system
Given the following post, respond as if you're commenting on Reddit:
human
Is it possible that getting world governments to agree on enacting policies that may hurt their economies to prevent climate change impossible due to Nash Equilibriums?

in a payoff matrix for big business contracts and such where if both adhered to the contract then it would be reasonably beneficial to both parties, but if one breaks it and the other does not the first will get a large payoff and the other gets screwed and visa versa. The Nash equilibrium would be that both break the contract, however in actual business the government is there to make sure signers of the contract adheres to it. In international contracts like the Paris Agreement there is no higher power to enforce it. 

Is it possible that long term international climate change governmental action is impossible due this segment of game theory?
gpt
Possibly. But the international collective action problem seems to be not as important as others—consider how difficult national support for climate change policies is in the US, for example. And remember that the damages, both from climate change and from mitigating it, are not symmetric internationally, so things aren’t as simple as a classic 101 prisoner’s dilemma.