{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.02471315092674316, 'fraction_numerical': 0.01059135039717564, 'mean_word_length': 5.3, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
The demand for local political autonomy: an individualistic theory

In recent years several social scientists interested in the public sector have reaped considerable analytical returns from the theory of elites. For example, Albert Breton (1964, 1966) has put forward an interesting hypothesis which explains why even a power elite (of the sort described for Canada in Porter, 1965) might rationally expand public expenditures even though they will have to pay for them, at least in part, and the expenditures will benefit most directly those groups which are not themselves included in the power structure. In a social system organized along elite lines one might in principle expect the preferences of the more powerful groups to be reflected in both revenue and expenditure patterns; for example, in the low-cost (even free!) provision of higher education for the scions of the upper-income groups. Breton suggests, however, that the controlling groups may also desire certain "public goods" such as industrialization or nationalism, perhaps because these "goods" carry with them a secure and expanding role-and hence substantial