system
Given the following post, respond as if you're commenting on Reddit:
human
What are the philosophical solutions to "ship of Theseus" problem of identity? Is there evidence that replacement doesn't affect or change identity?

Ship of Theseus is a thought experiment in which every piece of a ship kept in a harbor is replaced one at a time. The questions are: would the end result be the same ship or a new ship? If it is not the same ship; at what point did it stop being the ship of Theseus? If it is the same ship; would reassembling the removed pieces to form another ship result in another ship of Theseus? Surely the ship would not be in two places at once? **What philosophies argue that the result is the same ship? And how do the philosophies defend their position that replacement doesn't affect or change identity?**

Rephrasing the thought experiment to improve relevance: our bodies grow and change. The old, worn out cells are replaced one at a time. The atoms that make up our cells and bodies too are replaced. Is the end result the same human from before or a new human? **What philosophies argue that the result is the same human? And how do the philosophies defend their position that replacement doesn't affect or change identity?**
gpt
> What philosophies argue that the result is the same human? And how do the philosophies defend their position that replacement doesn't affect or change identity?

Some philosophers claim that being the same person is compatible with undergoing some degree of change, in particular, they deny that the growth or aging of their bodies carries any philosophical implication for whether someone is the same person or not. Losing a leg, same person. We identify people largely based on their physical features, spatio-temporal continuity and the relative stability of their emotional, psychological and moral characteristics. Loss of memory doesn't even disqualify many people from being the same person -- though their sense of their identity may be very different.