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John Gray and the Political Theory of Modus Vivendi

Abstract John Gray’s advocacy of a political theory of modus vivendi is closely linked by him with his commitment to value‐pluralism. In this essay I raise some problems about value‐pluralism, suggesting that it is too controversial and beset by theoretical difficulties of its own to serve as a secure basis for modus vivendi. I go on to argue that modus vivendi can be better defended against its critics by making it less dependent on value‐pluralism. The idea of modus vivendi is then defended against four specific charges: that it is unstable; that it is indeterminate; that it is unjust or immoral; and that it privileges a narrow and contestable conception of value.