (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2015).
General antecedent conditions involve the availability of resources, the institutional and political environment, and the need to have multiple organizations working together to address the given issue. Initial conditions, drivers, and linking mechanisms emphasize the importance for collaborative partners to agree on the problem as well as initial goals and objectives. This category also stresses the importance of using preexisting relationships as a means of judging the trustworthiness of potential collaborative partners. The collaborative processes category accentuates the importance of trust, inclusive partnerships, establishment of communication systems, and planning and building capacity to achieve mutual goals and objectives. Another important part of the collaborative process is building legitimacy among both external constituents and collaborative partners. Collaboration structures broadly refer to the need to develop rules, agreements, and norms of engagement among collaborative partners. The intersections of processes and structure category involves the need to establish leadership roles and governance structures, and to have a thorough understanding of the collaborative partners' capacity and competencies. The endemic conflicts and tensions category refers to being aware of power imbalances and establishing mechanisms to address tension. Finally, the accountability and outcomes category emphasizes the need to establish formal and informal accountability mechanisms as well as create immediate, intermediate, and long-term outcomes. These seven categories provide important insights into the design and management of cross-sector collaborations and also show the inherent complexity of engaging in cross-sector collaborations.
Cross-Sector Collaboration in Fragile States
Effective humanitarian relief, especially in fragile states, requires that the organizations of competing sectors develop relationships prior to the onset of a catastrophic natural disaster. Before, during, and after a natural disaster, fragile states should consider collaborating with a number of key players, including governments, international aid agencies, nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and donors. Figure 2 presents a graphical illustration of these players. The lines connecting these key players represent their potential interactions. Not all collaborations, however, require the integration of all the key players. The decision to initiate a collaboration and include a key player depends on the expertise and resources needed to address the societal problem successfully.
Affected host governments maintain overall responsibility for preparing, responding, and recovering from natural disasters. As a result, the affected host government also maintains authority to initiate operations and mobilize resources (Cozzolino, 2012). These governments can also call upon their military for assistance, though at a relatively high cost. When host governments' resources become overwhelmed, they can then request assistance from international aid agencies as well as neighboring countries. However, the engagement of other countries remains a delicate matter, as many fragile states do not enjoy favorable relationships with their neighboring states (Cozzolino, 2012).
International Aid Agencies
International aid agencies are the organizations and offices, such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, responsible for administering foreign aid to civilians. International aid agencies are an important collaborative partner, as these entities not only have a wealth of response resources, but they are also very agile and adaptable (Van Wassenhove, 2006). For example, because they have experience responding to myriad rapid and continuous natural disasters, international aid organizations are capable of obtaining and mobilizing logistical support quickly and in different environments (Van Wassenhove, 2006). Finally, and as mentioned earlier, international aid agencies like the United Nations frequently assume leadership of coordinating natural disaster response and recovery in fragile states.
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) refer to local, national, and international non-profit organizations. NGOs, as well as faith-based organizations, are important collaborative partners, for they provide critical health and human services to community members (Simo & Bies, 2007). These entities can range from large, international nonprofit organizations to small, regional nonprofit organizations. CARE, for example, is a leading international NGO that deploys emergency response teams to help disaster-stricken communities by providing emergency food, shelter, water, and sanitation supplies to survivors.
Private Sector
Humanitarian relief agencies have traditionally only interacted with the private sector as needed and solely on a monetary basis (Cozzolino, 2012). In fact, it was not until the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami that humanitarian actors recognized the importance of engaging corporate businesses in pre-disaster planning (Cozzolino, 2012). This incident showed that private companies could assist well beyond the typical monetary goods. For example, Coca-Cola bottled large quantities of water and used its distribution network to deliver the water to relief sites during this disaster (Cozzolino, 2012). Furthermore, several transportation companies, including British Airways, the United Parcel Service (UPS), and Federal Express (FedEx), provided free or subsidized transportation for relief cargo (Cozzolino, 2012).
Overtime, for-profit organizations have become more aware of the benefits of collaborating with humanitarian relief agencies (Cozzolino, 2012). For example, private businesses now view providing funding and goods as a means of contributing to society while simultaneously enhancing their reputation and image. Additionally, companies may be interested in establishing relationships with affected governments as a means of detecting new markets and business opportunities to deliver their services. Similarly, companies may become interested in developing new or improved products, services, or processes to help humanitarian agencies to respond more effectively to affected areas. For instance, companies in the pharmaceutical, packaging, food, and other logistical sectors have developed tailored products specifically for humanitarian purposes (Cozzolino, 2012).
Donors play an invaluable role in humanitarian relief operations as they provide the majority of the funding for response activities (Cozzolino, 2012; Kovács & Spens, 2007). Donors include country-specific funding (e.g., funding provided by the United States, European Union) and foundations, individual donors, and the private sector (Kovács & Spens, 2007). These donors generally provide in-cash donations as well as goods and resources to assist host governments and international aid agencies to respond to the natural disaster (Figure 2).
Challenges in Engaging in Cross-Sector Collaborations
Although collaborations are indeed desirable, especially in extreme circumstances such as natural disasters, crises, emergencies, and catastrophes, organizations face several problems and obstacles when engaging in a cross-sector collaboration in fragile states (Tomasini & Van Wassenhove, 2009). According to Kovács and Spens (2009), the first obstacle is determining what organizations to collaborate with. This task is by no means easy; every organization has a unique mission and goals. Thus, finding the right partner to collaborate with becomes challenging. The second obstacle is overcoming a lack of mutual understanding (Tomasini & Van Wassenhove, 2009). Different humanitarian actors maintain different goals, objectives, and approaches to solving the collective problem. These differences can fuel grievances among the disparate individuals and organizations seeking to lend help. The third challenge is identifying the roles and responsibilities of the humanitarian actors. Tomasini and Wassenhove (2009) note that aid agencies may be reluctant to have private businesses take on certain tasks, believing that private businesses are only assisting to increase their reputation and public image. Fourth, and arguably the greatest challenge, is managing the collaboration. Collaborations come in various shapes and sizes, and when they become too large, they can cause greater confusion and chaos, resulting in duplicated efforts (Van Wassenhove, 2006). The fifth challenge is obtaining buy-in from all collaborative partners. Because a top-level manager typically decides whether to engage in a collaboration, it is important to ensure that employees at the operational level (e.g., humanitarian workers in the field) are fully committed to engaging in the collaboration.
Haiti Case Study
Haiti as a Fragile State
Haiti is one of the poorest nations in the world and has historically been plagued by political instability, violence, and natural disasters (Brattberg & Sundelius, 2011; Sadiq, 2014). Haiti has also suffered from significant challenges related to education and employment (Sadiq, 2014). For example, its unemployment rate remains around 40% (Klose & Webersik, 2010), and approximately half of all school-age children do not attend school (Kaufman, 2012). Together, these characteristics have caused official development agencies and international organizations to classify Haiti as a fragile state. The 2010 Haiti Earthquake greatly exacerbated the nation's fragility. For example, according to the Fund for Peace's Fragile State Index, in 2009, Haiti ranked as the twelfth most fragile state in the world (Fund for Peace, 2009). Just two years later, Haiti moved up seven placements, becoming the fifth most fragile state in the world (Fund for Peace, 2011).
2010 Haiti Earthquake
On January 12, 2010, at approximately 4:53 p.m., a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck just 15 miles southwest of Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti (DesRoches et al., 2011). After the initial earthquake, the country experienced, at a minimum, 59 aftershocks with a magnitude of 4.5 or higher (USGS, 2011). The devastation engendered by this event was overwhelming—roughly 316,000 fatalities and over $11 billion in property damage estimates—making this earthquake the nation's most devastating natural disaster ever (USGS, 2011; U.S. Department of State, 2012). Scholars have gone further: they have described this incident as "the worst recorded natural disaster in the Western Hemisphere" (Weisenfield, 2011, p. 1097).
Haiti's Emergency Management System
Haiti's emergency management system has maintained limited capabilities to respond to natural disasters. As a result, the country has historically relied on regional and international bodies to reduce the physical and economic losses engendered by natural disasters (Fordyce, Sadiq, & Chikoto, 2013; Sadiq, 2014). Indeed, the international community helped develop the first regional emergency management program named the Pan-Caribbean Disaster Preparedness Prevention Project (PCDPPP) (Poncelet, 1997). Established in 1981, the PCDPPP underscored the importance of disaster preparedness and mitigation, laying the foundation for Caribbean countries such as Haiti to begin developing national disaster management systems (Poncelet, 1997). Although the PCDPPP remained successful at emphasizing the need for disaster preparedness, it failed to reduce the risk of natural disasters through mitigation efforts. This realization prompted the Caribbean community to develop the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA) in 1989.
Unlike the PCDPPP, CDERA commanded a much stronger position by taking part in cooperative agreements with international agencies (e.g., air and defense carriers) as a means of establishing procedures for mobilizing resources to disaster-stricken Caribbean nations (Fordyce, Sadiq, & Chikoto, 2013). CDERA, which is called the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), remains funded by its member states and donor agencies, making this agency a key resource in Haiti's national emergency management system (Fordyce, Sadiq, & Chikoto, 2013). Although Haiti's reliance on these regional systems has helped this fragile state mitigate, prepare, respond, and recover from natural disasters, the 2010 Haiti Earthquake is evidence that the country must take responsibility over these actions and that an overhaul of its emergency management system is desperately needed (Sadiq, 2014).
Response to the Earthquake
Profoundly affected by the unimaginable devastation Haiti suffered in the earthquake, the international community responded with an enormous show of support (Sadiq, 2014). Specifically, the international community assisted with response and recovery operations by sending personnel, equipment, and other critical resources. For example, the United States sent approximately 13,000 troops, equipped with 23 ships and 263 aircrafts to the disaster-stricken nation (Brattberg & Sundelius, 2011). Humanitarian assistance also came from other countries, including England, and France. International aid was channeled through bilateral agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or through international NGOs (Fordyce, Sadiq, & Chikoto, 2013). According to OCHA's database, 505 international NGOs and 222 national NGOs operated in Haiti (OCHA, 2012). Moreover, before the 2010 earthquake, there were approximately 8,000 international NGOs in Haiti, making Haiti the country with one of the highest number of NGOs per capita in the world (Lawry, 2010).
To respond to this unprecedented catastrophe, the United Nations appointed a relief coordinator and implemented the cluster system to coordinate the myriad players involved in the relief and recovery operations. Moreover, CDEMA played an integral role in the aftermath of the 2010 Haiti Earthquake. For example, within 24 hours of the event, CDEMA deployed its disaster relief unit, which then teamed up with the Jamaica Defense Force to provide humanitarian assistance. CDEMA also developed a Regional Response Mechanism (RRM) to provide survivors with necessities such as food, water, and shelter. Finally, CDEMA facilitated and channeled fundraising efforts (Fordyce, Sadiq, & Chikoto, 2013).
Agency Coordination and Cross-Sector Collaboration in the Aftermath of the Haiti Earthquake
Despite the huge influx of humanitarian aid and the presence of NGOs in Haiti, the 2010 Haiti Earthquake revealed serious problems with coordination and collaboration. There was weak coordination between the international humanitarian actors, civil society groups, and the Haitian government (Haver, 2011; Rencoret et al., 2010). For example, in many instances, local groups within Haiti were excluded during the coordination of the relief efforts, thus undermining the legitimacy of such efforts and buy-in from local groups (Rencoret et al., 2010). In addition, the U.N. cluster system failed in many areas (Howitt et al., 2011). Specifically, clusters related to health, water, sanitation, and hygiene were deemed largely ineffective. Moreover, cluster leaders had little training and only limited ability to establish subgroups within the cluster (Howitt et al., 2011). In terms of collaboration, Howitt et al. (2011) note that several agencies did not collaborate well for various reasons. For instance, the U.S. government did not always collaborate well with the United Nations. Similarly, the United Nations did not collaborate well with the Haitian government and, at times, disrespected their authority (Howitt et al., 2011).
Despite these weaknesses, Howitt et al. (2011) suggest that some improvements in coordination and collaboration occurred during the Haiti Earthquake. The use of social media and other information-sharing technologies, for example, improved the ability of organizations to coordinate relief efforts. Howitt et al. (2011) further add that civilian-military relationships and food distribution were largely effective and heavily praised. These improvements suggest that fragile states can indeed make meaningful efforts to enhance coordination and collaboration in the aftermath of a natural disaster.
The following set of recommendations can improve agency coordination and cross-sector collaborations in fragile states.
Better Coordination among International NGOs (INGOs), the National Government, Local, and Civil Society Groups
In the aftermath of a natural disaster in a fragile state, it is imperative that all agencies, including national, local governments, and civil society groups and international NGOs and other international humanitarian groups, work collaboratively to ensure that the response to the natural disaster is effective. It is beneficial for each agency to value one another by recognizing that each has something to contribute toward achieving the collective goal. One approach in this area may be for the United Nations to conduct training exercises with INGOs, national governments, and local/civil societies. In so doing, agencies will familiarize themselves with the work each one does, as well as understand the role of each agency prior to and during a natural disaster. By working collaboratively as one, the agencies can build trust, synergy, and strong relationships that can enhance their collaboration and coordination in future natural disasters.
Cultural Barriers
A major challenge facing agency coordination and cross-sector collaboration in fragile states is dealing with cultural issues such as language barriers. For example, during the response to the Haiti Earthquake, some humanitarian actors could speak neither French nor Creole, not surprisingly leading to communication problems (Rencoret et al., 2010). Although organizations such as the United Nations have taken important steps to ensure the representation of different languages among their humanitarian personnel like their emergency response teams (Baker & Chikoto, 2004), the language base of their workers needs to be expanded. While INGOs cannot have all languages represented in their humanitarian workers, certain strategies could help with this issue. For instance, as part of their mandate, INGOs could include working with a credible local agency in the disaster-affected country to deliver humanitarian services. Similarly, the United Nations could maintain a database of such local partners, train with those partners, and establish a strong partnership with them prior to a natural disaster. In so doing, these partners will be familiar with U.N. procedures and in turn, the United Nations will be familiar with the partner's modus operandi.
A lack of trust between local agencies and INGOs was a major obstacle to successful coordination and collaboration in the aftermath of the Haiti Earthquake (Remington & Ganapati, 2016). It is therefore imperative that the United Nations recognize and take active steps to foster trust among the national, state, and local governments of a disaster-stricken country and INGOs. One way to establish this trust is for the United Nations to provide the forums by which INGOs can spend time with the local organizations, learning their problems and their needs, and work together to create solutions to the identified problems (Remington & Ganapati, 2016). Unfortunately, procedures put in place to ensure the safety of aid workers, such as curfews and restricted zones, may undermine the much needed immersion and integration of aid workers with locals (Remington & Ganapati, 2016). The United Nations needs to examine this issue and come up with a solution that balances the needs of integration and coordination with protection of the need to aid workers. For example, rather than designate restricted areas, the United Nations could give aid workers access to those areas, accompanied by security personnel.
Good Governance Structure
The importance of framing a good governance structure to foster agency coordination and cross-sector collaborations in fragile states cannot be overemphasized. The presence of a credible, reliable, and transparent government can contribute to an atmosphere of collaboration and inclusion. In addition, a good governance structure can provide the necessary foundation for establishing meaningful programs and policies that will lead to social, political, and economic improvement in fragile states.
Establishment of an Information Sharing Platform
The United Nations should create a platform for sharing information such as lessons learned and best practices with regard to agency coordination and cross-sector collaboration. Such a platform should contain information that will include, but not be limited to, what works and what does not work in efforts to establish agency coordination and cross-sector collaboration in fragile states. The United Nations should ensure that fragile states, NGOs, humanitarian agencies, and relevant private entities have access to the platform, with the proviso that parties will contribute to and benefit from the platform.
The United States Department of Defense's (DOD) All Partners Access Network (APAN) could serve as a model for helping the United Nations develop an information-sharing platform for fragile states. Established as a collaboration enterprise for the DOD, APAN provides the DOD and other collaborative partners, such as governmental agencies, militaries, and international humanitarian relief organizations, with the ability to share information on a common, unclassified website (APAN, 2016). The DOD and its collaborative partners use APAN during disaster response and humanitarian relief operations to share real-time information, increase situational awareness, and, ultimately, reduce response times (APAN, 2016). But regardless of what platform the United Nations employs, it is essential that the platform be updated frequently so that it contains the latest trends, lessons, and best practices on agency coordination and cross-sector collaboration in fragile states.
Because research on topics such as coordination in times of natural disasters and other catastrophes remains rudimentary, there is an urgent need for additional studies. Scholars, for example, should study the factors that enhance and hinder agency coordination and cross-sector collaborations in fragile states. This will give researchers and practitioners a better understanding of how to improve collaboration and coordination among various actors working to address the problems confronting fragile states, especially their vulnerability to natural disasters, climate change, and poor socioeconomic conditions. Future studies should also seek to examine the role natural disasters play in developing and improving agency coordination and cross-sector collaboration in fragile states. Natural disasters, for example, can create windows of opportunity that organizations and donors can leverage to make disaster management a higher priority. This study is a first step in gaining a better understanding of these topics.
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Reviewed By roger c (NANTICOKE, MD) Reviewed for a 2009 Pontiac G8 —9/29/2015 5:07 AM
Purchased car used and came with Volant cold air intake. there was no record on how old filter was except a date stamped on the filter of Nov 11. I decided to replace after a recommendation from Volant. I was a little taken back on the price (expensive) but with a 4 year/100,000 mile change out it is cheaper that convention filters replacing at every 20,000 miles! Plus filtration is superior.

subset: commoncrawl


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Angelina Jolie is calling out the Obama administration for its approach to the situation in Sudan.
"There policy, though, raises a number of questions," the star wrote in a Newsweek editorial. "How is the Obama administration's approach to Sudan an evolution of justice? In addition, when the administration says it intends to work to 'improve the lives of the people of Darfur,' I would like to know what that means, besides the obvious point that their lives could hardly get worse."
VIEW THE PHOTOS: Then & Now: The Lovely Angelina Jolie!
The actress, a U.N. Goodwill Ambassador since 2001, has devoted much of her efforts toward work in the troubled Darfur region, including her role in the Jolie-Pitt Foundation.
Her editorial came in honor of Human Rights Day, noting past historical tragedies before settling on the Darfur crisis, which she writes has left "300,000 dead and 2.7 million people internally displaced."
VIEW THE PHOTOS: Brangelina's Family Album
"[The administration] has not yet announced any serious moves to enforce the decision of the ICC and execute its warrants," Angelina wrote. "There will be pressure on the United States and its partners to bring stability to Sudan, even at the expense of criminal accountability. Regardless of the rationale, the end would be the same: victims left without justice while perpetrators walk away."
However, the star said she supported the president's methods.
"Like many Americans, I support the administration's willingness to engage diplomatically, even with regimes we abhor. And I believe President Obama and his special envoy Scott Gration will do their best to bring peace to the region," she said. "I also hope we will act sooner and more powerfully to prevent future atrocities."
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I have the great honor and pleasure of talking to credit union professionals all over the nation. The subject of the proud history of CUs, holds special meaning to me because I had worked with the movement for about ten years before I learned ANYTHING about its incredible history. I certainly had no idea that the movement started in my backyard, a hop skip and jump across the border, in Manchester, New Hampshire.
I gave a talk on social media and World 2.0 this morning to a group of about forty credit union marketing professionals from Massachusetts, Rhode Island and New Hampshire at the CU League's headquarters in Marlborough, Mass. I asked about the movement's founding, and it was wonderful to get a detailed answer. In our presence was a representative of that very first CU, Andrea Pruna of St. Mary's Bank. Not only did she know the date by heart (November 24, 1908), but she let us know about a wonderful section of their web site devoted to this, the Centennial Year of Credit Union service. I encourage everyone to check out Celebrating 100 Years for a terrific look at the amazing road we've traveled so far.
This is one of the reasons I'm especially excited that BarCampBank NewEngland will be held in America's Credit Union Museum on April 5. The museum is the actual house where St. Mary's Bank first began operations 100 years ago, out of the home of Attorney Joseph Boivin, who served as the CU's President. If you listen very carefully, you may hear the whispers of the generations that have preceeded you when you stand in the parlor of the building.
Shout-outs to so many of the fabulous credit union marketers who came today. Thanks to Jon Reske and Anne Pinkerton from UMassFive College FCU, Mark Vautour from Telephone Workers CU, Deena Bernier from NMTW Community CU, and Debra Perrin from Southern Mass CU. I'm not good with names, so I haven't remembered those who I met for the first time, but thank you also. It was fun that we had four one-billion-dollar CUs represented as well, Greylock FCU in the Berkshires, HarborOne CU in the South Boston area, DCU of the Worcester area, and Navigant CU in RI. Thank you to Rob Kimmett for organizing a great event and inviting me, and it was wonderful to catch up with CU whirlwind Bonnie Doolin.
My presentation today included demonstrating and explaining Twitter, Facebook, blogging, and showed examples from Shari Storm and the Verity CU team, William Azaroff of Vancity CU and Change Everything, Ginny Brady, board member of UFirst FCU with the Boardcast, and Tim McAlpine of Currency Marketing with Larissa Walkiw, spokesperson for Young and Free Alberta, and her infamous Credit Union Difference video part one, currently at 16,228 views. On the topic of Facebook, I have started writing a paper on the Facebook as Marketing Engine and plan on publishing excerpts to this blog. For those interested in checking out twitter, here's the one-page PDF of Twitter Tips.
I also touched on Peer-to-Peer Lending (P2P Lending), Prosper's amazing growth rate, and how CUs can participate by getting in touch with Doug True, SVP of Lending, at Forum CU. Doug has been instrumental in having P2P Lending company Zopa partner with CUs to offer NCUA-insured loans and investments.


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Thank you for your interest in our villas. We look forward to speaking with you!
At Tiger Palm, fragrant dishes from the streets and kitchens of Penang have been carefully recreated with the highest quality ingredients, sourced both locally and overseas. Rich curries, soft rice noodles, crispy bites and fresh fish are inspired by Chef Will Meyrick's travels, his in-depth research of Malaysian cuisine and his close associations with some of the regions top chefs. The spices, flavours and soul of Malaysia have been transported to Bali.


text: Menopause is one of the most crucial and critical phases for any woman and it is also a sign to affect her health. This is something which comes with age and the metabolism also comes down. So, the best way to deal with this would be by having certain foods which helps ease the phase of menopause. The fundamental is, by having healthy food one can reduce the challenges. Firstly, you should go for food which is high in fiber. This can be in the form of fruits, vegetables, whole grains which reduce cholesterol and lower the blood glucose. It also prevents constipation. The second type of foods that you should focus is calcium. Eating and drinking dairy products which are calcium-rich will reduce the risk of osteoporosis. Calcium helps deal with menopause effectively. The other type of food that can be had is Soybean. They contain phytoestrogens and isoflavones and they help improve menopause symptoms like hot flashes. Soy works as a great source of fiber and having different types of Tofu also gives good calcium. Having Flaxseed is also useful. They will have Lignins and are very useful transmitters of hormone metabolism. You can also focus on foods which are rich in iron. Having stuff like red meat, poultry, fish, eggs, leafy green vegetables will always help. Foods which are good in vitamin B and omega-3 are also useful as they help you deal with mood swings. Even protein rich foods like meat, dairy products, nuts and pulses help the body to deal with any infections. Having water is the most important thing during this phase.


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SKU: 1965x
$16.95 – $19.95
by Michael H. Popkin, Ph.D.
This book/workbook combo provides vital information for parents of children ages 5 to 12. Covers ways to discipline without violence; skills to build open communication; how to prevent risky behavior; and more. The books are sold separately, or save 29% by ordering this combo set.
The Parent's Guide (219 pp.) provides in-depth exploration of all parts of the Active Parenting methods. Your class participants will be able to share the Guide with other adults in the family, and will refer to it long after your class is finished. It is filled with illustrations and memorable photos from the video. Click here for sample pages from the Parent's Guide.
The Parent's Workbook (80 pp.) contains worksheets to use in class and for home activities. It also contains copies of the program's PowerPoint slides so parents can take notes as they follow along. Click here for sample pages from the Parent's Workbook.
Note: This product is available in print or in ebook format. Please allow 2 business days for electronic delivery of ebooks. The ebooks can be used on laptops, tablets, and other mobile devices using iOS or Android. Your ebooks are limited to 3 devices. Ebooks cannot be printed, downloaded, or shared. Your login information will arrive via the email address you provide during the checkout process. If you are ordering multiple copies of the ebooks, you will be provided with multiple logins.


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This morning I got from Maine Department of Environmental Protection a list of mining sites in Maine and how many acres each site is permitted for. I sought out the info in writing about a proposed gravel pit expansion in Lamoine because I had been told the expanded pit would be pretty big, and I wanted to see just how it would compare to other similar mining sites in Maine.
According to DEP the expanded pit, if approved, would be the largest permitted mining site in Hancock County and in the top 20 for the state. The largest permitted mining site in Maine is a 345-acre quarry in Poland, while the largest permitted gravel pit in the state is a 238-acre site in the York County town of Dayton.
Other large mining sites in Maine include a 200-acre gravel pit in Hampden, a 231-acre gravel pit in New Gloucester, and a 163-acre quarry in Jonesboro. An 84-acre gravel pit in Hancock already operated by Harold MacQuinn Inc., the applicant for the proposed 110-acre pit in Lamoine, does not register in the top 25 largest permitted mining sites in Maine.
To see the top 25 list, click here. Note that even though the 110-acre site in Lamoine is on the list, the expanded pit has yet to be approved by DEP or the Lamoine planning board.


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Stay Updated Car news, reviews, and more!
$ 8,683
19 / 19 cu. ft.
The 2010 EX crossover is the smallest, most carlike, and least expensive sport/utility vehicle in Infiniti's luxury lineup, residing below the larger, more powerful FX and the full-size, eight-passenger QX. Designed for yuppies and empty nesters alike, the EX puts an emphasis on sport and style, what with a 297-horsepower V-6, a G sedan-based sport-tuned suspension, and a GT hatchback silhouette.
Acceleration is quick — 0 to 60 in 6.5 seconds and the quarter mile in 14.9 seconds at 94.5 mph — and handling and braking numbers border on sport-sedan territory, thanks to 0.81 g of lateral grip and a 123-foot 60-to-0 stopping distance.
The EX's utility factor, however, scores somewhat low, due to only 28.5 inches of rear legroom, 16.8 cubic-feet of cargo volume, and 5.7 inches of ground clearance. Most of the Infiniti's competitors tout at least 35 inches of rear legroom, 29 cubic-feet of cargo, and seven inches of clearance. For those who have children or tend to haul a lot of gear, the EX is somewhat of a compromised choice.
Bodystyle: Crossover SUV
Engine: 3.5L V-6
Transmission: 5-speed automatic
Models: EX35, EX35 AWD, EX35 Journey, EX35 Journey AWD
The EX enters the 2010 model year with minimal changes. Revisions include heated outside mirrors on EX35, heated front seats on EX35 AWD, Bluetooth on EX Journey, navigation as a standalone option, and standard auto on/off headlamps and a USB connection port for all models. Bluetooth streaming audio, XM NavWeather, and Zagat restaurant guide are now included in the hard-drive navigation system.
The EX35 features a coupe-like roofline and aggressive proportions highlighted by a long hood, short overhangs, and rearward cabin. Measuring 182.3-inches long and only 61.9-inches tall, the EX is a ringer for a G35 hatchback.
Infiniti's compact crossover boasts standard leather, black lacquer and aluminum trim, satellite radio, and iPod connectivity. Available options include maple wood trim, navigation, and Around View Monitor, which displays a 360-degree view around the vehi
A 3.5-liter 297-horsepower 253-pound-foot V-6 motivates the EX, and is paired to a five-speed automatic. Power is routed to the rear wheels or, if fitted with the optional ATTESA E-TS all-wheel-drive system, all four. The EX uses a front control-arm suspension and a rear multilink setup, providing excellent ride composure and body control, whether rolling on the standard 17-inch wheels or optional 18s.
Passive safety technology includes driver and passenger front airbags as well as front side and side curtain airbags. To avoid an airbag deploying, the EX features stability and traction control and anti-lock brakes with brake assist.
EX35, EX35 Journey: 17 mpg city/24 mpg highway
EX35 AWD, EX35 Journey AWD: 16 mpg city/23 mpg highway
High on sport, low on utility


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Why Choose HNTB?
For more than a century, HNTB has helped deliver infrastructure solutions that best meet the unique needs of our clients. With client relationships spanning decades, we understand infrastructure life cycles and have the perspective to solve technical challenges with clarity and imagination.
We are far more than a design firm. We see and help address far-reaching issues of financing, legislation, design, construction, community outreach and ongoing operations. As employee-owners committed to the highest levels of performance, we enable clients to achieve their goals and inspiring visions.At HNTB, we're encouraged to go beyond discovering mere solutions that will impact our very landscape.
We are encouraged to ask, "What if?" Our HNTB family fosters an inventive and resourceful commitment to finding unique answers to complex problems. We believe that the act of wondering sparks creativity. We will work to foster your creativity, career and personal growth.
Come join HNTB and unleash your spark of imagination.For you, "together" can mean the chance to put together an exciting career. At HNTB "together" also means collaborating across geographies and disciplines within the firm. And "together" means that we are partners with our clients. Our goals are linked, and their success is our success. "Together" means that we are engaged in the communities we serve we live there and are committed to their growth and development.
Just like we are committed to delivering for our clients, HNTB is also committed to delivering for you by offering benefits to protect the health of you and your family, help you balance family and career, and build your savings for retirement. Learn more at https://www.myhntbtotalrewards.com.
The time is right to join HNTB! HNTB is currently seeking an Engineer-Traffic in our Salt Lake City, Utah office.
The ideal candidate would have some working knowledge of MicroStation and AutoCAD. The candidate will participate in the collection and analysis of data and the prepartion of satisfactory designs. The candidate will perform design calculations, conduct investigative analyses toward completion of assigned design tasks, and direct prepartion of design drawings and/or specifications.
Job Summary
Assists assigned department by performing basic engineering-related tasks including research, development, design and delivery on assigned project(s).
Essential Responsibilities
Contributes to the preparation or modification of reports, plans and designs for projects.
Assists in the preparation of project quantity and cost estimates.
Performs other duties as assigned.
Additional Responsibilities
Traffic Engineer
Perform design calculations
Assist in quanitity and cost estimates
Check calculations and drawings
Perform specific short-term design applications
Contributes to the preparation or modification of reports, plans, and designs for projects.
Basic Qualifications
Bachelor's degree in Engineering
Preferred Qualifications/Skills
Bachelor's degree in civil engineering
Some working knowledge of MicroStation, AutoCAD, Inroads or Civil 3D- Preferred
General Work Conditions
Combination Office and Field Environment: Most work is performed in an office environment in which there is only minimal exposure to potentially unpleasant working conditions.
Incumbent must have the ability to stand and sit frequently and reach horizontally as well as vertically for overhead use. Work may infrequently be performed at client's job site, construction trailer, and in the field. Work may sometimes require working in inclement weather, working in a construction site, being exposed to heavy construction equipment and doing extensive walking. Adherence to applicable safety protocol is required.
EEO Statement
HNTB Corporation is an Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity Employer, Minority/Female/Disabled/Veteran. The HNTB Companies are an equal opportunity employer and does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, creed, sex, national origin, age, disability, pregnancy status, sexual orientation, gender identity, veteran status, marital status, genetic information, citizenship status, or other status protected by law. In compliance with the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, we will hire only U.S. citizens and aliens lawfully authorized to work in the United States (if the position is or will be one which is subject to U.S. law). We will provide reasonable accommodation for qualified individual with a disability where appropriate.
"EEO is the Law" Poster
"EEO is the Law" Poster Supplement
Hntb Corporation


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Download of the day: Python 3.0last updated in Categories Download of the day, programming, python
Python 3.0 final officially released!
Python is a dynamic object-oriented programming language that can be used for many kinds of software development. It offers strong support for integration with other languages and tools, comes with extensive standard libraries, and can be learned in a few days. Many Python programmers report substantial productivity gains and feel the language encourages the development of higher quality, more maintainable code.


text: Cosmos - A Space Time Odyssey follows in the footsteps of Carl Sagan's series from more than thirty years ago. The series is produced by Seth McFarlane (yes, that Seth McFarlane) and is hosted by Neil deGrasse Tyson. First trailer is here ... ... show will premiere in 2014 [yt]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gMJxjYRXYkU#at=184[/yt]


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BALI, Indonesia — After a nine-day trip through Asia in which he showed command on the world stage, President Barack Obama headed back Sautrday to debt-deadlocked Washington, where he'll confront fresh reminders of the limits of his power at home.
Obama departed from Bali's international airport Saturday afternoon for a 21-hour flight that, factoring in time-zone changes, was to return him to the White House before dawn Sunday. He'll be arriving days ahead of a deadline for a congressional supercommittee to produce recommendations to attack the country's yawning deficit.
But even though the president spoke to the supercommittee leaders from Air Force One as he headed out of town and urged them to get a deal, the panel is no further along than when Obama left Washington: frozen stuck along partisan lines.
If no agreement is reached, steep cuts would be enacted across the federal government that both sides say they want to avoid, particularly to the defense budget. But no end game was in sight as Obama made his way back home from the other side of the globe.
Also awaiting him are presidential politics heading into the 2012 election year, something Obama largely avoided while traveling in Hawaii, Australia and Indonesia. And with his opponents on the attack over his stewardship of the listless economy, Obama will renew his largely futile efforts to get Congress to pass his jobs bill as he aims to cast Republicans as the ones to blame.
For Obama, it may amount to something of a harsh homecoming after playing proud host in his native Hawaii to a summit of Pacific Rim nations, and traveling on to two countries where he remains highly popular and received warm welcomes.
Obama set out in his Asia-Pacific tour to deepen U.S. engagement in a fast-growing region that the White House views as increasingly critical to America's security and economic prosperity. He achieved some successes, including progress on a regional free-trade deal that could pay off with U.S. jobs, and a new military agreement with Australia that will boost the U.S. defense posture in the region by deploying more marines and U.S. aircraft to Australia.
Obama also announced he was dispatching his secretary of state to Myanmar in a significant step to prod forward reforms in that country, and throughout the trip the complexities of the U.S. relationship with China were on display.
But domestic issues were on Obama's mind as he wrapped up his trip. Obama focused his Saturday morning radio and Internet address on the trade deals he presided over and the jobs they were likely to create back home, including a multi-billion-dollar Boeing sale of commercial planes to Indonesia and a deal to export General Electric engines.
He portrayed his trip around the Pacific Rim as a hunt for new markets.
"As the fastest-growing region in the world, no market is more important to our economic future than the Asia Pacific — a region where our exports already support five million American jobs," he said.
In a further reminder of what awaits Obama in Washington, Saturday's Republican address focused on the work of the supercommittee. Sen. Patrick Toomey of Pennsylvania, a member of the panel and architect of one of the central GOP proposals, said that despite the fast-approaching deadline he remained hopeful lawmakers could still accomplish some deficit reduction.
"We have what is truly a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to pass legislation that will generate millions of jobs, create a simpler, fairer tax system with lower rates for everyone, and put our government on a path toward fiscal sanity," he said.
On China, throughout his trip Obama sent both public and private signals to the rising giant, cementing American power in a manner seen to counter China, and scolding Chinese leaders about the need to play by the rules economically.
On the final day of his trip, Saturday in Indonesia, Obama held a surprise meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on the sidelines of an East Asia summit, focusing on the economic matters that have prompted disputes between the two major world powers.
White House National Security Advisor Tom Donilon told reporters that Obama stressed the importance of China adjusting the value of its currency, which the United States contends is deeply undervalued, and he said Obama and Wen also briefly discussed territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
China's state broadcaster, CCTV, reported that Wen told Obama the grim global economic picture made it practical and necessary for the U.S. and China to strengthen their economic and trade relationship.
He said more trade and investment would help ease the Sino-U.S. trade imbalance. Wen also restated Beijing's call for the U.S. to relax restrictions on high-tech exports to China, CCTV reported.
China, Wen said, had made strides in reforming its currency exchange and would continue to do so, the broadcaster said.
Later, Obama and leaders at an East Asia summit retreat raised the issue of maritime security, prompting Wen to respond. A senior U.S. administration official told reporters aboard Air Force One that Wen's remarks signaled a gradual evolution toward resolving quarrels with Asian neighbors over the major shipping route. He said U.S. officials were encouraged by Wen's response.
Donilon downplayed tensions and rejected suggestions that the nine-day mission in the Asia-Pacific was designed to thwart a rising China. The U.S. policy, Donilon said, was about rebalancing U.S. interests and focusing once more on the Asia-pacific region.
"This has nothing to do with isolating or containing anybody," he said.
© 2013 msnbc.com


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Bruce Springsteen @ Walter Kerr Theatre
June 14, 2018 @ 8:00 PM
"The Boss" is on Broadway. Fans don't want to miss the legendary performers first-ever residency show which has now been extended to maximize attendance. Here Bruce will discuss his life and personal stories with guitar and piano. This second extension of performances will hopefully find all the diehards getting a chance to see him in this intimate setting.
To submit an event for consideration on this calendar for the greater NYC Metro area, please use this form and be as detailed as possible. Thanks.


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The anime wolves tutorial was a blast to create, but I had so much more fun making this chibi figure that has a lot of spunk and pizazz. Today I will be showing you "how to draw chibi Captain America", step by step. He is going to be in the new Avengers movie this year so I thought it would only be right to conjure up my own version of the man behind the blue mask. One of the other major reasons why I love how this drawing came out is because of his superhero colors. Captain America is blue and red just like Dragoart.com. It is going to be a very special and exciting treat as you tackle this tutorial on drawing chibi Captain America, and I think you will find that it's going to be really hard to shy away from such an image when you are browsing through the front page of the site. So don't be shy and open an eye, you have to try drawing this chibi because it is really fun. Have an awesome day folks and be sure to leave me a comment or rate which ever you choose. Peace out people!
DragoArt members upload artwork and drawing tutorials! They are also allowed to leave comments on tutorials, profiles, etc. Many more features, as well; it's way better than just being a boring guest! Register Now!


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Uncyclopedia Headquarters, America - Lately, an administrator named Mordillo, had a problem with one of Uncyclopedia's most prolific writers, Clemens177. So small were his balls, and his opinion of himself, that he banned Clemens177 for over a month, not for anything bad Clemens177 did, but simply for that prolific writer talking back to him.
Now, given that the management of Uncyclopedia recognizes how prolific that writer was, and what an insecure prick Mordillo was, they have let Clemens177 back, it is expected that Clemens177 will help carry Uncyclopedia again.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
The truth is, as has been talked about in the Village Forum, Uncyclopedia is slowly dwindling in popularity due to a dearth of good writers. Truth is, they need regularly posting writers like Clemens177 and others, just to tread water, let alone to swim a millimeter upstream. And finally, truth is, that having cock sucking faggot sons of bitches like Mordillo on management, who ban for an obviously bullshit reason, because they are distressed at hearing someone mention what a small dicked mother fucker they are, is greatly decreasing Uncyclopedia's viability.
Mordillo saw Clemens177 interacting with another member. He chose to publicly upbraid Clemens177 for drama, though none existed. When Clemens177 privately spoke to Mordillo about this - thus avoiding drama - Mordillo banned Clemens177 for another reason - that of showing dead jews in an article in which that was appropriate.
Now bear in mind, dead jew pictures are rarely appropriate. However, this is the forum that has articles about fucking children, and the forum that has articles making fun of retarded children, and the forum that has articles about death, rape, child sex, etc. as our staples.
Clearly then, an article about how the Nobel committee was wrong to award Obama, and mentioning that they'd given a peace prize to the man - Cordell Hull - who killed 250 jews, was not a stretch or inappropriate. Rather it was Mordillo grasping any excuse he could in a vain attempt to regain a manhood he never had. Or so his mother told me in post-coital bliss. Glenn Beck, who was there at the time, can verify this. At least the first half. He left then, to rape and kill another teenager. At least I think that's what he left for, and he certainly never denied it to me.
Here's the deal. Mordillo is either banned till the date he said I was banned till, (sometime in November after PLS) or you all can continue to whine in the Village Dump about the lack of good writers on Uncyclopedia. I've no doubt that you'll choose to keep that pathetically ball-less faggot Mordillo on board. But if you actually have any brains, you'll upbraid him, ban him till then, and keep a good and prolific writer here, and let faggot Mordillo come back sadder and wiser in November.
I'll know soon enough, next time I try to write or post or edit. Remember - cocksuckers like Mordillo banning are a dime a dozen. Writers who can make you laugh each day are what you are complaining there is a lack of.
- John Wayne Gacy "[www.NAMBLA.com Mordillo is our best member]" NAMBLA Times, October 14, 2009


text: As part of its roundup of the tech that can save the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, The Atlantic takes a look at the water chillers that could help stabilize temperatures and bring the plant under control. It's a system that the French have used for years, and amounts to basically a (very) fancy air conditioning unit. For more on water chillers and the other gear that's working overtime in Japan, check out the full roundup here: [The Atlantic]


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Fullmetal Alchemist: Brotherhood is a re-inventing of the original series, done to accurately portray the plot of the original manga (something that FMA couldn't do because the manga was not yet complete). While the two series differ greatly in terms of plot, their basic premise is the same: Edward and Alphonse Elric are two brothers who open the 'portal of truth' in an attempt to use alchemy to resurrect their dead mother. But the toll of seeing the truth is harsh, Ed loses an arm and a leg, while his brother loses his entire body. With Ed's missing limbs replaced by mechanical 'auto-mail' ones and Al's... See full review
Story - 10/10 - A thought provoking, highly emotional tale, made all the more distressing by the fact that it's a true telling of one man's experience. Barefoot Gen is a 1983 anime based on the manga of the same name by Keiji Nakazawa. It is set in WWII Hiroshima, Japan and tells the true story of Nakazawa's experience of the bomb which hit Hiroshima on August 6th 1945. Gen and his pregnant mother survive the bombing by sheer fluke; unfortunately their family aren't as lucky. Now Gen must brave the eradiated landscape of Hiroshima and find a way for him, his mother and his newborn sibling to survive. The... See full review
Overview Howl's Moving Castle is based on the novel of the same name by Diana Wynne-Jones although the 2 differ greatly. Sofie is an average young girl who works hard for a living until one day she is turned into an old woman by a wicked witch. With nowhere to go and no way to avoid her family, an aged Sofie sets out across the treacherous 'Wastes' in an attempt to find a way to rid herself of her curse. Along the way she encounters a hulking, steam powered, Baba Yaga-esque castle which turns out to be the home of Howl - the legendary wizard, and his assistant, Markel and their fire... yes, fire, Calcifer... See full review


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