system
Given the following post, respond as if you're commenting on Reddit:
human
"The scandal of philosophy" - the unsolved problem of induction and its impact of rationality

Before I start, let me state that I'm not trying to put forward an idea here rather just asking a question out of pure curiosity. 

Every time I read about the problem of induction and it's many proposed solutions, I'm always left unsatisfied. It seems to me at least that no proposed solution is satisfactory. I'm starting to wonder whether the correct response to the problem is to revise our concepts of rationality or revise what we want from our arguments.  

From what I've read of the literature it seems that attempts to solve the problem try to show inductive reasoning to be rational in a traditional sense. Of course what is meant by 'rational in a traditional sense' is debatable. But, is this the correct response? Hume's problem seems to be too strong. Inductive reasoning may be impossible to ground rationally (as we traditionally understand the concept). Should we need weaken our concept of rationality to include inductive reasoning? Has anyone attempted this strategy?

Sorry about the vagueness of the terms used and the lack of directness of the question. It is a question of mere curiosity rather than a fully fleshed out one; but if this subreddit is not the place for mere curiosity where else is?!
gpt
Briefly, yes, many philosophers have tried some variation on the strategy you suggest. There are several options. First, Hume himself (at least on one reading -- Hume isn't especially *clear* on this) suggests justifying inductive reasoning non-rationally, by way of custom and habit. Loeb and Qu have developed readings of Hume along these lines, if you want to look into professional literature on it. Other naturalists in the Humean tradition, most prominently Quine, have also pursued this kind of line. Second, some philosophers such as Strawson think the way to go is to simply take inductive reasoning as *constitutive* of rationality. It is just analytic that using induction is rational. You might understand this as revising the meaning of "rationality" or you might understand it as challenging Hume's understanding of that term. Third, some philosophers, such as Popper, think that Hume's attack is entirely successful but that it doesn't really matter because in our best reasoning, we don't use induction anyway. It's not obvious to me that Popper's strategy really works, but that's a longer conversation. Fourth, there are some Bayesian philosophers, such as Howson, who think that Hume cannot be answered directly but that there are deductive constraints on permissive credences and how they are updated. You could understand Howson's position (I think) as approximating induction with some stipulations. And then you could take the stipulations as what we add to our account of rationality.

Is this the sort of thing that you're looking for?