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How moral values influence conservation: a framework to capture different management perspectives

Perspectives in conservation can be based on a variety of value systems and normative postulates. Perspectives also vary between cultures. Such differences in what and how people value nature, underlie many disagreements and conflicts during the formulation and implementation of environmental management policies. Specifically, whether an action intended to promote conservation (e.g. killing cats to save birds threatened with extinction) is viewed as moral can vary among people who hold different value systems. Here, we present a conceptual framework that mathematically formalises the interplay of value systems. We argue that this framework provides a heuristic tool to clarify normative postulates in conservation approaches, and highlights how different value systems might rank various management options differently. We illustrate this by applying the framework to specific cases involving invasive alien species, rewilding, and trophy hunting; and comparing how management decisions would likely be viewed under different idealised value systems (ecocentric conservation, new conservation, and compassionate conservation). By making value systems and their consequences in practice explicit, the framework can facilitate debates on contested conservation issues, and, we hope, will ultimately provide insights into how conflicts in conservation can be reduced.

1). Because these postulates are considered as truths, they are, as it were, non-negotiable.

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Therefore, if the truths of different value systems come into conflict, it is hard for a resolution to 76 be found, and so conservationists who value biodiversity per se [as defined initially by Soulé 77 (1985), called hereafter 'traditional conservation' (Table 1) In practice, the separation between these different normative approaches of environmental ethics 142 is blurry, and values given to different species may vary under the same general approach. For 143 example, biocentrism can range from complete egalitarianism between organisms, i.e. 144 universalism (Table 1) Soulé (1985), and relies on the four following normative postulates: 157 "diversity of organisms is good," "ecological complexity is good," "evolution is good," and 158 "biotic diversity has intrinsic value" (Soulé 1985). It historically underlies widely-used  to the extent that they contribute to the well-being of humans. These values encompass 171 ecosystem services that help sustain human life (Bolund & Hunhammar, 1999) or economic 7 assets (Fisher et al., 2008), and can rely on the assessment of species and ecosystem services in 173 terms of their economic value (Costanza et al., 1997). The anthropocentric 'nature for people' 174 perspective is exemplified by 'new conservation', also termed 'social conservation' (Kareiva,175 2014; Miller, Minteer, & Malan, 2011) (Table 1). It has been argued that such an anthropocentric 176 perspective will, by extension, help and even be necessary to conserve the aspects of nature that   Aside from the value systems described above, two main normative theories are relevant to 228 decision making in environmental management: consequentialism and deontology.

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Consequentialism aims at choosing an action to optimise an objective function, which can be 230 determined based on a given value system. In other words, consequentialism aims at maximising 231 the 'greater good' (e.g. maximising the average wellbeing of people). In contrast, deontology 232 considers that some actions are intrinsically morally wrong or right based on specific criteria, 233 and that decisions should be based on the moral status of actions. These often come into conflict, 9 e.g. is it acceptable to hurt a few to improve the wellbeing of many. In practice, both theories 235 have their limitations, and a combination of both can offer a solution to complex situations 236 (Alexander & Moore, 2016). A third normative theory is virtue ethics, which emphasises the role 237 of virtue or moral character to make a decision. The distinction with the other two theories is 238 nonetheless less clear, as virtue is also a common concern in consequentialist and deontological 239 perspectives (Nussbaum, 1999;Varner, 2008).

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Here, we propose a mathematical formalisation approach to conceptualise the appropriateness of 242 environmental management actions, decomposed into the consequences and morality of an 243 action, and argue that it can account for different value systems, including the anthropocentric, 244 sentientist, biocentric and species-based ecocentric systems (see Appendix S1 for an extension to 245 ecocentrism beyond species and considering wider collectives, i.e. ecosystems), while also 246 accounting for cultural and personal perspectives. We believe that while formalising the different 247 approaches of environmental ethics has specific limitations (discussed below), it is useful for 248 practical and theoretical reasons, as it allows to clarify normative postulates, and to evaluate The impact I as defined in this framework (see Table 1 value systems and personal subjectivity, as some impacts may be considered incommensurable 297 (Essl et al., 2017). Which impacts are incommensurable may depend on the value system (e.g.

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death of non-human sentient individuals vs. human health;   (Table 1). Inherent values are therefore subjective and likely to 317 vary in time and across locations, and depend not only on the characteristics of the species but 318 also on those of the assessor. For example, some alien species that did not have any value prior to 319 their introduction have been incorporated in local cultures, therefore providing them a novel and 320 higher inherent value such as horses being linked to a strong local cultural identity in some parts 321 of the USA (Rikoon, 2006). Note that we distinguish between the inherent value given to a 322 species here, which is captured by Vs and is determined by value systems described above and 323 the assessor's subjectivity, and the utilitarian value that a species has due to its impact, through 324 exploitation or biotic interactions, on the species with intrinsic values. The utilitarian value is 325 accounted for by ¯ (Figure 1), because a management action can change the impact a species has 12 on another, therefore representing the indirect impact of a management action, as explained 327 above.

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Many factors can therefore influence the assessment of the ¯ and Vs variables (see Table 2  The traditional conservation in Equation 2 emphasises that "diversity of organisms is good" and 383 that "biotic diversity has intrinsic value" (M. E. Soulé, 1985). Here, we propose to assign a 384 stronger weight to rare species, indicated by the parameter a < 0, to account for the fact that rare The assumption of new conservation is that a management action that minimizes consequences 419 C in the new conservation Equations 3 will also decrease C in the traditional conservation anything" is an active choice that has consequences (Table 2) (Table 1) 538 from the observer will tend to make the distribution uniform (therefore in line with the considers that native species intrinsically have higher value than alien species (Table 1) The issue of spatial and temporal scale also warrants consideration (Table 2). In the case of a 683 species that may be detrimental to others in a given location but in decline globally, the spatial 684 scale and the population considered for evaluating the terms of Equations 1 to 5 will be crucial to 685 determine appropriate management actions. Similarly, management actions may also result in a 686 temporary decrease in welfare conditions for animals, which may increase later on (Ohl & Van   687 der Staay, 2012), or the impacts may be manifested with a temporal lag. In that case, determining 688 the appropriate time period over which to evaluate the terms of Equations 1 to 5 will not be 689 straightforward. Impacts may also not have the same importance depending on whether they 690 occur in the short-or long-term, especially since long-term impacts are harder to predict and 691 involve higher uncertainty. Discount rates (Table 2)   Term Definition

Anthropocentrism
Value system that considers humans to be the sole, or primary, holder of moral standing, and therefore the concern of direct moral obligations.
Non-human species are considered only to the extent that they affect humans (Rolston III 2003;Palmer et al. 2014).
Anthropomorphism "The attribution of human personality or characteristics to something non-human, like an animal, object, etc." (Oxford English Dictionary).

Biocentrism
Value system considering all living beings as the concern of direct moral obligations (Rolston III 2003;Palmer et al. 2014).

Collectivism
Value system in which a group or collective has a higher value than the Consequentialism "An ethical doctrine which holds that the morality of an action is to be judged solely by its consequences" (Oxford English Dictionary).

Deontology
A normative ethical theory considering that "choices are morally required, forbidden, or permitted" (Alexander & Moore 2016).

Ecocentrism
Value system considering that species, their assemblages and their functions, as well as more broadly ecosystems, rather than individuals, are the concern of direct moral obligations ( Normative postulate Value statements that make up the basis of an ethic of appropriate attitudes toward other forms of life (Soulé 1985).

Parochialism
Ideology in which moral regard is directed "towards socially closer and structurally tighter targets, relative to socially more distant and structurally looser targets", and, by extension, to species phylogenetically, cognitively, or in appearance closer to humans (Waytz

Sentience
The ability to experience phenomenal consciousness, i.e. the qualitative, subjective, experiential, or phenomenological aspects of conscious experience, rather than just the experience of pain and pleasure (Allen & Trestman 2017).

Sentientism
Value system considering sentient beings as the concern of direct moral obligations (Rolston III 2003;Palmer et al. 2014).

Speciesism
Value system in which some species are considered to have a higher value than others, for various possible reasons (Singer 2009). Speciesism is often used to refer to the superiority of humans, which is a specific expression of speciesism as considered in this paper.

Suffering
Negative emotion, sometimes called emotional distress, experienced by sentient beings, and which can result from different causes, including but not limited to physical pain (Dawkins 2008; Farah 2008).
Traditional conservation Discipline aiming at preserving biological diversity through the management of nature, and based on four value-driven normative postulates: "diversity of organisms is good," "ecological complexity is 42 good," "evolution is good," and "biotic diversity has intrinsic value" (Soulé 1985). Traditional conservation is rooted in ecocentrism.
Virtue ethics Ethical doctrine that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character as the reason for action (Hursthouse & Pettigrove 2018).
1163 Table 2. List of factors to consider regarding the effects of environmental management actions 1164 from an environmental ethics perspective.

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Factor Influence on variables and outputs in Equations 1 to 5

Biotic interactions
The impact or suffering of individuals from one species can be caused by individuals from another species, either through direct or indirect interactions. Management actions can therefore also have non-trivial indirect impacts on some species.
Capacity to provide ecosystem services The presence of species may increase the welfare of other animal species through the ecosystem services they provide. Since these effects can be difficult to quantify explicitly, the value of such species may be increased in Equations 1 to 4 to account for them, or an additional term can be included, as in Equation 5.
Discounting rate Rate at which impacts that occur in the future lose importance.

Impact quantification and commensurability
How the impacts of management actions are quantified is also dependent on value systems, as some impacts (such as death) may be considered incommensurable to others (such as suffering).

Responsibility from previous actions
Previous human actions on certain species, such as reintroduction of domesticated species or the introduction of alien species can change the perception of the public and therefore increase the value attributed to these species, or decrease the morality of an action, in addition to obviously having an impact on these species.

Spatial scale
The spatial scale will change the abundance N and the number of species considered. As a result, a management action that is more beneficial than another at small scale may not be such at a larger scale, and reciprocally.