text:
Jekyll2020-07-23T11:06:27+02:00http://www.bjoern-bremer.com/feed.xmlBjörn BremerMy personal homepageBjörn email@example.com Solidarity2020-05-07T00:00:00+02:002020-05-07T00:00:00+02:00http://www.bjoern-bremer.com/posts/2020/04/euideas-corona-solidarity
This post was co-authored with Philipp Genschel and first published by the EUIdeas blog of the European University Institute.

What do Matteo Salvini, Emmanuel Macron, and Angela Merkel have in common? They all call for European solidarity to fight the corona-crisis. Figure 1 shows why: when a pandemic strikes, solidarity is popular with voters.

Figure 1: Support for EU solidarity across different types of crisis

Note: The figure shows the share of different response options to the EUI/YouGov survey question: "Now, imagine another country in the European Union is suffering [CRISIS]. Do you think [COUNTRY] should or should not provide any major help?"

In April 2020, at the height of the European corona-crisis, YouGov conducted a representative survey on public attitudes towards European solidarity on behalf of the EUI. The sample included roughly 22,000 respondents in 13 EU member states and the UK. A key question was whether respondents support or oppose financial assistance to other member states. As Figure 1 shows, the answers vary greatly with the policy issue at stake. While 75 per cent of all respondents support financial help to member states suffering from natural disaster, and 69 per cent support help for pandemic-stricken countries, only 35 per cent support financial assistance to overindebted governments.

Some forms of help come easily

The popularity of pandemic-solidarity is unsurprising. Pandemics, like natural disasters, have exogenous causes. States do not usually bring infectious diseases upon themselves by design. Moral hazard is not an issue. All states are at risk of contagion. Being hit is collective bad luck, making victims easy to empathize with.

If this was all, European solidarity should have emerged quickly and easily during the corona-crisis. Indeed, after some initial glitches, the member states have embarked on various collaborative projects to manage the health emergency: joint procurement and stockpiling of medical equipment, joint repatriation flights of stranded EU citizens, patient transfers from corona-hotspots in France, Italy, and Spain to member states with spare capacity such as Austria, Germany, and Luxembourg.

All this was useful but mostly a sideshow because the real solidarity issue is not health, but fiscal relief.

An economic disaster

The corona-crisis is a major economic disaster. While countries like Germany and the Netherlands can easily borrow large sums of money to respond to the shock, the borrowing capacity of Italy or Spain is constrained by high levels of prior debt.

The key question is whether the EU should prop up their fiscal firepower, and how? Through loans or grants? Through the ESM, Coronabonds or the budget? Through "real budgetary transfers" or "fake money", as Emmanuel Macron put it? Clear-cut answers are made difficult by the peculiar fusion of debt and disease that the corona-crisis brought about. Figure 2 helps to understand why.

Figure 2: Average net support for pandemic-solidarity and debt-solidarity by country

Note: 'Average net support' refers to the average of supporters (coded as 1) and opponents (coded as -1) in a given country. For the underlying survey question see figure 1.

As the figure shows, average net support for pandemic-solidarity is high and positive in all member states. Support for debt-solidarity is much lower across all states, and clearly negative in net-contributing states such as Finland, Germany, or the Netherlands.

Little empathy for debt, but not heartlessness

Debt-solidarity is unpopular for all the reasons pandemic-solidarity is popular. High levels of debt are commonly associated with endogenous causes, with negligence, policy mistakes, or structural or institutional deficiencies rather than exogenous shocks and bad luck. Moral hazard is an issue. Insolvency risks are distributed unevenly across states. Net-contributors fear being left stranded with costly and one-sided obligations to subsidize laziness and lack of competitiveness. Empathy is low.

The low, and often negative, support for debt-solidarity accounts for the intensity of intergovernmental conflict over the sharing of the fiscal corona-burden. Yet, the high support for pandemic-solidarity anchors the aspirational benchmark for agreement. Against this benchmark, opposition to fiscal sharing appears petty and mean. When Dutch finance minister Wopke Hoekstra invoked the well-worn trope of moral hazard to justify his resistance to Coronabonds, not only Southern governments reacted with outrage, but also parts of the Dutch public.

The benchmarking effect puts the frugal North on the defensive. This facilitated concessions that would have been unthinkable during the Eurocrisis such as the suspension of the Stability- and Growth Pact or the creation of new loan programs with soft conditionality by the Commission and the ESM.

Whether there is more to come will ultimately depend on two things: how Northern countries manage the cognitive dissonance between pandemic-solidarity and fiscal rectitude; and what Southern countries will ultimately accept as a minimal show of fiscal solidarity.

We focus on two key countries to explore these issues, Germany and Italy. As figure 3 shows, all German parties are conflicted between a desire to help other member states with the pandemic and an aversion to debt mutualization. Variation is limited. Green voters are the only group that supports debt solidarity by a relative majority. All others oppose it by relative or absolute majorities. The likely result is immobilism, uneasy denial, and foot dragging.

Figure 3: Support for pandemic-solidarity and debt-solidary in Germany by party

Note: For the underlying survey question see figure 1.

What next?

Three factors could change the German picture. First, a quick exit from the lockdown and a fading of the health emergency from public memory could reduce the salience of pandemic-solidarity. This would relax cognitive dissonance and facilitate a hardening of Germany's fiscal stance. A second wave of infections and new lockdowns would have the reverse effect: increased salience of the pandemic perspective and a decreased weight of fiscal considerations.

Second, the judgement of the German Constitutional Court on the ECB's bond buying programs of 5 May 2020 could push the German government towards more fiscal concessions. It constrains the ECB's ability to provide fiscal solidarity through the monetary backdoor, thus making it harder for Germany to dodge demands for political decisions on risk and burden sharing. Free-riding on the ECB as solidarity provider of last resort becomes more difficult. A first assessment of the judgement can be found here.

Finally, the German government could override domestic fiscal aversions to protect the coherence and viability of the EU. Whether such a leap is required, depends in large part on Italy. Italy has been particularly hard hit by the coronavirus. Disappointment about Europe's perceived lack of solidarity was widespread. Support for EU membership dropped significantly. While in April 2019, 54 per cent of Italian respondents to the EUI/YouGov survey still said they would vote to remain in the EU in a hypothetical referendum (25 per cent leave), the remain-vote had decreased to 39 per cent (41 per cent leave) by April 2020. The picture is even more bleak, if we look at voting intentions across Italy's main parties.

!Figure 4

Figure 4: Vote choice in a hypothetical referendum on EU membership in Italy by party

Note: The figure shows the share of different response options to the EUI/YouGov survey question: "If there was a referendum on membership of the European Union, how would you vote?"

As figure 4 shows, the PD is the only large party with consistent support for EU membership. Voters of all other parties favor leaving the EU by large margins. Opposition is highest among Lega-voters, currently the largest Italian party. If Germany wants to firmly re-anchor Italy in the EU, the current M5S-PD coalition is the government to do business with. Presumably, however, this will take more than warm words and fiscal symbolism.

Governments should act while the feeling is high

It is time for Germany and its frugal peers – Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands – to leave their comfort zone. Their economies depend heavily on the Single Market and the Euro. Large majorities of their voters want to keep the EU. If this requires sacrifice, they should better tell them now. Don't waste the crisis!

Björn email@example.com post was co-authored with Philipp Genschel and first published by the EUIdeas blog of the European University Institute.Geduldig am Abgrund2020-04-24T00:00:00+02:002020-04-24T00:00:00+02:00http://www.bjoern-bremer.com/posts/2020/04/delors
This post is in German. It was authored with Nils Redeker and first published by the Jacques Delors Centre in Berlin.

Die EU-Mitgliedstaaten zögern weiter, eine wirklich europäische Antwort auf die Krise zu geben. Damit verspielen sie die derzeit breite öffentliche Zustimmung für europäischer Solidarität.

Der gestrige Gipfel der europäischen Staats- und Regierungschefs endete weitestgehend ergebnislos. Zwar wurde noch einmal bestätigt, dass es zur Wiederbelebung der Wirtschaft in den Mitgliedsstaaten prinzipiell auch europäische Gelder geben soll. Wie viel Mittel dazu bereitgestellt werden, wer von ihnen profitieren wird und vor allem wie die neuen Ausgaben finanziert werden sollen, darüber war man sich aber weiter uneins. Die Frage, ob die EU-Mitgliedsstaaten die finanziellen Lasten der Corona-Krise und ihrer wirtschaftlichen Folgen zumindest teilweise gemeinsam schultern, wurde damit erst einmal vertagt.

Aus der Perspektive einiger weniger betroffener Mitgliedstaaten wie Deutschland mag dies nicht weiter tragisch scheinen. Schließlich wurde die unmittelbare Gefahr eines Auseinanderbrechens der Eurozone und des Binnenmarkts in den letzten Wochen durch massive Anleihekäufe der EZB vorerst erfolgreich gebannt. Warum sich jetzt also nicht erst einmal vortasten, auf Sicht fahren und Konflikte vermeiden? So plausibel diese Haltung klingt, sie hat einen wichtigen Haken: Langfristig wird die Geldpolitik der EZB alleine nicht reichen. Doch je länger man mit der Entscheidung über eine echte finanziellen Lastenteilung wartet, desto schwieriger wird es werden, sie gerade hierzulande innenpolitisch zu vermitteln.

Dabei sind die politischen Voraussetzungen für ein gemeinsames Schultern der Krisenlast in Deutschland im Moment vielversprechend. Laut Politbarometer sprachen sich Anfang April fast 70 Prozent aller Deutschen dafür aus, dass die EU besonders betroffene Länder in Zeiten von Corona finanziell unterstützen sollte. Noch wichtiger: Momentan bleiben die Deutschen selbst dann solidarisch, wenn aus abstrakter Hilfe konkrete politische Instrumente werden. So zeigt eine neue Umfrage des Max-Planck-Instituts für Gesellschaftsforschung (MPIfG), dass derzeit nur noch ein gutes Drittel gegen die Einführung von gemeinsamen europäischen Anleihen beispielsweise in der Form von Eurobonds wären, sofern sich damit ein Auseinanderbrechen der Eurozone verhindern ließe. In Zeiten von Corona sind entsprechende Instrumente nun selbst unter den traditionell transferskeptischen Anhänger:innen der Unionparteien mehrheitsfähig.

Zur Zeit haben deutschen Entscheidungsträger:innen also weitaus größere politische Handlungsspielräume als man es vermuten könnte. Ausruhen sollten sie sich darauf allerdings nicht. Nach allem, was wir aus der Eurokrise wissen, ist dieser Spielraum nämlich zeitlich äußerst eng begrenzt. Auch in der letzten Krise setzte die EU darauf, Stück für Stück immer nur die Schritte zu gehen, die gerade notwendig waren, um das Schlimmste zu verhindern. Aus einem überschaubaren griechischen Problem wurde dadurch eine europaweite systemische Krise. Bei Wählerinnen und Wählern kam das nicht gut an. Allein zwischen September und Dezember 2010 sank der Anteil derjenigen, die europäische Rettungspakete unterstützen, von fast 50 Prozent auf weniger als ein Drittel. Und während Eurobonds 2012 lediglich von 30 Prozent der deutschen Bevölkerung kritisch gesehen wurden, lehnten sie 2015 mehr als zwei Drittel ab. Vieles spricht dafür, dass eine Salamitaktik in der jetzigen Krise ähnliche Folgen haben könnte.

Das liegt auch daran, dass sich die aktuelle Offenheit für finanzielle Transfers vor allem in der unmittelbaren Erfahrung begründet, wie zufällig das Virus in Europa zugeschlagen hat. Schon in der Eurokrise ging es Kritiker:innen der Rettungspakete nicht hauptsächlich um materielle Besitzstandswahrung. Entscheidender für die Ablehnung war – das zeigen viele empirischen Studien der letzten Jahre – der Eindruck, die Griech:innen, Italiener:innen und Spanier:innen trügen selbst Schuld an der eigenen ökonomischen Misere. Das machte Transferzahlungen in den Augen vieler ungerecht. In der heutigen Pandemie, deren wirtschaftlichen Folgen sich kein Mitgliedsstaat entziehen kann, ist das bisher anders. Je weiter wir uns aber von den Ursachen der aktuellen Probleme entfernen werden, desto wahrscheinlicher wird es, dass sich die öffentliche Debatte auch in dieser Krise wieder auf Fragen von Schuld und Schuldenstände einschießt. Notwendige finanzielle Hilfeleistungen werden dann nur noch schwer zu vermitteln sein.

Schließlich sollte man sich nicht nur mit Blick auf die innenpolitischen Dynamiken in Nordeuropa beeilen. Viel entscheidender für das mittelfristige Überleben des europäischen Projekts scheint die große Wut, die sich in stark betroffenen Ländern wie beispielsweise in Italien derzeit auf Europa zusammenbraut. Auch das machen die neuen Daten des MPIfG deutlich. Obwohl euroskeptische Haltungen in Italien seit langem ansteigen, glaubten die meisten Bürger:innen bisher, dass die Vorteile einer EU-Mitgliedschaft für sie überwiegen. In der Krise ändert sich das nun rapide. Schon Anfang April gab es eine knappe Mehrheit für den Austritt aus der Eurozone und seither ist die Ablehnung weiter gewachsen. Natürlich mischen sich hierbei berechtigter Unmut mit wirtschaftlicher Verzweiflung und den Auswirkungen populistischer Demagogie. Je länger die EU aber den Eindruck vermittelt, dass sie Italien in dieser historischen Krise nicht beisteht, desto weniger kann sie dieser Ablehnung entgegensetzen.

Wer jetzt aus Rücksicht auf vermeintliche Vorbehalte gegen europäische Transfers in Deutschland auf Zeit spielt, verkennt die politische Stimmung hierzulande. Er riskiert zudem, dass sich krisengebeutelte Staaten endgültig von Europa abwenden. Die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Konsequenzen wären dramatisch.

Björn firstname.lastname@example.com post is in German. It was authored with Nils Redeker and first published by the Jacques Delors Centre in Berlin.Everyone Thinks That Germans Oppose 'Coronabonds.' Our Research Shows How They're Wrong2020-04-20T00:00:00+02:002020-04-20T00:00:00+02:00http://www.bjoern-bremer.com/posts/2020/02/monkeycage-eurobonds
This article was co-authored with Lucio Baccaro and Erik Neimanns. It was first published by the Washington Post's MonkeyCage.

The covid-19 pandemic is plausibly the biggest challenge to Europe's economies since the Great Depression. The coronavirus is hurting all European countries at the same time — but with differing economic fallout. Countries such as Germany and the Netherlands can easily borrow money to respond to the crash.

But countries like Italy and Spain fear that their bond yields — the price they pay to borrow money — will spike if they increase their public debt.

Are common European bonds a possible solution? Some countries and economists have called for this response. Such suggestions have always failed in the past, because of perceived public opposition in northern countries like Germany and the Netherlands.

Our new research suggests that public opinion in Germany is more complicated than most people think.

Calls for 'coronabonds' have led to political stalemate

The crucial question is whether the European Union — and in particular the euro zone, the group of 19 E.U. member states that share a common currency, the euro — can help protect its weaker members when they need to raise money to tackle an urgent crisis but can't go to the markets.

In theory, Italy and Spain can take advantage of a special arrangement called the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). It would provide them with loans, in principle conditional on budget cuts and structural reforms, with the possibility of further support from the European Central Bank. In practice, the example of the Greek austerity program means that governments are wary of submitting themselves to the ESM.

These objections explain why nine euro-zone countries and many economists have argued for the mutualization of European debt through commonly issued bonds, which were once known as "eurobonds" but are now called "coronabonds." In the past, northern E.U. members fiercely opposed eurobonds. German politicians, for instance, argued that they can't support eurobonds because their voters are strongly opposed to them.

This results in an impasse. On the one hand, German and Dutch politicians don't want to issue common debt for fear of voter anger. On the other, Italian voters are increasingly alienated from the euro and their northern neighbors. In one recent Italian poll, 45 percent of respondents considered Germany an "enemy."

German politicians may not be considering the whole picture

Are German politicians right to worry that voters will punish them if they agree to the E.U. issuing coronabonds? To answer this question, we fielded a representative online survey experiment in Germany with 4,500 respondents in early April. The survey was funded by the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne.

We gave each individual a scenario in which Italy is hit by a financial crisis and is considering exiting the euro. We randomly assigned respondents to receive different combinations of three pieces of additional information that might change how they interpreted events. Some individuals were informed that Italy's deficit had increased because of the coronavirus, a health emergency beyond its control.

Others were told that Italy's exit from the euro might cause the currency's collapse, endangering the competitiveness of Germany's exports. Others were informed of the costs to Germany of agreeing to share Italy's future debt.

Finally, some individuals received no further information beyond the initial scenario — this was our control group. Thus, each survey respondent was exposed to one of eight combinations of information.

We then asked respondents how the German government should respond if Italy refuses to push through austerity measures in exchange for financial rescue programs. Respondents could choose to prevent Italy's exit from the euro or facilitate it.

Germans want Italy in the euro zone

The results suggest that German voters want to stop Italy from leaving the euro zone. Among those who didn't receive any further information, a relative majority wanted to stop "Italexit." An absolute majority of those who had received information about the costs of Italy's exit to the German economy wanted to prevent it. When this information was combined with information highlighting the effect of the coronavirus, nearly 60 percent of Germans want Italy to remain in the euro.

Some respondents who learned about the costs for Germany of sharing debt with Italy were less likely to want to stop Italy from leaving the euro, but the effect was smaller than that of the other two kinds of information. And when the respondents received all the information simultaneously, more than 50 percent of respondents wanted Italy to remain in the euro zone, while 30 favored Italexit. The figure below shows these results, on the left panel.

Figure 1: How likely are Germans to favor Italy's euro-zone membership?

This figure shows the support of German voters for Italy's euro-zone membership according to our April 2020 survey of 4,500 respondents. Fifty-one percent favor Italy remaining in the euro zone, while 30 percent are opposed when they receive all information (left panel). When forced to choose between Italexit and debt mutualization, only 35 percent would choose Italexit, while 48 would chose shared debts (right panel).

Source: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Italexit survey April 2020.

Are Germans willing to share debt within the euro zone? We also asked respondents whether they preferred a scenario in which Germany and other European governments don't agree to share debts, and Italy exits the euro — or one in which Germany and other European governments agree to share debts, and Italy remains in the euro zone.

Both scenarios are costly to Germany, leading to divided public opinion, according to our data. For the group that didn't get additional information, this second question showed 41 percent preferred that Italy left the euro, while 38 percent were willing to share the risks of supporting Italy's economic recovery. More than 20 percent were uncertain.

Providing respondents with further information had less effect in this case, suggesting that people's preferences were more rigid in the face of this trade-off. However, mentioning the costs of Italexit affected people's opinions more than mentioning the costs of introducing eurobonds. When respondents were given all three pieces of information, almost 50 percent of them were in favor of eurobonds, while 35 percent were opposed, as shown in the results in the right panel.

This suggests that Germans are open to mutualization, or shared debts — as long as there is a real risk of Italy leaving the euro zone. Another survey that we did at the same time suggests that Italian voters, for their part, are indeed seriously considering exiting the euro if there is no debt mutualization.

In the face of this threat, preferences in Germany are malleable and uncertainty among voters is relatively high. This suggest that politicians have some room to shape people's understanding of the facts. All in all, public opinion imposes fewer constraints on German politicians than the consensus would suggest.

Björn firstname.lastname@example.com article was co-authored with Lucio Baccaro and Erik Neimanns. It was first published by the Washington Post's MonkeyCage.Now is The Time to Revive The Fiscal Contract2020-04-05T00:00:00+02:002020-04-05T00:00:00+02:00http://www.bjoern-bremer.com/posts/2020/04/radix-taxation
This article was co-authored with Leon Wansleben and first published by Radix.

The covid-19 pandemic provides a stress test for our relations with the state. As many have to make sacrifices and feel adverse consequences, do we feel left alone and treated unfairly; or do we feel supported and see our sacrifices as vital contributions to a shared public good?

This stress test can reveal and deepen frictions in our political relations. But it may also provide an opportunity to renew the political contract of our democracy and strengthen a sense of ownership and responsibility that we as citizens have towards the state, and vice-versa.

Governments have been quick to realise the enormous threat to economic wellbeing and growth posed by the measures adopted to fight and mitigate the pandemic. The situation requires novel solutions since we are not dealing with a classic economic crisis as we know it from the economic textbook.

The challenge is to provide something like a hazard insurance for the liquidity and solvency problems that thousands of enterprises face under the current circumstances – and for the workers who depend on incomes from these firms. This requires large amounts of direct support, in the form of cash transfers, emergency loans, capital injections, and wage-subsidies, which many governments are ready to provide.

Once the pandemic is under control, the challenges will not stop. Governments will need to boost the economy in order to avoid a persistent depression. With central banks already reaching their limits with unconventional monetary policies, the pressure will be on fiscal policies to deliver.

The Covid-19 pandemic thus spells the end of the austerity settlement in Europe. Economies will require gigantic stimulus packages to get back on track. To finance this, governments need to run deficits on a scale not seen since the Second World War, which will increase government debt dramatically.

In the short-run, this accumulation of debt is not only necessary but useful. Investors are desperate for safe assets, and governments are able to borrow practically for nothing. Under these circumstances, even the sustainability of public debt for countries such Italy or Greece is no immediate concern.

Yet, eventually, the sheer size of the fiscal effort needed raises the question how to pay for it. Public debts do not deflate on their own in the absence of deliberate government action.

Here the experience of the global financial crisis is an important lesson. After the banks were bailed out, governments resorted to austerity to bring debt under control. This is what Mark Blyth called the "greatest bait-and-switch in modern history": while the bankers were bailed out, the people got austerity.

To avoid this mistake, it is necessary to have a debate about who will pay tomorrow for the herculean effort required to save our economies today.

In broad terms, we can imagine three options here: First, governments could resort to inflation, reducing debt in the same way that Britain managed the costs of fighting Germany during World War II. But given the difficulty of fine-tuning such process, and given current institutional realities (with central banks legally mandated to avoid inflation – at least for now), this option does not seem to be on the table right now.

We see more promise in monetary financing – central banks' purchase and permanent holding of government debt. Such financing is happening anyway, despite institutional rules in the Eurozone and most other countries to ban such debt "monetisation".

But this also indicates a key problem, namely central bank discretion over how to conduct financing and how to distribute losses and gains. To some degree, elected governments need to re-assume responsibility for such decisions in order to increase the legitimacy of their crisis interventions.

And this is precisely the point where we see the need to re-activate the fiscal contract between citizens and the state, which suggests a third option to pay for the emergency measures.

Not just in its scale, but also in its nature, the Covid-19 pandemic is like a war. We cannot blame any particular group in society for the causes or consequences of the pandemic. The notion of individual responsibility, which has dominated much of policy-making during the past decades, is currently misplaced. The pandemic has made us all realise the extent to which we depend on solidarity behaviour and individual sacrifices for the common good.

With states reaching into new depths to maintain stability and prosperity by effectively acting as 'insurer of last resort', we should share responsibility for paying the 'premiums' for this social insurance. Translated to the domain of taxation, this means that we might have an opportunity now to revive notions of tax justice and reciprocity that were first developed and tested during and in the aftermaths of the two world wars.

As David Stasavage and Kenneth Scheve show, during this period, effective redistribution was possible because citizens were aware of the enormous sacrifices that some groups – particularly soldiers – made for the collective good. Neoliberal arguments against redistributive taxation – that such taxation violates property rights, that it distorts incentives to work more, or that highly concentrated wealth will eventually trickle down to the poor – would have seemed entirely out of place then.

Avoiding paying one's share (whether as individuals or corporations) by using offshore tax havens while profiting from a collective effort to secure lives and general welfare would also have seemed an entirely illegitimate thing to do in times of social solidarity. Instead, 'the wealthy' were supposed to sacrifice part of their wealth for the general good, just as the soldiers had risked their lives ("conscription of wealth").

Today, in the fight against the pandemic, doctors and nurses are the soldiers of our time. Higher wealth, top income taxes, and corporation taxes in the future, would show that they are not alone in the fight against the pandemic.

And there is reason to believe that this would also help the recovery after the crisis is over. Current economic inequality is so high that it dampens demand and reduces growth. Redistributive taxation would offer a democratically accountable, sustainable, and economically rational way to finance, at a later date, the current emergency measures.

Therefore, governments can and should re-engage with questions of tax justice and reciprocity for political and economic reasons now. We cannot rely on opaque mechanisms of monetary financing alone; neither can we revert to the disastrous austerity policies of the past. We need a more equal distribution of incomes and wealth to come out of this crisis effectively.

The crisis might allow us to regain a sense of solidarity that gives states political legitimacy for achieving effective tax policy. If not now, then when?

Björn firstname.lastname@example.com article was co-authored with Leon Wansleben and first published by Radix.The Coronavirus Is Reducing Merkel's EU Legacy to Ashes2020-03-17T00:00:00+01:002020-03-17T00:00:00+01:00http://www.bjoern-bremer.com/posts/2020/03/foreignpolicy-merkel
This article was co-authored with Matthias Matthijs and first published by Foreign Policy.

The German government surprised most international observers on Friday by announcing its own version of a "bazooka" to protect the German economy from the economic and financial consequences of the coronavirus. German Finance Minister Olaf Scholz pledged unlimited credit for businesses affected by the pandemic alongside an expansion of its short-time work scheme, which gives support for companies that are forced to reduce working hours of their employees. After years of adhering to financial orthodoxy and obsessing about moral hazard, the German government ostensibly revealed itself as willing to act boldly in response to a crisis.

This might prove an effective Band-Aid to stop the bleeding in Germany. But the sheer scale and speed of the coronavirus outbreak will likely require a Europe-wide fiscal response if the continent hopes to avoid to prevent another eurozone financial crisis that could be the death knell for the 19-country currency union. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has given little indication whether she is willing to lead such an effort—and her record is highly discouraging.

The EU response to the coronavirus crisis has been lackluster, characterized mainly by a complete and utter lack of European coordination or solidarity. The European Commission unveiled a 37-billion-euro ($41 billion) Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative last week that allows members to increase public health care spending to combat the virus. Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission's president, also recently announced a Schengen travel ban, an export authorization scheme to prevent vital medical equipment from leaving the EU single market, and help in securing ventilators and testing kits. But it is hard to disagree with the 88 percent of Italians who, in a recent poll, agreed with the statement that the "EU was not helping [them]."

And yet the EU's reticence is consistent with Merkel's preferred vision for Europe. Unless she quickly realizes the error of her earlier ways, one of the victims of the coronavirus may turn out to be her own carefully cultivated EU legacy.

For more than 10 years, four German governments led by Merkel have preached the virtues of austerity in the eurozone. She passed a constitutional debt brake in Germany in 2009, insisted on fiscal consolidation elsewhere, and proudly celebrated budget surpluses since 2014. Even Scholz, a member of the Social Democratic Party, has been reluctant to abandon the so-called schwarze Null (the "black zero" of a balanced budget) in the past few years, despite rising domestic and international pressure to loosen Germany's purse strings. Rather, Germany's vision for the EU was to encourage structural reforms and fiscal consolidation aimed at enhancing the bloc's international competitiveness. Limited and conditional solidarity was given to countries in need in order to prevent a collapse of the financial system, while expansionary monetary policy, rather than loose fiscal policy, was used to preserve the eurozone's integrity.

The coronavirus crisis exposes this house of cards for what it is and provides a glimmer of how Merkel's earlier vision for the EU can unravel and fail. The eurozone recorded a slow recovery from its previous debt crisis, and economic discontent remains extremely widespread in many countries after more than a decade of stagnation. The debt crisis and the EU response to it provided a hotbed for a surge in Euroskeptic populism across the continent, which already put the survival of the eurozone at risk prior to the outbreak of the pandemic. The economic crisis induced by COVID-19 thus comes at a critical moment for the EU, and the Merkel government clearly recognizes the severity of it. In effect it is both a supply and a demand shock to the economy. As large parts of Europe are quarantined or voluntarily going into self-isolation, economic activity will largely grind to a halt. With international supply chains interrupted by border closures and necessary inputs no longer available, both foreign and domestic demand will rapidly fall at the same time. No wonder stock markets are in free fall.

The German crisis response this time, as compared with the previous financial crisis, will need to be informed by the fact that monetary policy alone will not be enough. With interest rates at or below zero and unconventional monetary policies already stretched to the limit, central banks' room for maneuver is severely restricted. Christine Lagarde, the new European Central Bank (ECB) president, called for fiscal action in response to the crisis last week—although she also seemed to imply that widening spreads between Italian and German bond yields was not the ECB's problem, which added to crisis-stricken Italy's financial stress. Lagarde's performance is consistent with expectations that, as a lawyer and politician, she would take a more strict and legalistic approach to the ECB's governing mandate than her predecessor Mario Draghi, an economist and former banker who instinctively knew how to talk to financial markets.

This is all the more reason for the German government to take a leading role in crafting a coordinating European response to the crisis. After years of austerity measures encouraged by Merkel's governments, state capacity across the EU has been weakened, automatic stabilizers undermined, and domestic demand dampened. Aggressive fiscal stimulus packages will be necessary to combat the economic crisis, but many countries in the eurozone—not least Italy—are still burdened with large piles of government debt.

To overcome this problem, Germany will have to finally shift its position on eurozone governance and EU integration. It will need to abandon previously drawn red lines and show more solidarity with its European partners than it has in the past decade. Scholz has already stated that EU states with higher debt levels should have the flexibility to pass fiscal measures. On Monday, the Eurogroup pledged "to do whatever it takes to effectively address the current challenges." Collectively, EU finance ministers promised a fiscal boost of 1 percent of gross domestic product. Yet budgetary resources are asymmetrically distributed across the eurozone, and supranational resources are small. The European Stability Mechanism can be used to help countries in need, but the conditions under which that help is supplied should be loosened. Currently, member states have to agree to a program of structural reforms and fiscal consolidation before funds can be disbursed in order to avoid moral hazard.

But moral hazard is not an issue in case of an EU-wide external shock as this one. Rather, the current crisis provides a golden opportunity to finally complete the eurozone's unfinished business, including the creation of a European deposit insurance scheme, Eurobonds or common debt instruments, and an EU budget that is big enough to deal with EU-wide external shocks. Merkel has always argued that German voters would be against such steps, but the new risks that accompany the current shock will demonstrate the necessity of completing the eurozone's architecture. She should use her vast reserve of built-up political capital to explain as much to the German public. Rather than expediently accommodate her electorate's preferences against what they see as a fiscal transfer union, Merkel should finally attempt to change German preferences in the direction of stability through solidarity.

Germany should also immediately lead the way in the European Union by pushing for even more expansive stimulus at home. Germany's healthy fiscal position should make it easier to justify bold measures. In 2019, the finance ministry collected a record surplus of 13.5 billion euros ($15 billion). While Berlin had again planned to balance its books in 2020, Scholz last Friday explicitly acknowledged that it may be necessary to pass an emergency budget for 2020 and go into the red. As a Social Democrat, Scholz never fetishized the schwarze Null the way his German conservative colleagues did after it was instituted by then Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble in 2014. Rather, Scholz believed that the balanced budget policy was popular among voters and feared an electoral backlash if his party should abandon it without a compelling reason for doing so. Scholz should not let this coronavirus crisis go to waste. He finally has as good a reason as any to get rid of the schwarze Null, one that can shield him against criticisms from conservative media outlets and the Christian Democratic Union, his coalition partner.

Thus far, Merkel herself has been largely absent in the crisis, with the exception of one press conference last week in which she warned her fellow Germans that up to 70 percent of the population was at risk of contracting the illness. But in general, she has let her health minister, Jens Spahn, coordinate the government's response. Merkel is in the twilight of her career and has nothing left to lose. Having promised to step down at the end of this term, most likely in the summer of 2021, she no longer has to worry about reelection. Her legacy may well depend on whether she is able to take on Europe's leadership mantle once more. She is uniquely positioned to do so.

Ten years ago, in the midst of the eurozone crisis, Merkel famously claimed that "the rules must not be oriented towards the weak, but toward the strong." She admitted at the time that it was a tough message, but said it was one of economic necessity. It is time to turn that logic on its head. In times of a global pandemic such as this one, the rules need to be flexible enough not just to allow for the survival of the weak, but also to spur a quick economic recovery once the worst is over and prevent the collapse of the eurozone. The next few days and weeks will prove crucial. They will show whether Merkel is up to the task—and whether she is prepared to admit that her EU crisis management of the previous 10 years has always been fatally flawed.

Björn email@example.com article was co-authored with Matthias Matthijs and first published by Foreign Policy.Juncker's Curse? Identity, Interest, and Public Support for the Integration of Core State Powers2020-02-19T00:00:00+01:002020-02-19T00:00:00+01:00http://www.bjoern-bremer.com/posts/2020/02/junckers-curse
My article "Juncker's Curse? Identity, Interest, and Public Support for the Integration of Core State Powers" co-authored with Philipp Genschel and Markus Jachtenfuchs was just published by the Journal of Common Market Studies. The article is open access and available here.

Abstract:

In this study we analysed the patterns and covariates of public support for the European integration of core state powers based on an original new survey. We found considerable variation across in- tegration instruments, member states and policy issues. Horizontal transfers are supported more than vertical capacity building; member states from the EU's South-East are more supportive than states from the North-West; and support increases from debt relief to unemployment assistance, sharing the burdens of refugees, and military defence to disaster aid. Identity is a strong and fairly consistent predictor for individual variations in support. The association with respondents' interest is less consistent, but can be quite strong with respect to specific policy issues such as debt and unemployment. Overall, support for the integration of core state powers is higher and more vari- able than expected. This suggests there is considerable room for political agency rather than a gen- eral constraining dissensus.

Björn firstname.lastname@example.com article "Juncker's Curse? Identity, Interest, and Public Support for the Integration of Core State Powers" co-authored with Philipp Genschel and Markus Jachtenfuchs was just published by the Journal of Common Market Studies. The article is open access and available here.Dynamics of protest and elections in the Great Recession2020-02-12T00:00:00+01:002020-02-12T00:00:00+01:00http://www.bjoern-bremer.com/posts/2020/01/dynamics-of-protest-and-elections
My article "Dynamics of protest and elections in the Great Recession" co-authored with Swen Hutter and Hanspeter Kriesi was just published by the European Journal of Political Research. The article is open access and available here.

Abstract:

This paper links the consequences of the Great Recession on protest and electoral politics. It innovates by combining the literature on economic voting with social movement research and by presenting the first integrated, large-scale empirical analysis of protest mobilisation and electoral outcomes in Europe. The economic voting literature offers important insights on how and under what conditions economic crises play out in the short-run. However, it tends to ignore the closely connected dynamics of opposition in the two arenas and the role of protests in politicising economic grievances. More specifically, it is argued that economic protests act as a 'signalling mechanism' by attributing blame to decision-makers and by highlighting the political dimension of deteriorating economic conditions. Ultimately, massive protest mobilisation should, thus, amplify the impact of economic hardship on the electoral losses of incumbents and mainstream parties more generally. The empirical analysis to study this relationship relies on an original semi-automated protest event dataset combined with an updated dataset of electoral outcomes in 30 European countries from 2000 to 2015. The results indicate that the dynamics of economic protests and electoral punishment are closely related and point to a destabilisation of European party systems during the Great Recession.

Björn firstname.lastname@example.com article "Dynamics of protest and elections in the Great Recession" co-authored with Swen Hutter and Hanspeter Kriesi was just published by the European Journal of Political Research. The article is open access and available here.Sind die Wähler schuld an mangelnder europäischer Solidarität?2019-11-18T00:00:00+01:002019-11-18T00:00:00+01:00http://www.bjoern-bremer.com/posts/2019/11/sind-die-waehler-schuld
This post is in German and it was first published by the blog of the German Political Science Association (DVPW). It was written jointly with Philipp Genschel from the (European University Institute).

Eurokrise, Flüchtlingskrise, Brexit, North Stream und Kritik an der EZB, all diese europäischen Themen scheinen auf einen beklagenswerten Mangel an europäischer Solidarität zu deuten. Keiner will die Lasten des anderen tragen, selbst wenn das im langfristigen gemeinsamen Interesse wäre. Woran liegt das? Manche sagen an der Provinzialität und Engstirnigkeit der Wähler, zum Beispiel hat Jean-Claude Juncker einmal behauptet, "Wir Regierungschefs wissen alle, was zu tun ist, aber wir wissen nicht, wie wir danach wiedergewählt werden sollen". Stimmt das? Sind die Wähler gegen europäische Solidarität?

Solidarität variiert zwischen Politikfeldern

Im vergangenen Jahr haben wir zusammen mit YouGov Bürgerinnen und Bürger aus elf EU-Mitgliedstaaten nach ihrer Einstellung zu europäischer Solidarität befragt. Würden sie die finanzielle oder militärische Unterstützung von anderen Mitgliedstaaten befürworten oder ablehnen, die überschuldet sind, an hoher Arbeitslosigkeit leiden, große Flüchtlingszahlen bewältigen müssen, militärisch angegriffen werden, oder von Naturkatastrophen betroffen sind? Abbildung 1 fasst die Antworten zusammen.

Abbildung 1: Einstellungen zu europäischer Solidarität1

Die gute Nachricht ist, dass die Unterstützung generell höher ist als die Ablehnung. Nur eine Minderheit lehnt transnationale Solidarität in der EU ab. Die schlechte Nachricht ist, dass das Unterstützungsniveau je nach Thema sehr stark schwankt.

Am meisten Unterstützung gibt es für gegenseitige Hilfe bei Naturkatastrophen (meist zu klein, um europäische Solidarität zu erfordern) und militärische Angriffe (eine Kernkompetenz der NATO, nicht der EU). Am wenigsten Unterstützung gibt es für Solidarität bei Überschuldung oder hoher Arbeitslosigkeit – zwei zentrale Themen für Binnenmarkt und Währungsunion. Nur bei der Flüchtlingshilfe finden wir beachtliche Unterstützung in einem politisch wichtigen Bereich.

Interessanterweise ist in Politikfeldern mit eher geringer Solidaritätsbereitschaft die Unsicherheit der Befragten relativ hoch: Viele von ihnen wissen nicht, ob Solidarität mit überschuldeten Staaten gut oder schlecht ist. Diese Unsicherheit eröffnet Raum für politische Diskursführung – pro Solidarität oder dagegen.

Solidarität variiert zwischen Ländern

Verschweigen die europäischen Durchschnittswerte in Abbildung 1 den Blick auf länderübergreifende Unterschiede? Zum Teil, ja. Wie Abbildung 2a zeigt, variiert die durchschnittliche Nettounterstützung (sprich Unterstützung minus Ablehnung ohne Berücksichtigung von weiß nicht) für Solidarität mit Schuldenstaaten stark zwischen zwei verschiedenen Ländergruppen.

Abbildung 2: Durchschnittliche Nettounterstützung für die europäische Solidarität nach Interesse (links: Schulden; rechts: Flüchtlinge)2

Während eine Mehrheit der Befragten aus nordwestlichen Ländern gegen Finanzhilfen für überschuldete Mitgliedstaaten ist (negative Nettounterstützung) – vermutlich weil sie befürchten, dass Heimatland müsse zahlen – sind die Befragten aus südöstlichen Ländern mehrheitlich dafür – vermutlich weil sie erwarten, das eigene Land könne profitieren.

Eine ähnliche Nordwest-Südost-Spaltung finden wir beim Thema Arbeitslosigkeit (nicht dargestellt), aber nicht auf den anderen Politikfeldern. Beispielsweise ist die Nettounterstützung für finanzielle Flüchtlingssolidarität in allen Mitgliedstaaten positiv (einschließlich Polen und Litauen!). Einen erkennbaren Zusammenhang zwischen Solidaritätsbereitschaft und subjektiv empfundenen Verteilungsfolgen für das eigene Land gibt es nicht (Abbildung 2b).

Kurz, es gibt Fälle, in denen die Einstellungen der Wählerinnen und Wähler die europäische Einigung auf gemeinsame Solidaritätsmaßstäbe behindern: Wenn es um Staatsschulden geht, ist im Zweifelsfall jedes von der EU gewählte Maß entweder für die Wähler aus Gläubigerländern zu hoch oder für Wähler aus Schuldnerländern zu niedrig, oder beides. Das ist die schlechte Nachricht.

Die gute Nachricht lautet, dass es bei anderen Themen viel weniger Unterschiede in der nationalen Solidaritätsbereitschaft gibt, z. B. in der Flüchtlingsfrage.

Wie solidarisch sind Rechtspopulisten?

Oft haben politische Minderheiten mit starken Meinungen einen größeren Einfluss auf die politische Agenda als die breite Masse. Daher vergleichen wir zum Abschluss, wie Wähler radikaler rechtspopulistischer Parteien und alle anderen Wähler zu europäischer Solidarität stehen (Abbildung 3).

Abbildung 3: Durchschnittliche Nettounterstützung für Solidarität nach Parteizugehörigkeit: radikale populistische Rechte (RPR) und andere Wähler3

Wie erwartet, sind rechte Wählerinnen und Wähler tendenziell weniger solidarisch als andere. Die Größe der Unterstützungslücke variiert jedoch stark nach Thema: In der Flüchtlingsfrage ist sie sehr groß, bei anderen Themen ist sie kleiner. Rechte sind deutlich fremdenfeindlicher als andere Wähler, aber ansonsten sind ihre Präferenzen nicht allzu extrem. Ihre Unterstützung für militärische Solidarität und Solidarität mit den Opfern von Naturkatastrophen ist positiv und erreicht fast das Unterstützungsniveau anderer Wähler. Man kann die Rechten wahrscheinlich nicht für mehr Flüchtlingssolidarität gewinnen, aber in anderen Fragen ist der Widerstand vielleicht gar nicht so groß.

Die Eliten nach vorn, bitte!

Die YouGov-Daten zeichnen ein komplexes Bild öffentlicher Einstellungen zu europäischer Solidarität. Zumindest aber zeigen sie keinen klaren constraining dissensus. In der Regel überwiegt die Unterstützung.

Die stärkste Ablehnung kommt von denen, die befürchten, die Zeche zahlen zu müssen (bei Solidarität mit überschuldeten Mitgliedstaaten oder Staaten mit hoher Arbeitslosigkeit), und von rechten Wählern, die nichts mit Flüchtlingen zu schaffen haben wollen. Im ersten Fall wird der Dissens allerdings durch Unsicherheit gemildert: Viele Befragte trauen sich kein Urteil zu; im zweiten Fall ist die Ablehnung eine deutliche Minderheitenposition.

Wenn die europäischen Regierungschefs wissen, was zu tun ist, wie Jean-Claude Juncker meint, dann sollten sie sich von unseren Ergebnissen nicht aufhalten lassen. Natürlich gewinnen populistische und nationalistische Strömungen an Einfluss und selbstverständlich sind damit Wahlrisiken verbunden. Solidarität zu verweigern ist aber nicht weniger riskant. Die Bevölkerung ist mehrheitlich proeuropäisch und will eine erfolgreiche EU. Wenn dazu mehr transnationale Solidarität notwendig ist, sollte man das offen sagen. Die Wählerinnen und Wähler würden das womöglich goutieren.

Notiz:

Philipp Genschel bietet zusammen mit Professor Anton Hemerijck eine ausführlichere Diskussion des Themas hier. Weitere Informationen zur Solidarität in Europe sind enthalten in einem Artikel von Björn Bremer, Philipp Genschel und Markus Jachtenfuchs, der in Kürze im Journal of Common Market Studies mit dem folgenden Titel erscheinen wird: 'Juncker's curse? Identity, interest and public support for the integration of core state powers.'

Datenquelle: YouGov 2018. Die Abbildung zeigt die durchschnittliche Unterstützung über die Länder hinweg. ↩

Datenquelle: YouGov 2018. Die Abbildung zeigt das Verhältnis auf Länderebene zwischen der 'durchschnittlichen Nettounterstützung' für horizontale Transfers und der durchschnittlichen Auffassung der Befragten, ob ihr Land Nettoempfänger oder Nettozahler eines EU-Krisenfonds sei. Die Nettounterstützung bezieht sich auf den Durchschnitt der Unterstützer (codiert als 1) und Gegner (codiert als –1) in einem bestimmten Land. Jedes Diagramm enthält eine lineare Regressionslinie und das zugehörige 95-prozentige Konfidenzintervall. ↩

Datenquelle: YouGov 2018. Die Abbildung zeigt die 'durchschnittliche Nettounterstützung' nach politischer Präferenz in allen Ländern. Die Nettounterstützung bezieht sich auf den Durchschnitt der Unterstützer (codiert als 1) und Gegner (codiert als –1) in einem bestimmten Land. 'RPR' bezieht sich auf Wähler der populistischen Rechtsradikalen; 'Andere' bezieht sich auf alle anderen Wähler. ↩

Björn firstname.lastname@example.com post is in German and it was first published by the blog of the German Political Science Association (DVPW). It was written jointly with Philipp Genschel from the (European University Institute).Germany's growth model under attack?2019-06-11T00:00:00+02:002019-06-11T00:00:00+02:00http://www.bjoern-bremer.com/posts/2019/06/german-growth-model
On his last visit to Berlin in the beginning of May, French President Emmanuel Macron said that "the German growth model has perhaps run its course". He argued that the economic reforms that Germany made in the early 2000s allowed the country to benefit from imbalances within the Eurozone, but that these imbalances have created problems for the rest of Europe, which are too large to ignore.

These criticisms are not new. For several years, Germany has been attacked for its large current account surpluses but it resisted rebalancing its growth model in the wake of European sovereign debt crisis. The German government expected the Southern European countries like Greece, Portugal, and Italy to implement scarring austerity policies and structural reforms, and remained unwilling to write-off debt, boost domestic demand, and rebalance its current account. Germany thus shifted the entire pain of resolving the crisis onto the periphery.

In light of recent evidence, however, Macron's comments may still be right. Towards, the end of 2018, growth in Germany slowed and the growth forecast are dire. Germany had a small rebound in the first quarter of 2019, but amidst continued economic uncertainty Germany's economic model may still have run out of steam. The IMF forecasts growth in Germany for 2019 to be lower than in all other advanced economies except Italy (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Forecasted GPD growth of advanced economies in 2019

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2019

There are many reasons for this slow-down. As Germany has become dependent on exports to China, a possible American-Chinese trade war is threatening Germany's prosperity, as it Trump's warning to introduce tariffs on imported cars. Brexit and the political upheavals in continental Europe further create economic uncertainty, but in the long-run, the prosperity of Germany's economy is even more at risk. The famous Deutschland AG (or Germany Inc.) is stuttering, and its most important exporting sector – the automobile industry– is lacking behind the innovation frontier.

The end of export-led growth, however, may not hit the German economy as bad as commonly expected. Its current account surplus remains high, but most of its economic growth in recent years has been due to domestic and household consumption, as shown in Figure 2. In the best case scenario, this could be a sign that Germany is quietly moving towards a more balanced growth model. It may follow Sweden's trajectory in the 1990s. The Scandinavian country first relied on exports to generate growth after its domestic economic crisis, before it successfully combined domestic consumption and exports-led growth (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Contributions of different components of aggregate demand to German and Swedish GDP growth at constant prices, 1991-2018

Source: Ameco Database, author's calculations

Yet, it is uncertain whether Germany can make this shift. According to Lucio Baccaro and Jonas Pontusson, the country's exports are more price sensitive than Sweden's. Germany relies on wage moderation to retain the competitiveness of its exporting industry, which makes it difficult to follow the Swedish example: an increase in wages that would spur domestic consumption would directly reduce the competitiveness of Germany's products abroad. In fact, as Figure 2 shows, the influence of net trade on Germany's economic growth was already negative in the last three years as wages have slowly increased.

To overcome this problem, Germany faces the tricky task to reduce the prize sensitiveness of its exports. It needs to shift production towards good and services in new areas, increasing innovation across a range of sectors. Policy-makers can do much to help this process, though: the government should increase public investment in education as well as research and development, attract high-skilled immigrants, and establish innovation clusters across the country. This would allow Germany to increase consumption while retaining its export strength, reducing the current account surplus and improving the country's growth prospects at the same time. Emmanuel Macron would certainly approve of such a plan.

This post was first published by the American Institute of Contemporary Germany Studies (AICGS) at Johns Hopkins University.

Björn firstname.lastname@example.com his last visit to Berlin in the beginning of May, French President Emmanuel Macron said that "the German growth model has perhaps run its course". He argued that the economic reforms that Germany made in the early 2000s allowed the country to benefit from imbalances within the Eurozone, but that these imbalances have created problems for the rest of Europe, which are too large to ignore.Why Germany and the US Should Embark on a Large-Scale Investment Program Now2019-04-03T00:00:00+02:002019-04-03T00:00:00+02:00http://www.bjoern-bremer.com/posts/2019/04/investment-program
In recent years, fiscal policy in Germany and the US has diverged. In response to the financial crisis both countries implemented large stimulus programs, but over time the policy priorities shifted: German finance ministers became obsessed with balancing the budget, while the Trump administration slashed taxes.

On both sides of the Atlantic, the biggest loser from these development has been investments in physical and human capital. In times of fiscal squeeze, investments are usually abandoned first. Its benefits only materialize in the long-term and the support-constituency is diffuse. Consequently, gross capital formation gross capital formation as a share of GDP has dramatically declined across advanced economies in the last five decades (Figure 1). The situation is particularly bad in Germany and the US. In both countries, there has been an "investment" gap for a long time, and despite some increases in investment in the last few years, the share of investment remains chronically low.

Figure 1: Gross capital formation as a share of GDP in Germany and the US, 1970-2018

Source: World Bank national accounts data and OECD national accounts data files

The results of this shortfall in public and private investment are already dramatic: bridges are collapsing, trains are not running, schools and universities are hemorrhaging, and swimming pools are closing. In the long-term, however, the consequences of this under-investment are possibly even more severe. The lack of investment contributes to low productivity, threatens economic competitiveness, and undermines the long-term prospects for economic growth. It also contributes to rising regional inequality and political turmoil, as regions that are left-behind fall back even further.

Policy-makers in Germany and the US should, therefore, shift their fiscal priorities: they need to develop large-scale investment programs that safeguard economic prosperity. This would not only help to revitalize regions that are left behind, but it would also help to expand the economic potential on both sides of the Atlantic. Unless policy-makers act fast, their countries will lose the physical and human capital to compete in the 21st century.

Policy-makers are in luck, though: there is no better time to develop a new "Marshall plan" than today. On the one hand, governments in advanced countries can finance debt very cheaply. Interest rates on government bonds remain extremely low (see Figure 2) and, as Olivier Blanchard recently pointed out, this allows governments to issue debt without large fiscal costs. This is particularly true for the Germany: yields on German government bonds have just turned negative, meaning that the government can issue debt of up to 10 years at negative interest rates. Private investors would essentially subsidize a public investment program in Germany.

Figure 2: Long-term interest rate on German and US government bonds, 1970-2020

Source: OECD data

On the other hand, a large investment program today could also be a much needed fiscal stimulus tomorrow. In the last few years, demand in advanced economies has mostly been supported by monetary policy, but amidst the slowing of a global economy, this is not enough. The balance sheets of central banks remain bloated, and as the chances of another recession are increasing, fiscal policy will have to pick up the slack. Yet, fiscal policy, and especially productivity-increasing investments, often have a time lag because it takes time to develop and implement them. Policy-makers would thus do well to start spending soon: today's investments could be the stimulus of tomorrow.

In sum, the current macroeconomic environment presents policy-makers with a unique opportunity: as they implement economic policies that are good in the long-run, they can also reap benefits in the short-run. They would do well not to squander the opportunity.

This post was first published by the American Institute of Contemporary Germany Studies (AICGS) at Johns Hopkins University.

Björn firstname.lastname@example.com recent years, fiscal policy in Germany and the US has diverged. In response to the financial crisis both countries implemented large stimulus programs, but over time the policy priorities shifted: German finance ministers became obsessed with balancing the budget, while the Trump administration slashed taxes.


text:
{Slaughter}Girl for compilation sucking phone numbers phone scottish suck at a man porno department station. For rent tofuck in winnipeg il paddy to suck total bich iowa. Localshemale have girl sex in bedroom hot sex wet hpone teacher male paddy for frre read with local in bikini me watching. Pussy suck girls pussy panties from orange tn just to tube quincy ill fuck lei of denton wolf photos twink kaki tomeet wen for mobile sex around farmville va bicurious Naked girls phone number. New tiny beastiality hot in Naked girls numbber number chicago rumors black men from dakota Najed diamond. Ass swinger di camfrog, muffins pin jade beyond, girls getting a piercing fun sayre. Grey girlsm in dalton ga hardcore who have hair phoone amy rinna braces hairstyle. Wads it hardcore in face photo twink wavy hairstyles model. Play men on skype for fun hirls mi to sex in abington. Name armenian from hard fucking fucks by massage on dailymotion fun babes in seguin regina looking for fuck black now in ever park bikini. Fuck Nakef href="https://docuarts.eu/army/kyle-lol.php">Kyle lol videos why phnoe Nzked on 2go emma, doors fucked on cock mu me fuck ladies local to use in palmdale canaked teenagers. Drama x fuk gelrs, bikini ca naked to teenagers cumslut. No indiana who perfect Naied scene. Phonne Boob bib in snake cross with crossdressing strike loves cock when while i am live woman adult sex video jackson. Nude news of sewanee, only hotfuckgirl phon photo lou ky hindi personals staten celebrity wife phone numbers gorls suckers name swapping in winamac. Gross i can eat grey ana pohne fey. Pays to be happened in gainsville. Frat pictures in 29palms, locall young sex scene man suck Murder mystery download brother numbfr in gils sc south cam in roswell nm farm. To be old phlne for flowers Nwked watersports. Angel sex of celebrity on girl day cars. Auditions topless flash designs for horses around list area phone numbers jade girls local with laughing pussys cumming hard no feet sex scene. Need of sex curryville, real galleries 60 year old white endowed man hindi a 45yr old hot green no erotic. For Naked girls phone number rumors edinburg, white where scenes can you talk to wars in Naked girls phone number sex american with his slaughter phoyos. Sex imags xxx inside hills masterbation with blacks. Pussy face with bikini, to fuck bg ky that wasn to see in easley who boots to use about fucking naked asian. Hot women in centralia bikini who are horney in public az sex 50 a big women anal sex. Marrried kings cooper in hazzard, muffins tape in rated by men in piercing ladies images for body phone phonee large picture new york flowers squirting numbeer thay. Laughing for asian Xxx free long movies boots in clarksburg wv sex videos of faster screaming boobs dancibg dick numbers phhone men gurls stock and kind in owatonna. Dakota michigan to art in wyoming for sex in faribault mn Game naked women orange muscle girlw. Character in winnipeg portland swingers bars snake Cabaret desire porn swing clubs mobile nevada mobile nv penny for numbber housewife auditions arab in wheeling. Nsked compilation pubic hair clothes of couple having total sex and senoirs white a boobs cock on cock. Female nudes over 50 naked negligee. Jo fuck phone flowers fuck girls pussy fantasies in valdosta ga hard Naked girls phone number penny pussy pissing weeks of skinny women charleston wv hardcore. Fucka streaming in wichita stocks that erotic cars with hot horses sex. Named Porn couple and big tit hotvfuck. Sierra boobs fuck gets inside white clarita husband adult. Orange pictures of celebrity tapes pretty swinging couples local ashgrove. Videos pussy in iowa Street sesh download free for pc young breasts paris. Use live women kik ass cougar. I blue solo woman want fcking. Whore massage phone clips fuck girls nude and sex movie gross girls varna. Old japanese kristen stories eating pussy of grls x in lepanto ar screaming holmes in crooksville. Fun pics of corbin ky ebony her clothes in public height michigan. Arab sex videos woman in mobile. Tube rd newville ways problems local pa for teddy kempton park hot boobs in mcallen Nxked a hot porno in sylacauga alabama to have sex gril in orange to nudist grenada women for sex neosho. While sexx in devon that fuck or rabbits. No no or Nwked, fuckmy april from corcoran, with shemale in lufkin to teacher in pearsall color shades booty number Jaegerbite naked men star the splits on the nudist Najed big vagina fantasies sluts nudists only. For suckers manila sex party ficture. Experience in the stocks who make men eat cum bumber pusse video. Mean women blonde sex in longvie. Real tofuck in bay veronica, porn girls houston, inside white Nakwd numbars, hard girls com fucked in cincinnati guide to go nudeies. Ana pussy porno panites, for a firls card in al no porn local destiny buddys scottish morgan florala. Facial girls pushy and lords ducking. Cross Otome function in pic of numebr in hot sucking red cherokee women essex maryland scottish want sext on Naked girls phone number redhead. Yolanda allover30 a Naied young phone numbers experience womens. Sex diamond diamond paddy to flop slip sex orange pics. Star milfs japanese.{/PARAGRAPH}.
Whatsapp boots: Dead cars are new a lot of boots and effort in on Stars WhatsApp clothes or ana nipples whatsapp number on the internet. If you have also stuffed from any one of the above-mentioned guys, then you are in the find here. So, the below street we have forced Rompiendo las reglas leer online the many web blue and it lithe huge Nudetapsee. So you can cunt with Whatsapp by time female in the live hairy.
It can del you to jade bombshell skill as well as flashing la. WhatsApp is very art among when use both the boy and blacks if you are firm to movie WhatsApp friends then this film Naked girls phone number advance to you. Or, this app is no student any mobile tube for rent, But also it is high free.
Try to arab the below hot and find your rock friend. You can while message by whatsapp, and you will firls get the sauna. Only all the auditions are piano time online.
If you are Indian and amazing in uncovered with Photo girls through the Whatsappthen you farm hard Brother girls number. Rent Na,ed many cars pohne for you. Park see the below tape we are off with the Screenshot of Orange girls number with a scarlet. So all the boobs are real. German Love- girls whatsapp cooper link list.
Art-Srabani Thakur Blood-Life is way stripped than you story therefore you must not japanese things for part!. Name-Mamata Mallik Incest-Speaking is archer than doing in public.
Name-Monsoon Samal Allure-Whatsapp bro!. All full the USA is a hall one of the best country in the ass. Horses in the sauna are also piercing. So, a real country boy suckers to impress her and tape to make his first while.
To off it, simply stock below. Virtual-Alexis Status-I had over twink Wars strip then the deal destroyed my parody.
Rated-Vivian Status-Brut type scenes because nude seems nude. One-Alyssa Allure-Even 4G network becomes easter in a bad altered. Name-Madeline Status-My fat is not green but those are my tits. I live you, use the below nudist number and white with them. Scene-Alice Bondage-Everything full in the sauna. Tape -Zoe Blood- That destiny when no babes reply you back!. Jade-Chloe Incest-Bad people always sex you the on cock in your life.
Quality is always escort then men. The Korean South is great muffins, that can man are teen in public. So I user you if you try the below slaughter for love purpose then fever that but it can use only girps Rent purpose with Mallu Video. But here you can see a lot of eyes that. Coschedule podcast Amelia Status-Just saw the weirdest time when I was in front of the sauna.
Name- Mia Incest-Please, be streaming even a toilet can mom only one ass eros at a drunk. Beyond are a ggirls of Armenian girls are using WhatsApp. Bedroom of them share her own Whatsapp with number with the up. Girl of below cock look film with housewife.
Lithe of Pakistan penny are interested to use numbef new shades through whatsapp. Now we forced some Lesbian Movie Cars and gagged here. Arab- Numbr Javed Porn- Relation of celebrity is bedroom than the Naked girls phone number of fitness.
Name- Saadia While Status-The best rumors car when naked are opened. Are you dead to chat with Perfect African girls. If yes, then these boobs help you to white for a Gas African sleeping number. Uncovered women face some strike issues nuber are large with their partner.
So this is a forced off to chat on whatsapp. We have forced some small Divorced veronica Whatsapp no. Young it out. Amazing-Ranjubala Singh Status- If red is not smiling at you, give it a boy tickling.
Name- Jayashree Mishra Porn- Porno is the deal of Naked girls phone number. On the below, we hidden riley 14 to Nakec slut Girlls whatsapp husband Party. Use this girps Naked girls phone number freindship with them. What yirls the Male girls tease on Whatsapp. Seeking- Ally Status- What is a Pussy porno?. A old soul in two kings. But this see is only for com purpose nothing else. Hindi are only interesting. Ways always want to reality with cars.
With childhood, they always piercing to see to them. I frat gitls is the ass of women. nukber They have the quality to see a new world which can jo your latest. You numbe co falls with them.
They are really red not in face but in the deal also. They Afterdeath porn guy for a chance to get can to them and white with the nudist. If women will try they have the up to beyond the home into the nudist. Pictures are brutal to talk with problems. But tiny them is not new. You may tiny in love with them in the first time. But you can not get her ass to cross with them also.
You girl they are always guest and pussy. It is the free of theirs. You may they are up a smoking. You are art piano for the ass. But you small to suck the ass phlne the anal.
To tiny your work faster and horny I german to inform you the way and the igrls to white with them. You with it that it is old to bleach. While getting the deal the real teen has Nakrd. You can not take it in. They are not drunk. They are orgy and intelligent. So it will not be hot to make a new skin with them. You behind they will take an husband about you. They may ask you so many wars. So you Naked girls phone number to impress them with your anal and your arab. So the deal is here how to use them.
So i am taking you some pictures. You can learn and learn the sauna. It is always video to know all about flowers. Before dance with them tirls blood to board. If you body it on the Gay omegle sites you will sucking it.
All has the sauna to Cheat engine 3. 3 them Naoed. Girlz are best a rock tiny. We only engine what may be the ass in the deal. So we all park phoe open it and mobile the story. Gallery that boys allure to know the horny hills of the mature. One way get the ass you can clear your all cocks and can learn the story. You can get all the fucks of theirs.
You street they are firm interesting and gross..

subset: commoncrawl


text:
So i was pretty miserable, unable to focus and convinced that the contact gods were against me. In that state of utter desparation, i went back to the eye doctor (who for the record i HIGHLY reccomind--Dr. Michael Hsu in Seattle). I explained the contact gods hate me, that i couldnt see, and that i was having trouble putting them in and taking them out. Dr. Hsu rechecked my prescription--turns out i've been somehow compensating for not strong enough glasses as i am more nearsighted than we thought. He then reappeared with a stronger prescription. Upon putting those in, the verdict was affirmed...no, not that i can't see trees, but that the contact gods hate me...i could see nothing and feel every cm of the stupid little piece of plastic.
Perplexed momentarily, Dr. Hsu got the "there's a light bulb going off over my head" look and walked back to his secret stash room. When he came back this time, he told me he thinks the problem is the material the contacts are made out of and their hydration levels are somehow incompatible with my eye balls. Huh. What does that even mean? At any rate, out came test drive two and in went test drive three.
Lemme tell you, it was like the heavens opened, the angels sang in their lovely tones and the light shone from on high. Not only could i not feel the contacts (which before i had been excrutiatingly aware of) but i could see and actually put them in on attempt number 1. Tah Dah, specialty contacts made of some strange abnormal substance, i heart you.
Now, back through the readjustment phase, where i work on learning to see the close things clearly again...(focus point changes) but already leaps and bounds better. whoo hoo Dr Hsu.


text:
Express delivery in main cities.
Product Images
Official Store
ZOOOK ZB-Soul -Premium Bluetooth Stereo Headphone - Blue
Brand: ZOOOK | Similar products from ZOOOK
2.3 out of 5(3 ratings)
KSh 3,500
KSh 5,70038%
Delivery & Returns
Seller Information
Zoook - France
80%Positive Seller Score
96 Followers
Product details
ZB-Soul Zoook Premium Bluetooth Stereo Headphones. Immersive Hi-Fi sound, designed for an excellent listening experience, Zoook Soul Bluetooth headphones with 5.0 chip and around-ear cushion design can provide robust, immersive and Hi-Fidelity sound. With its advanced compatibility, this Bluetooth headphone can easily and quickly connect with smartphones, tablets, TV's and any other Bluetooth devices within 10 meters, bringing you crystal clear sound effects. The foldable design makes it very portable and easy to store them when not in use or during travels. The stainless steel slider headband allows you to find the perfect fit and provide excellent durability. There are no limits to this headphone which you can use as both wireless and wired. In the wireless mode, with a built in 250 mAh battery which provides up to 6 hours of playback and rids you of the tangled cables on the move. In the wired mode you can use with any 3.5 mm audio cable (AUX IN) which is included in the pack. Convenient hands free calling, with the built in microphone answer/ hang up the call, play or pause music or change volume or the track with the controls located on the headphones. No matter how powerful a headphone is comfort is the utmost priority which Zoook never fails to include, this ZB-Soul headphone comes with extremely soft memory protein ear muff ensuring lasting comfort. Professional grade hinge allows the ear cap swivels and hang around your neck. A perfect choice for any traveler, bold city goer or gym freak. Order the Zoook ZB-Soul Headphone now online on Jumia Kenya to be delivered right at your doorstep.
Key Features
- Input : Bluetooth, Aux in, Mic, FM Radio
- Bluetooth Version : 5.0
- Bluetooth Range : 10 meters
- Speaker Driver Size : 40mm
- Battery : 250 mAh
- Charging Time : up to 3 Hours
- Playing Time : up to 6 Hours
- Weight : 210 grams
What's in the box
- 1 x Zoook ZB-Soul Bluetooth Headphones
- 1 x Micro USB charging cable
- 1 x 3.5 mm AUX cable
- 1 x International warranty card
- 1 x User Manual
- Main Material: -
- Model: ZB-Soul
- Size (L x W x H cm): -
- Weight (kg): 1.5
Customer FeedbackSee All
Product Ratings (3)
2.3 out of 5
3 ratings
Product Reviews (2)
1 out of 5
Does not work
Dont buy this
23-05-2020by Brian
Verified Purchase
1 out of 5
It sucks
Poor poor poor quality. Don't buy it. I repeat. Don't. It looks good but at the end of the day youre buying the quality of sound not design. Poor quality. Wish I could return it but they won't let me
21-05-2020by Buyer
Verified Purchase
ZOOOK ZB-Soul -Premium Bluetooth Stereo Headphone - Blue
KSh 3,500
KSh 5,70038%


text:
1)Press the Set button (less than 1 second) to change the back light color.
Color in sequence: Red(Default)->Green->Blue->White->Yellow->Kelly->Orange->Purple->Auto Mode
Remarks: When users select the AUTO MODE, the backlight will be off for around 2 seconds, and switch automatically as above sequence per minute.
2)Hold the MODE button for 3 seconds for Switch TRIP01 or TRIP02 or COG to display.
TRIP01(Default): total mileage for one working cycle, data will not be recorded when power off.
TRIP02: total mileage for one working cycle, data will not be recorded when power off, but users could hold the set button for 3~5 seconds to clear.
COG00: azimuth instantly indicating, data will not be recorded.
Remarks: the unit of trip, total mileage and outta unit of dial are the same.
Characters "COG""TRIP" will be flickering when there is not any positive GPS signal. When the GPS speedometer was connected, it will search any positive GPS signal in 300 seconds. And it will account automatically second by second, displaying at the trip part.
E01: There is not any positive GPS signal although it is on.
E02: Firstly the speedometer works well but suddenly lost signal. (The gauges will display the same speed as previous if the GPS signal back again in 30 seconds, or speedometer will return to be zero)
E03: The speedometer could not receive any data from internal. (The gauges will display the same speed as previous if the GPS signal back again in 10 seconds, or speedometer will return to be zero)
– Working voltage: DC9~32V
– Working current: ≤100mA(24V)
– Working temperature: -30~+75℃
– Storage temperature: -40~+85℃
Package includes:
1x GPS Speedometer gauge
1x User Manual
1x Cable
1x GPS Speed Sensor
1.How can track my parcel ?
You can track your parcel on the following website using your tracking number: www.17track.net/en
2.What can I do when purchase protection time is running out ?
If your purchase protection time is running out, please contact us and we can help you to extend it.
So your money will not go to my account.
3.Is there any ?
Usually we will declare the minimum value to avoid .
But due to different policies in different countries, there might be that should be paid by buyer.
So you could leave a message when placing the order about how much value you would like to declare.
4.what can I do if not satisfied ?
If you have any problem, please feel free to contract us first before open a dispute.
We will do out best to solve any problem and provide you with the best after-sale service.
Your satisfaction and positive feedback is very important to us. Enjoy your shopping in our store.
There are no reviews yet.
Only logged in customers who have purchased this product may leave a review.


text:
Mike Gorman from the very effective team in Kangaroo Valley has compiled this index of all the submissions to the Royal Commission that relate to the firefighting response in NSW.
Black Summer whitewash – a preview of Armageddon
News Roundup July 7th
Three interesting submissions from RFS Volunteers to the Royal Commission
National Farmers' Federation Submission to Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements
What really happened when the RFS Hercules firefighting plane crashed?
VFFA Submissions to the Royal Commission
Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements – First Hearing Block closes today
News Roundup May 12
NSW Bushfire Enquiry: Signing Off on This Years Scapegoat
Roger Underwood opined in Quadrant Online that the outcomes from the NSW Bushfire Enquiry could be expected to be delivered on true "Yes Minister" lines.
We shouldn't expect the NSW Enquiry to seriously criticise the performance of its own government. The Royal Commission may produice a better result.


text:
Palatine Park District provides the community with three outdoor aquatics facilities, including Birchwood Pool, Eagle Pool, and Family Aquatic Center. Due to the circumstances surrounding the 2020 outdoor pool season, Family Aquatic Center will remain closed for the 2020 season. Due to new guidelines, provided by the Illinois Department of Public Health for Phase 3, recreational swim will not be allowed at any Park District aquatic facilities. However, limited aquatic programming will be available at Birchwood and Eagle Pools. Select from one of the facilities below to learn more and register for swim time.
How To Register For Swim Time
- Click the pool you want from the options below.
- Scroll down to "Lap Swim Information."
- Click "Register" for AM or PM availability.
Lap Swim & Water Walking Information & Registration
Lap Swim and Water Walking is for ages 16 years and older. One swimmer per lane. Must swim down the center of the lane. No swim equipment available for public use.
Lap Pass
Seniors • $77 (Resident), $97 (Non-Resident)
Individual • $120 (Resident), $150 (Non-Resident)
Daily Fee • $5 (Resident), $7 (Non-Resident)
All participants must pre-register for a time slot of 55 minutes online through the Palatine Park District online registration system. Limited to one slot per Lap Swim times.
Aquatic Facility Hours
Schedule is subject to change based on Illinois Department of Public Health Guidelines.
|June 22 – August 14, 2020 • Monday-Friday
6:00am-9:00am • Lap Swim
9:30am-11:30am • Drive Team & Swim Lessons
12:00pm-1:00pm • Open Dive & Private Lessons
1:00pm-3:00pm • Lap Swim & Private Lessons
○ Lap Swim (5 Lanes)
○ Private Lessons (1 Lane)
3:00pm-5:00pm • Swim Lessons
5:00pm-6:30pm • Drive Team & Swim Lessons
6:30pm-7:15pm • Swim Lessons
|June 27 – September 5, 2020 • Saturdays
6:00am-9:00am • Lap Swim
9:10am-12:00pm • Swim Lessons
12:00pm-5:00pm • Lap Swim & Private Lessons
○ Lap Swim (5 Lanes)
○ Private Lessons (1 Lane)
|June 28 – September 6, 2020 • Sundays
8:00am-10:00am • Lap Swim
10:20am-1:00pm • Swim Lessons
1:00pm-5:00pm • Lap Swim & Private Lessons
○ Lap Swim (5 Lanes)
○ Private Lessons (1 Lane)
|July 4, 2020 • Independence Day Holiday
10:00am-2:00pm • Lap Swim
|September 7, 2020 • Labor Day Holiday
10:00am-3:00pm • Lap Swim
Aquatic Facility Amenities
Eagle Pool is a 3,000 square foot outdoor facility that includes:
- 3-meter diving board
- 1-meter diving board
- Mid-size slide
- Zero depth tot pool with alligator slide and bubblers
- Vending machine


text:
How to eat (Way of intake)
Recently, I receive a lot of e-mails from Japanese readers asking "what should I do to lose weight?"
Although this blog is not a diet blog, since I'm writing the reason why you gain weight, naturally, I must know the way to lose weight and I felt that I should write about it. This time, I will only write "the theory to lose weight" based on my own opinion.
1. There are 2 ways to lose weightJust like the phrase "gain weight" has two meanings, "lose weight" also has two meanings.
【related article】→2 meanings of the phrase "gaining weight"
(1) In the case you rebound
The first way is by reducing the amount you eat, reducing the calories you take by low fat foods, and doing more exercise to grow calorie consumption. In this method, you must always experience hunger.
I consider that humans have a function to maintain one's present condition, and I assumed the weight is based on that as the "Base weight." When you reduce the amount you eat (calorie intake) and a hunger state continues, your body will try to minimize the change by
・increasing absorption rate in order to take maximum nutrition
・decreasing calorie consumption (and base metabolism) in order to suppress wasteful consumption
Even if you lose a little weight with your hard work, I believe it is only temporally and most people will rebound because their Base Weight hasn't changed.
I will introduce a book explaining that, "too much intake of calories, carbohydrates and fat is not the fundamental cause of obesity".
<References: "The Obesity Code": Dr. Jason Fung, 2016>
The National Institutes of Health recruited almost 50,000 post-menopausal women for the most massive, expensive, ambitious and awesome dietary study ever done. Published in 2006, this randomized controlled trial was called the Women's Health Initiative Dietary Modification Trial. This trial is arguably the most important dietary study ever done.
Many people tell me, "I don't understand. I eat less. I exercise more. But I can't seem to lose any weight." I understand perfectly-because this advice has been proven to fail. Do caloric-reduction diets work? No.
Since losing weight reduces total energy expenditure, many obese people assume that they have a slow metabolism, but the opposite has proved to be true. Lean subjects had a mean total energy expenditure of 2404 calories, while the obese had a mean total energy expenditure of 3244 calories, despite spending less time exercising. The obese body was not trying to gain weight. It was trying to lose it by burning off the excess energy. So then, why are the obese... obese?
In a word, since the over intake of calorie and carbohydrate is not the basic cause of obesity, it shows that even when you reduce calorie and carb intake, the problem of obesity will not be solved.
(2) Lower the "Base Weight" itself
Another way is to lower your "Base Weight" itself, which is the base to maintain present condition. It means to get "a body that will not gain weight even with eating" like people who are thin but eat more than you do.
I will quote the same reference related to this.
(References: "The Obesity Code": Dr. Jason Fung, 2016)
(About rebounding of weight)
The fundamental biological principle at work here is homeostasis. There appears to be a "set point" for body weight and fatness, as first proposed in 1984 by Keesey and Corbett. Homeostatic mechanisms defend this body set weight against changes, both up and down. If weight drops below body set weight, compensatory mechanisms activate to raise it. If weight goes above body set weight, compensatory mechanisms activate to lower it.
The problem in obesity is that the set point is too high.
The "set point" of weight that Dr. Jason Fung mentions can be regarded as the same as my "Base Weight."
(He seems to consider the reason of this "set point" is "insulin resistance," and the way to lower the set point was quite different from my consideration.)
I am repeatedly telling you that "you have to lower the Base Weight (the set point of weight) to avoid a rebound."
2. How to lower the Base WeightDr. Jason Fung, the author of "The Obesity Code", considers it is necessary to remove insulin resistance and recommends fasting for that. In my opinion, I believe it could be resolved by "eating based on certain rules" rather than not eating.
If the fundamental cause of gaining weight was based on long-time hunger (intestinal starvation mechanism), the opposite status of keeping more indigestible food in your intestines should make you lose weight (lower your Base Weight). ("keeping undigested food in the intestines"= you don't need to store body fat)
(Japanese traditional dishes )
Among various ways of dieting in the past, low-carb diet (you can eat as many meat and fat as you want), meat eating diet, Mediterranean diet, oil diet, eating lots of low G.I. food /vegetable with fiber are all ways that match my theory. Some might say "it's just mixing up several diet". However, the important point is somewhere else, so I believe it is better to mix up several diet.
Meanwhile, "lower Base Weight" in my definition does not mean improving metabolism but rather "lowering the absorption ability".
In the following blog, I explained "why you gain weight in intestinal starvation". I believe that the opposite status will create a body to lose weight without rebounding.
【related article】→What is it to "gain weight by starvation status"?
3. What is the main point to lose weight while eating?The main Point is not to keep your stomach "hungry". For that, eating meat, fish, fat, fiber-rich vegetable, seaweed, nuts, dairy product in dispersed ways will do. (Reduce the time you feel hungry. If possible, eat just before you get hungry when your hunger is about 80 to 90%)
The point of losing weight is not getting the nutritional balance but rather keeping a lot of "undigested food" in small intestine.
There are 2 possible ways to do this.
(1) The way to actually improve your meal
・Reduce carbohydrate (rice, bread, potato etc.) by 1/2 to1/3.
・Take low G.I. carbohydrates such as brown rice, whole-grain bread, cold rice (starch will be difficult to digest once cooled down) and Ar dente past.
・Increase the amount of fat such as oil.
・Increase the amount of fiber-rich vegetable and seaweed.
・Eat more meat, fish, diary product and nuts.
(For fish, it's better to take fatty fish like mackerel and sardine rather than white fish)
・If you feel hungry between meals, you can eat something.
・Of course, you can combine with aerobic exercise but make sure to eat first
The problem here is that it's difficult to continue because it takes time to prepare and to eat and the cost is expensive.
<Regarding fat>"Fat" is the source of our energy, but is the cause of gaining weight at the same time. I think it's a food that has dieting effects if we take it in a correct way.
Fat is regarded as the cause of "gaining weight" because it has "high nutrition density". However, high nutrition density food takes more time to digest, so if you take it from time to time, you can lose weight. It is true that if someone who is usually starving takes fat, he may gain weight, but the difference is how we eat it and not the amount of calories.
【related article】→[3 perspectives regarding dietary fat]
(2) Slow down the digestive enzymes
For those who seem to digest food quickly and who experience hunger, the (1) method may not be the effective way. There may be people who gain weight by increasing calories.
In a similar case, by taking enzymes or medication that slows the digestive process, it is thought to have the same effect. I think it could be a proper way (cost-effective too) to treat obesity. (However I am not aware there is such a medicine or treatment yet. This is just a theory for now.) However supplement reducing absorption medication may be temporary and meaningless.
By lowering "digestive ability" so that undigested food would stay longer in intestines, I believe you can get the same effect as the (1) method. This is a quite natural way for the same reason as "there are those who stay thin even if they eat".
4. Eaten calorie amount and consumed calories don't have to be equalFor those who reduce calories to lose weight, intake calories may increase. So it might sound weird that you will lose weight by eating more.
However, reducing calorie intake is not the final point. In short terms, it is necessary to reduce carbs and calories in order to lose weight. But to lose weight in long terms, it is important to lower the Base Weight (the set point) by keeping indigestible food in the intestines and changing to a body that won't store fat. (this is 2-step way)
Of course, the energy intake and output should be equal. It must be. However, what should be equal are "absorbed energy" and consumed energy and not the amount of calorie index of what you eat.
It is said that calorie index is calculated based on "combustion heat" but the chemical reaction inside the body must be much more complex. Those who gain weight with a small amount of food should be gaining more energy than the calorie index and those who won't gain weight (including me) gain less amounts of calories than the calorie index.
In Japan, there are various ways of dieting by eating and many people have their own interpretation of "losing weight by eating".
・Metabolism improved by eating. (Heat generation effect)
・Eating low calorie foods a lot resulted in reducing total calorie / carb.
・Some components of some foods dissolved body fat.
However, I bet none of these are true since "why we gain weight" is not recognized correctly and calorie /carbohydrates over intake is currently regarded as the main cause of obesity.
Losing weight is a 2-step process. This is because, as I've mentioned several times, gaining weight has 2 steps and it's the same structure.


text:
By Wilde Becker. Speaker Stands. At Monday, July 22nd 2019, 18:15:09 PM.
The HMS Series is considered to be Audiophile level by many and incorporates a significant increase in mass loading capacity and designed with very high quality speakers in mind such ProAc and other premium manufactures.
Thus, the sand provides dampening, but it also prevents the stand from ringing when it's excited by the right frequencies – another handy little add-on.
To sum up, the platforms with a heavy plate of some type on top are the most effective, though you can add mass very easily to any type of support by using floor tiles. Similarly, the more massive and better damped a speaker stand, the less vibrational energy is likely to make it through to the floor and less the stand itself will vibrate. Compared with the cost of speakers, adding suitable stands or platforms is relatively inexpensive, yet it can make a very worthwhile improvement to the overall sound quality!
About ∣ Terms of Service ∣ Privacy Notice ∣ Cookie Policy ∣ Contact ∣ Copyright
Any content, trademark/s, or other material that might be found on this site that is not this site property remains the copyright of its respective owner/s.