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(R.) Bett (trans.) Sextus Empiricus. How to Keep an Open Mind. An Ancient Guide to Thinking Like a Skeptic. Pp. l + 225. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2021. Cased, £13.99, US$16.95. ISBN: 978-0-691-20604-2.

This text is a recent addition to the Princeton University Press Series Ancient Wisdom for Modern Readers. In this volume B. introduces an audience of non-specialists to Pyrrhonian Scepticism by presenting key passages from Sextus Empiricus’ works in his own translation, with the original Greek text on facing pages, an introduction and minimal notes. These key passages come primarily from Sextus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonian Scepticism, occasionally supplemented by parallel passages from Sextus’ other works. B.’s introduction is a pleasure to read and engages in a critical but also sympathetic fashion with the core tenets of Pyrrhonian Scepticism. His notes are illuminating. What is most remarkable about this book is that it contains a new translation of important parts of Sextus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonian Scepticism. The previously most recent translation of Sextus’ Outlines is by J. Annas and J. Barnes (2000). Both translations are excellent. However, there are some differences that matter philosophically. Here are two instances: B. translates pathos with ‘reaction’, Annas/Barnes with ‘feeling’. One of the central questions Pyrrhonian sceptics were confronted with is how they can act although they suspend judgement with respect to most or all beliefs. Sextus’ answer is twofold: Pyrrhonian sceptics assent to something, namely ‘pathē that are forced on them by appearance’ (PH 1.13). And sceptics act by following these pathē (PH 1.17). To translate pathē with ‘feelings’ suggests that Pyrrhonian sceptics endorse their own feelings and act depending on how they feel. But Sextus provides an example that clearly shows that he means something different: Pyrrhonian sceptics assent that honey appears sweet to them because honey appears to sweeten them as a matter of sense-perception (PH 1.20). That to which the sceptics assent here (i.e. the appearance of sweetness) is not a feeling, but rather a reaction of the sensory apparatus to honey. B. translates dogma with ‘doctrine’, Annas/Barnes with ‘belief’. Readers with knowledge of Greek usually assume ‘belief’ to be the translation of doxa or of some formulation with the verb dokein. Given the vexed debate whether Pyrrhonian sceptics have beliefs, it is wise to be careful in translating belief-related terms. As G. Fine (Méthexis 13 [2000], 81–105) has argued, it depends on one’s concept of belief whether it is correct to identify Sextus’ dogma with belief. It is easy to answer the question whether the sceptic has dogmata, because Sextus answers it – yes, sceptics have dogmata (PH 1.13). But it is unclear whether that amounts to our understanding of belief. ‘Doctrine’ seems to be a fine translation. This edition is the only one offering key passages from Sextus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonian Scepticism in an excellent translation with the facing Greek text (R.G. Bury’s translation from 1933 is antiquated and often wrong, and Annas/Barnes do not provide the Greek). Therefore, there is potential for this edition not only to be read by non-specialists, but also to be useful for specialists.