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China’s 16+1 and Belt and Road Initiative in Central and Eastern Europe: economic and political influence at a cheap price

ABSTRACT In September 2013, China’s President Xi Jinping announced the initiative of rebuilding the original Silk Road. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) covers a broad network of railways, pipelines, ports, and roads and involves more than 60 countries. Among these countries are the 16 Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) with whom China already set up the 16+1 forum in 2012. Both the 16+1 forum and the BRI project emphasize the enhancement of connectivity, cooperation, trade, and cultural exchange between China and the CEEC. Since their establishment, there has been a lot of discussion in IR scholarship about what these large-scale initiatives entail. This article argues that the 16+1 and the BRI give China the possibility of increasing its economic and political influence in the Central and Eastern Europe by using, on the one hand, economic carrots and promises and, on the other hand, by gaining soft power on the basis of cultural exchange and high-level diplomatic dialogue. While a big discrepancy remains between the objectives and the economic outcomes of the 16+1 and the BRI, this Hirschmanesque strategy with Chinese characteristics currently works to the advantage of the initiator.