{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.020240963855421686, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.329268292682927, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
The Representation of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: Yet Another Two Logics of Collective Action?

The internationalization of markets and the Europeanization of politics both have a number of implications for business and their associations in most of the EU Member States. While the size of firms has always been a dividing line within specific associations, this division is now becoming accentuated. This has to do with the differential salience the two major logics of organized collective action possess for both types of firms and their associations in a world of increasing complexity. The hypothesis raised in this contribution is as follows. Large firms are primarily challenged from the part of the LOGIC OF MEMBERSHIP. The INTERNATIONALIZATION OF MARKETS entails significant restructuring among larger companies. This often materializes in form of M&A activity, buy-outs and take-over and, subsequently, membership losses. Since dues paid by large firms represent a major source of income for business associations, organizational tasks located at the membership side of associative action (services, etc.) are increasingly more important. Small firms and their associations are less concerned by the internationalization of markets but meet significant pressure with respect to the REGULATION OF MARKETS by the EU. They are challenged, first of all, by developments within the LOGIC OF INFLUENCE dimension where they have always been in a disadvantaged position compared to larger companies. Moreover, large firms increasingly act on their own (direct lobbying) and often support EU-induced deregulation and liberalization. This creates an additional division both within and across business associations which, in a number of cases, has already resulted in the break-away of branch associations, the exit by members, and a declining loyalty vis-a-vis the organizational leadership. This paper seeks to present empirical evidence for these developments by drawing from research on large chemical and ICT interest associations in Britain, Germany and the US.