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The Cold War and the 1984 Olympic Games: A Soviet-American Surrogate War by Philip A. D’Agati (review)

In foreign policy, Bijedić at the peak of his career was received by President Gerald Ford, by Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev, and by the Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong. Despite Tito’s stewardship of Yugoslav foreign policy, Bijedić played a significant complementary role in diversifying Yugoslavia’s foreign policy choices. In relations with the nonaligned countries, Bijedić focused on improving economic cooperation. His Muslim (though Communist) identity may have helped, and certainly did not hinder, his success in relations with the nonaligned countries. The circumstances of Bijedić’s death spurred conspiracy theories. To this day, claims abound that his death was not merely an accident and that Tito’s failing health and increasingly tenuous hold on power opened the way for a succession struggle. Kamberović cites at length the official inquiries into the tragedy and concludes that despite inconsistencies in the reports, they turned up no evidence of a conspiracy. He nevertheless emphasizes that an archive in the Sarajevo Prosecutor’s Office has yet to be opened and could potentially shed further light on this issue. Kamberović has done a commendable job of piecing together a narrative based on serious archival work. However, his book is based for the most part on Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav regional sources. In his research, he did not use international media reports or archives (including published volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States series) to show what impression Bijedić left outside Yugoslavia, both publicly and privately. For instance, how did the U.S. media cover Bijedić’s 1975 meeting with President Ford, and how did Ford himself perceive the visit? Kamberović also omits several scholarly works on Yugoslavia in English language. The use of these sources could have provided a view of how Bijedić’s political career was assessed by non-Yugoslav experts and historians. Furthermore, scrutiny of the memoirs of key international leaders of the 1970s would have provided insight into their perceptions of Bijedić’s role at the helm of Yugoslav government. In spite of these shortcomings, Kamberović’s book sheds valuable light on the life and times of Tito’s comrade and the most prominent Bosnian Communist leader of Socialist Yugoslavia. Bijedić’s biography is in a way a story of Bosnia’s development within postwar Yugoslavia. A translation of the book into English would be eminently worthwhile to make accessible to a wider audience this aspect of Yugoslavia’s and Bosnia’s history.