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#show: template.with(
  title: "24.05 Second Revision",
  subtitle: "<NAME> (924310245)",
  pset: true,
)
<NAME> articulates his belief in “The Cosmological Fine-Tuning Argument” that the fine-tuning of the universe provides significant evidence for theism. Fine-tuning here refers to the setting of *fundamental* universal constants, such as the speed of light or the strength of atomic attractions. Even a slight alteration in these values could lead to a vastly different universe that interacts in a completely different way.

Here I will summarize White’s argument:

/ P1: If a fact E that we observe stands in need of explanation, and hypothesis H provides a satisfactory explanation of E that is better than any alternative explanation available,
then E provides significant evidential support for H.
/ P2: That our universe is life-permitting to life stands in need of explanation.
/ P3: That God adjusted the constants in order to allow for life to develop provides a satisfactory explanation for why our universe is life-permitting.
/ P4: There is no comparably satisfying explanation of this fact available.
/ P5: Therefore, that our universe is life-permitting provides significant evidential support for theism.

We can observe here that a central premise of White’s argument on Cosmological Fine Tuning (FTA) regards motivation - that the universe being hospitable for life is in need of explanation (P2). I will propose an argument against this premise, as well as the overall argument as follows:

/ P1: There exists an insignificant number of life in the universe
/ P2: If there exists an insignificant number of life in the universe, then the universe is not hospitable for life.
/ P3: If the universe is not hospitable for life, then the universe being hospitable is not in need of explanation.
/ P4: If the universe being hospitable is not in need of explanation, White’s second premise is false.
/ P5: If White’s second premise is false, then White’s argument is unsound.
/ C: White’s argument is unsound.

Since I have learned of the fine tuning argument from White’s paper, I will use “White’s argument” and Cosmological Fine Tuning (FTA) interchangeably. 

Regarding P1, I believe that all cumulative observations of humans up until the present would lead us to believe this premise. Not only have we been unable to locate any extraterrestrial life forms, it seems the universe is quite hostile, from poisonous atmospheres to bone-crushing gravity. I believe therefore, that we ought to think there is an insignificant amount of life in this universe. 

It is important to note here what I mean by “insignificant”. A believer of the FTA might say, for example, that even one instance of life should be considered significant, and to equate few forms of life as insignificant would be an injustice. However, I use insignificance in the context of the FTA - specifically that there is not enough life to justify that the universe is hospitable.

A supporter of White could easily contest this point that the given evidence is insignificant. As mentioned above, one or few instances of life might be enough reason to believe in fine-tuning, with uninhabitable locations in the universe being insignificant themselves in proving why existing life is not enough. They could argue that a given locale’s inhospitality does not diminish the hospitality of the universe, or the instances of life that do exist. However, I do not believe this is the case. Suppose we throw a hundred ruthless criminals into a mansion. The mansion is equipped with lavish furnishing, food, and entertainment. Yet still, the criminals try to kill each other. In no way can one say an environment such as this was hospitable, despite being “fine-tuned”. Perhaps for some well-doing citizens, it could be an acceptable environment, however there is nothing innately hospitable about the mansion. We could have instead used an abandoned warehouse, and things would have turned out the same. A truly hospitable environment would be one where the environment can supersede the specific situation - say if the mansion were equipped with therapists. Thus the idea that there exist so few instances of life should compel one to believe the universe is not generally hospitable for life, except in those few scenarios. I do not think we could be persuaded to say a universe with no life is hospitable for life, so thus a universe with little life is also inhospitable.

However, it is also possible to make a point against this - even if it is the case that the universe might not be the ideal circumstances for life in the vast majority of cases, it can still be immeasurably better than some alternatives. Suppose that the prisoners have an alternate housing option in the form of a deadly volcano that will erupt. The mansion, albeit not the ideal scenario, now looks incomparably better, and could be argued that it is now hospitable for these inmates. I do not think that this line of reasoning contributes any meaningful attack towards my saying that the mansion (the is inhospitable. This is because hospitality as I am defining it is not a relative term. When we say the universe is hospitable for life, I do not think we are trying to say that the universe is *more* hospitable than other potential environments. If it is, there is no contention that this point is true since some life exists, but our universe also becomes less interesting since we can imagine infinite universes with worse conditions.

Instead, hospitality should be taken to mean a state in which the host provides everything needed for the guest to flourish. Of course, circling back around to the aforementioned analogy, it is possible that even in the most perfect environment, a terrorist comes and makes the overall situation negative. I do not think that this takes away from hospitality. I define hospitality as a host that should provide a more likely chance (greater than half) to have a positive impact (whatever positive might mean in a specific context) for a random guest, on average. Hospitality should be viewed on a sliding scale instead of a binary metric. It is of course hard to tell where one draws the line between calling something “inhospitable” and “hospitable”, but I believe it is reasonable to say this occurs at the midway point.
 
Concretely, I do not believe the presence of life itself is that significant in itself, and the little life in the universe is insignificant to the idea that it is hospitable for life. A supporter of White might say that life in itself is rare and precious, to which I would respond that, yes, it might be, but without a large presence in the universe, our environment cannot be considered hospitable. Surely just as the universe could be less accommodating, it could also be *more* accommodating for life such that we see much more of it. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, I don’t expect to see the perfect conditions - just enough to persuade us that the universe is hospitable. The amount of life we have been able to observe is far from the significance needed to say the universe is hospitable for life.

A believer in the FTA might argue that we have no way of knowing if there is an abundance of life farther outward in the universe. To this, I agree, but the FTA is fundamentally limited by human understanding. Perhaps further scientific discoveries in the future will reveal the fine-tuning of the universe is not random at all. Thus we must work off of current human understanding to converse about the FTA.

It is not remarkable then, that the universe is somehow fine-tuned to be a hospitable environment for life. With how I have defined insignificant, it follows naturally from a state of insignificance that the universe is not hospitable.

Thus, P2 of White’s argument cannot be used. If the universe’s hospitality is not in need of an explanation, then an attempt to find a “best” explanation, and all other subsequent parts of his argument, cannot stand. With P2 being false, the contention is no longer sound, and the overall argument becomes unsound as well.
