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Incentives and disincentives for voluntary disclosure by pension funds: international evidence

Abstract This paper examines competing proprietary and political cost arguments for incentives facing managers of different types of Australian and UK pension fund, to voluntarily disclose pension liability information in annual reports sent to their participants. For Australian defined benefit pension funds, the disclosure reveals the fund's actuarial surplus or deficit, which conveys information to participants about the pension fund's ability to generate future cash flows. Tests are conducted on the voluntary reporting practices of a sample of 119 Australian and 100 UK pension funds, using variables which prior research suggests affects their financial valuation and performance. The empirical results support predictions that managerial discretionary disclosure carries proprietary cost implications for Australian defined benefit pension funds, as proxied by their investment risk and funding ratio, and political cost implications for Australian defined contribution and UK defined benefit pension funds, as proxied by their size.