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The Public and Atlantic Defense. Edited by Flynn Gregory and Rattinger Hans. (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, Publishers, 1985. Pp. xviii + 398. $45.00.)

An intriguing and well-documented tale of the complex and tragic German-Jewish/Israeli relationship, this work also affords the opportunity to analyze and evaluate the overused concept of "special relationships" in international affairs. Although the tale is well told, the concept remains perplexing and perhaps misleading. The furor over a recent U.S. presidential visit to the Bitburg cemetery in the Federal Republic was merely the latest festering of the still unhealed wounds of German's past. Chancellor Kohl's Middle Eastern travels of 1984 also gave rise to controversy over the proposed sale of sophisticated weapons to Saudi Arabia. While in Israel, Kohl maintained that 40 years had produced a "new Germany" led by guilt-free leaders and entitled to the prerogatives of a major regional power; the Israeli government in effect said, "Not yet." The cards remaining in Israeli hands—to be played for influence at such times of disagreement with Bonn—reflect what Feldman terms the continued special Bonn-Tel Aviv relationship, a relationship born of twentieth-century German antisemitism and the Holocaust, and forged by political and economic sensitivities and needs on both sides. However the pace of evolution, means of influence, and issues of contention now evident in this relationship do not appear to differ markedly from those of any bilateral international diplomacy. Therefore, one wonders what is gained by viewing Israeli-West German relations as "special." As Anthony Eden discovered to his chagrin at Suez, belief in supposedly special ties (e.g., U.S.-UK) can produce the gravest sorts of miscalculations and delusions.