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The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl: A Historical Development J. N. Mohanty New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008. xi + 447 pp., $55.00

In sum, Mental Causation is a clear and thorough defence of anomalous monism. It leaves anomalous monism on a stronger footing than it began with, and clearly articulates the reason why anomalous monism is immune to the common objections raised against it. There are, however, several reasons to pause before returning to the Davidsonian account. First of all, the central line of defence Campbell uses is to claim that Davidson is a nominalist. Whether or not Davidson is a nominalist is a contested issue. Not only does Davidson continue to speak of properties (Davidson, 1993, p. 7), but his critics assume he believes in properties (Kim, 1993, p. 21). Given what is riding on Davidson’s acceptance of nominalism, a strong case that Davidson is a nominalist would be benefi cial. Campbell mentions several texts where Davidson insists that we must speak of mental descriptions rather than properties (p. 40; p. 44), and an argument that Davidson understands supervenience in terms of predicates (p. 53). But this evidence is not overwhelming. He could have addressed why Davidson continues to speak about properties when he actually only has predicates in mind. He could have also pointed to additional texts where Davidson acknowledges his nominalism. More profoundly, many will fi nd Davidson’s theory unsatisfactory for the precise reason that Campbell offers up as vindication for the theory. Namely, many think that properties do exist, and many think the discussion surrounding mental causation can only be understood in terms of the causal status of mental properties. Davidson, however, solves the problem of mental causation by simply saying that properties don’t exist. Campbell, likewise, responds to the various objections by relying on the fact that properties don’t exist. Surely, many who include properties in their ontology will consider this question-begging. Granted, the possibility of providing a successful account of mental causation is one motivation for abandoning properties. However, properties have numerous other benefi ts: they serve nicely as theory-independent counterparts to our predicates and generalizations, which generates a robust realism. They also help to explain the recurrences found in nature, while property instances serve as truthmakers for our sentences. Perhaps Campbell is aware of some of the appeal of properties, for he confesses “Kim’s thesis is more exotic than Davidson’s and does not require one to accept what might seem an unpalatable nominalism” (p. 58). Campbell, therefore, could have strengthened his case by discussing the virtues he sees in nominalism. These issues notwithstanding, Campbell offers up a spirited and persuasive reply to those who dismiss anomalous monism with too much haste. His vindication of anomalous monism represents a signifi cant advance in the discussion on mental causation.