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The Limits of Liberalism: Wrong to Others

In his preface to this first of a projected four volumes on the moral limits of the criminal law, Joel Feinberg reports that his project began as one philosophical chapter promised for a book about victimless crimes. We can be grateful that his reflections on the impossibility of fulfilling that promise led him to undertake these volumes rather than forget the whole thing. Even so, the genesis of the work has influenced its shape: this is primarily a study of whether criminal law should extend beyond its core of the "harm to others" principle, not an exploration of how the criminal law should deal with philosophical issues arising within that core. Feinberg's earlier Doing and Deserving (1970) remains an important contribution to those questions-for example, see his chapter "On Being 'Morally Speaking a Murderer.'"