{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.02028397565922921, 'fraction_numerical': 0.005409060175794456, 'mean_word_length': 5.040816326530612, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Wilhelm Agrell, Essence of Assessment: Methods and Problems of Intelligence Analysis

states’ interests. It may be so and future research will demonstrate it, or it may be so in some conflicts and with some audiences at certain times, depending on states’ strategic interests and goals, but it is not a given. Simpson expresses concern about the lack of public engagement with policymakers’ conception of an era of perpetual war (p.14) but throughout the book he seems to assume the necessity for such an era. Similarly, Simpson says that counterinsurgent success is about personal relationships (p.212), but does not add that the personal relationships he cites at the tactical level between foreign troops and local actors are strategically unsustainable. Simpson also stresses the need to understand the specifics of each conflict (p.228), but does not distinguish among the variety of ways that Western states are intervening in kaleidoscopic conflicts and the variety of conflicts that appear kaleidoscopic. Yemen is not Afghanistan is not Somalia is not the Central African Republic is not Mali is not Colombia. The strength of this book is its giving voice to the man fresh from the arena as he pleads for greater policymaker understanding of war and greater communication among members of the military and civilians. Simpson says policymakers must set achievable political goals based on their military leaders’ understanding of ground truth. It is difficult to disagree.