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Slicing and Bundling

We develop a theory of agenda setting in a legislature. A proposer supports a platform comprising several policies. Policies are divisible and can be bundled—the proposer can slice each policy into parts, and she can aggregate the various policy parts into bills. The proposer chooses an agenda, which is a collection of bills. The legislature votes each bill up or down, and all the policy parts in each approved bill are implemented. We address the following questions: In equilibrium, which agenda is chosen? What are the consequences for voters? What are the implications for institutional design?