{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.012468827930174564, 'fraction_numerical': 0.004987531172069825, 'mean_word_length': 4.948148148148148, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Collusive Decisions and Punishment under Demand and Cost Uncertainty

This paper provides a wider approach to competitive behaviour in sectors affected by a slump in demand, based on the contribution of the original paper by Green and Porter (1984). In addition to the cooperative solution where firms may enter a reversionary episode without breaking the collusion, the model of this study takes into consideration two forms of punishment as a result of future uncertainty; a total breakdown in collusion if there is no trust between its participants; or the formation of a new one by charging a lower common price as a disciplinary act. It is shown that under demand and cost uncertainty firms may have the incentives to choose a different short-run solution compared to the solution under certainty.