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The Copernican Revolution in Pragmatism? Dewey on Philosophy and Science

Copernican revolution1 heralds a grand renovation of a tradition of knowledge. In science—the discipline from which the concept originates—it aptly connotes a paradigm shift from a previously accepted notion of reality. It is upon this conceptualization that John Dewey wrote: “Kant claimed that he had effected a Copernican revolution in philosophy by treating the world and our knowledge of it from the standpoint of the knowing subject.”2 For the Enlightenment thinker, traditional philosophy construed a rational system of nature and then borrowed from it the features by which to characterize knowledge. He argued that this “borrowing” of a rational system should not be credited to some outworldy power, but to human reason. Thus, his “revolution” was a shift from theological to human authorship and a placing of the locus of intellect in man as a knowing subject. Kant’s work created a new center in philosophy: that it is the mind that knows by means of an equipment of powers complete within itself and that it merely exercises its capabilities upon an antecedent external material equally complete in itself. It is in the preface of the Critique of Pure Reason where Kant suggested the viability of his epistemological method: