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In recent years there have been those who assert that the philosophy
of Wittgenstein resembles Zen Buddhism and those who deny it on the
ground that any supposed resemblances are only apparent. But, so far as I
know, neither party has made any serious attempt to substantiate his
claim. Normally this is understandable because their main purposes lie
in a different directions. It is, for instance, quite common for the
latter merely to locate Wittgenstein in a different philosophical
tradition and pin a label such as Logical Positivism or Logical
Empiricism on him. I think the matter is much more complex than this or
indeed than either party seems to allow. I want to try to see to what
extent either position can be supported. Any errors and confusions of
which I am guilty may perhaps stimulate someone to give a more thorough
treatment or to attempt further clarification by way of correction. [1]
In one of his typical dissertations Wittgenstein himself pointed
out that its spirit was different from the mainstream of European and
American civilization. [2] About this K. T. Fann comments: "It is not
surprising that we should find striking resemblances between
Wittgenstein's methods and those of Zen Buddhism -- a philosophy from a
very different culture." [3] Because it is not relevant to his main
purpose Fann does not proceed to clarify or support his assertion about
these resemblances. He merely contents himself with one or two general
remarks about the well-known ability of Zen masters to show the
nonsensical character of metaphysical questions along with a remark
about a resemblance between the enlightenment attributed to the Buddha
and the state of complete clarity for which Wittgenstein was striving.
This seems as good a starting point as any other, and I will begin
negatively by challenging some of the resemblances mentioned by Fann.
At the outset one of his assertions must be rejected and another
regarded as seriously misleading. In the first place Zen is described as
"a philosophy from a very different culture." That Zen is the product
of a very different culture cannot be disputed; but that it is a
philosophy has to be denied, and Zennists have always done so. Indeed
Zen is a deliberate and clearheaded rejection of the propriety of
importing philosophizing of any kind into the types of situation where
the person is directly concerned with the attainment of the
enlightenment and liberation attributed to the Buddha. This may well
give Zen a certain philosophical interest, especially when some of the
methods used by Zen
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H. Hudson is a member of the Philosophy Department, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand.
1. Whenever I write about Buddhism I include Zen Buddhism, and
instead of "Zen Buddhism" I have used the term "Zen" for convenience.
The Wittgenstein of whom I write is the Wittgenstein of the
Philosophical Investigations and other associated works, not the earlier
Wittgenstein who wrote the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
2. Cf. Wittgenstein's Foreword to his Philosophische Bermerkugen.
3. K. T. Fann, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 110.
p. 472
masters have the purpose of helping the individual to realize the
absurdity of doing this. One may also, of course, philosophize about the
"aim" of Zen and its methods but as has often been pointed out, this is
not to practice it.
Secondly, Fann speaks of Zen masters showing the nonsensical
character of metaphysical questions. This is true, but misleading. It
might be interpreted as meaning, for example, that Zen masters hold
implicitly at least some general thesis about the nonsensicality of such
questions and assertions. But this is not so, either in Zen in
particular or in Buddhism in general. When the Buddha was asked the
famous Four Questions we are told that he refused to answer, saying that
they were profitless because they are irrelevant to the problem of
freeing us from suffering and are unanswerable or undecidable. By the
latter he has to be taken as meaning just what he says and exhorting us
to leave what is undecidable as undecidable. By abstaining from any kind
of yes or no answer he takes the Middle Way or the freedom of no
position on such matters. The questions have been said to be like asking
whether the hair of a tortoise is smooth or hard; but whatever we may
think of this analogy, the error involved seems to be that of confusing
the Transcendent with what is empirical in the ordinary sense of the
latter word. [4] Alternatively it amounts to confusing what is beyond
all conceptualization with what is conceptualized, or confusing two
different categories. Later in the Maadhyamika dialectic, there is a
systematic effort to show that if we abandon the Buddha's position on
such questions and relapse into dogmatism or giving a yes or a no
answer, the result is self-contradiction and nonsense. But the dialectic
is an attempt to demonstrate the absurdity of dogmatic attitudes to
propositions rather than the absurdity of the propositions themselves.
There is nothing wrong in conceptualization, the fault lies in us when
we confuse it with what is beyond conceptualization and take a dogmatic
attitude about the truth of the consequences of our mistake or about the
falsity of someone else's. In Zen, where the chief concern is with the
practice of meditation, a Zen master may indeed show the nonsensical
character of metaphysical questions and assertions, but when doing so he
speaks from the position of the Buddha, with such points as those
mentioned in mind, to those who are actively and directly engaged in
attaining enlightenment.
Nevertheless there is a perfectly legitimate function for
Buddhist metaphysics, although it is subject to certain provisos. It
must be constructed in such a way that it is helpful in freeing us from
attachment and, in accordance with the principles of the
nonsubstantiality of all things, their impermanence and conditionality.
In so helping us it will not and cannot describe or give us a picture of
the world as seen by a buddha, but it can point to the experience of a
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4. Cf. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, 2d ed. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960), pp. 44-45.
p. 473
buddha. Such schemes give us an account in terms of basic
constituents or the interrelatedness of things of such a kind that it
would be impossible or even conceptually absurd to be attached to them.
We are apt to become attached to our own pictures or constructions,
which we make from such accounts, and when this happens we are victims
of illusion. So we can say that any Buddhist metaphysic contains an
inbuilt correction against dogmatic attachment to it: like a kind of
medicine that carries with it an antidote against addiction.
From a conventional point of view such a metaphysic may be
regarded as true, and certainly every effort will be made to provide
something which can be so regarded. But this kind of truth applies only
to conceptual constructions, and its importance lies in the fact that it
enhances the scheme's utility for helping people. In short, its
function is basically therapeutic, and the motive involved is
compassion. One is not guilty of dogmatism even if one does regard such a
scheme as true, for one can see through it, so to speak -- see that it
is only a mere set of conceptual constructions and see that it points to
what is really important. It is the kind of thing to which it would be
absurd to be attached, so one is free to take it up or put it down
according to circumstances. Buddhism has often been described as
antimetaphysical, but this is a serious oversimplification. It all
depends on what we have in mind by metaphysics.
Wittgenstein was not antimetaphysical either, at least not in the
way that it has often been supposed. He has no project such as the
elimination of metaphysics nor has he any intention of reducing
metaphysical propositions to nonsense. When doing Wittgensteinian
philosophy, metaphysical assertions are at first typically puzzling.
Then we are able to see that a feature of such propositions is that they
obliterate the distinction between empirical and conceptual inquiries.
[5] They then take on the aspect of nonsense. But at a deeper level of
analysis we realize that they are illuminating because they help to give
us a clear view of the logical or philosophical grammar of important
terms in our language. It is because we lack such a view that so many of
our philosophical troubles arise. [6] The metaphysical assertions
remain quite undisturbed or unaltered for now we can see that they are
quite all right as they stand. Our angle of vision of them has changed.
This situation calls to mind a Zen master's characterization of what
happens in Zen practice. "Before you study Zen, mountains are mountains
and rivers are rivers; while you are studying it, mountains are no
longer mountains and rivers are no longer rivers; but once you have
Enlightenment, mountains are once again mountains and rivers are
rivers." [7] Despite the obvious difference between the philosophical
practice of
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5. Cf. Wittgenstein, Zettel trans. C. E. M. Anscombe, ed. C. E. M.
Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1967), para. 458.
6. Cf. Philosophical Investigations, trans. C. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), para. 122.
7. D. T. Suzuki, Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of Suzuki, ed. William Barrett (New York: Doubleday, 1956), pp. xvi-xvii.
p. 474
Wittgenstein and Zen meditation there is an intriguing parallel
between the steps taken to enlightenment or understanding in each.
When Wittgenstein speaks of bringing metaphysical terms back to
their uses in everyday language, [8] he does not do so from any spirit
of hostility to metaphysics but because he wishes to show how they
illuminate the deeper logical grammar of our language. This consists of
rules analogous to "A sphere has no length" or "A rod must have length,"
and rules of course are not descriptions. But with metaphysical
assertions we get what could be described as proposals to alter some of
the basic grammar. It is this which makes them illuminating and, even at
this deeper level of analysis, can give them a paradoxical look;
although once we can see what is going on they lose this. But as far as
this kind of view is concerned there is, to my knowledge, no parallel in
Buddhist thought.
As for the view that a feature of metaphysical propositions is
that they obliterate the distinction between conceptual and empirical
inquiries, there may appear to be some agreement but this is superficial
and masks an important difference. The word 'empirical' can be
misleading here. What Wittgenstein has in mind by an empirical inquiry
would be regarded in Buddhism as merely another conceptual type. For
Wittgenstein, for instance, natural science would certainly count as an
empirical inquiry, but not for Buddhism, because it has an elaborate
conceptual structure. Again, Zen is often said to be concerned with
direct, concrete experience. When we speak of an experience in this way,
we might think of direct perceptual experience as a typical example,
albeit this kind of experience is conceptualized; in Zen we have to
think in terms of nonconceptualized sensory experience. But this kind of
experience should not be thought of merely as nonconceptual. It is the
experience of one who is free from selfcenteredness and the attachments
that go with it. It is no use protesting that to do this is strictly
impossible. A whack with a master's stick or the first moment of pain
after burning ourselves on a hot stove will cut through our sophistries.
So the demarcation between the empirical and the conceptual is drawn
along different lines from that taken in Western philosophy.
Nor is there any analogy in Wittgenstein's work corresponding to
the mistake which the Buddhists think lies behind dogmatic metaphysics,
that is, the confusion of transcendental experience with ordinary
experience. And while metaphysics may be illuminating for each, it can
hardly be said to be illuminating in the same way. Nevertheless, despite
this difference, there is an interesting parallel in the various steps
or stages of illumination and between the flexible attitudes toward
metaphysics. I suppose that the mistake mentioned has some analogy with
the kind of mistake which Gilbert Ryle called a "category confusion" or
with what Wittgenstein would describe as a confusion of
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8. Philosophical Investigations, para 116.
p. 475
the rules of different kinds of language games. The Buddha seems to
have laid down a basic rule for the conduct of religious thinking. It is
not so much that this rule is peculiar to Buddhism but the way in which
it is applied is a crucial factor in giving Buddhism its distinctive
character.
Wittgenstein does not try to restrict us to any one view of
metaphysics. Like most other assertions, metaphysical assertions are
multifunctional. He has suggestions about another way of looking at
them. Our ordinary language "holds our minds in one position, as it
were, and in this position sometimes it feels cramped, having a desire
for other positions as well." [9] A metaphysician invents a notation
which stresses a difference more strongly, makes it more obvious than
ordinary language does. In a way he has discovered "a new way of looking
at things. As if [he] had invented a new way of painting, or again a
new metre, or a new kind of song." [10] According to this suggestion
then, metaphysics can be regarded as giving us the grammar so to speak,
of a new way of thinking which is involved in seeing the world
differently and which frees us from a kind of suffering -- from a sense
of mental or spiritual cramp or constriction. There can be, at the very
most, only a very limited analogy between the kind of suffering
Wittgenstein and the Buddhists have in mind, and the notion of word
'liberation' serves to conceal an important difference rather than to
indicate any significant similarity. For in Buddhism, liberation serves
to fit us for life in this everyday world by freeing us from its grip
not to give us a vision of a different world or even of this world seen
in terms of different categories and conceptual distinctions. Despite
his suggestion, perhaps it is significant that Wittgenstein himself in
his work concentrated on the philosophical practice of trying to free us
from deep, personal puzzles and perplexities. But whether this
indicates a deeper resemblance requires separate and subsequent
consideration.
Buddhism has been described as a set of methods and techniques
rather than as a set of doctrines, for even though it is customary to
speak of "doctrines," they are only conceptual constructions and their
test is their utility. Accordingly they are best regarded
methodologically rather than as statements of absolute and fundamental
truths. Wittgenstein too, denied that he taught any philosophical theses
or doctrines but only methods which function as kinds of therapy. For
philosophical perplexities are like different kinds of illness, and so
different methods are to be used according to the circumstances. Whether
Buddhism and Wittgenstein are or are not concerned basically with the
same thing, their attitudes toward dogmatism in philosophy are
surprisingly similar. [11]
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9. Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Books 1st ed., ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), p. 59.
10. Philosophical Investigations, para. 401.
11. Cf. ibid., paras. 132 and 133.
p. 476
Because of his obvious interest in ordinary language and its
connection with our perplexities, a lot of people seem to think that
Wittgenstein was mainly concerned with a therapy of language. He is not
concerned, however, with linguistic pathology and some type of surgical
reconstruction of language, but with people -- the users of language --
and with some of the special features of the instrument they use when
they use language. These are the features which are of special interest
to philosophers, since lack of proper appreciation of them is an
important cause of our philosophical troubles. There is nothing wrong
with natural language; there is not even anything wrong with
metaphysical language; the trouble lies in us: in our lack of knowledge
and insight into what we are doing when we use language. Consequently he
says: "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of
language; it can in the end only describe it." [12] Of course he did not
mean that philosophy may not affect our own personal use of language,
for instance, by giving it greater clarity, but he did not see the task
of philosophy, as he wanted to do it, as the introduction of linguistic
reforms which substitute supposedly more precise and refined forms for
ordinary language. He wanted to help the users to reform themselves.
This, of course, is a far cry from the position of various contemporary
purveyors of formal linguistic programs and systems who are eagerly
contributing their mite to the process of fitting us for the dawning
automated and computerized society.
From a Zen point of view there is nothing wrong with the forms of
ordinary experience nor with the forms of life which make up ordinary
existence. There is not even anything wrong with conceptual thinking and
with metaphysics. The trouble lies in us. There is no program of
substituting some special supermundane experience for ordinary
experience nor some special type of holy life for ordinary everyday
life. But after the kind of insight which can occur in Zen practice,
although in a sense everything is left as it is, the person is different
because his angle of vision has changed. Ordinary experience is now the
experience of a bodhisattva and our ordinary life is the holy life.
Here again, even though one might say that Wittgenstein and the Zen
Buddhists are obviously talking about different things, there is an
interesting similarity of attitude and approach to them. In connection
with this, Wittgenstein emphasized that language was inescapably
connected with life and with experience. "... the speaking of a language
is part of an activity, or a form of life." [13] "... for is what is
linguistic not an experience?" [14]
Wittgenstein tells us that philosophical problems have depth:
that "they are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the
forms of our language
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12. Ibid., para. 124.
13. Ibid., para. 23.
14. Ibid., para. 649.
p. 477
and their significance is as great as the importance of our
language." [15] I think that Zen Buddhists would agree with the first
statement and would also agree with Wittgenstein's characterization of
philosophy as a battle against the bewitchment of the intelligence by
words, but they would not regard the second statement as adequate. We
want a heart that is not bewitched, not merely an intelligence. The
roots of our problems are certainly deep, but the depth differs from
that of our linguistic forms and is proportional to the depth of our
ego-centeredness.
Zen methods enable us to reach down or out through thought and
language, as normally used, to quite a different level or kind of
experience. Language can still be used here, of course, but not as it is
normally used in everyday life and science; for example, as any reading
of Zen literature quickly shows, and certainly not in a way appropriate
to a more linguistic type of therapy of the users of language in a
philosophical context. In order to help us reach out through thought and
language and appreciate the different type of task or problem with
which we are faced, certain more intellectual and philosophical moves
are sometimes made as preliminary steps. It is here that Fann's remark
about the well-known ability of Zen masters to show the nonsensical
character of metaphysical questions and assertions applies. The swift
ironic and sometimes humorous demolition of such questions and
assertions serves to remind us that thinking of this type is out of
place. The use of more philosophical comments as reminders calls to mind
one of Wittgenstein's characterizations of philosophy as "assembling
reminders for a certain purpose." [16] But although the general function
is the same, the more special function is different for philosophical
comments are used to remind us of different things. Wittgenstein keeps
trying to bring us back from abstractions to what is concrete and
familiar, but which we are apt to overlook when we are doing philosophy;
and he keeps reminding us of these things and of what people do and do
not merely say in familiar everyday situations. This should not be taken
to mean that he gives what is familiar and everyday a special status at
the expense of what is unusual or strange but that he uses one to
illuminate the other. Obviously this cannot be done unless one can see
what is before one's eyes or under one's nose all the time.
Since it is a severely practical form of Buddhism, Zen is par
excellence meditational Buddhism. In Rinzai Zen, as is well known,
kooans are introduced into the meditation situation. These kooans, among
other things, can be regarded as functioning as reminders or warnings
that intellectual and logical types of thinking are out of place. But
whether kooans are introduced into the meditation situation or whether
this situation is itself regarded as a kooan, the
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15. Ibid., para. 111.
16. Ibid., para. 127.
p. 478
effect at first is to generate deep puzzlement and perplexity. For
here the individual does not know his way about, and even if he is given
useful hints and admonitions he does not know how to adjust to the
situation. Nor is he told or shown, supposing that were possible: this
would defeat the entire point of the procedure. He must find his own way
himself. This makes Zen deeply personal in a very direct way.
Recognition of this adds another dimension to what we should understand
by direct concrete experience in Zen and adds another difference to what
we would understand even if we spoke of 'direct concrete personal
experience'. This with all deference to Wittgenstein who also thought
that philosophy was deeply personal and not something formal, neutral,
and detached.
Because the person does not know his way about in the kooan cum
meditation situation, the situation seems to have the typical form of
one which can be cleared up by intelligent inquiry, experimentation, and
reflection. Despite warnings and reminders he will tend to treat it as
if it were a situation of this kind and become more puzzled and
perplexed than ever. He displays a tendency to force all problem
situations into the same general mold, thus showing how his thinking is
nourished by one-sided examples, which Wittgenstein remarks is a main
cause of philosophical disease; a statement with which any Zen master
could agree. A crucial step is made when the person sees, not merely
intellectually but deeply feels, that his rigid and stereotyped approach
is not correct. It is a very intelligent kind of insight. Rather too
much by way of overcorrection of prevalent tendencies is apt to be made
of the so-called non-rationality of Zen.
The deep puzzlement and frustration generated in this situation
has an analog in Wittgenstein's procedure with his students. He did his
utmost to ensure that they were thoroughly perplexed by a philosophical
problem. They had to actually feel and live it and work their way into
and through it. A person has to feel the need of the clarification,
which a comment or observation on a philosophical problem may bring,
otherwise it is worth very little. He does not give us any so-called
answers, but only methods and suggestions to be used according to the
circumstances; nor does he explain to us how to use his methods,
although he gives us examples to illustrate their point, which we have
to see for ourselves. Again, he believed that a question is often best
disposed of by a question; to give an answer is often unfair for it is
apt to involve one-sidedness and in any case is too apt to close up
further inquiries. Sometimes he disposes of a question or a thesis by a
joke. He once even suggested that a perfectly serious philosophical work
could be written which consisted entirely of jokes or of questions. The
similarity in the type of procedure used to that used by a Zen master
is too obvious to require further comment.
Finally, Wittgenstein has no intention of trying to tie us to
philosophy. On the contrary, by freeing us from philosophical
perplexities he aims to free us
p. 479
from philosophy; for the discovery which really counts is the one
that makes one capable of not philosophizing when one wants. It is
hardly surprising that various professional philosophers should regard
such a standpoint with amused incredulity and scepticism. In Buddhism
too the aim, among other things, is to free us from the grip of
doctrines and teachings, even Buddhist ones: for these are merely like
rafts, which enable us to cross a river. When we have crossed we have no
further use for them. Here again, whatever we may say about the
similarity or lack of it between the final goal of peace and clarity for
which Wittgenstein was striving and the goal of Zen, one can hardly
deny a similarity in attitude to theses and doctrines.
Wittgenstein saw philosophical problems, not as interesting,
intellectual puzzles but as deeply personal and genuinely tormenting,
and for him the practice of philosophy was a way of life for freeing us
from them. He speaks of the peace that comes from the real philosophical
discovery, "the ... discovery which makes me capable of stopping doing
philosophy when I want to." [17] So for him, philosophy can be regarded
as a way of liberation from obsessive worries and perplexities that have
a central role in our lives and find their expression in philosophical
problems. The culminating question of whether there is any analogy
between 'the real philosophical discovery' of which he speaks and the
serenity and clarity and the ability to 'take up and put down' theses,
attitudes, and feelings as they come and go, without agitation or
disturbance, which are products of Zen meditation and training, must now
be faced.
Enough has been said, I think, to show that to maintain there is
no similarity between Zen and the philosophical practice of
Wittgenstein, is untenable. But although the similarities mentioned may
be interesting and surprising, and depending on our point of view and
approach, even important, it does not follow that they warrant any claim
of a similarity such as the one in question. Perhaps what they take to
be the absence of this similarity is what some people have in mind when
they say there is no real resemblance. I will now attempt to put forward
some considerations which support this claim.
When all is said and done Buddhist philosophy and Zen practice
are based on a faith which understandably finds no expression in
Wittgenstein's position. Naagaarjuna, for example, may indeed have been a
great critical and dialectical philosopher in his own right, but he was
a deeply religious man and his philosophy is carried out from this
position and can be properly understood only in terms of it. Again, it
is doubtful, to say the least, whether Zen has anything even approaching
the same view of the dispersal of doubt and perplexity that
Wittgenstein has. In Rinzai Zen for instance, one does not try to clear
up and resolve doubts and worries about the meaning of life, the world,
and so on, by
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17. Ibid., para. 133.
p. 480
linguistic analysis or any other kind of analysis. One simply doubts
and doubts until, as it has been said, one becomes one with the doubt.
Indeed it is doubtful whether "doubt" is even quite the right word, for
there is wonder and faith involved as well. Wittgenstein's procedure
with his students is certainly surprisingly like that of a Zen master
with his pupils. But their aim is different. The former wants to get his
students to feel the doubt for themselves as a preliminary to exploring
and probing it. The latter wants to help his pupils to dispose of
anything that will distract them from just letting their doubt alone and
becoming one with it. This, of course, applies, among other things, to
the demonstrations of the absurdity of metaphysical types of questions
and assertions. In other words he uses his supporting procedures to
discourage the very kind of activities that Wittgenstein uses his to
encourage.
It might be said that understandably there is no analog in
Wittgenstein's philosophy for meditation, which is central and crucial
in Zen and in Buddhism generally; accordingly there can be no place for
the techniques appropriate to meditation in the practice of his
philosophy. This, of course, is true but the difference goes deeper than
that. It has to do with the different diagnoses of spiritual disorder,
provided one is prepared to describe the puzzlement and perplexity with
which Wittgenstein was so afflicted. For whereas he seems to ascribe it
to our lack of a clear view of the logical grammar of our discourse and
uses the knowledge of this gained by philosophy to make the distinctions
which help to release us from our worries, in Zen we come to see how
ego-centeredness and attachment lead us to make distinctions and keep
things apart when really they are together all the time. If one says
that both agree in regarding ignorance as a crucial source of our
troubles, then it seems clear enough that each understands the term
differently. Again, Wittgenstein is much more concerned with therapy
than with the style of life which follows successful therapy. One gets
the impression that he regarded the kind of enlightenment he sought as
marking the end of crucial philosophical practice for a person, though
he may, of course deepen and extend his understanding and try to help
others by acquainting them with his skills and techniques. So far as Zen
is concerned, there is an unfortunate and rather prevalent
misconception that enlightenment or satori is the end and culmination of
Zen practice; whereas it is the beginning of it.
For both Wittgenstein and Zen, enlightenment is thought of in
terms of changing the angle of vision to what is natural or what is
given rather than of replacing them with something else or of directing
our attention elsewhere. Because the forms of nature, of life, and of
language are all right as they stand, the source of our difficulties
lies in ourselves. Wittgenstein likens philosophy to a therapy of the
users of language rather than of language itself; there are different
methods like different therapies and they should be used according to
the circumstances. He refuses to tie us down to any one method and has
no
p. 481
philosophical theses to propound. He is constantly trying to free us
from the bewitchment of words and concepts and ignorance of what we are
doing when we use language -- all of which lead to rigidity and
dogmatism and one-sided emphases and theses. This instrumental approach
and the attempt to free us from rigidity and dogmatism has obvious
resemblances to what are regarded as the results of Zen practice. The
enlightenment conferred by both Wittgensteinian and Zen practice is a
kind of emancipation or freedom. For Wittgenstein it is the kind of
emancipation which makes one capable of not philosophizing when one
wants, of taking it up or putting it down. Above all it means freedom
from the obsessive worries and perplexities which played a central role
in his life. It might be said that any resemblance between the freedom
attainable by Wittgensteinian and Zen methods can, at most, be only
partial. But I think the position is that if a person did happen to
attain Wittgensteinian freedom one could not guarantee that he would be
free from such worries as those about death, the way he is treated by
others, and the like; whereas if he genuinely attained the freedom
sought by Zen one should be able to guarantee this. In other words one
cannot assert that the Wittgensteinian would not be free from such
worries but only that one could not guarantee it. Finally regarding
procedure, there are certainly striking resemblances between
Wittgenstein's practice of "assembling reminders for a certain purpose"
and his procedure with his students, and certain aspects of Zen
practice.
To dismiss the differences and resemblances mentioned as
superficial and unimportant does not seem to me to be reasonable, but
this means that any attempt to assess the claim that Wittgenstein was
striving for the same goal as that sought by Zen is not a simple and
straightforward matter. The differences are such that they cannot be
said to be seeking the same identical goal. On the other hand, the
resemblances are good enough to make it unreasonable to assert that they
are completely different. In view of this I think we can conclude that
there is a resemblance between the goal of Wittgenstein and that of Zen,
and by saying this I mean that the resemblance is of a significant and
not merely of a superficial kind. To go further than this does not seem
possible because any argument for drawing them closer together can be
countered by good arguments for keeping them further apart and vice
versa. When it is claimed that the two goals have a likeness or
resemblance it is natural to want some more definite statement and to
ask: "How alike and how unlike are they?" But such a question gives rise
to other difficult and complex ones, which it would be out of place to
try to answer here; for example, What are the criteria to be employed in
reaching a decision and what kind of person is best qualified to act as
judge or assessor in such a matter? Indeed, has such a question any
answer at all or in what sense if any has it one?
In recent years there have been those who assert that the philosophy
of Wittgenstein resembles Zen Buddhism and those who deny it on the
ground that any supposed resemblances are only apparent. But, so far as I
know, neither party has made any serious attempt to substantiate his
claim. Normally this is understandable because their main purposes lie
in a different directions. It is, for instance, quite common for the
latter merely to locate Wittgenstein in a different philosophical
tradition and pin a label such as Logical Positivism or Logical
Empiricism on him. I think the matter is much more complex than this or
indeed than either party seems to allow. I want to try to see to what
extent either position can be supported. Any errors and confusions of
which I am guilty may perhaps stimulate someone to give a more thorough
treatment or to attempt further clarification by way of correction. [1]
In one of his typical dissertations Wittgenstein himself pointed
out that its spirit was different from the mainstream of European and
American civilization. [2] About this K. T. Fann comments: "It is not
surprising that we should find striking resemblances between
Wittgenstein's methods and those of Zen Buddhism -- a philosophy from a
very different culture." [3] Because it is not relevant to his main
purpose Fann does not proceed to clarify or support his assertion about
these resemblances. He merely contents himself with one or two general
remarks about the well-known ability of Zen masters to show the
nonsensical character of metaphysical questions along with a remark
about a resemblance between the enlightenment attributed to the Buddha
and the state of complete clarity for which Wittgenstein was striving.
This seems as good a starting point as any other, and I will begin
negatively by challenging some of the resemblances mentioned by Fann.
At the outset one of his assertions must be rejected and another
regarded as seriously misleading. In the first place Zen is described as
"a philosophy from a very different culture." That Zen is the product
of a very different culture cannot be disputed; but that it is a
philosophy has to be denied, and Zennists have always done so. Indeed
Zen is a deliberate and clearheaded rejection of the propriety of
importing philosophizing of any kind into the types of situation where
the person is directly concerned with the attainment of the
enlightenment and liberation attributed to the Buddha. This may well
give Zen a certain philosophical interest, especially when some of the
methods used by Zen
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. Hudson is a member of the Philosophy Department, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand.
1. Whenever I write about Buddhism I include Zen Buddhism, and
instead of "Zen Buddhism" I have used the term "Zen" for convenience.
The Wittgenstein of whom I write is the Wittgenstein of the
Philosophical Investigations and other associated works, not the earlier
Wittgenstein who wrote the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
2. Cf. Wittgenstein's Foreword to his Philosophische Bermerkugen.
3. K. T. Fann, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 110.
p. 472
masters have the purpose of helping the individual to realize the
absurdity of doing this. One may also, of course, philosophize about the
"aim" of Zen and its methods but as has often been pointed out, this is
not to practice it.
Secondly, Fann speaks of Zen masters showing the nonsensical
character of metaphysical questions. This is true, but misleading. It
might be interpreted as meaning, for example, that Zen masters hold
implicitly at least some general thesis about the nonsensicality of such
questions and assertions. But this is not so, either in Zen in
particular or in Buddhism in general. When the Buddha was asked the
famous Four Questions we are told that he refused to answer, saying that
they were profitless because they are irrelevant to the problem of
freeing us from suffering and are unanswerable or undecidable. By the
latter he has to be taken as meaning just what he says and exhorting us
to leave what is undecidable as undecidable. By abstaining from any kind
of yes or no answer he takes the Middle Way or the freedom of no
position on such matters. The questions have been said to be like asking
whether the hair of a tortoise is smooth or hard; but whatever we may
think of this analogy, the error involved seems to be that of confusing
the Transcendent with what is empirical in the ordinary sense of the
latter word. [4] Alternatively it amounts to confusing what is beyond
all conceptualization with what is conceptualized, or confusing two
different categories. Later in the Maadhyamika dialectic, there is a
systematic effort to show that if we abandon the Buddha's position on
such questions and relapse into dogmatism or giving a yes or a no
answer, the result is self-contradiction and nonsense. But the dialectic
is an attempt to demonstrate the absurdity of dogmatic attitudes to
propositions rather than the absurdity of the propositions themselves.
There is nothing wrong in conceptualization, the fault lies in us when
we confuse it with what is beyond conceptualization and take a dogmatic
attitude about the truth of the consequences of our mistake or about the
falsity of someone else's. In Zen, where the chief concern is with the
practice of meditation, a Zen master may indeed show the nonsensical
character of metaphysical questions and assertions, but when doing so he
speaks from the position of the Buddha, with such points as those
mentioned in mind, to those who are actively and directly engaged in
attaining enlightenment.
Nevertheless there is a perfectly legitimate function for
Buddhist metaphysics, although it is subject to certain provisos. It
must be constructed in such a way that it is helpful in freeing us from
attachment and, in accordance with the principles of the
nonsubstantiality of all things, their impermanence and conditionality.
In so helping us it will not and cannot describe or give us a picture of
the world as seen by a buddha, but it can point to the experience of a
4. Cf. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, 2d ed. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960), pp. 44-45.
p. 473
buddha. Such schemes give us an account in terms of basic
constituents or the interrelatedness of things of such a kind that it
would be impossible or even conceptually absurd to be attached to them.
We are apt to become attached to our own pictures or constructions,
which we make from such accounts, and when this happens we are victims
of illusion. So we can say that any Buddhist metaphysic contains an
inbuilt correction against dogmatic attachment to it: like a kind of
medicine that carries with it an antidote against addiction.
From a conventional point of view such a metaphysic may be
regarded as true, and certainly every effort will be made to provide
something which can be so regarded. But this kind of truth applies only
to conceptual constructions, and its importance lies in the fact that it
enhances the scheme's utility for helping people. In short, its
function is basically therapeutic, and the motive involved is
compassion. One is not guilty of dogmatism even if one does regard such a
scheme as true, for one can see through it, so to speak -- see that it
is only a mere set of conceptual constructions and see that it points to
what is really important. It is the kind of thing to which it would be
absurd to be attached, so one is free to take it up or put it down
according to circumstances. Buddhism has often been described as
antimetaphysical, but this is a serious oversimplification. It all
depends on what we have in mind by metaphysics.
Wittgenstein was not antimetaphysical either, at least not in the
way that it has often been supposed. He has no project such as the
elimination of metaphysics nor has he any intention of reducing
metaphysical propositions to nonsense. When doing Wittgensteinian
philosophy, metaphysical assertions are at first typically puzzling.
Then we are able to see that a feature of such propositions is that they
obliterate the distinction between empirical and conceptual inquiries.
[5] They then take on the aspect of nonsense. But at a deeper level of
analysis we realize that they are illuminating because they help to give
us a clear view of the logical or philosophical grammar of important
terms in our language. It is because we lack such a view that so many of
our philosophical troubles arise. [6] The metaphysical assertions
remain quite undisturbed or unaltered for now we can see that they are
quite all right as they stand. Our angle of vision of them has changed.
This situation calls to mind a Zen master's characterization of what
happens in Zen practice. "Before you study Zen, mountains are mountains
and rivers are rivers; while you are studying it, mountains are no
longer mountains and rivers are no longer rivers; but once you have
Enlightenment, mountains are once again mountains and rivers are
rivers." [7] Despite the obvious difference between the philosophical
practice of
5. Cf. Wittgenstein, Zettel trans. C. E. M. Anscombe, ed. C. E. M.
Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1967), para. 458.
6. Cf. Philosophical Investigations, trans. C. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), para. 122.
7. D. T. Suzuki, Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of Suzuki, ed. William Barrett (New York: Doubleday, 1956), pp. xvi-xvii.
p. 474
Wittgenstein and Zen meditation there is an intriguing parallel
between the steps taken to enlightenment or understanding in each.
When Wittgenstein speaks of bringing metaphysical terms back to
their uses in everyday language, [8] he does not do so from any spirit
of hostility to metaphysics but because he wishes to show how they
illuminate the deeper logical grammar of our language. This consists of
rules analogous to "A sphere has no length" or "A rod must have length,"
and rules of course are not descriptions. But with metaphysical
assertions we get what could be described as proposals to alter some of
the basic grammar. It is this which makes them illuminating and, even at
this deeper level of analysis, can give them a paradoxical look;
although once we can see what is going on they lose this. But as far as
this kind of view is concerned there is, to my knowledge, no parallel in
Buddhist thought.
As for the view that a feature of metaphysical propositions is
that they obliterate the distinction between conceptual and empirical
inquiries, there may appear to be some agreement but this is superficial
and masks an important difference. The word 'empirical' can be
misleading here. What Wittgenstein has in mind by an empirical inquiry
would be regarded in Buddhism as merely another conceptual type. For
Wittgenstein, for instance, natural science would certainly count as an
empirical inquiry, but not for Buddhism, because it has an elaborate
conceptual structure. Again, Zen is often said to be concerned with
direct, concrete experience. When we speak of an experience in this way,
we might think of direct perceptual experience as a typical example,
albeit this kind of experience is conceptualized; in Zen we have to
think in terms of nonconceptualized sensory experience. But this kind of
experience should not be thought of merely as nonconceptual. It is the
experience of one who is free from selfcenteredness and the attachments
that go with it. It is no use protesting that to do this is strictly
impossible. A whack with a master's stick or the first moment of pain
after burning ourselves on a hot stove will cut through our sophistries.
So the demarcation between the empirical and the conceptual is drawn
along different lines from that taken in Western philosophy.
Nor is there any analogy in Wittgenstein's work corresponding to
the mistake which the Buddhists think lies behind dogmatic metaphysics,
that is, the confusion of transcendental experience with ordinary
experience. And while metaphysics may be illuminating for each, it can
hardly be said to be illuminating in the same way. Nevertheless, despite
this difference, there is an interesting parallel in the various steps
or stages of illumination and between the flexible attitudes toward
metaphysics. I suppose that the mistake mentioned has some analogy with
the kind of mistake which Gilbert Ryle called a "category confusion" or
with what Wittgenstein would describe as a confusion of
8. Philosophical Investigations, para 116.
p. 475
the rules of different kinds of language games. The Buddha seems to
have laid down a basic rule for the conduct of religious thinking. It is
not so much that this rule is peculiar to Buddhism but the way in which
it is applied is a crucial factor in giving Buddhism its distinctive
character.
Wittgenstein does not try to restrict us to any one view of
metaphysics. Like most other assertions, metaphysical assertions are
multifunctional. He has suggestions about another way of looking at
them. Our ordinary language "holds our minds in one position, as it
were, and in this position sometimes it feels cramped, having a desire
for other positions as well." [9] A metaphysician invents a notation
which stresses a difference more strongly, makes it more obvious than
ordinary language does. In a way he has discovered "a new way of looking
at things. As if [he] had invented a new way of painting, or again a
new metre, or a new kind of song." [10] According to this suggestion
then, metaphysics can be regarded as giving us the grammar so to speak,
of a new way of thinking which is involved in seeing the world
differently and which frees us from a kind of suffering -- from a sense
of mental or spiritual cramp or constriction. There can be, at the very
most, only a very limited analogy between the kind of suffering
Wittgenstein and the Buddhists have in mind, and the notion of word
'liberation' serves to conceal an important difference rather than to
indicate any significant similarity. For in Buddhism, liberation serves
to fit us for life in this everyday world by freeing us from its grip
not to give us a vision of a different world or even of this world seen
in terms of different categories and conceptual distinctions. Despite
his suggestion, perhaps it is significant that Wittgenstein himself in
his work concentrated on the philosophical practice of trying to free us
from deep, personal puzzles and perplexities. But whether this
indicates a deeper resemblance requires separate and subsequent
consideration.
Buddhism has been described as a set of methods and techniques
rather than as a set of doctrines, for even though it is customary to
speak of "doctrines," they are only conceptual constructions and their
test is their utility. Accordingly they are best regarded
methodologically rather than as statements of absolute and fundamental
truths. Wittgenstein too, denied that he taught any philosophical theses
or doctrines but only methods which function as kinds of therapy. For
philosophical perplexities are like different kinds of illness, and so
different methods are to be used according to the circumstances. Whether
Buddhism and Wittgenstein are or are not concerned basically with the
same thing, their attitudes toward dogmatism in philosophy are
surprisingly similar. [11]
9. Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Books 1st ed., ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), p. 59.
10. Philosophical Investigations, para. 401.
11. Cf. ibid., paras. 132 and 133.
p. 476
Because of his obvious interest in ordinary language and its
connection with our perplexities, a lot of people seem to think that
Wittgenstein was mainly concerned with a therapy of language. He is not
concerned, however, with linguistic pathology and some type of surgical
reconstruction of language, but with people -- the users of language --
and with some of the special features of the instrument they use when
they use language. These are the features which are of special interest
to philosophers, since lack of proper appreciation of them is an
important cause of our philosophical troubles. There is nothing wrong
with natural language; there is not even anything wrong with
metaphysical language; the trouble lies in us: in our lack of knowledge
and insight into what we are doing when we use language. Consequently he
says: "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of
language; it can in the end only describe it." [12] Of course he did not
mean that philosophy may not affect our own personal use of language,
for instance, by giving it greater clarity, but he did not see the task
of philosophy, as he wanted to do it, as the introduction of linguistic
reforms which substitute supposedly more precise and refined forms for
ordinary language. He wanted to help the users to reform themselves.
This, of course, is a far cry from the position of various contemporary
purveyors of formal linguistic programs and systems who are eagerly
contributing their mite to the process of fitting us for the dawning
automated and computerized society.
From a Zen point of view there is nothing wrong with the forms of
ordinary experience nor with the forms of life which make up ordinary
existence. There is not even anything wrong with conceptual thinking and
with metaphysics. The trouble lies in us. There is no program of
substituting some special supermundane experience for ordinary
experience nor some special type of holy life for ordinary everyday
life. But after the kind of insight which can occur in Zen practice,
although in a sense everything is left as it is, the person is different
because his angle of vision has changed. Ordinary experience is now the
experience of a bodhisattva and our ordinary life is the holy life.
Here again, even though one might say that Wittgenstein and the Zen
Buddhists are obviously talking about different things, there is an
interesting similarity of attitude and approach to them. In connection
with this, Wittgenstein emphasized that language was inescapably
connected with life and with experience. "... the speaking of a language
is part of an activity, or a form of life." [13] "... for is what is
linguistic not an experience?" [14]
Wittgenstein tells us that philosophical problems have depth:
that "they are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the
forms of our language
12. Ibid., para. 124.
13. Ibid., para. 23.
14. Ibid., para. 649.
p. 477
and their significance is as great as the importance of our
language." [15] I think that Zen Buddhists would agree with the first
statement and would also agree with Wittgenstein's characterization of
philosophy as a battle against the bewitchment of the intelligence by
words, but they would not regard the second statement as adequate. We
want a heart that is not bewitched, not merely an intelligence. The
roots of our problems are certainly deep, but the depth differs from
that of our linguistic forms and is proportional to the depth of our
ego-centeredness.
Zen methods enable us to reach down or out through thought and
language, as normally used, to quite a different level or kind of
experience. Language can still be used here, of course, but not as it is
normally used in everyday life and science; for example, as any reading
of Zen literature quickly shows, and certainly not in a way appropriate
to a more linguistic type of therapy of the users of language in a
philosophical context. In order to help us reach out through thought and
language and appreciate the different type of task or problem with
which we are faced, certain more intellectual and philosophical moves
are sometimes made as preliminary steps. It is here that Fann's remark
about the well-known ability of Zen masters to show the nonsensical
character of metaphysical questions and assertions applies. The swift
ironic and sometimes humorous demolition of such questions and
assertions serves to remind us that thinking of this type is out of
place. The use of more philosophical comments as reminders calls to mind
one of Wittgenstein's characterizations of philosophy as "assembling
reminders for a certain purpose." [16] But although the general function
is the same, the more special function is different for philosophical
comments are used to remind us of different things. Wittgenstein keeps
trying to bring us back from abstractions to what is concrete and
familiar, but which we are apt to overlook when we are doing philosophy;
and he keeps reminding us of these things and of what people do and do
not merely say in familiar everyday situations. This should not be taken
to mean that he gives what is familiar and everyday a special status at
the expense of what is unusual or strange but that he uses one to
illuminate the other. Obviously this cannot be done unless one can see
what is before one's eyes or under one's nose all the time.
Since it is a severely practical form of Buddhism, Zen is par
excellence meditational Buddhism. In Rinzai Zen, as is well known,
kooans are introduced into the meditation situation. These kooans, among
other things, can be regarded as functioning as reminders or warnings
that intellectual and logical types of thinking are out of place. But
whether kooans are introduced into the meditation situation or whether
this situation is itself regarded as a kooan, the
15. Ibid., para. 111.
16. Ibid., para. 127.
p. 478
effect at first is to generate deep puzzlement and perplexity. For
here the individual does not know his way about, and even if he is given
useful hints and admonitions he does not know how to adjust to the
situation. Nor is he told or shown, supposing that were possible: this
would defeat the entire point of the procedure. He must find his own way
himself. This makes Zen deeply personal in a very direct way.
Recognition of this adds another dimension to what we should understand
by direct concrete experience in Zen and adds another difference to what
we would understand even if we spoke of 'direct concrete personal
experience'. This with all deference to Wittgenstein who also thought
that philosophy was deeply personal and not something formal, neutral,
and detached.
Because the person does not know his way about in the kooan cum
meditation situation, the situation seems to have the typical form of
one which can be cleared up by intelligent inquiry, experimentation, and
reflection. Despite warnings and reminders he will tend to treat it as
if it were a situation of this kind and become more puzzled and
perplexed than ever. He displays a tendency to force all problem
situations into the same general mold, thus showing how his thinking is
nourished by one-sided examples, which Wittgenstein remarks is a main
cause of philosophical disease; a statement with which any Zen master
could agree. A crucial step is made when the person sees, not merely
intellectually but deeply feels, that his rigid and stereotyped approach
is not correct. It is a very intelligent kind of insight. Rather too
much by way of overcorrection of prevalent tendencies is apt to be made
of the so-called non-rationality of Zen.
The deep puzzlement and frustration generated in this situation
has an analog in Wittgenstein's procedure with his students. He did his
utmost to ensure that they were thoroughly perplexed by a philosophical
problem. They had to actually feel and live it and work their way into
and through it. A person has to feel the need of the clarification,
which a comment or observation on a philosophical problem may bring,
otherwise it is worth very little. He does not give us any so-called
answers, but only methods and suggestions to be used according to the
circumstances; nor does he explain to us how to use his methods,
although he gives us examples to illustrate their point, which we have
to see for ourselves. Again, he believed that a question is often best
disposed of by a question; to give an answer is often unfair for it is
apt to involve one-sidedness and in any case is too apt to close up
further inquiries. Sometimes he disposes of a question or a thesis by a
joke. He once even suggested that a perfectly serious philosophical work
could be written which consisted entirely of jokes or of questions. The
similarity in the type of procedure used to that used by a Zen master
is too obvious to require further comment.
Finally, Wittgenstein has no intention of trying to tie us to
philosophy. On the contrary, by freeing us from philosophical
perplexities he aims to free us
p. 479
from philosophy; for the discovery which really counts is the one
that makes one capable of not philosophizing when one wants. It is
hardly surprising that various professional philosophers should regard
such a standpoint with amused incredulity and scepticism. In Buddhism
too the aim, among other things, is to free us from the grip of
doctrines and teachings, even Buddhist ones: for these are merely like
rafts, which enable us to cross a river. When we have crossed we have no
further use for them. Here again, whatever we may say about the
similarity or lack of it between the final goal of peace and clarity for
which Wittgenstein was striving and the goal of Zen, one can hardly
deny a similarity in attitude to theses and doctrines.
Wittgenstein saw philosophical problems, not as interesting,
intellectual puzzles but as deeply personal and genuinely tormenting,
and for him the practice of philosophy was a way of life for freeing us
from them. He speaks of the peace that comes from the real philosophical
discovery, "the ... discovery which makes me capable of stopping doing
philosophy when I want to." [17] So for him, philosophy can be regarded
as a way of liberation from obsessive worries and perplexities that have
a central role in our lives and find their expression in philosophical
problems. The culminating question of whether there is any analogy
between 'the real philosophical discovery' of which he speaks and the
serenity and clarity and the ability to 'take up and put down' theses,
attitudes, and feelings as they come and go, without agitation or
disturbance, which are products of Zen meditation and training, must now
be faced.
Enough has been said, I think, to show that to maintain there is
no similarity between Zen and the philosophical practice of
Wittgenstein, is untenable. But although the similarities mentioned may
be interesting and surprising, and depending on our point of view and
approach, even important, it does not follow that they warrant any claim
of a similarity such as the one in question. Perhaps what they take to
be the absence of this similarity is what some people have in mind when
they say there is no real resemblance. I will now attempt to put forward
some considerations which support this claim.
When all is said and done Buddhist philosophy and Zen practice
are based on a faith which understandably finds no expression in
Wittgenstein's position. Naagaarjuna, for example, may indeed have been a
great critical and dialectical philosopher in his own right, but he was
a deeply religious man and his philosophy is carried out from this
position and can be properly understood only in terms of it. Again, it
is doubtful, to say the least, whether Zen has anything even approaching
the same view of the dispersal of doubt and perplexity that
Wittgenstein has. In Rinzai Zen for instance, one does not try to clear
up and resolve doubts and worries about the meaning of life, the world,
and so on, by
17. Ibid., para. 133.
p. 480
linguistic analysis or any other kind of analysis. One simply doubts
and doubts until, as it has been said, one becomes one with the doubt.
Indeed it is doubtful whether "doubt" is even quite the right word, for
there is wonder and faith involved as well. Wittgenstein's procedure
with his students is certainly surprisingly like that of a Zen master
with his pupils. But their aim is different. The former wants to get his
students to feel the doubt for themselves as a preliminary to exploring
and probing it. The latter wants to help his pupils to dispose of
anything that will distract them from just letting their doubt alone and
becoming one with it. This, of course, applies, among other things, to
the demonstrations of the absurdity of metaphysical types of questions
and assertions. In other words he uses his supporting procedures to
discourage the very kind of activities that Wittgenstein uses his to
encourage.
It might be said that understandably there is no analog in
Wittgenstein's philosophy for meditation, which is central and crucial
in Zen and in Buddhism generally; accordingly there can be no place for
the techniques appropriate to meditation in the practice of his
philosophy. This, of course, is true but the difference goes deeper than
that. It has to do with the different diagnoses of spiritual disorder,
provided one is prepared to describe the puzzlement and perplexity with
which Wittgenstein was so afflicted. For whereas he seems to ascribe it
to our lack of a clear view of the logical grammar of our discourse and
uses the knowledge of this gained by philosophy to make the distinctions
which help to release us from our worries, in Zen we come to see how
ego-centeredness and attachment lead us to make distinctions and keep
things apart when really they are together all the time. If one says
that both agree in regarding ignorance as a crucial source of our
troubles, then it seems clear enough that each understands the term
differently. Again, Wittgenstein is much more concerned with therapy
than with the style of life which follows successful therapy. One gets
the impression that he regarded the kind of enlightenment he sought as
marking the end of crucial philosophical practice for a person, though
he may, of course deepen and extend his understanding and try to help
others by acquainting them with his skills and techniques. So far as Zen
is concerned, there is an unfortunate and rather prevalent
misconception that enlightenment or satori is the end and culmination of
Zen practice; whereas it is the beginning of it.
For both Wittgenstein and Zen, enlightenment is thought of in
terms of changing the angle of vision to what is natural or what is
given rather than of replacing them with something else or of directing
our attention elsewhere. Because the forms of nature, of life, and of
language are all right as they stand, the source of our difficulties
lies in ourselves. Wittgenstein likens philosophy to a therapy of the
users of language rather than of language itself; there are different
methods like different therapies and they should be used according to
the circumstances. He refuses to tie us down to any one method and has
no
p. 481
philosophical theses to propound. He is constantly trying to free us
from the bewitchment of words and concepts and ignorance of what we are
doing when we use language -- all of which lead to rigidity and
dogmatism and one-sided emphases and theses. This instrumental approach
and the attempt to free us from rigidity and dogmatism has obvious
resemblances to what are regarded as the results of Zen practice. The
enlightenment conferred by both Wittgensteinian and Zen practice is a
kind of emancipation or freedom. For Wittgenstein it is the kind of
emancipation which makes one capable of not philosophizing when one
wants, of taking it up or putting it down. Above all it means freedom
from the obsessive worries and perplexities which played a central role
in his life. It might be said that any resemblance between the freedom
attainable by Wittgensteinian and Zen methods can, at most, be only
partial. But I think the position is that if a person did happen to
attain Wittgensteinian freedom one could not guarantee that he would be
free from such worries as those about death, the way he is treated by
others, and the like; whereas if he genuinely attained the freedom
sought by Zen one should be able to guarantee this. In other words one
cannot assert that the Wittgensteinian would not be free from such
worries but only that one could not guarantee it. Finally regarding
procedure, there are certainly striking resemblances between
Wittgenstein's practice of "assembling reminders for a certain purpose"
and his procedure with his students, and certain aspects of Zen
practice.


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[Chuyện bất thường](/tin-tuc/cuoi/chuyen-bat-thuong-2189352.html)/ [Eva nói gì?](/tin-tuc/cuoi/tieu-pham/eva-noi-gi-2188554.html)/ [Cần bố làm gì?](/tin-tuc/cuoi/can-bo-lam-gi-2188066.html)
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Hai cậu bé ngồi tranh luận với nhau. Một em bảo: "Lương mới của bố tớ cao hơn lương mới của bố cậu".
- Chưa chắc.
- Anh tớ học giỏi hơn anh cậu.
- Chưa chắc.
- Chị tớ đẹp hơn chị cậu
- Chưa chắc.
- Vậy thì mẹ tớ đẹp hơn mẹ cậu vậy.
- Điểm này thì chắc đấy.
- Vì sao cậu dám chắc vậy?
- Bố tớ cũng thừa nhận như vậy mà!

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![ Tăng giá xăng dầu từ 12h trưa nay ](/upload/WPA-2014-03/19/vnt_9LtorR_cefXANG.jpg)
Petrolimex chính thức tăng giá xăng dầu từ 12h trưa nay (19.3).
Lãnh đạo Petrolimex cho biết: Việc điều chỉnh
**dầu lần này xuất phát từ thực tiễn diễn biến giá dầu thành phẩm trên thị trường thế giới trong chu kỳ tính giá, phù hợp với nguyên tắc xác định giá bán tại Nghị định 84/2009/NĐ-CP ngày 15.10.2009 của Chính phủ về kinh doanh xăng dầu (NĐ 84) và các văn bản hướng dẫn thi hành NĐ 84 của Liên bộ Tài chính - Công Thương.** [giá xăng](http://vntimes.com.vn/tin-tuc/tin-xa-hoi/68162-xang-tang-gia-nguoi-viet-tiet-kiem-nhat-asean.html)
Quyết định về giá bán xăng dầu số 112/PLX-QĐ-TGĐ ngày 19.3.2014 do Phó tổng giám đốc Petrolimex Phạm Đức Thắng ký đã được gửi đến tất cả các đơn vị thành viên Petrolimex và báo cáo lên Văn phòng Chính phủ, Bộ Công Thương, Bộ Tài chính, Tổ giám sát Liên bộ Tài chính - Công Thương.
Ngoài ra, theo văn bản số 3458/BTC-QLG ngày 19.3.2014 của Bộ Tài chính về việc điều hành kinh doanh xăng dầu, mức chi sử dụng Quỹ Bình ổn giá (BOG) áp dụng từ 12 trưa nay cụ thể như sau: Xăng RON92, RON 95 giữ nguyên mức chi 300 đồng/lít; các loại diesel, dầu hỏa, dầu madút đều ngừng sử dụng quỹ BOG.
Đây là lần thứ hai giá xăng dầu tăng trong năm 2014. Trước đó, Petrolimex cũng .
Anh Đức
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**tim ban trai de qua dem miễn phí**thì hãy kéo xuống dưới bình luận bằng tài khoản của mình, chúng tôi sẽ gửi **tim ban trai de qua dem**qua cho bạn trong thời gian sớm nhất! Cảm ơn bạn đã quan tâm nhớ like và ++ cho chúng tôi để ủng hộ nha. Cảm ơn bạn! Còn nếu không bình luận bạn sẽ phải mất phí 15k để có thể xem nội dung.

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markdown: Con gái nhà Beckham lè lưỡi trước ống kính Linh Anh, Theo Dailymail Thứ Hai, ngày 13/2/2012 - 16:10 Tweet Abc Abc Email Print ANTĐ - Trong buổi ra mắt bộ sưu tập thời trang mới nhất của Victoria tại New York, David Beckham đã cùng cô con gái bé bỏng Harper đến dự và cổ vũ cho vợ của mình. Ngay từ lúc xuất hiện với bố, bé Harper đã trở thành một ngôi sao thu hút ống kính của các phóng viên. Trong tuần lễ thời trang New York, buổi trình diễn bộ sưu tập của Victoria có sự góp mặt của bé Harper trong vòng tay bố ngay hàng ghế đầu. Cô bé xuất hiện với chiếc váy len xinh xắn màu xám, kết hợp với quần tất và mũ len màu trắng. Một bức ảnh đã ghi lại được khoảnh khắc vô cùng đáng yêu của Harper khi cô bé thè lưỡi vào ống kính. David Beckham xuất hiện vô cùng lịch lãm và phong độ, trong khi Victoria lại diện một chiếc váy dài cùng cặp kính đen phong cách. Đây là lần ra mắt bộ sưu tập thu đông 2012/2013 của Victoria. Hai bố con cùng mẹ vào hậu trường David Beckham ngồi ngay hàng đầu, cạnh bà Anna - Tổng biên tập tạp chí Vogue Victoria xuất hiện vào cuối buổi diễn Tag : thời trang bóng đá ca sĩ con gái Tweet Bình luận Xem thêm Ý kiến của bạn sẽ được biên tập trước khi đăng. Xin vui lòng gõ tiếng Việt có dấu Họ tên (*) Email (*) Refresh Nhập mã bảo mật (*) Gửi Nhập lại Tin, bài khác 23.11.2014 “Điểm danh” những bộ áo dài Nguyễn Thị Loan mặc dự thi Miss World 23.11.2014 Nguyễn Thị Loan lộng lẫy trong trang phục thi Dance of the world 23.11.2014 Chờ đợi “bom tấn” 2015 22.11.2014 HHTG 2014: Ngày đầu tiên của Nguyễn Thị Loan ở xứ sở xương mù 22.11.2014 Fukushima hồi sinh 22.11.2014 Phim kinh dị Việt ra rạp dịp Giáng sinh

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# Cách làm sinh tố Xoài cam
Ngày 14/07/2013
Chỉ mất 5 phút nhưng bạn sẽ có một ly sinh tố thơm ngon từ xoài và cam để thưởng thức trong ngày cuối tuần.
**Cách làm sinh tố xoài cam cực đơn giản.**
**Nguyên liệu:**
- ¾ chén nước cam
- 180g sữa chua vani ít béo
- 1 muỗng canh mật ong
- 1 ½ chén xoài thái miếng để đông lạnh
- ½ chén đào thái miếng để đông lạnh
**Cách làm:**
Trộn nước cam, sữa chua, mật ong vào trong máy xay.
Thêm xoài vào đào rồi xay nhuyễn thành sinh tố.
Cho sinh tố xoài cam ra cốc rồi thưởng thức nhé!
Like, Share, Commentđể chia sẻ bài thuốc quý cho bạn bè nhé!

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Văn phòng Chủ tịch nước: Công bố 13 luật và 2 nghị quyết
Công bố 13 luật và 2 nghị quyết mới
Chủ tịch nước công bố Luật biển Việt Nam
Xem thêm vùng biển chủ quyền
Đình chỉ công tác ba cán bộ thuộc Công ty Quản lý bay miền nam
“Lộc quan khác với ăn chặn của dân!”
Mất quyền điều hành bay ở Tân Sơn Nhất: Đình chỉ một PGĐ
Tiếng chuông cảnh báo từ vụ ông Trần Văn Truyền
Triều cường tại TPHCM sẽ tiếp tục lên cao
Tạo mục mới Top mục tự tạo
Nhúng Baomoi vào web của bạn
Thống kê & So sánh báo điện tử
Việc tổng hợp và sắp xếp các thông tin trên Báo Mới đều được thực hiện tự động bởi một chương trình máy tính.
Giấy phép số 46/GP-TTĐT cấp ngày 13/01/2012
Báo Mới có bản quyền thuộc Công ty Cổ phần Công nghệ EPI.

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Clip dài gần 4 phút là nỗi lòng của một số bạn trẻ về tình trạng đăng ký học tín chỉ. Clip được chế lời qua bài hát khá nổi đình nổi đám của nhóm nhạc T-Ara. Dù chỉ mới đăng tải lên không lâu nhưng clip đã thu hút được khá nhiều lượt xem bởi sự tò mò và có phần đồng cảm của các bạn sinh viên.
Ảnh cắt ra từ clip. Nguồn Youtube
Việc đăng ký tín chỉ ở các trường thường gần với giai đoạn ôn thi cuối kỳ. Thời điểm này, sinh viên vừa phải lo ôn thi, vừa túc trực ở các website của trường để “xếp hàng” đăng ký nhằm có được những lớp học, ca học tốt nhất. Clip đã tái hiện lại tình trạng khó khăn của việc đăng kí học tín chỉ của các bạn sinh viên.
"Gần đến sáng mới log in được. F5 vật vã rồi cũng đăng ký đủ các môn kỳ này. Có phải cho mỗi mình thôi đâu, đăng kí hôh một lũ bạn nữa thế mà đến 10h20 cả trường bị xóa sạch đăng ký". Lý giải cho việc đăng kí khó khăn này là các chị khóa trên cũng như các em khóa dưới chen nhau đăng kí "Các em khóa sau chen ngang, dù đã canh web cả buổi không dám đi vệ sinh". Và kết cục là "8 năm vẫn chưa thể ra khỏi trường vì chưa hoàn thành tín chỉ". Rồi lại tình trạng website của trường có vấn đề "Thi thoảng tự nhiên out. Thi thoảng lại đơ đơ. Tick xong không save được. Thằng nào số đen còn bị xóa lại một hai môn...đông người đăng nhập là lại nghẽn mạng"
Có thể nói clip trên đã phần nào bộc lộ được những khó khăn của các bạn sinh viên khi đăng kí học tín chỉ. Clip nhận được khá đông sự đồng cảm của các bạn trẻ.
Một bạn hiện đang là sinh viên năm 2 của một trường chia sẻ: Mình cũng đã trải qua cái cảm giác ngồi canh để đăng ký môn. Thật đúng là khủng khiếp, cả kì mong ngóng sao cho đăng kí được còn học môn khác nhưng nhiều lúc cũng không thể đăng kí được. Lúc đó nản chả muốn học nữa. Đành ngậm ngùi đợi đợt sau.
Bạn Linh Lan sinh viên năm 3 bày tỏ quan điểm của mình sau khi xem clip như sau: Mình khâm phục bạn làm clip này quá, chỉ một bài hát mà nói gần hết được tình trạng đăng kí tín chỉ của đám sinh viên mình. Bản thân mình cũng đã phải thức đêm thức hôm mà cũng không đăng kí được. Chỉ vì đăng kí lỡ mà mình chậm mất kế hoạch đã dự định.
Ngọc Mai sinh viên năm cuối cho biết: Ở trường mình, mạng nội bộ mặc dù tốt giúp đăng ký nhanh hơn. Nhưng mỗi khi đăng ký tín chỉ là mình phải túc trực mấy đêm liền.
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Võ Như Lanh, người của những dấu ấn
Kho chăn đệm lớn nhất Việt Nam giảm SỐC tới…
“Cất bằng đại học làm công nhân”: Không thể bình thường
600 HS thất học: Dân túc trực ngày đêm để giữ trường
Thí sinh HH Việt Nam bỏ thi khi dính nghi vấn đụng dao kéo
Sinh viên TQ giận giữ vì 'chú chó học giả' bị giết
Sinh viên không ở, công chức, viên chức không mặn mà
Tạo mục mới Top mục tự tạo
Nhúng Baomoi vào web của bạn
Thống kê & So sánh báo điện tử
Việc tổng hợp và sắp xếp các thông tin trên Báo Mới đều được thực hiện tự động bởi một chương trình máy tính.
Giấy phép số 46/GP-TTĐT cấp ngày 13/01/2012
Báo Mới có bản quyền thuộc Công ty Cổ phần Công nghệ EPI.


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(SGGPO).- Chỉ còn hơn 10 ngày nữa là diễn ra bầu cử đại biểu Quốc hội, đại biểu Hội đồng Nhân dân các cấp nhiệm kỳ 2011 - 2016 trên toàn quốc.
Những ngày này, Ủy ban MTTQ các quận huyện tại TPHCM đang tổ chức các buổi tiếp xúc cử tri để những người ứng cử đại biểu Quốc hội, Hội đồng Nhân dân thực hiện quyền vận động bầu cử thông qua việc gặp gỡ, báo cáo với cử tri về chương trình hành động của mình.
Để cử tri hiểu rõ hơn về những người ứng cử, SGGPO xin giới thiệu tiểu sử, chương trình hành động của từng người ứng cử để cử tri tham khảo nhằm lựa chọn, bầu ra những người tài đức, xứng đáng là đại biểu Quốc hội, đại biểu Hội đồng Nhân dân.
Bí thư Thành ủy TPHCM Lê Thanh Hải cùng các ứng cử viên đại biểu Quốc hội tiếp xúc cử tri quận 5. Ảnh: VIỆT DŨNG
V.Anh – H.Hiệp
>> Mời bạn xem tiểu sử, chương trình hành động của ứng cử viên đại biểu Quốc hội
>> Mời bạn xem tiểu sử, chương trình hành động của ứng cử viên đại biểu Hội đồng Nhân dân TPHCM
Ngân sách là tiền dân, phải công khai với dân
Tuần cuối, QH ấn nút quyết số phận phiếu tín…
Khán giả Rockstorm được ưu đãi gì khi dùng…
Tuần Khuyến Mại Cuối cùng – Tháng Khuyến mại…
Lịch cắt điện Hà Nội ngày 24/11/2014
Kho chăn đệm lớn nhất Việt Nam giảm SỐC tới…
Nhà báo Võ Như Lanh qua đời
Đình chỉ công tác ba cán bộ thuộc Công ty Quản lý bay miền nam
Tổng Bí thư đến Thủ đô Moscow bắt đầu thăm chính thức Liên bang Nga
Chiến hạm Việt Nam chạy suốt 5 ngày đêm thăm Indonesia
“Lộc quan khác với ăn chặn của dân!”
Tạo mục mới Top mục tự tạo
Nhúng Baomoi vào web của bạn
Thống kê & So sánh báo điện tử
Việc tổng hợp và sắp xếp các thông tin trên Báo Mới đều được thực hiện tự động bởi một chương trình máy tính.
Giấy phép số 46/GP-TTĐT cấp ngày 13/01/2012
Báo Mới có bản quyền thuộc Công ty Cổ phần Công nghệ EPI.


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Các đồng chí đảng viên tiêu biểu của Đảng bộ cơ quan Văn phòng QH được tặng Huy hiệu 40 năm tuổi đảng, gồm: Trần Đình Đàn, Lê Quốc Dung, Nguyễn Đăng Vang; các đồng chí nhận Huy hiệu 30 năm tuổi đảng, gồm: Trần Ngọc Đường, Ngô Quang Xuân, Nguyễn Đăng Tiến, Trịnh Sao Mai.
Phát biểu ý kiến tại buổi lễ, thay mặt Đảng đoàn QH và Ủy ban Thường vụ QH, đồng chí Nguyễn Phú Trọng nhiệt liệt chúc mừng các đồng chí được tặng Huy hiệu 40 năm và 30 năm tuổi đảng, đồng thời nêu rõ, đây không chỉ là niềm vui, vinh dự của các đảng viên mà còn là niềm vui chung của toàn Đảng bộ cơ quan Văn phòng QH, là kỷ niệm sâu sắc đối với mỗi người bởi được nhận Huy hiệu đúng vào dịp cả nước đang hướng tới kỷ niệm 1000 năm Thăng Long - Hà Nội. Việc trao Huy hiệu hôm nay là dịp để mỗi đảng viên nhìn lại quá trình phấn đấu, rèn luyện của mình, từ đó, tiếp tục nỗ lực vươn lên, phát huy kinh nghiệm đã có, hoàn thành xuất sắc nhiệm vụ được giao, góp phần gìn giữ, bảo vệ thành quả cách mạng.
Đồng chí Nguyễn Phú Trọng đề nghị các đảng viên được tặng Huy hiệu 40 năm và 30 năm tuổi đảng tiếp tục nêu gương sáng trong công tác, trong rèn luyện để thế hệ trẻ và quần chúng noi theo; giữ vững bản lĩnh chính trị, kiên quyết đấu tranh phản bác những quan điểm sai trái; đi đầu trong học tập và làm theo tấm gương đạo đức Hồ Chí Minh.
Trọn niềm tin yêu Đảng
Xem thêm huy hiệu đảng viên quốc hội đảng bộ
Nhà báo Võ Như Lanh qua đời
Tổng Bí thư đến Thủ đô Moscow bắt đầu thăm chính thức Liên bang Nga
Chiến hạm Việt Nam chạy suốt 5 ngày đêm thăm Indonesia
Những nụ cười rạng rỡ trên thảm đỏ Liên hoan phim quốc tế Hà Nội
Tổng Bí thư đã đến Moscow bắt đầu thăm chính thức Liên bang Nga
Tạo mục mới Top mục tự tạo
Nhúng Baomoi vào web của bạn
Thống kê & So sánh báo điện tử
Việc tổng hợp và sắp xếp các thông tin trên Báo Mới đều được thực hiện tự động bởi một chương trình máy tính.
Giấy phép số 46/GP-TTĐT cấp ngày 13/01/2012
Báo Mới có bản quyền thuộc Công ty Cổ phần Công nghệ EPI.


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#
[KHOAI MÌ LUỘC NƯỚC CỐT DỪA ](/khoai-mi-luoc-nuoc-cot-dua-rd)
7
Số điểm mỗi món ăn đạt khi được thành viên tạo ra, bình luận, yêu thích, chia sẻ.
- 10/05/2012 22:33 - 38668 lượt xem
[Thích]| 4 yêu thích [Chia sẻ](/socialshare/10441) [0 bình luận](/user/login?destination=node/10441) ![ KHOAI MÌ LUỘC NƯỚC CỐT DỪA ](http://www.bepgiadinh.com/sites/default/files/styles/recipe_w300/public/hinh_chinh/km_6.jpg)
![ KHOAI MÌ LUỘC NƯỚC CỐT DỪA ](http://www.bepgiadinh.com/sites/default/files/styles/recipe_w300/public/hinh_chinh/km_6.jpg)
- dưới 30 phút
- Đơn giản
## Nguyên liệu
|Khoai mì||1,5||kg|
|Dừa khô nạo||500||gr|
|Lá dứa||1||nắm|
|Muối||1||muỗng|
|Mè||1/2||chén|
|Đường||2||muỗng|
Ngon không thể tả !
## Các bước thực hiện
- 1
- Khoai mì tuỳ theo ý thích của bạn,nếu thích khoai dẻo thì mua khoai mì kè ,còn thích bột thì mua khoai bột .
- 2
- Gọt vỏ khoai rồi ngâm nước vài giờ, vớt ra xả lại vài nước .
- 3
- Cho một chén nước ấm vào dừa khô nhồi vắt một chén nước cốt để riêng .
- Xếp lá dứa dưới đáy nồi rồi xếp khoai lên .
- Thêm chừng một lít nước ấm nữa vô vắt nước dão dừa vào nồi khoai, canh sao cho nước dừa ngập sấp sấp mặt khoai là được.
- 4
- Bắc nồi khoai lên bếp nấu lửa vừa,thêm vào xíu muối . Luộc khoai mì thì không đậy nắp nhé !
- 5
- Luộc tới khi nước cạn thì khoai chín,đổ hết chén nước cốt dừa vô,chế đều khắp nồi khoai . Nấu thêm vài phút cho nước cốt dừa ngấm hết vào khoai .
- Khoai chín gắp ra đĩa rắc muối mè lên hoặc để riêng chén muối mè vừa ăn vừa chấm .
- 6
LÀM MUỐI MÈ :
- 1 muỗng muối bột + 1/2 chén mè+ 2 muỗng đường.
- Rang mè và muối tới khi mè chín vàng thơm,tắt bếp. Đợi muối mè nguội hẳn rồi trộn đường vô.

Server: nginx

X-Drupal-Cache: HIT

X-Generator: Drupal 7 (http://drupal.org)

Cache-Control: public, max-age=0


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![Vol 4: Rồi Ngày Mai Sẽ Đến vol4](/home/images/stories/photo_album/vol4.jpg)
**Album Vol 4 : Rồi Ngày Mai Sẽ Đến**
Ca Sỹ : Uyên Trang
Ca Sỹ : Uyên Trang
Xin được cảm ơn ba mẹ, thầy, cô, quý vị khán thính giả, các fan, những người luôn yêu mến và ủng hộ Uyên Trang trong suốt thời gian qua...
Để có được album này. Uyên Trang đã phải "làm phiền" rất nhiều đến các nhạc sỹ, anh chị em, bạn bè, đồng nghiệp cùng những người thân trong suốt 1 thời gian dài. Xin được gửi lời "xin lỗi" chân thành nhất. hy vọng Uyên Trang đã, đang và sẽ luôn nhận được sự cảm thông, và giúp đỡ của tất cả mọi người. Uyên Trang mong mình sẽ ngày càng hoàn thiện hơn và những sản phẩm âm nhạc của mình sẽ ngày càng hoàn thiện hơn và những sản phẩm âm nhạc của mình sẽ ngày càng chất lượng hơn...

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