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Review: Law and Social Order in the United States

the most part however, it is only absolutism that makes the rules workable. Nonetheless, rules depend in large measure for their workability upon those to whom they apply submitting to a degree of self-imposed constraint what H.L.A. Hart characterized as the internal dimension of the rule. It is here in reality that Professor Wessel would like to see changes in the attitudes of large corporations embarking upon major litigation, but by adopting the phrase "rule of reason," he gives a credibility which is probably largely unwarranted to his reaction against presently apparent lack of discipline. Much of the book is devoted to advice to the effect that large cases should be competently and comprehensively prepared by large corporations at an early stage, and to advice on the best means, whether technical or in terms of personnel management, to achieve that end. Herein lies the fourth and perhaps most enuous assumption, the assumption that by adopting more treamlined procedures and more efficient practices, corporation will enable those good qualities which are the subject of the first of his premises to shine through; that the conduct of litigation would thereby become more ethical by reason of a move away from what he describes as the "sporting" approach to litigation, towards a "rule of reason" approach; and as a result that the public interest would be properly looked after. The book is paradoxical in that the author seeks to justify his supposedly new approach (although what is new about it is not entirely clear) upon the grounds that careful and timely preparation is more efficient both economically and in terms of public relations while at the same time advocating the new approach for reasons either of moral principle or utilitarianism in relation to the public interest. But the relationship between these two levels is never clearly recognized, let alone explored, and the reader is left with the feeling that questions of ethics and politics have been raised but not dealt with, while more peripheral questions of tactics, public relations, preparation for trial and the like have been tackled without ever being stated or their purpose being discussed. The advice on these latter issues is doubtless sound and born of much experience. In that way the book may prove useful to "house" lawyers in large or medium-sized corporations. But those who seek a discussion of the wider issues of representation of the public interest in large socioscientific cases will not find it here.