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On the security of a certificateless aggregate signature scheme

Aggregate signature can combine n signatures on n messages from n users into a single short signature, and the resulting signature can convince the verifier that the n users indeed signed the n corresponding messages. This feature makes aggregate signature very useful especially in environments with low bandwidth communication, low storage and low computability since it greatly reduces the total signature length and verification cost. Recently, Xiong et al. [H. Xiong, Z. Guan, Z. Chen, F. Li, An efficient certificateless aggregate signature with constant pairing computations, Information Sciences, 219 (2013) 225-235] proposed an efficient certificateless aggregate signature scheme. They proved that their scheme is secure in a strengthened security model, where the “malicious-but-passive” KGC attack was considered. In this paper, we show that Xiong et al.’s certificateless aggregate signature scheme is not secure even in a weaker security model called “honest-but-curious” KGC attack model.