#import "template.typ": *
#show: template.with(
  title: "24.05 First Revision",
  subtitle: "<NAME> (924310245)",
  pset: true,
)

= Introduction

The basic Divine Command Theory (DCT) states that "it is right because God commands it". One notable challenge to the DCT is presented in the Euthyphro Dilemma, which raises two conflicting horns:

+ God commands because it is right.
+ It is right because God commands it.

In response to this dilemma, a new Modified DCT (MDCT) is presented, which <NAME> puts forward with the critical observation that an act is wrong if and only if it is contrary to to the will of a *loving God*.

I will present an argument which leads to the exposure of a weakness in the DCT. This argument is motivated by an excerpt from Adams' paper about the MDCT:

#quote(block: true)[
  What is essential to such a theory is to maintain that when a believer says something is (ethically) wrong, at least part of what he means is that the action in question is contrary to God’s will or commands
]

== Argument

/ P1: The DCT should be rejected.
/ P2: If the DCT should be rejected, then what is right is not simply because God commands it.
/ P3: If what is right is not simply because God commands it, then God is not the author of ethics.
/ P4: If God is not the author of ethics, then God does not add anything to ethics.
/ P5: If God does not add anything to ethics, then no part of what it means to be ethically wrong can be attributed to God.
/ P6: If no part of what it means to be ethically wrong can be attributed to God, then the MDCT should be rejected.
/ C: The MDCT should be rejected.

= Premise 1

I maintain that it is a necessity for any discussion regarding the correctness of a modified DCT to assume that the DCT should be rejected. If it is not, then there is no reason to suggest a modified version, nor is there any point in arguing about the correctness of any such modified DCT.

= Premise 2

The DCT states "it is right because God commands it", and thus to reject the DCT is to accept the fact that it is not always the case that something is right because God commands it. I do not claim that it is *not right* if God commands it. I instead assert that there may be unrelated factors which matter to the righteousness of an action equally (or more) than the command of God. Thus, stemming from the rejection of the DCT, what is right is *not simply* because God commands it.

= Premise 3

== Author Definition

I define an author of a particular matter to be the entity responsible for creating the definition others use when referring to it. I also posit that being an author is an absolute power, that is, that which you decree is the truth.

I do not deny the possibility that a particular matter can have multiple authors, but in that case, regarding any specific topic, they must either:

+ Come to an agreement on a particular definition.
+ Only have one author responsible for the definition.

There is also an important distinction to make about authors. While it is the case that they are responsible for creating definitions, the interpretation of those definitions, as well as any particular enforcement, is fair grounds to be influenced by both authors and non-authors alike.

This definition of an author will be critical in the motivation of the next premises.

== Returning to P3

*P2* says that which is right is not *simply* right because God commands it. Thus God cannot be the author of ethics (the moral principles governing what is right and not), as otherwise it must be the case that anything God commands regarding ethics must be the definition and the truth.

= Premise 4

The verb "add" does not refer to the influence non-authors can have regarding the interpretation or enforcement as described above. Rather, "add" refers to the direct power to change, modify, or alter the definition of ethics. When I say that God is not the author of ethics, I also say that God does not add anything to ethics. This premise serves as a concrete representation of the lack of power non-authors have.

= Premise 5

The most crucial part of *P5* is answering the question that my definition of an author raises - is it not the case that someone who helps interpret or enforce ethics should be attributed to what it means to be ethically wrong? Should one really deny the attribution on the basis that they are not the author?

A defender of the claim that, at least some part of what it means to be ethically wrong should be attributed to God, might say that while God cannot be considered the author of ethics, it is only by his command that certain actions become right or wrong on the basis of ethics. I propose the following scenario in response.

== Mr. Steal

Mr. Steal is an oblivious man who does not like paying for things. One day, Mr. Steal walks into a grocery store and takes some food because he is hungry. He decides to shoplift the food to avoid paying. Shortly after, he gets arrested. Clearly Mr. Steal committed a crime.

In an alternate universe, Mr. Steal walks into a grocery store again, and takes food because he is hungry, but this time does not know that stealing food is a crime. There are no police around the grocery store, and as a result Mr. Steal goes home and enjoys his meal.

In the second case, although there was both no knowledge that a crime was being committed, nor an enforcement of the underlying law, it is still evident that Mr. Steal has committed a crime. It is not the fact that Mr. Steal is conscious of the action or that the police arrest him that makes the action a crime, rather it is the idea that stealing from a grocery store without paying is illegal.

== Returning to P5

Following the story of Mr. Steal, even if God is the entity that enforces ethics, or otherwise brings it to the attention of man, it does not add any significance to the underlying, authored definition of ethics. What it means to be ethically wrong is independent of these factors, and is controlled by the authors of ethics, which God is not.

= Premise 6

*P6* starts with the conditional that "no part of what it means to be ethically wrong can be attributed to God". Why is it necessarily the case that this leads to the rejection of the MDCT?

Adams' MDCT concedes that not every part of what it means to be right can be attributed to God. However, what the MDCT does require is that "when a believer says something is (ethically) wrong, at least part of what he means is that the action in question is contrary to God’s will or commands". In the context of cruelty, even if no God commands that we should not be cruel for the sake of it, it is reasonable to assume most people would take this stance anyways, thus it becomes necessary to accept that certain beliefs may be independent of God.

The importance of at least some attribution to God for the MDCT is "the belief in a law that is superior to all human laws". Certainly, this would be the case if parts of ethics can be linked directly to the will of God. However, no part of what it means to be ethically wrong can be attributed to God, and thus God does not dictate a law that is superior to human law. This fundamentally disrupts one of the core pillars of the MDCT, which is the connection between human ethics and a higher law imposed by God.

= Contention

As a result of the above premises, I conclude that one ought to reject the MDCT.

This is not a rejection of every MDCT, and also does not mean that it is not possible to construct a potential MDCT that circumvents these criticisms. However, any prospective modified theory must take into account the implications of what it means to reject the standard DCT.
