system
Given the following post, respond as if you're commenting on Reddit:
human
How do philosophers conceive of the difference between intended acts ("I want") and normative acts ("I should")?

I'm a psychology researcher working on a model of normativity - the biological and cognitive basis of the sense of "ought". One of our proposals (based on empirical evidence that I omit here) is that there is little distinction between the mechanisms underlying intended actions and actions that are believed normative. What you think is normative (what you think you ought to do) is in essence just what you intend to do, and the experience of a distinction (the sense that there is a big difference between an act that is intended and an act that is normative) is in large part illusory.

Is there any philosophical tradition along similar lines? What have philosophers arrived at when analysing the distinction between normative and intended actions? Are there philosophers who have argued that talk about normativity is not importantly different from talk about what people want?
gpt
Look into A.J. Ayer's Emotivism which is a non-cognitivist theory ("Killing is wrong!" = "Boo killing!" with the latter not being truth-apt).

For a refutation, look into the Frege-Geach-problem.

If you talk about statements that are truth-apt but subjective ("Killing is wrong!" = "I don't like killing."), then look into G.E. Moore's open-question-argument.

Those should be some good starting points.