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From epistemic monoculture to cooperation between epistemic communities: Lessons learnt from development research

Science is currently confronted by a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, scientific research and its applications are being held partially responsible for a range of ecological, social and economic problems. On the other hand, science is still seen as holding out hope for solutions to these problems. The role of the sciences has thus become permanently established as a topic of social debate. Even previously “objective” scientific disciplines such as physics, chemistry and biology are now increasingly subjected to criticism. The normative and usually implicit aspects of the sciences, and hence their epistemological foundations as well, are a particular point of controversy. This controversy has since pervaded virtually all important areas of human life. Whether in medicine (allopathic versus alternative medicine), agriculture (GMOs versus organic farming), economics (liberalisation versus social regulation), or the connections between the sciences and indigenous forms of knowledge, social actors now actively take part in normative debates. Social criticism of scientific undertakings is becoming more comprehensive, no longer focusing only on external processes of instrumentalisation of science and technology by political, economic or military elites. The internal structures of academic knowledge production are also increasingly becoming the focus of doubt. Questions about the social relevance of systematic thinking grounded in reductionism and causality to the solution of current social problems, or about the insufficient capacity to integrate scientific models rooted in an incalculable number of special disciplines, are now a permanent part of social debate. A growing number of people are only prepared to accept scientific approaches if the ethical consequences associated with them are perceived as tolerable or desirable. Science has accordingly lost its predominant role in defining and implementing “development” or “progress” and must now be reoriented. In this regard, science is beginning to perceive its work as part of the social process, in which scientific expertise is still sought but normative implications are seen as only one among many options. Building bridges to promote better understanding between the scientific community and other social groups is accordingly seen as one of the central challenges of the 21