system
Given the following post, respond as if you're commenting on Reddit:
human
Dasein vs Cartesian self ?

What is the difference?

To my understanding, the cartesian self is a mere abstraction of mind over matter, that asumes that these two are kind-of two separate things.
Then Dasein is kindof the state of being *with* the world, being *in* the world. For what I get this Dasein is a boundless self where identity melts into the world ?

I'm drowning *in* Heiddeger **HELP**
gpt
You are on the right track. Another important thing to notice is that Dasein is "always already" in a world, while the Cartesian subject begins isolated, and then systematically builds up the world around it (although this seems more like Fichte than Descartes).

For Heidegger, we don't start with the "I" of the "I think," but start with Dasein's *eksistence*, our way of Being. Then, we "say I," because this Being is always "mine," but most of the time, when we say "I," we are really not ourselves, but merely *"das Man"*. That is, when we say, for example, "I don't think you should do that," we identify ourselves with "what one should do." 

Heidegger is also worried about the tradition of grounding everything in the subject, and the subject/object distinction in general. Husserl also finds this troubling, but maintains this language. Heidegger drops the language altogether.

He also thinks that in modern philosophy, we understand Being to mean "present as an object before consciousness." Kant, for example, says that Being isn't a predicate, but only a relationship between the thing and our act of judgment. This is part, in his view, of the "forgetting" of the question of Being.

He sees the role of the subject or transcendental consciousness in modern philosophy as comparable to the medieval view of Being as "something created by God." Beings, in the middle ages, are understood as something created by God, a relation between an existing thing and the act of creation. Things "are" as long as God gives them Being. 

He sees the modern subjective point of view to be prefigured already in Greek philosophy, where beings are understood in terms of the *eidos* (form or outward appearance).

The problem with this, for Heidegger, is that it leads to a picture where knowledge is only possible through representations. This covers over the Truth of Being.