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Lessons for the courtroom from the study of Flashbulb memory: an integrative review

ABSTRACT In legal proceedings, when no corroboration is possible with external sources of evidence, judges and jurors derive from their own experience the criteria to ascertain if a memory report is accurate and a witness credible. These legal criteria closely resemble the aspects traditionally investigated by literature on Flashbulb memory (i.e., consistency, confidence, quantity), but have failed to obtain a generalised consensus within the scientific community. Drawing up a set of univocal rules upon which to base a conclusion regarding witnesses’ credibility is a difficult task, from both legal and scientific points of view. Respectful cooperation between cognitive science and criminal law will encompass both technical support by expert witnesses, and updating guidelines for fact-finders. This cooperation would prevent the risk of common sense fallacies in the legal process, preserving the legal autonomy to evaluate witness credibility.