{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.02616690240452617, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.261061946902655, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
From “Pearls” to “Arrows”: Rethinking the “String of Pearls” Theory of China's Naval Ambitions

Over the past decade, much has been made of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) growing maritime ambitions, both within its territorial waters and in neighboring oceans. However, as foreign analysts grapple with how to translate China's somewhat conflicting strategies into a unified strategy, they often are unable to find guidance from the government itself. As a result, the current metaphors that are used to describe China's naval strategies have become muddled and somewhat disconnected from both government rhetoric and military action. This article reexamines the frequently cited “String of Pearls” metaphor that has been used by many analysts to describe China's maritime ambitions within the Indian Ocean region. Instead of viewing its naval plans as inherently hostile and expansionist, this article makes the argument that it is more accurate to describe China's ambitions as part of a larger strategy that emphasizes both offensive and defensive capabilities stretching from the Indian Ocean to the East China Sea. This framework, which this article coins “the Bow and Arrow” strategy, sees the bulk of China's naval resources devoted to defensive efforts in the South and East China Seas. The Indian Ocean is of secondary importance and likely to only be a theater for occasional, limited excursions.