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The creation of the European economic and monetary union (EMU): intergovernmental negotiations and two-level games

The European economic and monetary union (EMU) is widely viewed as one of the most important developments in recent European integration. But it is less clear why EMU was started at all, and, more specifically,what the role of individual European Community (EC) member states has been in this process. Most importantly, some puzzling questions arise when trying to establish why Germany favored EMU, and as to its relative importance in the intergovernmental EMU negotiations. This article focuses on the negotiations that led to the establishment of the EMU. It first describes the environment in which the decision was made to move from the existing European monetary system (EMS) to EMU. It then seeks to explain howagreement was reached on EMU and on its institutional provisions and timing as foreseen in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and its Protocols. In order to explain this, the article resorts to a data base that contains information on the preferences that EC governments held with respect to different aspects of EMU. In addition, it employs simple negotiation models to explore these issues and looks into possible two-level game dynamics that may have influenced the intergovernmental bargaining processs.