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Responses of Federal District Judges to Court of Appeals Policies: An Exploration

EPMPIRICAL research on the implementation of judicial policies has contributed substantially to our understanding of the American judicial process. But its contributions are limited by the narrowness of its focus. Typically, studies have examined response to single dramatic decisions of the Supreme Court on constitutional civil liberties issues. Few studies examine response to policies made by courts other than the Supreme Court, non-civil liberties policies, or judicial policies established in series of "little" decisions rather than single major rulings.1 This paper reports a study of response to judicial decisions that differs from most of the existing research in each of the respects that has been noted. The policies with which it is concerned are the policies of the federal courts of appeals on the legal standard of patent validity between the late 1930s and the early 1970s, policies which differed among circuits and which changed over time in particular circuits. The question that it seeks to answer is the extent to which this variation in policy at the appellate level can help to explain policy variation in the federal district courts, the direct subordinates of the courts of appeals. This question differs substantially from the question of compliance that is central to most studies of response to judicial decisions. The findings of this study will tell not about compliance with individual rulings but about the more diffuse impact of appellate policies on the corresponding policies of lower courts. Because of this different perspective, the study may be able to shed some new light on hierarchical relationships within the judiciary. Patent policy is a relatively obscure field, so a brief description of the courts' role in this field will be helpful in understanding the analysis to follow.2 Patent litigation generally involves disputes between patent owners, "patentees," and alleged or potential violators of their patent rights. Most cases are actions for patent infringement, violation of the rights of exclusivity attached to a patent. Of the issues that may arise in patent cases, the most significant for public policy is the validity of the patent in question. Most defendants in patent suits raise as a defense the claim that the patented invention fails to meet the statutory requisites for the receipt of patent rights in effect, that the Patent Office erred in issuing a patent. The federal patent statute provides judges with general criteria for the determination of validity, but these criteria leave room for considerable discretion; a court may interpret the criteria to demand a rigorous or a lenient standard of validity. The courts'