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Utama Design and impact of water treaties: Managing climate change
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Matthew Zentner Design and Impact of Water Treaties Managing Climate Change Doctoral Thesis accepted by Oregon State University, USA 123 ; Author Dr. Matthew Zentner Oregon State University Corvallis OR 97331-5506 USA e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.com ISSN 2190-5053 ISBN 978-3-642-23742-3 DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-23743-0 Supervisor Prof. Aaron Wolf Department of Geosciences Oregon State University Corvallis, OR 97331-5506 USA e-ISSN 2190-5061 e-ISBN 978-3-642-23743-0 Springer Heidelberg Dordrecht London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2011937770 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broad casting, reproduction on microfilm or in any other way, and storage in data banks. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the German Copyright Law of September 9, 1965, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Violations are liable to prosecution under the German Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com) Supervisor's Foreword International cooperation around water has a long and successful history; some of the world's most vociferous enemies have negotiated water agreements. The institutions they have created are generally resilient, even when relations are strained. Despite the importance of treaties, there has not been a concerted effort to empirically and substantially explore the relationship between the design of treaties and their impact on relations. In this study, a literature review extracts core concepts commonly used to explain the success of treaties in managing hydrologic stress. These are summarized as seven treaty mechanisms categories (specificity, uncertainty management, enforcement, communications, flexibility, integrativeness, and scale) and are hypothesized as important for shaping the institutional resiliency of a treaty. Water and conflict are undergoing slow but steady changes. Increased variability of rainfall and flow from climate change has the potential to stress existing transboundary water sharing agreements and make meeting the needs of all riparians difficult. The general mechanisms provided in this analysis are used to evaluate specific treaties and their capability to manage projected changes in climate in five case study basins: the Nile, Jordan, Tigris/Euphrates, Indus, and Helmand. The case studies illustrate the difficulties in pinpointing the importance and impact of each mechanism, and the overall treaty design, on water relations. Treaty mechanisms certainly play an important role in de-escalating tensions when stresses occurred within each basin. However, this research illustrates that conflict de-escalation is not a direct cause and effect relationship between the capabilities of the water institutions and the amount of stress to the system. Instead, there is a complex relationship between change to the system and management efforts that involves a series of feedback loops and influence from non-water related sectors. This study presents a unique way to utilize the existing literature to explain the success of treaties in managing hydrologic stress. Analysis of the seven mechanisms and the five case studies provides several summary explanatory concepts that include: treaty design and mechanisms exert an influence not just on the management capability (institutional resilience) aspect of relations, but also help to shape the political context of the problem; complaints are not necessarily an v vi Supervisor's Foreword indicator of decreased institutional resiliency, weak, or ill-designed treaties, but in some cases illustrate that a treaty is functioning properly; and ambient poor relations are important for shaping many complaints. What is better understood through this research is how treaty design has a relevant and important role in shaping basin management so that nations may better achieve their goals in a changing climate. Having Matt in our program has been a real pleasure, and it was a joy to be his advisor. Few scholars bring such a rich combination of technical expertise, interest in human dimensions, and experience in real world applications. The reader will note this nexus of capabilities in the work presented here, and I trust that we will continue to see this kind of creativity coming from Matt in the years to come. , Aaron T. Wolf Contents 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Climate Change, Fluctuations in Water Availability and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1 Environmental and Water Institutions . . . . . . 2.1.2 International Water Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.3 Water Treaty Implementation and Application 2.1.4 Water Treaty Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3 ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11 12 16 16 18 Hypotheses, Definitions and Explanatory Mechanisms . . . . . . 3.1 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.1 Defining the System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2 Defining Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.3 Defining Institutional Success. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.4 Defining Hydrologic Stress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Importance of Treaty Design and Institutional Mechanisms 3.3 Explanatory Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.3 Specificity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.4 Integrativeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.5 Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.6 Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.7 Uncertainty Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.8 Hydrohegemony and Power: Impact on Relations . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 23 24 25 26 27 29 29 30 33 34 36 37 38 40 41 43 vii viii 4 5 6 Contents Data and Methods: Treaties, Power, Scarcity and Conflict . . . . 4.1 Methodology Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Datasets and Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Dependent Variables: Conflict/Events Data . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Independent Variables: Treaty Mechanisms . . . . . . . . 4.2.3 Calculating Treaty Mechanism Independent Variables . 4.2.4 Independent Variable: Power and Hydrohegemony . . . 4.2.5 Independent Variable: Measuring Hydrologic Stress . . 4.2.6 Historical Drought/Scarcity Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 Independent Variables in MLR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 Dependent Variables in MLR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.3 Summary of Dependent and Independent Combinations Used in MLR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.4 Projected Drought/Scarcity Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 47 50 51 52 63 65 66 69 70 71 72 .. .. .. 73 73 75 ...... ...... 77 77 . . . . . . . . 80 83 85 87 ...... 88 ...... ...... 89 93 ...... ...... ...... 94 96 98 ........ ........ 99 99 Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Count Models/Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Literature Review Based Mechanism and Treaty Strength Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Linear Models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Regression Based Treaty Strength Results . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Hydrologic Stress, Drought and Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.1 PDSI Summary According to Presence/Absence of Complaints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.2 In-Depth Analysis of PDSI Specific to Basins with Complaints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.3 Power and Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.4 Comparison of Impact of Drought, Power and Treaties on Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Case Studies: Application of the Results . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Basin Selection Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Basin Specific Analysis of Treaty Design and Future Hydrologic Stress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.1 Nile River Basin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2 Helmand River Basin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.3 Indus River Basin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.4 Tigris/Euphrates River Basin . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.5 Jordan River Basin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 101 115 130 144 157 Contents 6.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.1 Case Study and Hypotheses 6.3.2 Explanatory Concepts . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix . . . . 174 174 179 185 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 Appendix A: Bibliography Analysis of Treaty Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . 197 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 7 ......... Discussion . ......... ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 1 Introduction Projecting the changes to water supplies, and our ability to manage those changes, is a worthwhile endeavor given recent data on climate change. The exacerbation of seasonal rainfall variability in a changing climate, as outlined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), will likely have considerable effects on freshwater systems and aggravate other existing stresses to water supplies. Based on projected increases in water variability, current management practices may not be robust enough to cope with the impacts of climate change on water supply, flood risk, ecosystems, health, energy supply, and agriculture (Bates et al. 2008). Transboundary rivers, where water resource management is already a delicate and complicated balance of myriad needs and decision processes, will be especially challenged. Increased variability of rainfall and flow from climate change has the potential to stress existing transboundary water sharing agreements and make meeting the needs of all riparians difficult.1 For some shared international rivers, a shift may occur from all needs being met and no history of disagreement to unfulfilled treaty requirements and, perhaps, an elevated potential for conflict (Zeitoun and Allan 2008; Cooley 2009). Basins with extreme changes in climate will certainly have the resiliency of any relevant treaty tested.2 Some authors have predicted that treaties will fail, with potentially extreme political-economic consequences (Amery 2002; Gleick 2010; Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998).3 Climate changes will inevitably affect water resources around the world, altering water availability, quality, and the management of infrastructure. New disputes are already arising in transboundary watersheds and are likely to become more common. The existing agreements and international principles for sharing water will not adequately handle the strain of future pressures, particularly those caused by climate change (Gleick 2010). 1 Water sharing agreements are defined synonymously with institutions as binding arrangements, typically called treaties or conventions. 2 Resiliency is defined as the ability to mitigate conflict or adapt to stress (in particular, hydrologic) or changing circumstances. 3 Failure in this study is defined as the measurable exhibition of conflict, especially when directly attributed to climate-related stress within a system. M. Zentner, Design and Impact of Water Treaties, Springer Theses, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-23743-0_1, Ó Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 1 2 1 Introduction Will treaties indeed fail and conflict ensue due to growing stresses, including those from climate change? Perhaps. Unless institutions and agreements have mechanisms robust enough to respond to changing local and global situations (including hydrologic), the stresses associated with climate change may outpace the capacity of the agreement to manage the changes (Giordano et al. 2005). Most transboundary treaties are uniform in their ostensible goal to enable countries to manage shared waters without conflict. However, international water law does not provide explicit rules and procedures, but rather suggests guiding principles based on legal precedence. Consequently, nations are often left on their own in determining how to best design and implement an agreement. While recognizing that water treaties are non-uniform and each institution is unique, some treaty designs may be better able to manage external stresses to the agreement, such as allocation of unforeseen inter-annual variability in river flows. However, empirically derived analyses that quantify the impact of specific mechanisms on mitigating conflict are lacking in general. An analysis of a large number of basins (n [ 5) that generalizes the extent to which many common and dissimilar institutional characteristics may influence the success or failure of a treaty has not been undertaken. Consequently, the general principles and conditions under which international river treaties are most effective are not well understood. Using a comprehensive, quantitative approach with multiple basins (n = 52) and treaties (n = 146), this research suggests mechanisms and general treaty components which best explain why some water treaties have been more resilient to past hydrologic stress. The mechanisms are empirically tested with historical observations of hydrologic stress and response, made across multiple basins/treaties over time. The results show which types of mechanisms are most important for managing seasonal and interannual variability of flows. With an understanding of treaty mechanisms and their response to past water stresses, models of future hydrologic scenarios associated with climate change are used in several case studies to estimate the treaty's capability to manage the scenarios. The results are used to develop a model for considering strategies in transboundary water law formation, which can mitigate the negative impacts of variability on riparian relations. The literature is first examined to determine a general set of principles that are most commonly cited as critical to effective water treaties. The literature review in Chap. 2 discusses how water scarcity and fluctuations in availability impacts national stability and security, which in turn determines the priority that nations place on the management of water. The projected impacts of climate change are discussed, as well as its potential to cause multiple, often indirect changes to water supplies that will affect internal stability as well as the relations between nations. The literature review identifies many of the principles most often cited as important for mitigating hydrologic stress related conflict. In Chap. 3, seven treaty mechanisms are used to categorize and quantify the extent that treaties contain the literature principles. These mechanism categories are: specificity, uncertainty management, enforcement, communications flexibility, integrativeness, and scale. Hydrologic fluctuations (drought/flooding) and differences in power (political, economic, internal stability) are also considered 1 Introduction 3 important for shaping the interactions between riparians. Three hypotheses are presented: (1) increased hydrologic stress increases the likelihood of complaints or state grievances involving a shared water resource; (2) water sharing agreements that have mechanisms in place will have less conflict and fewer grievances; and (3) all mechanisms have added benefit, but some mechanisms are more important to providing increased institutional capacity. In Chap. 4, a methodology for observing and quantifying each of the seven treaty mechanisms is discussed. Treaty, drought, power, and conflict data is then used to estimate treaty strength, or institutional resiliency in four basic steps: 1. Treaties are assessed for a total of 38 treaty measurements from Oregon State University and International Water Management Institute (IWMI) databases that are used to quantify the mechanisms that play a role in managing hydrologic stress. From this, a preliminary strength based on the number of mechanisms is estimated for each treaty (called the Literature Review strength). 2. The amount of hydrologic stress that treaties have managed in the past is quantified using the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) for the period 1950–2005.4 3. The presence and severity of conflict/complaints is used to measure the success of the treaty in managing hydrologic stress applied to the system. This study utilizes the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) Basins at Risk (BAR) dataset, which estimates intensity of conflict, as an indicator of the overall health of the system. A total of 388 complaints are segregated, based on their description, into climate related (85 total complaints) or non-climate related (303 total complaints). 4. The relative importance of each treaty mechanisms towards responding to hydrologic stress is quantified using a multiple linear regression (MLR) analysis.5 From the coefficients for each mechanism, another treaty strength is calculated (called the MLR strength). Results of the above analysis are presented in Chap. 5. Surprisingly, drought does not occur any more frequently in basins that have reported climate related conflict than it does in other basins. However, for treaties that do have climate related conflict, complaints are shown to be much more likely during periods of greater drought and hydrologic stress, indicating that for a certain subset of treaties, climate fluctuations are a driver of conflict. It was also unexpected that the stronger treaties (based on the Literature Review strength that emphasizes the number of treaty components) have a higher instance of both climate and general 4 The PDSI was selected from three different modeling approaches (PDSI, remotely sensed surface wetness, and water balance) with the aim of simulating past hydrological time series. Each was analyzed for their suitability for this study, with the PDSI selected as the most appropriate. 5 Several combinations of independent and dependent variables are used to extract regression coefficients. Generally, the dependent variable incorporates the conflictive events within the BAR, while the independent variables are formed from the seven treaty mechanisms, power differences between the signatories, and hydrologic stresses to the system. 4 1 Introduction conflict. A comparison of the quantity of mechanisms per treaty for treaties with climate complaints, any type of complaint, and no complaints indicates that treaties with more mechanisms had an increased likelihood of having complaints. The coefficients obtained from regression analysis indicate that an increase in flexibility, scale, and enforcement within a treaty result in less conflict. The MLR analysis also indicates that communications, specificity, and integrativeness are indicators of decreased likelihood of a complaint being filed. In Chap. 6, case studies for the Nile, Indus, Tigris/Euphrates, Jordan, and Helmand Rivers show how the study's findings regarding general treaty mechanisms can be used to help explain and shape riparian relations within specific basins. The treaty mechanism results are combined with future climate projections to estimate whether specific treaties are likely resilient enough to manage hydrologic stresses from climate change. The case study results provide some confirmation of strengths/weakness as estimated by the MLR. The MLR results indicating that an increase in scale, flexibility, and enforcement within a treaty result in fewer or better managed complaints were confirmed in all case studies. MLR results for communications and integrativeness that indicate these mechanisms result in more conflict were not reflected in the cases studies. The conclusion from the mechanism and case study analysis is that political, economic, and social influences and factors that are often only indirectly related to water are a key factor in determining the effectiveness of a treaty and the quantity and severity of water complaints. Complaints have typically occurred where water is important for national stability and where nations have placed extra emphasis on the treaty creation process resulting in treaties that are on average more robust (have more mechanisms) than treaties without complaints. Design elements can positively or negatively influence the treaty capabilities for managing stresses to the system. Complaints are not necessarily an indicator of decreased institutional resiliency, weak, or ill-designed treaties, but in some cases illustrates that a treaty is functioning properly. This research does not use past treaty non-compliance as a predictor of future non-compliance. It also does not intend to predict conflict in any given basin nor to predict the specific impacts of climate change, many of which will be unprecedented and perhaps impossible to gauge. This research does use past treaty successes and failures in managing hydrologic stress as a means of determining the importance of treaty design parameters, which can then be used to estimate treaty capabilities for managing stresses, such as those from climate change. It also assumes that treaties in general improve resiliency and intends to provide direction for basins without a treaty or for those that wish to develop institutions to better account for climate change. The power of this analysis is that the results can be used to explain success across multiple basins and to guide the design of future basin agreements. This dissertation is part of a larger project funded by the World Bank that includes several collaborators investigating basin and treaty vulnerability. While the author has been involved in all aspects, and data from the larger project is utilized, the primary focus of this research is on the treaty analysis. References 5 References Amery HA (2002) Water wars in the Middle East: a looming threat. Geog J 168(4):313–323 Bates B, Kundzewicz Z, Wu S, Palutikof J (2008) Climate change and water. Technical paper of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Geneva: IPCC Secretariat Cooley H, Christian-Smith J, Gleick P, Allen L (2009) Understanding and reducing the risks of climate change for transboundary waters. Pacific Institute, Oakland Giordano M, Giordano MA, Wolf AT (2005) International resource conflict and mitigation. J Peace Res 42(1):47–65 Gleick P (2010) Climate change will worsen water conflict across borders Pacific Institute Research for United Nations Cites strategies for reducing risk of tensions over shared water resources retrieved Accessed 5 October 2010, from http://www.pacinst.org/reports/transboundary_ waters/index.htm Homer-Dixon T, Blitt J (1998) Ecoviolence: links among environment, population, and security. Oxford, Rowman-Littlefield Zeitoun M, Allan JA (2008) Applying hegemony and power theory to transboundary water analysis. Water Policy 10(2):3–12 Chapter 2 Literature Review 2.1 Climate Change, Fluctuations in Water Availability and Security The focus of this review is to examine the relationships between international conflict and changes in climate (with shifts in water availability being a key factor in these changes). There is a vast amount of literature touching on the issues of climate and conflict, and by extension on environment and natural resources and their influence on societal and political stability (Brown et al. 2007; Eckstein 2010; Swart 1996). Global warming has raised concerns that changes to climate will pose unique challenges to many nations' security interests. Several studies have examined how already stressed systems that are vulnerable could be driven past a tipping point by shifts in climate (Barnett 2003; Dabelko 2008; Mabey 2007). The 2007 IPCC report summarizes the scientific understanding of climate change's impact on both air temperature and water resources, including farreaching changes in the intensity and variability of precipitation and increases in the risk of flood and drought in many areas of the world (Bates et al. 2008; IPCC 2007).6 Models indicate that changes in climate will vary significantly in time and in space and, consequently, international river basins, and the stability of the treaties that govern them, will not be impacted uniformly. Those areas that are already vulnerable to drought may have its frequency and intensity increased. Likewise, areas that have floods may receive higher intensity flooding more often. For many locations, the IPCC projects that the changes in water resources are likely to be dramatic. Historically, long-term fluctuations in water supplies have typically occurred on a relatively limited scale, with usually only localized areas impacted. However, climate change will likely intensify the global hydrologic cycle, impacting multiple regions at the same time (Fowler et al. 2003). When 6 Such climate shifts are predicted with fairly good certainty at the global level, but this certainty is reduced as scales decrease to the national and local level. M. Zentner, Design and Impact of Water Treaties, Springer Theses, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-23743-0_2, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 7 8 2 Literature Review stresses to a basin are severe or long-term (such as from shifts in climate patterns), sometimes second, third, and fourth order changes must develop before a new equilibrium is attained. Putting a finger on the causes and responses to change that are often indirect and at multiple scales requires an understanding of the social and physio-chemical dynamics within these ecosystems that is undoubtedly a daunting challenge. Many of the impacts of climate change, both positive and negative, will coincide with fluctuations in water resources that in many areas are already scarce. Twenty-one countries fell below the threshold for water scarcity in 2000 and ''another 14 will join them by 2030. This represents 55% of the world's population'' that will have insufficient domestic water (Falkenmark 1990; World Economic Forum Water Initiative 2009).7 Changes in precipitation and temperature from climate change create uncertainty regarding the timing, quality, and quantity of current water resources. A change in absolute water resources also has an impact on the relative wealth of countries and causes changes in relative power. Allan (2007) notes that contemporary conflict theory postulates that ''conflict and social change originate from shifts in relative deprivation, from absolute deprivation, where the availability of even the lowest quality of life is uncertain, to a state of relative deprivation, which raises an awareness that others have more.'' Migration could result from both the increased appeal of areas with abundance or from shifts to scarcity that can make areas less habitable. Such rapid shifts have been proposed as causes of conflict in the past, especially in areas where governance structures are not robust and institutional resiliency is low (Giordano et al. 2005; Lee 2010). Fluctuating or inadequate water resources, such as those predicted by the IPCC, have been cited by many scholars as a potential major factor in political conflict and even war (Starr 1991). Despite a lack of historical precedent, some studies continue to revert to environmental determinism, with a linear relationship between climate change induced resource scarcity and resulting conflict (World Economic Forum Water Initiative 2009). While recognizing that the relationship between resource scarcity and conflict is complex and non-linear, climate-related stresses can certainly complicate relations (UNEP 2004; Giordano et al. 2005). Conflict over transboundary water resources, when it has occurred, has usually been associated with rapid change and the introduction of stress to a system such as from drought, dam construction, or shifting political boundaries, as well as negative overall political relations (Wolf 2007). When such stresses to the status-quo are beyond the available water management capabilities of nations, often incorporated in institutions such as treaties, they have often struggled to find satisfactory solutions that fulfill both their own requirements and the needs of neighbors who share the water. The complexities of nations sharing a vital, valuable, and 7 Although water requirements are highly variable depending on the demands of an individual country, 1,000 m3/capita/year water scarcity in this case is used as a measure of where water becomes a limitation to economic development (Falkenmark 1990). Many countries exist and flourish on much less than this amount, while other countries lack the infrastructure or management capacity to utilize their abundant existing resources. 2.1 Climate Change, Fluctuations in Water Availability and Security 9 increasingly variable natural resource cause water management to blend more into international diplomacy and conflict management (Odom and Wolf 2008). Internal instability within states often carries over into the international realm and must also be considered. For example, the Darfur conflict at least partially stemmed from local pastoral and agricultural groups fighting over access to scarce resources that then grew to have international aspects. The current UN General Secretary Ban Ki-Moon has made such connections, stating that the Darfur crisis ''grew at least in part from desertification, ecological degradation, and a scarcity of resources, foremost among them water'' (UNEP 2010). The interaction between environmental stresses, responses at various scales, and state stability have been described by scholars through the lens of securitization (Allan 2007). Buzan (2000) considers security from different scales to describe how people or societies construct or ''securitize'' threats. The three levels used to describe interactions at different scales are individuals, states, and international systems (Buzan and Waever 2009). Starting at the individual level, security can be considered as a factor of ''life, health, status, wealth, freedom'' (Stone 2009). While defining individual security can be complicated by personal differences, Maslow's Hierarchy type-requirements generally hold true (Maslow 1943). However, the concept of security at the individual level does not directly translate and apply to national security (Stone 2009). For the level of state security, Buzan (2000; Buzan and Waever 2009) considers that states are larger, more complicated entities with a constantly shifting hierarchy of requirements in often overlapping sectors of Political, Military, Economic, Societal, and Environmental. Each sector impacts security, but also is linked to all the other sectors in often intricate and complex ways so that a discussion of each sector on its own does not adequately address the issue of security (Stone 2009). It is necessary to decipher where one sector ends and another begins to determine how each sector individually affects overall security. Buzan (2000, 2001) discussion of security and stability at different scales and for different sectors is especially useful in the context of climate change. The impacts of climate change will be largely in the Environmental sector, but it will arguably be as much of a factor and influence in other sectors, with consequences that are largely unpredictable. As opposed to most problems, climate change is unique as an environmental stressor since it has the potential to have a varying degree of impact on the Political, Military, Economic, Societal, and Environmental sectors at the same time and at all three scales (individuals, states and international systems). Allan (2001) builds on Buzan's ideas and notes that contentious issues arising over shared freshwater resources occur when extreme circumstances temporarily elevate the 'normal' lower status of water to the 'high' level of 'security politics.' With climate change and added scarcity, this increased importance has the potential to become permanent. Many of the impacts of climate change will have little to do with the actual, realized environmental shifts within their borders, but instead are based on responses to the perceptions of projected change and the international political and economic ramifications of change in other areas. Nations are taking notice of and are already planning for the security implications of climate change. Many 10 2 Literature Review countries' actions for mitigating or taking advantage of climate change are already having second and third order impacts on both national and international stability. In India, approximately 2.6% of the country's 2006–2007 GDP was spent on adaptation to climate variability, likely intended to protect the 18.6% of their GDP and 60% of their employment that originates from agriculture (Paskal 2010). ''All countries will need to attain a reasonable measure of water security to compete effectively in global markets'' (World Economic Forum Water Initiative 2009). Perhaps in response to climate change projections, water-scarce, developed countries seeking their own water solutions are causing changes in the geopolitical landscape by securing agricultural land overseas from less developed nations. Wild fluctuations in global food prices associated with the 2008 crisis coupled with forecasts for future water demand has led many countries that were previously willing to rely on 'virtual water' in the form of food and other imports to now believe that ''rapidly industrializing economies across South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa'' (supporting approximately 2.5 billion people) will need to acquire additional water resources, including in the form of water-rich agricultural land outside their borders (World Economic Forum Water Initiative 2009). Countries with more natural water resources will become more attractive locations for investments, and instability could be exacerbated in less developed countries willing to mortgage long-term water scarcity for immediate financial gains (World Economic Forum Water Initiative 2009). Many countries have already taken steps towards this.8 In this way, the projections (and not the documented impacts) of physical scarcity from climate change are driving and influencing changes in geopolitical and socio-economic scarcity both between and within nations. Conflict often has indirect and multiple causes, and similarly the path from changes in climate to conflict between nations, if it is to occur, will not be a direct one (Lee 2010). Conflict is not a linear response to stresses and changes from a shifting climate. Lee (2010) proposes three pathways for climate change to lead to conflict: sustained trends, conflict triggers, and intervening variables. Sustained periods of divergent weather leads to decreased national management capabilities and increased vulnerability to any additional stress. Lee's second pathway is conflict triggers, which include events that spark conflict such as assassinations, extreme natural events, or acts of violence. Climate change can create conditions where the threshold is lowered in order for conflict triggers to incite international conflict. Intervening variables include a degradation in adaptive abilities originating from factors other than climate change such as poverty, inequities between groups, weapons availability, ethnic tension, and institutional resilience. From Lee's analysis we see that 8 Saudi Arabia considered its options to continue growing sufficient wheat for the country. In 2008, they gave up being self-sufficient and instead chose to ''set up an investment fund to acquire land overseas to grow crops, possibly in Pakistan or the Horn of Africa. China is acquiring agricultural land in Southern Africa for similar purposes'' (World Economic Forum Water Initiative 2009). South Korea was looking to lease land from the government of Madagascar to grow food until protests occurred, which may have had some influence on a regime change in 2009 (African Economic Outlook 2010). 2.1 Climate Change, Fluctuations in Water Availability and Security 11 the institutional resilience that treaties help to engender is only one of a number of determining factors for climate change related conflict. Treaties may be especially important, though, from the international aspect of managing climate stress. Paskal (2010) states that treaties should be considered not only for their equity and legality, but also for their ability to adapt to changing environmental circumstances. 2.1.1 Environmental and Water Institutions Institutions can take on a number of different appearances and designs, but are generally understood as agreements or procedures intended to establish a protocol for enhancing mutually beneficial political or technical interaction. Institutions can be formal or informal, and can be applied across a wide variety of scales from the individual to regional to global. Dombrowsky (2008) states that institutions make up international regimes which in turn are the ''implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations.'' Institutions are often regarded as an important explanatory variable with regard to conflict or cooperation, with most studies indicating that institutions have helped to prevent disputes over shared water resources and increased cooperation between riparian states (Mitchell 2006; Wolf 1997). Under regime theory, treaties act as tools intended to better manage and share natural resources, such as water (Daoudy 2008; Jagerskog 2003). Institutions represent a nation's means to manage environmental stress and the ''will, wit or capacity to change (a) state of knowledge, social goals, cultural modes, and technological mixes, or form of economy'' (Selby 2006). Treaties can define acceptable behavior and direct political interactions, and thus enhance stability. Recognized rights that have been previously established in a treaty can limit the potential for conflict since the likelihood of conflict generally decreases with ''explicitly stated rational goals; and when there are norms and legal channels available for resolving conflict'' (Allan 2007, p. 231). If all parties have agreed upon limits, transgressions are easier to avoid and redress. Transgressions of a well-designed treaty with clear definitions can often be solved with simple objections or communication without broaching the larger, perhaps more volatile subjects that were tackled at the time of the treaty signing (Hamner 2008, p. 40). Mitchell (2006) notes that institutions can help with compliance and with conflict management through processes that include ''facilitative intervention in the form of good offices, mediation, conciliation, and fact finding, and binding intervention in the form of arbitration or adjudication.'' Many bilateral and regional water sharing agreements incorporate the overarching principles or general concepts of international law, but do not include specific mechanisms designed to facilitate negotiations and interactions between nations. In other words, the means to ''not only solve disputes between states, but facilitate negotiation and positive interaction to resolve minor points of disagreement before they become legal disputes'' (Subedi 2003, p. 35). 12 2 Literature Review While the establishment of a comprehensive regime is almost universally recognized as a positive, the effectiveness of specific principles (with the principles within the 1997 UN treaty most often cited) during the application of the treaty has not been empirically determined (Tanzi and Maurizio 2001). Research concerning the impacts of institutional design on the management of international rivers remains limited and the mere creation of an international water regime ''does not provide any guarantees that it will ultimately contribute towards problem solving'' (Dombrowsky 2008). With regards to environmental institutions in general, there have been many explanatory models/variables proposed in an effort to account for their success/failure [e.g. (Gerlak 2004, 2007; Gerlak and Heikkila 2006, 2007; Heikkila and Gerlak 2005; Young 2006, 2002)]. Chasek and Brown (2006) discuss how regime effectiveness is tied most closely to three main factors: first, regime design, which includes enforcement, reporting, and monitoring; second, implementation, which includes the ''extent to which actors adopt formal legislation and other regulations to enact the agreement.''; third, compliance, or how much actors actually observe the treaty and regulations. Chasek then notes several obstacles to implementing/complying with conventions. These include transition from regime laws to domestic laws, lack of capacity to implement laws, lack of respect for the law, compliance costs, and lack of funding. Treaties are often considered for their perceived impact without any knowledge of their inner workings. Blomquist et al. (2004) notes that additional investigation of institutions is warranted to determine how they affect the outcome by prompting people to change their management practices, easing or hindering change, and shaping the management alternatives that water uses and organizations consider and adopt. The next step for treaty research is to go beyond a generic view of their positive nature towards an examination of the design and application that determines how and why they matter. 2.1.2 International Water Law A review of international law reveals very few accepted general rules and guidelines for governing water resources. International water law is still in its formative state and nations have generally been solving their water sharing issues on an ad hoc basis with very few specific internationally recognized, overarching principles. An examination of the world's inter-state water agreements shows a wide array of mechanisms used to manage flow variability and minimize disagreement with varying degrees of effectiveness. According to the Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD 2008), there are over 450 international treaties that govern river basins worldwide. Interpretations vary among the global community regarding which mechanisms are most important and the extent to which they have contributed to a successful agreement. Consequently, there is a lack of uniformity in the broad range of principles and prescriptions found within the world's water treaties. 2.1 Climate Change, Fluctuations in Water Availability and Security 13 Perhaps prompted by the limits of established international water law, nations have employed a wide variety of tools to facilitate compliance. The extent to which nations agree to enforce their treaties is sometimes described in terms of 'hard' or 'soft' law. Both terms have broad definitions that can refer to a number of processes, but the common thread generally used to segregate them is the binding nature of an agreement. Soft law sometimes refers to codes of conduct or is explained as 'customary law' that is not formally binding. There is not usually a set protocol for enforcing soft law; instead, the opinion and feedback from funding agencies, donors, and other nations is perhaps the greatest force for applying pressure.9 Hard law includes some sort of obligation, sanctions, and/or an enforcement mechanism (Trubek et al. 2005). International hard law provides the greatest leverage to enforce a state's or community's desired impact. Abbott and Duncan (2000) describe the international use of hard and soft agreements, finding merit for both types of agreement. They state, ''private actors generally seek hard legal arrangements that reflect their particular interests and values.'' However, hard laws ''often conflict with those of other private actors or of government.'' For this reason, ''soft legalization helps balance competing considerations, offering techniques for compromise among states, among private actors, and between states and private actors.'' International water law, which is shaped by and includes the treaties themselves, almost always falls under the category of soft or customary (Vinogradov et al. 2003). The most comprehensive, widely referenced summary of customary law for international water management is in the United Nations 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Use of International Watercourses.10 The convention states its intent is to lay a widely-applicable ''codification and progressive development of rules of international law'' and framework that ''will ensure the utilization, development, conservation, management and protection of international watercourses'' (U.N. 1997). The convention builds on the International Law Association's Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers and summarizes many of the core concepts found in treaties at the time of its signing (McCaffrey 2007).11 Negotiations for the 1997 UN Convention began in 1981 and had participation from all UN member states. ''Adopted by a large majority on May 21, 1997, the Convention has not entered into force since…35 9 Soft, or customary law, enforcement tactics can include 'naming and shaming' those parties that are not in compliance with an agreement (McCaffrey 2007). 10 The convention was constructed by the International Law Commission, which is a ''UN body composed of legal experts nominated by states, elected by the United Nations General Assembly, and tasked with the codification and progressive development of international law'' (Salman 2007). 11 The 1997 Convention is based in large part on the Helsinki Rules. ''Concepts such as equitable utilization and the consideration of all beneficial uses, as well as using the international basin as the primary unit of analysis, were laid out in the Helsinki Rules'' (McCaffrey 2007). 14 2 Literature Review countries are needed to make the UN Convention applicable to all parties'' (Salman 2007).12 As of 1 July 2010, it has only been ratified or approved by 19 countries.13 Wouters and Salman (2000) notes that the Convention did not require 35 ratifications by May 20, 2000 in order to come into force and that ''as with many other global international treaties, the UN Watercourses Convention will come into force upon acquiring the necessary number of ratifications. This could occur at any time and, in fact, is a feasible possibility.'' Even if it does enter into force, only countries who have signed the convention will be party to it. States that initially voted for the convention are not obligated to then sign or abide by it. The 1997 UN Convention presents baseline principles in order to provide a framework for managing international waters or dispute resolution. There are very few specifics; instead, common definitions and expectations are laid out with the intent that they be applied in a way that is appropriate for the specific basin. For example, broad terms such as ''watercourse'' are defined, but the specifics are left to those applying the definitions (Salman 2007). There are four principles in the convention that are increasingly referenced by those managing international watercourses. They are: • Article 5 is the ''equitable and reasonable utilization and participation'' obligation to utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner (often summarized as 'equitable utilization') (U.N. 1997); • Article 7, which presents the ''obligation not to cause significant harm'' to other riparian states (the ''significant harm'' rule) (U.N. 1997); • Article 12, entitled ''notification concerning planned measures with possible adverse effects'' discusses the notification of other riparians of water management and construction that could ''have a significant adverse effect upon other watercourse States'' (often summarized as ''prior notification'') (U.N. 1997); • Articles 20–26, entitled ''Protection, Preservation and Management,'' these articles deal with obligations to protect the environment associated ''with international watercourses, including protection and preservation of ecosystems; prevention, reduction and control of pollution; introduction of alien or new species; and protection and preservation of the marine environment'' (Salman 2007; U.N. 1997). A twenty-year analysis of hundreds of treaties led to the establishment of the core principles found in the 1997 UN Convention (Conca 2006). The pendulum now swings in the other direction, with nations encouraged to take the general 12 106 countries voted for the Convention, and three against (Burundi, China, and Turkey), with 26 abstentions (from personal communication with Ms. Flavia Loures, at the World Wildlife Fund). 13 Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Namibia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, and, most recently, Guinea-Bissau have signed onto the Convention (from personal communication with Ms. Flavia Loures). 2.1 Climate Change, Fluctuations in Water Availability and Security 15 principles from the convention and apply them in the hundreds of specific agreements. While the convention may never get the necessary signatures to enter into force, it does influence nations regarding how they manage their agreements, especially new agreements or the diplomatic negotiations regarding their shared watercourses. For instance, Southern African Development Community Protocol on Shared Watercourses have rewritten the protocol to include the main provisions of the Convention (Loures et al. 2010; Wouters and Salman 2000). Unfortunately, the broad and vague language used in the convention can be interpreted in a variety of ways that can often be conflictive. There is no overarching management body to provide direction and it is left up to the parties involved to determine whether actions and principles conform to the convention. Application of the convention is further complicated by a lack of oversight or practical enforcement by the UN for situations that cannot be resolved independently.14 The net effect is that abstract UN Convention principles, such as absolute territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity, can be the basis for an agreement, but also require a compromise based on basin-specific water requirements (Odom and Wolf 2008). For practical application of the convention, interpretation of general principles such as 'equitable utilization' and 'no harm' is accomplished by looking at existing treaties and how they have already applied these terms. This is, in essence, the basis for all legal construct as established under 'Customary International Law.' The definitions of 'fair and equitable' and 'no harm' are determined by the widespread repetition of similar acts by States ''out of the belief that the law required them to act that way'' (Berkeley 2007). In other words, ''it is by looking back at previously established treaties that we can best understand how to go forward with these principles'' (Dinar et al. 2007). However, detecting and quantifying these principles is often difficult. From examination of the actual treaties, the ''aforementioned principles of causing no significant harm, prior use and priority of use are not explicitly referred to in documents that allocate water'' (Odom and Wolf 2008). International law has arguably not kept up with the shifting management requirements that stem from increased use and new applications of water. Many international problems from the expanding and myriad uses of water have yet to be solved. Thus far, ''most attempts to manage the new suite of water sharing problems have simply mirrored the methods used for navigation'' (McCaffrey 2007). As McCaffrey (2007) states, ''maintaining harmony between nations sharing freshwater resources and providing equitable allocation of those resources while protecting ecosystems and water quality is one of the great challenges facing international law and institutions in the twenty-first century.'' 14 The International Court of Justice will hear cases that may be in violation of the Convention, but only when both parties agree to it and only regarding specific issues (McCaffrey 2007). 16 2 Literature Review 2.1.3 Water Treaty Implementation and Application The application and implementation phase of water treaties has largely gone unanalyzed. Some suggest that empirical research of the sort that catalogues representative observations is too limited for properly identifying critical factors and for creating regression equations that speak towards causality (USACE 2006, p. 13). Academic work has largely been focused on how water treaties were established (i.e. how to get parties to cooperate enough to sign and implement these agreements), rather than the impact of the treaty subsequent to its signing (Bernauer 2002; Koundouri 2006; Siegfried and Bernauer 2007). Research examining the impact and effectiveness of treaties has generally been limited to individual basin case studies, which have been conducted for several specific basins around the world (Alam 2002; Eyal Benvenisti 2003; Jagerskog 2003; Mimi 2003; Williams 2007). These case studies often examine the effectiveness of treaty design features in order to provide answers to when and why each treaty fails or succeeds. While a strong institutional influence is almost universally acknowledged by these studies as a positive causal factor for successful management of trans-boundary waters, the construction and performance of the different institutions is highly variable. Since a comparison with other treaties and locations is often not pursued, the applicability of these results is usually limited to a specific study basin (Bernauer 2002). Very few researchers have empirically examined the relative strengths and weaknesses of institutions across multiple basins (Marty 1999; Shira Yoffe 2003; Yoffe et al. 2003). A quantitative study across a large number of basins that generalizes the extent to which common and dissimilar institutional characteristics may influence the success or failure of a treaty has not been undertaken. 2.1.4 Water Treaty Design Most international organizations limit their prescriptions for modifying old treaties and creating new ones to general guidelines such as those in the UN Watercourses Agreement. For example, UNDP Water Governance Facility at SIWI acknowledges that there is no blueprint for how transboundary water cooperation should be accomplished, but instead gives general guidelines such as: • ''The respective riparian feel an ownership of, and a political commitment to, processes of promoting cooperation''; • ''The respective riparian shifts focus and moves from challenges and constraints to opportunities''; and • ''Trust and personal relations are developed among riparian delegations from countries and between domestic water user groups'' (U.N.D.P. Water Governance Facility 2010). 2.1 Climate Change, Fluctuations in Water Availability and Security 17 Overarching principles such as these are indeed needed to provide goals and a vision from which all parties can agree to base their negotiations. However, what is often lost in the generalities is a blueprint of how to best implement such nebulous ideas as 'promoting cooperation' and developing 'trust and personal relations'. In other words, what are the 'nuts and bolts' that can be applied to mold these principles into a workable agreement? This section examines the academic literature and provides a summary analysis of the treaty parameters that are most often cited as essential to successful treaty implementation. Treaty parameters and principles that have theoretically been important, but are not shown empirically across a large number of treaties, have been put forth by multiple authors. Recent work (Dinar et al. 2008; Drieschova et al. 2008; Itay Fischhendler 2007, 2008; Stahl et al. 2010) has shown that some water allocation mechanisms are better able to cope with climate-uncertainty, based on their ability to manage hydrologic changes and subsequent reductions in the number of interstate grievances associated with changes in runoff. Drieschova et al. (2008) and Fischhendler and Feitelson (2005) found that specific allocation mechanisms resulting from negotiations vary and that many that had been agreed upon by all involved parties were not ideal due to technical or political barriers.15 Dinar et al. (2008) describes eight allocation methods that include ''fixed quantities that vary according to water availability, fixed quantities recouped in the following period, by percentage available, prior approval (e.g. by joint management commission), geographic distribution/allocation of entire rivers, consultation, and prioritization of uses.'' Using this classification, Dinar et al. (2008) identified 137 treaties and associated grievances that pertained to water quantity, hydropower and flood control. Statistical analyses were conducted on a subset of 74 treaties (basins with only two riparians) to infer how precipitation variability affected the frequency and intensity of complaints and found that ''various mechanisms are statistically different in their resiliency to complaints and grievances'' (De Stefano et al. 2009; Dinar et al. 2008). Overall, the works by Marty (1999) and Drieschova et al. (2008) have perhaps best framed the terms for water institutional effectiveness/resiliency, and supported the hypothesis with some empirical data across multiple basins. Marty provides a solid foundation for proceeding to a larger-scale research (with a larger number of basins) using social and political theory as explanatory mechanisms. Marty proposes that treaties that are detailed and have exact guidelines are more successful. The more specific the expectations, the more behavior can be influenced since the parties know how they should behave to comply with the regime specifications. He contends that increased clarity inherently resulting from most treaties prevents future confusion or conflict and simplifies the implementation and operation of the basin management plan. However, while specificity in treaties may be an indicator of strength, the mere presence of a mutually agreed upon thresholds could also be 15 In that case, 'ideal' meaning flexible in the face of change but still enforceable and binding. 18 2 Literature Review superficial in its importance. Institutions that go beyond metrics and also define outcomes and strategies for successfully achieving those outcomes, including specific goals and thresholds, may be inherently more focused and resilient. Drieschova et al. (2008) look at treaty mechanisms for addressing flow variability. They propose several mechanisms that are likely to aid in managing variability. They then examine large numbers of treaties and calculate the percent of treaties that contain those mechanisms. While they propose that each mechanism could play a role in management, they do not attempt to empirically quantify or evaluate the role of each mechanism in treaty resiliency. While some treaties include mechanisms that are explicit in their intention to manage flow variability, the majority use broad, non-specific mechanisms that ''deviate from an 'ideal' state of being both flexible in the face of change but binding in enforcement'' that rather ''reflect trade-offs between flexibility and enforcement.'' References Abbott K, Duncan S (2000) Hard and soft law in international governance. Int Organiz 54(3):421–456 African Economic Outlook (2010) Retrieved 12 Sep 2010, from http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/southern-africa/madagascar/ Alam UZ (2002) Questioning the water wars rationale: a case study of the Indus waters treaty. Geog J 168:341–353 Allan JA (2001) The middle east water question: hydropolitics and the global economy. I.B. 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Oregon State University, Corvallis Yoffe S, Wolf AT, Giordano M (2003) Conflict and cooperation over international freshwater resources: indicators of basins at risk. J Am Water Resour Assoc 39(5):1109–1126 Young OR (2002) The institutional dimensions of environmental change: fit interplay, and scale. MIT Press, Cambridge Young O (2006) Vertical interplay among scale-dependent environmental and resource regimes. Ecol Soc 11(1):27 Chapter 3 Hypotheses, Definitions and Explanatory Mechanisms This research uses past treaty successes and failures in managing hydrologic stress as a means of determining the importance of treaty design parameters. These parameters can then be used more broadly across other treaties to estimate capabilities for managing stresses, such as those from climate change. It assumes that treaties in general improve resiliency and hopes to provide direction for basins without a treaty or those that wish to develop institutions to better account for climate change. It is likely impossible to consider what makes a robust and resilient treaty without also considering what makes an effective treaty. Draper (2006) considers an effective treaty as one that facilitates adequate planning, conservation, and management of a water basin in a manner that causes no significant harm to most other parties. Effectiveness, or success, in this study is defined simply as the avoidance of conflict, as manifested by the public and official expression of dissatisfaction by a party. Part of the question regarding the assessment of the design and application of institutions is ''what makes a treaty effective?'' Secondary to that is ''how well does (and what makes) a treaty remain effective even when the system is changed/ stressed?'' Together these two questions help us to better answer what makes a treaty resilient. While this study uses hydrologic stress and response, the ''resilient'' traits that the treaties either have or don't have are not specific to water treaties. In other words, while this study uses water treaties as the lens with which to view treaty resilience, the principles researched here can apply to all treaties, especially within the environmental realm. 3.1 Hypotheses While recognizing that there is significant variability between basins and treaties, this project uses a large treaty and conflict dataset to examine the hypothesis that some treaty mechanisms are more important to deterring conflict and complaints that may occur due to hydrologic stress. In turn, treaties can perhaps be better evaluated to determine their capacity to manage projected changes in climate. Specifically, there M. Zentner, Design and Impact of Water Treaties, Springer Theses, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-23743-0_3, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 23 24 3 Hypotheses, Definitions and Explanatory Mechanisms are seven treaty characteristics, or mechanisms, that are expected to elicit less conflict and fewer complaints when they are implemented in an agreement. It is expected that these mechanisms should make the agreement more stable in the face of increased variability and decreased flows and run-off. In addition to the treaty mechanisms, the importance of both the magnitude of hydrologic stress and the difference in economic and political strength between the riparians is investigated. In this dissertation three hypotheses are tested, which are: Hypothesis 1 A state experiencing a period of increased hydrologic stress in the form of drought or additional variability will have an increased likelihood of complaints involving a shared water resource, compared to a state that is not experiencing hydrologic stress. Hypothesis 2 Water sharing agreements that have mechanisms in place, namely specificity, uncertainty management, enforcement, communications flexibility, integrativeness, and scale, will have less conflict and fewer grievances, including those that are climate related. Each mechanism contributes equally to the treaty's utility in managing hydrologic stress, and the overall institutional resiliency of a treaty can be summarized by adding the number of mechanisms included in the treaty. Hypothesis 3 All mechanisms have added benefit, but some mechanisms are more important to providing increased institutional capacity to manage drivers of conflict such as hydrologic stress, as well as stress from differences in political power, national stability, and economics that, if left unmitigated, could otherwise lead to conflict. The basis for these hypotheses is laid out in this section and tested and discussed further in Chaps. 4 (Methodology), 5 (Results), 6 (Case Studies), and 7 (Conclusions). The definitions used to frame the analysis and testing of the hypotheses are presented below, including the physical and theoretical extent of the system, the parameters for hydrologic stress, explanations of what a successful treaty entails, and the interpretation of institution in this study. 3.1.1 Defining the System In order to understand how to best measure and monitor parameters, the theoretical, spatial, and temporal extent of the system needs to be clearly defined. This is a global study, but our analysis begins with the scale that the treaty covers. Therefore, the unit of analysis is the treaty and the system is defined as the spatial, political, and, topical areas that are included in the treaty.16 Most international 16 Scale differences in the typical unit of analysis political and physical scientists use to delineate and describe a basin-or in other words, the way to define the scope of the problem- complicates the integration of data and discussions from both disciplines. Political scientists typically follow the accepted country, region, and local boundaries when defining their areas of consideration. Physical scientists tend to use the basin itself to define the area. The two different definitions would not be an issue if the river basins area coincided with the political boundaries. Unfortunately, rivers often do not follow political boundaries. 3.1 Hypotheses 25 water treaties are directed primarily at a specific basin or water body. The spatial delineation of the basins considered are identified by the TFDD.17 All agreements used in the study originated between 1945 and 2008 and included the topics of flood-control, water quantity and/or hydropower. Some cases were not included since they did not contain the mechanisms and independent variables of interest due to missing data or a lack of foreign language translation. After taking these restrictions into consideration, a total of 146 agreements were used in this analysis. A broader view beyond the flows of a specific river is necessary to understand the stress and management challenges that a basin is undergoing. Gleditsch et al. (2004) note that this ''could include the standard upstream/downstream conflict scenario, but also broader concerns about watershed management, pollution, and a more subjective notion of scarcity.'' The degree that a treaty remains effective is influenced by things at scales both greater and smaller than those outlined in the treaty. Impacts and interactions are not limited to one scale. For example, a local area might dissent with national policies, but in may unite with the rest of the nation when faced with a common international disagreement. Accordingly, it is not always possible to know which unit of analysis we are working with. When analyzing our system, impacts (social, political, economic, biophysical) of the institution across multiple scales (international and national) as well as the dynamic interaction with interrelated issues are considered. In order for this research to be effective, however, multiple comparable data sets are necessary. In this study, the sampling design/data sets are primarily at the national or regional scale, where we have information on treaties, events, responses, and biophysical data. Therefore, the analysis of impacts to the system will primarily be at the nation-state level. In the case study analysis, national stresses and response to social, political, economic, and biophysical parameters, including those that at first may appear only tangentially related, are considered to determine to what extent they have a relationship with treaty functionality. 3.1.2 Defining Institution Institutions come under the guise of many different names and definitions. For simplicity, in this study institutions are defined as a binding agreement, typically called treaties or conventions.18 Chasek and Brown (2006) place institutions under the broader definition for ''regime,'' which is defined as either a set of ''norms, rules, operating procedures, or institutions that actors create or accept to regulate 17 Gleditsch et al. (2004) define a river basin as ''a topographically delineated area drained by a stream system—that is, the total land area above some point on a stream or river that drains past that point. This means that it encompasses all of the fresh and ground water in a large geographical area. Often encompassing a unique ecosystem, it is frequently used as a spatial unit for socio-economic management.'' 18 Treaty, convention, and institution are used synonymously in this study. 26 3 Hypotheses, Definitions and Explanatory Mechanisms action.'' Young (2002, 2006) emphasizes the behavioral impact that the arrangement produces and his definition makes the distinction between ''thick'' and ''thin'' institutions. Thin institutions are ''systems of rules, decision making procedures, and programs as articulated in constructive documents (e.g. treaties).'' Thick institutions are defined as ''social practices'' that are based on constructive documents, but also include ''common discourses in terms of which to address the issues at stake, informal understandings regarding appropriate behavior on the part of participants, and routine activities that grow up in conjunction with efforts to implement the rules.'' Chasek's definition of ''regime'' and Young's definition for ''thick institutions'' seem to be similar, with an emphasis on the behavioral impact that the arrangement produces. Hardin (1968) explained that both individuals and societies act in an unsustainable manner towards common resources, ultimately overexploiting and depleting the resource. The solution to this ''Tragedy of the Commons,'' was for institutions to provide ''mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected.'' Hardin's ideas have been influential in examining institutional arrangements and management regimes which are generally considered important factors in shaping the actions of the constituents (Dietz et al. 2003). However, there is much variability in the purpose and characteristics of the institution. 3.1.3 Defining Institutional Success What constitutes success and failure of a treaty remains a matter of interpretation among scholars (as well as those designing and applying the treaty). Bernauer (2002) provides an excellent review of two measurements for success and failure employed by social scientists (compliance and problem solving). Mere compliance to a treaty, he argues, is a poor indicator of success since it does not accurately reflect the extent to which an international river management problem was dealt with. Compliance with a poorly designed and ineffective treaty has no real meaning. Another measurement of success is the extent of problem-solving that the treaty facilitates. Problem-solving essentially seeks to measure the extent to which institutions change behavior towards solving specific environmental problems. A robust and resilient treaty is often defined as one that continues to function as intended even when the system changes or is stressed in some way. Gerlak and Heikkila (2007) note that in addition to persistence, it is also important to consider the functionality of the institution. Young (2002) similarly considers the sustainability of institutions, but calls this ''robustness'' and defines it as ''a measure of the capacity of an institution to survive various pressures intact in the sense of withstanding the impact of destabilizing forces without suffering collapse or experiencing transformative change.'' Giordano et al. (2005) note that institutions may not be sustainable where ''rapid changes in resource environments outpace the capacity of institutions to deal with the change.'' These pressures can be either 3.1 Hypotheses 27 internal or external to the issue at hand, and can be either immediate or grow gradually; the institutional capacity to deal with the stress is often dependent on the type and timing of the stress. Our measurement of success in this paper leans more toward the problemsolving philosophy, with resiliency used as a measure of problem-solving capability. Resilience is defined by Nelson et al. (2007) as the amount of change (or stress) a system can undergo and still retain the same function and structure while maintaining options to develop. Treaties are designed to lessen the impact and minimize the overall stress on a system, thereby increasing system resiliency. Our measurement of institutional success then becomes how well the treaty buffers the system from stress. Or, put another way, institutional strength/resiliency/success is defined synonymously as the ability of an institution to aid the system in mitigating or adapting to stress (in particular, hydrologic) or changing circumstances. The measurable exhibition of this success is the presence or absence of complaints, especially those that can be directly attributed to the climate-related stress being applied to the system. 3.1.4 Defining Hydrologic Stress In several international basins, water allocation rules agreed upon in water sharing agreements or treaties have been challenged due to uncommon hydrological conditions (e.g. prolonged droughts or severe floods). Such flood and drought events may become more frequent due to climate change effects. Identifying the hydrological conditions associated with past water treaty challenges and then estimating the probability of having similar (or more severe) conditions in the future based on climate change projections will contribute to the understanding of how climate change might increase stresses on international water sharing agreements. International water-sharing treaties often express water allocation rules between the riparian countries as a minimum in-stream flow to be maintained at any time or as a volume of water (accumulated flow) to be delivered within a specific timeframe (e.g. year, season). However, the clear quantification and location of the allocation, although essential for monitoring treaty compliance, can be ambiguously expressed in the treaty texts (Fischhendler 2008a). Moreover, data about past difficulties to meet the allocations specified in treaties can be vague, misconstrued, or absent. The analysis of gauged streamflow data available at the Global Runoff Data Centre for international basins shows that flow records are not always available or of sufficient quality in river stretches where treaty compliance is to be monitored (Stahl 2007). Hence, in many cases historical records cannot be used for identifying hydrological conditions associated with treaty allocations or disagreements related to compliance with these allocations. This project is interested in thresholds of flow (stream, river) or water body levels as stated within the water treaty. When flows/levels are pushed below these 28 3 Hypotheses, Definitions and Explanatory Mechanisms thresholds, a signatory is in non-compliance. Non-compliance thresholds can be used as an indicator of where higher political or social stress could result, unless treaty mechanisms are able to manage the non-compliance. Due to the great variety in data availability and the inherent problems with flow and water level modeling, both quantitative and qualitative techniques (water balance, soil moisture, and drought index) were considered.19 For this study, the more qualitative drought index and the term 'drought' is used to describe the state when a basin has experienced hydrologic stress that might have challenged allocation agreements. Drought is often used loosely to describe any situation where water is deficient, but there is a lack of consensus within academia on how to define and quantify drought. Droughts have received over 150 definitions over time and, in most cases, thresholds for declaring drought are arbitrary (Smakhtin and Schipper 2008). This analysis is interested in meteorological drought, or a deviation from the average precipitation pattern (Burke and Brown 2006).20 For this study, the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) for the period 1950–2005 is used as a quantifier of meteorological drought. Using this dataset as a baseline, two study-appropriate definitions were used to classify the extent that a basin is experiencing hydrologic stress. The first definition used is absolute drought, or a point on the PDSI defined by Palmer where conditions are severe enough to be universally classified as drought regardless of the location. The second definition is relative drought that uses the average PDSI for each basin to define a numerical threshold below which a situation can be considered to be a drought. Each of these definitions is discussed in greater detail in the methodology (Sect. 4.2.5). The hydrologic stress definitions used in this study are spatially and temporally broad. This is a direct result of a lack of data and modeling approaches with the spatial detail relevant to determining water availability at the location where the treaty stipulates water is to be delivered or monitored. Both of the definitions used for drought are serviceable, but do not provide an ideal indicator of when a treaty's allocation thresholds may have been challenged by decreased flows. However, they can be universally applied and enable comparison across multiple basins. Ideally, each basin would be considered individually and a definition created that incorporates the area-specific consequences of hydrological drought that depend on regional/local circumstances such as soil type, water storage capabilities, 19 An in depth study was conducted to determine the best way to reconstruct past hydrologic conditions and river flows, especially in poorly gauged or ungauged rivers. A detailed summary of the merits and limitations of three different methods is available from the author by request. 20 Burke and Brown (2006) provide the following drought definitions: ''meteorological drought relates actual precipitation departure to average amounts on monthly, seasonal, water year, or annual time scales; agricultural drought focus on precipitation shortages, differences between actual and potential evapotranspiration, and soil water deficits (for specific crop activities); hydrological drought focus on the effects of periods of precipitation shortfall on surface or subsurface water supply (i.e. streamflow, reservoir and lake levels, groundwater) rather than with precipitation shortfalls; and socioeconomic drought associates the supply and demand of some economic good or service (e.g. water, hydroelectric power) affected by precipitation shortages.'' 3.1 Hypotheses 29 agriculture production, availability and depth of groundwater (Bresser et al. 2006). Unfortunately data are too sparse and non-uniform to be applied across a large number of basins. Future hydrologic stress is defined differently than historical drought as described above. Climate change causes variability in precipitation and evapotranspiration, which in turn are related to the variability of drought. This study uses modeled variability of precipitation and subsequent runoff, rather than the PDSI, to define future hydrologic stress. Modeled data are used to establish a coefficient of variation (CV) for these two variables, which is defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean of all annual values within a given time period (De Stefano et al. 2009). The methodology for evaluating projected climate is discussed in Sect. 184.108.40.206. 3.2 Importance of Treaty Design and Institutional Mechanisms As discussed in the literature review, significant research at the basin level has resulted in many theories regarding treaty design that postulate different criteria that make the most impact on institutional performance. In addition, the success or failure of environmental institutions in general has been studied and many explanatory variables have been proposed. The theoretical basis for this project is that certain of the institutional mechanisms discussed above are of more significance to the effectiveness of the treaty than other mechanisms: in other words, the design of the treaty has a large impact on the capacity of a treaty to manage water stress (either from variability or from changes in requirements). Of the three measures of treaty effectiveness explained by Chasek previously (design, implementation, and compliance), we are thus primarily focused on its design. 3.3 Explanatory Mechanisms This study uses seven explanatory mechanisms that are common to the literature review and most often cited for being of primary importance to resiliency. These criteria are a means to collapse treaties into their basic components to better explain successful treaties. A broad set of case studies, academic articles, reports, and books regarding water treaties and their application was utilized as part of the literature review. Each article was reviewed and the concepts proposed as key to the success or failure of a treaty for managing stress, particularly hydrologic, were recorded. While far from exhaustive, a quantitative analysis of 45 academic publications revealed a large number of principles and concepts that were mentioned as critical to effective water treaties (Appendix A). While the principles proposed by each article were unique in many ways, commonalities were apparent 30 3 Hypotheses, Definitions and Explanatory Mechanisms regarding the overall emphasis or intent of the principle. Based on these commonalities, the author grouped and segregated the principles into seven summary categories, which are: specificity, uncertainty management, enforcement, communications flexibility, integrativeness, and scale. In Table 3.1, the mechanisms are ranked according to their estimated importance (based on the number of times mentioned as a factor in treaty success in the literature review). Each of the mechanism categories is defined and discussed in greater detail below. The methodology for measuring each mechanism is presented in Sect. 4.2.2. 3.3.1 Communications Communication networks and provisions can help address uncertainty, adaptability, and capacity issues that can hinder compliance and cooperation. Drieschova et al. (2008, p. 9) propose that developing communication networks can ''overcome the rigidity of water treaties and serve as a venue for solving water conflicts.'' Subedi (2003) states that creative ''win–win'' solutions to most problems are possible, but may be hindered by a lack of regular communication. Brett (2001) notes that the key to making a sustainable integrative agreement is an understanding of the underlying interests and values of each group, achieved thorough effective communication. Much of the work of successfully implementing and managing institutions is laying a proper communications framework, and a treaty that has those mechanisms already in place avoids confusion and potential conflict over an inability to share timely and accurate data. Communication networks can be established by multiple means, including via some of the other mechanisms discussed in this section (e.g. flexibility, uncertainty management) that have integrated communication elements. Communication mechanisms increase the contact between parties. Such interaction and sharing of accurate information helps to build relationships of trust. Where data are iteratively shared, perceptions of inequality and unilateral action can be minimized. Successful communication is about sharing information, and disclosure often requires and foments trust between both parties, providing the institutional framework for improving cooperation. Effective communication between local, national, and international levels allows policymakers to quickly respond to what are often dynamic and highly variable end-user requirements. Many treaties and governance mechanisms ''emphasize centralized institutions with little local participation, resulting in stymied multi-level communication'' and limiting the effectiveness of governance apparatus that are often built on the assumption that there is a constant flow of information and feedback (Michel 2009, p. 9). Conversely, information overload can occur, resulting in complex and often cumbersome decision-making, without proper information management. Communication can be hampered by a lack of data and collection mechanisms. A lack of clear precipitation and flow data on the Euphrates has complicated Syria's Manage changes in the water flow/availability or in the existing political framework. Provide precise rules and procedures to structure the participant's actions Increase the cross-scale and cross-topic cooperation the treaty addresses Flexibility Specificity Integrativeness Communications Increase the contact and data sharing between parties to increase compliance and cooperation Information exchange Establish meetings schedule/protocol Data validation Treaty amendment mechanisms that can be applied in times of rapid change Managerial tools to recognize and plan for variability Communications mechanisms for observing and relaying change Guidance for implementation of the treaty; crisis response to and mitigation of drought/flood Confirm locations and measurement methods for increased data accuracy Illustrates benefits/requirements outside of water (hydropower, etc.) Non-water exchanges or concessions linked to water issues Integrated view of total environmental sphere Requirements of larger political issues Table 3.1 Summary of the purpose, function, and relative importance of mechanisms Mechanism Purpose Practical application/components 12 13 20 25 4 3 2 1 (continued) Number of times Ranking of mentioned in relative literature importance 3.3 Explanatory Mechanisms 31 7 6 4 Number of times Ranking of mentioned in relative literature importance Treaty variables that are most often cited as being instrumental to successful management of relational stress are segregated into seven categories, or mechanisms Provide leverage and protocols to influence adherence to the treaty Practical application/components Resolution mechanism and procedures 12 for disputes Communication requirements for alterations to basin Equitable joint management bodies that can exert influence. Scale Provide policy direction for regional, national, and local Enhance public participation 11 management Include needs of all stakeholders/nonsignatory riparians Incorporate national programs Uncertainty Recognize and plan for the possibility that available data may Alternative scenarios to increase 4 management not accurately reflect current conditions or that the future preparedness may be very different from the current environment Application of prediction models Variability management for periods of flood/drought Enforcement Table 3.1 (continued) Mechanism Purpose 32 3 Hypotheses, Definitions and Explanatory Mechanisms 3.3 Explanatory Mechanisms 33 agreement with Iraq; ''Evidence is lacking to draw a definitive conclusion, but indications are that there has been only minimal and periodic compliance'' (Zawahri 2006, p. 1048). While the effects of drought and other biophysical stresses would not be completely overcome with better communication and reporting, the effects might be assuaged by better timed releases of water. Many of the negative impacts from drought and other biophysical stresses in the basin have stemmed from a lack of an effective monitoring and reporting framework, and several other mechanisms have communications components as their keystone. Communications can improve and facilitate uncertainty management and flexibility through the ''early identification of future trends, and (offset) the problem of asymmetrical information between riparians'' (Drieschova et al. 2008). In addition, enforcement confusion and unfounded perceptions of non-compliance can be minimi