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Optimal tendering system for projects as non-cooperative games with imperfect information

This paper is about how to tender and contract a project consisting of interdependent tasks, allowing random events in the decision trees of the participants as well, about which the issuer need not know. We will show that the tendering system when the issuer foreshows that he will care only about his minimum possible payoff, that is he chooses the submissions and makes his decisions such way that maximizes this, then it will maximize his payoff, assuming competitive setting. The method enables to submit any well-defined submission and supports changing the conditions of the contracts during the process.