text:
Competitive Cyber-Insurance and Internet Security
- Roderick Atkinson
- 3 years ago
- Views:
1 Competitive Cyber-Insurance and Internet Security Nikhil Shetty Galina Schwartz Mark Felegyhazi Jean Walrand Abstract This paper investigates how competitive cyber-insurers affect network security and welfare of the networked society. In our model, a user s probability to incur damage (from being attacked) depends on both his security and the network security, with the latter taken by individual users as given. First, we consider cyber-insurers who cannot observe (and thus, affect) individual user security. This asymmetric information causes moral hazard. Then, for most parameters, no equilibrium exists: the insurance market is missing. Even if an equilibrium exists, the insurance contract covers only a minor fraction of the damage; network security worsens relative to the no-insurance equilibrium. Second, we consider insurers with perfect information about their users security. Here, user security is perfectly enforceable (zero cost); each insurance contract stipulates the required user security. The unique equilibrium contract covers the entire user damage. Still, for most parameters, network security worsens relative to the no-insurance equilibrium. Although cyber-insurance improves user welfare, in general, competitive cyber-insurers fail to improve network security. Keywords: Cyber Insurance, Interdependent Security, Asymmetric Information, Network Externalities, Incentives for Cyber-Security, Moral Hazard
2 Introduction In this paper, we propose a model to study the effects of cyber insurance on user security and their welfare. Our model highlights how network externalities combined with information asymmetry lead to a missing market for cyber insurance. The Internet serves as a ubiquitous communication platform for both individuals and businesses. Thus, an increasing amount of wealth is accessible online, and cyber-crime is becoming one of the most lucrative criminal activities. Cyber-crime is lucrative because network vulnerabilities are easy to exploit and persecution of cyber-criminals is plagued by enforcement problems. First, and importantly, criminals are relying on the anonymity of the Internet protocols to disguise their traces. Second, global Internet connectivity makes it difficult for law enforcement authorities to identify the origin of the attacks. Exploiting national differences in legal systems, criminals often operate safely from countries with the weakest legislations and enforcement. Third, criminals quickly adapt their attack strategies as new defenses are developed; thus, cyber-crime evolves to minimize the chance of persecution. Altogether, this situation results in formation of highly professional, mafia-style cyber-crime establishments, which are rapidly expanding, see [2]. Technology-based defense and enforcement solutions are available, but there is a consensus among security researchers [2] that the existing security problems cannot be solved by technological means alone. We concur that these security problems primarily result from misaligned incentives of the networked parties with respect to their security. Existing research [4, 7, 6, 9, 8] indicates that risk management in general and cyber-insurance in particular are potentially valuable tools for security management. Still, at present, risk management capabilities are virtually nonexistent in the network [2]. We model the effects of informational asymmetries in the presence of network externalities, and study their consequences for network security incentives. We believe that these features of the environment induce socially suboptimal network security, and complicate the management of security risks. We build on the seminal ideas of Akerlof[], Rothschild and Stiglitz [7] and others, 2 which we combine with the ideas of interdependent security originated by Heal-Kunreuther This work was funded in part by the National Science Foundation under grant NSF Any opinions, findings, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding source. 2 See [20] for the literature review. 2
3 [4], Gordon-Loeb [8] and Hausken []. 3 In our model, all users are identical, meaning that their wealth is identical and they suffer identical damage if successfully attacked. In our model, the user s probability of being attacked depends on both the user security level and the network security level, which individual users take as given. Thus, we have an externality. Indeed, due to this externality, individually optimal user security level is lower than the socially optimal one. Our setting emphasizes that interdependent security is a focal feature, which shapes the incentives for Internet security. Although security interdependence is present in other contexts (such as terrorist attacks [5]), network security is especially prone to these effects because everyone is interlinked. First, we investigate the effects of information asymmetry in the presence of network effects. Though our model allows to study both moral hazard (when insurers are not aware of user security levels) and adverse selection (when insurers cannot distinguish different user types), in this paper, we address only moral hazard. We demonstrate that for a wide range of parameters, insurance market fails to exist, i.e., we observe a missing market. Next, we assume no information asymmetry between the insurers and the insured (users). We demonstrate that user utility is higher with insurance, but the network security level is not necessarily higher. On reverse, in many cases network security worsens with insurers. Indeed, insurers only manage risks, but they do not necessarily reduce them. Our homogeneity assumption is simplistic, and does not hold in the actual Internet. But, adding user and insurer heterogeneity to our setting only adds more informational asymmetries. Then, the lemon problem becomes likely, which itself could cause missing markets []. Thus, with heterogeneity, one expects adverse selection problems, which would also contribute to missing markets. We make two main contributions to the literature. First, we observe that even with no heterogeneity (of users and insurers), information asymmetries complicate the formation of viable cyber-insurance markets. Second, we demonstrate that even in the absence of informational asymmetries, competitive cyber-insurers fail to improve network security. The significant implication is that in the existing network environment, cyber-insurance markets cannot serve as a catalyst for improvement of network security. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we propose a base model, derive its Nash equilibrium, and compare it with socially optimal allocation. In 3 See also [7, 9, 2, 5, 0, 3, 6, 3, 2]. This list is by no means exhaustive. 3
4 Section 3, we add competitive insurers to our base model, analyze the equilibrium with insurers. We consider two cases: when individual security levels are noncontractible and when insurers include the requirement about individual security level into the contract. In Section 4, we summarize our findings and conclude. The technical details are relegated to Appendix. 2 Model In this section, we present our base model, which highlights the interdependence of user and network security. We consider a network populated by identical users. Each user i has two choice variables: the convenience level a i > 0 of his network activity, and his security level s i [0, ]. The convenience level a i can be, for example, characterized by the number of applications utilized by the user, such as s, Web, IM, P2P, etc. If there are no security problems, the user derives utility from his wealth and from network usage. We assume that both these components of user utility U i are additively separable: U i = K f(w ) + K 2 g(a i ) K 3 a i, where K, K 2 and K 3 are positive constants, and W > 0 denotes user s wealth. We assume that the functions f and g are increasing and concave, reflecting that user wealth W and convenience level a i have a positive but decreasing marginal benefit for the user. To increase his convenience level, user incurs a linear cost (cost of effort). In the presence of network attacks, we assume that, if the attack on the user is successful, the user incurs a monetary damage (0, W ). Let p i be the probability that user i suffers such an attack. This probability depends on two factors: the network security level s [0, ], which determines the probability of a user being attacked, and the user security level s i, which determines the probability of success of such an attack. This justifies our expression for p i : p i = ( s i ) ( s) = v i v, () where for mathematical convenience, we introduce the user vulnerability level v i = s i and the network vulnerability level v = s. Further, assume that s is equal to the average security levels of its users: s = s i i=,...n 4 N, (2)
5 and we let the number of users N be large enough so that a single user has a negligible effect on the network security level. Thus, each user takes the network security level as a given parameter. We assume that user s choice of a higher security requires a higher user cost (in terms of effort), and this cost is proportional to the convenience level. Again, assuming additive separability, we express the expected utility of user i in the presence of network insecurity as: E[U i ] = K {( p i ) f(w ) + p i f(w )}+K 2 g(a i ) K 3 a i (h(s i )+), (3) where the security cost function, h( ) is increasing and convex (h, h > 0) with h(0) = 0 corresponding to zero security level and h() =, corresponding to a hypothetical perfectly secure system. Thus, it becomes increasingly costly to improve the security level at a higher level of security. For simplicity, we let f(x) = g(x) = x and h(x) = x and solve the problem for these specific functions. Then, (3) becomes: E[U i ] = K { ( p i ) W + p i W } + K 2 ai K 3 a i vi ). (4) Since we assume that the convenience level of user i s network usage a i is not affected even when this user is attacked, this model may be more suitable for attacks like phishing, eavesdropping, etc. rather than for attacks like denial-ofservice. 2. Analysis We start by deriving the optimal convenience level a i by taking the partial derivative of (4) with respect to a i : E[U i ] = K 2 K 3, a i 2 ai vi from which a i is: a i = K2 2 v 4 K3 2 i. (5) Thus, the user s a i depends only on her choice of v i, but not on network vulnerability level v. Next, we substitute (5) in (4) to obtain: E[U i ] = K2 2 [ v i v i vk( W W ) + K W ] (6) 4 K 3 5
6 where K = 4K K 3. To simplify, we let K K K 3 =, and obtain a normalized utility: E[U i ] = v i v i vk( W W ) + K W. (7) The constant K characterizes how users value their wealth relative to the utility from the network. 2.. Nash Equilibrium To find the user i s best response vi ( v) to a given network vulnerability v, we optimize (7) with respect to v i (subject to v i ) and express vi ( v) as { } vi ( v) = min [2 vk( W W )],. (8) 2 From (8), vi ( v) is identical for all users, from which any Nash equilibrium is symmetric, and let vi ( v) = vj ( v) = v for any users i and j. Then, from (2), we have v = v and hence, { v = min [2v K( W W )] 2, from which we obtain Nash equilibrium vulnerability v : { } v = s = min [2K( W W )],. (9) 2/3 From (9), v < only if W W > and thus, all else equal, users 2K invest in security only when their damage or K become sufficiently high, or when user wealth W is low Social Optimum We assume that a social planner unilaterally dictates user vulnerability, v i = v, and maximizes cumulative utility of the users. Since users are identical, this maximization is identical to a representative user utility maximization with v = v. From (7), the representative user utility is: }, E[U] = v v 2 K( W W ) + K W. (0) 6
7 Maximizing (0), subject to v, we obtain the socially optimal vulnerability v soc as: { } v soc = s soc = min [4K( W W )],. () 2/3 Thus, v soc < only if ( W W ) > 4K. As expected, vsoc v, which allows us to formulate the following proposition: Proposition When the socially optimal security level is strictly positive, it is strictly higher than the individually optimal one: s soc > s. Users are strictly better off in the social optimum than in the Nash equilibrium. In the next section, we extend this model to the presence of competitive insurers. We will investigate how insurer information about user security level (or lack of such information) impacts network security. 3 Insurance Model We define market equilibrium similar to the model of Rothschild and Stiglitz [7], who pioneered examination of equilibria in insurance markets with information asymmetries. We assume that each insurer offers a single insurance contract in a class of admissible contracts, or does nothing. A Nash equilibrium is defined as a set of admissible contracts such that: i) all contracts result in a non-negative utility for the insurers, ii) taking as given the contracts offered by incumbent insurers (those offering contracts), there is no additional contract which an entrant-insurer (one not offering a contract) can offer and make a strictly positive profit and iii) taking as given the set of contracts offered by other incumbent insurers, no incumbent can increase its profits by altering his offered contract. The literature referred to such contracts as competitive, because entry and exit are free, and because no barrier to entry or scale economies are present. We consider risk neutral insurers who compete with each other. Let ρ be the premium charged to a user and L > 0 be his loss covered by the insurer. We do not consider L < 0 because it is unrealistic to expect a fine when a user suffers a damage. Let v and v be the user and network vulnerability. Then, we denote the respective user utility by U(v, v, ρ, L), and from (7) and (), we have: U(v, v, ρ, L) = v + v vk W + L ρ + ( v v)k W ρ. (2) 7
8 If v, ρ, L are identical for all users, then v = v, and we obtain U(v, v, ρ, L) = v + v 2 K W + L ρ + ( v 2 )K W ρ. (3) Additionally, we will assume that insurers take network security v as given. This assumption reflects that individual insurers cannot affect v on their own. 3. Insurance with Non-Contractible Security In this section, we assume that it is impossible (or too costly) for the insurers to monitor the users security level. Indeed, even if v is included in the contract and user compliance is observable by the insurer, but unverifiable in court (due to the prohibitively high costs), the insurer would effectively operate as if no requirement on v is imposed. Thus, we consider the contracts of the form (ρ, L) only. In addition, we will assume that contracts stipulate that purchase of extra coverage from outside parties is prohibited. Further, since the users are homogeneous, we will restrict our attention to a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., the equilibria with identical user actions. Henceforth, we will use the superscript to distinguish the values in such an equilibrium. Let user i purchase a contract (ρ, L). Then, he will choose his vulnerability v i to maximize his utility (taking v as given): E [U i ] = v i v i vk( W ρ W + L ρ) + K W ρ. (4) Any contract which improves user utility U(v, v, ρ, L) is preferred by users to any other contract. Hence, in equilibrium, there should exist no such deviating contract that makes non-negative profits for an insurer. Further, the equilibrium contract is constrained by user participation - a user must prefer to buy insurance, assuming that others already did so, to staying without insurance. In Appendix, we show that this participation constraint never binds, and, in equilibrium, due to competition, insurers profits are zero: ρ = ( v ) 2 L ; further, we demonstrate that, in any equilibrium: L <, and from user optimization, we have: v = [ 2K( W ρ ] 2/3. (5) W + (L ρ ) 8
9 Comparing (5) with (9), we infer that in any equilibrium: v > v. (6) Although the availability of insurance may allow users to reach a higher utility, the network security is strictly lower with insurance. In Appendix, we prove the following proposition: Proposition 2 If < 8 W, any insurance contract with security levels unobservable by the insurers strictly decreases the utility of the users. Hence, no insurance 9 is offered and no insurance market exists. If > 8 W, there could exist an equilibrium in which all users purchase insurance contract (ρ, L ). This insurance 9 improves users utility relative to the no insurance case, but decreases their security (i.e., v > v is always true). From Proposition 2, the presence of insurers negatively affects network security. Indeed, here, security is chosen by the users, and insured users have meager incentives to secure themselves. This is a typical manifestation of a moral hazard. In this case, the expected per user loss due to network insecurity increases by: = [ (v ) 2 (v ) 2]. 3.2 Insurance with Contractible Security In this section, we assume that insurers can enforce a desired security level for the insured users at zero cost. Thus, we permit contracts (v, ρ, L) to specify a user s required vulnerability v. In reality, this may be achieved, for example, by deploying tamper-proof security software that monitors and enforces user security Social Planner Next, we derive the social planner choice of contract when security is contractible. Let (v, ρ, L ) soc be the contract chosen by a social planner. The social planner objective is to maximize the user utility, subject to the constraint of non-negative profits: max ρ,v,l U(v, v, ρ, L) s.t. v 2 L ρ and v. 9
10 In Appendix, we solve this optimization problem, and derive the following social planner s equilibrium: ρ soc = (v soc ) 2 L soc, and full coverage will be offered since users prefer it: L soc =. If the equilibrium vulnerability v soc <, then it must be a solution of: which we have proven to be unique Competitive Insurers v 3 W v 2 = (2K), (7) 2 Any insurance contract (v, ρ, L) that achieves a higher user utility U(v, v, ρ, L) would be preferred to other contracts. In equilibrium, there should exist no contract that permits non-negative insurer profits and yields a higher user utility than the equilibrium contract does. In addition, we modify the definition of insurance market equilibrium in Section 3 and assume that no single insurer affects the network vulnerability. This assumption is realistic since competitive insurers lack market power. The participation constraint must hold in equilibrium, i.e., insured users must obtain at least the same utility with insurance than by staying uninsured. In Appendix, we show that only a unique contract can exist in equilibrium. Let this equilibrium contract be denoted by (v, ρ, L ). In Appendix, we demonstrate that, in equilibrium, insurers make zero profits and offer full coverage since users prefer it. ρ = (v ) 2 L, and L =. If the equilibrium vulnerability v <, then it must be a solution of: v 3 W v 2 = (K), (8) 2 which we have proven to be unique. From (7) and (8), we conclude that the vulnerability in the competitive insurer equilibrium is higher than that in the social optimum: v > v soc. In Appendix, we also derive the condition for v < v. We find that equilibrium vulnerability only improves (relative to the Nash equilibrium 0
11 without insurance) when is lower than some critical value. This critical value is W achieved only when v is close to, i.e., when user security is close to zero in the no-insurance Nash equilibrium. Thus, for a large range of parameters, v > v, i.e., the presence of insurance leads to a higher vulnerability. This permits us to formulate the following proposition: Proposition 3 With insurers present, and security levels contractible, in any equilibrium, full coverage L = is offered. For most parameters, equilibrium network security is lower than in the no-insurance equilibrium. Only when user security is low in the no-insurance Nash equilibrium (i.e., v close to ), the presence of insurers improves network security. From Proposition 3, with security levels observable by the insurers, the insurers presence allows to improve user welfare, but hardly improves network security. When v < v, the insurers presence reduces the per user expected loss from network insecurity by, where: = [ (v ) 2 (v ) 2]. Else, the per user expected loss increases by = [ (v ) 2 (v ) 2]. Figure (a) depicts the equilibrium security level of users (and hence the network security level) as a function of the damage while Figure (b) depicts the equilibrium utility of users as a function of. The parameter values used are K = and W = Conclusion In this paper, we investigate the effects of competitive cyber-insurers on network security and welfare. We highlight the impact of asymmetric information in the presence of network externalities and address the effects of interdependent security on the market for cyber-risks. The existing literature attributes cyberinsurance a significant role in cyber-risk management; it especially emphasizes positive effects of cyber-insurance market on security incentives. We find that, on reverse, the presence of competitive cyber-insurers weakens user incentives to improve security.
12 s vs U vs No insurance NE No insurance SO Insurance Competition Insurance Social Planner No insurance NE No insurance SO Insurance Competition Insurance Social planner (a) (b) Figure : (a) Security level and (b) utility of homogeneous users in equilibrium as a function of the damage 0 < < W. Here W = 000 and K =. First, we consider insurers who cannot observe (and thus, cannot contract) user security; here, insurers observe the network security only. Then, the moral hazard problem is present, i.e., with more insurance coverage, the users incentives to invest in security become meager. In this case, for most parameters, the insurance market collapses, i.e., no insurance is offered in equilibrium. Even if cyber-insurance exists, it covers a minor fraction of damages only. Our findings are in line with the existing Internet, where cyber-insurance is scantly observed. Second, we consider insurers who observe (and thus, can contract) user security. Here, insurers contracts include user security level which insurers enforce at zero cost, and thus, no moral hazard is present. Still, in general, competitive insurers fail to improve upon the security level of the no-insurance equilibrium. Though insurance improves the utility for risk-averse users, it does not serve as an incentive device for improving security practices. Indeed, insurance is a tool for risk management and redistribution, not necessarily a tool for risk reduction. To sum up, we argue that a combination of network effects and information asymmetries leads to difficulties in formation of viable insurance markets for cyber risks. Thus, our results dash the hopes for both, expectations of development of cyber insurance markets under the current network environment, and for the beliefs that such markets may serve as a catalyst for improvement of network security. 2
13 5 Appendix Proof of Proposition 2 When the user vulnerability v is non-contractible, the contracts have the form (ρ, L), and v is selfishly chosen by the users. Since our users are homogeneous, we will restrict our attention to a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., user actions in equilibrium are identical. Let (ρ, L ) be such an equilibrium insurance contract and v be the resulting network vulnerability. First, we show that in any equilibrium L <. Assume the reverse and let (ρ, L = ) be an equilibrium. In this case, it is optimal for each user to choose v =. Hence, v = and ρ = for non-negative insurer profits. From (3), U(,,, ) = U(,, 0, 0), which implies that the user is indifferent between buying and not buying insurance. If the vulnerability in the no-insurance Nash equilibrium v <, then the user s participation constraint does not hold: U(v i,, 0, 0) > U(,,, ) for some v i <. This is a contradiction since user i is better off not purchasing such an insurance, and therefore L <. To determine the vulnerability that the insured user chooses selfishly, we differentiate his utility with respect to v, keeping v fixed: and we have v = U(v, v, ρ, L ) v = 0, (2 v K( W ρ W + L ρ)) 2. (9) where W = W. In equilibrium, v = v and from (9), we obtain (similar to (9)): v = [ 2K( W ρ ] 2/3, (20) W + (L ρ ) Comparing (20) with (9), we infer that: v < v, (2) because W ρ < W and W + (L ρ ) W. 3
14 Next, let us make sure that no user deviates and stays without insurance, that is the participation constraint holds. For the uninsured user i, utility is maximized at v i = Comparing this with (9), we have and from (2), ( v ) 2[ 2K( W W ) ] 2. (22) v i ( v ) 2 = (v ) 3, ( ) v 2 v i = v < v, v and his maximum attainable utility is U i = v i + v i v [2K( W ] W ) + K W ( ) ( ) v v v [ = + (v ) 2 2K( W ] W v v ) + K W < U.(23) Note that U = U(v, v, 0, 0). Hence, for (ρ, L ) to be an equilibrium contract, U(v, v, ρ, L ) > U(v, v, 0, 0) = U. Then, from (23), U i < U < U(v, v, ρ, L ), and we infer that the participation constraint does not bind. Next, we show that, if < 8 W, the only equilibrium contract is (0, 0). Consider a contract (ρ, L) and let ṽ be the vulnerability obtained from (20). ue to 9 insurer competition, in any equilibrium ρ = ṽ 2 L. (24) If not, an entrant insurer could design another contract that yields lower profits, which users prefer since it maximizes their utility. The user utility is obtained by substituting (20) in (2). Then, we have U = K W ρ + (6K( W ρ. (25) W + L ρ)) /3 Using (24), we rewrite (25) as K W ṽ 2 L + (6K( W ṽ 2 L W +L ṽ 2 L)) /3. 4
15 Let ṽ denote ṽ L, and let = W + (L ρ) and = W ρ. Next, we demonstrate that ṽ > 0. From (20), ṽ 3 L = L 3ṽ 2 ṽ = = = ( ṽ 3ṽ 2 + = (2K( )) 2 ) L ( 2 (2K( )) 2 3 L 2 ( 2 ( ṽ 2 2ṽ ṽl) (2K( )) 2 ( ) ṽ2 2ṽ ṽl) 3 2 ( (ṽ 2 + 2ṽ ṽl) + ( ) ṽ2 2ṽ ṽl) (2K( )) 3 [ 2ṽL ]) (2K( )) 3 ( ṽ2 + ( ) ṽ2 ), (2K( )) 3 where the last step is obtained by moving all the terms involving ṽ to the LHS. The RHS is obviously positive while the coefficient of ṽ on the LHS is also positive (since > ) and ṽ > 0 is proven. Next, we differentiate the utility w.r.t. L, U L = K 2 W ṽ 2 L ( ṽ2 2ṽ ṽl) + ( ( ṽ 2 2ṽ ṽl)... (6K) /3 ( W ṽ 2 L W + L ṽ 2 L)... 4/3 2 W ṽ 2 L (( ) ṽ2 ) 2ṽ ṽl) 2 W + L ṽ 2 L ( = K( ṽ2 2ṽ ṽl) 2 W ṽ 2 L Kṽ2 ( ṽ 2 2ṽ ṽl) 3 2 W ṽ 2 L (( ) ṽ2 ) 2ṽ ṽl) 2 W + L ṽ 2 L Collecting the terms and simplifying we obtain: 2 U K L = ṽ2 ( = ṽ 2 = ṽ 2 ( 2ṽ ṽl + 3 ṽ ) ) ṽ2 3 2ṽ ṽl 2ṽ ṽl 5 ( ( ṽ 2 2ṽ ṽl) + ṽ2 (ṽ 2 +2ṽ ṽl) 3 + ṽ2 (ṽ 2 +2ṽ ṽl) 3 3 ) ( ṽ2 2ṽ ṽl) ( ( ) ) (26)
16 Since 2ṽ ṽl > 0 and <, the last two terms of (26) are strictly negative for any L 0. Let < 8 W. Then, W < 9(W ), and taking the square root we obtain: 9 3 W W > 0, (27) and since = W + (L ρ ) > W and = W ρ < W from (27) we have: 3 > 3 W W > 0. Hence, we have proven that if < 8 9 W, 3 > 0. In this case, the first term of (26) is negative as well, which leads to: 2 U K L < 0. Thus, we have proven that if < 8 W, utility is maximized at L = 0. Thus, the 9 only equilibrium insurance contract is (0, 0). If > 8 W, there could exist an insurance contract, which improves user 9 utility relative to U. See Fig. 2(a) for an example which shows how U(ρ, L) is maximized at L > 0, and users may reach a higher utility with insurance U(ρ,L) vs L δ = /W δ δ L (a) W (b) Figure 2: (a) Unobservable case: U vs L (L [0, 20], K =, W = 00, = 99) and (b) Observable case: δ and δ vs W. 6
17 Proof of Proposition 3 First, we notice that in any equilibrium, L = and insurer profit is zero due to competition, as in Proposition 2. Hence, we restrict our analysis to full coverage only. Second, in any equilibrium, user utility from deviation to no-insurance gives user a strictly lower utility. Indeed, assume the reverse. Suppose a user can deviate to v i with no insurance and his utility without insurance is equal to his utility with insurance, i.e., U(v i, v, 0, 0) U(v, v, v 2, ). Consider an entrant insurer who offers him a contract (v i, v i v, ) that offers non-zero coverage at actuarially fair price. By adopting this contract, the user improves his utility, which conflicts our assumption about the equilibrium. Therefore, the utility from deviation must be strictly lower and all users strictly prefer to buy insurance. Lastly, we prove that in any equilibrium, all user contracts are identical. Assume the reverse, and let (v, v v, ) and (v 2, v 2 v, ) be two contracts in equilibrium, with non-zero fraction of users buying each contract. Without loss of generality, we let v < v 2, and thus v < v < v 2. From Section 3.2.2, we assume that insurers take v as given. Consider the contract (ṽ, ṽ v, ) offered by an entrant insurer. Suppose this contract maximizes U(ṽ, ṽ v, ): (ṽ ) + K W ṽ v = 0. ṽ (ṽ ) + K W ṽ v = 0 ṽ 2 ṽ K v 2 W ṽ v = 0 W ṽ v ṽ = K v (28) From (28), there is a unique solution for ṽ since the LHS is monotone decreasing. Hence, ṽ v and ṽ v 2 since if either were true, then U(v, v v, ) U(v 2, v 2 v, ), which is a contradiction. Thus, U(ṽ, ṽ v, ) > U(v, v v, ) = U(v 2, v 2 v, ) and insured users will be willing to deviate to this new contract. Thus, we have shown that two different contracts cannot be present in equilibrium, and we have proven that in any equilibrium, all users buy an identical contract. Next, we prove that the equilibrium is unique. From (28), in any equilibrium, 7
18 ṽ = v = v, and we have W v 2 v = Kv W v 2 = Kv v v 3 W v 2 = (K). (29) 2 From (29), there is a unique solution for the equilibrium v, since the LHS is monotone decreasing. Thus, the equilibrium is unique. Next, we determine how this unique v compares to v. When both v and v <, we can equate v 3 from (9) and (29) to get W Using (9) for v < and denoting W [2K( W = W v2 W )] 2 (K) 2 2 [2( W W )] 2 = W v 2 [2( W W )] 2 = v 2 W [2( W = W )] 2 W W = [2( W )]2 δ δ [2( = δ)] 2 by δ, we have Thus, we obtain an equation for δ: ( ( ) ( δ) δ) /3 δ δ 4( δ) ( ( δ) /3 ( + δ) ( + ) δ) 4 [2K( W W )] 4/3 [2K W ( W )]4/3 [2K W ( δ)] 4/3. = = [2K W ] 4/3 [2K (30) W ] 4/3 We observe that the LHS is an increasing function of δ, which gives us a unique solution δ of (30). For δ δ, we have v v, i.e., insurance improves the 8
19 security level in the no-insurance Nash equilibrium. From (9), we know that when δ is low, v is high. This implies that insurance improves upon the no-insurance security level only when v is high. Let δ denote the δ at which v =. Fig. 2 (b) depicts δ and δ as a function of the wealth W (K = ). Social Planner The contract offered by a social planner must be a solution to the following optimization problem: Next, we write the Lagrangian: max v,ρ,l U(v, v, ρ, L) s.t. v 2 L ρ and v. LAN = U(v, v, ρ, L) λ (v 2 L ρ) λ 2 (v ) Taking the derivatives of LAN w.r.t. v, L and ρ and equating to 0 gives us the following equations. LAN v = U(v, v, ρ, L) v 2λ vl λ 2 = 0 ( 2 v 2vK( W ρ W + L ρ)) 2λ vl λ 2 = 0 (3) LAN U(v, v, ρ, L) = λ v 2 L L = 0 Kv 2 2 W + L ρ λ v 2 = 0 (32) LAN U(v, v, ρ, L) = + λ ρ ρ = 0 Kv 2 2 W + L ρ K( v2 ) 2 W ρ + λ = 0 (33) Further, from complementary slackness, we have λ (v 2 L ρ) = 0, (34) and λ 2 (v ) = 0 (35) 9
20 Note that v 0, since that would require infinite security costs for the users. From (32), we conclude that λ > 0 and thus the constraint (34) binds: Equating λ from (32) and (33), we obtain: v 2 L = ρ (36) K 2 W + L ρ = Kv 2 2 W + L ρ + K( v2 ) 2 W ρ Canceling out K/2 > 0, we obtain: W + L ρ = v 2 + ( v2 ), W + L ρ W ρ or ( v 2 ) = ( v2 ), W + L ρ W ρ which leads to: L = if v <. (37) Now, if v <, we can substitute (36) and (37) into (32) to get λ = Substituting this value of λ, λ 2 = 0 (since v < ) and (37) into (3), we get K 2. W v 2 2 K = v W v2 v v 3 W v 2 = (38) (2K) 2 Thus, if v <, it is the unique solution to (38) (since the LHS is monotone increasing). References [] George A Akerlof. The market for lemons : Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3): , August 970. [2] R. Anderson, R. Böehme, R. Clayton, and T. Moore. Security economics and european policy. In Proceedings of WEIS 08, Hanover, USA, Jun
Competitive Cyber-Insurance and Internet Security
Competitive Cyber-Insurance and Internet Security Nikhil Shetty Galina Schwartz Mark Felegyhazi Jean Walrand {nikhils@eecs, schwartz@eecs, mark@icsi, wlr@eecs}.berkeley.edu Abstract This paper investigatesMore information
Competitive Cyber-Insurance and Internet Security
Competitive Cyber-Insurance and Internet Security Nikhil Shetty, Galina Schwartz, Mark Felegyhazi, and Jean Walrand Abstract This paper investigates how competitive cyber-insurers affect network securityMore information
Voluntary Participation in Cyber-insurance Markets
Voluntary Participation in Cyber-insurance Markets Parinaz aghizadeh and Mingyan Liu Abstract The study of cyber-insurance, both as a method for transferring residual cyber-security risks, and as an incentiveMore information
2. Information Economics
2. Information Economics In General Equilibrium Theory all agents had full information regarding any variable of interest (prices, commodities, state of nature, cost function, preferences, etc.) In manyMore information
Unraveling versus Unraveling: A Memo on Competitive Equilibriums and Trade in Insurance Markets
Unraveling versus Unraveling: A Memo on Competitive Equilibriums and Trade in Insurance Markets Nathaniel Hendren January, 2014 Abstract Both Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show thatMore information
Moral Hazard. Itay Goldstein. Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Moral Hazard Itay Goldstein Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 1 Principal-Agent Problem Basic problem in corporate finance: separation of ownership and control: o The owners of the firm are typicallyMore information
Voluntary Participation in Cyber-insurance Markets
1 Voluntary Participation in Cyber-insurance Markets Parinaz aghizadeh, Mingyan Liu Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 4819-1 Email:More information
Security Games with Market Insurance
Security Games with Market Insurance Benjamin Johnson a, Rainer Böhme b, and Jens Grossklags c a Department of Mathematics, UC Berkeley b Department of Information Systems, University of Münster c CollegeMore information
Closing the Price of Anarchy Gap in the Interdependent Security Game
Closing the Price of Anarchy Gap in the Interdependent Security Game Parinaz aghizadeh and Mingyan Liu Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan,More information
Coordination in Network Security Games
Coordination in Network Security Games Marc Lelarge INRIA - ENS Paris, France Email: firstname.lastname@example.com Abstract Malicious softwares or malwares for short have become a major security threat. While originatingMore information
Insurance Markets with Differential Information
Insurance Markets with Differential Information S. Hun Seog [석승훈] Graduate School of Management, KAIST (KGSM) 207-43 Cheongryangri-Dong, Dongdaemun-Gu, Seoul, 130-722, KOREA Email: firstname.lastname@example.com information
The Reasonable Person Negligence Standard and Liability Insurance. Vickie Bajtelsmit * Colorado State University
\ins\liab\dlirpr.v3a 06-06-07 The Reasonable Person Negligence Standard and Liability Insurance Vickie Bajtelsmit * Colorado State University Paul Thistle University of Nevada Las Vegas Thistle s researchMore information
Market Power and Efficiency in Card Payment Systems: A Comment on Rochet and Tirole
Market Power and Efficiency in Card Payment Systems: A Comment on Rochet and Tirole Luís M. B. Cabral New York University and CEPR November 2005 1 Introduction Beginning with their seminal 2002 paper,More information
Security Adoption in Heterogeneous Networks: the Influence of Cyber-insurance Market
Security Adoption in Heterogeneous Networks: the Influence of Cyber-insurance Market Zichao Yang and John C.S. Lui Computer Science & Engineering Department The Chinese University of Hong Kong Abstract.More information
A Game Theory Model of Cybersecurity Investments with Information Asymmetry
A Game Theory Model of Cybersecurity Investments with Information Asymmetry Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts 01003 and Ladimer S. NagurneyMore information
Modeling Internet Security Investments
Modeling Internet Security Investments 1 The Case of Dealing with Information Uncertainty Ranjan Pal and Pan Hui University of Southern California, Deutsch Telekom Laboratories arxiv:1104.0594v1 [cs.cr]More information
Security investments. Economics of Security and Privacy (BMEVIHIAV15) Mark Felegyhazi. assistant professor CrySyS Lab.
Economics of Security and Privacy (BMEVIHIAV15) Mark Felegyhazi assistant professor CrySyS Lab. BME Department of Telecommunications (Híradástechnikai Tanszék) mfelegyhazi(atat)crysys(dot)hu InformationMore information
Optimal insurance contracts with adverse selection and comonotonic background risk
Optimal insurance contracts with adverse selection and comonotonic background risk Alary D. Bien F. TSE (LERNA) University Paris Dauphine Abstract In this note, we consider an adverse selection problemMore information
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economic of Imperfect Information
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economic of Imperfect Information By: Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz Presented by Benjamin S. Barber IV, Xiaoshu Bei, Zhi Chen, ShaiobiMore information
Lecture notes for Choice Under Uncertainty
Lecture notes for Choice Under Uncertainty 1. Introduction In this lecture we examine the theory of decision-making under uncertainty and its application to the demand for insurance. The undergraduateMore information
On the Interaction and Competition among Internet Service Providers
On the Interaction and Competition among Internet Service Providers Sam C.M. Lee John C.S. Lui + Abstract The current Internet architecture comprises of different privately owned Internet service providersMore information
Labor Economics, 14.661. Lecture 3: Education, Selection, and Signaling
Labor Economics, 14.661. Lecture 3: Education, Selection, and Signaling Daron Acemoglu MIT November 3, 2011. Daron Acemoglu (MIT) Education, Selection, and Signaling November 3, 2011. 1 / 31 IntroductionMore information
Chapter 7. Sealed-bid Auctions
Chapter 7 Sealed-bid Auctions An auction is a procedure used for selling and buying items by offering them up for bid. Auctions are often used to sell objects that have a variable price (for example oil)More information
Chapter 21: The Discounted Utility Model
Chapter 21: The Discounted Utility Model 21.1: Introduction This is an important chapter in that it introduces, and explores the implications of, an empirically relevant utility function representing intertemporalMore information
Price Discrimination: Part 2. Sotiris Georganas
Price Discrimination: Part 2 Sotiris Georganas 1 More pricing techniques We will look at some further pricing techniques... 1. Non-linear pricing (2nd degree price discrimination) 2. Bundling 2 Non-linearMore information
Economics of Insurance
Economics of Insurance In this last lecture, we cover most topics of Economics of Information within a single application. Through this, you will see how the differential informational assumptions allowMore information
Identifying Tipping Points in a Decision-Theoretic Model of Network Security
Identifying Tipping Points in a Decision-Theoretic Model of Network Security C. F. Larry Heimann, Alan Nochenson Carnegie Mellon University Information Systems Pittsburgh, PA 15213 {profh, email@example.com information
Explaining Insurance Policy Provisions via Adverse Selection
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 22: 121 134 (1997) c 1997 The Geneva Association Explaining Insurance Policy Provisions via Adverse Selection VIRGINIA R. YOUNG AND MARK J. BROWNE SchoolMore information
SCREENING IN INSURANCE MARKETS WITH ADVERSE SELECTION AND BACKGROUND RISK. Keith J. Crocker
SCREENING IN INSURANCE MARKETS WIT ADVERSE SEECTION AND BACKGROUND RISK Keith J. Crocker University of Michigan Business School 70 Tappan Street Ann Arbor, MI 4809 and Arthur Snow Department of EconomicsMore information
Regret and Rejoicing Effects on Mixed Insurance *
Regret and Rejoicing Effects on Mixed Insurance * Yoichiro Fujii, Osaka Sangyo University Mahito Okura, Doshisha Women s College of Liberal Arts Yusuke Osaki, Osaka Sangyo University + Abstract This papersMore information
Work incentives and household insurance: Sequential contracting with altruistic individuals and moral hazard
Work incentives and household insurance: Sequential contracting with altruistic individuals and moral hazard Cécile Aubert Abstract Two agents sequentially contracts with different principals under moralMore information
In this section, we will consider techniques for solving problems of this type.
Constrained optimisation roblems in economics typically involve maximising some quantity, such as utility or profit, subject to a constraint for example income. We shall therefore need techniques for solvingMore information
Prices versus Exams as Strategic Instruments for Competing Universities
Prices versus Exams as Strategic Instruments for Competing Universities Elena Del Rey and Laura Romero October 004 Abstract In this paper we investigate the optimal choice of prices and/or exams by universitiesMore information
Demand and supply of health insurance. Folland et al Chapter 8
Demand and supply of health Folland et al Chapter 8 Chris Auld Economics 317 February 9, 2011 What is insurance? From an individual s perspective, insurance transfers wealth from good states of the worldMore information
ECON 312: Oligopolisitic Competition 1. Industrial Organization Oligopolistic Competition
ECON 312: Oligopolisitic Competition 1 Industrial Organization Oligopolistic Competition Both the monopoly and the perfectly competitive market structure has in common is that neither has to concern itselfMore information
Impact of QoS on Internet User Welfare
Impact of QoS on Internet User Welfare Galina Schwartz, Nikhil Shetty, and Jean Walrand Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences (EECS), University of California Berkeley, Cory Hall,More information
Why the government should do cost-effectiveness analysis in a health insurance market
Government Why the government should do cost-effectiveness analysis in a health insurance market TILEC, Tilburg University April 17, 2012 Government Outline 1 Motivation 2 3 4 Government 5 6 GovernmentMore information
Adverse selection in health insurance: are first best. contracts impossible?
Adverse selection in health insurance: are first best contracts impossible? David Alary CERPEM-SDF, University Paris Dauphine Franck Bien EuRISCO LEGOS, University Paris Dauphine Abstract In this note,More information
At t = 0, a generic intermediary j solves the optimization problem:
Internet Appendix for A Model of hadow Banking * At t = 0, a generic intermediary j solves the optimization problem: max ( D, I H, I L, H, L, TH, TL ) [R (I H + T H H ) + p H ( H T H )] + [E ω (π ω ) AMore information
Mandatory Security Information Sharing with Authorities: Implications on Investments in Internal Controls
Mandatory Security Information Sharing with Authorities: Implications on Investments in Internal Controls ABSTRACT Stefan Laube Department of Information Systems University of Münster Münster Germany StefanLaube@uni-muensterdeMore information
Web Appendix for Overconfidence, Insurance and Paternalism.
Web Appendix for Overconfidence, Insurance and Paternalism. Alvaro Sandroni Francesco Squintani Abstract This paper is not self-contained. It is the mathematical appendix of the paper "Overconfidence,More information
Alternative proof for claim in [1]
Alternative proof for claim in [1] Ritesh Kolte and Ayfer Özgür Aydin The problem addressed in [1] is described in Section 1 and the solution is given in Section. In the proof in [1], it seems that obtainingMore information
Choice under Uncertainty
Choice under Uncertainty Part 1: Expected Utility Function, Attitudes towards Risk, Demand for Insurance Slide 1 Choice under Uncertainty We ll analyze the underlying assumptions of expected utility theoryMore information
Demand for Health Insurance
Demand for Health Insurance Demand for Health Insurance is principally derived from the uncertainty or randomness with which illnesses befall individuals. Consequently, the derived demand for health insuranceMore information
The Stewardship Role of Accounting
The Stewardship Role of Accounting by Richard A. Young 1. Introduction One important role of accounting is in the valuation of an asset or firm. When markets are perfect one can value assets at their marketMore information
ECO 317 Economics of Uncertainty Fall Term 2009 Week 5 Precepts October 21 Insurance, Portfolio Choice - Questions
ECO 37 Economics of Uncertainty Fall Term 2009 Week 5 Precepts October 2 Insurance, Portfolio Choice - Questions Important Note: To get the best value out of this precept, come with your calculator orMore information
Credible Discovery, Settlement, and Negative Expected Value Suits
Credible iscovery, Settlement, and Negative Expected Value Suits Warren F. Schwartz Abraham L. Wickelgren Abstract: This paper introduces the option to conduct discovery into a model of settlement bargainingMore information
Information Security as a Credence Good
Information Security as a Credence Good Ping Fan Ke 1, Kai-Lung Hui 1, and Wei T. Yue 1 Hong Kong University of Science and Technology email@example.com, email@example.com City University of Hong Kong firstname.lastname@example.com information
Gains from trade in a Hotelling model of differentiated duopoly
Gains from trade in a Hotelling model of differentiated duopoly Kenji Fujiwara School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University and Department of Economics, McGill University August 8, 009 Abstract ConstructingMore information
Warranty Designs and Brand Reputation Analysis in a Duopoly
Warranty Designs and Brand Reputation Analysis in a Duopoly Kunpeng Li * Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX, U.S.A. Qin Geng Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, Kutztown, PA, U.S.A. Bin ShaoMore information
Screening. Sandeep Baliga. March 29. Sandeep Baliga () Screening March 29 1 / 26
Screening Sandeep Baliga March 29 Sandeep Baliga () Screening March 29 1 / 26 Screening So far we studied competitive equilibrium and benevolent government intervention when there is asymmetric information.More information
Problem Set 9 Solutions
Problem Set 9 s 1. A monopoly insurance company provides accident insurance to two types of customers: low risk customers, for whom the probability of an accident is 0.25, and high risk customers, forMore information
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES SELF-PROTECTION AND INSURANCE WITH INTERDEPENDENCIES. Alexander Muermann Howard Kunreuther
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES SELF-PROTECTION AND INSURANCE WITH INTERDEPENDENCIES Alexander Muermann Howard Kunreuther Working Paper 12827 http://www.nber.org/papers/w12827 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCHMore information
SELECTION IN INSURANCE MARKETS by Steven E. Landsburg University of Rochester
SELECTION IN INSURANCE MARKETS by Steven E. Landsburg University of Rochester Consider an insurance market say, for insurance against accidental injuries. Agents face different levels of accident risk,More information
Online Appendix Feedback Effects, Asymmetric Trading, and the Limits to Arbitrage
Online Appendix Feedback Effects, Asymmetric Trading, and the Limits to Arbitrage Alex Edmans LBS, NBER, CEPR, and ECGI Itay Goldstein Wharton Wei Jiang Columbia May 8, 05 A Proofs of Propositions andMore information
The Market-Clearing Model
Chapter 5 The Market-Clearing Model Most of the models that we use in this book build on two common assumptions. First, we assume that there exist markets for all goods present in the economy, and thatMore information
Aegis A Novel Cyber-Insurance Model
Aegis A Novel Cyber-Insurance Model Ranjan Pal, eana Golubchik, Konstantinos Psounis University of Southern California, USA {rpal, leana, email@example.com Abstract. Recent works on Internet risk managementMore information
Notes - Gruber, Public Finance Section 12.1 Social Insurance What is insurance? Individuals pay money to an insurer (private firm or gov).
Notes - Gruber, Public Finance Section 12.1 Social Insurance What is insurance? Individuals pay money to an insurer (private firm or gov). These payments are called premiums. Insurer promises to make aMore information
Insurance. Michael Peters. December 27, 2013
Insurance Michael Peters December 27, 2013 1 Introduction In this chapter, we study a very simple model of insurance using the ideas and concepts developed in the chapter on risk aversion. You may recallMore information
Optimal Paternalism: Sin Taxes and Health Subsidies
Optimal Paternalism: Sin Taxes and Health Subsidies Thomas Aronsson and Linda Thunström Department of Economics, Umeå University SE - 901 87 Umeå, Sweden April 2005 Abstract The starting point for thisMore information
Week 4 Market Failure due to Moral Hazard The Principal-Agent Problem
Week 4 Market Failure due to Moral Hazard The Principal-Agent Problem Principal-Agent Issues Adverse selection arises because one side of the market cannot observe the quality of the product or the customerMore information
System Reliability and Free Riding
System Reliability and Free Riding Hal R. Varian University of California, Berkeley February 2001 This version: November 30, 2004. System reliability often depends on the effort of many individuals, makingMore information
On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in General Imperfectly Competitive Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information
analysing existence in general insurance environments that go beyond the canonical insurance paradigm. More recently, theoretical and empirical work has attempted to identify selection in insurance marketsMore information
Alok Gupta. Dmitry Zhdanov
RESEARCH ARTICLE GROWTH AND SUSTAINABILITY OF MANAGED SECURITY SERVICES NETWORKS: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE Alok Gupta Department of Information and Decision Sciences, Carlson School of Management, UniversityMore information
Week 3: Monopoly and Duopoly
EC202, University of Warwick, Term 2 1 of 34 Week 3: Monopoly and Duopoly Dr Daniel Sgroi Reading: 1. Osborne Sections 3.1 and 3.2; 2. Snyder & Nicholson, chapters 14 and 15; 3. Sydsæter & Hammond, EssentialMore information
Working Paper Series
RGEA Universidade de Vigo http://webs.uvigo.es/rgea Working Paper Series A Market Game Approach to Differential Information Economies Guadalupe Fugarolas, Carlos Hervés-Beloso, Emma Moreno- García andMore information
IMPLICIT CLIENT SORTING AND BONUS MALUS CONTRACTS Francisco J. Vazquez (C. U. Francisco Vitoria & Universidad Autónoma de Madrid) Richard Watt* (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid) Abstract In an earlier paper,More information
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES OPTIMAL PROVISION OF LOANS AND INSURANCE AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT FROM A LIFETIME PERSPECTIVE. Joseph Stiglitz Jungyoll Yun
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES OPTIMAL PROVISION OF LOANS AND INSURANCE AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT FROM A LIFETIME PERSPECTIVE Joseph Stiglitz Jungyoll Yun Working Paper 19064 http://www.nber.org/papers/w19064 NATIONALMore information
Buyer Search Costs and Endogenous Product Design
Buyer Search Costs and Endogenous Product Design Dmitri Kuksov email@example.com University of California, Berkeley August, 2002 Abstract In many cases, buyers must incur search costs to find theMore information
Manipulability of the Price Mechanism for Data Centers
Manipulability of the Price Mechanism for Data Centers Greg Bodwin 1, Eric Friedman 2,3,4, and Scott Shenker 3,4 1 Department of Computer Science, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts 02155 2 SchoolMore information
Imperfect information Up to now, consider only firms and consumers who are perfectly informed about market conditions: 1. prices, range of products
Imperfect information Up to now, consider only firms and consumers who are perfectly informed about market conditions: 1. prices, range of products available 2. characteristics or relative qualities ofMore information
Increasing cybersecurity investments in private sector firms
Journal of Cybersecurity, 1(1), 2015, 3 17 doi: 10.1093/cybsec/tyv011 Advance Access Publication Date: 27 November 2015 Research Article Research Article Increasing cybersecurity investments in privateMore information
On Compulsory Per-Claim Deductibles in Automobile Insurance
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 28: 25 32, 2003 c 2003 The Geneva Association On Compulsory Per-Claim Deductibles in Automobile Insurance CHU-SHIU LI Department of Economics, Feng ChiaMore information
Pricing Differentiated Internet Services
1 Pricing Differentiated Internet Services Linhai He and Jean Walrand Dept. of EECS, U.C. Berkeley {linhai,firstname.lastname@example.com Abstract One of the critical challenges facing the networking industryMore information
Why Plaintiffs Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts
Why Plaintiffs Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts Winand Emons 1 Claude Fluet 2 1 Department of Economics University of Bern, CEPR, CIRPEE 2 Université du Québec à Montréal,More information
Oligopoly: How do firms behave when there are only a few competitors? These firms produce all or most of their industry s output.
Topic 8 Chapter 13 Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition Econ 203 Topic 8 page 1 Oligopoly: How do firms behave when there are only a few competitors? These firms produce all or most of their industryMore information
Product Differentiation In homogeneous goods markets, price competition leads to perfectly competitive outcome, even with two firms Price competition
Product Differentiation In homogeneous goods markets, price competition leads to perfectly competitive outcome, even with two firms Price competition with differentiated products Models where differentiationMore information
A Simple Model of Price Dispersion *
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper No. 112 http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/institute/wpapers/2012/0112.pdf A Simple Model of Price DispersionMore information
Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons
Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons Andrea Attar Thomas Mariotti François Salanié October 2007 Abstract In order to check the impact of the exclusivity regime on equilibrium allocations,More information
Adaptive Online Gradient Descent
Adaptive Online Gradient Descent Peter L Bartlett Division of Computer Science Department of Statistics UC Berkeley Berkeley, CA 94709 bartlett@csberkeleyedu Elad Hazan IBM Almaden Research Center 650More information
A Game Theoretical Framework on Intrusion Detection in Heterogeneous Networks Lin Chen, Member, IEEE, and Jean Leneutre
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL 4, NO 2, JUNE 2009 165 A Game Theoretical Framework on Intrusion Detection in Heterogeneous Networks Lin Chen, Member, IEEE, and Jean LeneutreMore information
Switching Cost, Competition, and Pricing in the Property/Casualty Insurance Market for Large Commercial Accounts
Switching Cost, Competition, and Pricing in the Property/Casualty Insurance Market for Large Commercial Accounts Lisa L. Posey * Abstract: With large commercial accounts, a small number of insurers negotiateMore information
Intellectual Property Right Protection in the Software Market
Intellectual Property Right Protection in the Software Market Yasuhiro Arai Aomori Public College 153-4, Yamazaki, Goushizawa, Aomori-city, Aomori 030-0196, Japan March 01 Abstract We discuss the softwareMore information
When Information Improves Information Security
When Information Improves Information Security (Short paper) Jens Grossklags a, Benjamin Johnson b, and Nicolas Christin b a Center for Information Technology Policy, Princeton University b CyLab, CarnegieMore information
Topics in Information Economics: Adverse Selection
Chapter 3 Topics in Information Economics: Adverse Selection 1. The adverse selection problem.. Akerlof s application to the second-hand car market. 3. Screening: A price discrimination model. 3.1 IntroductionMore information
Secure or Insure? Analyzing Network Security Games with Externalities
Secure or Insure? Analyzing Network Security Games with Externalities Nicolas Christin Carnegie Mellon University, CyLab & INI Collaborators John Chuang (UC Berkeley), Jens Grossklags (Penn State), BenjaminMore information
Cyber Insurance as an Incentive for Internet Security
Cyber Insurance as an Incentive for Internet Security Jean Bolot Sprint, California, USA email@example.com Marc Lelarge INRIA-ENS, Paris, France firstname.lastname@example.com Abstract Managing security risks in theMore information
Universidad de Montevideo Macroeconomia II. The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans Model
Universidad de Montevideo Macroeconomia II Danilo R. Trupkin Class Notes (very preliminar) The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans Model 1 Introduction One shortcoming of the Solow model is that the saving rate is exogenousMore information
Documents de Travail du Centre d Economie de la Sorbonne
Documents de Travail du Centre d Economie de la Sorbonne Trade Liberalization and Optimal R&D Policies with Process Innovation Thanh LE, Cuong LE VAN 014.79 Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-11 boulevardMore information
Name. Final Exam, Economics 210A, December 2011 Here are some remarks to help you with answering the questions.
Name Final Exam, Economics 210A, December 2011 Here are some remarks to help you with answering the questions. Question 1. A firm has a production function F (x 1, x 2 ) = ( x 1 + x 2 ) 2. It is a priceMore information
Network Security: an Economic Perspective
Network Security: an Economic Perspective Marc Lelarge (INRIA-ENS) currently visiting STANFORD TRUST seminar, Berkeley 2011. Threats and Vulnerabilities Attacks are exogenous Contribution (1) Optimal securityMore information
INVESTING IN CYBERSECURITY: Insights from the Gordon-Loeb Model Lawrence A. Gordon EY Alumni Professor of Managerial Accounting & Information Assurance Affiliate Professor in University of Maryland InstituteMore information
Lecture 6: Price discrimination II (Nonlinear Pricing)
Lecture 6: Price discrimination II (Nonlinear Pricing) EC 105. Industrial Organization. Fall 2011 Matt Shum HSS, California Institute of Technology November 14, 2012 EC 105. Industrial Organization. FallMore information
Cloud Computing Infrastructure Robustness: A Game Theory Approach
Cloud Computing Infrastructure Robustness: A Game Theory Approach Nageswara S. V. Rao, Stephen W. Poole Oak Ridge National Laboratory Fei He, Jun Zhuang State University of New York at Buffalo Chris Y.More information
ECO 305 FALL 2003 December 4
ECO 305 FALL 2003 December 4 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION CONCEPTS Moral Hazard One party s (costly to it) actions affect risky outcomes (exercising care to reduce probability or size of loss, making effortMore information
Modeling Competition and Market. Equilibrium in Insurance: Empirical. Issues
Modeling Competition and Market Equilibrium in Insurance: Empirical Issues Pierre-André Chiappori Bernard Salanié December 2007 In the last decade or so, numerous papers have been devoted to empiricalMore information
Modeling Internet Security Investments Tackling Topological Information Uncertainty
Modeling Internet Security Investments Tackling Topological Information Uncertainty Ranjan Pal Department of Computer Science University of Southern California, USA Joint Work with Pan Hui Deutsch TelekomMore information
Conditions for Efficiency in Package Pricing
Conditions for Efficiency in Package Pricing Babu Nahata Department of Economics University of Louisville Louisville, Kentucky 40292, USA. e-mail: email@example.com and Serguei Kokovin and Evgeny ZhelobodkoMore information
Linear Programming Notes V Problem Transformations
Linear Programming Notes V Problem Transformations 1 Introduction Any linear programming problem can be rewritten in either of two standard forms. In the first form, the objective is to maximize, the materialMore information
Why do merchants accept payment cards?
Why do merchants accept payment cards? Julian Wright National University of Singapore Abstract This note explains why merchants accept expensive payment cards when merchants are Cournot competitors. TheMore information


text:
Hector Zazou
Formative producer of world music
* Garth Cartwright
* The Guardian,
* Wednesday September 24 2008
* Article history
The French musician Hector Zazou, who has died aged 60, was best known as a producer of albums that combined the work of popular western musicians with that of folk musicians from Africa, Asia and Europe. He was both influential and controversial, with critics suggesting that he turned ethnic music forms into easy-listening kitsch.
He was born Pierre Job in Sidi Bel Abbès, in north-western Algeria, to a French father and a Spanish mother. The family joined the diaspora of pieds-noirs (Algerian-born Europeans) moving to France and settled in Marseille, where Job embraced the new 1960s musical upheavals while studying classical composition.
He began to play with experimental rock-jazz fusion outfits, but it was not until the mid-1970s that Zazou (he had by now adopted this name) began to record. Debuting as half of ZNR, a duo with Josef Racaille, he played the violin and keyboards and produced their 1976 album Barricades 3, which demonstrated Zazou's desire to mix and match musical forms, with rock, jazz and chamber music colliding.
Another ZNR album followed in 1978, before Zazou's 1979 solo debut La Perversitia. In the early 1980s he established his sound and reputation. Working with Parisian-based Congolese singers, he began creating electronic dance rhythms around their singing. Taken up in New York and Paris discos, these could be seen as formative recordings in what is now widely considered world music. In the late 1980s, he began mixing classical composition with electronics; hailed as a studio enfant terrible, he was compared to the British experimental musicians/producers Brian Eno and Peter Gabriel.
Zazou enjoyed his greatest commercial and critical success with three albums that allowed his eclectic tastes to roam widely. Les Nouvelles Poly-phonies Corses (1991) featured Corsican male choirs, and Sahara Blue (1992) was a celebration of the centenary of the death of poet Arthur Rimbaud.
By the time he recorded Chansons des mers froides (Songs from the Cold Sea, 1993), Zazou was signed to Sony, with access to a huge budget. He spent it travelling through the frozen tundra, where he recorded surviving Inuit and Siberian folk singers. Back in Paris, he added electronic backgrounds and brought in a variety of western singers, including Björk and Siouxsie Sioux, to complete the album. "I wanted to have a musical sound where everything would be part of a whole and where it's difficult to identify individual sounds," Zazou told the journalist Paul Tingen, "... and the instruments are a part of the colour and texture of [the] whole picture."
While Zazou's output sold only modestly, it found a devoted audience and he continued working on an ethnic/electronic formula, releasing solo projects and producing lush albums for the Tibetan vocalist Yung Chen Lhamo and Uzbek singer Sevara Nazarkhan for the Real World label. On his most recent album, In the House of Mirrors, due for release next Monday, he collaborated with Indian and Uzbek instrumentalists.
Zazou is survived by his son.
Strange rock, neo classical compositions, world music (from Africa to Central Asia), string quartets, pieces for wind instruments, voices or synthesizers, Hector Zazou had a surprise waiting with each new record, showing his passion for the most unexpected mixes. From the album Les Nouvelles Polyphonies Corses (1991) till Quadri+Chromies (2006), the list of the musicians and singers who have worked with him is amazing : Jon Hassell, Manu Di Bango, Ryuichi Sakamoto, John Cale, Caroline Lavelle, David Sylvian, Khaled, Lisa Gerrard, Suzanne Vega, Bjork, Peter Gabriel, Brian Eno, Peter Buck, Jane Birkin, Lisa Germano, Laurie Anderson but also Asia Argento and Gerard Depardieu. Hector Zazou was a member of Slow Music (with Bill Rieflin, Peter Buck, Robert Fripp, Matt Chamberlain and Fred Chalanor). His album with Katie Jane Garside called Corps Electriques was released in 2007. In the House of Mirrors featuring uzbek and indian musicians plus many guests is now available.
I forgot I wanted to send these a while back from the Paris underground. The best part was upon leaving catagnomes, there was this bag check after climbing 9 flight worth of stairs. There were two skulls and a femur laying on the safe box that they must put the shit in everytime they find it. There were two heathen metal heads about 5 minutes in front of us that were probably the dudes.>Herzog
ideologic.org | ©2018

subset: commoncrawl


text: Can I opt out of having this on my badge? Zak Sent from my iPod On Jan 6, 2012, at 4:00 AM, "YAPC::NA Director" <admin at yapcna.org> wrote: > <tumblr_lwxvr2jCRU1qm5pt2o1_400.png> > > This is a QR Code. We're going to use QR Codes a lot at YAPC::NA 2012, so make sure you have a QR Code reader on your phone before you come to YAPC. > > The exhibitors at the job fair will be encouraged to use them for each of their job listings. We'll be using them to share links to important information such as maps that can help you find your way around the conference. And we probably will even put them on each of your badges so that you can easily share your contact information with someone else just by scanning their code. > > [From the YAPC::NA Blog.] > > _______________________________________________ > yapc mailing list > yapc at pm.org > http://mail.pm.org/mailman/listinfo/yapc -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <http://mail.pm.org/mailman/private/yapc/attachments/20120106/777a41a8/attachment.html>


text:
My nurses here at Sunshine Coast private have been AMAZiNG!!! And I don't know if it was just the amount of drugs I was on but all look like models! Gorgeous! I'm being well looked after although not to fond of heparin injections.
I have just had my drip removed, however am still sporting these two lovely drains from each breast and will be keeping these for a while. They have had to change then once already so producing a bit of fluid which hopefully will settle. They remind me of the Tupperware cookie decorator where you squash them down to get the stuff out.
Those I'm friends with on Facebook are already aware of the ninja situation on my legs! Hiiiyyaahh!! Blood pressure cuff around my calf as well (obviously with nodes removed we are unable to use my arm.
Honestly... I'm uncomfortable, tired, the pain is manageable but just awkward. It's going to take some time to get use to these expanders.
On the plus I just had a lovely parcel delivered from Zonta and Buderim cancer group.
Zonta has given me pillows for my arms, a drain holder and a DVD.
The breast cancer group parcel has some fluffy socks, and some little snacks and drink which I'm excited about. One the bag it can in is this quote which just sums up everything beautifully.... "Once you choose hope, anything is possible."
Thank you all for your support and well wishes. The hard bits done.... Now it's just the uncomfortable road for a few weeks! Time to go back to sleep for me!


text:
Screenshot of the Foundary, thefoudary.com.
Today, Hayneedle released its latest product offering into an exclusive beta. The Foundary (thefoundary.com) will be a "source for daily indulgence in coveted home essentials at up to 70% off retail," the site's FAQ page states. "Every day, Foundary members receive an email with new sales events featuring products to shape their homes – all at unprecedented savings."
Here's more from the Foundary's About Us page:
The Foundary was launched by Hayneedle to further realize its vision of connecting people with the home and lifestyle products that are perfect for them. At Hayneedle, discerning customers can hunt down their ideal option in any of 250+ categories. the Foundary offers an immediate feast. Both offer the thrill of discovery.
To deliver on Hayneedle's promise of true variety, Hayneedle buyers present a selection of such depth and breadth, that they inevitably forge strong relationships with merchants the world over. Many of these relationships are what make the unprecedented savings at the Foundary possible.
While daily deal sites* such as Groupon and LivingSocial Deals may pop into your head when you learn of the Foundary, it's more similar to One Kings Lane, a site featuring home decor brands and designers at up to 70% off retail. The former two send subscribers deals of services and products in their city of residence, while the latter two send deals on home furnishing items for online purchase.
According to the Foundary's FAQ, new sales events are announced daily and typically start at 12 p.m. EST. Each announcement includes 4-7 different events. For example, today's announcement (left, screenshot of shop.thefoundary.com/event_194) has six different product selections: lamps, cookware, rugs, chairs, and fire pits. The majority of the Foundary sales events last three days, though some events may run as long as five.
With Hayneedle's core of 120 speciality stores catered to home owners, at first glance, the Foundary seems set to compliment this model quite well. Of course, we'll find out and learn more in the weeks to come. For the foreseeable future, the site will be in beta and, after speaking with the Hayneedle team, consistent daily events won't begin until October 25.
Here's more about the beta release, from shop.thefoundary.com/beta.
You're here, which means you're in the know. While the Foundary is pretty new – we just opened our doors on Oct. 15, 2010 – our team has been in online retail for years. However, newness can have its hiccups, so we could use your help.
If you notice any issues during this exclusive beta period, please let us know. We'd like to get everything cleaned up in time for your next visit. After all, we built the Foundary for you. And we plan on being here a while.
To check out the Foundary for yourself, visit thefoundary.com. Sign up is free.
Learn more about the Foundary on its About Us page, shop.thefoundary.com/aboutus and FAQ page, shop.thefoundary.com/FAQ.
*Update Monday, November 15 – Although labeled a "daily deal" site above, the Foundary should be labeled as a "flash sale site."


text:
Geena Davis to reunite with A League of Their Own cast for softball game
- Bang Showbiz
- 10 April 2017
Geena Davis has revealed that she and the cast of 1992 movie 'A League of Their Own' are to reunite for a softball match to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the baseball film
Geena Davis is to reunite with the cast of 'A League of Their Own' to play a softball game to celebrate the movie's 25th anniversary.
The actress led an all-star cast in the 1992 film, which included Madonna, Tom Hanks, Rosie O'Donnell and Lori Petty, which told the true story of the creation of the All-American Girls Professional Baseball League in 1943 when Major League Baseball was under threat due to a lack of players because the men were serving in the American military during World War II.
The movie has lived on due to the positive message of female empowerment and Geena has revealed the cast and director Penny Marshall intend to celebrate its' legacy with a day of softball - a baseball variant played with a bigger bat and larger ball.
She spilled: "[I see] Tom, for sure. I also see a lot of the girls at my Bentonville Film Festival. We're having a 'League of Their Own' 25th anniversary softball game, with the whole cast and director Penny Marshall."
Geena, 61, is very proud of the film - in which she played catcher Dorothy 'Dottie' Hinson - and says she still receives letters from young girls and their mothers now crediting the film with inspiring them to play sport.
In an interview with Parade magazine, she said: "Everything about 'A League of their Own' was appealing. I had always cared about women and girls' empowerment, but having just been in 'Thelma & Louise' and seen the reaction that it got just jacked it through the roof. And then to be able to be a part of a movie that is about women having a chance to do things they don't ordinarily get to do was incredible. It is played by an ensemble of women, directed by a woman [Penny Marshall]. I'd never played an athlete before. I was scared, but it was really fun.
"It's had a tremendous impact on girls playing sports. And I still have girls and women recognise me from that movie and say that it encouraged them to play sports. That's what I hear constantly, 'I play sports because of that movie.' "
Geena has always been a trailblazer in Hollywood when it comes to gender inequality on the big screen and she has no intention of stopping now she's in her 60s.
However, she doesn't believe there is a Hollywood conspiracy to limit women's roles but the lack of significant parts is driven by commercial reasons.
She said: "Half of it is the idea that men don't want to watch women in leading roles. The other half is unconscious gender bias. For the most part, women take up very little space onscreen, are valued for their appearance and don't get to do the adventurous and important things. It's unconscious gender bias that's responsible, not a Hollywood plot against women ... I don't want to be forced into retirement. I tremendously resent how everything really narrows down the older you get. It's not fun."


text:
Alternative Titles
Synonyms: Virus Removal
Japanese: オープン・ゲート
Type: Manga
Volumes: 1
Chapters: 7
Status: Finished
Published: Jul 28, 2006 to Jan 27, 2007
Genres: Hentai
Authors: Kyoumoto, Takayuki (Story & Art)
Serialization: Comic Aun
Score: 5.501 (scored by 4 users)
1 This score is not weighted. Please note that 'Not yet published' titles are excluded.
Ranked: N/A2
2 based on the top manga page. Please note that 'R18+' titles are excluded.
Popularity: #33962
Members: 42
Favorites: 0


text:
Having problems with your Vacuums ?
Red "bag is full" indicator shows even though new bag has been put in and vacuum cleaner wont pick up. Also floor adjustment does not adjust. This is for a powerforce model 3522 series
Answers :
The red light tell you that it is sensing a full bag. But a clog in the hose or the inlet down by the brush roll will also do this.
Repair Help & Product Troubleshooting for Vacuums
Tips for a great answer:- Provide details, support with references or personal experience .
- If you need clarification, ask it in the comment box .
- It's 100% free, no registration required.
Suggested Questions/Answers :
Red "bag is full" indicator shows even though new bag has been put in and vacuum cleaner wont pick up. Also floor adjustment does not adjust. This is for a powerforce model 3522 series
The red light tell you that it is sensing a full bag. But a clog in the hose or the inlet down by the brush roll will also do this. ... Vacuums
We have two of these vacuums and both of them have experienced the same problems. First the floor heighth adjustment doesn't work and now neither one will pick up on either carpet or floor when in the brush/floor mode. They both seem to work with the suction hose function. We have removed the back panel to see if there was an obstruction but it was clear. We have changed the bag and the small filter (not the HEPA filter) all to no avail. What else can we do? We are desperate to use our vacu
Did you check the powerhead for obstructions? With a bend in the tube just below where the hose connects, this is a common spot for clogs. To check, detach hose and drop a coin in the hole. If it doesn't drop through, a blockage is present. Use t ... Electrolux Oxygen 3 Upright Vacuum Cleaner - EL5035 Vacuum
My new Kenmoore Powermate 116 canister has poor suction. I have no pets and light dust. Its not picking up small particles on the wood floor with the floor attachment. When I put my hand to the suction it feels weak. Cleared hose and changed bag. Using again, same issues. This should not be happening with a new vacuum. Is it a bad design in the elbow joint of the hose? I want to return this!!!!
First of all disassemble the handle and hose as much as possible and examine the inside. Make sure there is not any significant debris lodged in the hose somewhere like a plastic bag or something.\015\012\015\012Also check at the top of t ... Kenmore 23912 Progressive PowerMate Bagged Canister Vacuum
Need Kirby Generation 3 Vacuum cleaner manual. Vacuum is not picking up dirt from floor. Seems to have enough suction to inflate the bag, but when you check the suction under the vacuum, there seems to be extremely litle suction.
If your brush roll is turning and your bag is not overly full, then the only other thing it can be is a clog where the bag connects to the vacuum. Turn the plastic part out away from vacuum and lift off to see if you have something clogging it. It ... Kirby Generation 3 Bagged Upright Vacuum
No Suction The suction of the vaccuum has stopped. We haven't had the vaccuum for very long and the bag has been recently changed. Both the floor vaccuum and the hose are not picking anything up. I'm not sure what the problem could be.
Your Power head is blocked with hair or dirt,,or the hose which connects the Upright with the power head is blocked.Try taking a steel coat hanger apart (straighten it out) and then push it into the pickup hose to remove blockage. ... Eureka Smartvac 4870 Bagged Upright Vacuum
Hoover windtunnel t series wont pick up - Hoover U6437-900 / U6439-900 Windtunnel Bagged Upright Vacuum
... Hoover U6437-900 / U6439-900 Windtunnel Bagged Upright Vacuum
Dirt devil vacuum cleaner--trouble vacuuming dirt and pet hair on carpeting --is the problem with the spinning brush which contacts the floor, not contacting the carpeting?? I thought (when I bought this vacuum) that the aforementioned brush was adjustable to various heights of carpeting. Sometimes, it seems like nothing is being vacuumed up --unless I have just put a new bag on the vacuum... Do I need or can I replace the spinning brush on the bottom of the vacuum so it kicks up and vacuums
Try replacing the belt. Rubber belts stretch out after about a year. ... Dirt Devil CE6100 Featherlite Upright Vacuum
My electrolux oxygen cannister has the "bag change" light on when there is a new bag. The light stays on when the suction power is high (to pick up small particles) and it won't pick up, but the ight goes off when the suction power is low (to pick up big objects). I changed the hepa filter, cleaned the motor filter and changed bags, but all that didn't help.
You may have a clog in the hose, and/or the inlet by the brush roll. A clog will turn on that light as well as a full bag. ... Vacuums
Blocked suction The FLOOR suction line (Hose) is clogged. I Can vaceum the floor, but it will not pick up anything because the hose to the bagless canister is blocked. I can switch from floor to hose and can vaceum furniture. it will not pick up off the floor. I have tried running a wire down/up the hose. I Can feel the blockage, but I cannot get it out. I am afraid to pull the flem hose out as I do not know how it is attached at each end.
Hi,Here is a tip that I wrote about my Bissel ... the hose should just pull out... it is just stuck in there tightly...\015\012Bissell Bagless Upright Vacuum ... Royal 088500 Featherlite Upright Vacuum
I have a ProHeat Bissell 8910 Series. Won't release or pick up
Hi,Here is a tip that will give you all the information you need to fix your BissellProheat Vacuum Problem.Bissell Proheat Upright Wet/ ... Bissell 8910 ProHeat Clear View Upright Vacuum
My dyson will not pick up from the floor. it will pick up from the extension wand but not off of the floor where the main vacuuming is done
Usually this is from a clogged pipe in the vacuum and filters need to be cleaned. Most vacuums need a phillips screwdriver or a torks driver. Looks like a star. Underneath the vacuum where the rolling brush is at, remove the srews to access the the r ... Dyson DC14 Bagless Upright Cyclonic Vacuum
Merlin Automatic Inground Pool cleaner (onboard bag, no hoses)is no longer picking up debris. Bag is clean, it still moves across pool all seems as it should be -- EXCEPT he's not picking up the dirt!?
The belts need to be replaced ... Vacuums
The vacuum cleaner does not pick up anything from carpet. It does not even pick up pieces of thread laying on carpet. On tile floors it blows dirt away instead of picking it up. I've tried all the settings on the brush and nothing works. It has done this since new
Sounds like there is a clog..\015\012\015\012Usually its in the hose - look closely.. Stretch the hose out straight and look in there good..\015\012\015\012Or a clog could be in the vac close to where the hose conects to the v ... Hoover U5269910 Bagless Upright Vacuum
Miele, Flamenco II. 2 probs. 1. the head brush is not turning when I put it on the floor. If I pick it up to look inside...the brush is spinning fast..I put it down on the floor...the head does not spin at all. 2. The suction power has dropped significantly. The suction used to be so intense, the head would **** itself to my floor and hold on...now, hardly any suction at all.
Sounds like the belt is not on correctly on the beater brush or the belt is worned out now for the suction check filters or bags that need to be empty or clean ... Miele Vacuums
Noise Hi... I was doing normal house work and had been using it on carpet... I put it on floor for my hardwood floors and picked up loose clean cat litter and went to put it back on carpet and it made a horrible noise like it was rubbing. cleaned the filter... cleaned the roller thingi ...checked the belt and it is still making that horrible noise. It does not make the noise when I have it on floor but as soon as I put it on carpet it screams at me. Help! Please and thanks Linda
Hi Linda,\015\012Sounds like clutch problems, try to move the lever for carpet/floor back and forth a few times maybe it will free up. If it still makes the grinding noise, the clutch assembly will have to be replaced. Let me know, i can even ... Dyson DC07 Bagless Upright Cyclonic Vacuum
My dyson seems to have lost its suction therefore is not picking up anything yet i have found that when my dyson is standing upright it has a little more suction but nothing like how it use to work. This has only happend in the last 2 weeks. I sanded a floor & though the sander picked up majority of the dust i did use the dyson to pick up the excess and it is since then that my dyson has not been working to its full potential.
Hi there,\015\012\015\012Sorry to hear you're having a problem with your DC07. You should be able to resolve the issue by following these simple steps: ... Dyson DC07 Bagless Upright Cyclonic Vacuum
When i turn on vacuum it spreads the dirt i am trying to pick up all over the floor, then a need to revacuum the floor. Pls help.
Sounds like you need to change bag and clean out hose and dirt channel underneatch behind brushroll. ... Eureka 4700A Maxima Bagless Upright Vacuum
Dirt devel ultra vision turbo floor adjuster is stuck
... Dirt Devil Vision Turbo W/Bonus Upright Vacuum Vacuum
Need Hoover cannister vacuum floor brush & filter bags
Yes attachment are available just bring your wand into your local vacuum store to insure the proper fit ... Vacuums
Hoover 6446 900 WindTunnel Bagged Upright has little suction at the floor brush but plenty at hose if disconnected. It does not seem that there is anything blocking the inlet at the floor brush.
Check for a clog in the brush hose ... Hoover Tempo Widepath Upright Vacuum - Blue
Hoover floormate. I want to be able to scrub the floor with out it picking up the water.. and after I scrub it, then I want to pick up the water....
Can't do it. The machine vacuums in both scrub and pick-up. Sorry.\015\012\015\012Kirk Thompson\015\012San Juan,PR ... Hoover Floormate H3000 Upright Wet/Dry Vacuum
Hello, I have the same model. And though it is three years old, starting from the last month, it does not clean anything anymore. Cannot even pick up one single thing from the floor. Every dirt gets stuck in the hose. I cleaned the hose and cleaned the filters but it still does not pick anything up. Is three years its normal lifetime or do I have the change the filters, instead of cleaning them? Thanks.
I know bissell vacuums are very cheap but they should last more than 3 years. there should be two parts to the dirt cup. remove the dirt cup and above it there should be a round plastic part. unscrew it and check that filter. ... Bissell 6594 PowerForce Bagless Upright Vacuum
Windtunnel bag vacuum won't pick anything up. changed bag, clean roller , now what?
I would try changing the belts. You can get the belts you need here:Hoover Windtunnel Replacement Belts ... Hoover U6437-900 / U6439-900 Windtunnel Bagged Upright Vacuum
My dyson dc17 animal will pick up via the hose attachment but there is no suction when you use the regular vaccuum on the floor - you can hear the difference in the suction once you put the floor part down - we took it apart - cleaned it - checked all hoses - still does not work????
Hi its Darran at Dyson.Check that the brush control dial is in the centre position when upright and then moves forward when the head is released. If the brush bar is still not spinning when switched on in the vacuuming position, check th ... Dyson DC17 Animal Bagless Upright Cyclonic Vacuum
My Hoover U5491900 Anniversary Windtunnel will not pick up very well, there is good suction when I use the attachments, but when I use it on the floor it won't pick up much, what is wrong with it and how can I fix it?
The reason why it is not picking up well is because the belt is worn or stretched and it can't turn the brush (which picks up debris) against the resistance of the carpet. Here is the belt you need: ... Hoover U5491-900 Bagged Upright Vacuum


text:
Tairawhiti District Health
Te Mana Hauora O Te Tairawhiti
Te Mana Hauora O Te Tairawhiti
Home » News and Media » News » Improving clinical access to patient information
1 October 2016
Good clinical decisions need accurate, available and accessible patient information. Hauora Tairāwhiti is committed to improving clinical access to patient information.
Clinicians at Hauora Tairāwhiti can now link into patient information held by Waikato District Health Board. Waikato Hospital is where the majority of Tairāwhiti people go who need tertiary-level (specialist) care that Hauora Tairāwhiti doesn't provide. Easy access to this information is making a significant difference for clinical staff.
The next step is the implementation of a clinical results repository at Hauora Tairāwhiti by July 2017 and shared throughout Midland region DHBs. This project is part of the eSPACE programme which will offer a new clinical portal that better enables safer diagnosis and treatment for our patients.
Hauora Tairāwhiti is also working with Midlands Health Network (MHN) to consider integrating Hauora Tairāwhiti patient information with Indici. Indici is a patient information platform used by MHN General Practices. Hauora Tairāwhiti would be piggy-backing on the successful project in Taranaki DHB. Ngāti Porou Hauora has moved on to the MHN operating platform and they are signalling their intention to use Indici in the future.


text:
Timothy Barber
THE old-fashioned interior of Suttons & Robertsons isn't really the kind of place you'd associate with cutting-edge modern art. Across the road from Victoria station, the venerable pawnbroking establishment – London's oldest – with its oak-lined, private pledge booths in which customers can exchange expensive items in return for a loan, harks back to an age before the gaudy sensationalism of Damien Hirst or Banksy.

Yet works by both those artists, as well as pieces by Picasso and other modern masters, have recently made their ways through the doors. With the art market having tumbled in the recession, it seems some of those who waded into it at the top – it was in the middle of last year, for instance, that Banksy prices were rocketing from nowhere into six-figure territory – have suddenly seen themselves a bit light of pocket.

Jim Tannahill, Suttons and Robertsons' group director, says: "The past 12 months has seen an enormous uplift in enquiries of loans against fine art and antiques, with many customers telling us they have tried to sell items but have failed to achieve a satisfactory price."

While most of the economy languishes in the doldrums, it's been a heady year for the pawnbroking industry. With the recession applying financial pressures and mainstream lines of credit drying up, people have had to find other ways of raising money, while pawnbrokers have also been taking advantage of the surging price of gold.

Yesterday high street pawnbroker H&T announced that it is trading well ahead of expectations for the year, while rival Albemarle & Bond said last month that its pre-tax profits had risen 42 per cent for the year to 30 June. Both have been setting up new shops and stalls for punters to cash in gold jewellery while prices are high, but volumes in the traditional pawnbroking businesses have been up too.

Suttons & Robertsons operates at the highest end of the market with average loans of £2,000 (10 times the high street average), and business has been similarly fulsome from its rich but cash-strapped clientele. Seeing which way the wind has been blowing, in August the company opened a second premises in South Kensington – nearer to the doorsteps of its natural clientele – replacing fusty pledge booths with swish sofas and designer interiors. The idea is to attract younger customers with acquired bling rather than family heirlooms, and the borrowing average there has trebled to £6,000.

Nevertheless, Tannahill says the pawnbroking industry still labours under something of a stigma – after all, it's an industry that essentially depends upon the financial problems of its customers for business. But as he points out, it isn't out of selling on pawned items that brokers make money – the vast majority of customers repay within the six-month loan period and get their assets back. When customers do default, their item gets sent to auction, and if it sells for more than the loan plus interest, the difference is returned to the client.

REDRAWING THE LINES
"People need a short term loan for all sorts of reasons such as holidays, cars, investment opportunities, even to pay the school fees," says Tannahill. He also believes City people use the service to cover themselves in advance of receiving their bonuses.

Another company redrawing the lines of the pawnbroking business, and seeing the City as one of its main sources of business, is Borro, the UK's first online pawnbroker. It has flourished since opening for business last year, and the online nature of the business hasn't prevented it from operating near the top end of the market, with average loans of around £1,000. As well as its stock in trade of jewellery and watches, it has made loans against cars including Aston Martins and Ferraris, as well as art by the likes of Henry Moore and, once again, Banksy. While its business is principally online, Borro has a City consultancy in Chancery Lane where clients can get items valued by its experts.

"60 per cent of our customers have never done this before," says Paul Aitken, Borro's managing director. "Attitudes to pawnbroking are changing, and will carry on changing."


text: I got the Droid about 3 weeks ago and just love it. !! I moved on from the Blackberry Storm. Well actually 3 Storms and when the third one pooped out they wanted to give me (under warranty) a 4th Storm. You know the rest of the story. I really do like Verizon's coverage and the iPhone was not a choice for me. Very happy with the Droid !


text:
Pierre Belvédère is a leader in the toy distribution industry. Selected in accordance with our values, we offer a large assortment of games and toys with social appeal and educational value. We act as experienced advisors to our retail partners.
Thanks to our expertise and excellent relations with various industry stakeholders, we deliver real value for our retail partners. We offer the widest assortment of exclusive games and educational toys in North America. Whether educational or creative, all our toys offer exceptional play value.


text:
Thanksgiving Weekend PurgeAnd no, I'm not talking bulimia. I've tried that and it just doesn't work for me. Though, after the gluttony that was Thanksgiving Day, I should re-think that option.
No, what I'm talking about is my annual tradition of cleaning out my closets and getting rid of things that don't fit or that I haven't worn in a year. Plus it gives me the opportunity to clean up my closets and chest of drawers. So the good news is that this year, I'm actually getting rid of clothes that don't fit because they are too big. Yeah! While I'm still fat, I'm less fat than I have been in a long time. So that's nice. And the beauty of the purge is that I get to discover clothes I bought years ago and haven't worn because I couldn't fit into them. I was kind of depressed that I only had one pair of decent jeans. And voila! I found a great pair of black jeans and then some jeans that are sort of low rise jeans that actually work on me. So that's a pleasant surprise.
The results of the purge? Four trash bags full of clothes that I dropped off at Goodwill today. My closets look great and are stuffed with clothes any more.
Since we (Museum Man and myself) ventured into the Commonwealth to go to the Goodwill drop off, we decided to brave the crowds at Tysons. And it wasn't as awful as I thought. I did pick up a couple of things. Museum Man is a bit of label whore, and some of that rubbed off on me. But while I did buy a Diesel and Hugo Boss shirt, I got them both on sale.
Tonight if my energy levels stay up, we're going to hit Town. Should be fun.


text:
Yesterday Once More
The Carpenters ReaderBook - 2012
With a string of number-one hits showcasing Karen Carpenter's warm and distinctive vocals and Richard Carpenter's sophisticated compositions and arrangements, the Carpenters were responsible for some of the most popular music of the 1970s, and this compendium collects more than 50 articles, interviews, essays, reviews, and reassessments that chronicle the lives and career of this brother-sister musical team. Writings from pop journalists and historians such as Daniel J. Levitin, John Tobler, Digby Diehl, Ray Coleman, Robert Hilburn, and Lester Bangs provide insight into the music and personalities of the duo who produced such timeless pop music. From serious musical analyses of the Carpenters' arrangements to lighter pieces in which Karen and Richard discuss dating, cars, and high school, this new edition has been revised and expanded to include nearly a dozen additional pieces, some of which have never been published.
From the critics
Community Activity
CommentAdd a Comment
There are no comments for this title yet.
AgeAdd Age Suitability
There are no ages for this title yet.
SummaryAdd a Summary
There are no summaries for this title yet.
NoticesAdd Notices
There are no notices for this title yet.
QuotesAdd a Quote
There are no quotes for this title yet.


text:
PHILADELPHIA A sales manager who "just couldn't abide" by the way Merck wanted him to market the drugs Vioxx and Zocor to doctors took the lonely step of filing a whistle-blower suit against his employer.
Seven years later, Merck & Co. will pay $671 million to settle complaints it overcharged government health programs and gave doctors improper inducements to prescribe its drugs.
And whistle-blower H. Dean Steinke, the Michigan sales manager whose lawsuit led to about $400 million of the recovery, gets a $68 million reward.
"He did it because he really, truly thought that Merck was doing the wrong thing and he just couldn't abide by it, even though he was putting his career on hold,'" said Steinke's lawyer, Steven Cohen of Chicago. His small firm, which specializes in such cases, will receive an undisclosed share of the award.
Steinke, who through his lawyer declined an interview, had climbed the sales ladder at Merck for about 12 years and was a district sales manager when he filed the lawsuit. He made the move only after his internal complaints were ignored, Cohen said.
Steinke believed that Merck, as it introduced the much-anticipated painkiller Vioxx and tried to ward off competition for Zocor, an anti-cholesterol drug, had crossed the line when it came to inducements to physicians.
The government investigated his sealed lawsuit, which also alleged that Merck overcharged government health plans, under the Federal False Claims Act.
Prosecutors ultimately alleged that Merck paid physicians, hospitals and others excess fees to run supposed educational programs, from lunches to speaking engagements to visiting professorships, in hopes they would favor their products.
Prosecutors also accused Merck of giving doctors and hospitals steep volume-based discounts on Vioxx, Zocor and Pepcid, in the hope that patients would come to rely on them. The company failed to offer Medicare and other government agencies the same price, as required by law, they said.
"It's heroin-dealer economics. Your first shot of dope is free and then it's more expensive," said Pat Burns, a spokesman for the whistle-blower group Taxpayers Against Fraud.
As part of the agreement, Merck denied any wrongdoing.
Steinke left Merck a month after he filed his lawsuit in December 2000 and went to work for a small pharmaceutical company that shared his values, Cohen said. He made repeated trips to Philadelphia to help government investigators.
"The whistle-blower is stuck in a very lonely and isolated circumstance while the government's investigation is proceeding," Cohen said.
His award includes $44.7 million from federal agencies roughly 20 percent of the government's recovery and about $23.5 million from various states, Cohen said.
The remainder of the settlement announced Wednesday stems from a lawsuit filed by a New Orleans doctor, William St. John LaCorte. His award had not yet been determined.
Cohen described Steinke, who is married with no children, as a reserved man from "good Midwestern stock."
He recently left his drug-company job.