system
Given the following post, respond as if you're commenting on Reddit:
human
If you are a moral realist, are you also by the same reasons committed to aesthetic realism? Can we divide normative facts?

How does one separate aesthetic norms from, say, moral norms and epistemic norms? If you buy into realism about one of them (e.g., moral realism), are you committed to realism about *all* normative facts?

I was thinking about the kind of argument presented by Cuneo concerning the "normative web": the idea that a rejection of moral realism would also mean the rejection of epistemic norms. Normative facts are intertwined. But I am wondering where aesthetic norms fall into this.

In short, I would want to say the following:

1. Epistemic norms are real.
2. Moral norms are real.
3. Aesthetic norms are *not* real; they are entirely subjective.

I have the easiest time believing that there are epistemic facts. I have a fairly good time believing that moral facts are real. However, I have a very hard time believing (though not for any especially informed reasons) that there are such things as aesthetic facts. It seems like "Vanilla is the best flavor of ice cream" or "The Mona Lisa is beautiful" are entirely subjective judgements. I find it very striking in everyday life when my philosophy peers who I tend to agree with on virtually everything simply have *completely* divergent tastes in music, art, etc. 

I would hope to think that we come to agreement in other domains because there is a general convergence toward truth; however, the sheer divergence we have when it comes specifically to aesthetic judgments makes me think that there mustn't be aesthetic facts.

Can this be defended in a consistent way? 

Thank you.
gpt
According to his philpapers survey, derek parfit is an intersubjectivist about aesthetic judgments. he is a realist about both moral and epistemic judgments. 

it seems like a reasonable set of positions to hold to me. You might think the truth-maker of 'the mona lisa is beautiful' is a fact about social reality, but that for epistemic and moral judgments the truthmaker is a mind-independent fact.