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Enhancing information on financial stability

1. The recent financial crisis revealed a deepened integration of economies and markets, and a strengthening of interlinkages across financial institutions, that data systems failed to comprehensively capture. There is overwhelming evidence that, leading up to the crisis, credit risks were worsened by extensive use of leverage coupled with a high degree of maturity transformation, a large part of which took place outside of traditional depository corporations through the use of commercial paper, repurchase agreements, and other similar instruments. It is estimated that the over-the-counter derivatives market exploded from $91 trillion in 1998 to about $600 trillion in 2008 in notional value terms. At the height of the crisis, concerns about the ability of companies to make good on these contracts, and the lack of transparency about what risks existed, caused credit markets to freeze. As Bear Stearns, American International Group, and Lehman Brothers failed, investors became wary of trading as new transactions could expose them to more risks. Liquidity-constrained institutions were compelled to offload assets at distressed prices, which amplified margin calls for leveraged actors and exacerbated mark-to-market losses for all asset holders.