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Robert O. Freedman, ed., The Middle East Since Camp David (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984). Pp. 278.Bernard Reich, The United States and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship (New York: Praeger, 1984). Pp. 256.

scholars who suggest that a religious revival has taken place overlook the major trend. Professor Geyikdagi recognizes that Turkey has undergone "Islamic manifestations" (p. v) and an increase in the number of religious movements in the past two or three decades (p. 11), but attributes these to the level of industrialization that the country has so far achieved. In contemporary Turkey, there are people suffering from anomie and declining social classes who turn to religion and new urban groups who use Islam for political purposes. Once this stage is passed, however, people "regain their self-confidence and become more flexible in their ideas " (p. 12). It is difficult to believe that Islam will not continue to play a significant role in Turkey. First, the situation in the advanced countries suggests that the factors making for religious activism are remarkably vital. Indeed, a considerable amount of empirical and theoretical work, which Professor Geyikdagi does not draw upon, demonstrates that the relationship between religion and socio-economic change is far more complex than is suggested above. Second, this study does not provide a systematic analysis of the issue. There is little reliance on theory, key terms and concepts are not rigorously defined, and one does not find a clearly elaborated argument supported by evidence. Instead, Professor Geyikdagi presents in 8 short chapters (three of which deal with events prior to 1950) a rather cursory treatment of such topics as the policies and attitudes of parties and political leaders towards Islam, judgments about the extent to which they "exploited" religion, their socio-economic bases of support, and constitutional provisions, through the early 1980s. Most of the discussion is based on the standard sources, primarily those in English, and is consonant with accepted views. Sometimes, however, Professor Geyikdagi reaches provocative conclusions. He rejects the notion that the Arabs turned against Turkey in World War I (p. 30), argues that the Ecevit government of 1978-1979 failed principally because of Ecevit's weak understanding of economics and his reliance on mediocre advisors who were not from the best schools (pp. 128-129), and worries that "some self-styled secularists hamper the process of secularization by unnecessarily aping other cultures" (p. 152). In general, the work contributes little to our understanding of Turkish political life or the role of Islam therein. It will, therefore, be of limited interest to scholars. Persons seeking a succint introduction to political developments as they relate to religion may find it of some interest.