text:
This question was actually asked by Alan Munn in a comment to How do I create a LCM tree diagram?. I repeat (and self-answer) it here because the answer is too long to fit the margin :-)
qtree is a well-known and heavily used package for drawing trees using the so-called bracket notation. (The bracket notation is especially familiar to linguists.)
forest is my own, recent package for the same job. Due to the awesome power of
tikz (in particular, the
pgfkeys utility), which it is based on,
forest is an extremely flexible package. ---From the feedback I got so far, including feedback from this site, I don't seem to be the only one who believes so. Which makes me happy. :-)
Although both
qtree and
forest encode trees using the bracket notation, the exact syntax is somewhat different. While
forest requires that each node (including its children) be enclosed in square brackets (like this:
[node [child node] ... [child node]]),
qtree relaxes this requirement in the case of terminal nodes (leaves): they can be separated simply by whitespace, like this:
[.node leaf ... leaf ]. Furthermore, the packages differ in the encoding of node labels: as showh above, in
qtree a bracketed (usually non-terminal) node's label must be preceded by a dot (
forest uses the same syntax as
synttree; another package that uses (and extends)
qtree's syntax is (obviously)
tikz-qtree. As I mentioned in a comment in the above-mentioned question, I have decided for
synttree-like syntax purely out of personal taste. I guess I found it more consistent.)
As Alan pointed out, the difference in the syntax makes the potential transition from
qtree to
forest harder: nobody wants to throw away tons of trees (s)he has painstakingly drawn. Thus Alan's question: would it be possible for
forest to support both syntactic dialects?


text:
- OAI-harvestable records Home
- Sample OAI-PMH requests
- OAI-PMH related resources
For More Information
About the metadata formats
Sample Requests Using the Open Archives Initiative Protocol for Metadata Harvesting (OAI-PMH v 2.0)
These links and requests return XML. They are best used in an XML-aware browser or viewing application, for example, Internet Explorer (v 5.0 or newer).
Try some pre-configured requests to LC's data provider service for records for selected digitized items from LC's historical collections:

subset: commoncrawl


text:
- Ads Page
- All Dolled Up
- Amy Marie Tag Extra's
- Andy Cooper
- Arthur Crowe Extra's
- Arthur Crowe Tutorial's
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- CDO Scrap Kit's PTU
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- Danny Lee
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- Devilish DEzines Extra Tag's
- Extras
- Freek's Creation Scrap Kit Tag's
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- Kissed By Kelz
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- Kissed by Kelz Posers
- KiwiBgCT
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- Masks
- Michelle Myth's Extra's
- Michelle Myths Scrap Tag's
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- My Cluster Frames
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- Roman Zaric
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- Snaggable Timeline's and Avatar's
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- Stina's Scrap kit's
- Tag Show off's No Tutorial's
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- Timeline Templates (ambcreations)
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Monday, April 2, 2018
Easter Charm
No Tutorial.
Tag Show off.
A beautiful PTU kit Easter Charm designed by Scrappin with Lil Ole Me.
This kit is available the links below.
Mystical Scraps
Designer Scraps
Both tags i used artist Verymany. You can find her work here.
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Favorite Artists
Blogs I Stalk
Cullenary Delights
Dee-Gee Creations
Gimptastic Scraps
Millie's Psp Madness
Scrappin' Krazy Designs
TootyPups Scraps
Toxic Desirez


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Below we have listed all the EJB Interview Questions and answers. Feel free to comment on any EJB Interview Questions or answer by the comment feature available on the page.
To buy an eBook containing 30,000 Interview Questions, with Answers, Click Here.
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Enterprise Java Beans (EJB) is a development architecture for building highly scalable and robust enterprise level applications to be deployed on J2EE compliant Application Server such as JBOSS, Web Logic etc. Enterprise JavaBeans (EJB) is an architecture for setting up program components, written in the Java programming language, that run in the server parts of a computer network that uses the client/server model.
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|What are the call back methods in Session bean?
|Already we have http session in servlets. so why we use session beans ejb?
|What is parent class of Hashtable?
|How should I set max-beans-in-free-pool for stateless beans?
|Explain about the naming and directory services present in EJB?
|What is difference between EJB 1.1 and EJB 2.0
|What is local interface. How values will be passed?
|What is the difference between distributed transactions and Flat transactions in EJB?
|How can I avoid violating NOT NULL constraints on foreign keys that are mapped to cmr-fields?
|If i throw a custom ApplicationException from a business method in Entity bean which is participating in a transaction, would the transaction be rolled back by container. Does container rolls back transaction only in case of SystemExceptions?
|How many EJB Objects are created for a Bean?
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|Is is possible for an EJB client to marshal an object of class java.lang.Class to an EJB?
|If session has thrown ApplicaitonException would you use EJBContext.setRollBackOnly method?
|Why can't I call the setXXX method for a cmr-field during ejbCreate?
|What is the difference between session and entity beans? When should I use one or the other?
|What is an EJB Context?
|When should I use a Stateful session bean and when should I use a servlet session?
|Why CMP beans are abstract classes?
India News Network
Latest 20 Questions
Payment of time- barred debt is:
(a) Valid
(b) Void
(c) Illegal
(d) Voidable
Consideration is defined in the Indian Contract Act,1872 in: (a) Section 2(f) (b) Section 2(e) (c) Section 2(g) (d) Section 2(d)
Which of the following is not an exception to the rule, "No consideration, No contract": (a) Natural love and affection (b) Compensation for involuntary services (c) Completed gift (d) Agency
Consideration must move at the desire of: (a) The promisor (b) The promisee (c) The promisor or any other party (d) Both the promisor and the promisee
An offer which is open for acceptance over a period of time is: (a) Cross Offer (b) Counter Offer (c) Standing Offer (d) Implied Offer
Specific offer can be communicated to__________ (a) All the parties of contract (b) General public in universe (c) Specific person (d) None of the above
_________ amounts to rejection of the original offer. (a) Cross offer (b) Special offer (c) Standing offer (d) Counter offer
A advertises to sell his old car by advertising in a newspaper. This offer is caleed: (a) General Offer (b) Special Offer (c) Continuing Offer (d) None of the above
In case a counter offer is made, the original offer stands: (a) Rejected (b) Accepted automatically (c) Accepted subject to certain modifications and variations (d) None of the above
In case of unenforceable contract having some technical defect, parties (a) Can sue upon it (b) Cannot sue upon it (c) Should consider it to be illegal (d) None of the above
If entire specified goods is perished before entering into contract of sale, the contract is (a) Valid (b) Void (c) Voidable (d) Cancelled
______________ contracts are also caled contracts with executed consideration. (a) Unilateral (b) Completed (c) Bilateral (d) Executory
A offers B to supply books @ Rs 100 each but B accepts the same with condition of 10% discount. This is a case of (a) Counter Offer (b) Cross Offer (c) Specific Offer (d) General Offer
_____________ is a game of chance. (a) Conditional Contract (b) Contingent Contract (c) Wagering Contract (d) Quasi Contract
There is no binding contract in case of _______ as one's offer cannot be constructed as acceptance (a) Cross Offer (b) Standing Offer (c) Counter Offer (d) Special Offer
An offer is made with an intention to have negotiation from other party. This type of offer is: (a) Invitation to offer (b) Valid offer (c) Voidable (d) None of the above
When an offer is made to the world at large, it is ____________ offer. (a) Counter (b) Special (c) General (d) None of the above
Implied contract even if not in writing or express words is perfectly _______________ if all the conditions are satisfied:- (a) Void (b) Voidable (c) Valid (d) Illegal
A specific offer can be accepted by ___________. (a) Any person (b) Any friend to offeror (c) The person to whom it is made (d) Any friend of offeree
An agreement toput a fire on a person's car is a ______: (a) Legal (b) Voidable (c) Valid (d) Illegal


text:
DURHAM — Chris Zarkoskie, a left guard and captain on the 10th-ranked University of New Hampshire football team, was named to the Capital One Academic NCAA Division I Football District 1 First Team on Thursday, as announced by the College Sports Information Directors of America.
Zarkoskie, a senior with a 3.54 grade-point-average in psychology who also received this accolade in 2011, advances to the national ballot. The Academic All-America Team will be announced Dec. 6.
The three-year starter on the offensive line has been named to UNH's Academic Honor Roll every semester, including Highest Honors twice and High Honors three times, and he was a 2012 Allstate American Football Coaches Association (AFCA) Good Works Team nominee.
Zarkoskie has started all 10 games in 2012 and, due to his blocking and leadership skills, the Wildcats' offense is ranked No. 8 in total offense (483 yards per game) and No. 9 in scoring (36.7 points per game) – both of those numbers rank second in the Colonial Athletic Association conference – and UNH is 8-2 overall (6-1 CAA) with a six-game winning streak.
As a sophomore and junior, Zarkoskie received the CAA Commissioner's Academic Award and was named to the Academic All-Conference Team; he was also a 2011 FCS Athletics Directors Association Academic All-Star Team honoree.
Capital One has launched a website devoted to the Academic All-America� program and more information can be found at www.CapitalOneAcademicAllAmerica.com.
New Hampshire returns to action Nov. 17 (12 p.m.) at Cowell Stadium for its Senior Day regular-season finale against Towson University.
Volleyball falls to Albany
DURHAM — Junior Destiny Tolliver racked up 21 kills and three other Wildcats reached double-figures, but the UNH women's volleyball team fell to Albany, 3-2, in the regular season finale Sunday afternoon at Lundholm Gymnasium.
New Hampshire wraps up the regular season at 15-13 overall and 7-5 in America East, while the Great Danes finished 13-14 on the season and 9-2 in conference play to secure the top seed as the tournament host. Set scores in the match were 24-26, 17-25, 25-18, 25-18 and 11-15.
UNH will face off in a rematch against reigning conference champion Albany in the semifinal round of the conference tournament on Friday, Nov. 16 at 7 p.m. No. 2 Binghamton and No. 3 UMBC will meet in the other semifinal match at 4 p.m. on the same day, while the championship match will take place on Saturday, Nov. 17 at 7 p.m.
Senior Jessie Schnepp posted 19 digs to break the program's single-season dig record. Schnepp currently has 555 digs, surpassing Alyse Lahti's mark of 540 set during the 2007 season.
Tolliver hit at a .362 clip and added six blocks, while junior Morgan Thatcher registered 14 kills. Freshmen Tori Forrest and Abby Brinkman totaled 12 kills apiece, while Forrest also added 11 digs for the double-double.
Sophomore Taylor Dunklau also registered a double-double with 53 assists and 20 digs. Sophomore Sam Henke and freshman Madison Lightfoot posted 27 and 14 digs, respectively.
Women's hockey ties PC
PROVIDENCE — Junior forward Arielle O'Neill scored a shorthanded goal in the third period to help the UNH women's hockey team notch a 2-2 tie at Providence Sunday afternoon.
The draw sets the Wildcats at 4-7-1 overall and 2-2-1 in conference play while the Friars are now 7-4-2 overall and 5-1-2 in Hockey East action.
Megan Armstrong also scored for UNH with Kristina Lavoie assisting.
Marie-Eve Jean finished with 25 saves.
New Hampshire will return to the ice when it travels to Maine for one game Saturday, Nov. 17. Puck drop is set for 12 p.m.
Community gymnastics returns
DURHAM — The UNH gymnastics program announced Tuesday that gymnastics classes for school-age community children are being offered Wednesday afternoons at the UNH Field House starting Jan. 16. Classes of all levels for boys and girls are taught in a safe, progressive manner.
The eight-week winter session runs from Jan. 16-March 6. There are two separate class times available: 4-5 p.m. and 5-6 p.m. Each session costs $90.00 plus a $20.00 registration fee if not already paid for the 2012-13 school year.
For more information, contact Melanie Brown at (603) 862-4148 or firstname.lastname@example.com.
UNH Roundup: Zarkoskie named to all-academic team
DURHAM — Chris Zarkoskie, a left guard and captain on the 10th-ranked University of New Hampshire football team, was named to the Capital One Academic NCAA Division I Football District 1 First Team on Thursday, as announced by the College Sports Information Directors of America.


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Not sure what to search for?click here to find out more
The Art Glaze range from Royal Crown Derby is a collection of simple, elegant and functional shapes which feature exquisite, jewel-like, reactive glazes.
The four coloured glazes have been developed to be beautiful individually, or in contrast with each other. Special attention has been given to deliver a refreshing, high-end presentation platform to best showcase chef-driven menus.
Select a colour:


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[Skip to content]
Countering truckers' parking conundrum
Colin Sowman hears about a new truck parking information system being piloted across eight states. Legislation limits truck drivers' hours with the result that they are often caught in a situation where they need to stop either for a break or an overnight rest. But as truck parking is in short supply, truck drivers spend an average of 56 minutes a day searching for available spaces and are...
Smartphone solution for parking performance
Automated parking offers optimised space utilisation and fewer damage complaints as David Crawford discovers. As cars become smarter, technology designed to make parking them more straightforward is developing in parallel. In turn, it is becoming clear that the places where vehicles spend much of their time will need to respond more comprehensively than by supporting established aids such as...
Amsterdam reaps the reward of digitised parking
Amsterdam had taken the final step in digitising parking and parking enforcement and the move is paying dividends. It was almost a decade ago that the City of Amsterdam decided to start the evolution - or maybe even a revolution of its parking enforcement: it got rid of the paper parking permit or ticket behind the windscreen and introduced the digital parking right. It was the first step on...
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Cape Cod Hotel | Hyannis MA Hotel | Orleans MA Motels |Cape Cod Hotels |Orleans MA Hotels
The Most Affordable & Family
Seashore Park Inn is the only Orleans MA hotel with both indoor and outdoor pools. We call our indoor pool the "Vacation Saver". Your family can relax and swim right here in any weather. The indoor pool also features a hot tub, and separate men's and women's saunas. A sunny patio area is located just outside the indoor pool, and a barbecue area with gazebo is centrally located.
We invite you to start your day with our complimentary continental breakfast, including coffee, juices, and more in the main building. Here you'll find a lobby stocked with visitor information, a game room with pool tables and television, and a friendly staff ready to help you plan activities. If you are looking for a Cape Cod hotel near the National Seashore, Hyannis and Provincetown, we welcome you to the Seashore Park Inn.
Seashore Park Inn also welcomes your family reunions, weddings and other social functions.
Cape Cod Hotel | Hyannis MA Hotel | Orleans MA Motels |Cape Cod Hotels |Orleans MA Hotels


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The US government opened a new website yesterday (alzheimers.gov) which aims to answer questions like: What are the treatment options? What does insurance pay for? Where can I go for help?
This website is part of the Obama administration's first National Alzheimer's Plan (.pdf) to prevent and treat Alzheimer's by 2025. Some of the research that the National Institutes of Health is looking at includes an insulin spray therapy which is squirted into the nose, and a study targeting amyloid, the "brain plaque" that appears in Alzheimer's cases.
You can also visit the NIH's Alzheimer's Disease and Education Referral Center for information on locating nearby clinical trials, research centers, and more.


text:
Job Posting Browse - State of Texas Agency / University
- Browse does not use your saved matching options.
- Browse lets you sample job postings so you usually cannot View Contact Information here. You can view more contact information if you are registered and run a match.
- You may enter any portion of the employer name or select a job classification to search.
- Enter at least three (3) characters to search for the employer.
- You may click the "View a list of all State Of Texas Agencies and Universities" link to see a listing of every State Agency and University.


text:
The End of Death
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS HAVE PHASES. IN SPORTS, athletes first build skill and endurance, then they play the game, and finally interpret the results, celebrating victory or learning from defeat. Banquets also have phases. After we savor the meal itself, we linger …Read More
The Good Life
I am a lover of hip hop. I fell in love with the music form when I was 10, and I've never been the same since. As a child and a teenager, when I wasn't in class or …Read More
"I Believe in the Life Everlasting"
His name is "Beechie." Recently he surprised us with a serendipitous visit. He called to say he was in Orlando with part of his family and asked if he could make an impromptu visit to our home. We responded …Read More
In the Face of Death
"I write these things to you who believe in the name of the Son of God that you may know that you have eternal life" (1 John 5:13). Are you afraid of dying? I have seen some people overcome …Read More
The Last Enemy
"HALT! WHO GOES THERE?" Such might be the words of a sentry who confronts a mysterious stranger in the darkness. The sentry must discern the identity of the trespasser to determine whether he is a friend or foe. Armed …Read More
The New Creation
Christianity affirms the material order. In creation God made the physical world (Gen. 1) and man with a tangible body (Gen. 2:7). In redemption God effects the incarnation of Christ (Heb. 2:14) and His physical resurrection (Luke 24 …Read More


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Today's daily deal list at Target includes quite a few electric "Bella Makers" – including Mini-Pie Maker, Donut Maker, Smores Maker, Cupcake Maker, and more. If you're looking for something fun and different to give this year, these would be perfect way to bring more fun (and ease) into someone's kitchen!
Daily deals from Target ship free.


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01489 550999
Servicing & Repairs
We can provide Servicing and Repairs for all types of garden equipment including lawnmowers (both ride on mowers and walk behind mowers), chainsaws, brushcutters, cultivators, hedgetrimmers.
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Sharpening and balancing of rotary mowers and machine sharpening of chainsaws
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Products In Lawnflite Pro
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(Total Products 1, Showing: 1 -> 1)


text:
Ballet life behind the scenes: from classes, rehearsals, and performances to the company and home lives of the dancers
Crown, 1982 - Performing Arts - 182 pages
Provides an inside look at the private and professional lives of such noted dancers as Mikhail Baryshnikov, Cynthia Gregory, Rudolf Nureyev, Natalia Makarova, Peter Martins, and Patricia McBride
From inside the book
13 pages matching deux in this book
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able American Ballet Theatre Anthony Dowell appear onstage artists audience Balanchine's ballerina ballet companies ballet dancer ballet master ballet member Ballet School barre Bart Cook become believes body Bonnefous Bullough career choreographer choreologist classical ballet corps de ballet corps member costume critic Cynthia Gregory dance dancers deux difficult feel feet Fernando Bujones floor Frankel Gelsey Kirkland George Balanchine girls Giselle give hard injury Ivan Nagy Jean-Pierre Jimmy Dunne Joffrey Ballet Kay Mazzo Legrand lift look Martine van Hamel massage Merrill Ashley Mikhail Baryshnikov Miss Makarova move movement muscles Natalia Makarova never Notation pain partner Patrick Bissell performance Peter Martins pianist pointe problems realized rehearsal role Royal Ballet Rudolf Nureyev says schedule School of American season shoes soloist sometimes stage manager steps style suffered Swan Lake teacher technique things usually watching week York City Ballet


text:
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With more than 50 standard reports and unlimited configurable reports, OrbSix provides distributors and executives with visibility into the information they require to make informed decisions and keep the excitement moving in the right direction.
OrbSix offers a unique treeview that creates a detailed graphical display of each distributor's organization. Easy navigation and the advanced search window option allow distributors to quickly locate team members in large organizations. Enrolling or placing a new distributor in a specific location is fast and easy.
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Our Rank Management reporting will provide each distributor with detailed information about their personal rank advancement. It also displays the vital information of each downline team member and what each one must to do in order to meet their next rank.
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Manages each distributor's business using navigation that is both sleek and informative.
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Replicated Websites
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What is included in a dog grooming?
Dog grooming is so much more than giving your dog a bath. Dog grooming is a broad term that covers all aspects of canine cleanliness and hygiene. The services included in dog grooming will vary based on your needs and what you choose to pay. Unless they are rolling in cowpies or playing in mud puddles, most dogs are okay getting a shampoo bath only as needed. You'll know when they need it if they smell bad or are bringing dirt into the house. Some dogs, like shepherds and shih tzus, have thick coats that can get matted and tangled without regular care. Pro dog groomers can deftly blow dry a dog's hair after a bath so that it is shiny and smooth. Dog grooming can include brushing that detangles dog hair and also thins the undercoat to minimize shedding.
Dog grooming also includes hygiene services such as toothbrushing and ear cleaning. Clean teeth are important to the health of your dog, and the pros have the patience and proper technique to get it done. Regular dog grooming can stave off tear stains, those reddish stains below your dog's eyes. Anal gland expression is something not many people want to do on their own, even if they love their dog. A dog groomer can safely and efficiently release any blocked anal gland fluid. Other dog grooming services include nail trimming and clipping. Nationally, dog grooming prices range from $60 to $80. Most dog groomers offer discounts to customers who purchase monthly packages or bundle multiple grooming services at one time.
What does a dog walker do?
We all know our dogs love going on long, adventure-filled walks, but jobs and family and commuting can make it difficult to give them the leash time they deserve. You can hire a professional dog walker to make sure your furry friend gets adequate exercise and outdoor time each day. A professional dog walker may be an individual contractor or work for a dedicated dog-walking company. In either case, you want to make sure the pro has the appropriate insurance in case of an emergency. Some people opt to give the dog walker a key to their house; others to have them pick up the dog from the yard. Dog walking can happen as often as multiple times per day, or just a few times a month as needed. Here are some questions to ask when you are interviewing a new dog walker:
- Will you or someone else be walking my dog?
- Do you have a backup plan if you can't make it for a scheduled walk?
- Will you walk my dog by itself, or do you walk several dogs at once?
- What are your different walk routes?
- When will you pick up and drop off?
- How will we communicate?
- Do I have to commit to a schedule or are you flexible?
- What's your cancellation policy?
- What's your response plan if my dog gets injured or becomes sick?
- How and how often do I pay you?
- Do you offer package pricing if I buy multiple dog walks up front?
What is a dog groomer?
Keep your family dogs happy, healthy and clean with regular dog grooming. A dog groomer is a business owner or employee of a dog grooming business who specializes in dog hygiene and grooming. To find a reputable dog groomer, research reviews, ask for references and confirm that the groomer has good standing in the dog grooming community.
A dog groomer should be comfortable and competent working with dogs of all breeds and temperaments. Typically a groomer will have trained with other groomers and taken educational courses to keep abreast of the latest safety information and techniques. There are brick-and-mortar dog grooming businesses, as well as mobile dog groomers who bring all their equipment and provide their services at your home or location. In some cases, brick-and-mortar businesses will also pick up and return your dog for an additional fee.
What is a dog groomer?
A dog groomer is a service professional who provides dog grooming and basic hygiene care for your dog. Dog groomers are typically animal lovers who are competent and comfortable working with a wide range of dog breeds and temperaments. Dog groomers are knowledgeable about the care needs for different kinds of dog coats. A poodle will have different haircut needs than a shih tzu, for example, so it pays to have a trained pro provide the proper cut. Good dog groomers know how to safely clean your dog's teeth, bathe your dog, and cut their nails without going too short. They understand how to trim the hair from around your dog's face, express anal glands, and clean your dog's ears. Many people who choose dog grooming as a profession also pursue other dog services such as attending veterinary school, running a doggy day care center, working as a professional dog walker, and more.
How much do you tip the dog groomer?
Do you have a dog that you get groomed regularly? If you do, you've probably wondered how much — or even if — you're supposed to tip your dog groomer. Treat your dog groomer as you would your own hair stylist. A 15 percent to 20 percent tip is an appropriate amount to show your appreciation for a dog grooming job well done. If your dog didn't get clean or their nails didn't get properly clipped, then you certainly don't have to tip. But if you're satisfied with the service, consider the tip part of the standard dog grooming price, and just plan it into your dog care budget so you'll have a happy groomer and a well-groomed dog. Here are a few examples of when you should tip extra:
- Your dog bit the groomer! Not good. A big tip will help.
- Your pooch barked like a wild beast or wrestled the groomer the entire time.
- Your dog's hair was extra gross and dirty — think dog poo or major mud matted in their hindquarters.
- Your senior or disabled dog can't stand on their own and needs extra care and support.


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2014 Developer Salary Survey, May 13, 2014 Our survey of more than 2,200 U.S. developers shows salaries in a well-paid field are nudging up as the economy picks up steam.
Staff (that is, developers) in the West and Mountain time zones enjoyed the biggest increases, while the rest of the country saw base compensation remain comparatively flat. To my eye, the jump in the Mountain time zone's figure is as peculiar as the regions' previous years of inconsistent results: notably the declines in 2011 and 2013 when the rest of the country was seeing increases. I suspect this is the result of a low sample base, but not low enough to trigger a warning from the statisticians who analyzed the survey results.


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This document explains how to use Inkscape's Interpolate extension
Interpolate does a linear interpolation between two or more selected paths. It basically means that it "fills in the gaps" between the paths and transforms them according to the number of steps given.
To use the Interpolate effect, select the paths that you wish to transform, and choosefrom the menu.
Before invoking the effect, the objects that you are going to transform need to be paths. This is done by selecting the object and usingor Shift+Ctrl+C. If your objects are not paths, the effect will do nothing.
Interpolation between two of the same path
The simplest use of the Interpolate effect is to interpolate between two paths that are identical. When the effect is called, the result is that the space between the two paths is filled with duplicates of the original paths. The number of steps defines how many of these duplicates are placed.
For example, take the following two paths:
Now, select the two paths, and run the Interpolate effect with the settings shown in the following image.
As can be seen from the above result, the space between the two circle-shaped paths has been filled with 6 (the number of interpolation steps) other circle-shaped paths. Also note that the effect groups these shapes together.
Interpolation between two different paths
When interpolation is done on two different paths, the program interpolates the shape of the path from one into the other. The result is that you get a morphing sequence between the paths, with the regularity still defined by the Interpolation Steps value.
For example, take the following two paths:
Now, select the two paths, and run the Interpolate effect. The result should be like this:
As can be seen from the above result, the space between the circle-shaped path and the triangle-shaped path has been filled with 6 paths that progress in shape from one path to the other.
When using the Interpolate effect on two different paths, the position of the starting node of each path is important. To find the starting node of a path, select the path, then choose the Node Tool so that the nodes appear and press TAB. The first node that is selected is the starting node of that path.
See the image below, which is identical to the previous example, apart from the node points being displayed. The node that is green on each path is the starting node.
The previous example (shown again below) was done with these nodes being the starting node.
Now, notice the changes in the interpolation result when the triangle path is mirrored so the starting node is in a different position:
Interpolation Method
One of the parameters of the Interpolate effect is the Interpolation Method. There are 2 interpolation methods implemented, and they differ in the way that they calculate the curves of the new shapes. The choices are either Interpolation Method 1 or 2.
In the examples above, we used Interpolation Method 2, and the result was:
Now compare this to Interpolation Method 1:
The differences in how these methods calculate the numbers is beyond the scope of this document, so simply try both, and use which ever one gives the result closest to what you intend.
The exponent parameter controls the spacing between steps of the interpolation. An exponent of 0 makes the spacing between the copies all even.
Here is the result of another basic example with an exponent of 0.
The same example with an exponent of 1:
with an exponent of 2:
and with an exponent of -1:
When dealing with exponents in the Interpolate effect, the order that you select the objects is important. In the examples above, the star-shaped path on the left was selected first, and the hexagon-shaped path on the right was selected second.
View the result when the path on the right was selected first. The exponent in this example was set to 1:
Duplicate Endpaths
This parameter defines whether the group of paths that is generated by the effect includes a copy of the original paths that interpolate was applied on.
Interpolate Style
This parameter is one of the neat functions of the interpolate effect. It tells the effect to attempt to change the style of the paths at each step. So if the start and end paths are different colors, the paths that are generated will incrementally change as well.
Here is an example where the Interpolate Style function is used on the fill of a path:
Interpolate Style also affects the stroke of a path:
Of course, the path of the start point and the end point does not have to be the same either:
Using Interpolate to fake irregular-shaped gradients
It is not possible in Inkscape (yet) to create a gradient other than linear (straight line) or radial (round). However, it can be faked using the Interpolate effect and Interpolate Style. A simple example follows — draw two lines of different strokes:
And interpolate between the two lines to create your gradient:
As demonstrated above, the Inkscape Interpolate effect is a powerful tool. This tutorial covers the basics of this effect, but experimentation is the key to exploring interpolation further.


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I'm probably done blogging at this address, but I have a new website if interested (and will post there from time to time):
Clayton Littlejohn
Think Tonk
Monday, April 25, 2016
Sunday, November 29, 2015
Happy Holidays. I'm taking a break.
God: kill your son
Abraham: uh...ok
God: holy shit I'm jk
Abraham: umm...
God: I'll probably kill mine tho lol
Abraham: wtf?
— PapeяWash© (@PaperWash) November 11, 2015
Thursday, November 13, 2014
Introducing (and solving?) a puzzle about rationality
On a natural way of drawing the line between the internal and the external, knowledge is an externalist notion. Knowledge requires a proper fit between appearance and reality, so the stuff knowledge is made of isn't just in the head. It might seem clear to you that p, you might have strong evidence for p, and you might reason as carefully as anyone can in concluding that p, but p still might be false. If, however, it seems clear to you that p, you have incredibly strong evidence for p, and you reason carefully in concluding that p, isn't there something good about believing what you do? If all the available evidence supports p, it might seem unreasonable for you not to believe p. If that's right, maybe it's just the stuff in the head that matters to rationality.
The gap between appearance and reality is a potential threat to knowledge, but it doesn't seem to be a direct threat to rationality. Consider the new evil demon case.[1] Your non-factive mental duplicate is deceived by a Cartesian demon. Everything you see and remember, they seem to see and remember. Everything that strikes you as plausible strikes them that way, too. You reason in just the same ways. You draw all and only the same conclusions. In spite of this, there are vast differences in what you know. In spite of this, there doesn't seem to be any difference in how rational your beliefs are. This suggests that neither the presence of the appearance-reality gap nor the things on the far side of it have any direct bearing on what's rational to believe. Perhaps this is because the absence or presence of such things doesn't have any direct bearing on what's intelligible from your point of view.
A natural explanation as to why rationality supervenes upon the mental is an evidentialist explanation. The reason that facts about your mental states wholly determine whether it's rational for you to believe a proposition is that facts about your mental states determine what evidence you have and evidential support relations determine what's rational for you to believe. If your evidence provides sufficiently strong support for your beliefs, they're rational. If they're rational, it's because they're supported to a sufficient degree by the evidence.
This evidentialist explanation is not uncontroversial, but it's not unpopular either. There's been a debate about whether your evidence supervenes upon your non-factive mental states, but I'd like to bracket this issue we haven't paid enough attention to the second part of the evidentialist explanation. Should we say that rational beliefs are rational because the evidence provides sufficiently strong support for them? Even if we grant that rationality supervenes upon the evidence, this is a stronger claim, a grounding thesis. It's not clear whether we should think that it's true.
I don't think it is true. We shouldn't think of epistemic rationality as merely a matter of strong evidential support. My target is an evidentialist view with three core commitments:
1. Dependence: If you rationally believe p, you have evidence for p that provides sufficiently strong support for p.
2. Priority: The possession of evidence for p is independent from and prior to the rational status of your belief concerning p.
3. Structural Sufficiency: If you have evidence for p that provides sufficiently strong support for p, it's rational to believe p.[2]
Structural sufficiency says that there's a reason why the evidence plays the rational role that it does. By providing a level of support that crosses some sort of threshold, the evidence makes it rational to believe what's rational to believe. We should reject structural sufficiency. It's possible for two propositions to receive the same level of evidential support where it's rational to believe only one of them. Thus, strong evidential support isn't the stuff that rationality is made of.
The argument against evidentialism will be indirect. I will present a puzzle about rationality, discuss three potential solutions, and show that we have to reject evidentialism to solve the puzzle.
2. The Puzzle
There's been considerable debate recently about (putative) rational requirements such as these:
L: If t is a ticket for a fair lottery that hasn't been drawn with more than 1,00,000 tickets, you're rationally required to believe that t is a losing ticket.[3]D: If you acknowledge that your peer disagrees with you about whether p, you're rationally required to refrain from believing p.[4]
The arguments can pull us in different directions. I've changed my mind about L. When this happened, novel considerations seemed to give me good reason to change my mind. The optimist in me thinks that they could have made it rational for me to believe L. The pluralist in me thinks that my opponents could have had strong evidence for their views about L, mistaken though they were.
If we suppose that it's possible to have evidence that supports L, it should be possible to have evidence that provides a sufficient level of support for L:
1. There's sufficient evidence for you to believe L.[5]
If (1) is correct, the structural sufficiency thesis tells us:
2. You rationally believe L.
The move from (1) to (2) seems plausible. Just as we know that there are features of your perspective that can make it rational to believe you have hands by making it seem that you have them, don't we know that there are features of your perspective that can make it rational to believe L by making it seem as if L is true?
Bearing in mind what L says, let's suppose I give you a ticket for a large, fair lottery. Let p be the proposition that your ticket is a loser. Since you rationally believe L, this seems to follow from (2):
3. You rationally believe that rationality requires you to believe p.
With this belief in place and with its blessing from rationality, it's hard to see how rationality could then require you to refrain from believing that the ticket I just gave you is a loser, so we have this:
4. You rationally believe p.
Here's the turn. All that I've told you about L is that you have sufficiently strong evidence for it. I never said whether it was true or not. It wasn't:
5. L is false. You're actually rationally required to refrain from believing p.
This is the puzzle. It's hard to see how rationality could require you to believe and refrain from believing the very same proposition, so we have to give something up.
3. Three Responses
Consider three responses to our puzzle. The first starts from the idea that features of your perspective make it reasonable to believe things generally. By making it rational to believe L, they thereby have an effect on whether it's rational for you to believe lottery propositions. According to the perspectivist, rationality requires a mesh between your beliefs and your beliefs about rationality:
Enkratic Requirement: Rationality requires that you don't both believe that you're rationally required to believe p and refrain from believing p. [6]
If features of your perspective make your beliefs about rationality rational, they'll help to determine whether it's rational for you to, say, believe lottery propositions. They accept (1)-(4) and reject (5).
The Enkratic Requirement implies it's not possible for certain kinds of mistaken beliefs about rationality to be rational:
Fixed-Point Thesis: If you believe that rationality requires believing p, this belief is either true or rationally prohibited.[7]
This is a surprising consequence and some people don't like surprises. You might think that there can be rational mistakes about just about anything. The best evidence might be misleading. If it's good enough evidence, it might make mistakes reasonable. If you think strong but misleading evidence can make it rational to form mistaken beliefs about rationality, you're an incoherentist.[8] The incoherentist thinks that there can be rationally acceptable 'mismatches' where rationality permits refraining from believing p even if you rationally believe belief is required. Incoherentists think it's fine to stipulate that (5) is true. They reject (4) and try to show that (1)-(3) doesn't support it.
Objectivists agree with the perspectivist rationality requires you to be enkratic.[9] They disagree with the perspectivist about the rational significance of beliefs about rationality on our first-order attitudes. Objectivists think that we should think of the requirements of rationality as independent targets our attitudes aim to hit when we're thinking about rationality. When our beliefs about rationality miss their targets, they're irrational. This means that beliefs about rationality are different from beliefs about the weather, but this is a difference we have to live with. The facts on the bottom place constraints on what's rational to believe about rationality. They reject (2).
4. Perspectivism
Perspectivists try to solve the puzzle by denying (5) on the grounds that it conflicts with (1)-(4). They deny that we can specify the rational requirements that apply to you without taking any account of your perspective. The internal connections between your perspective and your beliefs determine whether they're rational and determine whether something like L applies to you. Let's start by looking at two arguments for perspectivism.
The intelligibility argument starts with the observation that a rational response must be intelligible from the subject's perspective. Suppose a subject's options always contain at least one rationally permitted option. Rationality couldn't reasonably require you to refrain from believing, refrain from disbelieving, and refrain from refraining. Suppose that your evidence strongly supports the belief that you're rationally required to believe p. If so, you might think that if the subject believes that she's rationally required to believe p, this belief is rationally permitted. Suppose, that's right and that's what she believes. Which of the following options would be rationally permitted?
1. Believing ~p whilst rationally believing that she's rationally required to believe p.
2. Believing neither p nor ~p whilst rationally believing that she's rationally required to believe p.
3. Believing p whilst rationally believing that she's rationally required to believe p.
It isn't intelligible to suspend or disbelieve in light of the belief that believing is rationally required, so (1) and (2) fail the intelligibility test. Thus, if one option is rationally permitted, it's (3). Perspectivism is vindicated.[10]
The second argument for perspectivism is the evidentialist's argument. Evidentialists say we should respect all the evidence, including higher-order evidence. Suppose, if only for reductio, there's a counterexample to perspectivism. The counterexample would have to be a case in which (a) you rationally believe that you're rationally required to believe p and (b) believing p isn't rationally permitted. Feldman (2005) thinks this is impossible. If (a) holds, there's sufficient evidence for believing that you're rationally required to believe p. If (b) holds, there's not sufficient support for believing p. The trouble with this description of the case, according to Feldman, is that the evidence that supports the epistemic belief and ensures that (a) is met is evidence that supports the first-order belief p, in which case (b) isn't met.
4.1 A Response
Feldman overlooks the possibility of having sufficiently strong evidence for an anti-evidentialist view of rationality, such as a view on which you can be rationally required to believe p in the absence of evidence when such a belief is desirable. While such a view strikes us as implausible, there still could be subjects that believe it on strong evidence. We don't know what happened in William James' basement. Maybe he locked students away in cages and fed them a diet of gruel and arguments for the claim that rationality can require belief in the absence of evidence. If their evidence supported such pragmatist views, the evidentialist should recognize that these views were rationally held. If so, evidentialism says that these subjects would rationally believe that they were rationally required to believe p even when they knew that p wasn't supported by evidence. The level of evidential support for p wouldn't be sufficient for rationality, not even if the belief that p is rationally required was supported to a sufficiently high degree. Evidentialism predicts counterexamples to the enkratic requirement, so there's no good evidentialist argument for perspectivism.
We can see the views are in tension if you imagine reasoning as follows:
P1. There's sufficient evidential support for p.P2. If there's sufficient evidential support for p, I'm rationally required to believe p.C. I'm rationally required to believe p.
Suppose that, in keeping with evidentialism, you know (P2). Suppose, however, that you have strong but misleading evidence for (P1). Evidentialists and perspectivists agree that you rationally believe both premises, in which case they should agree that you could rationally accept (C). Since (P1) is false, there isn't sufficient evidence for p. The evidentialists should say, then, that the argument's conclusion is false even if both premises are rationally believed. Perspectivists have to accept the argument's conclusion and reject the evidentialist's dependency thesis.
The perspectivist objection overgeneralizes and threatens to lead to a kind of epistemic anarchism on which there aren't any principles that specify the conditions that determine what's rationally required of all rational subjects. The second objection to evidentialism applies to any view that says that there's at least one rational requirement with these two properties:
1. The requirement states, 'If C obtains, you're rationally permitted to believe p' where the fact that C obtains isn't a fact about rationality.
2. C's obtaining is a necessary condition for rational permission (i.e., if C doesn't obtain, you're rationally prohibited from believing p).
To see this, it seems possible that a subject's evidence could provide arbitrarily strong support for (a) false propositions about the rational significance of C or (b) false propositions about whether C obtains. Under these conditions, perspectivists should say that what's rationally required isn't what the putative principle states, so the perspectivist would say that the principle is spurious. It seems to be a pretty weak requirement on a theory of rational belief that it recognizes at least one rational requirement that meets both conditions, so I have real worries about perspectivism.
Epistemic anarchism is a rather troubling view because it seems to conflict with some independently plausible claims about rational requirements. These requirements are supposed to be categorical requirements that have rational authority over all thinkers regardless of what attitude they take towards them. They're supposed to tell us what kinds of things have rational significance and what their significance is and so it seems that denying that there are such principles comes at tremendous cost.
There's a truth in the neighborhood of the evidentialist's priority thesis that we mustn't forget. Thoughts about rationality don't make things rational, not even when backed by evidence. Consider the relationship between a subject's attitudes about fitting emotional responses and fitting emotional responses. We don't think that part of what determines whether anger or joy is fitting is a subject's attitude towards whether it's fitting. Having strong evidence for your theory of fitting emotional response wouldn't make it rational for you to be angered by the sight of animals enjoying a bask in the sun, not even if that followed from your theory. If rational belief is anything like a fitting response to accessible features of your situation, we should likewise be skeptical of the suggestion that the fittingness of such doxastic responses is determined by beliefs about rational responses.[11] If rational support doesn't flow down from evidence for beliefs about rationality to the beliefs you take to be rational, either rationality doesn't care about whether your higher-order and lower-order attitudes mesh or the constraints that apply to the lower-order attitudes apply all the way up.
5. Incoherentism
Incoherentism is a natural choice for evidentialists. If strong evidential support for beliefs about rationality doesn't invariably trickle down to provide evidential support for beliefs we think we're required to have, shouldn't we reject the enkratic requirement? The incoherentists think so. They think that structural sufficiency shows us that there are counterexamples to the fixed-point thesis, cases in which there's sufficient evidential support for believing false propositions about the requirements of rationality. Since arguments against the fixed-point thesis are, inter alia, arguments against the enkratic requirement, the incoherentist thinks that we can solve the puzzle by rejecting this requirement. By doing so, we can retain (5) and retain (1)-(3).[12]
Unfortunately, incoherentism is hard on our intuitions. Consider a dramatization of an exchange between you and your epistemic conscience:
EC: Let's start with the bad news. These are the results of your periodic epistemic evaluation. A lot of your first-order doxastic responses we've flagged for irrationality. Do you want to start with omissions or commissions?
You: Omissions.
EC: Fine. You don't believe p.You: That's right.
EC: Right, I know you know that. It's irrational. You're rationally required to believe p.You: That seems right to me.
EC: I thought you'd say that. You don't seem to remember, but I told you the same thing on the last three visits. And yet, here we are. Look, if you don't agree with my assessments, just tell me. I'm starting to worry that you don't take this seriously.You: On the contrary! I take this very seriously. I agreed earlier and I agree with you now.EC: So, what gives? If you agree that it's irrational for you not to believe p, why are you just sitting there? Why don't you get up and change your mind?
You: I'm not sure that that's called for. I agree that it's not rational for me to refrain from believing p. I believe that. Really, that seems obvious to me. I just don't know what change is called for.EC: Is that because you're waiting for the good news? We've run the tests and your beliefs about rationality are all fine.You: Oh, I expected as much. I'm certain that my higher-order beliefs are all rational.EC: I've lost the thread. You agree that it's irrational for you not to believe p. You agree that it's rational for you to agree on this point. You acknowledge that you don't believe p. You just don't yet see that this calls for any sort of change.
You: Right.
EC: Should we continue with these evaluations?
You: Yes, of course we should, they're very important.
When you discover a mismatch the discovery should be the beginning of of epistemic self-assessment and revision, not the conclusion of it. If, however, the incoherentist is right, your akrasia might be just the thing that's keeping you in line with the requirements of rationality. In the exchange with your epistemic conscience, you don't seem very reasonable, so it's hard to see how maintaining your akratic position could be preferable from the point of view of rationality than alternatives in which you conform to the enkratic requirement.
There's a further reason to be uneasy about this idea of rational epistemic akrasia. Suppose someone believes evidentialism. Suppose she has sufficient evidence to believe that she's rationally required to believe p but she doesn't believe p. She violates the enkratic requirement. Incoherentists should think that it doesn't matter to the rationality of her relevant attitudes whether she knows that she doesn't believe p or not, so let's say that she knows that she doesn't believe p.[13] If she's aware that she doesn't believe p, it seems to her that she cannot settle the question whether p. While she takes the question to be open, she thinks that there's not only evidence that supports p, it requires her to settle the question whether p in a particular way. It's hard to understand how she could (a) rationally take the question to be one that she cannot now settle if (b) she also thinks that her evidence rationally compels her to settle it in a particular way. If you judge that your evidence rationally compels you to believe that the correct answer to the question whether p is p, wouldn't any reasonable person take that question to be closed?[14] The mindset of this person is opaque. It's hard to see how rationality could sanction such a mindset. If rationality requires you not to knowingly violate the enkratic requirement, it should require you not to violate it at all.
6. Objectivism
Objectivism is the best of a bad bunch. Because objectivists recognize the enkratic requirement, they avoid objections to incoherentism. The argument from perspectivism to epistemic anarchism assumed that the internal connections between features of a subject's perspective and her attitudes about rationality wholly determined whether those attitudes were rational. The objectivist doesn't think that such internal connections are sufficient on their own to make the relevant attitudes rational because they don't guarantee that they'd hit an independent target. The argument for epistemic anarchism is blocked from the outset. We solve the puzzle by denying that (1) establishes (2).
Doesn't this point to obvious problems with objectivism? The only defenses of the enkratic requirement and fixed-point thesis appeal to contested intuitions or arguments that support perspectivism. One might reasonably worry that objectivist responses to the puzzle are ad hoc. What's worse is that objectivism seems to conflict with some platitudinous claims about the way that the features of our perspective make our beliefs rational. Doesn't the intelligibility argument rule this view out?
Objectivists have to respond to these worries. Let's start with the intelligibility argument. It rests on two assumptions:
Intelligibility Thesis: If f-ing is a rational response to the situation, f-ing is an intelligible response to the situation (i.e., one that makes sense from the subject's point of view).[15]Availability Thesis: In any situation there's at least one rationally permitted response to that situation.These imply that in any given situation there's at least one response that's rationally intelligible.
Without the availability thesis, the intelligibility argument won't go through. The success of the argument depends upon whether we can run an argument by elimination to show that once you rationally believe p to be rationally required, believing p is rationally permitted on the grounds that alternatives aren't intelligible.
One thing the objectivist could argue is that the theses don't pair together terribly well. Think about the possibility of muddles, situations in which none of the available options is intelligible to someone. If you're guilty of some gross rational failing, can't you arrange things so that none of the available options is intelligible? If so, the intelligibility thesis is at odds with the availability thesis.
We can revise the availability thesis to avoid this:
Modest Availability Thesis: If you find yourself in a situation and this isn't the result of some rational failure on your part, there's at least one rationally permitted response to that situation.
The weakened thesis doesn't support the argument for perspectivism. Suppose you and a peer disagree about L in that you think that we're rationally required to believe lottery propositions and they think that we're prohibited from believing them. If you both judge, in keeping with your views, that the lottery proposition is one that you're rationally required to believe or prohibited from believing, objectivism says that one of you will find yourself in a situation in which there are no rationally permissible options when it comes to the lottery proposition. If you cannot intelligibly suspend on whether p when you believe belief to be rationally required, suspension and disbelief would be ruled out. If you are on the wrong side of the debate about L, however, belief would also be ruled out. This doesn't threaten the Modest Availability Thesis, however, because if you're the one who's wrong about what rationality requires, objectivism says that you're in the bad situation as a result of a rational failure on your part. Objectivists might be fine with the idea of perplexity secundum quid even if they reject the idea of perplexity simpliciter (i.e., they might reject the idea that there are no permissible options when you're guilty of some sort of wrong even if they think that when you do no wrong there must always be at least one permissible option).
But, you might ask, where's the rational failure? You've followed the evidence and the evidence suggested that L is true. How can this be a case of rational failure? The objectivist says that this is a case of perplexity secundum quid because mistakes about the requirements of rationality are rational failures.
This is only satisfying if we have a defense of the fixed-point thesis. Titelbaum suggests that the thesis might be correct because we all happen to have propositional justification to believe the truth about what rationality requires of us. As he puts it, the reason that the 'justificatory map' is arranged in such a way that we don't have justification for believing falsehoods about the requirements of rationality is that "every agent possesses apriori, propositional justification for true beliefs about the requirements of rationality in her current situation" (forthcoming: 21).
Is this convincing? If justification is a matter of strong evidential support, the suggestion is that the reason it's irrational to form false beliefs about what rationality requires is that we all have strong (undefeated?) evidence for the right views of rationality. Is this plausible? The possession of evidence for any particular view depends upon contingent facts about a subject's psychology. Changing a subject's mental states by presenting new arguments that she finds convincing can change a subject's evidence. Haven't some of us had evidence for L and later had evidence that weighs strongly against L?
Titelbaum's explanation assumes we have assets we don't have. My explanation of the fixed-point thesis focuses on liabilities, not assets. Consider an example. Suppose your accountant watches while you fill in your forms for the IRS and he tells you that you ought to take certain deductions and report certain kinds of income in specific ways. The result is that you lose money you could have saved and you break a few laws. Meanwhile, a neighbor does their taxes in just the same way you've done working on their own. Your neighbor isn't competent at handling this kind of situation. Their actions manifest this incompetence. What about your accountant? I'd say that he manifests the same kind of incompetence and shows himself to be incapable of managing the situation even though this incompetence is manifested in his beliefs about what you should do rather than the actions that manifested the neighbor's incompetence. Both have shown themselves to be insensitive or unresponsive to the relevant features of the situation in spite of their awareness of them.
A similar point applies when it comes to handling reasons/evidence. Rationality requires an understanding of what's required when reasons apply to you. If your first-order attitudes violate rational requirements (e.g., by believing on the basis of the wrong kind of grounds or on the basis of insufficient evidence), you'll manifest the kind of incompetence at handling reasons that merits the charge of irrationality. If instead you judge that you should form beliefs that happen to violate these requirements, this judgment reflects the same incompetence, the same failure to discern what a situation requires of you, that the first-order irrational belief did. Since this failure is what makes for the irrationality of the first-order attitude, it makes the belief about rationality irrational. This is why mistaken beliefs about what rationality requires of you are themselves irrational beliefs.
The fixed-point thesis isn't true because we all happen to have evidence for the right list of rational requirements; rather, it's true because the grounds for saying that someone's attitudes are irrational is that those attitudes reveal a kind of incompetence with respect to handling reasons and their demands.
7. Objectivism and Evidentialism
There's a quick argument from objectivism against structural sufficiency. A source (e.g., testimony, apparent rational insight, reasoning) might provide evidence that R1 and R2 are both genuine requirements of rationality. Suppose only R1 is. If the support is sufficiently strong in both cases, structural sufficiency tells us that it's rational to believe both to be rational requirements. The fixed-point thesis says, however, that it could only be rational to believe one to be a rational requirement. Thus, according to the fixed-point thesis, rationality isn't simply a matter of having sufficiently strong evidential support.
If rationality isn't simply a matter of strong evidential support, what is it? The principles that capture the requirements of rationality have application conditions that pick out conditions that matter to epistemology much in the way that, say, a law's application condition is connected to some value that the law aims to protect. If you're aware of the relevant condition but aren't moved in the way the principle states you're required to be, this manifests a kind of unresponsiveness to the relevant value, de re unresponsiveness.[16] The objectivist sees this kind of responsiveness as essential to rational belief formation. If rational beliefs are irrational because they're de re unresponsive, we have an explanation of the enkratic requirement and fixed-point thesis. Just as the first-order belief that, say, some ticket lost might count as irrational because it's not properly responsive to epistemically relevant features that call for certain responses, the belief that you're rationally compelled to believe this ticket to be a loser is in its own way de re unresponsive as it manifests the same commitment to go against the things that our epistemic standards care about.
Here's one lesson to take from this. If we start by helping themselves to evidence and possession and try to work from there to construct a theory of rational belief on which the stuff that makes rational belief rational is some formal relation between the rational belief and the elements that support it, we face a difficulty. It seems that evidence that something shows real insight, understanding, proper sensibility, and responsiveness might be misleading. Thus, we have to choose between a view on which such things don't matter to rationality or we have to argue that the evidence cannot be misleading because the evidence for thinking something is insightful or shows proper sensitivity just makes something insightful or properly sensitive. Neither option is palatable.
The worry can be put like this. Take a view on which actual rational insight or understanding is a necessary precondition for having rational beliefs about what rationality requires from you. To rationally believe, say, that you shouldn't violate the enkratic requirement or shouldn't believe lottery propositions, a merely apparent rational insight won't do. We need a genuine insight and genuine understanding. Some will object to such a view on the grounds that a merely apparent rational insight should have some rational force that's comparable to the rational force of a genuine one much in the way that, say, hallucination should have comparable rational force to perception. We'll be invited to think of genuine and merely apparent rational insight as having some sort of common character and that it cannot be more rational to respond to the genuine rational insights than the apparent ones.[17]
This has to be a mistake, but where does the mistake lie? It's not in the idea that there are mock insights. It's in the idea that there's no rational difference between mock insight and genuine insight. Notice, however, that we're not going to make much headway in understanding where the difference lies until we see how limited assets-based explanations are in epistemology. We'd be forced to fight this fight in terms familiar from debates about the rational role of experience and the significance of error cases and find something that's an aspect of genuine insight that's lacking from a mock insight. This is the wrong way to approach the issue. The difference between sensory error and the errors about rationality's requirements are clearer when we think about the role of value. In the case of sensory error, your beliefs don't manifest any sort of de re unresponsiveness. They don't show that you're bad at understanding what reasons require of you, only that you sometimes make mistakes about which reasons there are that place demands on you. In the case of mock insight, you're committing yourself to something perverse, something bad, something untoward and revealing that your values are out of line with the things that epistemology cares about. It's perverse to care about things that epistemology takes to be worthless or to fail to respect the things that epistemology values and then to insist that you care about epistemology's approval.
We'll see that the formal approach to rationality that the evidentialist takes is bankrupt if we think about things like the rational relations between beliefs, actions, and emotions. Foley (2001) once defended the view that epistemic rationality plays a foundational role in the overall theory of rationality because, he said, if you rationally believe rationality requires you to feel, think, or do, rationality just will permit feeling, thinking, or so doing. If you rationally judge that rationality requires being angry or going to the left, the features of your perspective that make the belief rational ensure that the emotion or action is rational, too.
It's clear now that if we think of a subject's perspective as a collection of mental states that make things seem to her a certain way, this model isn't very good, not if you think that the rationality of being angry about something depends upon whether it's anger directed at a fitting object. Your evidence could provide arbitrarily strong support for a theory of fitting objects of anger according to which it's appropriate to be angry about things like the happiness of children or the equitable distribution of resources, but it's not fitting to be angry about such things. If fittingness is connected to rationality, the rationality of an emotional response can't be wholly determined by the stuff that Foley thinks makes for rational belief. Either rationality of emotion has nothing to do with whether the emotional response is appropriate or he has to admit that he got things the wrong way around. If indeed there's a nexus and the rationality of a belief is connected to the rational standing of the stuff that beliefs rationalize, he has to see that the determinants of epistemic rationality aren't just features of your perspective but also includes the features of things that determine what response is fitting.
If we apply this now back to belief, we might think that something similar holds for belief. Certain beliefs are appropriate responses to epistemic situations, situations that we characterize in terms of a subject's perspective on the world. Just as certain beliefs won't be fitting in certain epistemic situations, certain beliefs about what rationality requires of you will be constrained by features of the epistemic situation, not your take on it.
Adler, J. 2002. Belief's Own Ethics. MIT University Press.
Arpaly, N. 2002. Unprincipled Virtue. Oxford University Press.
Broome, J. 2013. Rationality Through Reasoning. Wiley-Blackwell.
Coates, A. 2012. Rational Epistemic Akrasia. American Philosophical Quarterly 49: 113-24.
Cohen, S. 1984. Justification and Truth. Philosophical Studies 46: 279-95.
Conee, E. and R. Feldman. 2004. Evidentialism. Oxford University Press.
Fantl, Jeremy and Matt McGrath. 2009. Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford University Press.
Feldman, R. 2005. Respecting the Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 19: 95-119.
____. 2006. Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement. In S. Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press, pp. 216-37.
Foley, R. 2001. The Foundational Role of Epistemology in a General Theory of Rationality. In A. Fairweather and L. Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press, pp. 214– 31.
Gibbons, J. 2014. The Norm of Belief. Oxford University Press.
Greco, D. Forthcoming. A Puzzle about Epistemic Akrasia. Philosophical Studies.
Hawthorne, J. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
Huemer, M. 2006. Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition. American Philosophical Quarterly 43: 147-58.
____. 2007. Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74: 30-55.
Horowitz, S. Forthcoming. Epistemic Akrasia. Nous.
Ichikawa, J. and B. Jarvis. 2013. The Rules of Thought. Oxford University Press.
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. MS. Enkrasia or Evidentialism: Learning to Love Mismatch.
Littlejohn, C. 2012. Justification and the Truth-Connection. Cambridge University Press.
Nelkin, D. 2000. The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality. Philosophical Review 109: 373–409.
Smithies, D. 2012. Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85: 273-300.
Sutton, J. 2007. Without Justification. MIT University Press.
Titelbaum, M. Forthcoming. Rationality's Fixed Point (Or: In Defense of Right Reason). In J. Hawthorne and T. Gendler (ed.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
____. Forthcoming b. How to Derive a Narrow-Scope Requirement from Wide-Scope Requirements. Philosophical Studies.
Wedgwood, R. 2002. Internalism Explained. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64: 349-69.
Whiting, D. 2014. Keeping Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the Apriori. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
[1] See Cohen (1984) and Wedgwood (2002).
[2] See Conee and Feldman (2004).
[3] See Hawthorne (2004) and Nelkin (2000).
[4] See Feldman (2006).
[5] It doesn't seem terribly plausible to deny (1) because there are things that we rationally believe about rationality. If this fact isn't itself trouble for the evidentialist, then we often have sufficient evidence to believe things about rationality. If we can have strong evidence to believe things about rationality, it seems that somebody could have strong evidence for L.
[6] Feldman (2005), Foley (2001) and Gibbons (2014) are the two writers who seem to be the most sympathetic to perspectivism in the literature. Broome (2013), Greco (forthcoming), Horowitz (forthcoming), Ichikawa and Jarvis (2013), and Smithies (2012) defend the enkratic requirement and/or fixed-point thesis for justification or rationality, but it's not clear whether they should be classified as perspectivists or objectivists.
[7] See Titelbaum (forthcoming, forthcoming b) where he shows how the fixed-point thesis can be derived from the enkratic requirement. He doesn't offer much defense of the enkratic requirement, but I offer an argument and explanation below.
[8] See Coates (2012) and Lasonen-Aarnio (MS.) for defenses of incoherentism.
[9] Titelbaum (forthcoming, forthcoming b) seems to be an objectivist. Littlejohn (2012) and Sutton (2007) defend similar views concerning justification, but not for rationality.
[10] See Gibbons (2014). I think Foley (2001) is also sympathetic to this line of argument. Fantl and McGrath (2009) offer a similar argument for internalism about justification.
[11] Once we see why Feldman's argument for perspectivism isn't a goer, perspectivists shouldn't be tempted to think that some formal or structural relationship is in place so that the evidence that supports higher-order beliefs provides sufficiently strong support for lower-order attitudes. So, while they might not describe their view as a view on which attitudes about rationality make lower-order beliefs rational, they really can't say that such higher-order beliefs merely ensure that there's sufficient support for lower-order attitudes.
[12] See Coates (2012) and Lasonon-Aarnio (MS).
[13] The incoherentist shouldn't think that it matters whether the subject knows that she doesn't believe p. The evidentialist view seems to predict that there will be counterexamples to the enkratic requirement even when the subject knows that she doesn't believe p.
[14] This point is similar to points defended by Adler (2002).
[15] I have worries about the intelligibility thesis, too. If the intelligibility of responding to a rational requirement requires registering that there's something in the situation that merits the response, the intelligibility thesis implies that those who don't have the proper sensitivity or understanding won't be bound by the (putative) rational requirement because they lack what's needed to register its significance. This implies, in turn, that the requirement isn't categorical for it applies only to those who can appreciate its rational force. If our conception of rational requirements is, however, the conception of requirements that have rational authority for all rational creatures, the intelligibility thesis needs to be seriously modified. Once modified, I doubt that the modified thesis would support the argument for perspectivism.
[16] See Arpaly (2002).
[17] See Huemer (2006, 2007). The point I'm challenging is one he takes to be an important internalist insight.
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The Estherville community should be extremely proud of the Community Christmas Project which took place yesterday (Tuesday) at the Duhigg Center.
Initiated and coordinated by the Estherville Area Ministerial Association, this project served 984 individuals this year, which translates into 192 men, 282 women, and 510 children. This means that 984 individuals in Emmet County will have Christmas gifts this year, and be assured that their neighbors and friends in Christian love really do care about them and their well-being.
The Estherville Community Christmas Project is a marvelous example of a total community cooperation.
Volunteers from the Ministerial Association churches spend many days working together, organizing the project, doing the necessary leg work, buying, and working with the churches, organizations, merchants, and individuals, as well as the Department of Human Services, and Upper Des Moines Opportunity. Much credit must be given to the media for the publicity, and also to St. Patrick's Church for donating their Duhigg Center facility for the days of the project.
Gifts for the project come from many sources. Individuals contribute gifts through their churches, merchants are very helpful, service and civic organizations participate, and many individuals contribute funds, which are used to purchase any needed gifts that may not have been donated. This project takes on added meaning each year for many of the volunteers as they seek to continue this tradition of service, which began before 1982, in memory of those volunteers who have helped over the years, but are not longer able to participate.
Father Brian Hughes,
For the Estherville Area Ministerial Association


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The Social Network
12 comments
- KATHY said...
Buenas tardes Lore!!!
ahhhh que elegante que estas!!! y la carita animada...besosssss
- Jan 28, 2011, 1:45:00 PM
I am totally on FB!
Having said that, I want to explain myself a bit more. I only use it to communicate with friends who live all over the world. However some people might go a bit overboard with it. I don't like it.
- Jan 28, 2011, 2:37:00 PM
- Biba said...
I am. But I,too, use it for communication purposes only.
- Jan 28, 2011, 3:33:00 PM
Yes, I've been on for years. It was pretty fun until my MIL wanted to be my friend. That sort of wrecked the whole thing for me. ;)
- Jan 28, 2011, 3:43:00 PM
- LyddieGal said...
I haven't seen the social network yet either. It's on my netflix queue, so whenever it eventually comes up...
I am on FB, but I don't often go on. It has been evolving a lot, and I feel like the original users (the college students) sort of got left in the dust. My sister in highschool goes on rants about someone having "inboxed" her (sent her a PM through FB) My mother is on all the time reconnecting with old highschool friends, and she likes to rant about people who would dare friend her and NOT even write her a message.
But I'd rather email my friends, and not have to deal with declining 20 million requests to join farmville.
- Jan 28, 2011, 3:45:00 PM
- Sheila said...
I am not on Facebook and have no plans to be. I have enough of an online presence with my blog (which I'm pretty public about with people that I meet), but email is enough for me to communicate or plan things with friends - I just don't need to be in touch the way Facebook is set up.
I don't even have a cell phone!
- Jan 28, 2011, 4:43:00 PM
- Miss Emma Kitty said...
That is a Beautiful top. I am on facebook but I don't use it very often.
- Jan 28, 2011, 5:24:00 PM
- drollgirl said...
i will be watching this movie over the weekend.
i lOATHE facebook. i cannot stand it. but i want to see the movie just to have the background story on the smarties that came up with the concept.
have a good weekend!
- Jan 28, 2011, 5:58:00 PM
- Paperlicious Girl said...
I am on facebook~but it has been to communicate with old friends and family out of state! I love being able to catch up with people I normally wouldn't be able to~but I am not on there everyday or even every week~I definitely limit my time!
Thanks so much for visiting my blog! Yes the placemats are available and are $12 without shipping! Thank you!!!
- Jan 28, 2011, 8:13:00 PM
- Cosmic said...
Love your ethnic print silk? top(elegant, feminine and demure:)BTW I managed to close my FB account in 2009.
- Jan 29, 2011, 11:46:00 AM
- 十十f十 said...
hi Lorena, thanks for stopping by! i enjoyed this post. i've yet to watch the movie and i'm on FB. fact, i even have two... i hardly participate in any of those games and features on FB. i started the second one only as an additional way to reach out to more people for my online shop. i should measure its effectiveness... eBay's already doing quite a good job. i've asked myself if this is sustainable (just like i wondered if i'd keep blogging). why can't i just link the online shop to just one FB account? i have issues about privacy. yet my blog's open to all. less than a handful of friends know about my blog. i contradict myself alot, i know.
- Jan 29, 2011, 12:26:00 PM
i am a a facebookerS! :P
i kinda like da movie.. i find the dialog is soo rich... but yes its little bit boring in the beginning ..
- Feb 2, 2011, 6:53:00 AM


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I've never had a New Years Resolution that I took seriously – especially one I took seriously enough to admit having it in the first place. But 2012 will be different. In 2012, I'm holding everyone accountable for my New Years Resolutions – because if you know them, then I can't deny having them and I have effectively spread the responsibility of following them. I made them short, simple, and easy to remember. Here they are:
Eat more veggies
Do yoga
Take pictures
Work hard
Practice kindness
Simple enough, right? We'll see…
From what I hear, second semester of 1L year is a lot less stressful than first semester. They tell me I can already sort-of speak law, my ability to read cases has improved, and I know what to expect as far as cold-calling and final exams. I'm crossing my fingers these aren't lies to make me feel better. What does make me feel better is that I have accepted my first co-op position for this coming summer! I'll be working at the Greater Boston Legal Service's Immigration Unit. The office seems fast-paced, laid-back, and all around fantastic. Plus, I think I'll get to practice my Spanish!
I'm in the middle of LSSC Social Justice Intensive Week. It has been a great opportunity to focus on getting a large chunk of our project done while getting cozy with my Law Office in the NUSL library. We're working hard, taking few breaks, and letting our fresh brains and attitudes carry us through the week.
As my second semester books are slowly coming in the mail, I'm trying to get the last Hunger Games book finished (read them!) and do more "fun things" before the work begins. Last weekend, I baked cookies with my sister and ate so much dough that my stomach hurt. There's nothing like warm, fresh cookies on a cold winter day. So, I took a picture of the fruits of my labor and then ate veggies for dinner. Consider that 2 checks on the Resolution list.


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Kitchen Conversations Podcast main content.
by AMNH on
People in nearly every culture around the world cook—in fact, it's one of humankind's most distinctive traits. The Museum's special exhibition Our Global Kitchen: Food, Nature, Culture explores cultures and cooking, historic meals and markets, and the moments in our lives we mark with food—taking visitors on a journey of growing, transporting, cooking, tasting, and celebrating food.
During Festival Luna, a two-day Global Weekends festival that took place at the Museum in early 2013, the Museum hosted a team from Kitchen Conversations, a project to document storytelling about food. Interviewers asked visitors to offer personal reflections about meals and cooking. In this podcast, join the conversation with raconteurs of all ages and from different backgrounds as they swap recipes and recall their favorite home-cooked meals.
If you'd like to share an image of what food means to you, whether it's the strangest meal you've ever had, or remembering your family gathered around the dinner table, post your photo to Instagram with the hashtag #CelebrateFood, and include a brief caption. Your photo could be selected to be featured in the exhibition Our Global Kitchen.
Festival Luna took place at the Museum on January 25 and January 26, 2013. Our Global Kitchen: Food, Nature, Culture is open through August 11, 2013.
Podcast: Download | RSS | iTunes (18 mins, 22 MB)
The Presenting Sponsor of the Museum's cultural programming is MetLife Foundation.
Support for Global Weekends is made possible, in part, by the Ford Foundation, the May and Samuel Rudin Family Foundation, Inc., and the family of Frederick H. Leonhardt.
The exclusive corporate sponsor for Our Global Kitchen is J.P. Morgan.
Additional support for Our Global Kitchen and its related educational and online resources has been provided by Grace Communications Foundation.
The Kitchen Experience is presented by Whole Foods.


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Louis Vuitton Mussette Salsa Authentic Pre Owned
Authenticity code: Louis Vuitton CA0979
This authentic Louis Vuitton Monogram Musette Salsa bag an elegant and sleek looking bag, it is made with the timeless monogram canvas with natural cowhide trim and golden hardware. It comes with a versatile adjustable leather shoulder strap. It securely closes with a magnetic snap. Perfect if you are looking for something feminine and lightweight to hold all your daily essentials.The ideal bag to carry all day long.
Authentic: Preowned
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Interior: Gently used
Measurements: (Approx.) 9.4" x 9.8" x 2.8"
Product Code: 1713085
Read more about Louis Vuitton Date Code here.
All photos are of actual item being sold. © 2007-2019 LuxeDH.
This Louis Vuitton® item is guaranteed to be authentic. Louis Vuitton is a registered trademark of Louis Vuitton. LuxeDH is not affiliated with or represents Louis Vuitton in any way or form.


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Proofing fresh yeast
So how much foaminess should I get when proofing fresh yeast (Or any yeast for thy matter). Also, if I pull the fresh yeast out of the fridge, seems I should let it attain room temperature even if using warm water right? (Theory being that the cold yeast cools off the water and hence the lackluster foaming).


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Cool Hand Luke McKenzie Looks to Continue Aussie IRONMAN Excellence
The surprise star at last year's IRONMAN World Championship hopes to add to the legacy of Australian stars in the sport.
IRONMAN World Championship runner-up Luke McKenzie steps out for the first time since his Kona heroics, with the hope he can add to the legacy of Australian stars in the sport. McKenzie is one of the headline acts in this weekend's IRONMAN Asia Pacific Championship in Melbourne, where he takes on the likes of three-time IRONMAN World Champion Craig Alexander and a classy field.
Watching on from the sidelines, providing the live commentary, will be compatriot Greg Welch, the first non-American to triumph in Hawaii. Since 2007, when Chris McCormack triumphed for the first time, Australians have been a prominent part at the front of the field in Kona. McCormack, Alexander and Pete Jacobs have all joined the winners' circle on the Big Island to become stars in their own Big Island down under.
For McKenzie 2013 was a breakthrough year. Before his win at last June's IRONMAN Cairns, the Queenslander had won five IRONMAN titles, but his detractors suggested that he had yet to beat a world class field.
His win in Cairns came against a top-notch field that included two-time IRONMAN world champion Chris McCormack, 10-time IRONMAN New Zealand champion Cameron Brown and a host of quality Australians.
"Last year was game changing year for me. I made a commitment to myself to step it up and apply myself even more to my sport and it paid off. Training hard is just a small part of it. It really came down to a mental mindset and belief that I could compete and be at the top no matter what the race," McKenzie said. "This year is going to be different because, I guess, there will be a certain level of expectation on me. I am really looking forward to the challenges ahead of me in 2014. I have it in me to be one of the world's best Ironman triathletes. It's cliche to say it, but you have to believe it."
McKenzie is looking for a vastly improved result to his 2012 campaign when he failed to finish in Melbourne, an event that has become, in just three years, one of the premier races on the globe.
"The bike and run course suit me. The bike course looks pretty straight forward on paper, but it can be a tough one, especially if the wind is up. If I can utilise my bike strength and go onto that one way marathon with some time, I know I will be hard to catch."
While the weekend is his start to the year, his big focus is looking past Melbourne to a return to Hawaii, where he hopes to go one better.
The men's field for Sunday's race (local time) includes Alexander, Marino Vanhoenacker, Cameron Brown, Jimmy Johnson, Dirk Bockel and Courtney Atkinson.
Don't miss our live coverage of the race here on Ironman.com including video, text updates, athlete tracking and more.


text: HKSS.com | Community > Discussion Forum > View topic - Movie: Fearless (Jet Li) Home Community Superstars Music | What's New | Help HKSS | Search* Discussions | HKE Chat | Reflections of Life | Virtual Cards | Member Galleries Please excuse our mess. HKSS is currently under re-construction and some links/sections don't work yet. What's New: Latest updates | Member Galleries | Music | HKE Chat | About HKSS.com Community Discussions HKE Chat Reflections of Life Member Galleries Virtual Cards* Play Music Superstars Profiles* Galleries* Reviews Gossip & News Other Privacy Policy Terms of Use Link to HKSS* HKSS.com What's New About Contact* Advertise* Help HKSS Links YesAsia yuenStudios Do you like HKSS? My Watched Topics | My Favorites | My Profile Private IMs Register Log in Help | Stats | Members | Groups Search Forum Movie: Fearless (Jet Li) HKSS.com Forum Index -> Reviews View previous topic :: View next topic Author Message EddyInsane MemberJoined: 04 Oct 2003Posts: 327 Posted: Wed Feb 22, 2006 9:03 pm Post subject: Movie: Fearless (Jet Li) Fearless is the title for Jet Li's latest Chinese flim. I had a chance to watch it the other day. If you guys aren't aware of jet li's past movies, one of his most popular movie is called "fist of fury". Anyways jet li did the same movie back in early 90's and this movie, Fearless is the prequel to Fist of Fury. anyways, i am huge jet li and andy lau fan, so i loved this film, i've already saw it 3 times already. The one complain is that for majority of the movie, jet li is playing a teenage/young adult and he is just not that anymore, especially i still watch his old movies from time to time and i can just see his face deteriorating........ ok on to the review, ..........typical martial art film with NO special affects, except in the beginning when they clearly used a stunt guy for this white guy fighthing jet li. i love that there are no special martial affects (it would've looked ugly, especially production in China) You really hate the jet li character in most of the movie until the end. I am not sure how much it follow history, because i've heard tons of stories about the character jet li is playing. alright guys, just watch the movie when its available on DVD, BUY IT ! hehe Back to top Mikey_Life is good. Be inspired.Joined: 04 Oct 2003Posts: 1322Location: Fountain Valley, California (USA) Posted: Thu Feb 23, 2006 7:57 am Post subject: Sounds good Back to top twinklesstarsCurious MemberJoined: 12 Oct 2003Posts: 42Location: Australia Posted: Thu Apr 06, 2006 11:59 am Post subject: i heard that fearless will be his last martial art movie but I am not sure if the news is confirmed or rumour. Back to top Mikey_Life is good. Be inspired.Joined: 04 Oct 2003Posts: 1322Location: Fountain Valley, California (USA) Posted: Thu Apr 06, 2006 12:10 pm Post subject: I watched the film the other day... it was pretty good. I'm usually not too fond of Jet Li's movies, but for this one, go watch it Back to top Display posts from previous: All Posts1 Day7 Days2 Weeks1 Month3 Months6 Months1 Year Oldest FirstNewest First HKSS.com Forum Index -> Reviews All times are GMT - 8 Hours Page 1 of 1 Jump to: Select a forum Entertainment----------------All EntertainmentReviewsGossip and NewsIdol DiscussionsMusicMoviesTV Shows Non-Entertainment----------------General DiscussionsNew MembersFun and GamesReflections of LifeHobbies, TravelFood and CookingHelp!Websites HKSS.com----------------Announcements/ What's New?Help HKSS.comFeedback/ Contact HKSS.comWishlist You cannot post new topics in this forumYou cannot reply to topics in this forumYou cannot edit your posts in this forumYou cannot delete your posts in this forumYou cannot vote in polls in this forum Back to top Copyright © 1996-2014 HKSS.com™. All Rights Reserved. About | Link to HKSS.com | Advertise | Contact | Privacy Policy | Terms of Use Information and images accessed from this site are protected by international copyright and/or other intellectual property rights. You may infringe these rights if you download, copy, publish, distribute, transmit, or exploit such content without the explicit consent of HKSS.com. > Site design by yuenStudios.com (2006)