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Design by extrapolation: an evaluation of fault-tolerant avionics

Over the past 30 years, safety-critical avionics systems such as fly-by-wire (FBW) flight controls, full-authority digital engine controls, and other systems have been introduced on many commercial and military airplanes and spacecraft. Early FBW systems, such as on the F-16 and Airbus A320, were considered revolutionary and were introduced with extreme caution. These early systems and their successors all make use of redundant and fault-tolerant avionics to provide the required dependability and safety, but have used significantly different architectures. This paper examines the different levels of criticality and fault tolerance required by different types of avionics systems, establishes architectural categories of fault-tolerant architectures, and identifies the discriminating features of the different approaches. Examples of discriminators include the level of redundancy, methods of engaging backup systems, protection from software errors, and the use of dissimilar hardware and software. The strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches are identified. The paper concludes with some speculation on trends for future systems based on this evaluation of previous systems.