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Book Review: Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw

Dignity is an important aspect of what the authors refer to as the 'new bioethics', but is often raised in the manner of a wild card that trumps all other considerations. Either side within the same debate may claim that their opponent's position is contrary to human dignity. Thus, the authors note that dignity may be used as a bulwark for autonomy and 'empowerment' or-on the other side of the fence-it may be wielded as a 'constraint' to the exercise of free choice.1 Given that both sides of an argument are able to appeal to dignity in support of their case, the question arises as to whether an appeal for the respect for human dignity is 'no more than empty rhetoric'?2 This question, then, sets the scene for the authors to explore the concept of human dignity. The authors' consideration into human dignity is predicated on Alan Gewirth' s moral theory. As such, the book is not-and never pretends to be-a neutral analysis of the concept of human dignity. Rather, it is an unabashed argument in favour of a particular conception of human dignity based Gewirth's liberal, agency-centred Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC). 3 Since the authors devote about a quarter of the book to explaining the PGC and how it relates to human dignity, with one chapter focusing purely on the PGC, it is possible to read and understand the arguments without having any knowledge of Gewirth' s work itself. Having said that, however, it would no doubt be useful to have read his book, Reason and Morality, beforehand.4 Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw is divided into two sections. The first section-'making sense of "human dignity" '-examines what is meant by the concept of 'Human Dignity'. The second section deals with particular applications of the concept. The first chapter considers dignity as empowerment and examines the motivating effect of this 'conception' of human dignity on the development and drafting of human rights instruments following the Second World War.5 They distinguish