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A game theory framework for the robust transportation network

In this paper we deal with the problem of designing a rapid transit network that reacts
as well as possible to link failures. To do so we consider that when a link fails, another
transportation mode is provided to transport passengers between the endpoints of the
aected link. The goal is to build a network that attracts as many passengers as possible
when a failure occurs. The problem is posed as a two-person zero-sum non-cooperative
game with perfect information. Saddle points in the corresponding mixed enlarged game
correspond to robust network designs.