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Management Forecasts, Regulation FD, Information Asymmetry and the Cost of Debt

This study examines firms’ strategic management disclosure policy around debt offerings and its consequences on the cost of debt, considering Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD). Contrary to the literature on equity offerings, there is little evidence about whether debt offering firms increase their disclosure to reduce information asymmetry and how creditors evaluate management earnings forecasts. We find that firms issue more management disclosures around debt offerings and that the increase in management forecasts is more pronounced after Regulation FD. The results suggest that Regulation FD affects a firm’s disclosure policy before debt offerings. We also find that firms with high information asymmetry release more management disclosures before debt offerings. Finally, our results show that creditors reward the increased public disclosures with a lower cost of debt, especially more for the firms with severe information asymmetry. In total, this paper adds some evidence to the literature in this area on debt offerings, where there is a lack of such evidence.