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human
Moral Anti-Realism is starting to not seem so plausible to me

Before I ever started reading about ethics I always took an anti-realist position about it, because it just seemed obvious to me. But, after I think about it and read arguments made by realists, I just don't see how anti-realism is plausible anymore. 

I don't see why "good" is really any different than another concept like "consciousness" in terms of its ontological status. "good" is a concept, whether it's mind dependent or its a non-natural universal doesn't really seem to matter, because whatever you say about the ontology of "good" the ontology of the concept of "consciousness" or "purple" would fall in the same category, right? The only reason I could see for a division of the ontology of "purple" and "good" would be that "good" is a value where as "purple" isn't, therefore there is a fact of the matter about what "purple" is and not so for "good". But, then we have to defend the fact/value dichotomy which seems like a totally hopeless venture. 

A point that anti-realists commonly bring up is work in moral psychology that has shown that people generally use moral terms to refer to their brute, gut reactions to things. But, I don't see this as being much of an issue for the realist. Most people aren't philosophers and are frankly rather unintelligent in general, so them not understanding the implications of their use of moral terms doesn't seem to show that moral terms only refer to gut reactions.

I've never heard of someone being a relativist or a non-cognitivist about truth, time, causation, consciousness or anything else but this isn't so for moral claims, why is this so?
gpt
> I've never heard of someone being a relativist or a non-cognitivist about truth, time, causation, consciousness or anything else but this isn't so for moral claims, why is this so?

Then you haven't read enough! Humeanism about causation as well as laws of nature states they are merely generalizations. Anti-realism about science claims we can't be sure that, say, electrons really are a thing, and not just a description of what we measure. 'Anti-realist' positions on truth would usually run under pragmatism. 'Anti-realism' about consciousness is a thing, just not a very interesting position.