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West Germany, 1954–1970

Several leading international scholars argue that West Germany enjoyed limited autonomy in the Cold War and was thus susceptible to American coercion, especially on issues relating to nuclear weapons. This chapter challenges such arguments. It shows that the alliance with the United States was less useful for curbing West German nuclear ambitions than commonly presumed. It also demonstrates that in-theater conventional forces mattered for bolstering American extended nuclear guarantees to West Germany. American coercion of West Germany was important, but it played a much less direct role than what many scholars claim. Other factors—especially domestic politics—drove West Germany’s final choices pertaining to whether it should get nuclear weapons.