system
Given the following post, respond as if you're commenting on Reddit:
human
How do you engage with a philosophical argument when you don't have the intuition(s) you're "supposed" to have?

It seems like one could have a one sentence response along the lines of "nope, I don't share that intuition, and so the whole argument collapses". But, that doesn't seem to leave room for any reconciliation or understanding.

There seem to be a lot of claims and thought experiments in analytic philosophy that depend on people having the "right" intuition, for the intuition supports one view, causes problems for another and that position must justify itself, etc. 

A few examples:

- Peter Singer uses the case of the drowning child versus the starving third world child to convince people that we should help faraway people. You're "supposed" to have the intuition that there is no real morally relevant difference between the cases. But a reader has the intuition that the cases are *very* different because proximity is very morally relevant, and so Singer's thought experiment doesn't prove what he wants it to to that reader.

- Chalmers uses the philosophical zombie thought experiment. You're "supposed" to have the intuition that consciousness isn't necessarily entailed by our understanding of physics, so there might be more going on, and there is a hard problem to be solved. But, a reader may intuit that Chalmers' thought experiment is nonsensical, that he is postulating something that is inconceivable.

- Somebody reads Judith Jarvis Thompson's violinist example, and thinks it's obvious that they are obligated to keep the violinist attached to them, even though they're "supposed" to believe that they aren't.

It seems to me that if you don't have the intuitions you're "supposed" to, then entire dialectics in philosophy fall apart. Further, it's not clear how somebody with different intuitions would convince others to share their view or be convinced to change their mind. Is there a way for these people to engage? How do professional philosophers handle this when it happens? And, does this call into question the ability of thought experiments and intuitions to lead us to philosophical truth.
gpt
Here's how the game is played: if you don't share someone's intuitions in an example, identify which intuitions you don't share and briefly explain why. Then try some related examples to pump the intuition that you want to push, and to argue that this is where the previous thought experiment went wrong. Bonus points for folding this all into a broader account of your own.