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August 1998 and the development of Russia's post-communist political economy

ABSTRACT Russia's experience of financial crisis has been novel: crisis was followed by growth rather than depression, and did not lead to any increased role for foreign economic agencies or actors in Russia's economy. This novel experience resulted from the structure of Russia's economy in the 1990s, the limited role of financial intermediation in the Russian economy and rising oil prices. Consequently, the chief outcome of crisis has been political, the renewal of central political authority and a reining in of major economic interests. This has helped to solve the problem of state finances, which was the source of the 1998 crisis, but neither economic growth nor increased central political authority have managed to deal with the problem of capital deficiency in Russia so that it remains dependent on energy exports to continue growing. Potentially, this leaves Russia exposed to ‘resource curse’ problems. While these have been avoided so far, the absence of constraints on political leaders might lead to such problems in the future.