system
Given the following post, respond as if you're commenting on Reddit:
human
If utilitarianism is true, is it most effectively promoted by pretending other moral theories are true?

If utilitarianism is true, is it most effectively promoted by instead pretending other moral theories are true?

Assuming you're able to predict the consequences, perhaps best in a closed system, would it not, sometimes, bring most utility by promoting theories that, on the surface, go against utilitarianism? 

Maybe the truth is best honored by not everyone knowing it?

As long as people do the optimal thing ethically, does it matter why? And does it matter whether they know the right reason for it being the right thing to do? Is that always the optimal utility maximizing strategy?
gpt
> If utilitarianism is true, is it most effectively promoted by pretending other moral theories are true?

That’s an empirical question.  If it turns out that committed Kantians, for whatever reason, create the most utility then, sure, it would be right by the lights of utilitarianism to be a committed Kantian.  Do Kantians make the most utility?  We need to do an experiment.

This is not terribly surprising and people experience something like this all the time.  Imagine an athlete who focuses on winning so much that they make bad local decisions.  It might turn out that focusing on something else besides winning makes it easier to win.  Railton talks about how to approach this in “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality.”