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Restoring Discipline in the Ranks

The Triangular Plan of the 1960s was a key moment in the rightward shift of the Bolivian Revolution (1952–1964). Billed by the United States, West Germany, and the Inter-American Development Bank as a generous loan program to “rehabilitate” the Bolivian tin mines, the plan also gave its architects a chance to discipline Bolivian workers, further privatize the Bolivian economy, and test the usefulness of conditional economic aid in containing revolutionary nationalism. From an analysis of the Triangular Plan it is possible to draw three major conclusions about postwar U.S. policy with regard to Latin America: (1) independent nationalism and popular militancy, rather than Soviet-style Communism, were the primary fears of policy makers; (2) the response to the Bolivian Revolution was not, as some have implied, indicative of benign intentions in the face of revolutionary nationalism; and (3) Bolivia often served as a “test case” or laboratory for policy measures.