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Through the 'Moral Looking-Glass': Adam Smith on Self-Interest and Virtue

Adam Smith produces his clearest argument for the attainment of virtue in commercial society in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith intends to achieve this through a transformation of man's self-love and sympathy into prudence and magnanimity. Sympathy's basis in self-love and Smith's conscious concern throughout his works with the moral ills created by the commercial system he advocates so strongly can be seen as a response to the critique of civil society presented by his contemporaries. Most notably, Smith attempts to elevate the debased amour-propre Rousseau associates with modern life in the Discourse on Inequality. In this article, I examine the metamorphosis of self-love, however, and bring out its primary pitfall- self-deceit caused by vanity. I then argue that Smith's practical remedies for self-deceit only attenuate this problem in certain cases, stratifying ideal moral behavior. Lastly, I conclude that self-deception produces a gradated, rather than unified, virtue that lacks a general solution for corruption.