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The U.S. Involvement in Sinai: 1975 as a Legal-Political Turning Point

The role of the United States as midwife in the Israeli-Egyptian peace process has become a familiar one in recent years. Indeed, the local protagonists have all but taken for granted that their own peacemaking efforts would be catalyzed and reenforced by the United States. The pattern of American involvement has since 1975–76 had a dual aspect: American personnel have been permanently stationed in Sinai, and U.S. assurances have been extended to the parties (especially to Israel) as inducements to the acceptance of painful concessions. The American presence in Sinai, when initiated in 1975–76, was minimal both in terms of its numbers and its functions. Fewer than 200 U.S. civilians operated the Sinai Field Mission, an early warning system in the strategic Giddi and Mitla mountain passes, whose purpose was to complement the functions of the UN peacekeeping force in the Sinai (the UN Emergency Force or UNEF II).