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Formation of Preferences and Strategic Analysis : Can they be Decoupled ?

State-of-the-art computers and network technologies have already enabled the use of intelligent software agents for making decisions in real time. Software agents interact both with humans and with other such software agents. Many types of online interaction seem to be amenable to game-theoretic analysis, since they involve both competition and cooperation. For example, agents bargain with humans and with other agents about prices, participate in auctions, coordinate actions and utilization of resources, and also establish and manage trust. The question often arises whether game theory, as we know it, can be successfully applied in such situations. Theoretically, there are numerous ways in which game theory might be applicable. In this paper, we are interested only in the type of application, where players are programmed to behave in specific situations, based on game-theoretic analysis of preferences and choice of actions. The amounts of resources consumed by a computer program before it makes a decision must be limited by the operational requirements of the system. Therefore, the analysis must be relatively simple. Also, there has be a way to map such analysis to a computational procedure, which is essentially sequential. So, the high-level question we are interested in is whether there is a way to endow computer programs with game-theoretic rationality.