text: On Sun, Jan 29, 2012 at 06:34:06PM -0500, Joseph Werner wrote: > >> So if Perl Best Practices is too much, and you could only have 5 rules > >> for any perl script, what would they be? > > ... > > 3. Strictures: Always 'use strict' (and 'use warnings' during development) and > > explicitly state your minimum Perl version requirement. (e.g. 'use v5.10') > > [Ch18: "Strictures", "Warnings"] > > I will agree with always 'use strict', I have never [yet] had to not > 'use warnings' AFTER development. Funny. If I have to pick between strict and warnings in production, I'd pick warnings each and every time. I cannot remember ever having something in production which is then tripped by the run time effects of strict (except trying to dereference an undefined value, but see next sentence). But I see the run time effects of warnings (usually in the form of "uninitialized value") all the time. Now, the compile time effects of "use warnings", I can easily live without. In fact, some of them I disable right away; I always follow my "use warnings;" by a "no warnings 'syntax';". > Explicitly stating minimum Perl version requirement does not rise to > the same level of concern as 'use strict' and 'use warnings'. How > often do you regression test to know the minimum Perl version > requirement anyhow? It depends who the code is for *and* for its side effects. For $WORK code, I don't bother with supplying a version. We're on 5.8.5; writing code that doesn't work with it is pointless, and we have to plans to revert to 5.6. However, soon we should be on 5.14.x. Then I'll be using "use 5.010" (or some higher number), but not so much as to signal a minimum version. But since 5.010, "use 5.XXX" will have side effects. In particular, "use 5.010" enables the "say", "given" and "state" features. For CPAN code however, I typically do supply a "use $MINIMUM_VERSION" to signal the minimem required version. And I do have some old perls on my system so I can test against them. Abigail


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27. Andy Leleisi'uao
I am a New Zealand born Samoan from Auckland, New Zealand.
My first visit to Maria Valeria Bridge was humbling. I cannot help but smile. We become friends and feel she is comfortable enough for me to call her Maria after some time. Her great presence and history is an inspiration as I realise this is no ordinary Artist in Residence.
I was graciously invited here by Karol Fruhauf, Yuri and Sophia Himmler have overseen my gentle introduction into this wonderful township. I have had over fifty solo exhibitions to date and have been part of numerous projects. I hope I can reciprocate with people I meet here with my imagination and memories as a small token of my appreciation in serving my tenure as the 26th Bridge Guard (July 1st – September 31st).
Aug 2013 Episades of the Pino'nati, Auckland Art Fair.
Apr Le Tumau, Whitespace, Auckland.
Sep 2012 Dandelion People, BCA, Rarotonga, Cook Islands.
Immigration Mind, TSB Bank Wallace Art Centre, The Pah, Auckland.
Jun Quasimodo Love, PaperGraphica, Christchurch.
May Polyneitus Spring, Milford Gallery, Dunedin
Aug 2011 World of Lemeads, ROAR! Gallery, Wellington.
May World of Erodipolis, Milford Gallery, Dunedin.
Mar Arytipidal, Blue Oyster, Dunedin.
Ufological City, Volta, New York, USA.
Nov 2010 Cryptid Illuminati, Whitespace, Auckland.
Sep Andy Leleisi'uao, McCahon House, Titirangi, Auckland.
July Wandering Through Pandemonium Quiet, COCA Gallery, Christchurch.
May Andy Leleisi'uao, Thistle Hall, Wellington.
Nov 2009 Asefeka of the Unmalosa, Kips Gallery, Chelsea, New York, USA.
Sep Areatures of the Arctaur People, BCA, Rarotonga, Cook Isl

subset: commoncrawl


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Goldstein Lab CRISPR Plasmids Available from Addgene
Our Cas9-sgRNA plasmids contain both the Cas9 gene and an sgRNA gene. The inclusion of both components on a single plasmid facilitates archival and distribution, and makes it simpler to prepare injection mixes. The Cas9 coding sequence is codon-optimized and includes synthetic introns for efficient expression in C. elegans , and is driven by the eft-3 promoter for germline expression. The sgRNA is driven by the R07E5.16 U6 RNA promoter. Compared to the C. elegans CRISPR plasmids from John Calarco's lab, which are also available on Addgene, the biggest differences are 1) Inclusion of both components on the same plasmid, and 2) Use of a different U6 promoter to drive sgRNA expression. We have not compared the two systems side by side but would expect them to be similar in terms of efficiency.
Additional Resources:
The Supplementary Information in the publication contains a protocol for using the plasmids. A website has been created for sharing protocols and information: http://wormcas9hr.weebly.com/
These plasmids are described in:
Engineering the Caenorhabditis elegans genome using Cas9-triggered homologous recombination. Dickinson DJ, Ward JD, Reiner DJ, Goldstein B. Nat. Methods . 2013 Sept 1. PubMed . PMC .).
Individual plasmids can be ordered via the links below:
|pDD122 (Peft-3::Cas9 + ttTi5605 sgRNA) : Cas9 + sgRNA plasmid that is targeted to a genomic site near the ttTi5605 Mos1 insertion allele.
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|pDD162 (Peft-3::Cas9 + Empty sgRNA) : Cas9 + sgRNA plasmid that can be modified to cleave any Cas9 target site in the C. elegans genome.
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|pDD104 (Peft-3::Cre) : Cre recombinase expression plasmid for removal of floxed selectable markers in the C. elegans germline.
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Please note: eft-3 has officially been changed to eef-1A.1 Please see the eef-1A.1 WormBase entry for details.


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Search This Blog
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The Right Type of Legislator: A Theory of Taxation and Representation
- Benedict Collin Jackson
- 3 years ago
- Views:
1 The Right Type of Legislator: A Theory of Taxation and Representation Andrea Mattozzi European University Institute and MOVE apps.eui.eu/personal/amattozzi/ Erik Snowberg California Institute of Technology and NBER snowberg/ June 2, 2015 Abstract Theories of taxation conclude that legislators ability to target redistribution to their districts results in higher government spending and taxation. Yet, despite the fact that securing pork is an important part of a legislator s job in the U.S., but not in European countries, the U.S. has lower taxes. Our analysis adds a simple assumption to standard models to reconcile them with this fact. Our assumption that those who are successful in the private sector will also tend to be successful in negotiating transfers for their district allows our theory to match stylized facts about class representation in legislatures. The model can then be used to examine policies aimed at increasing descriptive representation in legislatures. We find that many of these policies have no, or negative, effects on descriptive representation, including: increasing the number of representatives, allowing parties to choose candidates, or giving parties some ability to discipline legislator s votes and screen candidates. On the other hand, two policies are found to be particularly effective for increasing descriptive representation: proportional representation and limiting competition between legislators. JEL Classifications: D02, D63, D72, D78, H10, H23 Keywords: Political Economy, Citizen Candidates, Taxation, Redistribution, Representation, Legislatures We thank Jonathan Chapman for excellent research assistance. Snowberg gratefully acknowledges the support of NSF SES We thank Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Josh Clinton, Stephen Coate, Daniel Diermeier, Tim Feddersen, Patrick Francois, Sean Gailmard, Andrea Galeotti, Alex Hirsch, Morgan Kousser, Kai Konrad, Jenny Mansbridge, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Pablo Montagnes, Salvatore Nunnari, Giacomo Ponzetto, Debraj Ray, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Allistair Smith, Ken Shotts, Jim Snyder, Francesco Trebbi, Leeat Yariv, and seminar audiences at the Priorat Workshop, the Rotterdam Workshop in Political Economy, WZB Berlin, the Chicago Workshop on Institutional Design, the Collegio Carlo Alberto, MPSA, Caltech, the University of Miami, IPEG, MEDS, George Mason, Georgetown, UBC, and UCB for useful conversations, comments, and encouragement. We also thank the Casa del Popolo di Fiesole for their hospitality, although it may have been reduced had they known what we were writing.
2 1 Introduction A central question in political science involves the determination of economic policies, like tax regimes. In the seminal models of distributive politics, legislators are viewed as independent actors mainly interested in directing public funds to their district at the expense of the general population (Tullock, 1959; Weingast, 1979; Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, 1981). Legislators desire to bring pork to their districts results in a common pool problem, leading to higher spending, and thus taxation. This mechanism is a fundamental component of the way the existing theoretical literature has modeled fiscal policy outcomes in representative democracies. The main drawback of this approach is that it is exactly the opposite of what is seen across developed countries. In particular, the U.S. has relatively low federal taxes even though successfully delivering pork is an important part of a legislator s job. In contrast, European countries, such as the U.K., Italy or Germany, have higher taxes yet legislators largely do not compete for pork. 1 Further, the literature investigating the empirical relation between the severity of the common pool problem (measured by the size of the legislature) and the size of government is not conclusive, with a number of papers finding a negative relationship. 2 In this paper, we reconcile the common pool logic with the above stylized facts, and generate a number of additional testable predictions. We do so by introducing the abilities and personal preferences of legislators into the model. Specifically, we combine workhorse models with a simple assumption: individuals who are more successful in the private sector will tend to be more successful, as legislators, at directing resources back to their district. This assumption is discussed at length in Section 1.3, but it can be easily summarized as: whatever gets one ahead in the private sector for example: connections, hard work, charisma is also useful, on average, in negotiating resources for one s district. We refer to 1 See, for example, 2 For a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the so-called Law of 1/n see Primo and Snyder (2008). Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) is one of the cleanest tests, and finds a negative relationship between spending and the number of legislators. 1
3 these skills, as a group, as negotiating skills. This is in contrast to recent work reviewed in Section 1.4 that has largely abandoned the common pool mechanism, and instead argues that cross-countries differences in tax regimes are the result of differences in the political system, the electoral rule, or culture. Our results are useful for organizing a number of stylized facts about differences in taxation, redistribution, and representation across developed countries. Our model predicts that the rich will be over-represented in all legislatures. It further concludes that the U.S. will have wealthier legislators, lower taxes, and parties that are less differentiated on tax policy than Western European countries. Further, our model provides an explanation of the underrepresentation of women in the U.S. Congress relative to legislatures in Germany, the U.K., or Italy. Finally, our model is consistent with the discrepancy in the U.S. between the high public approval of individual legislators, and the low approval of the legislature itself. All these predictions are broadly consistent with stylized facts reviewed in Section Theoretical Argument Our model allows for redistribution both between the rich and the poor, and between legislative districts. Citizen voting is assumed to follow standard median-voter logic (Hotelling, 1929; Downs, 1957; Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Once elected, legislators participate in a two-stage budgeting process where legislators first vote on taxes using majority rule, and then negotiate over the distribution of the budget (Chari, Jones and Marimon, 1997; Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 1997). Because we assume legislators are citizen candidates, their actions in office follow their own preferences. 3 Citizens are one of two types: rich or poor. Our central assumption discussed at length in Section 1.3 is that the rich have relatively strong negotiating skills, and the poor have relatively weak negotiating skills. The main tradeoff that our model highlights is simple and robust: a district s legislator, 3 This is in implicit in the citizen-candidate framework of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), and can be relaxed. See Sections 4.3, 6.4, and 10. This is consistent with the selection model of Miller and Stokes (1963), especially as elucidated by Mansbridge (2009). A focus on candidate preferences is rationalizable: Fearon (1999) finds that voters are better off using elections to select types, rather than disciplining incumbents. 2
4 as one of many in the legislature, has little impact on broad policies, such as the tax rate, but a relatively large impact on the transfers that the district receives. Knowing this, even the median voter of a poor district will ignore a candidate s preferences over redistribution and focus on his negotiating skills, that is, a rich candidate s superior ability to direct transfers to his district. 4 A more subtle intuition comes from seeing the game that voters play as a prisoner s dilemma: all poor voters voting for poor legislators would make all poor voters better off. However, it is strictly dominant for an individual poor voter to choose a successful that is, rich legislator. This model yields a striking result: when securing resources for one s district is important, then, in equilibrium, every district votes for candidates who are successful in the private sector that is, rich. This occurs even though those candidates prefer lower taxes which they actualize than voters, and despite the fact that everyone elects equally effective negotiators, so the spending in all districts is equal. The equilibrium exhibits three patterns of representation. When ability to direct funds to a legislator s own district does not matter at all say through budgeting procedures that make it impossible to target funding then every district elects a legislator who is the same type as its median voter, and the tax rate is effectively set by the median voter of the median district. We call this a representative equilibrium. If, instead, ability to direct funds matters just a little, many districts with poor median voters will elect rich legislators. legislature. However, poor legislators will still form a minimal winning coalition in the Those that vote for rich legislators will know, in equilibrium, that they will not cause the legislature to tip to a rich majority, and hence will choose a rich legislator for his superior negotiating abilities. The legislative majority, composed of poor legislators, knows that rich legislators will get more than an equal share of tax revenues, and will shade down the tax rate to reduce the expropriation from their districts. We call such equilibria somewhat representative. Finally, when the ability to direct funds to a legislator s own district is important, then the unique equilibrium will be for every district to elect a rich 4 We follow the principal-agent literature in referring to legislators (agents) using masculine pronouns, and citizens (principals) especially the median voter of a district using feminine pronouns. 3
5 legislator. This unrepresentative equilibrium occurs due to the logic laid out above. 1.2 Descriptive Representation An attractive feature of our model is that it makes predictions about descriptive representation (which we often refer to simply as representation where it will not cause confusion), a subject that has been largely overlooked by formal modelers in favor of ideological representation. However, it is worth noting that our model is only a first step, and thus restricted to descriptive characteristics that bear on representatives ability to negotiate resources for their districts the set of negotiating skills we define above. This likely excludes descriptive characteristics that may be of interest to voters, such as ethnicity or religion. Interestingly, many factors that might be thought to be helpful in fostering representation are in fact ineffective or counter-productive. Dahl and Tufte (1973), among others, argue that larger legislatures should promote representation. Unexpectedly, smaller legislative districts, such that each legislator represents fewer citizens, lead to less representative outcomes. Likewise, stronger parties are often seen as a force for increasing representation (Committee on Political Parties, 1950; Hazan and Rahat, 2010). However, in our model, policy-motivated parties with complete control of candidate nomination and some ability to discipline their politicians often make outcomes less representative. The intuition behind these results builds on the logic above. As legislatures grow to include more representatives, each legislator s influence over broad policy outcomes like taxation diminishes, while the influence he has on his own district s welfare through transfers stays relatively constant. This leads to unrepresentative equilibria even when the rich have a relatively small advantage in directing resources to their own district. Additionally, the ability of policy-motivated parties to discipline their politicians will be used by the party that favors low taxes to make their candidates positions on tax policy more attractive to the poor. This, combined with the greater skill of the rich in negotiating transfers for their districts, will lead to all districts electing rich candidates and these candidates implementing lower taxes than would otherwise be obtained in equilibrium. On the other hand, we 4
6 show that two factors unambiguously increase representation: proportional representation, and limiting the competition between legislators for district-specific transfers. In addition to the predictions on class representation described above, our model can be extended to any group that is perceived by society as being less able negotiators. A particularly interesting case is women, who are generally perceived as less capable negotiators (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009) or as having less bargaining power than men (Ayres and Siegelman, 1995; Altonji and Black, 1999; Harding, Rosenthal and Sirmans, 2003). Regardless of the correctness of these beliefs and recent research indicates that they may be mistaken (Volden, Wiseman and Wittmer, 2013; Besley et al., 2014) our model makes the same predictions for the representation of men as it does for the rich because voters believe that representatives with these descriptive characteristics will be able to deliver more pork to their districts. In particular, men will be over-represented in all legislatures, and legislatures characterized by a focus on pork will have an even greater majority of men than those that are not. Again, these patterns are broadly consistent with the stylized facts described in Section Discussion of our Central Assumption The main assumption of our model is that those who are more successful in the private sector are also better at negotiating resources for their district. 5 Unfortunately, a direct test of this assumption is hardly feasible because it involves assessing several variables that are often unmeasured, or unmeasurable. 6 However, what is actually required is that voters believe this is the case. While this appears plausible prima facie, in order to assess it, we ran a few simple surveys on convenience samples. 7 The questions on this survey were aimed at ascertaining whether U.S. voters saw private sector success as a signal of distributive 5 Note that allowing for positive but imperfect correlation between tax preferences and legislative ability can be easily incorporated in our model. See Section BLA. 6 We thank Salvatore Nunnari for pointing out that wealthier legislators, as determined by the poor quality data on opensecrets.org, sponsor more bills, and Jim Snyder for pointing out that Democrats from more marginal districts are more likely to be on one of the Big 4 committees, where most pork originates. 7 We obtained our convenience samples in the U.S. through Amazon s Mechanical Turk. For more on the use of Mechanical Turk in survey research see Berinsky, Huber and Lenz (2012). 5
7 prowess, and furthermore, whether this prowess was enough to overwhelm policy concerns in voting decisions. We asked a sample of U.S. citizens (n = 1, 076) to rank various professions in terms of the respondent s belief as to which would be most indicative of talent at obtaining resources for your district (for example by obtaining funding for local projects). Respondents ranked a list of professions from 1 6. These professions, with their average rank were as follows: successful businessman (2.07), entrepreneur (2.38), successful lawyer (2.63), high school teacher (3.73), factory worker (4.73), and bus driver (5.46). We also asked the same respondents to rank people with different educational backgrounds in terms of their ability to secure funds for the voter s district. The rankings were: MBA (2.28), law degree (2.44), PhD (2.78), medical degree (3.83), university degree (4.16), and only high school degree (5.50). 8 A clear pattern emerges in this data: more highly compensated professions, and educational backgrounds correlated with compensation, are perceived by voters as being indicative of the legislative skill of directing resources to a district. Finally, we asked a subset of this group (n = 233) a question aimed at understanding how they valued the trade-off between policy and directing resources to their district. We asked them to choose (hypothetically) between a Congressional candidate that was good at securing resources for your district: he has a long record of bringing in money for projects the district needs and prefers lower taxes, especially on high-income earners, and another that was not very good at securing resources for your district and prefers higher taxes, especially on high-income earners, which one would they choose? The first candidate was chosen by 73% of respondents. Self-identified Republicans chose the first candidate 93% of the time, versus 70% for self-identified Democrats. While this is supportive of the core assumption of our model, for this to have implications for fiscal policy, it must also be the case that the core assumption of the citizen candidate model holds as well. In particular, wealthier legislators prefer lower taxes. Here, we refer to Carnes (2013), which shows, based on roll-call votes, that legislators from higher socio- 8 All differences between rankings were significant at the p < 0.01 level. The rankings of those who reported they voted in the last congressional election were not significantly different than those who did not. 6
8 economic status professions have more conservative voting records, even controlling for party. 1.4 Literature Our work is closely related to papers in two additional literatures: the examination of heterogeneity in political skills, and the debate over whether their is a wealth bias that is, policy follows the preferences of the upper-classes in U.S. politics. A large literature has developed trying to understand the causes and consequences of valence or quality of politicians, following Stokes s (1963) influential critique of the Downsian model. Theory papers of this ilk tend to assume that the valence of a politician is a draw from a distribution (for example, Groseclose, 2001), while empirical papers consider education or prior income as markers of quality (for example, Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013). 9 Instead, we consider a specific ability the ability to negotiate resources for their district and assume that this ability is correlated with private sector success. 10 Our paper thus follows an emerging literature that considers additional dimensions of politician heterogeneity. 11 Moreover, we explicitly consider the interaction between different legislative districts, and how this alters voters preferences over politicians, whereas much of the previous literature considers a single politician in isolation. Our paper also contributes to the debate about whether or not there is a wealth bias in U.S. politics (Bartels, 2007; Gilens and Page, 2014). We build on Carnes s (2013) empirical findings with a formal-theoretic basis for why poorer voters would choose to be represented by wealthy legislators with policy preferences that differ from theirs. Our explanation is complementary to explanations that focus on differences in campaign resources (Campante, 2011) and the sensitivity of poor voters to the outcomes of richer voters (Bartels, 2007) Recent research has focused on identifying more direct measures of quality, see, for example Volden and Wiseman (2014). 10 Appendix B.2 compares results with a model where those that are successful in the private sector have a generic ability to improve the efficiency of policy. 11 Besley and Coate (1997) note the tension between politicians preferences and their ability to implement certain policies. Other papers in this literature, which often focuses on why poor quality politicians are elected, include Caselli and Morelli (2004), Messner and Polborn (2004), Mattozzi and Merlo (2008). 12 In a related analysis, Bai and Lagunoff (2013) explore what data would be needed to uncover a wealth bias in politics. 7
9 As mentioned earlier, there is a large literature, reviewed in Persson and Tabellini (2000), that argues that cross-country differences in tax regimes are primarily caused by the electoral system or rule. While these explanations capture important aspects of variation in tax regimes for countries with markedly different systems and rules, such as U.S. and Italy, they are less compelling for countries that are relatively similar, such as the U.S. and U.K. There is also a small literature that explores how experiences and social structure affect voters beliefs and preferences over redistribution (Piketty, 1995; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). Our paper instead focuses on the preferences of legislators. However, additional value may come from examining the belief formation process of legislators, and how this may in turn affect their reaction to informational lobbying. Finally, in both the somewhat representative and unrepresentative equilibria of our model, poor voters will vote for rich candidates who prefer a low tax rate. Huber and Ting (2013) also explain this behavior, although their explanation relies on parties that can exclude legislators from the opposing party from receiving funds. The poor then vote for the rich party in order to avoid being in the legislative majority. It is worth noting that this relies on powers there is little evidence that parties have: heterogeneity in federal spending across districts is not well explained by the party of the legislator (Boone, Dube and Kaplan, 2014). Moreover, coordination could be either on the party of the rich or the party of the poor. 2 Model In this section we lay out our core model. We then build intuition for our results by analyzing a simplified version with only three legislative districts. 2.1 Structure and Players Legislative Districts We model a country populated with a unit measure of citizens, and with 2n + 1 legislative districts j J = {1, 2,..., 2n + 1}, each containing an equal measure of citizens. 8
10 Citizens: A citizen s utility is her post-tax income plus utility from government spending in her district. A citizen s pre-tax income is determined solely by her publicly observable type, t {l, h}, which is either low or high. Specifically, the income of a low type is y l, and the income of a high type is y h = ηy l, with η (1, η) parameterizing the productivity difference between high types and low types. We occasionally refer to high types as rich or successful, and low types as poor or unsuccessful. Overall, a fraction λ of citizens are low types, so the total income of all legislative districts together is given by y (λ + (1 λ)η)y l. We restrict the tax instrument τ to be linear in income, so tax revenue is given by τy. 13 District j receives a proportion π j j of tax revenues, which is determined by the type of legislator elected in j s district, as well as the other ( j) districts. Section describes the specific process determining this distribution. The utility that each individual receives from x amount of local government spending is g(x) = x α /α with α (0, 1). Given the above, we can write the utility of an individual voter as: ( π j u ij = (1 τ)y i j + τy. (1) α When an equal proportion of tax revenues is transferred to each district π j j = 1/(2n+1), and we denote by τ l and τ h the most-preferred tax rates of low and high types, respectively: τ l = ( y (2n + 1)y 1 α l and τ h = ( y (2n + 1)(ηy l ) 1 α = τ l η 1 < τ l. (2) To guarantee τ l < 1, we assume that (2n + 1)y l > y α. Finally, we denote by u l (τ) the utility a low type receives from a given tax rate τ when tax revenues are divided equally between districts. Legislators: Legislators are citizen candidates, implying that their actions in office are determined solely by their preferences as citizens. Initially, we assume that two candidates run in each district, a low type and a high type. Later, we endogenize candidate selection 13 Section 10 briefly discusses more complicated tax instruments. 9
11 by adding parties. As types are publicly known, voters know what each candidate will do if elected, and vote accordingly. Median Voters: Using standard results, the winning candidate will be chosen by the median voter of each district. A number z (1 λ)(2n + 1) {0, 1,..., n} of districts have a high-type median voter. By making the proportion of high-type median voters roughly equivalent to the proportion of high types in the population, we eliminate the effect of the boundaries of districts on representation (Chen and Rodden, 2013). 2.2 Timeline Our model of elections and legislative policymaking proceeds in three stages. These are: 1. The voting stage. Voters simultaneously vote for one of two citizen candidates based on the utility they expect to receive with each candidate as their representative in the legislature. Thus, their votes will depend on the candidates types, and the types of candidates elected by the other legislative districts. 2. The tax-policy stage. Legislators vote on a level of taxes using an open rule. In subgame perfect equilibria, legislators will take into account what will happen in the distributive stage. As the majority of the legislature will always be of the same type, they will have the same most-preferred tax rate, which will be adopted. 3. The distributive stage. Distribution of the public budget among the three districts is determined by a negotiating process described in Section After the distribution stage, incomes are realized, taxes are levied, and tax revenue is distributed according to the decisions described above The Voting and Tax-Policy Stages The first two stages are governed by standard median voter results. Two districts have a low-type median voter, and one a high-type median voter. In the tax-policy stage, tax 10
12 preferences will depend on a legislator s type, and the type of the other legislators. However, there will always be at least n + 1 legislators who are the same type and face the same other types in the legislature and thus will end up with the same most-preferred tax rate. These legislators will vote together to establish the tax rate The Distributive Stage The third, distributive, stage ties together productivity in the public and private sector, and contains the assumption crucial for our results. As noted above, each district receives public transfers funded by a linear tax on income. High types are advantaged in negotiating transfers for their district by the same proportion as their increase in productivity in the private sector: η. Section 4.3 discusses the case when negotiating ability and preferences for redistribution are imperfectly correlated. A high type s advantage may be mitigated by institutional features. In particular, 1 γ [0, 1] parameterizes the degree to which a high type s negotiating ability is restricted. 14 The proportion of tax revenues that a district receives takes on six values that are relevant for the analysis. We define these as: π L (2n+1)L = 1 2n+1, π L (n+1)l = 1 n((1 γ)+γη)+(n+1) < 1 2n+1, πh (n+1)l = (1 γ)+γη n((1 γ)+γη)+(n+1) > 1 2n+1, π L (n+1)h = 1 (n+1)((1 γ)+γη)+n < 1 2n+1, πh (n+1)h = (1 γ)+γη (n+1)((1 γ)+γη)+n > 1 2n+1, (3) and π H (2n+1)H = 1 2n+1, where the subscript displays the number and type of legislators in the legislative majority, 14 Formally, the share of tax revenue that is returned to district j is given by: s j = { (1 γ)+γ 1 i si if legislator j is a low type (1 γ)+γ η i si if legislator j is a high type, This particular form can be motivated by the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) legislative bargaining model, see Appendix B.4. However, modeling this explicitly makes outcomes risky from the perspective of the voter, which, given the concavity of the utility of public spending, will lead to effects that obscure the main intuition driving our result without qualitatively affecting it. 11
13 and the superscript defines whether district j is represented by a high-type or low-type legislator. Note that the denominator changes to ensure that the sum of proportions always equals one. The existence of different abilities in negotiating transfers for a legislator s district is the major way in which our model departs from previous work. The parameter γ dictates the extent to which negotiating ability will matter for the transfers to a legislator s district. If γ is low, then most funds are simply divided evenly between districts, and a legislator s type will matter very little for the amount of transfers a district will receive. On the other hand, when γ is high, a legislator s type may matter quite a lot. Thus, 1 γ can be thought of as any institutional features that limit the competition between legislators, or reduce the amount of tax revenue a high-type legislator can negotiate for his district. For example, the ability to target only to broad demographic groups, rather than to narrow geographic areas, would result in a lower γ. How institutional features shape γ and the nature of representation is the subject of extensive discussion in Sections 6 and Equilibrium We focus on subgame perfect equilibria, and establish an equilibrium concept, stage-strong, to judge the robustness of equilibria to coordinated deviations of multiple legislative districts. Definition 1. An equilibrium is a pure-strategy, subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in which voters play weakly-undominated strategies. A stage-strong equilibrium is an equilibrium where there are no joint deviations within a single stage of the game that make all deviating players weakly better off, and one player strictly better off. 15 The assumption that voters play weakly-undominated strategies means we can just examine the strategies of the median voters of each district. The equilibria of this model can 15 In our environment, there will be no strong Nash equilibria, but the deviations that prevent such equilibria from occurring are not sequentially rational. On the other hand, unique equilibria are always coalitionproof (Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston, 1987; Bernheim and Whinston, 1987). Stage-strong equilibria are thus more robust to deviations than coalition-proof equilibria, but impose that deviations be sequentially rational. 12
14 be of three types. To fix terminology, we define: Definition We say an equilibrium is representative if the tax rate is the same as the most preferred tax rate of the median voter of the median district, τ l. 2. We say an equilibrium is somewhat representative if there is an over-representation of high-types in the legislature, and the equilibrium tax rate is τ (τ h, τ l ). 3. We say an equilibrium is unrepresentative if all districts elect high-type legislators, and the tax rate is that most preferred by a high-type citizen, τ h.16 3 Central Result Here we state our central result, before building intuition using the case with three legislative districts (n = 1). The result shows that when legislators ability to negotiate spending for their district does not matter, fairly standard results apply. However, when this ability is important, no district wants to reduce their transfers by electing a low-type legislator, and thus, only high-type legislators will be elected in equilibrium. Because high-type legislators are richer, they have a personal preference for lower taxation, which determines the equilibrium level of redistribution. Proposition If γ = 0, then every equilibrium is representative with tax rate τl, and all districts receive an equal proportion of the tax revenues. 2. If 0 < γ < γ (n) < 1 there are two types of equilibria: (a) Unrepresentative equilibria, with the legislature composed of all high types, and tax rate τh. These equilibria are not stage strong. (b) Somewhat representative, with the legislature composed of n + 1 low types and n high types, and tax rate ((2n + 1)π(n+1)L L τ l < τl. ( ( 3. If γ z (n) < γ < 1 then the unique equilibrium is unrepresentative. If > 1 η 1 α 2n+1 γ(η 1) this equilibrium is stage strong. η α ) α ) 1 16 We do not conduct welfare analyses, as these depend critically on assumptions about the distortionary effects of taxation. That is, there exists some level of distortion such that any of these equilibria structures may be welfare maximizing. 13
15 Figure 1: Equilibrium structure depends on the value of γ. The quantity γ (n) is defined implicitly. In particular, γ < γ (n) ( π H (n+1)h π L (n+1)l < u l(τ l ) y l u l (τ h ) y l (4) which is important in the following analyses. Before turning to a detailed construction of this result, note that the money transferred to each district will always be relatively equal. In the representative equilibrium, transfers are equal because γ = 0. In the unrepresentative equilibrium, all districts elect high types, leading to equal transfers. In the somewhat representative equilibria, transfers may be unequal, but they will be similar, as these equilibria only obtain for low values of γ, which is when high types have the smallest advantage in negotiating transfers for their districts. 4 Example: Three Districts To elucidate the central role that negotiating ability plays in our results, and build the intuition behind Proposition 1, we first examine the case when n = 1, that is, when there are three legislative districts. This example will also allow us to understand the case when tax preferences and negotiating ability may be imperfectly correlated. 4.1 Representative Equilibrium 14
16 When γ = 0, then (3) simplifies to π 3L = π2l L = πh 2L = πl 2H = πh 2H = π 3H = 1/3. That is, no matter what type of legislator a district elects, it will receive the exact same amount of the tax revenue. Thus, the median voter of each district will focus on the effect that her legislator will have on the tax rate. As such, median voters choose to elect someone who favors exactly the same tax rate that they do. The more interesting cases are the stage-strong equilibria when γ > 0. As the equilibria we consider are subgame perfect, we can solve for them using backwards induction. 4.2 Building the Central Result with Imperfect Discipline When γ > 0 there is the potential for redistribution not just between rich and poor, but also between districts. This changes incentives, especially for low-type median voters. If both of the other districts are electing a high type, a low-type median voter will want to elect a high type as well, leading to the first equilibrium in Part 2 of Proposition 1. However, this equilibrium is not stage strong. Specifically, if two districts with low-type median voters deviated to elect low-type legislators, these districts would be strictly better off. When γ < γ (n) holds, this deviation is also an equilibrium, and it is stage strong. However, when γ > γ (n), then this cannot be sustained as an equilibrium, as each low-type median voter is made strictly better off by electing a high type, no matter who the other median voter elects The Legislative Stages The outcome of the distributive stage is determined by the types of the three legislators, according to (3). As we focus on subgame perfect equilibria, the legislators will take this expected distribution into account when voting on the tax rate. If the legislature is composed either entirely of high types or entirely of low types, then all three districts will receive the same proportion of tax revenue π j = 1/3 for all j. Thus, τ3l = τ l, and τ 3H = τ h, which are the ideal tax rates of high- and low-type citizens, respectively. The legislative majority could also consist of two low types or two high types, which leads to two other potential values of 15
17 Table 1: Median Voter Incentives If the other two A low-type median voter A high-type median voter districts elect will want to elect a will want to elect a Two low types: high type high type A low type and a high type: ( π H 2H π L 2L low type if: u l (τ l ) y l u l (τh ) y, (5) high type l otherwise, a high type Two high types: high type high type the tax rate in equilibrium, τ 2L (3π L 2L τ l and τ 2H (3π H 2H τ h, (5) respectively. Note that as π H 2H > πh 3H = 1 3, τ 2H > τ h, and as πl 2L < πl 3L = 1 3, τ 2L < τ l. Thus, in equilibrium, τ l < τ 2L < τ 2H < τ h The Election Stage The utility of a median voter in a given district will depend on the types of the legislators elected from all three districts (see (3) and (5)). It is thus useful to examine what type of legislator a median voter would want to elect given the types of legislators elected from the other two districts. As, in equilibrium, a voter s beliefs about the types of the legislators elected by other districts must be correct, these preferences will shape the median voter s vote choice. The preferences of median voters, conditional on the types elected in other districts, are 16
18 summarized in Table 1. A high-type median voter will always want to elect a high type, as, from her perspective, there is no strategic delegation problem. A low-type median voter will also want to elect a high-type legislator whenever the other two legislative districts both elect high types or both elect low types, as the median voter s choice will not affect tax rates much, and they will get a larger portion of tax revenue. The crucial conflict occurs when a low-type median voter is pivotal in determining the majority type in the legislature. In this case, she must weigh the benefits of a high type s ability to direct resources to her district the left-hand side of (5) against the cost of allowing high types to set the tax rate the right-hand side of (5). This inequality is the same as (4) for n = 1, and is crucial in understanding the unrepresentative equilibrium. When it fails to hold, a low-type median voter will not want to elect a low-type legislator, even when she knows her choice will be pivotal in determining the majority type in the legislature. Thus, two districts with low-type median voters are in a prisoner s dilemma: they cannot commit to each other to both elect low types even if one followed through, the other would be strictly better off electing a high type. 4.3 Imperfect Correlation between Types There are, of course, politicians who are successful in the private sector, but favor high taxes. Allowing for positive but imperfect correlation between tax preferences and legislative ability can be easily incorporated in our model as long as we maintain our assumption that the only signal of a citizen s type is his or her success. In this case, there is little effect on our results, and the existence of such a correlation may make unrepresentative equilibria hold for a wider range of parameter values that is, it may lower γ (n). In particular, consider the case where success in the private sector is a perfect signal of a citizen s ability to direct resources to his district, but an imperfect signal of his tax preferences. That is, with probability 1 q < 1/2 a high-type citizen will vote for tax rates as if he had low income, y l. This means that ability to direct funds to one s district and tax preferences are imperfectly correlated (with a correlation proportional to q), and there is a 17
19 single signal of both dimensions of a citizen s type. ( π H 2H When private-sector success is imperfectly correlated with tax preferences, (4) becomes: π L 2L ( π H 2H π L 2L u l (τ l ) y l q 2 u l (τ h ) + (1 q)2 u l (τ l ) + 2q(1 q)u l u l (τ l ) y l q(2 q)u l (τ h ) + (1 q)2 u l (τ l ) y l ( τ l ((1 γ)+γη ) y l when γ is low when γ is high. The difference in expressions is due to the fact that when two districts elect high types, as γ grows, the identity of the median voter changes from a low type to a high type. Proposition 2. γ (n) is increasing in q. That is, the higher the correlation between the different dimensions of a citizen s type, the broader the range of parameters for which a somewhat unrepresentative equilibrium occurs. To see why, note that the denominator of the right-hand side is larger when private sector success is an imperfect signal of tax preferences. Intuitively, the cost to a low-type median voter of electing a high type is reduced because the high type might share the low type s preferences for redistribution The Common Pool As pointed out in the introduction, a central question in the literature on fiscal policy is how taxing and spending evolve as the size of the legislature grows. In this respect, our model delivers an anti-common pool result, which appears to be consistent with a number of empirical findings. 18 To establish this, we examine how taxing and spending evolve as n, and thus the size of the legislature, grows. The main mechanism at work here is that as n 17 Note that the probability that these high types with preferences for large amounts of redistribution will be numerous enough to affect the tax rate (that is, a majority of the legislators) will be less in larger legislatures. Moreover, as the legislature grows, the number of high types in the somewhat representative equilibria may be a super-majority, without composing the entire legislature, as the biggest change in utility between electing a high and a low type may occur in a district other than the median. This complexity accounts for the fact that we chose to display this result, which holds in general, for the case of n = See the review in Primo and Snyder (2008). 18
20 grows, the effect of a legislator s ability to negotiate resources for his district is relatively constant, while his effect on tax policy shrinks. As such, low types want to elect high-type legislators even if γ is relatively low. Recall that there are z n high-type median voters. These voters will always elect a high-type legislator. Thus, when (4) holds, n z low-type median voters will elect high-type legislators. This makes the remaining n + 1 low-type median voters pivotal, so they will prefer to elect a low-type legislator. On the other-hand, if (4) does not hold, then low-type median voters always wish to elect high-type legislators, no matter who is elected in every other district. As electing a low-type legislator is strictly dominated, the unique equilibrium will be for every district to elect a high-type legislator. To understand how (4) depends on n, note that the right-hand side can be reduced to η 1 () η α, which is constant in n. However, the left-hand side is increasing in n. Thus, holding γ > 0 constant, as n grows there is a point where the equilibrium switches from a somewhat representative equilibrium to the unrepresentative equilibrium. Defining τ n as the tax rate implemented when there are 2n + 1 legislators, the next result makes this point precise: Proposition γ (n) is decreasing in n. As n, γ (n) κ(η, α), where κ(η, α) (0, 1). 2. τ n is decreasing in n. 19 There are two reasons that taxes decrease when n increases. First, the tax rate in a somewhat representative equilibrium is ((2n + 1)π L (n+1)l τ l. This is decreasing in n, due to the fact that as n increases, closer and closer to 50% of the districts are represented by high types. Thus, if γ < κ(η, α) then the tax rate be will continually decreasing as n grows. On the other hand, if γ > κ(η, α) then at some n the tax rate will drop from τ (n+1)l > τ h 19 This is due, in part, to the way we have modeled the utility of government spending: the functional form implies spending is on local public goods. Thus, as districts become smaller, the effectiveness of this spending goes down (see, for example, the expression for τl in (2)). Appendix B.5 shows the result still holds when using a slightly different citizen utility function that does not have this feature. 19
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March 8, 2010
Colour boost
It's a fun little exercise if you want/need to get ideas for colour combinations that maybe you wouldn't normally pick yourself. And you know me, I tend to gravitate towards happy colours, but that doesn't mean that I don't like other colours/combinations.
So it is also a very useful exercise to get you out of your colour rut! And maybe even more useful if you remember to take a picture of the picture/magazine page/whatever that inspired the colour combination... ;-)
I have a few posts like this coming in the near future. I'd love to see the results if anyone else tries this.
Subscribe to: Post Comments (Atom)


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Guess what we did yesterday...
Went to the Wiggles concert! Yes we took a 2 year old to a concert. And yes Brad and I both went to a children's concert. But you have to understand, Wiggles have come right up to tie for first place with Blue's Clues. The kid just LOVES them. So when the Wiggles came to Lethbridge how could we not go. For about half the concert he just sat in awe - totally shocked that the Wiggles were there. He would just point and stare. So funny!
But we got lots of smiles too. Especailly when Wags or Dorothy or Captain came out. And I am too stupid to know how to put up a video - and too lazy to learn. So you will just have to take my word for it that there was some crazy dancing going on as well! Ended off with one of Ro's favs, Hot Potato! And man oh man did he dance his heart out!
Here is the cheese face with his feather sword. I know I know, but at least it's not a hat or t-shirt. It kept him very entertained until the concert started and all the way home. So worth it.
I was thinking to myself on the way home, how do you know you are a parent? You know you are a parent when you are more excited to take your kid to the Wiggles concert than you were to see Pearl Jam in Las Vegas! Lots of fun had by our little family.
Kitchen table + fitted sheet = best fort ever!
The fitted sheet works so much better than anything else, stays in place so good. A great lunch was had by all in our fort. Lots of crumbs on the ground and a smashed strawberry on the sheet were so worth it for all the smiles and laughing I got.
4 months ago


text: Our Crab Apple Tree Flowering - 2013 Get link Facebook Twitter Pinterest Google+ Email Other Apps Posted by Jake Parrillo on May 15, 2013 For but one week each Spring, the Crab Apple tree in our backyard turns into a spectacular pink beauty. It gets covered with these flowers and really shows off. Unfortunately, the show isn't very long and the petals fall into the landscape beds and the tree leafs out. When we moved in, I wanted to take the tree down, but Nat pushed back. She really likes the size/shape of the tree while I hate the location. It is still standing. And isn't going anywhere. backyard daily landscape trees Get link Facebook Twitter Pinterest Google+ Email Other Apps


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The fast food industry in the us was meant to be a starter employer for college students not a full time career! By increasing the wages we encourage an ever increasing number of uneducated and unmotivated individuals to use these positions as their chosen career whilst robbing college students the opportunity to gain valuable work experience and much need funds!
Why should we be forced to pay more in prices and wages just because they were too lazy to focus and study at school? Anyone in this country can get an education if they so desire!


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Offering bed and breakfast accommodation.
The Edwardian Lodge is situated on the Castle Road, Salisbury, (also the A345) about 1/2 mile north of the city centre, and market square; about a 10-15 minute walk either via Castle Road, and Castle Street, or along the footpath/cycle way of The River Avon. The Cathedral is a further 5 minute walk from the centre.
The Guest House dates from 1902, has been beautifully refurbished and decorated preserving original features. More recently some careful restoration work has enhanced the exterior appearance.
The bedrooms all have their own private bathroom facilities, centrally heated and double glazed. Breakfast at the guest house is served in a spacious conservatory overlooking the rear garden of the lodge. Free parking is available for our guests.
We operate a totally Non-Smoking policy at the guest house, which we ask the guests to respect.


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Visit national vacation rental-by-owner sites HomeAway.com, FlipKey.com or VRBO.com to view detailed information about individual vacation rentals in Lake Havasu City, Arizona. Alternatively, contact local rental companies that manage vacation rentals in the area, such as Destination Havasu and Integrity Arizona Real Estate, to view information about available properties.
HomeAway.com, FlipKey.com and VRBO.com list more than 400 vacation rental properties in Lake Havasu City, ranging from studios and condos that sleep two people to six-bedroom homes that can sleep up to 22 people. Search for properties by the number of bedrooms and price range and apply filters to search for features such as waterfront locations or child-friendly destinations. Click a property listing to view additional information, including photographs, location map, amenities, guest reviews and owner contact details. DestinationHavasu.com and RentHavasu.com also provide photos of each rental property along with information about amenities.


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Proposal submitted by U.S. Senator Sam Brownback calls on international community and Arab countries to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital, states 'Jerusalem not mentioned in Koran'
A U.S. senator drafted a bill demanding the recognition of Jerusalem as the unified and indivisible capital of Israel before any recognition of an independent Palestinian state.
The proposal, which was submitted by Senator Sam Brownback (Republican – Kansas), also calls on the international community and Arab countries to acknowledge Jerusalem as Israel's capital in exchange for considering the possibility of permitting the establishment of a Palestinian state.
"180 days prior to the recognition of a Palestinian state, the U.S. would move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem," the proposal states. "Jerusalem is where the Israeli government, president, parliament, and High Court of Justice are situated."
According to the bill, Jerusalem is not mentioned in the Koran and was never the capital of any other nation.
"Jerusalem is essential in Judaism, it is mentioned in the bible 766 times," the proposal states.
Threat to national security
Brownback, a devout Catholic, is considered an avid supporter of Israel. He submitted the proposal also on the behalf of fellow Republican Senators Michael Crapo (Idaho) and Gordon Smith (Oregon).
The fact that solely Republicans signed the proposal does not bode well for its approval or implementation.
U.S. President's Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have refused to carry out a Congress resolution from the mid 1990s that called to move the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, as they believe it would have a negative affect on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
The Americans continue to delay the embassy's move on account of what they claim are threats to national security.


text:
A cat has saved a young boy from a vicious dog attack in a spectacular fight caught on surveillance video.
The boy is making his way up a driveway on a toddler's balance bicycle, struggling with each step, when a local dog–with no owner in sight–spots the child, rounds a car in the driveway, and attacks the child viciously.
As the dog drags the child by the leg to the lawn, a cat appears from the top of the driveway, sprints to the scene and pounces on the dog, who immediately runs away. The cat is followed soon afterward by the boy's mother.
The video, spliced together from security camera footage and dated May 13, was uploaded to YouTube on May 14 by the boy's father, Roger Triantafilo. It was also presented by KERO, the ABC News affiliate in Bakersfield, CA, and featured on CNN. A report by KERO indicates that the child is fine, aside from a few stitches.


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A Star Is Born - Always Remember Us This Way
This ones for my love, MR. It was one of my favorite songs from a Star is Born. I haven't been this moved by a film in a long time, and now I can't stop listening to the soundtrack. I was so inspired by the music and Lady Gaga's interpretation, I had to record it. Did you guys watch the movie? Are you as obsessed as I am? Lol
Thank you for watching! Comment below what you'd like to see next.
#astarisborn #cover #ladygaga #always
Follow me on my other socials:
Snapchat & Twitter: @mseliamaria


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|"Pascal Parraud (Updated) (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
|[jira] [Updated] (MATH-695) Incomplete reinitialization with some events handling
|Tue, 25 Oct 2011 16:58:32 GMT
[ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MATH-695?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel ] Pascal Parraud updated MATH-695: -------------------------------- Attachment: events.patch this patch resolves my problem but breaks some unit tests. > Incomplete reinitialization with some events handling > ----------------------------------------------------- > > Key: MATH-695 > URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MATH-695 > Project: Commons Math > Issue Type: Bug > Affects Versions: 3.0 > Reporter: Pascal Parraud > Attachments: events.patch > > > I get a bug with event handling: I track 2 events that occur in the same step, when the first one is accepted, it resets the state but the reinitialization is not complete and the second one becomes unable to find its way. > I can't give my context, which is rather large, but I tried a patch that works for me, unfortunately it breaks the unit tests. -- This message is automatically generated by JIRA. If you think it was sent incorrectly, please contact your JIRA administrators: https://issues.apache.org/jira/secure/ContactAdministrators!default.jspa For more information on JIRA, see: http://www.atlassian.com/software/jira
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WESTFIELD, N.J. - (January 28, 2013) - For the 26th consecutive year, the Westfield East office of Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage hosted an annual holiday toy drive at its 209 Central Avenue office to benefit local families in need through Family and Children's Services, a non-profit behavioral health and social service agency serving Union county and its surroundings. Pictured are Kathy Shea (center), a sales associate from the Westfield East office who participated in the toy drive and Maria Roman (left) and Cheramy Brown (right) from Family and Children's Services.
Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage in New Jersey and Rockland County, New York, a leading residential real estate brokerage company, operates 58 offices with more than 3,000 sales associates serving all communities from Rockland County, N.Y. to Monmouth County, New Jersey. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage in New Jersey and Rockland County, N.Y. is part of NRT LLC, the nation's largest residential real estate brokerage company. Visit ColdwellBankerMoves.com for more information.


text: Why doesn't anyone ever race the F1 car in the US times? I can find races on Sunday usually in the morning maybe in the afternoon as well, however the rest of the week forget it. There isn't ever a single person that I have seen even in que. This car is rockin and I wish it was more active.


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Books by I.D. Blind
4 comments:
i cant wait for the fourth book for witch hollow to come out !!!! that was an awesome cliff hanger you put in the end of the third bookReplyDelete
! i kind of figured it out though when dickens was smelling her hair......... but still! cant wait!
Wow, Tegan, you have guessed it really early. You're an attentive reader :)ReplyDelete
I am working on the 4th book right now and plan to publish it in February, 2014.
Thank you for your comment; I love hearing from my readers.
Happy New Year!
Just finished Witch Hollow and the Wrong Spell. Read volume 2, Witch Hollow and the Fountain Riddle, enjoyed it and went looking for volume 1, which happily was still free. Enjoyed it too and am planning on buying volumes 3 & 4 in a few weeks, the budget is tight. Read your blog and was surprised that you are not a native speaker. Thought about it and remembered a few places where idioms might have been used if you were a native speaker, but they were not necessary. It is not easy to write with idioms, I read current books written and published in the UK and when they use some idioms I have no idea what they mean, I have to guess from the context. Your books have a nice flavor. They are not the usual formula with the usual drop in dialogue. You stated a YA readership but the vocabulary and dialogue were not limited to the ages of the characters and younger allowing older readers to enjoy them too. I am a 64 year-old grandma. The books are well constructed; the story moves along well and does not bog down as many books by newer authors do. I will enjoy seeing the changes in your writing as you gain experience. I will be ready for volume 5 soon. Any idea on a release date? Thanks for the enjoyable books. Judy - Kansas, USA.ReplyDeleteReplies
Judy, thank you so much for your beautiful message. It means the world to me.Delete
If you still haven't bought the 3rd and 4th books, then don't. I will happily send them to you as gifts.
You have noted right, I still have a lot to learn. I'm not writing Witch Hollow series to earn money (though I need money as much as any other person), but to learn to write in English and gain experience. Just drop me and email at firstname.lastname@example.com and I will send you the books. I'd love to hear your thoughts on the sequels and whether my writing has improved with the latest books.
I am working on the last part now and plan to publish it at the end of winter.
With love,


text: At 01:51 PM 1/7/99 +1100, Damon Atkins wrote: >In OpenLDAP you have added SHA1 I would like to see this replaced with >Interleaved SHA You are welcomed to submit patches. You might also review IETF-LDAPext (http://www.ietf.org/) discussions/drafts on authentication, in particular concerning mandatory SASL methods. SRP might be a suitable alternative to CRAM-MD5. Kurt