{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.012369172216936251, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.743589743589744, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
A method of intruder deduction for security protocol in the presence of Abelian group operation

Network security protocols are used to protect computer data and communication in transit. Many security protocols fundamentally depend on the algebraic properties of cryptographic operators. It is however difficult to handle these properties when formally analyzing protocols, since basic problems like the equality of terms that represent cryptographic messages are undecidable, even for relatively simple algebraic theories. Since the perfect cryptography assumption is unrealistic for cryptographic primitives with visible algebraic properties such as Abelian groups, we extend the conventional Dolev-Yao model by permitting the intruder to exploit these properties. We propose a method, which transfer the intruder deduction problem into a linear systems solving problem, presenting some critical concepts and propositions in the deduction of the problem solving. The method of this paper is reasonable and sound, proved to be efficient by practice.