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New Standards, Strategy, and Artillery

Chapter 5 shows that through 1951–1952, the CMAG systematically introduced Chinese military standards and regulations as the model for a regular, modern Vietnamese army. All of the PAVN divisions adopted more flexible and realistic strategies and tactics. They engaged in both offensive and defensive battles to maintain a relatively stable front line, emphasizing the role of firepower and technology, especially artillery, operating on the front and behind the enemy lines, and improving logistical support. By the summer of 1952, the People’s Army of Vietnam had completed its first transformation from a peasant force fighting guerrilla warfare to a regular army engaging in mobile warfare. This chapter examines three major campaigns from November 1951 to May 1953, including the defense of Hoa Binh, the Northwestern Offensive Campaign, and the Battle of Laos. In 1951–1952, China helped the Vietnamese establish the 316th and 325th Divisions.