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Method and apparatus for verifying secure document timestamping
According to one embodiment of the invention, a method is provided for receiving a timestamp from a caller via a telephone connection; receiving a device identifier from the caller, in which the device identifier identifies a device; determining a cryptographic key based on the device identifier; determining an indication of a time based on the timestamp and the cryptographic key; providing the indication of the time to the caller; determining an account; and charging a fee to the account.
[0001] The present application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/149,024, "METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR SECURE DOCUMENT TIMESTAMPING", filed Sep. 8, 1998; which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/622,034, filed Mar. 21, 1996, and which issued Jul. 13, 1999 as U.S. Pat. No. 5,923,763. Each of the above related applications is incorporated herein by reference.
[0002] 1. Field Of the Invention
[0003] The present invention relates generally to methods and apparatuses for document timestamping. More particularly, the invention relates to secure and authenticable timestamping of documents in such a way that the timestamp can be verified by a party who was not necessarily present during the timestamping.
[0004] 2. Background
[0005] In many instances where timestamped documents are to be communicated to a temporally or spatially distant recipient, one would like to be able to verify the authenticity and integrity of the timestamp. For example, consider the problem of proving document creation in the course of business transactions. Both the author and the recipient would like to be able to timestamp the document in a manner that demonstrates to others that it was stamped: 1) by the timestamping device (i.e., knowing which device generated the timestamp), and 2) at the indicated time (i.e., that the timestamp has not been modified during or subsequent to timestamping). The first requirement relates to timestamping device authenticability, while the second requirement relates to time integrity. Either or both of these requirements may exist anytime documents are created by one party (or at one location) not under the direct control of the recipient. Common examples include timestamps at the top of fax pages, timestamps at the bottoms of printouts, and postage marks as evidence of mailing. Besides documents, other examples include timeclocks for hourly employees, or for parking garage patrons, for recording the date/time of entry onto the premises.
[0006] As indicated by the above examples, many timestamping applications are associated primarily with physical (e.g., paper-based) applications rather than electronic (e.g., digital) applications. This is especially true for document generation where, despite the almost universal use of computer word processing, the majority of documents are still used and stored on paper because of its advantages over electronic media. Such advantages include: 1) ease of document creation (e.g., taking handwritten notes), 2) ease of document retrieval (e.g., without computers or other specialized document readers and no worries about evolving diskette or word processing file formats), 3) long-term stability of paper (e.g., degradation of magnetic media), 4) low cost, and 5) portability. Therefore, a timestamping device for everyday usage should be particularly suitable for use with paper-based documents.
[0007] Traditionally, timestamping devices have relied on mechanical inaccessibility, fixed location, and public display to suggest the accuracy of timestamps produced thereby. Many contemporary electronic timestamping devices provide even less assurance than mechanical devices because their timestamping mechanisms are user-accessible, user-resettable, and hidden from public view. Examples include camera date recorders to timestamp pictures, answering machine/voicemail date/time recorders, and computer clocks to timestamp file creation and output such timestamps on document trailers.
[0008] Whether mechanical or electronic, each of the above-mentioned examples is prone to resetting of the clock prior to timestamping, or modification of the timestamp after timestamping. For example, the ability to reset the internal date/time is built into almost all personal computer operating systems. Furthermore, the purely electronic devices are especially prone to tampering because of the ease with which a purely electronic document to be timestamped can be accessed and manipulated. Such ease of manipulation has led to the creation of devices which cryptographically certify the authenticity and integrity of electronic documents. Examples of such devices may be seen in several U.S. Pat. Nos. (5,189,700; 5,157,726; 5,136,647; 5,136,646; 5,022,080; 5,001,752; and 4,786,940) disclosing devices that input digital data, cryptographically certify the digital data, and output a digital message. In addition, certain of these devices optionally add time from a secure internal clock to the digital message.
[0009] The aforementioned devices are directed at applications whose primary goal is digital data certification, and any associated timestamping is an adjunct to that goal. In contrast, in many document timestamping applications, the primary goal is time certification rather than data certification. Although the data certification devices can be used for timestamping, such usage would be relatively complicated, expensive, and ill-suited for paper-based timestamping applications because the document data must be digitized. For example, the use of data certification devices with paper documents would require the addition of a document scanner to generate a digital representation of the document for input to the device, leading to increased device cost and complexity.
[0010] Furthermore, because data representing the document would be included in the cryptographic message, one wishing to verify the message (e.g., by recomputing the timestamp) would also have to create a digital representation of the message—a costly and possibly infeasible operation for those with limited capabilities. It is often inefficient to timestamp a paper document such that verification of the timestamp requires the timestamp recipient to re-digitize the paper document.
[0011] Therefore, there exists a need for a simple, inexpensive, easy-to-use device that generates an accurate and unalterable timestamp, for application to physical media such as paper documents, that can be easily verified by the document recipient.
[0012] According to one embodiment of the invention, a method is provided for receiving a timestamp from a caller via a telephone connection; receiving a device identifier from the caller, in which the device identifier identifies a device; determining a cryptographic key based on the device identifier; determining an indication of a time based on the timestamp and the cryptographic key; providing the indication of the time to the caller; determining an account; and charging a fee to the account.
[0013] FIG. 1 illustrates the basic components of a device for secure timestamping.
[0014] FIG. 2A illustrates a bottom view of a timestamp printer for use with paper documents.
[0015] FIG. 2B illustrates an end view of a timestamp printer for use with paper documents.
[0016] FIG. 3 illustrates a system for verifying a timestamp.
[0017] Various embodiments of the present invention provide for verifying a timestamp. As used throughout this document, the term "timestamp" shall be understood to correspond to any representation of a date, time, day-of-week, or any other measurement produced by a chronographic device. In many cases, such measurements are effectively synonymous; for example, many computer clocks record time as the number of seconds elapsed since Jan. 1, 1900, which is easily converted to date and day-of-week formats. The timestamp may include a cleartext portion, a ciphertext portion or both. A timestamp could be used to record the time at which a document was printed, a photocopy was made, or a facsimile was received.
[0018] In this disclosure, certain ancillary elements used in conjunction with the timestamping device are well understood to those skilled in the art and are not shown. For example, the design and construction of clocks, computer memories, and software or hardware cryptographic algorithms, are well known to those skilled in the art and will not be described in detail herein.
[0019] In accordance with various embodiments of the present invention, a recipient of the timestamp can determine timestamping device authenticity and time integrity by verifying the cryptographic operation used to generate the timestamp. For example, the recipient could provide the timestamp and a timestamp device identifier to a third party for verification. The third party could use the device identifier to determine the cryptographic operation used to generate the timestamp, and/or to determine the key used in the cryptographic operation. The third party could then perform an appropriate cryptographic operation to verify the authenticity of the timestamping device and the integrity of the timestamp presented. For example, the third party could decrypt a ciphertext portion of a timestamp having both a ciphertext portion and a cleartext portion, in order to confirm that the ciphertext portion represented the same time as the cleartext portion.
[0020] If the timestamp was encrypted with a device private key, the recipient could use the corresponding device public key to decrypt and verify the timestamp. The public key could either be obtained from a public database or distributed using digital certificates within the timestamp. Alternatively, instead of public/private key pairs, the timestamping device could use a symmetric key—either alone or in combination with public key cryptography. Or, in the case of a hashed time, the recipient can verify the timestamp by recomputing the hash of the cleartext time and comparing it with the received hash (the ciphertext portion of the timestamp). The hash could even be a keyed operation to provide greater security.
Timestamping Device and Timestamping Operations
[0021] Referring now to FIG. 1, there is shown one embodiment of a timestamping device including a cryptoprocessor 10, a clock 20, random access memory (RAM) 30, nonvolatile memory 40 and output device 100. The cryptoprocessor 10 can be a general purpose processor (e.g., an Intel CPU) receiving instructions from RAM 30 or memory 40, or it can be a special purpose processor optimized for performing cryptographic operations (e.g., a National Semiconductor iPower SPU). That is, the cryptoprocessor may comprise any hardware or software engine capable of performing cryptographic operations on a given quantity. As described in greater detail below, such operations may include both keyless and keyed operations, as well as various combinations thereof. The cryptoprocessor 10 and clock 20 are powered by external power source 50, with standby battery 60 to ensure operability during replacement or absence of external power source 50. Thus, external power source 50 could be an user-replaceable battery or an AC power source. Alternatively, the device could be powered by internal battery 60 alone (in which case the device stops functioning at battery death) or external power source 50 alone (necessitating resetting the clock from a trusted external time source—e.g., the GPS satellite signals discussed below—upon powerup).
[0022] The cryptoprocessor 10, clock 20, RAM 30, memory 40 and the control signals for output device 100 are contained within secure perimeter 70, making these components resistant to external tampering. Secure perimeter 70 may include physical, electronic, or a combination of physical and electronic features to resist tampering. For example, physical features could include encapsulation, electronic features could include a silicon firewall, and combination features could include self-zeroizing, or otherwise volatile, RAM 30 or memory 40 which electrically modifies its contents upon detection of tampering. Such tampering might include physically stressing the device, attempting to change the clock rate by replacing external power source 50 with a battery outside allowable current or voltage ranges, or attempting to change the clock rate by replacing external power source 50 with an AC power source outside an allowable frequency range. Alternatively, secure perimeter 70 could be merely tamper-evident. In that case, the process of timestamp verification should include checking the timestamping device for evidence of tampering. As will be appreciated by those skilled in the art, a great variety of tamper-resistant tamper-evident techniques can be deployed, and will not be enumerated in detail herein. Therefore, as a matter of convenience, terms such as "tamper resistant" or "secure" shall be understood to refer to any of the aforementioned or other security measures throughout this discussion.
[0023] In one embodiment of the invention, the timestamping device generates a time from clock 20 and outputs a timestamp (or message) consisting of the cleartext time plus a one-way function representative of the time. As used herein, a one-way function is one that outputs a unique representation of an input such that a given output is likely only to have come from its corresponding input, and such that the input cannot be readily deduced from the output. Thus, the term one-way function includes hashes, message authenticity codes (MACs—keyed one-way functions), cyclic redundancy checks (CRCs), and other techniques that are well known to those skilled in the art. See, for example, Bruce Schneier, "Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C," 2nd ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996. As a matter of convenience, the term "hash" will be understood to represent any of the aforementioned or other one-way functions throughout this discussion. Typically, the hash would be performed by cryptoprocessor 10 using a hardwired hashing algorithm or one stored in RAM 30 or memory 40. The hash may either be a keyed or keyless operation.
[0024] Furthermore, a unique device identification number, stored in RAM 30 or memory 40, can be added to the hash to provide assurance of message authenticity. A recipient wishing to verify the time would read the time and device ID, then perform an identical hashing algorithm to recompute the hash. If the received and recomputed hashes agree, the recipient is assured that the timestamp came from the timestamping device and had not been altered subsequent to timestamping.
[0025] Where the timestamping device is used to timestamp a sequence of messages, a chain of hashes—where each timestamp also includes representations of one or more previous messages—provides an additional degree of message assurance. For example, RAM 30 or memory 40 could store a hash of the last three time stamps to be incorporated into the current timestamp, as shown in the following example. Imagine that timestamping is performed once monthly, with the latest four dates being: 11/19, 12/15, 1/13, and 2/24. The hash for the last timestamp could be Hash—2/24=Hash("2/24")+Hash—11/19+Hash—12/15+Hash—1/13, with the hashes for the November, December and January dates relating to their respective previous three months in a similar fashion. The chained hashes discourage fraudulent modification of a timestamp as described below.
[0026] Suppose a forger discovers the device private key and uses it to change both the cleartext and hashed portions of the 11/19 timestamp to read 11/9. A suspicious party could challenge the temporally altered 11/19 timestamp by using it to recompute the subsequent three timestamps, and comparing them with their known values. If the known and recomputed timestamps disagree, the 11/19 timestamp is demonstrated to have been altered. When tampering is generally suspected but no specific timestamp is in question, an altered timestamp can be discovered by recomputing the most recent timestamp and continuing backward until three successive unconfirmable timestamps are found, indicating that the next timestamp in sequence has been altered. Of course, the forger could theoretically change all the timestamps in the chained hash, but this would require more effort than changing just the desired one, and would increase the chances of detection.
[0027] Still greater assurance of integrity and authenticity can be obtained by encrypting part or all of the timestamp in cryptoprocessor 10 using a key stored in memory 40. For example, instead of hashing, the time might be encrypted with a device-specific private key if authenticity is required, and possibly also with a recipient-specific public key, if confidentiality is desired.
[0028] Certain well-known enhancements to public key cryptography can also be used to provide greater assurance. For example, the message could include digital certificates for public key distribution to a party that does not know the device public key needed to verify a timestamp encrypted with the device private key. In a digital certificate, the device public key is encrypted (and vouched for) by the private key of a trusted certifier (e.g., a well-known manufacturer of the timestamping device) whose public key is known to the recipient. The recipient uses the certifier's public key to decrypt the device public key, then uses the device public key to verify the timestamp.
[0029] Alternatively, the recipient could simply obtain the device public key from a publicly accessible database, eliminating the need for digital certification.
[0030] To this point, asymmetric (public key) encryption has been discussed in the context of the various cryptographic operations. However, symmetric key (e.g., DES) key encryption is also possible, either as a replacement for, or adjunct to (e.g., a symmetric session key transmitted using public key cryptography) public key cryptography.
[0031] Another commonly used cryptographic technique, the so-called challenge-response protocol (CRP), may be used to ensure to a recipient that a timestamp is current, i.e., not a copy of a previously used timestamp. In the CRP, a timestamp requestor challenges the timestamping device by transmitting a datum to the timestamping device, and checking for the same datum in the received response. Thus, reused timestamps are prevented (or at least detectable) because a reused timestamp would contain a datum corresponding to a previous request/reply pair, rather than the current datum. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the challenge can use any datum whose value cannot be predicted by the recipient; random numbers happen to be a particularly convenient choice. Alternatively, the timestamping device could include a random number generator 18 to generate random numbers internally. In this somewhat weaker version of the CRP, the recipient would not necessarily know that the timestamp was unique, but only that he had not been sent a copy of a timestamp he himself had previously received.
[0032] Although certain exemplary cryptographic operations (hashing, asymmetric encryption, symmetric encryption, digital certificates, and challenge-response protocols) have been disclosed for use singly or in specified combinations, those skilled in the art will appreciate that many other combinations of these basic operations may be used, depending on the needs of the specific application.
[0033] As discussed herein, the timestamp may be generated and/or outputted at a variety of frequencies and/or in response to a variety of requests, including: 1) at predetermined times, 2) upon request of either the user or the recipient, 3) upon presentation of a request encrypted in a public key corresponding to the private key of the timestamping device, 4) upon production of data by an output device (e.g., a document production device), or 5) under control of a broadcast signal.
[0034] The timestamp can be created and outputted upon receipt of a timestamping request at input device 12. Input device 12 might be a simple I/O port for receiving an external electronic signal, or could include a push-button or other mechanical device to generate the timestamp request. In the case of an electronic signal, the cryptoprocessor 10 might only accept a request encrypted with a public, private, or symmetric key, and the cryptoprocessor 10 would then verify the timestamp request prior to providing the requested timestamp. The external electronic signal could be generated by a remote location which broadcasts or otherwise transmits the timestamp request to the timestamping device.
[0035] Alternatively, the time request could be internally generated under control of the cryptoprocessor 10, according to a predetermined schedule, having either regular or irregular intervals, loaded in RAM 30 or memory 40. Timestamping in response to a predetermined schedule, rather than requester control, would be useful in applications such as remote monitoring or event logging. The schedule could either be factory loaded (and unalterable) or loadable through input device 12. In the latter case, a request to load the schedule would preferably be encrypted in the device public key, as described above with respect to requestor timestamping. As yet another alternative, timestamping could be dynamically controlled using an algorithm in which a future timestamp is set in response to one or more previous timestamps. For example, in certain monitoring applications, a normally infrequent timestamping schedule could be accelerated in response to detection of targeted events.
[0036] The timestamp is outputted through output device 100. For use in document timestamping, the output device 100 might be a printer for recording the timestamp onto a piece of paper. FIGS. 2A and 2B illustrate bottom and end views, respectively, of an exemplary printwheel device 100. Printwheel device 100 rotates rubber-stamp wheels 110 using geared motors 120 under control of an electrical control signal at input port 130. The wheels 110 have teeth 140 around their circumference to print an alphanumeric code when a selected sequence of teeth 140 is in contact with substrate 150. The teeth 140 receive ink from an ink supply 160. As mentioned previously, the timestamp would typically include some cryptographic function of the time, such as a hash or encrypted code, which one could use to verify the integrity and/or authenticity of the time. If used as a stand-alone device, the timestamping command could be given via a push button or could be generated automatically by pushing down on a spring-loaded housing enclosing printwheel device 100, much like currently available hand-held devices for document stamping. Access to the timestamping device could optionally be controlled by requiring an authorized password (e.g., via an alphanumeric keypad) before timestamping will occur.
[0037] Regardless of the configuration of the device, signal flows between the cryptoprocessor and the output device could be secured to provide additional assurance.
[0038] Timestamp operations may be limited and/or controlled based on specified criteria. For example, the timestamp device may be allowed to generate only a specified number of timestamps, or, alternatively, may be allowed to use a specified cryptographic key or algorithm only a specified number of times. Thus, one embodiment of the present invention comprises determining a maximum number of timestamps stored in RAM 30 or memory 40 and comparing the maximum number to a total number of timestamps produced stored in RAM 30 or memory 40. If the number of timestamps produced is greater than the maximum number of timestamps, cryptoprocessor 10 may be prohibited from producing another timestamp. The comparing process described above may be performed by the cryptoprocessor 10 itself or by an external source that then transmits a command signal to the cryptoprocessor 10, thereby prohibiting the production of further timestamps. The comparing process may be performed in response to a request for a timestamp or according to a predetermined schedule.
[0039] A user may be prompted to "recharge" the timestamping device by purchasing, for example, an additional number of timestamp generations, or additional use of the present cryptographic key. Alternatively, a new cryptographic key may be transmitted to the timestamping device and stored in RAM 30 or memory 40 in exchange for a fee.
[0040] The production of timestamps may be limited based on an amount of funds in an account associated with the timestamping device. For example, the account may be charged a fee each time a timestamp is generated by the timestamping device. According to one embodiment, a process for generating a timestamp may include a step of determining an amount of funds associated with the account and determining the fee charged for generating the timestamp. If the amount of funds in the account is less than the fee amount, the timestamp will not be generated. A user may then be informed that the timestamp request is denied, and may further be prompted to increase the amount of funds in the account.
Timestamp Verification
[0041] Generating and outputting a timestamp enables a party who did not necessarily witness the timestamping to verify the authenticity of the timestamp and/or the integrity of the time represented by the timestamp. In general, the recipient will verify the timestamp by performing some combination of hashing and decryption appropriate to the particular combination of cryptographic operations used to create the timestamp.
[0042] For example, in cases where the timestamp is generated by hashing, the recipient need only read the cleartext time and recompute a hash value of the cleartext time to verify the timestamp. If the received and recomputed hash values agree, the recipient may be confident that the timestamp has not been altered.
[0043] In cases where the timestamp is encrypted with a corresponding device private key, the recipient can then simply decrypt the timestamp and perform any other cryptographic operations needed to verify the timestamp. The recipient would look up the corresponding public key from a public database, read the timestamp from the document, decrypt the timestamp using the public key, and determine and verify the document creation time. Alternatively, as suggested earlier, digital certificates could be used to distribute the device public key to a timestamp recipient.
[0044] In certain situations, the above procedures may not be possible—for example: 1) when public key cryptography is not used, 2) when it is desired to keep the cryptographic algorithms confidential from the recipient, or 3) when the recipient lacks the capability to perform cryptographic verifications.
[0045] In such cases, a third-party certifier may provide the recipient with verification. For example, the verification can be provided by a central controller 200 accessible through a communications network 300 by a recipient using a communication device 400. The communication device 400 and the communications network may employ at least one of a variety of well-known communication means, including a telephone connection, an Internet connection, a wireless connection, or a website. Verification and/or access to the central controller 200 may be free or toll-based. According to one embodiment of the present invention, a caller would use the touch-tone keypad of a telephone to enter the date (or other representation of a time) and the timestamping device ID number after connecting to the central controller 200 via a 900 number. The caller could also provide the information verbally in response to prompts from an interactive response unit (IRU). Alternatively, a recipient with an Internet connection could enter any necessary information into a form displayed on a website, using a keyboard or other input device, such as a wireless handheld device. The central controller 200 would use the device ID number to look up the database record for that particular device in a database and retrieve its cryptographic key. The central controller 200 would then use the cryptographic key to perform the appropriate cryptographic operation (e.g., hashing, device-specific key encryption, etc.) necessary to verify the received timestamp. For example, the central controller 200 could recompute a hash value of the date and provide the hash value to the caller. The communication to the recipient could be via any well-known communication means, including the telephone connection, email, facsimile, or via a displayed webpage. The caller could then compare the recomputed hash value to his received hash value.
[0046] Alternatively, the caller could provide the received timestamp (either instead of or in addition to the date) and the device ID number to the central controller 200. The central controller 200 would then use the determined cryptographic key to perform an appropriate cryptographic operation on the timestamp. For example, the central controller 200 could decrypt the received timestamp and provide the decrypted date to the caller. The caller could then verify the timestamp by comparing the decrypted date to the cleartext portion of the received timestamp. If the caller also provided a received cleartext date to the central controller 200, the central controller 200 could compare the determined date to the received cleartext date and provide a confirmation to the caller.
[0047] The party desiring to verify the timestamp may be charged a fee by the central controller 200 in exchange for providing verification of the timestamp. Such a fee may be based on a predetermined flat fee, the connection (or duration of the connection) to the central controller 200, or a subscription. The central controller 200 could also (or alternatively) charge a fee to the party that generated the timestamp. For example, the device ID number might be used by the central controller 200 to identify an account associated with the party that generated the timestamp. A fee could then be charged to this account.
Alternative Time Sources
[0048] It was mentioned previously that the time is generated via an internal clock 20. In another embodiment of the invention, the timestamping device could obtain time from an external source via signal receiver 24 disposed inside the secure perimeter 70. The signal receiver 24 could receive time signals from ground stations (e.g., the US Naval Observatory atomic clock), from orbiting satellites, or from any other trusted external time source. External time signals are especially advantageous for deterring hacking of an internal clock.
[0049] In the satellite example, the timestamping device could receive timing signals from the American Global Positioning System (GPS), for which sensors (receivers) are widely available on the commercial market. Alternatively, the receiver could receive signals from the Russian Glonass system. Although GPS is primarily used for location finding, those skilled in the art will appreciate that the same timing signals can also be used as an accurate time source. Consequently, the signal receiver 24 may be as an alternative time generator to clock 20. These basic operating principles of satellite ranging systems are well known (e.g., Herring, "The Global Positioning System," Scientific American, February 1996, pp. 44-50; and "How Does GPS Work?," Jane's Intl. Defense Review, Dec. 31, 1994, p. 147) but will be briefly summarized below to illustrate the dual location- and time-determining capabilities of GPS.
[0050] Any signal sent from a satellite to a terrestrial receiver is delayed by an amount proportional to the distance from the satellite to the receiver. Therefore, the difference between a clock signal sent from a satellite and a receiver's local clock (typically a few hundredths of a second) will determine the distance from the satellite to the receiver. Knowing this distance establishes that the receiver is located somewhere on the surface of a sphere, of radius equal to the determined distance, centered about the satellite. However, the receiver's exact location—a particular point on the surface of that sphere—remains undetermined. By receiving signals from several orbiting satellites, the receiver's exact three-dimensional location on the surface of the earth can be determined as the point of intersection of all their locating spheres.
[0051] In practice, the receiver clock is cheaper, and therefore less accurate, than the satellite' highly accurate atomic clocks. This means that all of the locating spheres will be slightly smaller or larger than their true values, depending on whether the receiver clock runs slow or fast, respectively. Consequently, the location spheres may not intersect at a single point. This difficulty is overcome by adjusting the receiver clock by an arbitrary amount, which in turn changes each of the location radii by the same amount, and to check for a single point of intersection of the locating spheres. If not, the receiver clock is readjusted, in an iterative process, until a single point of intersection is found. That is, the inaccurate receiver clock provides a good initial guess regarding the point of intersection, and the fact that the locating spheres must intersect at a single point corresponding to the receive's terrestrial location is used to improve the initial guess. Taken to its extreme, such iteration could be performed without requiring a receiver clock at all—this would simply require more iterations than if the receiver clock had been available to provide an initial guess.
[0052] The end result of the iteration process is a determination of both the exact location of the receiver and the correct time. This time can then be used as part of the timestamping process. Of course, if high time accuracy is not required (the received GPS time is only off by a few hundredths of a second), the timestamping device could simply accept the received satellite clock signal (or an average of several such signals) as an approximation to the correct time without performing the iterative process described above.
[0053] Finally, as is currently done for certain military applications, the received time signals could be encrypted in the time transmitter's private key, or in the receiver's public key, as an extra measure of assurance that an impostor has not substituted an incorrect time for that of the broadcast source. In the latter example, the broadcasted time signal may be thought of as narrowcasted because only a specific recipient can decrypt the time. In such applications, the cryptoprocessor 10, RAM 30 and memory 40 may be used to perform the necessary decrypting (or other decoding). It will be advantageous to dispose the receiver within the secure perimeter to prevent insertion of fraudulent signals. Alternatively, an encrypted time could be certified without prior decryption, with this step to be performed by the recipient during subsequent verification.
[0054] As the foregoing illustrates, the signal receiver 24 could either supplement or replace the clock 20. In certain embodiments, the clock 20 could be used to double-check the received time (or vice-versa) by comparing the received time against the internal clock time—which could have been set at the factory or by a previous radio broadcast. The received time would be deemed accurate provided the two times agreed to within the cumulative inaccuracies of the received signal (external time source inaccuracy plus any uncorrected transmission delay) and the internal clock 20. Such double-checking might be especially useful where the GPS signals are broadcast in slightly degraded form (e.g., the Standard Positioning mode used in many commercial applications).
Authenticated Location
[0055] In certain cases, it will be desired to certify both the time and geographical location at which the document was timestamped. For example, it might be desired to certify the time zone in which the document was timestamped. As discussed above with respect to external time, the GPS signal receiver 24 is also ideally suited to provide the necessary location signals. Such signals would be incorporated into the timestamp, either as cleartext and/or cryptographic form.
Alternative Output Devices
[0056] More sophisticated printers can also be used in addition to the simple printwheel mechanism described above. For example, the printer could include traditional dot-based (e.g., laser, bubble, inkjet, or line printers) or character-based computer printers (e.g., daisywheel), as well as dot-based document printers (e.g., facsimile machines, photocopiers, or even barcode printers), or any other document production device. Each of these devices could send a timestamping request through input 12, either automatically upon document printing or manually upon operator request (e.g., a "certify" button to be used manually upon printing a page). Furthermore, manual or automatic operation could be selectable via an on-off timestamp toggle.
[0057] Many other output devices are possible, especially when the timestamp is not required to be directly printed on a paper substrate. For example, the output device could print a special, difficult-to-forge label to be applied to the surface of a paper document or other substrate. Furthermore, the timestamp has been described previously as a human-readable alphanumeric code, but this is not necessary. Any machine-readable, optically-detectable code would serve equally well, and might be preferred to deter casual snooping. For example, the timestamp could be a fine mesh of dots in a geometric pattern covering the entire document. The dots would be small enough to allow easy viewing of the document while at the same time making it much more difficult to change any of the words in the document since the dots would be laid over the text. The dots could be laid down using any arbitrary machine-readable coding scheme. For example, the distance between individual dots could represent the digits of the coded portion of the timestamp. Such an embodiment is most practically performed by a timestamping device connected to a printer or fax machine which is easily capable of setting down such a fine mesh of dots.
[0058] Machine-readable, optically-detectable codes are also appropriate when the output device is a recorder used for writing the timestamp to a non-paper medium. Certain of these media, such as optical data recording devices, have an added advantage of being write-only, which can provide extra assurance against timestamp modification. For example, a laser could write to optical media (e.g., CD-ROM or magneto-optical disk). Like paper, such write-only media are often permanent or semi-permanent in nature.
[0059] Finally, the timestamp need not be written to a permanent or semi-permanent media, but could be displayed for transient viewing on an electronic or other display in human- or machine-readable form.
[0060] Finally, the output device need not be physically located with the rest of the timestamping device. For example, a centrally located timestamping device could have one or more remotely located output devices accessible via broadcast signals or data or voice networks. Such configuration would be especially useful for remote time notarization applications.
[0061] Note that, just as with conventional timestamping devices, the timestamp, according to some embodiments, may not attest to the authenticity of the timestamped document, but only to when the timestamp was appended. For example, a fraudulent user could still copy a legitimate timestamp from a first document to a second document and present the falsely timestamped second document to an unsuspecting recipient.
[0062] Nevertheless, by providing added assurance as to the timestamp, the timestamping device disclosed herein represents a distinct improvement over conventional timestamping devices which provide assurance of neither the timestamp nor the document. Timestamp copying can be further discouraged by the use of special measures such as write-once media (as discussed above) for timestamping electronic documents or uncopyable inks for timestamping paper documents. Examples of uncopyable (but ultimately optically detectable) inks include: 1) specially colored inks that cannot be detected by photocopy machines, 2) so-called "invisible" inks that appear upon application of a chemical or ultraviolet developer, and 3) delayed-visibility inks that are initially invisible but develop slowly over time in response to aging or light exposure. The term "uncopyable inks" could also include timestamps that can be copied with less than full fidelity, e.g., inks that fade, change color, or change contrast upon copying. Finally, the timestamping device could print "uncopyable patterns" that exhibit interference patterns or other optical distortions upon copying. Such uncopyable inks or uncopyable patterns would be especially useful where timestamped documents are to be transmitted via an unsecured courier. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that these and other types of anti-counterfeiting measures can increase the difficulty of successfully copying an original timestamp onto another document.
[0063] Yet another type of fraud involves modifying the document data rather than the timestamp—for example, timestamping a document and later altering the document content, or pre-timestamping blank pages to be printed at a later time. Such fraud can be discouraged by the use of inks or patterns whose physical characteristics (e.g., reflectivity, refractivity, contrast, color or hue) depend on whether the timestamp is applied on top of printing, or printing is done on top of a timestamp. Preferably, the timestamp will normally be applied over portions of the printed document to be protected, and any attempt to overprint the timestamp with other printing will be optically detectable. The timestamp could even be restricted to only the printed portion of a page, to discourage the addition of new text atop a previously timestamped but otherwise blank portion of the page. Restricting the timestamp to only the printed portion of the page could easily be implemented in connection with a facsimile printer, computer printer, or any other device capable of outputting a timestamp of arbitrary size. If the timestamping device produces a timestamp of fixed size, and a single timestamp is smaller than the portion of the printed document that is to be protected, multiple applications of the timestamp may be used. Alternatively, the printwheel device of FIG. 2 could be adapted to operate in a continuous fashion (e.g., a roller) for timestamping atop text of arbitrary size. Any of the aforementioned fraud detection techniques shall be referred to as "overprint detection."
Augmented Timestamps
[0064] The aforementioned techniques—uncopyable inks, uncopyable patterns and overprint detection—are examples of physical techniques that may be used to deter fraud. Besides physical techniques, informational techniques may also be used to deter fraud. Informational techniques involve incorporating information about the document, in the form of 1) content identifiers, 2) witness identifiers, or 3) time bracketing into the timestamp.
[0065] In a simple form of content identifier, a timestamping device operator could count the number of words on the document to be timestamped and then enter this number into the timestamping device. Data input could be conducted through a numeric keypad attached to the device. When the timestamp was then generated by the cryptographic processor, the coded portion of the timestamp would include an encrypted version of the number of words in addition to the date. Other data elements that could be incorporated into the timestamp include the number of lines of text, the number of instances of a particular word, the largest dollar amount, the number of pages in the document, etc. Such information incorporated into the timestamp makes it increasingly difficult for anyone to undetectably modify the original document. The memory of each timestamping device could contain a database of 100 data element categories as described above. A printed copy would be available to the timestamping device user. The user would simply decide which data element to incorporate, enter the index number of the data element database, and then enter the numeric value of the data element. Upon authentication of the timestamp, the data element would be revealed.
[0066] The content identifier could also include information about the document in the form of various timestamp color schemes. A blue timestamp, for instance, could indicate a financial document while red was reserved for legal documents. The timestamping device operator would enter a code such as 01 for finance, 02 for legal, 03 for contracts, etc. The timestamping device would incorporate this information into the color of the timestamp, perhaps using separate colors for the clear text and coded text portions of the timestamp. As shown by the foregoing examples, those skilled in the art will appreciate that any identifiable datum reflective of document content can be used as the content identifier.
[0067] In addition to providing a degree of document integrity, timestamps could include information about those individuals present at the time the timestamp was affixed to the document. In a simple form of witness identifier, each witness to the event enters a unique private identifier (such as his private key or personal ID number) into the timestamping device before the timestamp is affixed to the document. The private identifier is then incorporated into the coded portion of the timestamp. The private identifier could be entered manually via a keypad, or automatically via touch memory buttons (described in more detail below), PCMCIA cards, or other portable personal access tokens.
[0068] If greater levels of security are required, a challenge-response protocol can be used to verify that none of the event witnesses has stolen another person's private identifier. After entering his private identifier, a witness would be challenged by the timestamping device to enter an additional piece of information, such as his mother's maiden name. The response would be compared against its expected value stored in a database in the memory of the timestamping device when the private identifier was first registered with the device. Incorrect responses would invalidate the previously entered private identifier.
[0069] In the above embodiments, users must be careful when entering private identifiers to ensure that they are not stolen by other users of the timestamping device. To make this process more secure, tokens such as the Touch Memory device manufactured by Dallas Semiconductor can be used. Each timestamping device user would have his private identifier stored in a Touch Memory button which consists of a computer chip housed within a small button shaped stainless steel case. The case may be ring-shaped and worn around a user's finger. The chip contains up to 64 kb of RAM or EPROM, sufficient to store a plurality of cryptographic keys. The device transmits data bi-directionally at 16.3 kb per second when placed into contact with a reader device, which would reside within the timestamping device. The user touches the button device to the reader each time that he wants his private identifier incorporated into the timestamp. Each chip contains a unique serial number that is laser-etched into the chip at the time of manufacture. The DS 1427 configuration includes a tamperresistant real-time clock that may be utilized as a supplementary audit trail, so that authenticatable information could be stored in the user's Touch Memory button in addition to being incorporated into the coded portion of the timestamp.
[0070] Still greater levels of security can be obtained if biometric readers are built into the timestamping device for incorporating biometric data (e.g., fingerprint, retinal pattern or any other unique physiological parameter) into the coded portion of the timestamp. Biometric readers could also be used to authenticate the private identifiers that are entered by all witnesses.
[0071] Yet another informational technique could be used to temporarily bracket access by the timestamp operator. In this technique, a timestamp would indicate an open date and a close date, creating a virtual open parenthesis or closed parenthesis within the coded portion of the timestamp. For example, a professional working on a document might need to show the starting and ending times in order to determine billable hours. The timestamping device could have separate buttons labeled start and stop. The start button would be pressed before stamping a document, with such indication being incorporated into the coded portion of the timestamp. The document would then be changed, and the close timestamp would be placed over the open timestamp.
[0072] As described above, the device ID may be incorporated into the timestamp. According to some embodiments, the device ID may serve as an account identifier, and, as described above, may be used by a verification service to bill an account. Those skilled in the art will recognize that many various types of identifiers may be used to identify an account associated with the timestamp. For example, a witness identifier or financial account identifier (such as a bank account number or credit card number) may be incorporated into a timestamp and used by a verification service to identify an account to be charged when a recipient of a timestamp requests verification of the timestamp.
Alternate Timestamping Commands
[0073] It was mentioned previously that output device 100 could generate the timestamp upon external command. Although such an external command will often be a request from a timestamp recipient, it could also be generated automatically upon detection of an event (or measurement) external to the timestamping device by an appropriate sensor acting as input device 12. Such an event could be any normal or abnormal occurrence whose time of occurrence is to be recorded.
[0074] For example, in automobile applications, normal events might include entering an automated toll road or a police car passing a prescribed checkpoint, while abnormal events might include a rental car leaving an authorized operating area or air bag inflation during an accident. In any of the aforementioned examples, a sensor would detect the triggering event and automatically order the timestamp generation. The sensor could take many different forms, ranging from a simple photodiode (e.g., detecting a laser beam marking a boundary) to a GPS receiver (e.g., used as a location finder subject to predetermined alarm limits). In addition, the sensor could be located either within the timestainping device (e.g., analogous to a "flight recorder" ), or externally (e.g., a central monitoring station). Where the sensor is external, it would transmit a timestamp request to a receiver, disposed within the timestamping device, acting as input device 12. In a variation of the above-mentioned location finder, the GPS receiver could be linked to a transmitter for broadcasting the car's location upon receipt of an authorized command at a sensor. Considered together, the GPS receiver, transmitter, and airbag sensor could be regarded as a transponder. The actual transmitters, receivers, and sensors needed for such location transmitters will not be discussed in detail, as those skilled in the art will appreciate that all the necessary components are widely commercially available. For example, the Lojak car anti-theft system uses such components—but without cryptographically assured timestamping—to transmit a stolen car's location upon command of a radio signal. Finally, the timestamping device could be augmented with electromechanical circuitry to take additional action automatically upon detecting the triggering event. For example, a common application might be an automatic cut-off (a kind of "dead man's switch") to disable an engine in the event of emergency or straying outside a prescribed region.
[0075] Although the above examples have been given primarily in the document production and automotive contexts, those skilled in the art will appreciate that the same technology can be used in any other monitoring applications where the time of occurrence of an event is to be recorded.
[0076] For purposes of illustration only, and not to limit generality, the present invention has been explained with reference to various examples of time sources, cryptographic operations, output devices, and sensors. However, one skilled in the art will appreciate that the invention is not limited to the particular illustrated embodiments or applications, but includes many others that operate in accordance with the principles disclosed herein.
1. A method comprising:
- receiving a timestamp from a caller via a telephone connection;
- receiving a device identifier from the caller, in which the device identifier identifies a device;
- determining a cryptographic key based on the device identifier;
- determining a representation of a time based on the timestamp and the cryptographic key;
- providing the representation of the time to the caller;
- determining an account; and
- charging a fee to the account.
2. The method of claim 1, in which the timestamp is optically detectable on a physical document.
3. The method of claim 1, in which receiving the timestamp comprises:
- receiving the timestamp at a central controller.
4. The method of claim 1, further comprising:
- receiving a telephone call from the caller.
5. The method of claim 1, in which receiving the timestamp comprises:
- receiving a sequence of DTMF signals; and
- determining the timestamp based on the DTMF signals.
6. The method of claim 5, in which the sequence is entered by the caller at a keypad.
7. The method of claim 1, in which receiving the timestamp comprises:
- receiving a sequence of signals via an interactive response unit (IRU).
8. The method of claim 1, in which receiving the timestamp comprises:
- receiving the timestamp via a toll-based telephone line.
9. The method of claim 8, in which the toll-based telephone line is associated with a 900 number.
10. The method of claim 1, in which the timestamp comprises a sequence of alphanumeric characters.
11. The method of claim 1, in which determining the account comprises:
- receiving an account identifier that identifies the account.
12. The method of claim 1, in which the timestamp comprises an account identifier that identifies the account:
13. The method of claim 1, in which the account is associated with the caller.
14. The method of claim 1, in which the account is associated with a third party.
15. The method of claim 1, in which determining the account comprises:
- determining the account based on the device identifier.
16. The method of claim 1, in which the account is a prepaid account.
17. The method of claim 17, in which charging the fee comprises:
- debiting the account based on the fee.
18. The method of claim 1, in which determining the representation of the time comprises:
- performing a cryptographic operation on the timestamp.
19. The method of claim 1, in which determining the representation of the time comprises:
- decrypting the timestamp based on the cryptographic key.
20. The method of claim 1, in which providing the representation of the time comprises:
- transmitting the representation of the time to the caller.
21. The method of claim 1, in which providing the representation of the time comprises:
- displaying the representation of the time to the caller.
22. The method of claim 1, in which determining the cryptographic key comprises:
- selecting a database record based on the device identifier, in which the database record comprises the device identifier.
23. A method comprising:
- receiving a sequence of DTMF signals from a caller via a telephone connection;
- determining a timestamp based on the DTMF signals;
- receiving a device identifier from the caller, in which the device identifier identifies a device;
- determining a cryptographic key based on the device identifier;
- determining a representation of a time based on the timestamp and the cryptographic key;
- providing the representation of the time to the caller;
- determining an account; and
- charging a fee to the account.
24. A method comprising:
- receiving a timestamp from a timestamp recipient via an Internet connection;
- receiving a device identifier via the Internet connection, in which the device identifier identifies a device;
- determining a cryptographic key based on the device identifier;
- determining a representation of a time based on the timestamp and the cryptographic key;
- providing the representation of the time to the timestamp recipient via the Internet connection;
- determining an account; and
- charging a fee to the account.
Patent History
Type: Application
Filed: Jul 17, 2001
Publication Date: Aug 29, 2002
Patent Grant number: 6959387
Inventors: Jay S. Walker (Ridgefield, CT), Bruce Schneier (Minneapolis, MN), James A. Jorasch (Stamford, CT), Dean P. Alderucci (Stamford, CT)
Application Number: 09907112
International Classification: H04L009/00;


text:
Norvasc (Amlodipine Besylate)
Istin (℞)
5mg Tablet
(℞) Prescription required. May be split. Product of UK/EU. Shipped from United Kingdom. Norvasc is also marketed internationally under the name Istin.
Istin (℞)
10mg Tablet
(℞) Prescription required. May be split. Product of UK/EU. Shipped from United Kingdom. Norvasc is also marketed internationally under the name Istin.
Generic equivalents for Norvasc... What are generics?
Amlodipine Besylate (℞)
2.5mg Tablet
(℞) Prescription required. May be split. Product of Canada. Shipped from Canada.
Amlodipine Besylate (℞)
5mg Tablet
(℞) Prescription required. May be split. Product of UK/EU. Shipped from United Kingdom.
Amlodipine Besylate (℞)
10mg Tablet
(℞) Prescription required. May be split. Product of Canada. Shipped from Canada.
To comply with Canadian International Pharmacy Association regulations you are permitted to order a 3-month supply or the closest package size available based on your personal prescription. read more
Amlodipine Besylate Information
AMLODIPINE (am LOE di peen) is a calcium-channel blocker. It affects the amount of calcium found in your heart and muscle cells. This relaxes your blood vessels, which can reduce the amount of work the heart has to do. This medicine is used to lower high blood pressure. It is also used to prevent chest pain.
This medicine may be used for other purposes; ask your health care provider or pharmacist if you have questions.
They need to know if you have any of these conditions: -heart problems like heart failure or aortic stenosis -liver disease -an unusual or allergic reaction to amlodipine, other medicines, foods, dyes, or preservatives -pregnant or trying to get pregnant -breast-feeding
Take this medicine by mouth with a glass of water. Follow the directions on the prescription label. Take your medicine at regular intervals. Do not take more medicine than directed. Talk to your pediatrician regarding the use of this medicine in children. Special care may be needed. This medicine has been used in children as young as 6. Persons over 65 years old may have a stronger reaction to this medicine and need smaller doses.
Overdosage: If you think you have taken too much of this medicine contact a poison control center or emergency room at once. NOTE: This medicine is only for you. Do not share this medicine with others.
If you miss a dose, take it as soon as you can. If it is almost time for your next dose, take only that dose. Do not take double or extra doses.
-herbal or dietary supplements -local or general anesthetics -medicines for high blood pressure -medicines for prostate problems -rifampin
This list may not describe all possible interactions. Give your health care provider a list of all the medicines, herbs, non-prescription drugs, or dietary supplements you use. Also tell them if you smoke, drink alcohol, or use illegal drugs. Some items may interact with your medicine.
Visit your doctor or health care professional for regular check ups. Check your blood pressure and pulse rate regularly. Ask your health care professional what your blood pressure and pulse rate should be, and when you should contact him or her. This medicine may make you feel confused, dizzy or lightheaded. Do not drive, use machinery, or do anything that needs mental alertness until you know how this medicine affects you. To reduce the risk of dizzy or fainting spells, do not sit or stand up quickly, especially if you are an older patient. Avoid alcoholic drinks; they can make you more dizzy. Do not suddenly stop taking amlodipine. Ask your doctor or health care professional how you can gradually reduce the dose.
Side effects that you should report to your doctor or health care professional as soon as possible: -allergic reactions like skin rash, itching or hives, swelling of the face, lips, or tongue -breathing problems -changes in vision or hearing -chest pain -fast, irregular heartbeat -swelling of legs or ankles Side effects that usually do not require medical attention (report to your doctor or health care professional if they continue or are bothersome): -dry mouth -facial flushing -nausea, vomiting -stomach gas, pain -tired, weak -trouble sleeping
This list may not describe all possible side effects. Call your doctor for medical advice about side effects. You may report side effects to FDA at 1-800-FDA-1088.
Keep out of the reach of children. Store at room temperature between 59 and 86 degrees F (15 and 30 degrees C). Protect from light. Keep container tightly closed. Throw away any unused medicine after the expiration date.
NOTE: This sheet is a summary. It may not cover all possible information. If you have questions about this medicine, talk to your doctor, pharmacist, or health care provider.
Amlodipine Besylate Oral tablet

subset: commoncrawl


text:
SHOPPING WITH JAMES: CHANEL TRI-COLOR FLAP BAGSCategories:Other Brands
There are as many variations of Chanel Bags available as we can imagine, and that also includes the Chanel Classic Flap Bag.
Life can be more interesting, if you allow to. Instead of sticking to the 'black colors', which are usually refer to as timeless and classic, perhaps…perhaps… we should move out of our comfort zone and be bold, and try something else.
Like the latest Chanel Extra Mini Classic Flap Bag, we know that the single colors are the favorite picks. Who doesn't love the Extra Mini Classic Flap Bag in pink?
READ: Chanel Extra Mini Classic Flap Bag in Pink
Listen to the advice of our friend James, she just went back from the Chanel boutique and the SA offered her the Boy Chanel Clutch Bag in Ombre Patent Leather. This boy bag is really nice, the gorgeous color from beige to red, designed with the classic boy clasp in shiny golden hardware. There is basically nothing wrong with this bag, but somehow our intuition tell us 'no'.
You see, this bag doesn't seem to be practical, especially when want a bag to carry everyday. And such bags need to fit to the right outfit, it should be perfect for the special occasions.
So James turned the SA's offer down, also because she spotted something even more gorgeous – the Mini Classic Flap Bag in tri-color. You see, to avoid buyer's remorse later on, you need listen to your heart.
James: 'The Tri-color Mini Classic Flap Bag, it was offered in all classic collection, I think 3 or 4 different combo's. One I got is the blue, green and turquoise, if I remember, there are also red, blue, brown-red, pink, drank pink and one more combo'.
Tri-colors handbags need to be handpicked carefully, choosing the wrong color and you will regret later on. I really love the choice of James, the colors are so yummie. You know, this bag doesn't feel too flashy, like you're showing off, its gentle and absolutely gorgeous.
So we went on to ask for the prices, here what we got:
The Boy Chanel Clutch Bag is priced at $3800 CAD, the Mini Classic Flap Bag is priced at $3100 CAD. Obvious they are also in styles like medium and jumbo, they are the same price as the normal classics.
Tags: bags Chanel Flap TRI-COLOR
comnum(0) tbcount(0) tbcount(361)
CHANEL TRI-COLOR FLAP BAGCategories:Other Brands
Itching for a multi-color Classic Flap Bag?
Disappointed because you've missed the train to purchase the Chanel Valentine Flap Bag (which is also in multi-color pink by the way).
READ: Chanel Valentine 2014 Flap Bag
Well, no worries, here's another seasonal style to add to your collection and it's different than the single colored Classic Flap Bags.
Perhaps its time to make a switch, avoid the bags painted in one color and adds some colors to your life. Different colors create different feelings and experience. Perhaps there is a style in your wardrobe that's designed to match this bag.
The flap is brown, then burgundy on the other parts, refined with beige color to help the silver CC logo to shine. It's a relaxing combination of shades, but still pretty.
And just like all Chanel stunning bags, this version is also quilted. It comes with an interwoven chain.
Tags: bag Chanel Flap TRI-COLOR


text:
Visit Clutha NZ
Our spectacular scenery and wildlife is spread across a myriad of landscapes.
1 / 5
Our spectacular scenery and wildlife is spread across a myriad of landscapes. Our rocky shores, sandy beaches, wetlands, rolling hills and the Blue Mountains, make the Clutha District a magnificent place to holiday. It's time to head South, meet the friendly people and enjoy all we have to offer.
Located on the east coast of the South Island of New Zealand, Clutha is home to clear, deep rivers and undisturbed beaches. Relaxed farming communities dot the countryside with New Zealand's largest river, the Clutha (Mata-au), weaving through the region. Clutha's population is around 17,000 people – some of the friendliest in the country – spread over 6,363km2.
If you're coming from the north, take in the natural and recreational splendours of Taieri Mouth, Lake Waihola and the nearby Sinclair Wetlands - a haven to rare birds with a rich cultural history. Then rest and replenish in Milton and explore the surrounding coastal settlements of Toko Mouth and Bull Creek.
Further south on the banks of the Clutha River, Kaitangata, the "Black Gold Town" is ideally situated to take advantage of boating, seasonal white baiting and angling opportunities. It has a fascinating heritage linked to its long mining history.
Head inland and soak up the history in Lawrence, birthplace of the New Zealand Gold Rush and home today to a truly fabulous range of boutiques and eateries. Try your hand at gold panning or the Clutha Gold Trail, an easy 2-day cycling experience, which showcases early Maori and gold mining heritage.
Venture towards the Blue Mountains and into West Otago with its rich agricultural heritage, and discover a place to truly escape the rat race, while taking advantage of the fabulous hunting, fishing and other outdoor opportunities.
Travel via Clinton, the five horse town, to Balclutha which is the heart of the Clutha district. Balclutha's impressive arch bridge crosses the mighty Clutha River and the town itself offers a variety of eateries, shopping and services.
Through Balclutha and towards the coast, the region enjoys one of the best and most unspoiled natural wonderlands in New Zealand, The Catlins. See spectacular natural marvels such as Nugget Point, Purakaunui Falls and a petrified forest, and encounter wildlife such as sea lions and the rare yellow-eyed penguin. Don't miss the charming coastal town of Kaka Point with its attractive swimming and surfing beaches, and the rural town of Owaka, which is a good base to explore more of The Catlins. Head down to Papatowai for dramatic native bush and seaside scenery.
From the moment you enter to when you leave, Clutha has something truly remarkable to offer. Leave the rest of the world behind, come and experience the welcome and wonders of the Clutha District.
Article by
Destination Clutha
Whether you love heritage, wildlife, or the great outdoors, there truly is something for everyone. New Zealand's largest river, the Clutha weaving through the region. It's time to head South, meet the friendly people and enjoy all we have to offer.


text:
The best of Rotorua in a day
Rotorua is a jewel in any New Zealand holiday itinerary – here are our favourite reasons to visit this cultural and geothermal hotspot.
1 / 5
Rotorua is a jewel in any New Zealand holiday itinerary – you'll get your fix of geothermal goodness, culture and fun & excitement. Here are our favourite reasons to visit Rotorua.
An adventure-packed geothermal wonderland
Nestled in the Central North Island just three hours' drive from Auckland, the region is highly geothermal and lets you get up close to geysers and boiling thermal mud, marvel at richly-hued pools coloured by thermophilic life, climb volcanoes and relax in therapeutic hot pools. The area also has 18 sparkling lakes of all sizes to be explored by kayak, paddleboard, steamer or walking trails. The adventures doesn't end there – hikers, mountain bikers and horse riders can explore the Whakarewarewa Forest, a cool 5600 hectares locally known as 'The Redwoods' for its towering Californian trees alongside native New Zealand forest. In the evenings, attend Maori concerts and dinners to learn more about New Zealand's indigenous culture.
Making the most of Rotorua
One way to make sure you get the most out of your time is to tick off a few experiences on the same day, and one way is to use combos provided by Rotorua Combos and Kaitiaki Adventures. Let's explore combo 20 for a rip-roaring ride.
Volcano hiking
Begin your day with a guided tour of Mount Tarawera, a dormant volcano with spectacular views over many of Rotorua's lakes and diverse landscapes. Mount Tarawera's terrible rise to fame took place in 1886 when its violent eruption destroyed the Pink and White Terraces – which were considered the Eighth Natural Wonder of the World – and buried entire villages. Your guide will pick you up from your accommodation, drop you off, and throughout the day regale you with stories of one of the local Maori peoples, Ngati Rangitihi, as well as race you in an exhilarating run down loose scoria to the bottom of the crater!
Wild white-water action
The second half of the day involves a uniquely adrenaline-pumping white-water experience: rafting the Kaituna River while learning about local Maori culture from your guide. You'll plunge down a seven-metre waterfall – Tutea Falls – and glide through twisting, forested canyons, all the while immersing yourself in ancient Maori tales of the area.
Hot spring therapy
After all this action, you'll need a little well-deserved relaxation: soaking in the seven adults-only hot pools at Polynesian Spa. The first three pools cascade and are luxuriously lined with marble. Fed by an alkaline spring, this water of 38-39 degrees C comes with the benefit of sodium silica as a natural antiseptic. There's also a deeper alkaline pool in which to stretch out, and the remaining three are the acidic Priest Spa pools. These are hotter at 39-42 degrees C and are from a radium spring, renowned for health benefits. They were named after a Catholic priest who calmed his arthritis by bathing in these pools in the late 1800s.
What are you waiting for?
To make the most out of your time in Rotorua, book this combo and many others on by visiting the Rotorua combos website. For more information on visiting Mt Tarawera or rafting the Kaituna River, please visit the Kaitiaki Adventures website.


text:
Main Content:
Men's Blazers On Sale
Banana Republic Men's Blazers on Sale
Strike a successful pose for less with handsome fashions from the men's suits sale at Banana Republic. Add to your business suit collection with elegant coordinates at substantially reduced prices. Build a unique look with the men's blazer sale with striking suit jackets and blazers in contemporary designs. Find comfortable linen or wool tailored jackets and blazers available in short and long cuts. Our men's suits sale includes coordinating suit trousers sporting tailored designs and distinctive details. Use our convenient online size chart to find the best fit. Mix and match pieces with the men's blazers sale; find matching suits or shop by-the-piece to create your own formal fashions. Lead the way in the affordable, formal designs from the men's suits sale at Banana Republic.


text:
|View Poll Results: Darker Than Black - Episode 12 Rating
|Perfect 10
|9 out of 10 : Excellent
|8 out of 10 : Very Good
|7 out of 10 : Good
|6 out of 10 : Average
|5 out of 10 : Below Average
|4 out of 10 : Poor
|3 out of 10 : Bad
|2 out of 10 : Very Bad
|1 out of 10 : Painful
|Voters: 204. You may not vote on this poll
|Thread Tools
|2009-12-27, 17:25
|Link #241
~Rock ☆~
Graphic Designer
Join Date: Apr 2007
Location: In The Farplane
|2009-12-27, 17:46
|Link #242
Waiting for more taiyuki!
Join Date: Jan 2004
|2009-12-27, 19:14
|Link #243
Join Date: Nov 2008
Location: Somewhere between heaven and hell !
Wow , what an end but still good .
It was rushed though .
Too many things happenned .
So , Shion copied the earth then Suou , her family (except Shion) and July went there in the end otherwise they're dead .
Ow , when July was happy and hug Suou , it was so cute .
But seems that the magician guy isn't dead wait what ?
So , Rock Guy is a traitor and the samurai girl killed him .
Wow , Hei lost , hopefully he was saved ...
OMG , the futurist car XD that make sense lulz !!!
Mao still the funniest character
White Yin / Black Yin ? and Last Yin ? (in the end) someone can tell me what happens ...
Hei was with White Yin and Last Yin in the coffin was Black Yin ? <---- NVM , look the previous posts
Well , his star is still there so i think he's still alive somewhere ...
Omg , Misaki in the end !!! She's beautiful
Give it 9/10 even though it was rushed ...
Misaki said it's just the beginning so a Season 3 ?
And the twins said that another gate is created .
Ow , they should have make more episodes .. compared to S1 this season is a bit down ..
PS : And yeah , i lol my ass at RAMBO in the end
Last edited by -Sho-; 2009-12-27 at 19:25.
|2009-12-27, 20:12
|Link #245
In the Tatami Galaxy ↓
Join Date: Feb 2006
I would agree with someone when he said that the ending wasn't as bad because of its commentary on our own memories. Memories are an important part of making us who we are, and it reflected on Suou. At least the loss of her memories was recompensed with a gain of a peaceful new life. I thought Hei's scene with her was touching.
I constructed that hypothesis of mine because of the unlikelihood of Hei wanting to kill the only person that really mattered to him for the past few years. Suou was important, but she wasn't the world to Hei. Yin is.
I also definitely don't really think he'd strengthen his resolve in killing her when he discovered she tried her best not to let Izanami come out. In fact there are parallels to Tsukihime, where Arcueid would rather sleep forever than harm any one of Shiki's kind. That's the depth of her love for him. Upon realizing that, would you still go out and kill her?
Hei's not inhuman. He's all too human. It just doesn't make sense for him to kill Yin.
|2009-12-27, 20:23
|Link #246
Senior Member
Join Date: Mar 2009
Location: Normandy SR-2
Age: 24
I just watched the episode, and I have to say that I'm very confused. What the heck happened with Hei and Yin anyways? It wasn't a really bad episode or anything, my head's just hurting from all the questions it left, rather than the answers it should've given us...
|2009-12-27, 20:40
|Link #247
Joseph Defense Squad
Join Date: Nov 2009
Location: Mars
Well, I have to say, as an ending to Suou's story arc, I like it. I enjoyed watching the episode, and it has a lot of good points
- Hazuki kicking butt! Awesome- would've loved to see the whole thing, but there was no time... o well!
- Misaki's new look. That's just so good, they should've done it way earlier. She'd be more popular
- Mao switching his, erm, "form of transport", I'd love for him to stick around Misaki, it would be fun. Did they show what happened to him, I think I missed it?!
- Suou's finale with Hei was touching. Was I the only one who thought she was not only talking about Hei when she said something were missing? After all, there doesn't seem to be a Shion either, and she has to be reintroduced to July too.
- About July, I didn't get the feeling he "lost" Suou, like some said, just because they have an age difference and she doesn't remember him. They'll probably be reintroduced, at some point, and Suou doesn't seem like the type of kid who'd be "too cool" to hang out with a younger boy, at least not if he can pass as a really cute little brother- don't they always advertise how anime girls like cute little boys anyways? It seemed to me that what he lost was rather his abilities as an (evolved!!) doll? Whether that's good or bad is debatable, but still.
The whole thing definitely felt like a setup for a sequel, it gave sufficient closure to the Suou story, but left tons of material for a S3, but I'm not sure what the cast would be?
I don't think they'd have the guts to make a show starring Misaki, Oreille, creepy twins, Rambo and maybe Mao and Hazuki, even though that's what it felt like, at least to me (and personally, I'd find it awesome).
It felt as if they were removing Hei, but that would be a bad move. He would return at some point.
The way he carried Yin's body reminded me of a couple of other death scenes for some reason (hah, I bet we'll see him lobbing Yin into some lake at the beginning of S3!!! Mark my words! ), so she seemed pretty dead to me, especially for the lack of clothes as someone mentioned.
It's just, if someone's been through obvious trauma, the first move is to wrap them into something, but this might just be for dramatic effect. Still.
Thing is, we'll be spending the whole OVA episodes on explaining what happened to Yin before S2, and if she were to just get up and carry on after all this, why bother with dramatic-looking OVA- episodes about her?
On the other hand, Yin seems to be very popular, so I didn't think they'd go through with killing her off, though it would be the only option that makes sense...
I also really liked the music. Just hope we'll get a S3, one that is maybe a bit more tightly written, but overall, despite its flaws, I enjoyed the show, though unfortunately nowhere near as much as S1.
Had I watched it as Suou's story, not a sequel to DtB, I would've liked it more, but that's just a problem with what I had expected
|2009-12-27, 21:00
|Link #248
~Night of Gales~
Join Date: Dec 2005
I find it funny you talk about being optimistic, while you denounce Yin's fate as TRIPLE BAD END + IRONIC INESCAPABLE FATE one way or another.
|2009-12-27, 21:06
|Link #249
ショ ン (^^)
IT Support
Well it seems the ending curse for this season continues with DTB. I honestly had hoped it would not turn out like this. I cant help but to feel that writers got lazy with the ending this i truly feel. In my mind they solved nothing about the bigger problem of the real Earth. Shion saved a few with his copy plan but the real problem and the real war continues to rage. So to me they solved nothing but Suou's story. Which technically is what they could have wanted and leave open a 3rd series possibility to finish up with Hei and the rest of the crew.
This was not the worst ending of the seasons and i didnt hate it i just feel it was a weak cop out of the larger problems at hand. Others are still miserable and the gates continue to appear in the real world. The ending feels more like running away from the problems than solving anything.
I think i will just count this season as 12 episode ova than an actual season. Darker Than Black season 1 is still the only one in my mind.
|2009-12-27, 21:37
|Link #250
. . .
Join Date: Oct 2009
Location: Brazil
Age: 31
|2009-12-27, 21:53
|Link #251
Senior Member
Join Date: Jun 2008
Age: 32
|2009-12-27, 22:14
|Link #252
Joseph Defense Squad
Join Date: Nov 2009
Location: Mars
I'd also guess there was no time to focus on her, but if she were alive, there would be time to explain in a S3, but if she's finished, it would make sense to give her a sort of farewell-OVA, to wrap up her story? Just guessing.
I feel they should wrap her story up in the OVA, and just having her back after ALL this drama and talk about her needing to be killed, and her killing here and there randomly, and the build-up in this episode, they'd have a really hard time making it plausible and not seem cheesy and for keeping fanboys happy, if they chose to keep her alive.
Characters have not been redeemed for lesser evil, so unless someone can give me a plausible scenario for her survival to play out, I'd rather she's a tragic heroine than some fanbait.
I am neutral towards Yin, so it's just that I don't see a plausible way for her to make it out of her mess, but as I said, if someone can think of something good, I'd like to hear it
Last edited by Faerie; 2009-12-27 at 22:16. Reason: addition
|2009-12-27, 22:46
|Link #253
~Night of Gales~
Join Date: Dec 2005
Even if you say that it's a build-up for S3's antagonist, conflict between America/Syndicate 2.0 isn't going to be over even if the prophecy is thwarted. The birth of Kagu-tsuchi just adds a new, more dangerous element to the entire conflict.
And I'd say that the last episode itself created a loophole to redeem Yin. All these while, we thought Yin's entire being had evolved into Izanami, and like Hei, had little to no hope for redemption. But it turns out to be entirely untrue because Izanami turns out to just be one part of Yin gone haywire ( probably Yin's doll-spectre power gone out of control ) that the real Yin suppressed. By making Izanami and Yin 2 separate, yet inter-linked existence, it actually gave room to redeem Yin.
|2009-12-27, 22:58
|Link #254
. . .
Join Date: Oct 2009
Location: Brazil
Age: 31
In the end, the plot focus was the meeting between Izanami and Izanagi, and the birth of this new being that we saw in the end.
Since S1 the syndicate was trying to take Yin from Hei. Remember the "stepfather"/piano teacher arc, with the lady and the guy who made poetry for his remuneration? Probably it's more than a dramatic OVA, and it can give good answers about the syndicate and, of courser, about Yin and Hei.
I don't think it's just fanboysm. Yin/Izanami turned to be the main character, along with Hei and now the evil shota. Hei spoke about kill Yin/Izanami, but we can see that it changed after he was told that Yin capt Izanami at bay in a first moment. Even S3 thought a second time before kill her when they saw that she was struggling to constrain Izanami inside.
And yes, I'm a fan of Yin/Hei. Someone like more Suou, others Misaki, probably there's even someone attached to Gemma
|2009-12-27, 23:04
|Link #255
Senior Member
Join Date: Jun 2008
Age: 32
Yin Lives:
1. Hei cared for Yin, this at least became obvious as the season progressed.
2. Izanami was said to be a separate personality from Yin.
3. In episode 12 there are two Yins, the dark most likely being Izanami and the white most likely being Yin. One of the two says to kill her, but Hei only responds by smiling, meaning we don't know what his decision was.
4. The next scene we see Hei standing in front of Yin(it looks to be her real body that was said to be an empty shell before) with his hand on her heart, and you could say he's not killing her here because the light is pinkish rather than blue.
5. Hei is seen carrying Yin's limp body, but having no idea what just took place before it's hard to say with certainty that she's dead.
6. The boy Yin is born meaning that Hei didn't stop the new life from being born
Yin Dies:
1. Yin is now Izanami and has become an antagonist.
2. Hei cares for Yin so he may see killing her as relieving her.
3. One of the 2 Yin's says to kill her and that there is still time(still time for what though? The kid is still born).
4. Hei is seen with his hand on her heart and could have indeed killed her.
5. Hei is seen carrying Yin's limp body.
6. In the Izanami myth Izanami dies after childbirth.
I also wouldn't say Yin killing lots of contractors has much to do with anything as far as Hei is concerned. I mean he offed April like it was nothing to start the season, killed a human, and lots of others as well. Hei never seemed to care about the people Yin killed but more so that Yin had turned into a weapon and he wanted to stop her for personal reasons.
Another question that has to be raised is what happened to Hei? If he did kill Yin, did he just fade back into the city and go into hiding again? Did he stay inside the gate, or go to the new earth so he could stalk Suou long enough for her to be legal?
|2009-12-27, 23:07
|Link #256
Senior Member
Join Date: Jun 2008
Age: 32
|2009-12-27, 23:18
|Link #257
Joseph Defense Squad
Join Date: Nov 2009
Location: Mars
What I mean is, even after learning that Yin tried to stop her change (and hence still had her own consciousness) he said "let's end this", and then suddenly- bam- they make themselves a loophole to maybe keep Yin and to keep people guessing/ hoping.
Well, you have a point that it seems too harsh to have her die and the demon spawn coming about anyway, but isn't that in accordance with the legend too, that Izanami doesn't survive the incident? Someone mentioned that before, I think.
And what would they do with Yin, if she survived? She clearly can't just resume her role from S1.
Her recent development will be handled in the OVA and she can't resume her role as the team's doll without first getting more screentime in S3 to develop her back into it. And then what would her purpose in the plot be?
They can chose to save her, the problem is just, what to do with her then? Havoc was on her way to redemption too, or Amber, and yet they didn't make it. Now, if Amber were to suddenly pop up again for good, then all the drama around her was pointless (even though I'd like her around a lot, it's better she stays dead, and as of now, I think same goes for Yin).
|2009-12-27, 23:20
|Link #258
. . .
Join Date: Oct 2009
Location: Brazil
Age: 31
Like Shion, who was a contractor since his birth, and his father was part of the syndicate . On top of that his researches was so secret tha othe faction in send Mao to spy on him.
The two cases, in my opinion, seens to be already knew by the syndicate. Shion's we saw in tha anime. Yin we need the manga and the OVAs.
|2009-12-27, 23:33
|Link #259
Senior Member
Join Date: Jun 2008
Age: 32
|2009-12-27, 23:40
|Link #260
Junior Member
Join Date: Dec 2009
darker than black
Here is what I think that happen at the end.
Hei got his power back because the meteor fragment was broken by Yin, which release his power back to him. I believe he change Yin to something else with his power without killing her. Hence the glowing lights like hells gate at end of season 1. Remember Hei has the power to change matters and probably more. The new Yin look alike is probably what they need to stop in the 3rd season if we get one.
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Reviewed by Mythri M. (age 8)
I like this book because it is long. It is a mystery and I like mysteries. My favorite part is when Julie solves the mystery. When she solves the mystery it is a surprising ending. I don't want to give it away! If you like mysteries and the Julie series you should buy this book. There are a few illustrations and I like all of them. The author always shows what she is talking about with a picture. This makes it easier to understand the book.
I would surely recommend this book to anyone who likes mysteries. The story is very interesting and will keep you in suspence. I think second and third graders would like this book.


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Title: Tree Of Life
Buy Canvas Art
I wanted this "Tree Of Life" to be warm, fun, and expressive. This abstract artwork is digital mixed media because I created a digital abstract painting through many different methods and then adapted a very rustic hand drawn silhouette of the tree into it. I paired the many textured circles with the rectangular shapes to express the complimentary polarities – the feminine and masculine balance that is throughout all of creation. Canvas art, metal art, acrylic art, and paper prints are available from my print gallery. Canvas art prints can be made up to the massive size of 48? x 48."


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Pink Flamingo Beach Art Print
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This hand painted flamingo art print is the perfect way to bring tropical style to your home, office or nursery.
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The paper we use for prints replicates that of traditional watercolor papers – featuring a textured surface that supports a wide color gamut. It's also acid-free, which gives the pigments in the print a longer life. Please note that all prints are printed with no bleed.
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Herbert H. Thompson is chief security strategist for People Security, a security education company. He also teaches software security at Columbia University in New York.
Software testing comes in many flavors. Unit testing analyzes individual components before they're integrated into larger systems. System and integration testing checks that modules work together. Regression testing verifies that everything still works after a change is made to the code. And security testing checks that data is protected.
Tools such as source-code scanners, security-aware compilers, and application scanners help developers find vulnerabilities in code. And techniques like fuzz testing uncover inputs that can cause apps to behave badly.
With fuzzing, we deliberately attack software with random data in search of weaknesses and unexpected responses. Fuzz testing is particularly important in Web application development, and it's playing a growing role in ensuring that "security quality" -- the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of systems and data for users -- is integrated into every phase of development.
Fuzz testing finds vulnerabilities that are too complicated for a person to see. With complex programs -- Windows 7 has an estimated 50 million lines of code, for instance -- it's difficult to anticipate everything that can go wrong. Fuzzing takes a "big hammer" approach to systems, hitting them persistently with strange inputs. Fuzzers also save companies money because they don't require much human intervention. Microsoft fuzzes its apps until end of life because it's so cheap to do. Another advantage of fuzz testing is its simplicity. Tests that target specific vulnerabilities can quickly be implemented. Fuzzing is credited recently with finding vulnerabilities in the Windows 7, iPhone, and Android communications protocols.
Early Fuzzing
My first fuzzing experience was in the late 1980s when soda vending machines appeared in the Bahamas, where I grew up. But the machines had signs on them saying "U.S. Quarters Only." The Bahamian currency is pegged one-to-one with the U.S. dollar, and both currencies are accepted everywhere. When my friends and I came across our first soda machine, none of us had a U.S. quarter, so we started experimenting. One of us put a washer in the slot. It dropped right through. We tried a U.S. dime. Nothing. A Bahamian quarter. Still nothing. The outlook for soda was bleak until we dropped a Bahamian 10-cent piece in.
To our amazement, the display instantly registered "25" -- the machine mistook the 10-cent coin for a U.S. quarter. We scrambled to find three more 10-cent pieces. The machine read "50," "75," and finally "1.00." We hit Select and got a soda.
Years later, I learned that the vending machine measured diameter and weight to determine if an object dropped into the slot was a U.S. quarter. Bahamian 10-cent pieces coincidently have almost exactly the same diameter and weight as U.S. quarters.
Without understanding the mechanics of the machine, we had applied semi-random inputs and hoped for something interesting to happen. What we were doing is now known as "fuzzing" -- applying inputs with some degree of randomness, then looking for unexpected outputs. In theory, it sounds straightforward, but in practice, it can be difficult to do well.
How Fuzzing Works
There are many freely available fuzzers, such as Peach Fuzzer from Eddington and Frantz, Spike from Immunity, and MiniFuzz from Microsoft, as well as commercial fuzzers such as Codenomicon from Codenomicon Defensics and Beyond Security's BeStorm. Web application fuzzers are by far the most mature. They understand how an application is supposed to respond to normal input, then they either look for deviations or symptoms of failure. When testing for SQL Injection vulnerabilities, for instance, an input might be a string of text with a single quote mark. If a database error message is returned, the tester knows there's a potential vulnerability. For non-Web software, fuzzing is murkier. These fuzzers work by corrupting files, network traffic, or API parameters by doing the following:
- They generate a random input (or randomly corrupt an existing input).
- Deliver that input to the app.
- Monitor it for an exception or crash.
This approach finds problems such as buffer overflows, a symptom of which is usually a crash. If you're looking for other, noncrashing vulnerabilities, fuzzing can still be useful if it can be automated.
Back to my soda machine, we were looking for one thing -- the red display showing the money we put in had registered. In retrospect, there were other outcomes that would have been interesting: The machine might have crashed, short-circuited, or become hopelessly jammed. If you can specify the symptoms you're interested in, fuzzing can be an incredibly cheap way to see how a system responds to a large set of inputs. The problem is that it can miss more subtle architectural problems.


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This thread is for images you think are cool.
Atekimogus wrote:
Captain Seafort wrote:1) There's no definite article before "HMS".
Captain Seafort wrote:2) "Image"
Mikey wrote:As I was before I was corrected, he's just using the American common usage.
Perhaps HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Zumwalt look like blue question marks.
JudgeKing wrote:There, I've corrected the Zumwalt-class destroyer image.
Atekimogus wrote:Since a pic saying "All hail brittania" with cute japanese girls strikes me as odd I took the liberty to change a few details, enjoy
Reliant121 wrote:Oi, you git. Our teeth aren't that bad
Sonic Glitch wrote:JudgeKing wrote:There, I've corrected the Zumwalt-class destroyer image.
Still no image for HMS Queen Elisabeth (happy seafort? )
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Robotics Case Studies
Case Studies
- This case study is filed under:
- Industry
FANUC Palletizing System Reduces Labor Costs at Alto Dairy
by Cathy Powell
FANUC America Corporation Posted 06/01/2008
Waupun, Wisconsin-based Alto Dairy faced significant costs related to strains and injuries suffered by workers required to palletize over 7,600 cases of cheese per eight hour shift. In addition, the repetitive manual palletizing job was boring and left workers overly tired and prone to absenteeism.
As a major producer of natural cheese, Alto Dairy required a cost-effective solution that would allow it to maintain an aggressive packaging schedule and reallocate its manual palletizing staff to less strenuous positions.
FANUC Robotics recommended the M-410i robot which offers the flexibility to handle multiple-sized products, but compact enough to fit into Alto's tight workspace.
"Installation took only one day and went without a hitch," said Dave Lemmenes, packaging maintenance leader at Alto Dairy. "We were running full production in less than one week."
In the system, the M-410i robot, equipped with vacuum end-of-arm-tooling, PalletTool application software and related palletizing equipment automatically palletizes cases of cheese products from two infeed conveyors. As cases approach, the robot places a slip sheet onto an empty pallet and picks and palletizes two cases at a time. A fork truck operator transports full unit loads of up to 90 cases each out of the palletizing area.
"Not only have we reduced labor costs, but FANUC Robotics' process design, 24-hour support and excellent training have contributed to 100% uptime," said Lemmenes." "All this, plus the robot's ability to work in a small space and its one-day installation, is helping Alto quickly realize full payback."
Automated palletizing has allowed Alto Dairy to reallocate its manual palletizing staff to more fulfilling positions and has prompted the company to invest in a second robotic palletizer.
Palletizing 45-pound cases of shredded cheese, five days a week was once a back-wrenching job for workers at Alto Dairy. Now, a FANUC Robotics M-410i robot does the heavy lifting without breaking a sweat.