system
Given the following post, respond as if you're commenting on Reddit:
human
CMV: I believe Hobby Lobby should be able to determine what religious beliefs go into their policies because they are a private and not a public corporation.

If Hobby Lobby is a private company, then why should they not be able to dictate their own policies? I, personally, would not follow the practices they do, but I believe they have the right to do so because they are not a public company. No one has to work there if they don't agree with their policies. If they don't like it, find a new a job. It has always been made public to people how they run their company, so don't apply if you don't agree with their policies. It's a private corporation and they should be able to determine how they run their company. Why should a private corporation be told by the government how they need to dictate their policies and what kind of health insurance they are required to uphold? Or that they can't be contradictory, as if that is illegal? I understand people think it is hypocritical that they have shares in contraceptives, etc., but that is a separate issue, and really should have no part in what the government can tell them how they run their private company, in such context.
gpt
Hobby Lobby may be a private company, but it is chartered by the State of Oklahoma for retailing goods to the public. Therefore any law generally applicable to the public should also be applicable to Hobby Lobby. 

Since the Supreme Court has now granted a religious exemption to a generally applicable law, where does it end? For instance, if Hobby Lobby decided to ban black and hispanic shoppers from all of its stores on religious grounds, would that be ok? Would it be okay if they allowed black and latino shoppers, but refused to hire any black or latino employees? After all, they are a private corporation. Or say there's a Pakistani grocery store: can they refuse to do business with Jews on religious grounds, since they are a closely held private company? As Justice Ginsburg writes in the dissent:  

>Until this litigation, no decision of this Court recognized a for-profit corporation’s qualification for a religious exemption from a generally applicable law, whether under the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA. The absence of such precedent is just what one would expect, for the exercise of religion is characteristic of natural persons, not artificial legal entities.