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Religion, Interpretation, and Diversity of Belief: The Framework Model from Kant to Durkheim to Davidson Terry F. Godlove Jr. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 207 p.

While it is by no means an easy read, this book has great merit; it relentlessly drives the mind of the reader through some of the thorniest problems of philosophy. When one is considering the perplexing question of the diversity of religions, one is liable to arrive at something like the following formula: each religion imposes a comprehensive conceptual framework upon the world, or upon the raw data of experience. It seems obviously right at first sight to envisage the radically conflicting beliefs of the Muslim, the Theravada Buddhist and the scientific rationalist in something like these terms. But this contrast, between framework on the one hand and world or raw data on the other, seems to turn out on the last analysis to be an incoherent one; since the world and the data, so far as we can get a clear conception of them at all, must themselves be a part of the framework. It looks as though we cannot do without the framework conception when we are considering the problem of religious differences, but that we cannot do with it either.