{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.021945866861741038, 'fraction_numerical': 0.008778346744696415, 'mean_word_length': 6.051546391752577, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Military consequences of cultural perceptions: The Spanish army in Morocco, 1912–1927

ABSTRACT This article examines the impact of cultural perceptions on military operations, using the history of the Spanish army in Morocco as a case study. Emphasizing what they regarded as the fundamentally non-Western character of indigenous North African warfare, top Spanish officers initially doubted the applicability of European military methods in Morocco. They also erroneously attributed a “native” quality to military practices that Europeans themselves had brought to the Maghreb, such as the razzia in its modern, colonial form. Cultural prejudices about Moroccan capabilities contributed to the massive rout of Spanish forces in 1921 near the Rifian settlement of Anwal (Annual)—the greatest defeat of any colonial army in twentieth-century Africa. After Anwal, the Spanish army’s dominant cultural conceptions evolved, as influential officers increasingly championed the viability of European military methods in North Africa, took steps to “de-exoticize” the Moroccan enemy, and stressed similarities rather than differences between Spaniards and Moroccans. Although traditional prejudices persisted, the cultural conceptions of prominent officers became more nuanced and less negative, facilitating relatively successful counterinsurgency and military occupation.