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The Army after Mao

Developments in the Chinese army since the death of Mao Zedong have been dominated by two somewhat contradictory features. On the one hand, the military has vigorously asserted its professional interests and has instituted important reforms designed to put the People's Liberation Army (pla)1 on a more professional basis. On the other hand, the demand of military officers for large-scale technological modernization of the armed forces has been rejected, and even the policy of selective re-equipment, which had apparently been agreed upon, has yet to bear fruit. Both features are the product of changes that have occurred in China in the post-Mao period. The death of Mao and the concomitant downfall of his radical supporters now stigmatized as the Gang of Four removed the chief barrier to the expression of professional views by the military. The army's crucial role in the succession struggle and in the consolidation of the new leadership gave the military substantial influence over national policy. This leadership, moreover, shares the military's commitment to professionalism and views its requirements with sympathy and understanding. However, this same leadership is also committed to the accelerated modernization of China and the military is only one of the four main sectors the others being industry, agriculture, and