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The maneuvering between Jiang Jieshi and southwestern warlords in the campaign to “exterminate the Communists” in 1934

ABSTRACT The maneuvering between Jiang Jieshi and the warlords in southwest China in 1934 epitomized the tortuous adjustments that characterized the relationship between the southwestern regional warlords and the Nanjing government. Despite the façade of the joint efforts to “exterminate the Communists,” Jiang Jieshi, Chen Jitang, and Hu Hanmin each had his own political calculus. In September and October 1934, after the Central Red Army broke through the Nationalist encirclement of the Jiangxi Soviet and moved west, the loss of this strategic buffer zone put the southwestern local militarists in an awkward position. They took advantage of Hu Hanmin’s political clout to force Jiang Jieshi to enter Sichuan and thus eased the direct military pressure they faced from the Communists. At the same time, the warlords engaged the Red Army militarily in Guizhou. Jiang Jieshi, however, successfully reshaped the political situation in Guizhou, taking advantage of the opportunity to exterminate the Communists there to simultaneously encircle Guangdong and Guangxi. Jiang’s relationship with the southwestern warlords temporarily affected Jiang’s pursuit of the Red Army. This created favorable conditions for the Red Army’s westward movement.