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Democracy and Development in Africa

1. The Facts: A Summary Scorecard A short three years ago, the African continent was dominated by unrepresentative, mostly predatory regimes that had lost whatever legitimacy they may have initially possessed. In 1992, although unrepresentative regimes still outnumber democrative governments, a dramatic process is underway to restore the fundamentals of political legitimacy. Because of Africa's poverty, observers who perceive economic progress as logically and chronologically superordinate to political pluralism see this process as anomalous. The experience of a few Asian countries (e.g. Korea) appears to support their view. But in Africa this proposition is counterfactual: predatory authoritarianism has been a central cause of Africa's economic underdevelopment not its handmaiden. Correspondingly, political pluralism is a necessary (though not sufficient condition for African economic recovery and not a luxury to be postponed until middle-income Nirvana is achieved. In the table below, the 52 African countries are classified in 2 x 2 matrices according to 'stability' and 'representativeness' in March 1989 and 1992, respectively.1 This classification contains some inevitable simplifications. Stability and representativeness are difficult concepts. Both of them are continuous variables, although the figures present them as dichotomous. Also, the evaluation of any given country as stable or unstable, representative or unrepresentative, has a subjective and arbitrary element. The discussion of the content of African democracy, below, may help to clarify the rationale for the classification. The trend, however, is unmistakable. Just 4 of the 52 African countries (Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius and Senegal) could be considered stable democracies in March 1989; three more (Madagascar, Tanzania and Zimbabwe) were moving in that direction; 40 countries almost 4 out of 5 were ruled by unrepresentative and unaccountable governments.