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A Study on Evolution Game of Accounts Receivable Pledge Financing in Supply Chain Finance Model

In practice, due to information asymmetry and the bounded rationality of game participants, most of the actions taken by game participants are irrational. The evolutionary game theory is based on bounded rationality and looks at the adjustment process of group behavior through the perspective of system theory. Therefore, this paper will use the idea of evolutionary game to discuss the issue of SMEs' accounts receivable pledge financing under the supply chain finance model. This paper builds the model on the basis that both sides of the game are bounded rationality. In real life, the behavior of individuals tends to be more bounded rationality. By constructing an evolutionary game model under bounded rationality, we can see that the final evolution result between banks and loan companies is related to many factors. From the phase diagram of the evolutionary game, it can be seen that the area on both sides of the dotted line of the phase diagram is mainly determined by the profit matrix, but the direction of the final evolution is mainly determined by the initial state of the game.