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Holocaust Monuments and National Memory Cultures in France and Germany since 1989: The Origins and Political Function of the Vél d’Hiv’ in Paris and the Holocaust Monument in Berlin

reports from occupied countries. But if we are to assess its importance to Allied strategy and warfare, we need to know the context. Was such information from Denmark tactically or strategically useful to Allied air or naval actions against the Germans, identifying important targets for attack? Because Denmark was a strategic backwater in terms of the overall Allied campaign in Northern Europe, one might question whether such information from Denmark was of major significance to the Allies. One of Hansen’s few attempts to highlight intelligence reports of special importance is a quoted report about repairs to the damaged battleship Tirpitz in northern Norway (p. 44). However, because the Tirpitz was under constant watch by a network of three to five Norwegian agents reporting by radio from the area, a lone report from a Danish source was hardly of enormous value. One example of vital intelligence from Danish sources is mentioned in the book, albeit only in the caption to a photograph. The photograph shows what was apparently the first available evidence of a German V-1 flying bomb—in the caption misleadingly referred to as a “rocket”—which had crashed on the Danish island of Bornholm. The picture is described in the caption as one of a collection of photographs and drawings provided by “the Danish intelligence organization in Stockholm” (p. 45). But the official history of MI6 by Keith Jeffery (MI6, p. 513) tells a different story: Jeffery reveals that this important V-1 intelligence material was provided through MI6’s station chief in Stockholm, Cyril Cheshire, from his “especially valuable Danish agent,” codenamed “Elgar.” Ultimately, therefore, Hansen’s book is disappointing to readers who expect to learn about the contribution of Danish intelligence agents to the Allied (and especially the U.S.) war effort in Northern Europe. This is doubly unfortunate because much more thorough and much better documented works on this topic by Jørgen Haestrup and Hans Christian Bjerg are available only in Danish.