text:
Northumberland Strait - western half
Marine Forecast
Issued 03:00 AM AST 11 December 2018
Today Tonight and Wednesday.
Wind northwest 20 to 25 knots diminishing to northwest 15 early this morning then backing to southwest 15 to 20 near noon. Wind diminishing to light near midnight then increasing to north 20 Wednesday morning. Wind increasing to north 30 Wednesday afternoon.
Flurries ending near midnight. Periods of snow beginning overnight. Visibility 1 mile or less in precipitation.
Freezing spray warning in effect.
Risk of freezing spray this morning. Freezing spray beginning Wednesday afternoon.
Temperatures near minus 6.
Extended Forecast
Ice Forecast
Stay connected
Weather Conditions
Zoom-in to make a selection
Ice Conditions
Ice ForecastsIssued 10:00 AM EST 10 December 2018 Today Tonight and Tuesday
Ice EdgeFirst ice edge estimated from Nova Scotia near 4545N 6210W to 4630N
6150W to 4705N 6400W to 4850N 6350W to 4925N 6515W to 4910N 6700W to
4955N 6605W to 4845N 6155W to 5115N 5740W to Newfoundland near 5040N
5715W. Sea ice west and north of the ice edge.
Second ice edge estimated from 4700N 6155W to 4715N 6220W to 4750N
6130W to 4735N 6105W to 4700N 6155W. Sea ice within the ice edge.
Ice Coverage
Ice free except 7 tenths new ice including 2 tenths grey ice along
parts of the coasts.
Warnings (In effect)
Freezing spray warning in effect
Northumberland Strait - western halfIssued 03:00 AM AST 11 December 2018
Moderate or severe freezing spray is occurring or expected to occur in this marine area. Please refer to the latest marine forecasts for further details and continue to monitor the situation through Canadian Coast Guard radio or Weatheradio stations.
Technical Marine SynopsisIssued 3:00 AM AST 11 December 2018 Today Tonight and Wednesday At 3:00 a.m. AST today trough located on a line northeast-southwest
over Cabot Strait.
By 3:30 p.m. AST today departing trough located on a line
northeast-southwest over the Grand Banks.
At 8:00 p.m. AST tonight intensifying low 998 mb located southwest
of Georges Bank.
By 8:00 p.m. AST Wednesday departing low 955 mb located over the
southeastern Grand Banks.
At 3:00 a.m. AST today ridge from 1025 mb high located on a line
northwest-southeast over Maine.
By 3:30 p.m. AST today ridge from 1022 mb high located on a line
northwest-southeast over East Scotian Slope.
Marine Weather StatementIssued 2:55 AM AST 11 December 2018 A trough of low pressure near the Cabot Strait will move south to
Banquereau this morning before moving east of forecast waters. Strong
to gale force northwesterlies prevail near the trough over eastern
waters tonight into this morning. The cold northwesterlies will also
give freezing spray to much of the northern marine district into this
An intensifying low pressure system southwest of Georges Bank
Tonight will move to lie near Laurentian Fan Wednesday morning.
This will give strong to gale force north to northeasterlies to slope
waters which will increase to gale to storm force northerlies for
easternmost waters. Again, cold northerlies developing behind the low
will give freezing spray to parts of the north and western marine
Marine interests are advised that a storm warning is in effect for
Laurentian Fan. Gale warnings are in effect for East Scotian Slope,
Fourchu, Banquereau, Cabot Strait, Northumberland Strait-eastern half
and Gulf-Magdalen eastern half.
In addition, freezing spray warnings are in effect for Fundy, Grand
Manan, Lurcher, Northumberland Strait, Gulf-Magdalen, Chaleur-Miscou
and Anticosti.
Atlantic - Newfoundland Area
- Anticosti - eastern half
- Anticosti - western half
- Banquereau - northwestern half
- Banquereau - southeastern half
- Belle Isle Bank
- Bras d'Or Lakes
- Cabot Strait
- Chaleur - Miscou - eastern half
- Chaleur - Miscou - western half
- Eastern Shore - eastern half
- East Coast - Cape St. Francis and south
- East Coast - north of Cape St. Francis
- Fourchu
- Funk Island Bank
- Gulf - Magdalen - eastern half
- Gulf - Magdalen - western half
- Gulf - Port au Port
- Lake Melville
- Laurentian Fan - northeastern half
- Mid Labrador Coast
- Northeast Coast
- Northeast Gulf
- Northern Grand Banks
- Northumberland Strait - eastern half
- Northumberland Strait - western half
- Sable - eastern half
- Southeastern Grand Banks
- Southwestern Grand Banks
- Southwest Coast
- South Coast
- South Labrador Coast
- South Labrador Sea
- Strait of Belle Isle
Another Region
- Arctic - Eastern Arctic
- Arctic - Western Arctic
- Atlantic - Labrador
- Atlantic - Maritimes
- Atlantic - Newfoundland
- Great Lakes - Lake Erie and Lake Ontario
- Great Lakes - Lake Huron
- Great Lakes - Lake Superior
What we are doing
Weather Forecasts
Weather Alerts
Weather Resources
- Date modified:


text:
These Kasuti patterns are made using the Neygi and Menthi stitches. These patterns can be printed on A4 sheets to be used for practice.
kasuti patterns 2
Created by sarah on 13 Sep 2011
14 Responses to "kasuti patterns 2"
HI sarah
your website is excellent and very imformative.
Hi sarah,
your website is very useful, excellent and widely informative…..
Hi sarah,
I love your website its a delight for beginners.Your pictures of stitches are very clear & easy to understand.love the way u teach stitches step by step.
Hi sarah, ur website veri usefull. iam fasion designing student this is very helpful my studing
hi sarah , ur website is very useful as im faculty
(fashion design) in inifd (vapi)-gujarat , our stunds have vast syllabus in designing as they r frm annamalia unversity. so v need to teach them all the countries emb.n ur site is ossam for us.thanks
I found your website last night and I love it. There are stitches I heard about for the first time. A lot of stitching and learning is waiting for me. Thank you very much.
May I just say that the Neygi pattern n°2 in high resolution is the same than the n°1?
Have a nice sunday Sarah :-))
thank u so much for such a wonderful web. this is very helpful. i liked the designs very much.
Hi sarah
Plz upload tutorials for kutch work…waiting
to learn that from you for a long time…
Hi sarah
Plz upload tutorials for kutch work…waiting
to learn that from you for a long time…I have asked you about this earlier also
Hi Sarah,
Your website is very informative. Do you know of anyone who does this embroidery on a professional level?
This blog has been of great help to me. Could you clarify how to proceed on to the next line for the menthi stitch if we are doing a sparrow motif ? We get running stitches on the backside right?
so so so beautiful 🙂

subset: commoncrawl


text:
0 Members and 1 Guest are viewing this topic.
"Bernanke admitted at the University of Chicago birthday bash for Milton Friedman that the Great Depression was engineered - Fed Contracted the money supply..."
The Constitution originally had federal Senators chosen by the legislature of the state government that the Senator was to represent. In 1913 state governments lost that "protection".
Senators Elected by State LegislaturesBy Spencer, for the Omaha World Herald, 1912 Reproduced from Robert C. Byrd, The Senate, 17891989In 1913 the Seventeenth Amendment officially became a part of the U.S. Constitution, providing for the direct popular election of senators. This was a major departure from the plan adopted by the framers in 1787. According to Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution, "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state, chosen by the legislature thereof for six Years." The framers believed that in electing senators, state legislatures would cement their ties with the national government. They also expected that senators elected by state legislatures would be freed from pressures of public opinion and therefore better able to concentrate on legislative business and serve the needs of each state. In essence, senators would serve as "states' ambassadors" to the federal government. Unfortunately, problems with this system soon arose, particularly when state legislators failed to agree on a Senate candidate, causing frequent Senate vacancies. By 1826 proposals for direct election of senators began appearing, but it took reformers nearly a century to achieve this constitutional change.
1776.I might get shit for saying that, but I really think that the "new world order" has been running the show since (at least) the Greek and Roman Empires. Same bloodline families, same systems of slavery, same identifiable groups (minorities, women, etc.), being consistently screwed over, same military/psychological-operations tactics, and similar (predecessor) secret societies that grew from the same root. I understand that the "revolution" did not have the support of the majority. How, then, was it able to defeat the immense force of the British military, including their formidable naval force? Official history offers implausible excuses, and others might say that they received help from higher powers. I, personally, feel that the "revolution" was sponsored by the Crown. Really, the "revolutionaries" were represented by wealthy men, many of whom were, like the elite of England, both slave owners and supporters of the system of patriarchy. Many of them were also members of the Masons or other strange, dark secret societies (like the Hellfire Club) that are a part of the same network that continues to run the world today. Is it simply a coincidence that the American "Empire" began to rise (circa 1917) two years just as the British Imperial Century came to a close (1914)? Or that the Eastern Roman Empire fell circa 1453 AD while the British Empire began to rise around 1497 AD? Perhaps the "collapse of America" is now being engineered so that the Chinese Empire can rise soon afterward! Behind them all, we find the same hidden hand. It is thoroughly documented fact that virtually every president in history (including the founding fathers) came from royal European bloodlines. Some (such as Thomas Jefferson) opposed the agenda openly, but supported it in a covert manner. This is simply more of what would later come to be known as the Hegelian dialectic. From what I understand:The motivation for the "revolution" was provided by King George III. It was heavy taxes. These were caused by the fact that the British Empire needed to pay the elite banking cartels, who were owed a lot of $$$ after they (like always) made massive loans to both sides during the Seven Year War between Britain and France. What caused this war? Well, George Washington (a Freemason since the age of 23), who led an unprovoked massacre of French soldiers while serving in the colonial army. If this is true, then we see that the same entity who would later become the face of the "revolution" and the founding of the United States was also ultimately the same military operative who commanded the massacre that ultimately brought on the conditions leading to the "revolution." Is this coincidence or is it the Hegelian manipulation we have all come to know and hate?
The same goes for another Clinton (thank god he only had one child and a female), Obama (thank god his kids are young and female).
Hello my question is. What year did the New World Order take over the United States of America ? I respect the Founding Fathers and the US Constitution and the Heroes of the American Revolution. My question is since the Government created by the Founding Fathers started out good when did the bad guys the Illuminati the Bankers take control of the American Government is there a year anyone can give what President sold us out who was the first President or Politicans who sold America out thank you ?The U.S. is a "British" Financial Colony By Henry Makow Ph.D.THE "CROWN"British bankers took over the U.S. during the Teddy Roosevelt Administration (1901-1909) when Rothschild front J.P. Morgan alone controlled 25% of American business. http://philadelphians.50megs.com/US-british.html
Page created in 0.06 seconds with 21 queries.


text:
Vendors usually fall into two different classes: the tick who is easily removed from the skin and the four foot tapeworm that is so far up my ass that I don't think I will ever get rid of them. Well I guess now it's time to add in a new class of vendor, The Flood. No I don't mean the parasitic species that almost ruined the entire Halo video game franchise or that shitty Jars of Clay song, I mean the vendors that are constantly flooding my inbox.
Listen I know we all get the random emails offering this new product or that fantastic service, but this is different. A few months back I talked to a vendor rep who represents a smaller biotech company because I was looking for a chemical inhibitor to an enzyme of interest to test for sensitivity using a particular assay. The rep said they would email me back with what her company had and damn if she didn't.
Now I really only wanted the chemical inhibitor to test on my specific genetic background but she tried to sell me the following:
-a cell line knocked down for the protein I wanted to inhibit
-purified recombinant protein
-a cell line over expressing the protein
-a completely different assay even though I stated upfront that I already had an assay
Guess what was the one product she didn't email me about? The damn chemical inhibitor! What makes it worse is that she had a back and forth discussion over products and what I might be able to use with a product scientist at the company. And she carbon copied myself AND my PI on all of them.
Now I love to know the inner workings of places but seriously in just an hour my inbox had over 25 email exchanges between the rep and the product scientist. I listed the emails as spam, they kept coming. Listed them as junk and they kept coming. I was thinking of sliding our IT folks some money on the sneak tip to block them at the mail server level if possible.
Then I just broke down and emailed them to stop emailing me and I'll find what I need in their catalog.
Four hours later I got an email saying maybe this assay might be good to try.
I think I'm going to have a rage induced stroke.


text:
Dictators are ruthless, power hungry people who will kill their own people for political gain. Just think what a world we would live in if Hitler, Hussein and Stalin were assassinated just as they gained power? Tens of millions of people would be alive today had those dictators been assassinated. Yes, a power vacuum would ensue after the assassination. However, bad men beget a bad end.
People can justify anything the choose to justify. People justify cheating on their spouse because they do not get attention at home. People justify lying to avoid conflict. People justify stealing because they want something yet they are unable or unwilling to pay for it. How is assassination of a dictator any different? It can be justified when a nation lives differently than another nation wants them to. Does that make it right? Some will say yes and some will say no but it will always be justified by some.
I believe assassinating a dictator is completely justified, if the dictator himself is viciously murdering his own people in highly brutal and horror acts. Sometimes these situations must happen in order to keep the innocent from living. If there is great evidence of his actions, where he refuses to surrender then he deserves to be put to death.


text:
Malaysia moved closer to clearing up the financial fallout of its 1MDB scandal on Monday by resolving a debt dispute with Abu Dhabi, bolstering Prime Minister Najib Razak ahead of elections.
The Malaysian state fund defaulted on its bonds a year ago, sparking a dispute with AbuDhabi's International Petroleum Investment Co (IPIC), which asked a London court to arbitrate over a claim totalling some $6.5 billion.
1MDB, once a pet project of its founder Najib, is the subject of money-laundering investigations in at least six countries, including Switzerland and Singapore.
1MDB has denied any wrongdoing and Najib, whose office did not immediately respond to a request for comment, has denied all allegations of corruption against him.
The Abu Dhabi deal, under which 1MDB will pay $1.2 billion in two instalments to IPIC, comes at a critical time for Najib, who has to call elections before August 2018. He is fighting to reverse dismal 2013 polls, when his party nearly lost power.
IPIC had guaranteed bonds issued by 1MDB, the two companies said in separate statements, but now 1MDB and Malaysia's Ministry of Finance will assume responsibility for all future interest and principal payments under two bonds issued by 1MDB Group companies, IPIC said in a filing in London.
These include the $1.75 billion 5.75 percent fixed rate notes due 2022 and $1.75 billion fixed rate 5.99 percent notes due 2022, both issued by 1MDB entities.
1MDB said payments will be made to IPIC by monetizing investment fund units.
A source aware of the discussions said both parties will continue talks until December 2020 over $3.5 billion linked to the two bonds, and no legal action will be pursued.
The agreement is conditional on the Arbitration Tribunal in London making a "consent award" by May 31.
The settlement is the first major step towards addressing IPIC's claims, which included $3.5 billion in bonds, plus interest amounting to $4.8 billion, a $1.2 billion loan plus interest, and about $481 million owed to IPIC's subsidiary Aabar, a source who asked not to be named told Reuters.
"Both sides had an interest in avoiding (an) arbitration hearing and that is what has happened," Christian de Guzman, a Singapore-based senior credit officer at Moody's Investors Service said, adding that "contingent risks" remain for both sides until the 1MDB bonds are fully settled


text:
Breaking the Bonds between Al-Qa ida and Its Affiliate Organizations
- Elfreda Merritt
- 3 years ago
- Views:
1 ANALYSIS PAPER Number 27, August 2012 Breaking the Bonds between Al-Qa ida and Its Affiliate Organizations Daniel L. Byman
2 ANALYSIS PAPER Number 27, August 2012 Breaking the Bonds between AL-Qa ida and Its Affiliate Organizations Daniel L. Byman
3 The Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars. Copyright Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C
4 Table of Contents Executive Summary...iv The Author....viii Introduction... 1 The Jihadist Universe Degrees of Affiliation Motivations to the Affiliate for Joining Motivations for the Al-Qa ida Core The Decision Not to Affiliate Strains in the Affiliate-Core Relationship Implications for Fighting Al-Qa ida Affiliates iii
5 Executive Summary Al-Qa ida seems to be on its heels. The death of Osama bin Laden and the fall of Arab dictators have left its leadership in disarray, its narrative confused, and the organization on the defensive. One silver lining for al-qaida, however, has been its affiliate organizations. In Iraq, the Maghreb, Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere, al- Qa ida has used local groups to expand its reach, increase its power, and grow its numbers. This string of mergers is not over. In places as diverse as the Sinai Peninsula and Nigeria, al-qa ida-linked organizations are emerging. However, the jihadist world is more fractured than it may appear at first glance. Many Salafi-jihadist groups have not joined with al-qa ida, and even if they have, tensions and divisions occur that present the United States and its allies with opportunities for weakening the bond. Al Qa ida and Its Affiliates Al-Qa ida has always been both a group with its own agenda and a facilitator of other terrorist groups. This meant that it not only carried out attacks on U.S. targets in Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen throughout the 1990s, but it helped other jihadist groups with funding, training, and additional logistical essentials. Toward the end of the 1990s, al- Qa ida incorporated Egyptian Islamic Jihad into its structure. After September 11, 2001, this process of deepening its relationship with outside groups took off, and today a number of regional groups bear the label al-qa ida in their name, along with a more local designation. Some of the most prominent affiliates include al-qa ida of Iraq (AQI),al-Qa ida of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-qa ida of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Shebaab in Somalia. Yet, at the same time, several Salafi-jihadist groups chose not to affiliate with al-qa ida, including Egypt s Gamaat al-islamiyya and Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), and fighters in Chechnya, Gaza, and Pakistan maintained their distance as well. Motivations to the Affiliate for Joining There are a number of reasons why a group may choose to affiliate with al-qa ida, some practical, some ideological, and some personal: Failure. Setback often motivates a group to link with al-qa ida. Groups have joined with the core after losing recruits and popular support and otherwise seeing their original goals frustrated. Money. For much of its history, al-qa ida was flush with cash, which made it an attractive partner for other terrorist groups. Aside from direct support, affiliation with, or even an endorsement from, al-qa ida is also a way for groups to attract funding from deep-pocket donors, particularly those in the Gulf. A Haven. One of the most important determinants of a terrorist group s success is whether it has a haven from which to operate. Al-Qa ida ran training camps, operated safe houses, and otherwise established a large infrastructure in support of terror. These facilities were an attractive resource for groups looking for a safe environment. iv
6 Training, Recruiting, Publicity, and Military Experience. Al-Qa ida historically offered impressive training facilities to various jihadist groups an attractive service, particularly for groups with inexperienced personnel and no place to conduct these exercises in their home countries. Common Defense. Because groups share havens, training facilities, and so on with al-qa ida, when these locations are targeted by government forces, the groups join al-qa ida in fighting back. Branding and Publicity. At times, groups may seek to replace their more local brand with that of al-qa ida, believing the latter is more compelling. Al-Qa ida can also help ensure publicity for a group beyond the group s borders. Personal Networks. The fact that jihadists spend time together training or fighting has created numerous overlapping networks. These ties often are an important factor in a group s decision to affiliate. Motivations for the Al-Qa ida Core While there are clear benefits for an affiliate in linking with al-qa ida, there are also rewards for the al-qa ida core: Mission Fulfillment and Reach. Having a diverse array of affiliates helps al-qa ida extend its reach and fulfill its self-image as the leader of the jihadist community. Relevance. Especially since 9/11, al-qa ida has been on the defensive. Today, amid the U.S. drone campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan against the group, the actions of al-qa ida s affiliates can serve as proof of the group s continued strength. Some of the most notorious al-qa ida attacks attempted since 9/11 have in fact been carried out by affiliate groups. Logistics. Beyond the ability to carry out attacks, affiliates offers al-qa ida access to their media resources, recruiters, and other core parts of their organizations. Hardened Fighters. Since its inception, al-qa ida has sought members who are experienced and dedicated. Many of the affiliates who come to al-qa ida do so with just such a cadre. The Decision Not to Affiliate Despite the benefits to joining with al-qa ida, not all Salafi-jihadist groups choose to affiliate with it. The jihadist movement as a whole has a wide range of ideological opinions, some of which are quite rigid. This has meant that al-qa ida and the many Sunni groups that are not pure Salafis have not linked with each other. There are also divisions in the jihadist community because some groups go so far as to take it on themselves to declare others to be unbelievers, which has tremendous consequences for how a group chooses its targets, and on a group s popularity the practice often alienates ordinary Muslims. The divide is even greater between al-qa ida and a non-sunni group like Hizballah, even though the latter would offer formidable capabilities in an alliance. In addition, an ideological divide over issues like targeting civilians has caused a rift among jihadists, partly based on disagreement about the appropriateness of doing so, and partly based on the that fact that jihadists often disagree on the definition of who is a civilian and who is not. Personal issues and even personalities play a role. Although some groups may want to affiliate with al-qa ida, the possibility to do so may be limited because of a lack of personal interaction or due to disputes among leaders. v
7 Local versus global outlooks have also played a role in keeping some groups from linking up with al- Qa ida. Al-Qa ida has a global agenda and global adversaries, whereas most of its affiliates formed to address far more limited objectives. Therefore, while working with al-qa ida may help an affiliate solve problems relating to logistics and branding, it may threaten to change the nature of the struggle. Even if a group shares al-qa ida s goals and ideology, going global brings a host of downsides, particularly the wrath of the United States and other strong powers. This, in turn, might set back a group s chances of achieving its local objectives. The 9/11 attacks were a disaster for many jihadist groups, as the United States came down on them in full force. Strains in the Affiliate-Core Relationship Even if a group makes a decision to affiliate or otherwise move closer to al-qa ida, tensions often arise, or existing ones become exacerbated. Different aims and divergent strategies may create strain in the al-qa ida-affiliate relationship. Because al- Qa ida s affiliates started out with local goals, linking with the al-qa ida core and expanding attacks to global targets can make it harder for a group to achieve its original aims. On the flip side, the core s anti-western brand can become hijacked or contaminated by local struggles. Similarly, since the core is less in tune with local conditions and realities, mistakes at the local level are more likely to occur when the core is calling the shots. Often, local groups have markedly different convictions from al-qa ida, particularly when it comes to nationalism and democracy. Nationalism, in particular, is a two-edged sword for al-qa ida. While some al-qa ida affiliates have at times exploited anti-foreign sentiment, be it in regards to the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq or Ethiopian forces in Somalia, al-qa ida itself has a strongly anti-nationalist bent. Al-Qaida criticizes Muslims who it sees as having excessive devotion to their country, believing nationalism creates a dividing point among the true community Muslims. At the same time, elections, and political opportunities in general, can create a divide between local fighters and foreign fighters attached to jihad. In essence, local populations see elections as a means of gaining power or otherwise defending their community, whereas for the more globally focused jihadists, elections represent a threat to ideological purity. Practical matters like finances often get in the way of the relationship. U.S. and allied pressure on al- Qa ida s finances has reduced the organization s ability to dispense largesse, often to the point where it has sought financial help from affiliates and charged potential recruits for training. Expansion also creates tensions inside and outside the core. As the number of affiliates increases, the overall security of the al-qa ida network decreases. An influx of outsiders creates stresses by challenging al-qa ida s insularity and making it harder to protect itself from possible infiltrators. At the same time, in cases where al-qa ida sends its own operatives and other non-locals to join an affiliate, these foreign fighters may alienate locals through their personal behavior or attempts to alter local traditions. These issues, and others, may not only create tension between the core and its affiliates, they may be cause for like-minded groups or prominent jihadists to publicly condemn al-qa ida something that costs al-qa ida heavily in terms of prestige, and possibly recruitment. Implications for Fighting Al-Qa ida Affiliates It is vital to distinguish between those groups that are full-fledged affiliates and those groups where there is just limited interaction with al-qa ida. By lumping an unaffiliated group with al-qa ida, the vi
8 United States can drive it into Zawahiri s arms. Often only a small portion of an affiliate s organization focuses on Western targets and an even smaller portion focuses on operations against Western targets outside the local theater of operations. In addition, while many members of affiliate groups are combathardened, and some have received al-qa ida training, relatively few are truly elites. It is also important to consider how some Sunni groups that act against U.S. interests can still serve to weaken al-qa ida. With these understandings in mind, the United States and its allies should take a number of steps that capitalize on the differences in interests between al-qa ida on the one hand and its affiliates and local populations on the other. Because members of the global jihadist movement hold markedly different views on theological issues and the nature of the struggle, an information operations campaign can try to widen these gaps, highlighting differences and thus encouraging them. In addition, whenever possible, the foreign nature of al-qa ida should be emphasized. Many of the most important jihadistlinked struggles, such as those in Chechnya, Kashmir, and Iraq, began with a more straightforward nationalist struggle against a perceived foreign invader. And even in cases where the struggle did not begin for nationalistic reasons, such as Somalia and Yemen, nationalism remains high among locals and many within the jihadist community. Because there is also a wedge between the way al- Qa ida and many others in the Muslim world approach the issue of democracy, the United States and its allies should call attention to this, and contrast it with statements by peaceful Salafi leaders in support of elections. the United States and its allies can take. Intelligence services can monitor radicals within diaspora communities and work with law enforcement officials to curtail fundraising for affiliate groups. Washington should also continue to disrupt al-qa ida s financing, which is also a blow to the group s affiliate strategy. If the core s money diminishes, the core will be less likely to be able to attract new affiliates to its banner. Moreover, depriving affiliate groups of revenue often leads them to undertake illicit activities, such as kidnapping and theft as a means to make up the funding shortfall. These actions paint the group as more criminal than heroic, further damaging its brand. It is also important for Washington to understand how actions its takes in the region may influence the al-qa ida-affiliate dynamic. In deciding whether to intervene abroad, for instance, U.S. policymakers should consider, along with other more obvious costs and benefits, how doing so may impact al-qa ida affiliation. Ultimately, there are no simple choices when confronting al-qa ida affiliates. On the one hand, ignoring groups until they become affiliates, or ignoring affiliates until they strike at U.S. targets, risks leaving U.S. intelligence and security officials in a defensive and reactive mode and vulnerable to a surprise attack. On the other hand, too aggressive an approach can create a self-fulfilling prophecy, strengthening bonds between al-qa ida and other jihadist groups by validating the al-qa ida narrative and leading groups to cooperate for self-defense and organizational advancement. So, as with most difficult counterterrorism issues, judgment and prudence are essential. Aside from capitalizing on the differences between the core and its affiliates, there are additional steps vii
9 The Author Daniel L. Byman is Director of Research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. He is also a professor in the Security Studies Program of Georgetown University s School of Foreign Service. His latest book is A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (Oxford, 2011). viii
10 I n t r o d u c t i o n The death of Osama bin Laden and the onset of the Arab Spring hit al-qa ida hard, leaving its leadership in disarray and putting the organization on the defensive. One silver lining for al-qa ida, however, is its affiliate organizations. In Iraq, the Maghreb, Somalia, Yemen, and Egypt, al-qa ida has won over formidable local allies to its cause, expanding its reach, power, and numbers in the process. This string of mergers is not over. In places as diverse as the Sinai Peninsula and Nigeria, al-qa ida-linked organizations are emerging. Some analyses paint these organizations as even more dangerous than the al-qa ida core, which has been weakened by the death of bin Laden and other losses. Indeed, the importance of these organizations may grow under bin Laden s successor, Ayman al- Zawahiri, because of his focus on territorial gains and establishing emirates across Muslim lands. 1 Yet the jihadist world is far from unified. Other Sunni jihadist organizations have not joined with al-qa ida, and some have moved away from it. These dissenters include important groups like Hamas and various Egyptian and Libyan Salafijihadist organizations that have splintered, with the bulk of fighters focusing primarily on local causes rather than embracing al-qa ida s global agenda. In addition, the al-qa ida core and its affiliates compete for money and recruits and often differ in their priorities. A report by West Point s Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) based on documents captured during the raid that killed bin Laden found that the relationship between the al-qa ida core and the affiliates is contested and that the core s control of the groups is limited at best. 2 This paper examines two overlapping issues. First, why do some jihadist groups with ideologies that are similar to al-qa ida s not join with Zawahiri s organization? Second, why might existing organizations drop out of the fold? Answering this second question requires examining potential cleavages between the al-qa ida core and affiliate organizations, divergences between local and global agendas, and leverage points that the United States or other outside powers might exercise to make a split more likely. Al-Qa ida always aspired to unite different Salafijihadist organizations, but it was, and remains, opportunistic in how it has done so. From its beginning, it has used financial incentives to try to foster 1 Leah Farrall, Will Al-Qa ida and Al-Shabab Formally Merge? CTC Sentinel 4, no. 7 (July 2011), available at: < will-al-qaida-and-al-shabab-formally-merge>; Letter from Ayman Al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, July 2005, available at: < globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zawahiri-zarqawi-letter_9jul2005.htm>. 2 See Nelly Lahoud, Stuart Caudill, Liam Collins, Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, Don Rassler, and Muhammad al- Ubaydi, Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined? Harmony Program, The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May 3,
11 cooperation, and as its training facilities and brand name became more attractive, it has used these assets to attract new groups to its banner. Yet the nature of each affiliation varies, and there does not appear to be a master plan. At times, the gaining of affiliates has reflected the group s strength and appeal, but in other instances it has reflected the opposite al-qa ida has sought affiliates because of its own weakness and operational limits. This paper argues that while there are many attractions to linking with al-qa ida, the price of affiliation is considerable. Affiliation is often an admission of failure at the local level. In addition, affiliation can inflame local nationalism, bring on new enemies, and otherwise leave a group more isolated and farther from its original goals. There is a price for the al-qa ida core as well affiliated groups can damage the al-qa ida brand through the actions and ideological stances of local fighters. The United States can play on these tensions, stressing ideological and strategic differences within the movement and emphasizing local identities and nationalism, both of which can be mobilized against al-qa ida. Continuing U.S. pressure on al-qa ida s haven, communications, and finances is also vital to disrupting the core-affiliate relationship. This paper first details the Salafi-jihadist universe, identifying a range of important groups that have affiliated with al-qa ida as well as others of a similar mindset that have chosen not to do so. Section two then briefly describes the degrees of affiliation, as no two relationships between al-qa ida and its affiliates are identical. The third section assesses the range of reasons why groups affiliate, and section four describes the benefits of affiliation from al- Qa ida s point of view. In section five the decision of several Salafi-jihadist groups not to affiliate is examined, and section six describes tensions that have emerged in the relationship between al-qa ida and many of its affiliates. The paper concludes by examining how to exploit potential cleavages between al-qa ida and its affiliate organizations. 2
12 T h e Jihadist Universe Al-Qa ida has been an active organization for over twenty years. When it was founded in 1988, it was simply one of many jihadist organizations, and by no means the most important. 3 From the start, however, al-qa ida was unusual: it was both a group with its own agenda and operations, as well as a facilitator for other terrorist groups. So al-qa ida in the 1990s carried out attacks on U.S. targets in Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen and, at the same time, acted as quartermaster for jihad, to use Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon s arresting phrase. This meant that al-qa ida helped other jihadist groups with funding, training, and additional logistical essentials. 4 Al-Qa ida s third role was proselytizing and indoctrination, spreading a gospel to other Muslims that they should take up jihad against the West and other perceived oppressors. Thus, from its inception, al-qa ida was immensely concerned with its relationship with outside groups. While, traditionally, groups with a similar mindset who operate in the same theater as one another compete fiercely for money and recruits, 5 for al-qa ida, the attitude was different. Al-Qa ida did still compete with other Salafi-jihadist groups, but at the same time, it believed that its own mission entailed furthering their aims. In order to fulfill this mission, it trained fighters from these other groups and undertook propaganda efforts on behalf of their causes. Beginning in the late 1990s, al-qa ida s relationship with outside groups deepened, and it began to incorporate other groups into its structure. After September 11, 2001, this process took off, and today a number of regional groups bear the label al-qa ida in their name, along with a more local designation to show that they are focused on the Arabian Peninsula, the Islamic Maghreb, or other parts of the Muslim world. According to one estimate, al-qa ida has used mergers in nineteen countries to increase its influence. 6 While this paper takes a more conservative view of what constitutes 3 See R. Kim Cragin, Early History of Al-Qa ida, The Historical Journal 51, no. 4 (2008). 4 Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002), p On terrorist organizational competition, see for example: Gordon H. McCormick, Terrorist Decision Making, Annual Review of Political Science, no. 6, pp and Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). 6 Al-Qa ida s Five Aspects of Power, CTC Sentinel 2, no. 1 (January 2009): p. 4. 3
13 a merger and excludes smaller groups, it is clear that al-qa ida has made several major acquisitions since 9/11. 7 Key Al-Qa ida Affiliates Before 9/11, al-qa ida supported a wide range of Salafi-jihadist groups, but it only integrated one of them Egyptian Islamic Jihad into its overall organization. After 9/11, however, al-qa ida developed partnerships with several other organizations, extending the group s reach in the Maghreb, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula, among other areas. The following is a brief overview of key affiliate groups. Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) The first, and perhaps most important, independent organization that joined al-qa ida was Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ). EIJ emerged during the explosive growth of Islamism in Egypt in the 1970s. Members of EIJ assassinated Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981, and the group carried out an underground struggle against the Egyptian regime in the years that followed. In the 1990s, EIJ was beset from all sides. Massive arrests in Egypt devastated the group s ranks there, and Zawahiri s failed efforts to establish a base in Chechnya in caused further damage to the group. Financially, the group was low on funds and unable to sustain its operations or support the families of its fighters. 8 Because of these problems, EIJ increasingly turned to al-qa ida for help and, as it did so, embraced a more global agenda. In 1997, EIJ s bulletins began to call for attacks on the United States. The following year, Zawahiri, who then led EIJ, signed on to the al-qa ida-backed declaration of the World Islamic Front for Combat against Jews and Crusaders, marking what the U.S. government argued was effectively a merger between EIJ and al-qa ida. 9 Zawahiri rationalized this union, and the shift of focus to the United States, in part by claiming the United States was at war with the group, the United States backed the Egyptian government, and the Jews controlled America. 10 The movement formally merged with al-qa ida in 2001, but there was de facto integration between the two in 1998, and considerable cooperation and interaction by senior individual members in the years before then. Before 9/11, the EIJ-al-Qa ida merger appeared to be a one-off. Al-Qa ida did not seem to be actively looking for other groups to take on the al-qa ida label, and was willing to cooperate with a wide range of organizations that retained a high level of autonomy. Al-Qa ida of Iraq (AQI)/The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) Foreign fighters flocked to Iraq after the 2003 U.S. invasion, and al-qa ida propaganda encouraged this. A number of groups and individuals fighting 7 This paper does not examine potential emerging al-qa ida affiliates like al-qa ida of the Sinai Peninsula or Boko Haram in Nigeria. The groups have al-qa ida-like tendencies, but unclassified data are still not clear on the degree of affiliation at this point. See, for example, Katherine Zimmerman, From Somalia to Nigeria: Jihad, Weekly Standard, June 18, 2011, available at: < Al-Qa ida is also tied to an array of groups with which it has numerous personal and organizational ties. These groups, however, are not formal affiliates as are groups like AQAP. Al-Qa ida, of course, also has long-standing ties to the Taliban and at different periods has worked closely with Jemaah Islamiya in Indonesia and the Islamic Jihad Union in Uzbekistan, but these organizations are now gravely weakened, and none formally merged with al-qa ida. Seth Nye, Al-Qa ida s Key Operative: A Profile of Mohammed Ilyas Kashmiri, CTC Sentinel 3, no. 9 (September 2010), p. 15; Sebastian Rotella, An Intricate Plot Unleashed in Mumbai, Washington Post, November 15, 2010; John D. Negroponte, Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2006, p Andrew Higgins and Alan Cullison, Terrorist s Odyssey, Wall Street Journal, July 2, United States of America v. Usama bin Laden et al., S(9) 98 Cr. 1023, p Lawrence Wright, The Man Behind Bin Laden, The New Yorker, September 16,
14 U.S. forces in Iraq had trained in Afghanistan in al-qa ida-run camps or otherwise had links with the core organization. The core movement tried to publicize the struggle in Iraq and facilitate the flow of fighters there. As the insurgency spread, so did the Salafi-jihadist ideology al-qa ida championed, which numerous groups in heretofore secular (or at least mainstream Islamist) Iraq embraced. The Jordanian-born Abu Musab al-zarqawi entered Iraq in 2002, as the head of the Salafi-jihadist, but non-al-qa ida affiliate, group Tawhid wal Jihad. He became the leading foreign fighter figure in Iraq, and after several years of negotiations, eventually pledged his loyalty to bin Laden in The organization went through several names, including al-qa ida of Iraq (AQI), the Mujahedin Shura Council, and the Islamic State of Iraq (this paper will use AQI to refer to the group). 11 Although foreigners have played an important role in AQI, Iraqis make up the core of its membership, and its focus is on Iraq. 12 The vast majority of AQI attacks are in Iraq itself, though the organization or its predecessors did conduct bloody attacks in Jordan in 2005, were implicated in the June 2007 plots in London and Glasgow, and considered attacks in 2008 in Denmark. 13 Al-Qa ida of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Al-Qa ida and the broader jihadist movement have long had a presence in both Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Throughout the 1990s, and even today, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states were an important fundraising source for al-qa ida and for other jihadist causes. 14 Yemen was a logistical hub for operations like the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings as well as the location of the 2000 attack on the USS Cole. In addition, both countries were important sources of al-qa ida recruits. In the early 1990s, Yemenis who had fought in Afghanistan returned to form local jihadist organizations that had loose links to al-qa ida (however, these organizations were not under al-qa ida s command and did not use the al-qa ida label). 15 After 9/11, many members of these groups were arrested, and by 2005, the groups themselves seemed devastated. 16 Similarly, Saudi Arabia was largely quiet between the 1995 attack on a U.S.-Saudi military facility by jihadists with loose links to al-qa ida, and the resumption of attacks in the Kingdom in The original, Saudi-based al-qa ida of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was set up by bin Laden after 9/11 and instructed in 2002 to prepare for a campaign in the Kingdom unlike other affiliates, it did not have a strong independent existence before linking with the al-qa ida core but rather was a direct spinoff of the core. The top al-qa ida leadership established parallel networks in the Kingdom and decided the timing of each branch s campaign. Nevertheless, the Saudi AQAP was also the first affiliate organization to make al-qa ida part of its official name. After a series of attacks on Western and Saudi targets that began in earnest in 2003, the group collapsed, with effective operations ending in The Saudi government launched a devastating campaign on the group, arresting or killing many of its 11 For the sake of readability, I at times use AQI in my descriptions of different historical periods even if the group was another predecessor that was still an al-qa ida affiliate. 12 Bruce Hoffman, The Cult of the Insurgent : Its Tactical and Strategic Implications, Australian Journal of International Affairs 61, no. 3 (September 2007): p Leah Farrall, How al Qaeda Works, Foreign Affairs, March/April National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Monograph on Terrorism Financing, available at: < 15 Barak Barfi, Yemen on the Brink? The Resurgence of al Qaeda in Yemen, New America Foundation (January 2010): p See Greg Johnsen, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 20, 2010, pp Thomas Hegghammer, The Failure of Jihad in Saudi Arabia, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Occasional Paper, February 25, 2010, pp
15 members. The Saudi religious establishment and many religious leaders who in the past had seemed favorable to the Salafi-jihadist cause also denounced the movement, and this along with the killing of Muslim civilians tarnished its appeal. Some group members fled to Yemen, where they joined with local jihadists who had rebounded after setbacks earlier in the decade. The quickly rebuilt their organization in and began a terrorist and insurgent campaign in Also in 2008, the group took on the name al-qa ida Organization of Jihad in the South of the Arabian Peninsula, and in 2009, the group declared itself to be AQAP, joining with the remnant of the Saudi organization. 18 Although it is tempting to see AQAP as a continuation of the Saudi AQAP and of past Yemeni and Saudi groups, its personnel and organization are quite distinct. 19 Many of them fought with other groups, but AQAP is far more linked to the al- Qa ida core, more global in outlook, and more professional than its Yemeni predecessors. 20 However, documents found during the raid that killed bin Laden showed that he saw AQAP as inexperienced, prone to mistakes, and too focused on Yemen. 21 Al-Qa ida of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) As the Algerian jihad raged in the 1990s, sowing death and destruction on a scale that made even hardened jihadists blanch, numerous organizations (and factions within them) emerged, disappeared, or split from established groups. One such group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), formed in the 1990s as a splinter of the brutal Armed Islamic Group (GIA) a group that had conducted numerous atrocities against ordinary Algerians as well as waged war on the government. Beginning in 2003, the GSPC started a process that would eventually make it the core of AQIM. This process began in part when a key commander pledged loyalty to bin Laden. It continued in a desultory way for several years until September 2006, when Zawahiri declared a blessed union with GSPC, emphasizing France as a shared enemy and urging the group to become a bone in the throat of the American and French crusaders. 22 In January 2007, GSPC declared it was formally changing its name to AQIM. The Shebaab In February 2012, the Somali-based Shebaab formally declared its loyalty to al-qa ida, a move that capped the transformation of al-qa ida s on-again, off-again relationship with Somali militants into a more substantial partnership. 23 In the early 1990s, al-qa ida tried to work in the collapsed Somali state, but often found the violent civil war there overwhelming, so much so that its operatives were unable to make significant inroads. It did, however, use Somalia as part of a regional base for attacks against U.S. and UN peacekeepers and strikes in Kenya against U.S. and Israeli targets. 24 During that decade, al-qa ida worked with al-itihaad al-islami (AIAI), a Somali militant group that 18 Johnsen, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relatinos Committee, pp As Hegghammer notes, There is little if any continuity of personnel between the Yemeni AQAP of 2009 and its Saudi predecessor. The few Saudis who did join the group often were latecomers to the Saudi fight or joined after being in Guantanamo. Hegghammer, The Failure of Jihad in Saudi Arabia, p Christopher Swift, From Periphery to Core: Foreign Fighters and the Evolution of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, in Michael P. Noonan, ed., The Foreign Fighters Problem, Recent Trends and Case Studies: Selected Essays, Foreign Policy Research Institute (April 2011), p Lahoud et al., Letters from Abbottabad, p Al-Qaeda Issue France Threat, BBC News, September 14, See Nelly Lahoud, The Merger of Al-Shabab and Qaidat-al-Jihad, CTC Sentinel, February 16, 2012, available at: < posts/the-merger-of-al-shabab-and-qaidat-al-jihad>. 24 Clint Watts, Jacob Shapiro, and Vahid Brown, Al-Qa ida s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa, West Point Combating Terrorism Center, July 2, 2007, pp
16 wanted to make Somalia an Islamic state. Other foreign jihadists also helped train members of AIAI, and wealthy donors from the Persian Gulf states, along with al-qa ida, played a key role in funding the group. In the late 1990s, however, AIAI collapsed. Several years later, in 2003, a small al- Qa ida-linked network emerged in Mogadishu, and after only a couple of years began to gain strength. 25 Beginning in 2005, the al-qa ida core started to make considerable gains in Somalia, and by 2007, the Shebaab, which had split from other Islamist groups, was trying to establish closer links to it. In 2008, both al-qa ida and the Shebaab used their respective websites to praise each other, and in September 2009, the Shebaab made a public declaration of allegiance to Osama bin Laden. 26 The love fest continued in the years that followed, with the Shebaab pledging support for Zawahiri after bin Laden s death and then in 2012 more formally joining al- Qa ida by declaring Shebaab members will march with you as loyal soldiers. 27 Some fighters who had trained in al-qa ida camps in Afghanistan moved to Somalia to train members of the Shebaab, and the two groups currently cooperate closely on everything from indoctrination and basic infantry skills to advanced training in explosives and assassination. 28 Al-Qa ida members now also reportedly play important roles in the Shebaab leadership by one count, over half of the Shebaab s executive council are foreigners, 29 and the organization in turn has embraced more global rhetoric and propaganda. 30 Out of a total of 3,000 to 7,000 fighters, perhaps 200 to 300 are non-somalis, and a number of others are Somalis from the diaspora. 31 As the International Crisis Group concluded, The hardliners, led by the foreign jihadis, wield enormous influence and have access to resources and the means to dictate their wishes to the less powerful factions. 32 Salafist Groups that Have Not Joined Although the label Salafi-jihadist and al-qa ida are often used interchangeably, there have been and are important Salafi-jihadist groups that have not affiliated with al-qa ida. The following are several of the most prominent Salafist groups that have maintained their distance from al-qa ida. Gamaat al-islamiyya (GI) Gamaat al-islamiyya, also known as the Islamic Group, is a Salafist organization that in the 1990s waged a low-level insurgent and terrorist campaign to overthrow the government of Egypt. Prior to this, during the 1980s, many GI members trained and fought in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the group based itself out of Peshawar, where al-qa ida 25 International Crisis Group, Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds? July 11, 2005, pp. 1-2; David Shinn, Al Shebaab s Foreign Threat to Somalia, in Michael P. Noonan, ed., The Foreign Fighters Problem, Recent Trends and Case Studies: Selected Essays, Foreign Policy Research Institute (April 2011), p Leah Farrall, Will Al-Qaeda and Al-Shebaab Formally Merge? 27 Shinn, Al Shebaab s Foreign Threat to Somalia, p. 29; Adam Kahan, Al Shebaab s Rise in the Al Qaeda Network, August 9, 2011, available at: < Al-Shebaab Joining Al Qaeda, CNN.com, February 9, 2012, available at: < s=pm:africa>. 28 Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: A Ticking Time Bomb, Report to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 21, 2010, p Remarks by Ambassador David Shinn in Michael P. Noonan, ed., The Foreign Fighters Problem, Recent Trends and Case Studies: Selected Essays, Foreign Policy Research Institute (April 2011), p. 4; Shinn, Al Shebaab s Foreign Threat to Somalia, pp According to Shinn, the non-somalis are primarily from Kenya, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Afghanistan, Yemen, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Saudi Arabia. 30 Rob Wise, Al Shebaab, Center for Strategic and International Studies AQAM Futures Project, July 2011, pp. 7 8, available at: < files/publication/110715_wise_alshebaab_aqam%20futures%20case%20study_web.pdf>. 31 David Shinn, Al Shebaab s Foreign Threat to Somalia, p International Crisis Group, Somalia s Divided Islamists, Africa Briefing No. 74, May 18, 2010, pp
17 was founded. 33 While EIJ and the Islamic Group themselves were distinct, many of their members had ties to both groups, and the two cooperated even as they competed with each other. 34 Elements of GI flirted with al-qa ida in the 1990s, conducting operations that either followed al- Qa ida s targeting logic or involved support from al- Qa ida itself. In 1995, a GI operative conducted a revenge-motivated suicide bombing in Croatia and the group planned attacks on NATO forces, which were ultimately disrupted. 35 Two years later, the group suffered devastating setbacks the GI s campaign of terror against the Egyptian government and the country s Coptic Christian community was flailing, with the Egyptian population turning against the group and many of its cadre dead or in prison. When the Islamic Group s leaders in prison called for a ceasefire in 1997 in part due to the group s setbacks and because popular opinion had turned against them other members of the group attacked tourists at a temple at Luxor and killed fifty-eight foreigners and four Egyptians, the bloodiest terrorism attack against the Egyptian regime conducted in Egypt during this period. 36 Some of the victims were beheaded, adding a further chilling note to a crime that had already horrified most Egyptians. Rifa i Taha, who at the time headed the GI s Shura Council, had opposed the ceasefire and claimed credit for the 1997 attack (some sources reported that EIJ collaborated in the attacks). 37 The following year, Taha signed the al-qa ida-backed World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Crusaders and the Jews, even though most of the Islamic Group leadership had accepted the ceasefire. As such, Taha spoke more for himself than for the GI, and for taking this stance he was eventually removed from his leadership position. He later recanted. 38 On August 5, 2006, Zawahiri announced that the GI had joined with al-qa ida, 39 with GI leader Muhammad Hakaima 40 standing beside him. At the time, another exiled leader Sheikh Abdel-Akher Hammad stated, If [some] brothers... have joined, then this is their personal view and I don t think that most Gamaa Islamiyya members share that same opinion. 41 Yet, as discussed further below, imprisoned GI members eventually condemned bin Laden and recanted their jihadist views. Arabs in Chechnya The anti-russian struggle in Chechnya, which began in the 1990s, attracted foreign fighters who were appalled by the slaughter of Muslims and eager to defeat (in their eyes, defeat again) the hated Russians. The Saudi-born Amir Khattab emerged as head of this group, forging close relations with several Chechen leaders and gaining admiration from many jihadist supporters in the Arab world. Although Khattab and bin Laden discussed closer cooperation in , Khattab rejected a partnership Y. Carmon, Y. Feldner, and D. Lav, The Al-Gama a Al-Islamiyya Cessation of Violence: An Ideological Reversal, Middle East Media Research Institute, December 22, Hamdi Rizq, Egyptian Jihad Case Highlights Afghan Links, Al-Wasat, June 22 28, For a review, see Evan Kohlmann, Al-Qa ida s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network (New York: Berg, 2004), pp Ayman al-zawahiri, Knights Under the Prophet s Banner; Lawrence Wright, The Rebellion Within, The New Yorker, June 2, Carmon et al., The Al-Gama a Al-Islamiyya Cessation of Violence ; Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), pp Omar Ashour, Lions Tamed? An Inquiry into the Causes of De-Radicalization of Armed Islamic Movements: The Case of the Egyptian Islamic Group, Middle East Journal 61(Autumn 2007): pp. 613 and Al-Zawahiri: Egyptian militant group joins al Qaeda, CNN.com, August 5, 2006, available at: < zawahiri.tape_1_zawahiri-al-jazeera-al-qaeda-terrorist-network?_s=pm:world>. 40 Al Qaeda Wins Converts from Egyptian Group, The Daily Star (Lebanon), August 7, 2006, available at: < Middle-East/Aug/07/Al-Qaeda-wins-converts-from-Egyptian-group.ashx#axzz1ZFpixRV3>. 41 Ibid. 42 Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p
18 While Khattab and bin Laden shared similar outlooks, enough differences remained to prevent an affiliation between their groups. Khattab, like bin Laden, endorsed a Salafi-jihadist worldview. He also claimed that Muslims had a duty to fight Americans for their presence in Saudi Arabia, just as he was fighting Russians in Chechnya. There is no difference between the American Army and the Russian Army. They seized our territory, and Muslims have the right to seek such a solution, he stated. 43 However, he did not go beyond rhetoric. He never tangibly supported attacks on Americans and was careful to focus his struggle exclusively on Chechnya and neighboring Muslim populations. Khattab was ultimately killed by the Russians in Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was founded in Pakistan in 1990 by Libyans who had fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Intellectually, GI and EIJ influenced the LIFG tremendously, with one scholar arguing that the LIFG s religious references are recycled from the literature of these groups. 44 The LIFG moved to Sudan in 1993, following al-qa ida there. In the 1990s, LIFG members outside of Libya, particularly those enjoying support from al-qa ida s ally the Taliban, collaborated with al-qa ida but retained full independence. 45 While the LIFG did not formally become part of al-qa ida, refusing to join the 1998 World Islamic Front or otherwise affiliate, some LIFG members in Afghanistan and elsewhere trained and worked with al-qa ida, and the LIFG issued statements of support for al-qa ida attacks on the United States. 46 As one LIFG statement put it: By declaring war against the Muslims and occupying their countries, the United States of America has made all of its worldwide interests into legitimate targets for the mujahideen. They [the mujahideen] shall bomb and demolish them by any means necessary. 47 Yet, in November 2007, LIFG member Abu Laith al-libi (now deceased) and Ayman al-zawahiri announced that the LIFG had affiliated with al- Qa ida. Several other senior al-qa ida members were of Libyan origins, lending credence to views that the groups had merged. 48 Group members in Libya, however, rejected talk of a merger. Similarly, group members in exile in London announced in 2009 that Abu Laith s claim was a personal decision that is at variance with the basic status of the group. They sought to clearly emphasize that the group is not, has never been, and will never be, linked to the Al-Qa ida organization. 49 Conversely, when LIFG members in Libya called for a ceasefire and rejected violence, the twenty to forty LIFG members in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area connected with al-qa ida rejected the main branch of the 43 Carlotta Gall, Muslim Fighter Embraces Warrior Mystique, New York Times, October 17, Omar Ashour, Post-Jihadism: Libya and the Global Transformations of Armed Islamist Movements, Terrorism and Political Violence 23 (2011): p Brian Fishman, Counting Al Qaeda, ForeignPolicy.com, July 1, 2010, available at: < how_many_members_does_al_qaeda_have>. 46 LIFG in the 1990 supported al-qa ida attacks on the United States, noting America is the country whose warplanes attacked Libya, not in order to get rid of Qadhafi, but rather in order to destroy Muslim homes in Libya. It imposed an oppressive embargo on the Libyan people, and the Muslims are the ones who suffer from its rancor... In face of this American tyranny, the Islamic nation in general and this Islamic movement in particular have no choice but to seek confrontation in defense of their religion, their land, and their dignity. Evan Kohlmann, Dossier: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, NEFA Foundation, October 2007, p. 13, available at: < pdf>. 47 Kohlmann, NEFA Foundation Dossier, pp Ashour, Post-Jihadism, p See also for example, Evan Kohlmann, Who is the Legitimate Voice for LIFG? Counterterrorism Blog, July 18, 2009, available at: < 49 Christopher Blanchard and Jim Zanotti, Libya: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report RL33142, February 18, 2011, p. 21, available at: < 9
19 LIFG s negotiations with the Libyan government. 50 This division reflects a decade of schism between Europe-based political dissidents and jihadist commanders in Afghanistan. 51 Today, the LIFG itself is formally defunct, but former members, particularly those outside Libya who are based in Afghanistan and Pakistan, are part of al-qa ida while those in Libya newly freed in the wake of Qadhafi s demise claim to reject the al- Qa ida core. 52 Palestinian Salafi-jihadists Salafi-jihadists groups including Jaysh al-islam, Jund Ansar Allah, Jaysh al-umma, and Tawhid wal-jihad have emerged in Gaza. But with total membership numbering perhaps 500 (about fifty of whom are foreign fighters), they are still a shadow of Hamas. 53 Because these groups are so fluid, often forming, merging, dividing, and becoming defunct in a relatively brief period, it is easier to talk about a Salafi-jihadist trend or movement rather than focus on particularly groups. The groups in Gaza are disorganized, divided, and for now not operationally linked to the al-qa ida core, in part because they are not able to communicate with core members or easily travel to and from core facilities in Pakistan. However, they often mimic al-qa ida fashion by wearing the shalwar kameez traditional Afghan loose-fitting outfits and have taken the vehement anti-shi ah attitudes of some Iraqi groups, criticizing Hamas for cooperating with Iran. Most Salafis in Gaza, from which these groups draw, are apolitical and reject both al- Qa ida and Hamas for their political agendas. 54 A Pakistan Exception? Given the prevalence of Salafi-jihadist groups in Pakistan that oppose the United States, India, and other al-qa ida foes, and the wide range of actors there that support these groups, the lack of an al- Qa ida of Pakistan or similar organization may at first seem surprising. More so, since bin Laden and other al-qa ida leaders were in regular contact with a wide range of groups in Pakistan and al-qa ida figures cooperate in ways large and small with them. For instance, members from Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and al-qa ida have at times worked together, conducting joint operations in Afghanistan. Similarly, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam worked closely with al-qa ida and reportedly even adopted some of its international goals, in part because of the objectives and connections of Mohammaed Ilyas Kashmiri, a key leader. And, while Lashkar-e Tayyiba remains focused on Kashmir and India, it has expanded its targets, carrying out attacks such as the 2008 strike in Mumbai that not only went after the traditional Indian enemy, but Americans, Europeans, and Jews. Nevertheless, bin Laden and now Zawahiri do not appear to have pushed these organizations to take on an al-qa ida label. One explanation for this surprising void in Pakistan is that the sheer number of organizations makes affiliation difficult. Which organization would get the nod? Choosing one risks alienating others. In addition, there is another technical challenge. Mullah Omar and his organization in Pakistan cannot be a franchise of al-qa ida, as he technically outranks Zawahiri. Finally, Pakistani intelligence is willing to tolerate jihadist activity to varying degrees, but tolerating an open affiliate would put Pakistan in a precarious position on the international stage Ibid. 51 Kohlmann, Who is the Legitimate Voice for LIFG? 52 Christopher Anzalone, Missionaries of Jihad, ForeignPolicy.com, June 3, 2011, available at: < missionaries_of_jihad>. 53 For a review, see International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Gaza, Middle East Report no. 104, March 29, The estimated size of 500 comes from Israel s domestic intelligence service as does the estimate of foreign fighters (see pp. 14 and 18). 54 International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Gaza, pp. 5 and I would like to thank Bruce Riedel for his thoughts on this section. 10
20 D e g r e e s of A f f i l i at i o n When a group begins to cooperate with al-qa ida, and even when a group goes so far as to change its name to include the al-qa ida label, it does not automatically become a branch of the core organization. Rather, it often retains its own command structure, personnel, and interests, and these coexist with those of al- Qa ida s senior leadership. In these circumstances, coordination is far from seamless, and the list of whom the organization chooses to target often remains similar to the pre-affiliation era. Part of what makes the merger challenging is that affiliates may have ties to other groups that are as close as those they have with the al-qa ida core. Variations on the Al-Qa ida Agenda When a group affiliates with al-qa ida, one key variant is whether or not the group fully embraces al-qa ida s global agenda. Algeria s GSPC, for example, first declared loyalty to bin Laden in 2003, 56 but it took over a year for it to declare that France, rather than the Algerian government, would be its primary target a more Western orientation that is in keeping with al-qa ida priorities. 57 Still, to the disappointment of al-qa ida s core leadership, AQIM leaders (GSPC formally became AQIM in 2007) have not tried hard to mobilize supporters in Europe on behalf of global jihad and have not brought the war to the Continent. 58 Nor has AQIM played a major role in the Maghreb outside Algeria, with the possible exception of Mauritania. Instead, AQIM has focused on neighboring Saharan countries. As Jean-Pierre Filiu comments, AQIM is the branch of the global jihad that has most clearly failed to follow its founding guidelines. 59 Likewise, the overwhelming number of AQI attacks have occurred in Iraq, though there have been important exceptions, including the 2005 strike on Western-owned hotels in Jordan, rocket attacks on Israel, and linkages to several attempted attacks in Europe. 60 Even AQAP, often touted as the affiliate closest to al-qa ida because it has attempted attacks on American civil aviation perhaps the ultimate target for the al-qa ida core still concentrates primarily on targets within Yemen itself. Still, a common consequence of the embrace of an al-qa ida label is for a group to seek out Western targets within a group s theater of operations. For 56 In 2003, Nabil Sahraoui, the GSPC head, declared that his organization strongly and fully support Osama bin Laden s jihad against the heretic America. 57 Lianne Kennedy Boudali, The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-qa ida s Global Jihad, The Combating Terrorism Center, April 2, 2007, pp Jason Burke, The 9/11 Wars (Allen Lane, 2011), p Jean-Pierre Filiu, Al-Qa ida in the Islamic Maghreb: A Case Study in the Opportunism of Global Jihad, CTC Sentinel 3 (April 2010): p Brian Fishman, Redefining the Islamic State: The Fall and Rise of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, New America Foundation (August 2011), pp
Assessment of the terror threat to Denmark
28 April 2016 Assessment of the terror threat to Denmark Summary The terror threat to Denmark remains significant. This means that there are individuals with intent and capacity to commit terrorist attacksMore information
Background Report: 9/11, Ten Years Later
Background Report: 9/11, Ten Years Later THE UNIQUE NATURE OF 9/11 Among terrorism incidents in the United States and around the world, al-qa ida s attacks on September 11, 21, are notably unique. FATALITIESMore information
Examples of International terrorist attacks since 9/11
PAPER ONE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE THREAT Any discussion of the Government s strategy to reduce the threat from international terrorism to the UK and its citizens must begin with the nature of theMore information
Option 1: Use the Might of the U.S. Military to End the Assad Regime
1 Option 1: Use the Might of the U.S. Military to End the Assad Regime The Syrian dictatorship s use of chemical weapons against its own people was terrible. But we must not let it overshadow the largerMore information
Option 1: Use the U.S. Military in Syria
1 Option 1: Use the U.S. Military in Syria The Syrian Civil War has been raging for five years. Nearly four hundred thousand people have died and more than one million have been injured. More than halfMore information
Assessment of the Terror Threat to Denmark
19 March 2015 Assessment of the Terror Threat to Denmark Summary The terrorist attacks in Copenhagen on 14 and 15 February 2015 confirm that the terror threat to Denmark is significant. There are individualsMore information
A Six-Day War: Its Aftermath in American Public Opinion
A Six-Day War: Its Aftermath in American Public Opinion For 40 years, public opinion has consistently favored Israel over the Palestinians by Robert Ruby, Senior Editor, Pew Forum on Religion & PublicMore information
NATURE OF THE THREAT OF TERRORIST ABUSE AND EXPLOITATION OF NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (NPOs)
NATURE OF THE THREAT OF TERRORIST ABUSE AND EXPLOITATION OF NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (NPOs) ONGOING EXPLOITATION OF CHARITIES BY TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS Terrorist organizations continue to exploit andMore information
Name. September 11, 2001: A Turning Point
Name Directions: For the following questions(s), use this passage adapted from Mark Kishlansky s, Patrick Geary s, and Patricia O Brien s text, Civilization in the West. September 11, 2001: A Turning PointMore information
Conflicts Middle East
Conflicts Middle East Video Clip-Conflicts- Middle East Persian Gulf War Arab-Israeli War- Israel s War for Independence Sequence of Events Activity First, find a partner Second, empty the contents andMore information
Munich A few months ago Tony Blair apologised for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and said that without that war the Islamic State could not have taken
Munich A few months ago Tony Blair apologised for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and said that without that war the Islamic State could not have taken shape. What he did not say is that its genesis startedMore information
How did European involvement in Southwest Asia impact the region after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire?
How did European involvement in Southwest Asia impact the region after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire? A. Many Europeans emigrated to Southwest Asia B. Countries in Southwest Asia modeled their governmentsMore information
Theme: The Growing Role of Private Security Companies in Protecting the Homeland.
Theme: The Growing Role of Private Security Companies in Protecting the Homeland. Background on terrorist organizations: A global threat, every object is a target, infinite number of targets. TerroristMore information
The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT)
The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT) Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict Conference 13 March 2006 This briefing is UNCLASSIFIED Agenda 21 st Century Security EnvironmentMore information
Radical Islamic Ideologies
Radical Islamic Ideologies To understand Islamist terrorism, we must understand the underlying belief systems used to justify armed struggle & motivate members to violent action. Islamism political ideologiesMore information
Curriculum Vitae PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Curriculum Vitae Seth G. Jones, Ph.D. Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center RAND 1200 South Hayes Street Washington, DC 22202 Phone: 703-413-1100 x5782 E-mail: email@example.com PROFESSIONALMore information
International Human Rights Day and Issues of Palestine & Kashmir
PO Box: 562, F-7, Islamabad, Pakistan Phone: +92 51 2514555 Email: firstname.lastname@example.com www.muslim-institute.org Round Table Discussion on International Human Rights Day and Issues of Palestine &More information
Ch. 29 Conflict in the Middle East. Section 2, The Arab-Israeli Conflict
Ch. 29 Conflict in the Middle East Section 2, The Arab-Israeli Conflict Learning Target 7: I can identify and explain at least two (2) causes and at least three (3) effects of the Arab-Israeli conflict.More information
U.S. Policy in Afghanistan
U.S. Policy in Afghanistan Teaching with the News Online Resource 1 Introduction U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Chad Runge, October 2009. Why are U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan?More information
Overview: Terrorism in 2014
BACKGROUND REPORT Overview: Terrorism in In, more than 16,800 terrorist attacks took place worldwide, causing more than 43,500 deaths and more than 40,900 injuries, including perpetrator casualties. MoreMore information
Dear Delegates, It is a pleasure to welcome you to the 2016 Montessori Model United Nations Conference.
Dear Delegates, It is a pleasure to welcome you to the 2016 Montessori Model United Nations Conference. The following pages intend to guide you in the research of the topics that will be debated at MMUNMore information
STATEMENT OF JAMES B. COMEY DIRECTOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE AT A HEARING ENTITLED THREATS TO THE HOMELANDMore information
Terrorist or freedom fighter or..?
Learning outcomes Students will practice arguing and understanding views which are not necessarily their own Students will gain an understanding of how history can judge events in a different way fromMore information
Worldwide Terrorism, Part 2. By William R. Polk. In my previous article, I described the inspiration for Islamic resistance to the
Worldwide Terrorism, Part 2 By William R. Polk In my previous article, I described the inspiration for Islamic resistance to the West and how opposition to Soviet imperialism coalesced the main movementMore information
War, Peace and International Relations in Contemporary Islam:
The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies Established by the Charles H. Revson Foundation War, Peace and International Relations in Contemporary Islam: Muslim Scholars on Peace-Treaty with Israel YitzhakMore information
The Plight of Christians in the Middle East. Supporting Religious Freedom, Pluralism, and Tolerance During a Time of Turmoil
AP PHOTO/HUSSEIN MALLA The Plight of Christians in the Middle East Supporting Religious Freedom, Pluralism, and Tolerance During a Time of Turmoil By Brian Katulis, Rudy deleon, and John Craig March 2015More information
Arab-Israeli Conflict
Arab-Israeli Conflict I. Palestine & Israel Jewish view: God promised land to Jews (1700 BCE) Jewish Diasporas (scattering) occurred 586 BCE: Destruction of Solomon s Temple 70 CE: Destruction of the SecondMore information
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the
Constitutional Connection To create a context for this lesson, have students complete Constitutional Connection: War and the Constitution. Constitutional Connection Insert text here George W. Bush OverviewMore information
Islamic Radicals in the UK - A Double-Edged Sword
Islamic Radicals in the UK - A Double-Edged Sword Yael Shahar 07/7/2005 ABSTRACT Experts have long contended that the UK is a safe haven for radical Islamic terror networks, which exploit British freedomsMore information
Taliban Insurgent Syndicate Intelligence Operations Oct 09
Taliban Insurgent Syndicate Intelligence Operations Oct 09 Taliban prepare for attack, Apr 2009 1 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION STATEMENT: THIS PUBLICATION MAY CONTAIN OPSEC SENSITIVE INFORMATION. DISTRIBUTIONMore information
Post-9/11 Islamic Extremism in the U.S.
Post-9/11 Islamic Extremism in the U.S. The ideologies of extreme intolerance that motivated the 19 hijackers responsible for carrying out the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks continue to pose a seriousMore information
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM June 2011 Table of Contents Introduction................................... 1 Overview of the National Strategy for Counterterrorism.................. 2 The ThreatMore information
EU COOPERATION. The Madrid bombings have provided additional impetus for action. In an 18-page declaration on counter terrorism on
TESTIMONY BY AMBASSADOR J. COFER BLACK COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM DEPARTMENT OF STATE BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE MARCH 31, 2004 Thank you Mr. Chairman and membersMore information
RESPONSE TO THE GOVERNMENT REVIEW OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 22 DECEMBER 2015 PHOTO: ALLEGED MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD HEADQUARTERS IN LONDON CAMPAIGN AGAINST ANTISEMITISM PO Box 2647, London W1A 3RB RegisteredMore information
Factsheet about 9/11. Page 1
Page 1 Factsheet about 9/11 What happened on 11 September 2001? In the early morning of 11 September 2001, 19 hijackers took control of four airliners taking off from different airports in the US Boston,More information
Results of Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No 25 22-24 January 2006
An-Najah National University Center for Opinion Polls and Survey Studies Tel: (972) (9) 2345113 Fax: (972)(9) 2345982 Nablus Palestinian: P.O.Box 7, 707 Email: email@example.com firstname.lastname@example.com ResultsMore information
World War II TOWARD A GLOBAL COMMUNITY (1900 PRESENT)
World War II TOWARD A GLOBAL COMMUNITY (1900 PRESENT) WWII began on September 1, 1939 when Germany invaded Poland. The Germans used a strategy known as blitzkrieg (lightening war), which involved coordinatedMore information
Erbil Declaration. Regional Women s Security Forum on Resolution UNSCR 1325
Erbil Declaration Regional Women s Security Forum on Resolution UNSCR 1325 The Women s Security Forum on Resolution No 1325 for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region concluded its work in ErbilMore information
The Iraqi Conflict: Its Impact on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
T The Iraqi Conflict: Its Impact on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict by Eric Rouleau here is a widespread belief in the Arab world and in western pro- Palestinian circles that there is a strong IsraeliMore information
UNITED HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL The United Nations Human Rights Council was created in March, 2006 and is the successor to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, which was often criticized for theMore information
THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary. Annex to U.S. - Gulf Cooperation Council Camp David Joint Statement
THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE May 14, 2015 Annex to U.S. - Gulf Cooperation Council Camp David Joint Statement President Obama and Heads of Delegations of the GulfMore information
July 10, 2006
July 10, 2006 http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/ July 10, 2006 Islamist spies with a licence to kill In early May, seven months after an earthquake killed more than 70,000 people and left 3 million homeless,More information
Homeland Security and Terrorism COURSE SYLLABUS
Homeland Security and COURSE SYLLABUS Course: CRJU 491T Section: 001 Semester: Spring 2015 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE Instructor: Leslie G. Wiser, Jr. Office:More information
Chapter 4A: World Opinion on Terrorism
1 Pew Global Attitudes Project, Spring 2007 Now I m going to read you a list of things that may be problems in our country. As I read each one, please tell me if you think it is a very big problem, a moderatelyMore information
Statement of James Costos. Ambassador Designate to Spain. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. July 25, 2013
Statement of James Costos Ambassador Designate to Spain Senate Foreign Relations Committee July 25, 2013 Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Johnson, Members of the Committee, Thank you for the opportunityMore information
Lecture Outline. Middle East & North Africa. History of Islam. Facts of Islam (p.175-6) More Facts of Islam
Lecture Outline Middle East & North Africa May 13, 2010 GEOG 1982 Islam History & Facts Distribution Veiling Political Islam Middle East 20 th century history Arab Israeli Conflict Northern Africa HistoryMore information
Home Security: Russia s Challenges
Home Security: Russia s Challenges A Russian Perspective Andrei Fedorov * Home security: Russia s challenges Home security and the struggle against terrorism is one of the most crucial issues for the RussianMore information
Pew Research Center Pew Global Attitudes Project: Spring 2006 Survey 15 Nation Survey FINAL TOPLINE
Pew Research Center Pew Global Attitudes Project: Spring 2006 Survey 15 Nation Survey FINAL TOPLINE United States May 2-14, 2006 (N=1001) Russia April 6-16, 2006 (N=1000) Nigeria April 20-29, 2006 (N=1000)More information
working group on foreign policy and grand strategy
A GRAND STRATEGY ESSAY Moral Hazard and the Obama Doctrine by James Fearon Working Group on Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy www.hoover.org/taskforces/foreign-policy Although his administration is commonlyMore information
The U.S. Air War in Iraq,
1800 K Street, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1.202.775.3270 Fax: 1.202.775.3199 Email: email@example.com Web: www.csis.org/burke/reports The U.S. Air War in Iraq, Afghanistan, and PakistanMore information
The 11 th Crusade For A Fee
The 11 th Crusade For A Fee Written by Jacob S. "The most important thing is for us to find Osama bin Laden. It is our number one priority and we will not rest until we find him." --Washington, D.C., Sept.More information
Worldwide Threats to the Homeland
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security Worldwide Threats to the Homeland September 17, 2014 Matthew G. Olsen Director National Counterterrorism Center Opening Thank you Chairman McCaul,More information
Iranian Parliament. Topic C: Syrian Conflict Response
Iranian Parliament Topic C: Syrian Conflict Response Chair: Andrew Abtahi Moderator: Siddarth Daftary Vice Chairs: Nida Bajwa and Daniel Toubman Crisis Staffers: Coretta Lemaitre, Thomas Key April 10 13,More information
The White House CVE Summit
The White House CVE Summit February 17-20/2015 Washington DC 1. CVE Roundtable with Vice- President Biden + three American cities (17 th feb.) 2. Meeting with Homeland Security & IA (18 th feb.) Presentation:More information
The Presidency of Barack Obama
The Presidency of Barack Obama There are many pictures and diagrams in this presentation. Yet, you have a set of notes as depicted to the right. Whenever a slide comes up with the title that matches yourMore information
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) ) v. ) Criminal No. 01-455-A ) ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, ) Defendant ) Statement of FactsMore information
Ohio Families First:
OHIO HEART AND SOUL www.tedstrickland.com Ohio Families First: Defeating Terrorism & Keeping Americans Safe On 9/11, our country was attacked on our home soil, and none of us who lived through that dayMore information
Key Concepts Chart (The United States after the Cold War)
Unit 10, Activity 1, Key Concepts Chart Key Concepts Chart (The United States after the Cold War) Key Concept +? - Explanation Extra Information NAFTA Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton bothMore information
Haganum Model United Nations Gymnasium Haganum, The Hague Research Reports. Security council. The Question of ISIS
Haganum Model United Nations Gymnasium Haganum, The Hague Research Reports Security council The Question of ISIS 4 th, 5 th and 6 th of March 2016 Haganum Model United Nations 2016 4th of March 6th ofMore information
The War of 1812 was the United States of America s first
Constitutional Connection To create a context for this lesson, have students complete Constitutional Connection: War and the Constitution. War in The Early Republic 42 Overview The War of 1812 was theMore information
Dear Delegates, It is a pleasure to welcome you to the 2016 Montessori Model United Nations Conference.
Dear Delegates, It is a pleasure to welcome you to the 2016 Montessori Model United Nations Conference. The following pages intend to guide you in the research of the topics that will be debated at MMUNMore information
Todd M. Rosenblum. Defining Homeland Security Intelligence
Prepared Remarks Todd M. Rosenblum Deputy Under Secretary of Intelligence Department of Homeland Security Defining Homeland Security Intelligence Washington Institute for Near East Policy June 4, 2010More information
In the feudal system, people pledged loyalty to a lord a ruler or powerful landholder. In return, they received protection from that lord.
The fall of the Roman Empire in 476 C.E. marks the beginning of the period in Europe known as the Middle Ages. In this chapter, you will learn about a political and economic system that developed duringMore information
Terrorism after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. Jessica Stern (Fellow at the Hoover Institution and FXB Center for Human Rights, Harvard
Terrorism after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq Jessica Stern (Fellow at the Hoover Institution and FXB Center for Human Rights, Harvard University) and Megan K. McBride (Brown University) Among the U.S. government'sMore information
Security Council. United Nations S/2008/434
United Nations S/2008/434 Security Council Distr.: General 3 July 2008 Original: English Special report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1806 (2008) on the United NationsMore information
Status of Foreign Fighters under international and national law
Status of Foreign Fighters under international and national law Foreign fighters and the question of structural shifts caused by current crises Role of the Security Council: Security council resolutionMore information
Item 2 9 October 2014
131 st IPU ASSEMBLY AND RELATED MEETINGS Geneva, 12-16.10.2014 Assembly A/131/2-P.8 Item 2 9 October 2014 Consideration of requests for the inclusion of an emergency item in the Assembly agenda RequestMore information
The Military Campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant: Arab Public Opinion
The Military Campaign against the Islamic State in and the Levant: Arab Public Opinion A coalition of 0 countries led by the United States began air strikes against the group known as the Islamic StateMore information
Law Enforcement Assessment of the Violent Extremism Threat. Charles Kurzman and David Schanzer June 25, 2015
Law Enforcement Assessment of the Violent Extremism Threat Charles Kurzman and David Schanzer June 25, 2015 About the Authors Charles Kurzman is a professor of sociology at the University of North CarolinaMore information
The Undergraduate Journal of the Social Sciences Interview Series
The Undergraduate Journal of the Social Sciences Interview Series Richard Engel Richard Engel recently visited West Point where he took time to share his expertise and insight with the UJSS. Mr. EngelMore information
Community Dialogue Participant s Guide. Lessons from Islamic Spain for Today s World
Community Dialogue Participant s Guide Many Religions, One Community: Lessons from Islamic Spain for Today s World Many Religions, One Community Guidelines for Interfaith Dialogues Remember the goals ofMore information
The Terrorist Threat: US Facing New Challenges at Abroad and at Home
The Terrorist Threat: US Facing New Challenges at Abroad and at Home Charles Allen Prepared for the Aspen Homeland Security Group June 24, 2013 A Changing Terrorism Landscape Since the decimation of alMore information
The Theory and Practice of Islamic Terrorism
The Theory and Practice of Islamic Terrorism This page intentionally left blank The Theory and Practice of Islamic Terrorism An Anthology Edited by Marvin Perry and Howard E. Negrin THE THEORY AND PRACTICEMore information
Religious Studies (Short Course) Revision Religion, War and Peace
Religious Studies (Short Course) Revision Religion, War and Peace How to use this presentation The first part of this presentation (blue headings) will give you brief information, religious viewpointsMore information
INTERVIEW WITH ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN * In this exclusive interview with TPQ, the Honorable Secretary General provides an overview of the major developments of the past two years in Turkey s neighborhood,More information
Foreign Affairs and National Security
Foreign Affairs and National Security Objectives: TLW understand and explain the following questions as it relates to the Foreign affairs of the American Government What is foreign policy? What is theMore information
General Guidelines for Jihad
بسم اهلل الرمحن الرحيم As-Sahab Media Presents General Guidelines for Jihad Shaikh Ayman al Zawahiri 1434 First: Introduction 1. It is not a hidden secret that our work in this stage has two aspects: TheMore information
The Militant Face of Islam. A Christian Response
The Militant Face of Islam A Christian Response Five Faces of Islam 1. The Missionary Face Islamic Da wahor Call/invitation to the straight path 2. The Mystical Face Sufism/Tasawwaf Islam as a spiritualMore information
HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL ISSUE : THE USSR INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN LILY BUTLER INTRODUCTION In the Soviet army it takes more courage to retreat than advance. - Joseph Stalin After the Second World War,More information
Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda
Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda April 24, 2007 PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR STEVEN KULL RESEARCH STAFF CLAY RAMSAY STEPHEN WEBER EVAN LEWIS EBRAHIM MOHSENI MARY SPECK MELANIEMore information
Risk Management for U.S. State Department Securing U.S. Missions Overseas
March 14, 2014 Risk Management for U.S. State Department Securing U.S. Missions Overseas Being on the front lines of U.S. national security has always been inherently risky; however, we strive to mitigateMore information
US PRESIDENT GEORGE W BUSH S SPEECH IN ABU DHABI, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 13 JANUARY 2008 (From the White House website)
US PRESIDENT GEORGE W BUSH S SPEECH IN ABU DHABI, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 13 JANUARY 2008 (From the White House website) Doctor Aida, thank you very much for the kind introduction. Ministers, members of theMore information
PAST PAPER QUESTIONS 2011-2014 PEACE AND CONFLICT UNIT 8: SECTION 3 1 2014 Question 5 (a) What does exploitation mean? (2) (b) Do you think religious organisations do enough to promote world peace? *(c)More information
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY CANTON, NEW YORK COURSE OUTLINE JUST 415 EMERGING ISSUES IN HOMELAND SECURITY Prepared By: Paul R. Bowdre SCHOOL OF SCIENCE, HEALTH AND CRIMINAL JUSTICEMore information
Teaching Notes Crisis Guide: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Teaching Notes Crisis Guide: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict CFR.org s award-winning multimedia Crisis Guide series aims to provide a detailed, tailored resource for the exploration of the world s mostMore information
Overview. The Threat Landscape
The Honorable Michael E. Leiter Director, National Counterterrorism Center (2007-2011) Senior Counselor to the Chief Executive Officer, Palantir Technologies Testimony before the United States Senate CommitteeMore information
Drone Warfare: effective or counter-productive?
Drone Warfare: effective or counter-productive? Stefan Wolff, University of Birmingham While there can be no doubt that the national and international legal regulation of the deployment of Unmanned AerialMore information
COURSE DESCRIPTION FOR THE BACHELOR DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Course Code 2507205 Course Name International Relations of the Middle East In this course the student will learn an historical andMore information
Timeline Date Title Summary. European External Action Service enters into operation
Timeline 01 January 04 January 09-15 January 14 January 25 January 05 February 11 February 16 February 26 February European External Action Service enters into operation Arab Spring begins South SudanMore information
The World War I Era ( )
America: Pathways to the Present Chapter 19 The World War I Era (1914 1920) Copyright 2005 by Pearson Education, Inc., publishing as Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey. All rights reserved.More information
Nationalistic Movements in SW Asia/Middle East
Nationalistic Movements in SW Asia/Middle East Dates of Independence for Nations of SW Asia/Middle East Nationalistic issues of Palestinian Arabs remain unresolved Ottoman Empire Falls Ottoman empire beginsMore information
Firstly, I would like to thank the organizers of this symposium for
Keynote Address by former Prime Minister of Malaysia Are We Really Civilized? Make War a Crime Mahathir bin Mohamad Firstly, I would like to thank the organizers of this symposium for this opportunityMore information
Geography Religion Population Capital
Iraq: An Overview Geography: borders Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. Population: More than 22 million excluding Kurdish-held northern Iraq. Capital: Baghdad (five million inhabitants).More information
Testimony of Matthew Rhoades Director Cyberspace & Security Program Truman National Security Project & Center for National Policy
Testimony of Matthew Rhoades Director Cyberspace & Security Program Truman National Security Project & Center for National Policy House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, InfrastructureMore information
Policy Instruments & (Side)-Effects
Policy Instruments & (Side)-Effects EU Parl. LIBE Hearing on the fight against terrorism and the challenges for EU internal security Quirine Eijkman, Centre for Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism FacultyMore information
Lecture 17: Religious Conflict and Terrorism
September 11, 2001 Lecture 17: Religious Conflict and Terrorism Part I: Islam and Christianity Part II: Religion and Terrorism Part III: Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda Part IV: Institutions/Strategies SeptemberMore information
The Foreign Policy of Ukraine
The Foreign Policy of Ukraine One Year After the Orange Revolution PONARS Policy Memo No. 372 Volodymyr Dubovyk Odessa National University December 2005 It has been a year since the Orange Revolution inMore information
Dear Friends, Chairman of the Board / Open Doors International. Open Doors 2014 Annual Report 2
2014 Annual Report Dear Friends, Our world grows less peaceful day by day. Many live in fear of terrorist attack, economic collapse or countless other disasters. Yet as we read in God s Word and have learnedMore information
Terrorist Group Backgrounder. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Terrorist Group Backgrounder Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Historical Background The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP or Pakistani Taliban) were formed in December, 2007 to unite several insurgent groupsMore information
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DIPLOMATIC SECURITY MOBILE SECURITY DEPLOYMENTS 1 DIPLOMATIC SECURITY MOBILE SECURITY DEPLOYMENTS Introduction U.S. State Department officialsMore information