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Artificial Virtues and the Equally Sensible Non-Knaves: A Response to Gauthier

Gauthier's splendidly dialectical paper1 first sets out Hume's official Treatise account ofhow each personhas a self-interestedmotive to curb her natural but socially troublesome self-interest, by agreeing to the adoption of the artifices ofprivate property rights, transfer by consent, and promise (provided others are also agreeing to adopt them), andhow the sympathy-dependent moral sentiment approves of such a redirection of "the interested passion." Enlightened self-interest gives us the natural obligation to justice; the fact that it is morally approved turns it into a moral obligation. Self-hatred for any breaches of the moral obligationmay come in to bolster the self-interested motivation, and this will be helped along by the extra artifices employed by educators and politicians. So far so good. But now enters the sensible knave, who queries the initial assumption that each will in fact gain more by strict conformity to the rules of the Humean social artifices than by occasional carefully calculated and undetected breaches of them. If the knave is right, then the Treatise story ofhow reasonable self-interested people can get themselves to conscientiously respect property rights (including rights ofbarter), and to keep promises, is in trouble. Only by an erroneous calculation of their interest could they end with the motivation which Hume attributes to them, and finds to bemorally approvable .Gauthier argues that there are indications even in the Treatise that Hume is aware ofthe flawed nature of his official account, since he attributes "sophistry" to some attempted justifications of honest behaviour, and attributes "feigned acts" of impossible willing to some conscientious promise-keepers. Gauthier finds Hume to have, in the Treatise, a second, less official story ofwhat it takes to be motivated to be just—that it takes error, and letting oneself be taken in by feignings and sophistry. In the Enquiry Concerning the Principles ofMorals this submerged account surfaces in the sensible knave's challenge and Hume's admission that his own answer will not be satisfactory to the knave. The charms of official Humeanjustice, Gauthier concludes, are spurious, since the "anatomy" of the account of the rational motivation to be just is known to be unsound. "The sensible knave's message is that human society . . . lacks anymoral foundation."