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Investment of Green Technology in a Tourism Supply Chain Under Competition

This article considers a green tourism supply chain (GTSC) composed of one scenic spot (SS) and two travel agencies (TAs) and derives the optimal green technology investments of the SS and TAs in the noncooperation, unilateral cooperation, and bilateral cooperation scenarios by establishing Stackelberg differential games. In addition, we investigate how the green tourism preference of tourists and the competition intensities of the TAs affect the green technology investments of the GTSC members and the greenness levels of tourism products. Our study indicates that the green technology investments of the GTSC members and the greenness levels of tourism products increase with the increasing of tourists’ green tourism preference. We also find that the green technology investments of the TAs and the greenness levels of tourism products change along with the competition intensity of the TAs, but the green technology investment of the SS remains unchanged. Meanwhile, we propose a bilateral cooperation policy that can achieve Pareto improvement of the GTSC performance.