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Match ends, Northampton Town 1, Manchester United 3.
Northampton Town 1-3 Manchester United
- From the section League Cup
Manchester United ended a run of three successive losses and eased the concerns surrounding manager Jose Mourinho with a comfortable EFL Cup win at League One Northampton Town.
Mourinho could not afford any mistakes in this third-round tie after Premier League defeats by Manchester City and Watford, with a Europa League loss to Feyenoord sandwiched in between.
It was eventually smooth passage, assisted by Northampton keeper Adam Smith, who endured a nightmare evening and played a big part in two of United's goals.
The highly rated 23-year-old picked up a back pass in the 17th minute and when Wayne Rooney's resulting free-kick was blocked, the recalled Michael Carrick fired home the loose ball emphatically.
Alex Revell gave the Cobblers hope of a shock from the penalty spot just before half-time after Daley Blind fouled Sam Hoskins - but this was not the night for an upset.
United regrouped and Ander Herrera's powerful drive put them in front after 68 minutes before Smith's misery was complete seven minutes later when he missed a simple long clearance to allow substitute Marcus Rashford to roll the ball into an empty net.
Relive Wednesday's EFL Cup action
Can Carrick unleash Pogba?
Jose Mourinho has been reluctant to use the 35-year-old England midfield man since his arrival at Old Trafford. This was his first start since Manchester United's win against Leicester City in the Community Shield at Wembley.
On this evidence he surely has a strong case to force his way into Mourinho's plans - not least because he possesses the style and composure to bring the best from United's £89m world record signing Paul Pogba.
Pogba has looked restricted in his early performances and the selection of Carrick, so reliable in possession and even chipping in with a goal here, would allow the France midfield man freedom, play to his strengths and give him the opportunity to do damage further forward.
Carrick's experience and expert reading of the game adds to Mourinho's options and could finally bring the best from his showpiece summer signing. Surely he will start against Leicester City at Old Trafford on Saturday.
Rooney's struggles continue
As Pogba got the night off and Zlatan Ibrahimovic and Rashford started on the bench with Mourinho making nine changes from United's 3-1 loss to Watford at Vicarage Road, there was no respite for Rooney.
United's embattled captain, who has bore the brunt of much of the criticism aimed at the side this season, was in the starting line-up but endured another night of frustration.
He worked hard but nothing is coming off for the 30-year-old. He missed one easy chance early on and when he did hit the target after Timothy Fosu-Mensah's header hit the bar, he was adjudged offside.
With Carrick and Herrera excelling and with a host of attacking options available to Mourinho, will Rooney's place come under threat against Leicester City at Old Trafford at the weekend?
Good night for Northampton?
Northampton may not have been able to spring the big shock and increase the woes for Mourinho by knocking Manchester United out of the EFL Cup - but there was still plenty for the club lying 11th in League One to be pleased about.
The neat Sixfields stadium was packed with a record crowd of 7,798. With a new stand in the process of being built, the club can be proud of the way it handled the big occasion.
Northampton's 31-game unbeaten run ended with defeat by Chesterfield on Saturday and for spells they showed United too much respect. This is, perhaps, understandable, but this was a night when Northampton as a club did itself great credit.
If there was a sadness, it was the disappointment suffered by keeper Smith, who has attracted Premier League attention but was badly at fault here.
Smith was included in the League Two team of the season as the Cobblers clinched the title in the previous campaign. There will be better days ahead for a talented young goalkeeper.
What they said
Manchester United manager Jose Mourinho: "It was as difficult as I was expecting but we looked to be in control for the first 35 minutes and then we looked to be in control for the last 45. I think the team was in control from the beginning and the subs were just a contribution.
"The game should be easier, we should have been playing against 10 men very early in the second half. Northampton fought and they tried to cause us problems which sometimes they did but it was a positive performance overall.
"I don't like to individualise the players, I think it was fine, the midfield were in control."
Northampton manager Rob Page: "When you get back in to it at 1-1 you never know.
"I'm really proud of the players, we had to be disciplined. They've had a tough week by their standards but we knew we had to be strong. When you give away soft goals you will get punished.
"He (goalkeeper Adam Smith) was outstanding last season and he'll bounce back from this. He's a strong character, we've all had moments like that as players."
- 1Smith
- 2Moloney
- 5Diamond
- 6Zakuani
- 3Buchanan
- 12McCourtBooked at 47minsSubstituted forRichardsat 73'minutes
- 14Hoskins
- 16BeautymanSubstituted forO'Tooleat 54'minutes
- 31Taylor
- 11GorréSubstituted forPotterat 66'minutesBooked at 89mins
- 10Revell
- 8Byrom
- 9Richards
- 15Potter
- 19Sonupe
- 21O'Toole
- 22Nyatanga
- 26Cornell
Man Utd
- 20Romero
- 24Fosu-MensahSubstituted forRashfordat 55'minutes
- 12Smalling
- 17BlindBooked at 74mins
- 5Rojo
- 21Herrera
- 16Carrick
- 28SchneiderlinSubstituted forFellainiat 73'minutes
- 18Young
- 10Rooney
- 7DepaySubstituted forIbrahimovicat 55'minutes
- 8Mata
- 9Ibrahimovic
- 14Lingard
- 19Rashford
- 27Fellaini
- 32Johnstone
- 36Darmian
- Referee:
- Stuart Attwell
- Attendance:
- 7,798
Match Stats
- Possession
- Home26%
- Away74%
- Shots
- Home8
- Away14
- Shots on Target
- Home2
- Away7
- Corners
- Home5
- Away4
- Fouls
- Home7
- Away7
Live Text
Full Time
Second Half ends, Northampton Town 1, Manchester United 3.
Attempt missed. Alex Revell (Northampton Town) left footed shot from the centre of the box misses to the left. Assisted by Alfie Potter with a cross.
Attempt saved. Zlatan Ibrahimovic (Manchester United) header from the centre of the box is saved in the centre of the goal. Assisted by Wayne Rooney with a cross.
Corner, Northampton Town. Conceded by Wayne Rooney.
Alfie Potter (Northampton Town) is shown the yellow card for a bad foul.
Wayne Rooney (Manchester United) wins a free kick on the right wing.
Foul by Alfie Potter (Northampton Town).
Ander Herrera (Manchester United) wins a free kick on the right wing.
Foul by John-Joe O'Toole (Northampton Town).
Corner, Manchester United. Conceded by Gabriel Zakuani.
Attempt blocked. Alfie Potter (Northampton Town) right footed shot from outside the box is blocked. Assisted by Matthew Taylor.
Attempt missed. Sam Hoskins (Northampton Town) left footed shot from the left side of the box is close, but misses to the left.
Corner, Northampton Town. Conceded by Chris Smalling.
Attempt saved. Marouane Fellaini (Manchester United) right footed shot from a difficult angle on the right is saved in the centre of the goal. Assisted by Zlatan Ibrahimovic with a through ball.
Daley Blind (Manchester United) wins a free kick in the defensive half.
Foul by Marc Richards (Northampton Town).
Goal! Northampton Town 1, Manchester United 3. Marcus Rashford (Manchester United) right footed shot from very close range to the centre of the goal. Assisted by Ander Herrera following a fast break.
Daley Blind (Manchester United) is shown the yellow card for a bad foul.
Foul by Daley Blind (Manchester United).
Sam Hoskins (Northampton Town) wins a free kick on the right wing.
Substitution, Manchester United. Marouane Fellaini replaces Morgan Schneiderlin.
Substitution, Northampton Town. Marc Richards replaces Jak McCourt.
Foul by Marcos Rojo (Manchester United).
Sam Hoskins (Northampton Town) wins a free kick in the defensive half.
Goal! Northampton Town 1, Manchester United 2. Ander Herrera (Manchester United) right footed shot from outside the box to the bottom left corner. Assisted by Marcus Rashford.
Substitution, Northampton Town. Alfie Potter replaces Kenji Gorré.
Delay over. They are ready to continue.
Delay in match Ashley Young (Manchester United) because of an injury.
Morgan Schneiderlin (Manchester United) wins a free kick in the defensive half.
Foul by John-Joe O'Toole (Northampton Town).
Ander Herrera (Manchester United) hits the right post with a left footed shot from outside the box. Assisted by Ashley Young.
Foul by Michael Carrick (Manchester United).
Jak McCourt (Northampton Town) wins a free kick in the attacking half.
Substitution, Manchester United. Marcus Rashford replaces Timothy Fosu-Mensah.
Substitution, Manchester United. Zlatan Ibrahimovic replaces Memphis Depay.
Substitution, Northampton Town. John-Joe O'Toole replaces Harry Beautyman.
Corner, Manchester United. Conceded by Sam Hoskins.
Corner, Manchester United. Conceded by Brendon Moloney.
Attempt saved. Memphis Depay (Manchester United) right footed shot from outside the box is saved in the centre of the goal. Assisted by Michael Carrick.

subset: commoncrawl


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Artist Notes: Tiziana 2001, like
most of my other portraits, is based on a photograph I took of someone
who was not posing. This Italian woman captured my attention on a plane
ride back from Italy. I imagined how Titian would want to paint her,
my having just been studying his works in Florence. The painting is acrylic
on stretched canvas, and framed. The framedmdimensions are 28 by 22 inches.
The shadow frame does not cut off any of the painting, which seems to float.
This original portrait is available online for $1,000 at


text:
LUCY ALLAIS | Manifest Reality: Kant's Idealism and his Realism | Oxford University Press 2015
By Lucy Allais
I would like to thank Critique for hosting this discussion, and especially to thank Colin Marshall and Colin McLear for their really fantastically interesting, penetrating, thoughtful and detailed engagement with my book. They have given me lots to think about.
Précis of Manifest Reality
Manifest Reality presents an interpretation of a central part of Kant's Critical philosophy, particularly as this is presented in the Critique of Pure Reason: Kant's transcendental idealism. As I see it, making sense of transcendental idealism centrally involves giving an account of Kant's distinction between things as they are in themselves and things as they appear to us, and then making sense of the claims he makes about each side of this distinction. With respect to things as they appear to us, Kant claims that they are mere appearances, that exist in us, and that do not exist apart from a connection to possible perception. With respect to things as they are in themselves, he claims that they ground appearances and that they cause appearances, but that cognition of things as they are in themselves is impossible for us.
A starting point for my account is that I aim to steer a middle course between two possible extremes in interpreting Kant's position. Kant sometimes says things that sound realist, and that sound like his concern is with conditions of knowledge rather than presenting a metaphysical system, and he denies that he is asserting the existence of a supersensible reality. On the other hand, he sometimes says things that sound strongly idealist, and also sometimes expresses a commitment to the existence of an aspect of reality we cannot cognise. Many interpretations of transcendental idealism emphasise one of these sides of Kant's position at the expense of the other, leading to what I see as a polarisation between extreme idealist interpretations, on the one hand, and extreme deflationary, anti-metaphysical interpretations, on the other. I aim to present an interpretation that does justice to both sides of Kant's position while avoiding the problems of both interpretative extremes. In the first part (of the three parts) of the book, I present and examine the textual evidence that has been taken to lead to the extreme views and also present objections to what I take to be representative accounts of the extreme views in the literature. I argue that an interpretation which accommodates the maximum textual evidence will be one which sees Kant as holding some kind of idealism or mind-dependence with respect to the spatio-temporal world of appearances, but which does not see this as extreme phenomenalistic idealism which understands the world of appearance as a construction out of what exists (actually or potentially) merely in minds. With respect to things in themselves, I argue that doing justice to the textual evidence requires an interpretation which sees Kant as committed to the existence of something independent of us that grounds the reality we experience, as well as to the claim that we cannot cognise this something, while not holding that we should understand this as a commitment to the existence of supersensible, non-spatio-temporal objects, distinct from the things of which we have experience. The rest of the book presents my positive account of the position.
In part two of the book I present two central components of my positive approach. I argue that to understand both Kant's argument for transcendental idealism and transcendental idealism as a position, it is important to note his concern with cognition (as opposed to knowledge), as well as the significance of his account of the necessary ingredients of cognition: intuitions and concepts. I argue that clarifying Kant's technical notion of intuition is crucial for understanding both the nature of Kant's idealism as well as his argument for it. Kant says that intuitions are singular and immediate representations that give us objects, and he contrasts them with concepts, which he says are general, mediate representations which can never give us objects. As I read Kant, intuitions are representations which give us acquaintance with perceptual particulars; this relation is crucial for cognition to connect with a world (to be about objects in the right way). On this account, when one has an intuition of an object that object is actually present to one's consciousness, so a hallucination would not count as outer intuition. I argue that understanding intuition in this way enables us to make sense of Kant's central argument for his idealism: it is because he holds that our representations of space and time are both intuitions and a priori that he concludes that they cannot present us with features of things as they are in themselves. In addition to my analysis of the role and nature of intuition, the other central aspect of my presentation of my positive account of Kant's idealism involves sketching an account of perceptual experience that allows that we can be directly presented with objects outside us in space while not necessarily perceiving these objects as they are independent of the possibility of their being perceived by us. I first present such an account of perception, independent of Kant, and use this to give an account of a kind of mind-dependence that does not involve existence merely in the mind. I argue that we can make sense of qualities of things which they have only in relation to the possibility of their being present in conscious experiences, and I call such qualities essentially manifest qualities. I argue that Kant's idealism consists in limiting the spatio-temporal world to what is essentially manifest.
In the final part of the book I put my understanding of the mind-dependence of appearances together with my account of Kant's commitment to things as they are in themselves and give an account of the relation between my interpretation and the role of the categories in the Transcendental Deduction. I close with a discussion of the relation between Kant's transcendental idealism and his account of the possibility of metaphysics, as I read it.
Response to McLear
Colin McLear's detailed, interesting and challenging comments focus on my account of intuition as giving us acquaintance with objects. As McLear notes, I read the singularity of intuition in terms of the idea that intuition presents us with perceptual particulars. I allow that what a subject is presented with as one perceptual particular might not in fact be one object in the full-blown Kantian sense in which an object is a relatively persisting causally unified subject of properties which is made up of stuff that persists through its coming into and going out of existence, and is in causal interaction with all other objects. For example, a perceptual particular could be made up of two objects (in the full-blown Kantian sense of object), or could be something which is not an object, such as a patch of light. McLear thinks this creates a worry for the 'fit' between what is given in intuition and what is cognised as a result of cooperation between intuitive and conceptual representation. He points out that, on the one hand, I allow as singular perceptual particulars things that don't correspond to singular objects; on the other, I argue that a central role of the categories is to exclude 'gerrymandered' concepts and properties as candidates for cognition, because such concepts are not excluded by what is given in intuition. McLear argues that it is not clear how intuition can make a determinate semantic contribution to thought while being unable to determine how it is that one should think of the object so presented.
On my view, the determinate contribution intuition makes is putting us in direct cognitive contact with the things about which we are able to think, the things to which we apply concepts. What is presented in intuition has determinacy in terms of spatio-temporal location and boundaries. Further, it is the actual things (empirically real objects) that determine both what is presented to us in intuition and what concepts apply to these things, but the fact that things are presented to us in intuition is not enough to explain what puts us in a position to think about objects, just as the existence of distinct spatially bounded and located objects does not solve the binding problem—the problem of how we succeed in perceptually representing distinct objects on the basis of a mass of sensory input. The question with which I am concerned is not what determines how one should think of the object present to one, but what puts one in a position to think about it at all. As I read him, Kant's concern in the Deduction is with what it takes for us to be in a position to think about objects (to apply empirical concepts to them); he argues that this requires the application to objects of the a priori concepts he calls the categories; and he argues for this on the basis that without concepts representing necessity and universality (and thereby, as I read it, ruling out gerrymandered objects and gerrymandered properties) we would not have a determinate object of thought and would not be in a position to apply empirical concepts to anything. The categories enable us to think about the objects given in intuition and this may involve discovering that what we initially took to be one object is in fact two. We couldn't discover this without the categories because their role of limiting what counts as a property and what counts as a subject of properties is crucial in enabling us to learn things' properties, including learning their principles of causal unity, which is part of what is involved in learning that what we at first took to be one thing is in fact two separate causal unities.
As McLear notes, I say that for Kant, when we have an intuition of an object, that object is present to consciousness, and I explain this in terms of the notion of acquaintance and the notion of direct presentation. McLear worries that I am not clear as to whether this is an epistemic relation to an object or a metaphysical feature of the state one is in when intuiting an object. Kant does not explain his notion using these terms but I think that it is fair to say that his notion has both epistemic and metaphysical aspects. It is not epistemic in any sense directly involving knowledge, since, as already noted, cognition, for Kant, is not the same as knowledge, and intuition is not cognition, but merely one ingredient in cognition. McLear suggests that the epistemic component in my reading is in my saying that intuition puts a subject 'directly in touch' with, and so provides non-inferential awareness of, a perceptual particular. However, he worries that I also construe the relation as metaphysical by seeing it as being 'object-dependent', in that we have an intuition of an object only when that object is in fact present to us. He sees similar ambiguity in my talk of 'presence' since a mere requirement on the existence of the object for some relation does not tell us anything about the epistemic relation.
In response to the last point, my account is not simply that the object of intuition is present to the subject in the sense of existing in the same space as the subject, but that it is present to the subject's consciousness. This, in my view, brings out how the epistemic role and the metaphysical requirements are connected, in the same way as in the relational accounts of perception I draw on. According to such accounts, a conscious state of perceiving an object intrinsically involves the presence to consciousness of the object perceived; on this analysis, a state of merely seeming to perceive an object is metaphysically different from an actual perceptual state and this difference is key to the role perception plays in cognition and knowledge: that of putting us directly in touch with a world of objects.
As McLear notes, I understand Kant's talk of our being 'given' objects in terms of our being acquainted with them or directly presented with them; McLear asks why one should construe givenness in these terms. This excellent question focuses on the crucial question of how to understand the cognitive requirement intuition satisfies: what is the unique contribution to cognition made by intuition—a contribution that could not be made by concepts? As McLear says, I read Kant as holding that acquaintance is required for referential thoughts (on a certain reading of 'referential'). However, while I do hold this, I hold that the contribution intuition makes to cognition has broader significance than this. The point is not just that we need to be able to have successful referential thoughts—that we need to be able to refer to objects if we are to have knowledge about them—but that we will not have what Kant calls cognition without the possibility of being in direct conscious contact with the objects of cognition. I argue that Kant's specific concern in the Deduction (his concern with what it takes for the categories to have 'relation to an object') is a concern with the conditions of a certain kind of referential thought or referential concept application, and that he argues that this requires that the categories be brought into relation to what is given in empirical intuition. Without the possibility of bringing concepts in relation to intuitions, a certain kind of thought about objects is not possible. As I read him, Kant thinks that concepts never uniquely individuate or pick out an object, that having a concept is always compatible with the possibility that there exists no object corresponding to the concept, and that merely having a concept cannot, on its own, give you the kind of direct connection to an object that guarantees that there is an object. This is why conceptual thought, on its own, lacks what Kant calls objective validity. The objective validity of cognition requires concepts and intuitions together, with intuitions putting us directly in touch with the objects about which concepts enable us to think. On my account, the way intuitions guarantee that there are objects corresponding to our concepts is by presenting us with them, and this is also what enables intuitions to individuate or pick out particulars.
McLear's interesting and challenging discussion pushes me on the point as to whether it is actual or merely possible acquaintance that is necessary for referential thought and cognition on my account. It may be that I am not always sufficiently clear about this, as I introduce and explain my account with respect to the basic case of referential thought of something with which the subject is actually acquainted. My view is that actual intuition is required for (theoretical) cognition, but that actual intuition of the specific object that is being cognised may not be needed, so long as it is both the case that this object is causally connected to something which is actually presented in intuition and also the case that the object of cognition could be presented in an intuition. Both possible and actual intuition feature here: it must be possible for the object being cognised to be presented to consciousness in an intuition and this object must be causally connected to something that is actually presented in an intuition. As I read Kant, he holds that concepts lack relation to an object unless they apply to objects which are given to us in empirical intuition, or to objects which are causally connected to something given to us in empirical intuition and also possibly presentable in intuition. Whenever we have (theoretical) cognition and whenever we have referential thought, there is something of which we have an actual intuition (an object actually present to consciousness), though this may not be the object referred to in the thought. Thus, acquaintance immediately puts a subject in contact with its object, and thereby guarantees the existence of its object, but this does not mean that we have referential thoughts only of the particulars we are acquainted with; this is also possible with respect to particulars with which it is possible for us to be acquainted, where these are causally connected to something with which we are actually acquainted.
McLear worries that the mere possibility of acquaintance, plus causal connection, would not be enough to do the cognitive work I need it to do in my account, to make referential thought possible. Once I understand this cognitive work as providing certainty, McLear argues, I cannot understand it in terms of the kind of inferential connections causal connections would provide. As I see it, the crucial point is not that acquaintance provides certainty but that it provides presence—an actual connection to objects that concepts cannot provide. McLear wonders why, once I have allowed causal connections to be enough, I am in a position to disallow acquaintance with sense-data that stand in the right causal connection to external objects. The problem with this is that (at least on standard understandings of sense-data) there would be no objects with which we are actually immediately presented. But as I read Kant, he holds that cognition requires that at least some of the objects of (theoretical) cognition are actually presented in intuition, and that other objects of (theoretical) cognition are the kinds of things that could be presented in intuition and also are causally connected to things which are actually presented in intuition. This account allows for uncertainty in a number of ways. We can be wrong about the kind of thing we take ourselves to be presented with in intuition, we can be wrong about whether we are actually presented with something in intuition, and we can be wrong about what is causally connected to the things directly presented to us in intuition.
McLear understands Kant's account to allow that there are aspects of empirical reality with which it is impossible for us to be acquainted; my reading of transcendental idealism denies this. In particular, with respect to magnetic matter (the example McLear cites with respect to this possibility), Kant says that "in accordance with the laws of sensibility and the context of our perceptions we could also happen upon the immediate empirical intuition of it in an experience if our senses, the crudeness of which does not affect the form of possible experience in general, were finer' (A226/B273; emphasis added). Notice that here Kant acknowledges that our senses are not able to give us an empirical intuition of magnetic matter but also says that it is something which could in principle be given in an empirical intuition: something that could be present to a conscious experience. Crucially, he says of magnetic material that "we could have an immediate empirical intuition" of it. I take this to mean that for something to be empirically real, for Kant, it must be the case that it could be presented in an empirical intuition to a possible sense and that it is causally related to things which are actually present to our consciousness. Thus, I do not take the discussion of magnetic matter to undermine my reading of the centrality, in Kant's account, of presence to consciousness in intuition.
McLear also worries about the claim that acquaintance is necessary for referential thought. He argues that I fail to distinguish between two distinct but both broadly referential notions—satisfaction and constitution. I do not think that it is easy to map onto Kant all the distinctions that might be drawn with respect to reference in contemporary philosophy, and of course the term can be used in a number of different ways. I therefore explain that, as I am using the term, it is not enough for a referential thought that there is in fact an object that falls under the concept in the thought (satisfaction), but rather that the subject must be in a position to connect the concept with the object. The most straightforward case of this would be applying it to something immediately given in intuition. This is why, on my use of the term 'reference', Kant would deny that we have referential thoughts about monads even if there are in fact (unknown to us) monads and our concepts of monads are coherent—we think about them using coherent concepts. We are not able to have acquaintance with them and therefore are unable to connect with them—to be in a relation to them in which we apply concepts to them through picking them out. While I do not argue that this is the only way in which contemporary notions of reference feature in Kant, or that this is the only thing philosophers might mean by the term 'reference', this is a possible sense of referential thought, and, in my view, it is what Kant is concerned with in the Deduction, when he talks about what it takes for concepts to have 'relation to an object'.
A problem for this account is that Kant seems to allow that we can have some kind of cognition, and therefore, one might think, referential thought (in my sense) of objects like God. Kant's account of practical cognition is a complicated and, arguably, under-explored notion. In order to assess this worry we would need a detailed account of what it is in practical cognition that makes good the lack of intuition, and how this is done. This is a fascinating issue and not one on which I have anything to say in the book. All I will say about it for now is that, as I see it, the access to God, the soul, and freedom that practical cognition gives us is special, and requires some special account of how this fills the role played by intuition; further, I think that such an account is not, on Kant's view, available with respect to notions such as that of monads. Thus I think the fact that Kant holds practical cognition to give us some cognitive access to the supersensible is compatible with denying that Kant allows us to have referential (in the specific sense of reference introduced) thoughts about monads. Further, whatever account we have of the way practical cognition fills the gap with respect to objects that cannot be given in empirical intuition, it is still significant that filling this gap does not provide us with theoretical cognition. A developed account of practical cognition should explain both how the gap filling works and the differences in the resultant cognition. This is a fascinating project, and one on which I wish I had more to say.
Response to Marshall
While Colin McLear pushes at the details of one central part of my account (my reading of intuition), Colin Marshall raises a wide variety of worries about a number of different aspects of the position. Marshall pushes more on the philosophical coherence of the picture I present than on its accuracy as an interpretation of Kant and in doing so raises what seem to me to be very interesting questions for the position.
Marshall notes that my reading falls within the tradition of 'one-world/two-aspect' interpretations of Kant's idealism, and that a central claim in this tradition is to say that each appearing object of experience is, in some sense, the same thing as some thing in itself, sometimes construing this as a claim about numerical identity. I do not make this numerical identity claim: I think it is a misleading way of expressing the point. One problem I raise with making the numerical identity claim is that, on Kant's account, we are not in a position to pose the question as to whether some thing in itself is an identical thing to some thing as it appears, because we are never in a position to individuate things in themselves. Further, I think saying that every appearance is a thing that is numerically identical with a thing that exists in itself problematically sees both appearances and things as they are in themselves as things, whereas they are, rather, aspects of things. It would be like saying that the round shape of an object and its red colour are numerically identical things. Rather, what we should say is that there is a thing which has a round shape and a red colour; further, we could say (for example on a Lockean view) that the thing is red only in our experience of it, and not as it is in itself, without asserting that redness and roundness are numerically identical things.
Two worries that may be raised about this are, first, whether it problematically makes appearances into properties rather than things, and second, whether it problematically (in terms of Kant's views about the limits of our cognition) allows us too much information about things in themselves.
In relation to the first worry, I don't think that the fact that we can characterise things as they appear to us only in terms of mind-dependent properties makes these things properties. We characterise objects by characterising their properties; Locke, for example, characterises objects as having primary, secondary, and tertiary qualities (which have different metaphysical statuses, as secondary qualities are mind-dependent). This does not mean that Locke turns objects into properties, and we could express Lockean realism by describing the mind-independent nature of primary qualities, in his account. In giving an account of the metaphysical status of the properties of spatio-temporal objects, Kant gives an account of the metaphysical status of such objects. Kant thinks, as I read him, that the essentially manifest qualities of things we are able to cognise exhaust the characteristics of spatio-temporal empirically real objects. He thinks that empirical knowledge and science gives us knowledge only of essentially manifest objects and does not need anything more. This does not make spatio-temporal, empirically real objects into properties; rather, it gives us a description of the status of the properties of the objects we know, and thereby gives us an account of the metaphysical status of the objects, including the fact that, as I understand him, Kant thinks what is empirically real is in a crucial sense not complete, and not metaphysically fundamental.
In response to the second worry, I argue that to say that the things we experience have a way they are independently of their appearing to us is not to say that picking out objects at the level of experience tells us how they are individuated in themselves. By way of analogy, grant, for the sake of argument, that there is a distinction between the visual colour we experience and the properties picked out by science that ground visual colour, such as spectral reflectance properties. Empirical science tells us that the physical properties which ground red, for example, are enormously varied. This means that picking out redness, at the level of experience, does not individuate properties at the level of the non-experiential properties physics studies, even if the former are grounded in the latter.
Marshall has two challenges to my central notion of essentially manifest qualities. The first challenge is to explain how properties which are essentially manifest are qualities of mind-independent objects; the second is to explain how to make sense of qualities that are manifest to us in perception but also dependent on the possibility of our perceiving them. These two sides of essentially manifest qualities are central to my account: that they have these two sides is what enables my reading to do justice to both Kant's empirical realism and his idealism. Essentially manifest qualities, as I introduce the notion, are genuinely qualities of objects (not of merely mental states), but are mind-dependent qualities of objects, and, in particular, depend on the possibility of their being perceived by creatures like us. Defending this account of essentially manifest qualities, and its role in explaining Kant's idealism and his empirical realism, takes up two chapters of the book (Chapters 5 and 6); it will not be possible for me to give an adequate account of the central features Marshall challenges here. I shall simply say something brief about each of the two sides of his worry.
Drawing on a Lockean account of colour, Marshall allows that we can easily understand how a mind-independent object (a spruce) could have the mind-dependent property of being green. However, he thinks this kind of example is of no help with making sense of the case in which we have no independent grasp on the mind-independent thing. This seems to be because he takes it that spatial qualities are essential to our grasp of colour, and in the Lockean account, spatial qualities are mind-independent. The problem, Marshall says, is that without knowing what the metaphysically deep properties of mind-independent objects are, we don't have grounds for saying that the essentially manifest qualities are qualities of those objects. I'm not sure I see the worry. For one thing, he has appealed to the claim that spatial qualities are essential to our grasp of colour, not to the claim that the mind-independence of spatial qualities is essential to this. So long as we can individuate objects within experience, we do not need to individuate mind-independent things which ground appearance properties, although we do, as I understand Kant's view, need the idea that there is something which does this. I think the worry Marshall raises might have more force against an account of qualities like colour which understands them as existing literally in the mind; if these were all we had access to, this might make it hard to see how we could have grounds for thinking that they are properties of objects. But essentially manifest qualities, as I understand them, are qualities of objects, not of something that exists merely in the mind.
This leads to the other side of Marshall's worry: how essentially manifest qualities can be both manifest in perceptual experience and mind-dependent. I hold that empirical reality, for Kant, is exhausted by what is essentially manifest, and that what is part of possible experience, for Kant, is either something directly present in experience or something which is both causally connected to something directly present in experience and also something which could be directly present in experience. In presenting my account of essentially manifest qualities, I start by presenting an account of colour understood as essentially manifest, which I argue is a possible account of colour. Marshall argues that the phenomenology of colour is in tension with colours having the metaphysical profile the essentially manifest account ascribes to them. He appeals to views which argue that the phenomenology of colour experience includes the fact that perceptual experience reveals to subjects what things in their environment are like independently of their experience of them. I have two responses to this.
On the one hand, it seems unlikely, on any interpretation of transcendental idealism, that the metaphysical status transcendentally ideal features of reality have is revealed in ordinary perceptual experience. If this were the case, transcendental idealism would be the default common-sense view—I assume that it is not. So I don't take Marshall's phenomenological point here to be enough to show that an analysis of qualities as essentially manifest could not capture Kant's account of transcendental ideality.
On the other hand, part of my account of essentially manifest qualities is that these qualities are, as experience presents them as being, both qualities of objects (not of merely mental states or ideas) and presented or manifested in experience. The nature of redness is revealed in experience (whether or not its mind-independent/mind-dependent status is so revealed). Thus, this account does justice to a central part of the phenomenology of colours: their being manifest qualities. The further possibility that colours are not just manifest but essentially manifest is not, in my view, something we should expect to be part of the phenomenology. It is crucial to note, against Marshall, that essentially manifest qualities do not exist in mere possibility—bursting into action when perceived—rather, like manifest qualities they are qualities of objects presented in perceptual experience, but further, are qualities the existence of which is limited to the possibility of their being presented in perceptual experience. Marshall suggests that we need an account of Kant's reasons for thinking that empirical reality has this status—my account of this is in Chapter 8, and it turns on both my account of intuition and Kant's arguments for space and time being a priori intuitions.
Marshall has concerns about my account of Kant's notion of sensation and its role in cognition and, in particular, its role in intuition. This is not something on which I have firmly settled views, and I find Marshall's discussion here very interesting. I am not convinced that Kant's account of sensation is either worked out enough or presented in enough detail to resolve all possible debates here. In my view, the way he talks about sensations is compatible with it being the case that, at least some of the time, they are theoretical postulates in a sub-personal processing system—ways in which objects causally affect us which play a role in our experience of objects without it necessarily always being the case that they are conscious representations. On my view, sensations are not intentional on their own (intuitions are intentional representations that present us with objects), but Marshall wonders how ordering something non-intentional could produce direct acquaintance with an object outside us; as I understand it, this is a problem for all direct realist or relational accounts of perception that (rightly) acknowledge that perceptual experience requires mental processing of a causally produced sensory input. The further complication for Kant's account is that he holds that one part of what enables us to go from a causal input to experience of objects involves an ordering contribution from the mind which does not present the way reality is independently of the possibility of its being presentable to minds. This is, no doubt, a philosophically complicated position. It is not part of the view, as I read it, that the forms in which we organise the causal sensory input reflect something merely mental; they enable us to be presented with things outside us, but only with aspects of those things which are limited to the possibility of their being presentable to us. However, as I said, I do not have firm views on Kant's account of sensation, I think that this is something that would benefit from more attention and I find Marshall's suggestions here interesting.
Marshall argues that my account of Kant's argument for his transcendental idealism (Chapter 8) neglects important alternatives to certain claims that are key to my account. I argue that, in the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant does not establish transcendental idealism by postulating it as a theory that would close a justificatory gap, enabling us to reach conclusions about the way objects are in the spatio-temporal world on the basis of features of our minds. In particular, I hold that Kant's transcendental arguments concerning the synthetic a priori conditions of cognition primarily enable us to reach conditional conclusions about the objects we can cognise, and that Kant does not argue for transcendental idealism on the basis of the claim that it would enable us to convert these conditional conclusions into conclusions about all spatio-temporal objects, but rather he argues for this latter move on the basis of already having established transcendental idealism. I don't see that the possibility of transcendental arguments with other conclusions and premises affects this.
Marshall argues that my account of Kant's argument for his idealism is open to a sceptical objection. The objection is that there could be states that are subjectively just like intuitions yet which do not in fact present any object; Marshall calls these quasi-intuitions. He asks what basis we have for thinking that we have intuitions rather than quasi-intuitions. It is not clear to me that Kant needs an answer to this question at this point: as I read him, his central concern is not in showing that we can rule out radical sceptical possibilities, but in giving an account of the nature of the world of which we have cognition, on the assumption that we do have empirical cognition. Further, I don't find it obvious that the possibility Marshall is concerned with is really a possibility with respect to an a priori intuition. If, as I hold, the object an a priori intuition presents just is, thereby, present to consciousness, then there could not be a quasi-intuition, in Marshall's sense, of space.
Marshall thinks I do not have a basis for ruling out a version of the so-called neglected alternative hypothesis which holds that the spatio-temporal structures present in our experience could also be present in reality as it is independent of us. I agree that in the Aesthetic Kant does not have an argument that rules out there being some structures in things in themselves that are somehow space and time-like. (I think he has further arguments for this in the Antinomies). However, I think that he does have an argument for the claim that whatever space-like or time-like structures there may be in things in themselves, these are not the structures that are present to us in our experience of space and time. In order to make my account of the argument in the Aesthetic work, I attribute to Kant an unstated premise that things that are independent of us get to be present to the mind only by affecting us. Marshall finds this premise implausible with respect to structures, such as the representations of space and time. My aim is not to defend the premise, but rather to defend the plausibility of Kant's having held it, or something like it, as it makes his argument go through at exactly the place he presents it, in exactly the way he presents it. The plausibility of the premise is something on which I welcome further philosophical reflection, as it is needed to determine whether Kant's argument is sound.
Like McLear, Marshall has some doubts about my account of the Deduction, and, in particular, my view that part of the argument of the Deduction is that the categories enable us to rule out gerrymandered objects and properties, and that this is a necessary condition of referential empirical thought. Marshall holds that someone could take herself to be in a very chaotic world, filled with gruesome properties and gerrymandered objects, and yet have no trouble in thinking about any possible combination of objects with properties. In my view, this claim is precisely what we need to deny to make sense of the part of Kant's argument in the Deduction that I discuss. I argue that he holds that someone in this position would not actually be in a position to have a determinate object of thought, and to investigate the objects in the world around them to work out what properties they have. I agree with Marshall that generality itself does not suggest substantive restrictions on representation; I argue that what troubles Kant is the combination of generality and spontaneity, which threaten the possibility of determinate concept application. I don't take myself to have sufficiently developed this account of the argument in the Deduction. In the book, I sketch it as a possibility; defending it as an interpretation of Kant and as an argument is an ongoing project.
Concluding Remarks
In closing, I want to respond to something Marshall says at the beginning of his piece. Marshall notes that I pay relatively little attention to Kant's pre-Critical work and don't discuss his contemporaries at all. I can only plead guilty to this: the book would have been a much longer book had I attempted to do this, and, in my view, this would have undermined from the close and continuous presentation of arguments based on philosophical concerns and primary texts, to present an interpretation of transcendental idealism. It would not, therefore, have been the book I wanted to write. This does not mean though that I disagree with Marshall's pointing out the significance of this absence, or that I think investigating Kant's contemporaries in relation to my reading would not be fruitful—I think it would be very fruitful indeed and I would welcome more work on it.
While I don't think Marshall means this as large criticism, I will take responding to it as a brief opportunity to say something about my approach to the history of philosophy. My view is that a great variety of approaches, from the extreme of detailed contextual scholarship that pays attention to, for example, the typescript and size of original editions, to the other extreme of books like The Bounds of Sense, which are more like a riff on the primary texts, can all make useful and important philosophical contributions to the history of philosophy. Given the amount of time it takes me to bring philosophical arguments and Kant's central Critical texts together (as well as my philosophical interests), I think my work will fall somewhat closer to The Bounds of Sense than the detailed contextual history extremes of the spectrum, but I have learned much from works with different approaches. Thus, I think that with respect to methodology in the history of philosophy, we should 'let a thousand flowers bloom'; further, I think this is in fact happening, and that there is a wonderful amount of rapidly growing, vibrant and diverse new work on Kant (to which my two interlocutors are contributors), and that this is a fantastic time to be working on Kant.
Received: 14 August 2016.
© Lucy Allais, 2016.
Lucy Allais is Henry E. Allison Endowed Chair in the History of Philosophy at University of California, San Diego and Professor of Philosophy at Wits University, Johannesburg. Her work focuses on Kant's philosophy and on topics related to wrongdoing and justice such as forgiveness and punishment. She has published widely in various journals such as Journal of the History of Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Journal of Moral Philosophy and South African Journal of Philosophy.


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aFe Magnum Force Cold Air Intake Part #51-11402 Customer Reviews
5 Customer Reviews
Reviewed by Ed H (Pomfret Center, CT) Reviewed for a 2008 Ford F-150 — Mar 21, 2013 6:17 AM
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Shipment a little slow as it was on back order. Installation is easier than the instructions were to follow, common sense. Asked AFE to email me instructions before hand so I could preview them and they sent it right over in PDF and you could zoom in on the pictures, very helpful. First noticed a total change in the sound of my flowmaster exhaust. Much deeper, throatier sound. Faster throttle response from stand still and quick at passing speeds.The sound is very mellow at cruising speed, no drone, but when you drop the hammer heads will turn. Very cool product especially when paired with a performance exhaust. Auto anything is a great company and they now get all my business.
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All offers will be reviewed by April 12
• 1336 sqft , 2 bath , 3 bdrm single story – FOR SALE 369000 USD . Fantastic Price! Act Now before this is gone!
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Behind the beautifully painted green door is a move in ready green house. Leased/solar with 21 panels that provides 106% of energy needs, lease has provision for purchase. 1 year old Milgard windows and back door. Newer carpet, tile and LVT flooring. Newer paint inside and out. Has a whole house carbon water filter system, Reverse osmosis, tankless water heater. Kitchen upgraded with granite counter tops and appliances and Bathrooms upgraded with granite counter tops and low flow commodes.


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Some folks go to Cape Cod in the summer. Others head to the Jersey Shore. Me? Where do I go on a warm evening to escape the heat and find a cool breeze?
This is the side hill next to our house. When we first moved into our house 14 years ago the alder trees in the greenbelt were creeping to our property line. Slowly over the years hubby has cut the trees and brambles back and now we have a beautiful rolling side hill filled of green grass and a gulley filled with ferns, huckleberries, wild flowers and alders. It's peaceful and when the weather is unbearable in the house the side hill is the place to be for both humans and dogs.
I picked up these Adirondak chairs at Home Depot. They had so many fun colors I finally narrowed it down to theses three. The "hill" is catching on with the neighbors too. Looks like it's going to be a fun summer!
Where's your hangout in the summer?


text: Know What Will Be Required Of You In A 55+ CommunityWhen deciding to live in a retirement community, you'll probably sign an agreement which states what you can expect from the community and what the community will expect from you. If you have never lived in a home or condo with a community organization, like a homeowners association (HOA), you may be surprised to discover yourself limited in more ways than you anticipated. Rules for parking, decorating your home, lawn maintenance and more may be in place.Living in an HOA or Condo community is like politics. Some things you will like and some things, not so much. All of that being said, the overall intent of community associations are to make policies that are best for the community.Some 55 and over communities have rules in place restricting who can live in the property. For example, you may find out that both a husband and wife need to be at least fifty-five years old. Some retirement communities do not allow kids to be residing in the property at all. Often people ask if they can purchase into a 55 and over community if one of the spouses is less than 55. These are questions that should be researched before buying.You may be wondering how it is lawful for a community to be able to discriminate based on age. There is an exception in the fair housing act called The "Housing For Older Persons Exemption". You can read more about this on HUD.GOV website.Make sure you are OK with the answers before you buy. ________________________________________Leave a Reply Cancel replyYour email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *CommentName * Email * Website Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment.


text: Urban logistics is the best way to transport incoming and outgoing goods and their movement within the urban fabric. It forms a whole that includes not only transport but also storage, packaging, order management, returns management, packaging and pallet management, home delivery and the delivery relay offer. A global reflection and management are essential. After having left the city for several decades, logistics is back.


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Week 3 Holiday To-Do List
1. Continue shopping for gifts.
2. Update Christmas card list.
3. Purchase or order Christmas cards.
4. Make and freeze a batch of baked goods (unfrosted cookies, bars, quick breads).
3. Start collecting boxes and gift bags to use for gift wrapping.
4. Start wrapping gifts as they are bought.
5. Finalize Thanksgiving dinner menu and entertainment plans.
Seen on Pinterest: acorns in glass jars (www.oldtimepottery.com). Love this. TO DO: take K and E out on an acorn hunt. Fill glass jars with acorns, fall flowers or candlesticks.


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Fetch.ai, a new decentralised system developed by early members of Google-owned DeepMind, is launched today. It enables Autonomous Economic Agents to automatically trade data and services with other AI-powered systems to deliver transactions at a scale of millions per second, a 'decentralised digital world' on a 'smart ledger'.
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Founded in 2016 and operating in stealth until now, the Fetch team includes original pioneers from DeepMind, the generalised artificial intelligence company acquired by Google, as well as economics and cybersecurity professors from Cambridge and Sheffield Universities.
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"Today's centralised systems and marketplaces result in siloes and there isn't a means to enable complex economic activity. We've built a decentralised and open system to solve this: for AI to interface with AI on both sides of an economic transaction. For the first time Fetch delivers a self-organising digital world that enables the discoverability of data for decision making, the trading of excess capacity, energy, computation, or the storage, transfer and transportation of digital or physical assets. When you have a decentralised collective intelligence and AI operating in the right environment, which our open network provides, an autonomous system like Fetch can solve problems before they even arise."
Outlier Ventures saw the promise in the project early on: "Its applications are vast," said CEO Jaime Burke, in a statement. "For the first time, we can genuinely say we have not smart contracts but instead a smart ledger. To date, blockchains haven't been capable of even rudimentary intelligence and anyone wanting to use today's dumb ledgers for anything complex, dynamic or predictive has been left severely wanting."
The Fetch smart ledger is already up an running at www.fetch.ai. Fetch plans to provide code on Github and announce a range of corporate partnerships over the coming months.
- Wanchain CEO Jack Lu: Why 2.0 is a Milestone for the Entire Blockchain Industry - July 23, 2018
- Hit the Road, Jack. Wanchain 2.0 and WanLabs Kick Off European Tour - July 20, 2018
- Peter Gabriel Backs British Blockchain Startup Provenance - July 18, 2018
- Bitfinex CEO Hits Back at Fraud Expert's Study Linking Tether to Crypto Price Manipulation - June 13, 2018
- Pundi X Moves Into Europe - June 5, 2018
- Dying for Crypto: The Ultimate ICO Publicity Stunt? - May 25, 2018
- Blockchain City Dubai Hosts Showstopping Summit, Unveils Registry to Expedite Business - May 8, 2018
- Crypto Tax: Victory for Tokenized Protest & Calls for Worldwide Reform - April 26, 2018
- Taking the Temperature at London's Blockchain Expo 2018 - April 24, 2018
- Death Knell for Crypto in Poland? Poles Mobilze to Protest Crippling Tax Law - April 11, 2018
- Taiwan's NOWnews Announces Plan to Launch Blockchain-Based Media Platform - April 3, 2018
- Study on 100 ICOs Identifies Social Reach, No. Of Advisors and a Raise of $10M as Key Factors for Success - April 2, 2018
- Exchange Group TMX Issues Guidance to Crypto and Blockchain Issuers - March 30, 2018
- DeepMind's AI Pioneers Launch Fetch.ai – the World's First Smart Ledger - March 29, 2018
- Kleros Joins Forces with Dether to Launch Decentralized Arbitration for Cryptocurrency Traders - March 26, 2018
- Future Crypto: 7 Clean Sneaks Past China's ICO Ban - March 26, 2018
- Proxeus & Mount10 Partner to Provide Military-Grade Storage Security - March 22, 2018
- Playboy Pounces on Blockchain, Plans Crypto Wallet - March 14, 2018
- Crypto Leaders Speak out as US Regulatory Uncertainty Around ICOs Continues - March 9, 2018
- EU Proposes Pan-European Licensing Plan for ICOs - March 8, 2018
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These beads are hand carved and strung in Africa on the Ivory Coast. They are made of camel bone and hand painted.
Sold individually by the strand
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In the beginning
Before starting Myownly Boarding Kennel, Cathi began her pet care career in 1968 at Northgate Veterinary clinic. With experience and a wealth of knowledge, she worked as a licensed animal-health technician in Lynnwood, Washington, for 20 years. She opened Myownly Boarding Kennel opened in 1989 and has provided Monroe, Snohomish County, and the greater Seattle area with high quality pet care and grooming.
Our facility is on 5 acres outside Monroe, WA. The original building holds 22 runs that are 5′ wide and 8′ deep. These runs face away from each other and include a privacy box. That being said, this area is much quieter and therefore perfect for shy, noisy, and antisocial boarders that need some space.
And then…
In 1992 walls were raised and Myownly Boarding Kennel expanded. The newest part of the kennel created a space with 30 varied 3′-8′ wide runs, heated floors, and indoor/outdoor kennels for dogs who require special care and space.
With a diverse set up, Myownly Boarding Kennel can accommodate and plan for almost every cat, dog, or special pet. We have two outdoor play areas, one covered and one out of doors. Both areas are secure by tall sturdy fences and surfaced with artificial turf to keep your pup clean and happy. Outside of the building we have plenty of space to go for a private walk and a dog park for off leash fun including fetch, agility work, and pool play time. Simply ask for our premium care package and we will be happy to provide the extra attention your pet needs.
Cathi envisioned a kennel provide a safe and trusted destination for pet owners to board their animals. Not only has she done that, Cathi has established herself as one of the most experienced groomers in the United States. Our staff is personally trained by her to ensure her high standards are met.
Beck's Place
If you are looking for a good place to invest your time and give back, look no further than Beck's Place. Myownly Boarding Kennel has worked with Beck's Place for several years and they are a first class program that puts the pets, people, and community first. THANK YOU for all that they do! In short, this group of amazing people help people and pets through rough times. If you would like to learn more please visit their website becksplace.org and see how you can help your community.
Our country setting is relaxing
Pet owners love us and their pets can relax in the beautiful rural setting. In our surveys, clients say they know their family pets are safe and happy in our hands. Which in turn, gives them peace of mind as they travel.
We impress the professionals
Our pet nannies are very knowledgeable in caring for pets post surgery or with special behavioral issues. Veterinarians, trainers, and some rescue groups refer their most fragile dogs to us for safekeeping when needing dog boarding.
We're easy to get to
We are just 10 minutes off Monroe's major highways and 20 minutes to 405 and I-5. The kennel is open 7 days a week for easy pick up and drop off. That being said, Myownly is super convenient if you are on your way to Eastern Washington or the Pass.
We provide premium dog boarding and cat boarding for clients from Monroe, Snohomish, Gold Bar, Sultan, Startup, Maltby, Bothell, Kirkland, Redmond, Bellevue, Mercer Island, Everett, Marysville, Mukilteo, Edmonds, Lynnwood, and all over King County, Snohomish County, and Pierce County.
We are honored to win Angie's List 2015 and 2014 Super Service Award for our work. Please, read through our client reviews and see for yourself.


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Garage Door Services in Denver, CO
Denver Garage Door Renovation
When you come home from a long day of doing what you do best, the last thing that you want to deal with is trouble simply securing your vehicle. You pride yourself in the home that you've established for you and your loved ones. So, whether you're looking to improve or repair your garage door, your roof, or even your heating and cooling, AAARK Heating, Air & Plumbing is the ultimate answer for you!
Your Garage Door Repairs Done Right
When you're looking for garage door repair in your area, you may not be capable of tackling the job on alone. Repairs can be tricky when it comes to your garage. Loose mounting brackets, for instance, could be loose, making your repair fast and simple. However, if your garage door lacks a torsion spring from displacement or damage, it's time to call in professional assistance to avoid injury. That's where AAARK Heating, Air & Plumbing comes into play. We provide you with the expert opinion and services you need to get your garage door in working order again.
Our Experience Shows
Since the launch of our home improvement & remodel business, AAARK Heating, Air & Plumbing has installed and repaired hundreds of garage doors. We know professional assistance and our expert technicians will prove it to you. Don't bother with major repairs when it comes to your garage door. Allow AAARK Heating, Air & Plumbing to perform your repairs or replacement for you today.
From Humble Denver Beginnings, To Thousands Served
We pride ourselves on providing the best products & services at competitive prices since 1984 and we've worked hard to earn the reputation of being a well-established, honest, fair and competent contractor. This has resulted in a current customer base of over 28,000 satisfied loyal customers who utilize ALL of AAARK Heating, Air & Plumbing's home improvement services.
Contact AAARK Heating, Air & Plumbing Today for your Denver Home Services
Contact us today to find out more information on how we can get you a free assessment for your home's garage door repair or replacement. Join the most efficient company available in Denver for all your garage door needs and services. Never worry about your repair needs again with AAARK Heating, Air & Plumbing, serving the Denver area today! Give us a call today, and never look back.


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NEW HYDE PARK, N.Y. (CBSNewYork) – There's a back-and-forth battle in the snow clean-up effort on Long Island.
As CBS 2's Jennifer McLogan reported, shoveled sidewalks have been quickly covered with snow and ice after plows pass by.
Some senior citizens in New Hyde Park said they can't keep up and worry they will be fined hundreds of dollars.
"God puts it there, I take it away, and then the state comes along and they put it back," William Jordan, 85, told McLogan.
Jordan said he works to clear off the sidewalk in from of his home after every snowstorm. But once his hard work is done, Jordan said New York State plows come down Hillside Avenue and shoot gritty snow and ice back onto his sidewalk where it refreezes.
He said he's concerned about incurring a fine for not re-clearing his sidewalk.
"I think it's four hours they allow you after the snowfall," Jordan told McLogan.
The fines range from $250 to $1,000.
"I was going to put a sign out here that if you have to walk in the street, don't blame me, call the DOT – Department of Transportation – they put it there," said Jordan.
The state told CBS 2 that plow operators will be asked to slow down in Jordan's neighborhood.
The village of New Hyde Park said it will work to give the elderly a break on citations.
Meantime, residents in Elmont are demanding that businesses be held accountable for failing to shovel their sidewalks.
Donna French told McLogan that her granddaughter is forced to walk in the street along the Hempstead Turnpike to get to school each day.
"Somebody has to do something," French said. "I've called the village, they passed it on to someone else. I called the state, they tell me it's not their job, they tell me to call the police department. They pass the buck."
The Town of Hempstead responded to the concerns about snow removal.
"We've issued notices of violation, which are like a warning, to some businesses along Hempstead Turnpike. We respond to complaints," said town spokesman Mike Deery.
According to village and town code in Elmont, snow and ice must be cleared from curb to property line within four hours of snowfall, excluding the overnight hours.
Some Long Island residents have also called in multiple complaints that they are being plowed in with four feet of ice on their driveways.
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[display-posts category="news" posts_per_page="4″]


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This sandwich is tough to chew, but it's anything but stale.
If you see an extra large, sumptuous looking sample of Think Sweet Café's signature sandwich, the Mefuneket, on display at the Midwood restaurant's storefront, don't be shocked by the $3,500 price tag — this hoagie's ingredients include limestone, epoxy, and some delicious shards of glass.
"It's a little hard on your teeth," said the creator, sculptor Robin Antar. "You might need diamond blades to digest this one."
The Midwood stone carver has made a name for herself by taking large chunks of limestone and whittling them down to resemble everyday objects, like boots, jean jackets, and — of all things — mayonnaise.
"I'm a sculptor and stone carver," Antar explained. "I have my stuff all over the country and I'm known for doing realism in stone — realistic jackets, jeans, boxing gloves, Oreo Cookies, ketchup, mustard, mayonnaise — food. It's very tedious work, you spend maybe a thousand hours on a piece."
But there's always been one Midwood staple the sculptor has been reluctant to tackle, the Mefuneket, despite petitions from sandwich inventor Morti Robinowitz.
"Well, she's a customer of mine and I told her, why don't you make a nice sandwich, and we'll display it," said Robinowitz, Think Sweet's owner and the mind behind the Mefuneket. "It took her quite a while, but she finally got to work and it came out beautifully. The colors, everything matches."
Robinowitz also takes his time when preparing the edible version of the Mefuneket, a popular Brooklyn original consisting of tomato, cucumber, olive, egg, and cream and Muenster cheeses, which Moti arranges with characteristic — occasionally frustrating — deliberateness.
"You ever see the Seinfeld episode, with the guy in the soup kitchen?" asked Antar. "It's kind of a joke, because you can't rush him. He's making the sandwich and places the cucumber all perfect, and you can't rush him."
Antar's Mefuneket, however, is anything but edible.
The 20-inch-long, five-inch-high hoagie is made of limestone bread, epoxy and glass cream cheese, and Sculpey clay Muenster cheese baked at high heat to achieve a translucent effect.
The sculptor was reluctant at first to take on the task, and had to invent new — and top secret — techniques to get the bread just right.
"Limestone doesn't look like bread, so I developed a technique to stain the stone," Antar explained. "When people ask me how long it took to make, I say 40 years, because it takes years of experience to make the stone do what you want."
The artist might have been sceptical about the outcome, but Robinowitz's customers are certainly pleased — a few have even inquired about purchasing the limestone sandwich.
"People really like it," said Robinowitz. "People have been asking about it and, if someone likes it, I'll give them [Antar's] number."
Antar's isn't the only Brooklyn sandwich in disguise — last April, pastry chef Antonio Fiorentino of the Cobble Hill Monteleone Bakery & Café crafted a cake in the spitting image of a tasty cheeseburger.
Think Sweet Café [546 Kings Hwy. between E. Third and E. Fourth streets in Midwood, (718) 645-3473]
Reach reporter Colin Mixson at email@example.com or by calling (718) 260-4514.


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OnSite is an invite-only freelance job posting site serving the London area. They specialize in connecting businesses with quality freelance talent. OnSite curators look for the best talent available and profile their work before listing them as freelance options.
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Modern coral reefs harbour a large number of cryptic species: species that are either small and/or well hidden in the nooks and crannies of the reef framework. Examples include certain fish, stomatopods, shrimps and crabs. One such group consists of members of the Cryptochiridae family or cryptic crabs. These are small, usually much less than 10mm carapace length, and fragile, because much of their exoskeleton is poorly calcified.
The phylogeny, systematics and ecology of these crabs have been an active field of research during the last few years, especially due to work of Sancia van der Meij (Naturalis Biodiversity Center, now at the Oxford University Museum of Natural History) and colleagues. The number of species known has increased notably from about about 45 in 2011 to 52 species in 2016. Along with the discovery of new taxa of these cryptic species, the placement in the Grapsoidea superfamily has been rejected and the Cryptochiridae are now firmly placed in the Cryptochiroidea superfamily.
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An Evening with Dame Diana Rigg
From The Avengers' Emma Peel to Lady Glenna Tyrell in Game of Thrones - Dame Diana Rigg's extraordinary career has spanned decades. Only last year she returned to Broadway in a revival of Lerner and Loewe's My Fair Lady, for which she earned a Tony Award nomination.
She's worked with all the greats, including Paul Schofield and Laurence Olivier, the former when she was barely out of The Royal Academy of Dramatic Art, and has originated two plays by the legendary Tom Stoppard. Hollywood cast her opposite the great George C Scott and she's rubbed shoulders with the likes of Elizabeth Taylor and Leslie Caron.
This rare close encounter with the writer and broadcaster Edward Seckerson promises to leave no stone unturned - or in the words of her hilarious collection of the worst reviews ever - No Turn Unstoned.
Image copyright: Graham Jepsen


text: Nik Taylor wrote: > In comparison, > English of 15 years ago has NO noticeable differences. There may be a > few statistical differences, e.g., in dialects with rhotic/nonrhotic > variation, the percentage of rhotic uses may have changed slightly, but > nothing that would be immediately obvious. Oh, I'm not so sure of that. There are a number of things going on in the language at subtle levels that could have profound changes. There was a survey by William Labov which I've mentioned on this list before that illustrates an American "Great Vowel Shift" happening right now in the Northern industrial states from, say, Pennsylvania all the way through to Illinois. (see: <http://www.ling.upenn.edu/phono_atlas/ICSLP4.html> ) This process has apparently been very rapidly accelerating in the most recent generation, if you go look at the data for the 14 year olds there. Strangely, a different and in some ways opposite shift is occuring in Southern states simultaneously. And that's just phonological. Recent trends to using degendered language has also increased in part because it's linked to trends like "politically correct" language, but also because of historical usages such as "they" in precisely that fashion. Then you get phenomena like the fact that English speakers seem to feel a distinct need for a second person plural pronoun, and so because of that, phrasal pronouns like "you guys" or now morphologically simplex forms like "y'all" are gaining ground almost daily. (As for where I live, I don't know *anyone* who would use just "you" in casual circumstances; "you all" or "y'all" or "you guys" are all the highly preferred forms). By the same measure, people (or at least so I've noticed) are more and more using the morphological simple-past of verbs with some sort of word like "yet" to indicate what used to be solely the province of the present perfect. So, for example, I've heard "Did you do you homework yet?" as opposed to "Have you done your homework [yet]?" (where the "yet" is mandatory in the first, but not in the second). None of these are the vast, sweeping changes that you describe for those Australian languages, but they are, I think, quite noticeable. (At least, some of these things have immediately leaped out at me before.) ======================================================= Tom Wier <[log in to unmask]> ICQ#: 4315704 AIM: Deuterotom Website: <http://www.angelfire.com/tx/eclectorium/> "Cogito ergo sum, sed credo ergo ero." Enlighten the people generally, and tyranny and oppressions of body and mind will vanish like evil spirits at the dawn of day. - Thomas Jefferson ========================================================


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Star WarsTransformers
BatmanG.I. Joe
He-ManMarvel Legends
Super PowersRobotech
DC UniverseReal Ghostbusters
Estimated Value(All values are markers for testing, and not to be considered accurate during Beta.)
In the Marvel Comics G.I. Joe series, Quick Kick first appeared in G.I. Joe: A Real American Hero #45 (March 1986).
Quick Kick's final appearance was issue #109. Several Joes, including Quick Kick, are captured by Cobra during a mission in Trucial-Abysmia. A misinterpreted order from Cobra Commander leads the Crimson Twins into thinking they are now obligated to have the Joes killed. Noting their reluctance, a S.A.W.-Viper steps up to volunteer for the task. He first kills the medic 'Doc', then opens fire on the subdued, captured Joes, killing Thunder and Heavy Metal. A well-aimed knife, previously hidden, allows the survivors to escape. They steal a Cobra Rage tank. Cobra forces pursue and destroy the tank, killing Quick-Kick, Breaker and Crazylegs. Duke, Lt. Falcon, and Cross-Country are the only survivors.
SILENT WEAPONSCode Name:QUICK KICKFile Name: Ito, MacArthur S.Grade: E-4Birthplace: Los Angeles, CAPrimary Specialty: InfantrySecondary Specialty: IntelligenceQuick Kick's Japanese father and Korean mother owned a grocery store in Watts. He found difficulty being accepted by either the Japanese or Korean community because of his mixed heritage. Quick Kick also has a passion for basketball, but was always turned down because of his height. Therefore, he turned to martial arts, and has earned black belts in Tae Kwon Do, Goju Ryu, Southern Praying Mantis Kung-Fu, Tai-Chi Sword, Zen Sword and Wing-Chun fighting arts. He later worked in Hollywood as a stuntman, where the U.S. Army noticed his skills and recruited him for the G.I. Joe Team. Quick Kick is also a qualified expert with all NATO and Warsaw Pact small arms.
Original retail price: $2.99


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The School (Beginners Calligraphy)
There is no greater teacher than Maybelle Imasa-Stukuls to hold your hand through the gentle art of learning modern calligraphy. She is Martha Stewart's favourite pen (read all about her here, here and here) and considered a handwriting style expert with her modern, loose and unequivocably beautiful take on this traditional art form. But what is the most wonderful discovery about Maybelle is that she is not just a top-end talent, she is gracious as well as gifted. Under her expert tuition you will learn to write again and discover the divinity of hand printed cards, letters and notes.
The 2 1/2 hours workshop is designed for beginners, and in the world of texts and tweets it's a lost art that you will be so relived you took the time to revive. The basics of contemporary calligraphy from A to Z are covered using Maybelle's favourite pointed pen and nib dipped into ink. The class covers letter form anatomy, writing techniques and practical applications including stationery, envelope and design. Included is your take home calligraphy starter kit – with everything you need to continue your work at home. It includes Maybelle's favourite wooden barrelled point pen nib, black ink, practice booklet (it's so beautiful, your first reaction will be to resist writing in it at all!), a divine letterpress alphabet made by hand, your lined guide and practice papers.
Refreshments and snacks included.


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2019 MS4 Conference
Early Bird Pricing Ends Today
The sixth annual Municipal Wet Weather Stormwater Conference hosted by the EPA Region 4, the International Erosion Control Association and the IECA Southeast Chapter will be May 20 – 22, 2019 in Greenville, SC. Early bird pricing ends today – Monday, April 22nd!
The 2019 MS4 conference is packed full of education you need to get the job done. Our opening keynote Brie Arthur, a leader in the national Foodscape movement, will give us a thoughtful look at management of landscapes as concerns of stormwater pollution increase. Get inspired to see the potential landscape offers by transforming them into purposeful spaces. Then join the technical presentations of your choice with a Stormwater Management, MS4 Management and Erosion/Sediment Control track you will find the experts and topics you are seeking. On Wednesday morning we will hear from the EPA regarding two recent laws that will further the EPA GI/LID mission. Our closing keynote, Keith Bowers, will look at the critical importance of coastal resiliency and habitat restoration through living shorelines.
This is a conference you don't want to miss! Reserve your space at the early bird pricing today: www.ieca.org/ms4event. See you in Greenville!
Any questions please contact IECA Education Director, Joanna Fetherolf: firstname.lastname@example.com


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How to Ditch the Paper & Spreadsheets: Cloud-Based Employee Performance Management for Dynamics GP (Recorded Webcast)
Is your organization struggling to manage employee performance and development using paper and spreadsheets?
Watch this informative recorded webinar where we show you how GP users can automate and streamline vital performance management processes with emPerform and align, develop, reward & retain a world-class workforce.
We review:
- Online appraisals & self-assessment samples & best-practices
- Year-round goal management
- Ongoing feedback & journaling
- Integrated 360° reviews & peer feedback
- Pay for performance planning
- Reporting & analytics
- Talent identification
To learn more about CRG emPerform, visit www.employee-performance.com or contact 1.877.711.0367


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1. Redesign of eXtension.org
2. Professional Development highlights
3. Digital Information Broker sessions in October
4. Delaware Launches AaE
5. Ask an Expert news/Question Wrangler updates
6. Galaxy IV plans
7. 4-H involvement in eXtension
8. Other
Join us the first Tuesday of each month for a meetup of eXtension Institutional Teams!
See the community listing in People at http://www.extension.org/people/communities/80.
Kevin Gamble, Beth Raney, Terry Meisenbach, Jerry Thomas, Janet Sylvia
Created by Terry Meisenbach