{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.02029769959404601, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 4.826771653543307, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
The Value of Human Knowledge

This chapter addresses the question of what sort of normativity is constitutive of a person's knowledge. A belief that falls short of knowledge is thereby inferior. A satisfactory answer to the value problem likely requires a correct view of the definitional problem. Two of Plato's best-known dialogues are inquiries about knowledge. The Theaetetus inquires into its nature, while the Meno into its value. Scholars assume that knowledge requires a belief that is true, and therefore asks what condition must a belief satisfy, in addition to being true, in order to constitute knowledge. This question about the nature of knowledge has been central to epistemology in recent decades, as it had been for Plato.