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Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations
- Kimberly Terry
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1 a report of the poni working group on u.s.- china nuclear dynamics Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations a way forward March 2013 Cochairs Elbridge A. Colby Abraham M. Denmark Executive Director John K. Warden CHARTING our future
3 a report of the poni working group on u.s.- china nuclear dynamics Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations a way forward March 2013 Cochairs Elbridge A. Colby Abraham M. Denmark Executive Director John K. Warden CHARTING our future
4 About CSIS 50th Anniversary Year For 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has developed solutions to the world s greatest policy challenges. As we celebrate this milestone, CSIS scholars are developing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center s 220 fulltime staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since Former deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre became the Center s president and chief executive officer in April CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s) by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Cover photo: Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta stands next to Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping during a full honors ceremony welcoming Xi to the Pentagon, Feb. 14, DOD photo by Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo, Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC Tel: (202) Fax: (202) Web: 2
5 contents Executive Summary About the Working Group 1. Introduction 1 iv x 2. The Significance and Objectives of U.S.-China Nuclear Relations 9 3. An Agenda for U.S.-China Engagement on Bilateral Nuclear Weapons Issues 16 Appendix A. China s Nuclear Strategy, Policy, and Capabilities 28 Appendix B. Trip Report, Beijing, September 12 15, Appendix C. About the Working Group Participants 41 iii
6 executive summary This report addresses the increasingly important set of issues surrounding the nuclear forces of the United States and China. It focuses on a series of policy and posture recommendations for the United States, but it does so with an eye toward U.S. allies in the region and Chinese audiences. The report also includes two appendixes one detailing the Working Group s assessment of China s nuclear strategy, policy, decisionmaking, posture, and capabilities (Appendix A), and one summarizing the Working Group s discussions in Beijing in September 2012 (Appendix B). For over a century, the United States has maintained a strong and enduring presence in the Asia- Pacific region, buttressed by a number of alliances and partnerships and undergirded by a robust military capability, ultimately including U.S. nuclear forces. It remains committed to this approach to the Asia-Pacific region and has redoubled its focus through its recent rebalance toward the region. The United States has long seen China as a central factor in its strategy in Asia. Since the 1970s, U.S. policy has sought to encourage China s economic reforms and development and to integrate China into the existing international political and economic order. While hopeful that China will develop into a constructive stakeholder, the United States and much of the Asia-Pacific region share continuing concerns about some aspects of China s behavior that, it is feared, could undermine regional stability and U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific. Unfortunately, significant sources of tension and disagreement between the United States and its allies, on the one hand, and China, on the other, remain. These sources of discord could, in the worst case, lead to conflict. Needless to say, a large-scale conventional war between the United States and China would be incredibly dangerous and likely tremendously damaging. Nuclear war between the two would be devastating for all involved. Even though a conventional war between the two nations currently seems unlikely and nuclear war even more so, the possibility that war could break out, posing dramatic dangers and damage, clearly indicates that active steps should be taken to avoid conflict and successfully manage U.S.-China nuclear dynamics. Significance and Objectives of U.S.-China Nuclear Relations Maintaining stability in U.S.-China nuclear relations will be critical to the interests of the United States and those of its allies and security partners in the coming years. The Working Group judges that the nuclear dynamics between the United States and China are relatively stable at this time, primarily because both sides have or will soon have a nuclear deterrent of the size and scope they determine they need, and China appears committed to a relatively restrained posture oriented around a lean and effective nuclear force and its no-first-use policy. Yet the Working Group is concerned that the changing conventional military balance of power in the region, the current iv
7 sources of tension and possible conflict, and the expansion of the quality and quantity of China s nuclear arsenal raise serious questions about the future stability of U.S-China nuclear relations. The recommendations contained in this report are therefore focused on enhancing nuclear stability between the United States and China, primarily by advocating a series of both bilateral and unilateral policy and posture adjustments that would enhance crisis stability and arms race stability, while also laying the groundwork for future bilateral and multilateral nuclear engagement. Because the current nuclear dynamics are broadly stabilizing and should be sustained, the Working Group recommends that U.S.-China nuclear relations be oriented toward sustaining these dynamics and avoiding decisions by either side that could erode stability. We therefore recommend a robust but realistically tailored program of engagement and dialogue on nuclear issues that reinforce China s nuclear restraint and advance U.S. interests in stability, dialogue, transparency, and progress toward arms control. The Working Group recognizes, however, the limited success attempts at dialogue and cooperation have thus far yielded. The Group s recommendations are therefore designed to be ambitious but realistic, and are structured in such a way that, in the event that Beijing is unwilling to engage in earnest along the lines the Group advocates, the United States would be left with a powerful strategic capability and in the strong political position of having proffered a serious, fair-minded path forward in bilateral nuclear weapons relations that China had rebuffed. The Working Group also recommends that the United States adopt a policy of accepting China s possession of an assured second-strike nuclear capability, and thus avoid attempting to acquire the capability to negate China s nuclear retaliatory capabilities. This judgment relies on the fundamental determination that the United States cannot realistically hope to deny China s second-strike capability, that a failed attempt to deny it would be costly and counterproductive, and that Beijing s possession of a reliable retaliatory capability promotes stability rather than detracts from it. In addition, this approach could reinforce China s nuclear restraint. The Working Group is, however, divided on whether the United States should publicly and formally announce this acceptance. The Working Group believes that some of the concepts associated with the idea of strategic stability provide an appropriate framework for U.S.-China engagement on nuclear weapons issues, although the specific meaning of the term is the subject of a long-running debate that has never been definitively settled. In order to gain the benefits of strategic stability, the Working Group believes that nuclear relations between the United States and China should emphasize two complementary approaches: crisis stability and arms race stability. Stability can emerge between the United States and China if each fields forces that are capable of surviving a first strike and if each is able to credibly demonstrate to the other side that its current and future capabilities are not capable of denying the other side a viable strategic deterrent. As a result, fear of preemption and the need to launch weapons early become irrelevant, either as irritants in crisis or as dangers in conflict. In this way, the benefits of deterrence can be retained, while minimizing the chances of nuclear escalation and avoiding a competition in the development of offensive and defensive strategic arms that would intensify uncertainties for both sides. Both sides could derive value from cooperation on nuclear weapons issues grounded in the stability concept. The United States worries about the composition of China s nuclear force, China s views on escalation and plans for nuclear use, and the future trajectory of China s strategic posture. China, meanwhile, worries about the ability of the United States to deny it a second-strike capability; the scope and sophistication of future U.S. nuclear, conventional prompt global strike, and elbridge a. colby and abraham m. denmark v
8 missile defense programs; and U.S. unwillingness to acknowledge a condition of mutual vulnerability between the two nations. A stability-grounded model could help address these anxieties on the U.S. side by providing greater insight into China s current and future force structure and deeper insight into China s ways of thinking about nuclear strategy, and on the Chinese side by providing similar insight into U.S. developments and a greater degree of assurance about U.S. acknowledgment of the survivability of the Chinese force. Concurrently, such an approach would have the added benefit of building confidence on both sides, thereby enhancing strategic trust more broadly. Finally, such a model could also provide a satisfactory way in which both nations could see something approximating their current force size, posture, and doctrine as satisfactory and compatible with stability. An Agenda for U.S.-China Engagement on Nuclear Weapons Historically, engagement on nuclear issues between the United States and China has been limited. It has been largely confined to more formalized interactions at the official level, as well as a somewhat greater degree of interaction at the Track 2-level. In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the Barack Obama administration called for strategic stability dialogues with China to discuss the range of issues related to nuclear weapons, but progress has been distinctly limited, with few substantive talks at the government level on nuclear weapons issues. To redress this limited progress, the United States should actively pursue informal means of shaping China s nuclear decisionmaking, policies, and posture toward restraint and stability. The Working Group recognizes that China may be reluctant to pursue several of the dialogues and initiatives proposed here, but nonetheless believes that history suggests that a serious set of proposals combined with sustained pressure can persuade Beijing to make gradual, if grudging, progress, even on delicate issues. Even though engagement has been and will no doubt continue to be difficult, recent years have repeatedly demonstrated that China responds to sufficient international pressure, multilateral mechanisms, and high-level bilateral engagement. The United States should therefore continue its efforts to urge China to engage in a more sustained and in-depth dialogue on strategic issues. Such dialogue should focus primarily on eliciting greater insight into how China thinks about the role and potential use of its nuclear weapons, its red lines and perception of its vital interests, its conception of escalation, and related topics. Such dialogue should also focus on exploring mechanisms for information exchange. Meanwhile, in concert with efforts to improve dialogue, the United States should take policy initiatives that would help to strengthen stability in the U.S.-China nuclear relationship. These initiatives are described in the rest of this section. U.S. acceptance of China s second-strike capability. The United States should plan, procure, and posture its forces and base its own policy on the assumption that an attempted U.S. disarming first strike, combined with U.S. missile defenses, could not reliably deny a Chinese nuclear retaliatory strike on the United States. This recommendation is based on a hard-nosed judgment that the combined strategic capabilities of the United States are not, and realistically cannot be, sufficiently numerous and reliable to deny China the ability to deliver nuclear warheads to the continental United States, no matter how much surprise the United States may achieve. It is important to vi nuclear weapons and u.s.-china relations: a way forward
9 emphasize that acceptance of China s second-strike capability is fully compatible with the maintenance of a potent and even a stronger U.S. extended deterrent posture in the Asia-Pacific region. Members of the Working Group differ, however, on whether the United States should explicitly and publicly acknowledge a state of mutual vulnerability with China. Some in the Group believe that such a step would reflect an underlying reality and would have positive stabilizing benefits on China s nuclear policy. Others agree that a situation of vulnerability does exist and will likely become more entrenched as China s capabilities continue to develop, yet they fear that public and formal acknowledgment of mutual vulnerability will achieve little more than raising questions from nervous allies. Ballistic missile defenses, linkage to North Korea. The United States should specifically and publicly tie the development and deployment of its national missile defenses oriented to East Asia to the North Korean threat, as it has tied its missile defense programs in the Euro-Atlantic area to the Iranian threat. The United States is building up its national missile defenses to guard against the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat from North Korea, Iran, and other rogue states. The Obama administration has consistently described the current U.S. national missile defenses as designed for Iran and North Korea, but it has been unable to allay China s concerns about the future development of the program. To minimize China s reactions to U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities, the United States should seek to quell China s concerns as much as possible by making the U.S. BMD program as transparent as prudence and security allow and by making it clear that the United States has no intention of using its ballistic missile defenses to negate China s long-range nuclear deterrent capability. The Working Group therefore recommends that the United States make it clear to Beijing that it will continue to adjust the size and scope of its national missile defenses in accordance with the development of the North Korean and Iranian ICBM threats, not China s long-range nuclear forces. The Working Group notes, however, that China s significant shorter-range conventional missile capability, especially those ballistic and cruise missiles that threaten U.S. military forces in the region as well as U.S. allies and partners, are a legitimate and necessary target for the development of U.S. theater missile defenses. Yet the reality that China s conventional and nuclear missile forces are often collocated challenges the ability of regional militaries to differentiate between them. Such a public pronouncement will demonstrate the seriousness of U.S. assurances and increase the cost of changing course, thereby increasing the credibility of the U.S. commitment. If Beijing s concerns about U.S. BMD programs are genuine, a public U.S. commitment should reduce or eliminate China s incentive to expand its missile forces beyond the current trajectory (assuming Beijing views the U.S. commitment as credible and lasting). Regardless, such a step would provide the basis for assessing the extent to which the increase in China s nuclear forces is being driven by U.S. BMD. If Beijing continues to build up its nuclear capabilities beyond what is needed for the lean and effective force it says it needs to protect its security, even in the face of a credible U.S. commitment, Washington and its allies will learn more about China s intentions. In addition, if China is genuinely concerned about U.S. BMD, explicitly tying expanded U.S. missile defense deployments to a growing North Korean threat would have the added benefit of encouraging China to do whatever it can to limit the expansion and modernization of North Korea s nuclear and missile programs and curtail its belligerence. Without a doubt, China s best chance to limit a U.S. BMD system capable of intercepting ICBMs launched from Asia is to help the United States mitigate the threat from North Korea. elbridge a. colby and abraham m. denmark vii
10 Strengthen U.S. extended deterrence in the Western Pacific. The Working Group believes the United States should strive to maintain, and in important respects strengthen, its extended deterrent structure in the Pacific. In particular, the Group commends the recent rebalancing effort toward the Asia-Pacific region, including its political, military, and economic aspects. Efforts such as the Extended Deterrence Dialogue and Extended Deterrence Policy Committee are commendable first steps that should be sustained and built upon. Especially important, however, will be the translation of admirable rhetoric about a restoration of U.S. attention to the Asia-Pacific region and promising first steps in the evolution of the U.S. regional force structure into sustained and concrete investments of resources, time, and energy. In the military realm, this means making significant investments in the kinds of capabilities that can maintain U.S. military advantages in the region, particularly conventional capabilities designed to counter anti-access/area-denial (A2/ AD) operations. Specifically, the United States should maintain an effective nuclear deterrent that can provide credible extended nuclear deterrence in the Western Pacific. Although the Working Group does not agree on every aspect of the appropriate U.S. nuclear or conventional modernization program, areas of agreement include the procurement of a fleet of next-generation strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), a new heavy bomber capable of carrying nuclear ordnance, and a new nuclear cruise missile. In addition, there is support within the Working Group for updating the B-61 nuclear gravity bomb, although some members believe the program should be contingent on U.S. allies making very substantial financial contributions. With this proviso, the Group supports the maintenance of a globally deployable posture of nonstrategic weapons and dual-capable aircraft. On the conventional side, the United States should invest in particularly valuable individual programs and capabilities such as the Virginia-class submarine (including the use of its payload module for prompt or time-urgent regional strike missions), effective and cost-efficient tactical missile defenses, a penetrating bomber, and other such capabilities. Confidence-Building Measures In addition to dialogue and the policy initiatives just described, the United States should consider a number of more concrete confidence-building measures (CBMs) with China. These CBMs would be grounded in the stability model just outlined. They could be advanced and organized through different media, including through the dialogues, and could be conducted either as part of integrated efforts or as separate, stand-alone initiatives. Proposals include: Reciprocal visits to national missile defense sites Reciprocal notification of ballistic missile defense and hypersonic vehicle test launches Observers at national BMD exercises and tests Mutual visits to reactors and enrichment and reprocessing facilities Technical exhibitions of strategic weapons Chinese participation in New START practice inspections Development of a common concept of strategic stability viii nuclear weapons and u.s.-china relations: a way forward
11 Toward Formal Arms Control As a practical matter, the time for formal arms control talks with China is not yet ripe. China remains deeply and consistently resistant to involvement in any such negotiations or framework for several reasons, including its insistence that the United States and Russia must further reduce their nuclear arsenals before China would become involved in negotiations and Beijing s concerns that the greater transparency required by any agreement could undermine China s security. Pursuit of a formal arms control agreement with China would therefore probably be stymied by China and could at worst exacerbate the ongoing friction in U.S.-China relations. Still, this situation should not preclude the United States from continuing to refer to arms control as a possible long-term goal with China, nor should this long-term objective interfere with or detract from the pursuit of more plausible nearterm opportunities. To this end, the United States should continue to urge Chinese participation in multilateral efforts, such as the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), which could encourage Beijing to become involved in arms control that covers nuclear weapons. The United States could also propose a verifiable multilateral agreement that bans the deployment of new fixed-site ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Such an agreement would give all nuclear powers an incentive to develop more survivable capabilities that are optimized for a second strike, thereby reducing crisis stability concerns. There are also more informal options. Ongoing consultations among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the P5), including a multilateral academic effort to develop a common nuclear glossary of terms and concepts, should be sustained. The United States could also call on China, along with the rest of the P5, to agree to no longer increase the size of its nuclear arsenal. This informal agreement could include steps such as mutual declarations of warhead numbers and reciprocal inspections. Conclusion The relationship between the United States and China will be of tremendous geopolitical consequence for the twenty-first century, and no issue in that relationship will be more important for the United States than protecting its interests and those of its allies and partners while maintaining peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. Even though conflict mercifully seems unlikely at this point, it cannot be ruled out and might become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky. With both sides possessing and appearing set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating. Finding ways to minimize the possibility of war and the use of nuclear weapons is therefore a primary responsibility of the political leaderships on both sides of the Pacific. This report is an effort to provide a flexible road map that U.S. leaders can use in working with their Chinese counterparts to fulfill this responsibility. elbridge a. colby and abraham m. denmark ix
12 about the working group The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) launched the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) in 2003 to develop the next generation of nuclear weapons policy experts. Through a number of interrelated initiatives, PONI has built a networked community of young professionals, facilitated dialogue across generations, and contributed to the debate on all aspects of U.S. nuclear weapons policy. In 2010 PONI added a leadership development program and commissioned its first Next Generation Working Group in order to give rising scholars an opportunity to formulate a consensus and infuse the policy debate on a critical nuclear policy issue. The inaugural working group, cochaired by James M. Acton and Michael S. Gerson, focused on U.S.-Russia arms control after New START. 1 In February 2012, PONI convened a second Next Generation Working Group to study the trends and dynamics of U.S.-China nuclear issues and relations. The group s goal is to inform and influence policy discourses in Washington and Beijing and help shape future U.S. government nuclear policy and strategy vis-à-vis China. In particular, the group seeks to identify key challenges and opportunities in this area and to recommend U.S. policies toward China related to U.S. and Chinese nuclear issues and relations for the next years. The PONI Working Group consists of 14 U.S.-based academics, analysts, and former government officials with expertise in nuclear issues and U.S.-China security dynamics. The Group met regularly for one year to explore the various issues and policy options and reach a consensus on recommendations. In September 2012, members of the Working Group traveled to Beijing for a series of roundtable discussions with Chinese analysts and officials to present the Group s initial findings and inform the study s analysis (for a trip report, see Appendix B) and to Tokyo for discussions with Japanese officials and experts. This report represents only the views of the Working Group; all members participated solely in their personal capacities, and their involvement in the Group does not imply the agreement or association of any institutions with which they are affiliated with this report or its conclusions. All Working Group members endorse this report s general policy thrust and judgments, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation. Each Working Group member was offered the opportunity to express any dissenting views. None chose to do so. 1. James Acton and Michael Gerson, Beyond New START: Advancing U.S. National Security through Arms Control with Russia (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2011), x nuclear weapons and u.s.-china relations: a way forward
13 The Working Group is composed of the following members: James M. Acton Jay K. Brotz Michael S. Chase Elbridge A. Colby, Cochair Abraham M. Denmark, Cochair M. Taylor Fravel Michael S. Gerson Michael C. Horowitz Patrick Lobner Oriana S. Mastro Vipin Narang Ely Ratner John K. Warden, Executive Director Robert Zarate The following individuals worked with the group as special advisers: Linton Brooks Bonnie Glaser Jeffrey Lewis David Santoro Randy Schriver elbridge a. colby and abraham m. denmark xi
15 1 introduction This report addresses the increasingly important set of issues surrounding the nuclear forces of the United States and China. It presents a series of policy and posture recommendations for the United States, but it does so with an eye toward both U.S. allies in the region and Chinese audiences. The report also includes two appendixes one detailing the Working Group s assessment of China s nuclear strategy, policy, decisionmaking, posture, and capabilities (Appendix A), and one summarizing the Working Group s discussions in Beijing in September 2012 (Appendix B). U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy and Nuclear Weapons For the United States, dealing with China in the context of nuclear weapons must be framed within the broader U.S. approach to the international order in general and to the Asia-Pacific region in particular. From Washington s perspective, the nuclear issues between Washington and Beijing are not a purely bilateral matter, nor can they be divorced from larger geopolitical issues. Instead, they must be seen as a constituent part of the broader U.S. strategy for the Asia-Pacific region and for how China integrates into a changing world. U.S. policy on these matters has been notably consistent for the last six decades. While U.S. strategy and posture has evolved, Washington has sought to uphold and defend an order in the Asia-Pacific region favorable to U.S. interests. This approach has been consistently rooted in a strong U.S. presence in the region, taking the form of both formal alliances as well as more implicit relationships with various Asian nations. 1 It has rested in turn on the continued ability of U.S. military forces to project power effectively throughout the Western Pacific, thereby ensuring U.S. access to defend its allies and sustain the security of the global commons. As evidenced by the Barack Obama administration s rebalancing effort, the U.S. government believes that this basic approach to the Asia-Pacific region remains well suited to protecting broad U.S. interests and fostering a favorable international political and economic order, and the Working Group agrees with this assessment. Thus the United States continues to see its alliance relationships in Asia, as well as its robust military presence, as necessary guarantors of regional stability and prosperity, which are in turn conducive to both its own interests and those of the entire 1. The United States currently extends treaty-based security guarantees to Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States has been clear that it will regard the use of force to determine Taiwan s status with grave concern, that it is committed to maintaining the capacity to resist the use of force or coercion against Taiwan, and that it will provide Taiwan with the defense articles and services necessary for its own defense. The United States is deliberately ambiguous about what it would do if Taiwan declared independence. The United States also has more informal security relationships with other states in the region such as Singapore. 1
16 region. 2 Although these alliances and partnerships must adapt to reflect changing economic and military realities, including the increasing pressures of budgetary stringency, retaining the basic security structure in the Pacific makes sense for the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has long viewed China as a central factor in its strategy in Asia originally as an adversary, then as a counterweight against Soviet power, and now as a key stakeholder in the international community. Since the 1970s, U.S. policy has sought to encourage and contribute to China s economic reforms and development in order to integrate China into the existing international political and economic order. Although they are hopeful that China will develop into a constructive stakeholder, the United States and much of the Asia-Pacific region share continuing concerns about some aspects of China s military posture and policies that, it is feared, could undermine regional stability and U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific. As a result, in the last decade the United States has pursued a policy of strategic hedging in which it has engaged China to try to capitalize on areas of agreement and further integrate China into the existing order, while also maintaining a robust capability to deter, deny, and (if needed) defeat any major aggression by China against the United States and its allies. The United States has begun to respond militarily to the changing strategic landscape in East Asia caused by China s rise. There is a growing sense among U.S. defense leaders and experts that the rise of China requires a serious and sustained investment in high-end U.S. military capabilities, as well as political relationships in the region, if the United States hopes to maintain a favorable conventional balance in the Western Pacific. Many U.S. Department of Defense programs, such as the AirSea Battle initiative, are best understood as attempts to maintain a favorable military balance in the Pacific. Going forward, the rise of China is very likely to play a central, if not defining, role in U.S. defense planning, procurement, and diplomacy. China s rise could also have a significant impact on U.S. nuclear policy. Nuclear weapons have been an important part of this U.S. posture in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of World War II. During the Cold War, when the United States was believed to be conventionally inferior to the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons played a central role in deterring major conventional war. Today, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and with technological advances in U.S. military capabilities, conventional forces constitute the primary focus of U.S. defense planning and posturing in East Asia. 3 Despite their diminished salience, U.S. nuclear weapons continue to play an important role is East Asia. 4 First, they serve to deter a nuclear attack. This mission has probably increased in importance since the end of the Cold War, because the conventional superiority that the United States currently enjoys could give an adversary the incentive to use nuclear weapons to try to avoid a conventional defeat. Second, any country considering the use of military force to challenge U.S. interests cannot exclude the possibility that conflict will escalate to nuclear use, at which point the 2. U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Washington, DC, January 2012, For a history, see Elbridge A. Colby, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy and Policymaking: The Asian Experience, in Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO, ed. Tom Nichols et al. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), Samuel W. Bodman and Robert M. Gates, signatories, National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense, Washington, DC, September 2008, 1; U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2010), 31 35, 2 nuclear weapons and u.s.-china relations: a way forward
17 state s most valuable assets will be at risk. 5 For this reason, U.S. nuclear weapons still contribute to a security architecture designed to deter aggression against the United States, its deployed forces, and its allies and partners. And finally, a number of U.S. allies in East Asia, some of whom view the progression of North Korea s nuclear program and China s burgeoning military capabilities with concern, continue to perceive U.S. nuclear forces as the ultimate guarantee of U.S. extended deterrence commitments and have pressed the United States to reaffirm that commitment. 6 The United States regards assuring allies as an important objective, not least because U.S. security guarantees are an important factor in reducing the incentives for allies to acquire their own nuclear weapons. If China s military modernization effort were to slow, or if the United States were able to sustain a reliable conventional military preeminence over China so that China could not credibly threaten U.S. or allied security with its conventional forces, U.S. nuclear forces might become even less salient than they are today. 7 Conversely, nuclear weapons may become more salient to U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific if the regional balance of conventional military power were to become unfavorable to U.S. interests. Such a dynamic would likely be intensified if China chose to use its growing military power to attempt to exclude the United States from the region, to shield North Korea from the consequences of its belligerence, to challenge the openness and stability of the global commons, or to take a more assertive approach to the resolution of territorial disputes. 8 In view of U.S. conventional superiority in the Western Pacific, it is extremely unlikely, under current conditions, that the United States would use nuclear weapons first (although it retains the explicit right to use nuclear weapons first as a matter of policy). 9 The conventional balance in the Western Pacific is, however, inherently dynamic. Consequently, there is a real possibility that, in the future, U.S. conventional forces may be inadequate to deal with all plausible conventional contingencies. There is some disagreement within the Working Group over how much the conventional balance would have to shift for such scenarios to arise, over the probable timescale for such a shift, and over the probability of it occurring. However, there is no disagreement on two key points. First, if China successfully achieves local conventional dominance in key contingencies (outlined shortly), the shifting balance would affect key U.S. interests, as well as those of U.S. allies and partners. Second, if this occurs, the United States and its allies would inevitably consider a greater role for nuclear weapons in their strategies to offset a relative conventional decline, and U.S. nuclear weapons would play a greater role in Chinese thinking. For this reason, the Working Group believes that the United States should work to maintain a highly capable conventional military posture, in part to maintain a favorable conventional balance 5. U.S. Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, Washington, DC, December 2006, See Condoleezza Rice et al., Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee, Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation, May 1, 2007, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, Washington, DC, June 16, 2009, Joint-vision-for-the-alliance-of-the-United-States-of-America-and-the-Republic-of-Korea. 7. However, other challenges in the Asia-Pacific, including those from North Korea and Russia, could sustain the salience of U.S. nuclear forces for the foreseeable future. 8. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People s Republic of China 2012, Washington, DC, May 2012, U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, viii. elbridge a. colby and abraham m. denmark 3
18 of military power in the Asia-Pacific. However, the United States should also strive to mitigate the security dilemma dynamics and potential spirals of instability that its investments and deployments might entail. Sources of Tension and Possible Conflict Considerations of U.S.-China nuclear relations would be a largely academic exercise without the serious risk of conflict and tension those relations entail. Unfortunately, the significant sources of tension and disagreement between the United States and China could, in the worst case, lead to conflict because a number of these disputes center on highly valued interests for Washington and Beijing and could be exacerbated by third parties, by miscommunication and miscalculation, by domestic political pressures, and by the perceived need to save face. 10 Moreover, few of these disputes appear likely to be resolved definitively in the near term. Beyond disputes, there is also the simple geopolitical reality of the rise of a new great power in the arena of a well-established status quo power. From time immemorial, this reality has proved to be a source of tension and competition among nations and has often led to war. A large-scale conventional war between the United States and China would be incredibly dangerous and destructive, and nuclear war between the two countries would be devastating for all involved. Even though the likelihood of conventional war between the two nations is currently low and the probability of nuclear war is even lower the appallingly high costs, dangers, and risks of a war demand that this risk be taken seriously and that steps be taken to render armed conflict more unlikely and less dangerous. The fact that China and the United States could come to blows does not mean that any conflict would result in the use of nuclear weapons, but it also does not mean that the use of nuclear weapons can be confidently ruled out, especially because even conflicts over apparently marginal issues can in ways that are not entirely predictable in advance escalate into conflicts over core interests. For these reasons, perhaps the single most important task of American statecraft in the coming century will be managing China s rise in a way that preserves peace while also defending important U.S. interests. 11 The following factors could threaten those objectives. Disputes Taiwan. Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the United States and China. Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan s independence, and the United States maintains the capability to come to Taiwan s defense. 12 Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible, complicated 10. James Dobbins, War with China, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 54 (August September 2012): Henry A. Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin, 2011), The United States has maintained a consistent one-china policy based on the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act for eight presidential administrations. It opposes any unilateral actions by either side to alter the status quo and believes that cross-strait issues should be resolved peacefully in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. 4 nuclear weapons and u.s.-china relations: a way forward
19 by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements. 13 Moreover, for the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of U.S. defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region. Korean peninsula. The real possibility of a conflict between North and South Korea or the collapse of the North Korean regime, both of which involve important U.S. and Chinese interests, raises the specter of another clash between the United States and China on the Korean peninsula. Territorial and maritime demarcation disputes. Disputes in the East and South China Seas over the sovereignty of small islands, the demarcation of maritime boundaries, and in certain cases the ownership of hydrocarbon resources that may lie under the seabed, have recently increased tensions between China and other states in the region. 14 Although these disputes appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the United States, they do provide kindling for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the United States. Exacerbating Factors Miscommunication and misunderstanding. The danger posed by these potential flashpoints is magnified by the potential for miscommunication and misunderstanding between China and the United States. Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of National Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion. 15 For example, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would elicit a military, or even nuclear, response by the other party. Furthermore, neither side seems to believe the other s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escala- 13. Richard Betts has observed well the dangers stemming from the Taiwan situation, which he terms the main potential flashpoint for the United States in East Asia. He notes that no other major flashpoint is more likely to bring the United States into combat with a major power.... Americans and Chinese see the issues at stake in the dispute over Taiwan in different terms; U.S. policy on the defense of Taiwan is uncertain, and thus so is the understanding in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington over how far the United States might go under different circumstances. He goes on to say that neither great power can fully control developments that might ignite a crisis. This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation, and uncontrolled escalation. See Richard K. Betts, American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), For a history of China s historical attitudes toward these disputes, see M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China s Territorial Disputes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 15. The challenges involved in communications between the U.S. and Chinese military establishments, especially in a crisis, were amply demonstrated during the 2001 EP-3 incident. Although channels of communication had been established, China preferred not to communicate with the United States and instead turned inward to develop a consensus on a preferred way forward. Only once that internal consensus had been established did Chinese interlocutors engage their U.S. counterparts. This approach completely undermines the purpose of crisis management mechanisms and could potentially prevent China from acting quickly to de-escalate a developing crisis. For some case studies on how this strategy has been employed, see Michael D. Swaine, Zhang Tuosheng, and Danielle F. S. Cohen, Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006). elbridge a. colby and abraham m. denmark 5
20 tion management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict. Moreover, the continued expansion of the military relationship in space and cyberspace introduces additional exacerbating factors. External nuclear factors. U.S.-China nuclear relations are complicated by the fact that both sides have nuclear relationships with other countries, and shifts related to one relationship can have dramatic effects on them all. For example, despite China s focus on the United States when it comes to nuclear weapons, other states especially Russia and India pay close attention to China s nuclear policies and capabilities and make adjustments accordingly, and vice versa. 16 Therefore, China s behavior on nuclear issues vis-à-vis the United States could have significant implications for its other strategic relationships. For example, if China decided to augment its nuclear force in response to India, concerns would emerge in the United States. These concerns could contribute to friction in the U.S.-China relationship. Underlying Structural Tensions Established and rising power. Beyond specific disputes and exacerbating factors, tensions between the United States and China are likely to persist for the simple reason that a rising great power such as China is bound to cause friction as its expanding objectives and growing strength rub against the interests of other nations in its region, including the long-established dominant power the United States. The study of international relations has long suggested that such power transitions are especially fraught with the danger of conflict for reasons having to do both with concrete calculations of power and wealth and with more ineffable factors of honor and pride. 17 Historically, a rising nation usually expects to be granted greater influence and respect in accordance with its growing stature, but nations that already possess that influence are generally reluctant to part with it, especially if they do not trust or share basic values with the rising state. Thus tensions can grow. The basic structural problems of how China s rise can be squared with the U.S. established position and the existing regional order Washington has underwritten are intensified by the ideological tensions between a global power structure established and overseen by liberal democratic powers and a rising power with an avowedly authoritarian government. Again, such tensions do not need to lead to conflict and war, but they might. Security dilemma. Within this broader dynamic, there is a real danger that the emerging structural dynamics between the United States and China are generating a classic security dilemma, in which the actions taken by one side to increase its defensive strength are interpreted as hostile or threatening by the other side, thereby eliciting a defensive response that the first side views as hostile or threatening, and so forth. 18 Although it appears that this dynamic already exists in some respects in the arena of conventional military competition for example, China s 16. James M. Acton, Bombs Away? Being Realistic about Deep Nuclear Reductions? Washington Quarterly 35 (Spring 2012): See, for example, A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1968); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). The classic statement of this problem, however, remains that made by Thucydides in 431 B.C. in The History of the Peloponnesian War ( classics.mit.edu/thucydides/pelopwar.html): What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta. 18. For classic discussions of the security dilemma, see Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War; Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951); John Herz, Idealist Internation- 6 nuclear weapons and u.s.-china relations: a way forward
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text: Hey guys, I am relatively new to this forum. Relatively because for the past couple of days I was going through the forum and yeah, i found there are thousands of methods out here. I am glad that atleast now I came across this forum. Looking for a great year ahead with all the inputs I get from here.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
The WEF is an independent non-profit organization dedicated to advancing project management skills.
In 1991 Max Wideman wrote a book, published by PMI®, and very kindly donated the net proceeds to the West Coast Chapter. In 2004, PMI HQ ceased selling the book, and the Chapter received further royalties from PMI in the amount of CAD $51,226.33.
At an Extraordinary General Meeting of the chapter's members held on November 23, 2004, the following motion was proposed and passed:
- Be it resolved that the Chapter establish a small steering committee of not more than four potential Education Foundation directors to initiate and establish the objectives and operating criteria of an independent non-profit Project Management Educational Foundation in this region of operation.
The committee meets every month and has established incorporated status with the BC provincial government in the name of "Wideman Education Foundation" (WEF) and has obtained Federal government charitable status. This is an exciting time in the development of WEF activities.
We strongly encourage any local PMI members who are interested in furthering the education of potential project managers, especially from the high school level on upwards, to contact the WEF with a view to participating and contributing ideas.
Contact Emails:
• President Joan Vincent:
• Secretary Max Wideman: email@example.com
• Treasurer Jamal Moustafaev: email@example.com
• Director SFU liaison Kamal Masri: firstname.lastname@example.com
More on our Contact Page


text:
|Harbor Island Rentals ~ Reservation Information
For reservations, a free brochure or further assistance, please call our toll-free number 1.800.553.0251 or 843.838.4800 and we will be happy to assist. Summer office hours are Monday - Saturday from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm. Off season office hours are Monday - Friday 9 am to 5pm. If calling after hours, please leave your name and number and we will be happy to return your call.
All reservations require 30 percent advance deposit within fourteen days of booking. A Visa, MasterCard or Discover Card number is required to secure your reservation. For reservations booked within thirty days of arrival, the advance deposit is to be charged at time of booking. Any outstanding balances are due upon arrival and can be paid by cash, check or credit card. All advance deposits will be placed in an interest-bearing escrow account and guests waive all claims to any interest earned.
Check-In / Check-Out Schedule:
In order to ensure our units are properly cleaned and prepared for your arrival, we ask that all guests abide by our check-in time of 4 pm and check-out time of 11 a.m. Early check-in or late departure requests cannot be guaranteed.
Cancellation Policy:
In case of cancellations thirty (30) or more days prior to arrival, a cancellation fee of $75.00 will be charged. For cancellations within thirty (30) days of arrival, your deposit amount (less cancellation fee) will be returned if the unit is re-rented for the cancelled period. If the unit is not re-rented, we will be unable to refund your advance rental deposit. Cancellations within 72 hours of arrival result in the full charge for the reservation.
Inclement Weather:
No refunds will be made due to inclement weather. In the event of a mandatory hurricane evacuation, a pro-rata portion of your occupancy fee will be refunded to you within 30 days. The refund will be for the period of the evacuation only.
No pets are allowed in any rental units. We reserve the right to terminate occupancy without refund should this occur.
Guests will be responsible for any damages or theft. Please report any damage at check-out or upon occurrence. YOUR CREDIT CARD NUMBER IS USED AS YOUR SECURITY DEPOSIT. Charges to your credit card may include, but are not limited to, damages over and above normal wear and tear, theft, phone charges and excessive cleanup.
After Hours Key Pick Up:
Key pick-up after office hours is located @ the office mail boxes on the porch
SC Taxes:
All rentals are subject to the 10% South Carolina Sales & Accommodations Tax if less than 90 days.
Harbor Island Owners Vehicle Pass:
The HOA charges a fee for each vehicle associated with the reservation depending on the duration of stay.
|Harbor Island Rentals | 2123-B Sea Island Parkway | Harbor Island, South Carolina 29920 | 1.800.553.0251


text:
Gwen Stefani feels 'guilty' being a working mother
Us WeeklyCovering the January 2013 issue of Vogue, Gwen Stefani, the 43-year-old No Doubt frontwoman, opens up about why she was hesitant to record new material with her bandmates after an 11-year hiatus. (The band released their sixth studio album, "Push and Shove," in September.)"Getting to the studio and not being able to make it happen, but missing out on being at home, missing out on putting the kids down. What's more important? I felt so guilty," she recalls. "'I am letting everyone down in the studio right now; I'm letting down my kids; I'm letting down myself.' Because time was so precious."PHOTOS: Gwen Stefani's life as a momThe toughest part was doing it on her own, she said. In September 2011, her husband Gavin Rossdale's band, Bush, released their first album in 10 years. The group spent nearly a year touring the world to promote "The Sea of Memories."PHOTOS: Gwen Stefani's incredible abs through the years"I mean, he was there for me mentally, but physically? These boys [Kingston, 6, and Zuma, 4] are physical. They wake up and they start punching each other!" she laughs. "One thing we've had in our relationship the whole time is that we can have it both ways: together, not together, and it's fine. But when you have kids? It's not so great. They need him. Once you have a family, it's just so obvious how everyone needs each other. So it's really nice to have him back."PHOTOS: Why Kingston Rossdale is Hollywood's trendiest totMotherhood itself presented a new set of challenges for Stefani, who launched her L.A.M.B. fashion line 10 years ago. "It's super fun being a mom, but it's not what you think it's going to be. And it's really gradual. At first, your life is totally the same. You have this cute little thing that you get to drive around everywhere, and you're so proud and it's amazing. And as they grow older, it really does start to change your life. Like, 'Oh, my God, they have school, they have to get through first grade, they have to learn to read.'"Continued ...© Fame Flynet


text:
Sunday, April 29, 2007
Before we 'met'
Though we have learned more about Taylor's musical past since AI ended, I'm only including things I knew durring AI Season Five:
Taylor Hicks never had a singing lesson or a music lesson in his life, but is singing, dancing and playing the harmonica from an early age.
*Taylor drops out of college as soon as someone starts to pay him to play music. (In Rick and Bubba interview, his dad sounds like he is STILL upset about that.)
*Taylor works as a musician for 10 years struggling to 'make it.'*He works festivals, weddings, bars and clubs.*He moves to Nashville for a while, but finds the market saturated and moves back to Alabama.
*Over the years he makes 2 cds that don't do anything but are very good!
*His brother, Sean, encourages Taylor to try out for American Idol.
*His dad tells him he might as well just buy a lotto ticket instead of American Idol because his chances would be better.
*Taylor has never seen an episode of American Idol.
*Because of Hurricane Katrina, a flight of Taylor's from New Orleans is cancelled and the airline gives Taylor a free ticket to anywhere in the country. Taylor uses the free ticket to get to Las Vegas to try out for American Idol. Later, Taylor says if he had not gotten that free ticket, he would not have been on Idol.
*Taylor is 28 at the Las Vegas auditions so he makes it in just at the cut-off age. He is only a few months from being too old for the competition.
*Taylor really liked the shirt in the pic above. A lot. (Photographic evidence available upon request.)
1/31/06 Taylor Hicks, America. America, Taylor Hicks.
• 1/31/06 AI performance: The Audition—Change Is Gonna Come and Swanee River Rock
I didn't see the audition when it aired because I didn't watch American Idol at that time. I preferred "CBS Rock Star" because it was a contest between people who could sing. And AI was a bunch of people who could not. At least that is how I thought of the show and so I didn't watch it, and planned to never watch it.
Some people who did watch it are blown away by the audition. There is a small segment of America who is already obsessed with Taylor Hicks. You can hear their excitement in the old posts on ricky.org, and the AI message boards. The excitement of someone REAL on AI is almost too good to believe.
Now, of course, the audition burned into my memory from watching the clip over and over.. Every word, every note. It was all such a perfect beginning. And such a perfect song choice! Simon's rejection based on anything but singing, Taylor's voice, Taylor holding his hands behind his back at first and then just letting loose with his movements for Swanne… Taylor's response to why he was there: "I want my voice heard" Why? "Because I think I got one." Taylor saying , "Gimme a chance, Gimme a chance."
It is history. The whole season is history.The magic had started:•
2/02/06 AI message board: first thread, "The Gray Haired Guy"•
2/02/06 AI message board: poster 'wiseguy' suggests the name, "Soul Patrol" for Taylor's fans.•
2/04/06 AI message board: the first "Soul Patrol" thread with a poll…there was also a 'silver foxes' thread.•
2/05/06 Taylor's CD, Under The Radar, comes out of nowhere to land on the Laser's Edge top sellers chart at #3.
2/08/06 AI performance clip: The First Cut Is The Deepest airs on AI during Hollywood Week.•
2/12/06 Under The Radar tops The Laser's Edges top sellers chart at #1…and STAYS THERE….it is still at #1 today, April 29, 2007.
Ain't No Sunshine...3 seconds that we will always dream about.
Taylor's 'harmonica walk' has America talking and the fans are going crazy. More evidence that Taylor is the REAL DEAL! Dare they hope?? The Soul Patrol grows!!I still have not seen the program and I don't know who Taylor Hicks is.People at work watch the show and convince me to give a shot, so that at least we can chit-chat about it on breaks.•
2/21/06 Taylor interviewed in The Birmingham News and says he needs a new couch:"I've been lying on a couch that I had in college," says Hicks, 29. "And it's not even a couch, just bundles of cotton. My friend's dog rolled in a cow carcass and sat on it." •
date ?????? Sojie and Connieb and the whole Soul Patrol decide to pitch in to get Taylor a new couch! These fans have seen him for maybe a total of 4 minutes on their TVs and they LOVE him. They really love him.
2/22/06 Levon
"Levon" gets a BIG response on the internet.
Ricky.org says, "interest (in Taylor Hicks) is burning up the internet."
Taylor's shout out to the 'Soul Patrol' after the song THRILLS the fans on the message boards. He is talking to US! He used our name! He read what we said, and he is talking to us! It goes down in history as a "The first Soul Patrol shout-out" and the fans treasure the memory.
This is the first program I watch. I like Taylor, but I don't get quite what is up with Jez, the obsessed fan I see on my regular, non-AI related message board. She made a dozen posts about him, just going on and on about him…! What the?? He is my favorite contestant after this first show too, but I also like Paris and Chris…Calm down, Jez!!
I liked it. I can't decide about the twitches, the wooo!s and the Ayyyy!s. Do I like it? Do I hate it? Is it fake? Is it real? Does he have 'a problem' of some sort?
America can't decide, either. Taylor takes a lot of bashing for it. People debate the questions endlessly on the internet and around the water cooler. People say he is just 'real' and feeling the music, people say he has autism or Tourette's Syndrome…
The song itself is ok…I like it. I see something there. Something interesting. What is IT? And more importantly, when can I see it again??
3/08/06 (a.m.) Taylor is interviewed on Rick and Bubba
By the end of Taylor's performance, I am on my feet, yelling and clapping! WOOOOOO! That was fantastic!!
**This song is the magic moment!!!**
The internet EXPLODES!!! Taylor is THE topic at work, and on the radio talk shows the next day.I am completely overcome with Taylor Mania. I don't know how bad I have it. But looking back, I see I was completely Taylorized by the time the song ended. My fate was sealed.
I want to watch Takin' It To The Streets again!
I realize maybe I can see it on the internet. Sure enough, I find it there and re-watch the performance many times. I get the same thrill every time I watch it, and the same huge smile.
I find this cool blog called graycharles...
• March, 2006 "In Your Time" is selling on Ebay for over $200 and up to $400.•
3/12/06 AI message board: Taylor's folder has 91,655 posts and the next highest folder, Ace, has only 23,460


text:
Hallandale Office
Mailing Address:
P.O. Box 250
Hallandale Beach, FL 33008-0250
Street Address:
217 E Hallandale Beach Blvd.
Hallandale Beach, FL 33009
Miami Office
Mailing Address:
P.O. Box 7637
Miami, FL 33255-7637
Street Address:
8120 Coral Way
Miami, FL 33155
Contact Us Online
If you want to contact us online, please fill out this short form.
You may also decide to select an appropriate email address to the right, and send a message to a specific department at Riemer Insurance Group .
Working Hours
8:30 am -5:00 pm
Dade: 305.945.5529
Broward: 954.454.3145
Toll Free: 800.742.1691
Fax: 954.458.7844


text:
mGBA is a new emulator for running Game Boy Advance games. It aims to be faster and more accurate than many existing Game Boy Advance emulators, as well as adding features that other emulators lack.
A new release of mGBA, version 0.6.1, is available. This version is a bugfix release, which contains many stability and accuracy fixes. An extensive list of changes follows after the cut.
Misc:GB, GBA: Fix crashes when attempting to identify null VFiles
GB, GBA: Fix sync to video with frameskip
GB, GBA Savedata: Fix savestate-related save overwriting (fixes #834)
GB Audio: Fix NRx2 writes while active (fixes #866)
GB Core: Fix palette loading when loading a foreign config
GB MBC: Pocket Cam memory should be accessible without enabling
GB MBC: Fix SRAM sizes 4 and 5
GB MBC: Fix RTC initialization (fixes #825)
GB MBC: Fix RTC loading when file size is off
GB Memory: Initialize peripheral pointers
GB Memory: Prevent accessing empty SRAM (fixes #831)
GB Memory: Fix HDMA count starting in mode 0 (fixes #855)
GB Memory: Actually load latch time from savestate
GB Serialize: Fix deserializing video STAT
GB Video: Fix 16-bit screenshots (fixes #826)
GB Video: Fix potential hang when ending mode 0
GB Video: Fix read mode when enabling LCD
GBA: Reset active region as needed when loading a ROM
GBA: Fix keypad IRQs not firing when extra buttons are pressed
GBA BIOS: Use coreâs VRAM variable instead of rendererâs
GBA Cheats: Fix PARv3 multiline blocks (fixes #889)
GBA I/O: Fix reading from a few invalid I/O registers (fixes #876)
GBA Savedata: Fix 512 byte EEPROM saving as 8kB (fixes #877)
GBA Savedata: Fix size of SRAM saves (fixes #883)
GBA Video: Fix broken sprite blending hack (fixes #532)
Python: Fix importing .gb or .gba before .core
Qt: Fix command line debugger closing second game
Qt: Fix LOG argument order
Qt: Fix timezone issues with time overrides
Qt: Fix sprite export pausing game indefinitely (fixes #841)
SDL: Fix potential race condition when pressing keys (fixes #872)
CMake: Fix CPack dependencies for libpng 1.6
GBA: Detect hardware for Pokémon FireRed ROM hacks
GBA Cheats: Improve detection of raw cheats
Qt: Donât rebuild library view if style hasnât changed
Qt: Allow overrides to be saved before a game is loaded
Qt: Hide mouse immediately when loading
SDL: Fix 2.0.5 build on macOS under some circumstances
VFS: Make VFile.truncate work growing files on PSV (fixes #885)
For: Windows, macOS and Linux


text:
Environmental permit: nature and heritage conservation screening
Find out if you require a conservation risk assessment prior to submitting your environmental permit application.
The Environment Agency has a legal duty to screen all of the activities they permit to identify those that may have a detrimental effect on heritage and nature conservation sites, protected species and habitats.
A heritage and nature conservation screen will identify if there are any of these sites relevant to your proposed activity. Where there are you'll be given a map and information pack.
Any future permit application you make must contain an explanation of how you believe your site may, or may not, impact on heritage and nature conservation. Failure to do so will result in your application being returned.
If you need help filling in this online form, please email firstname.lastname@example.com or call 03708 506 506 (Monday to Friday, 8am to 6pm). Find out about call charges.
Find out more about environmental permits.
Last updated 2 July 2015 + show all updates
- amended the request from url
- Changed from a Word file to an online form.
- First published.


text:
A vital factor to your golf game are the tee shots. The following golf driving techniques will dramatically improve your game.
It is no surprise that many golfers strive to improve their tee shots, most notably their accuracy and distance. The more distance you can get in a shot, the more likely you are to drop your strokes, resulting in better possibility of birdies or eagles. The better your accuracy, the less likely you are to hook or slice your strikes.
Mastering the combination of these two skills will exceedingly improve your game.
To be able to master both distance and accuracy you will need to perfect your stance and setup. When addressing, as a rule of thumb, always try to keep your feet virtually shoulder-width apart.
You must always remember to address the ball with a square stance, this is a very important technique! You must set your feet up in a way that they are lined up to the target. Although a square stance should always be used, you may find that in some situations you will want to slightly open or close the stance, this is ok, as long as you do so by adjusting the forward foot up or back. This same rule applies to your hips and shoulders, these should stay square to the target. These simple but sound tips to a square stance will have you making large improvements to your game.
In order to increase your distance, you will need to discover the art of speeding up the club head, this can be tricky to master. While keeping your knees flexed, you should make sure that you can fully coil and uncoild your body. Remember, your distance will suffer if your body is to rigid and tall.
If your shots a regularly slicing or hooking, you have a problem. Sometimes your grip can be to blame if your shots are inconsisitant. If it is too strong or too weak you will risk an open or closed club face on impact. To perform a smooth and accurate shot you will need to ensure your grip is neutral, this means not too tight but not too weak.
Always remember to play the ball forward while setting up. Basically, what this means is that that the ball should be closer to your leading foot, not in the middle of both feet. Making this small adjustment in your setup will allow your shot to reach the height and travel with the accuracy you desire.
Another of the less known golf driving techniques is to always make sure that your hips are leading the backswing, your hands and arms should follow. A proper hip turn is crucial in gaining distance off the tee. This is because as your hips start the turn, the hands, arms, head, and upper body will follow.
The top of the backswing is exceptionally important to your swing. Once you reach the top of your backswing, you must let your hips to begin the downswing. After mastering the technique of letting your hips lead the way, you will no doubt be surprised at your improvement.
One of the more well known techniques to improving your accuracy is to ensure the club head is followed by the hands through the strike. This helps you to hit the ball with a square club face, preventing any hooking or slicing issues and giving you a more consistantly accurate shot.
In conclusion to our golf driving techniques, you might want to make an effort with a newer 460cc driver. These drivers are the heaviest available drivers and they incorporate a much bigger head. This can permit you to gain more distance but you need to watch that your accuracy doesn't suffer, practice with these heavier clubs is important. - These things can take a bit of work to master.