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Economic Thought in Early Modern Japan . Edited by Bettina Gramlich-Oka and Gregory Smits. Leiden: Brill, 2010. Pp. xxii + 298. ISBN 10: 9004183833; 13: 9789004183834.

developments. The dilemma shows itself in a nutshell when we compare Watanabe’s conclusion that “At least in one respect, Tokugawa Japan opened itself to the ‘Modern West,’ having freely decided to do so as the result of an examination of universal principles” (p. 377) with what he writes a few pages further on, namely, that what made the difference with earlier approaches of European powers such as the embassies of Laxman (1791) and Rezanow (1804), the Morisson Incident (1837– 1839), or the letter of King William II of the Netherlands (1844) (discussed in pp. 363–70), was not the intrinsic quality of Perry’s case, but his aggressive approach and his guns (p. 385). Watanabe gives a subtle analysis of the events in the Bakumatsu Period (pp. 388–402), showing the intricate interplay of political, ideological, and psychological factors. The bakufu’s inability to call Perry’s bluff undermined its authority (go-ikō) and gave plausibility to the ideological rallying cry “Expel the barbarians” ( jōi). The improved status of the imperial court meant that whoever could claim that he represented the emperor need not fear any ideological opposition. Once the power structure began to crumble, both the rulers and the ruled lost their bearings. All routines were questioned, and the government suddenly found that it had to organize support for every measure it proposed. Broad consultation of the daimyō seemed a practicable way to rally this support. It helped that, in Confucian ideology, asking advice from one’s subalterns and “listening to the people” was highly positively regarded. In practice, however, it turned out to be dangerous, because it gave the activists (shishi) an opportunity to talk back to their superiors. What the activists really wanted – here Watanabe falls back on Fukuzawa’s analysis quoted earlier – was “freedom.” The opening of Japan was, as Watanabe justly claims (p. 382), a major event in world history, and its analysis is one of the highpoints of the book.