{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.017358490566037735, 'fraction_numerical': 0.00830188679245283, 'mean_word_length': 6.015873015873016, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Trade Disputes and Non-State Actors: New Institutional Arrangements and the Privatisation of Commercial Diplomacy

Critical aspects of commercial diplomacy in the United States and the European Union are undergoing a process of gradual privatisation. We examine institutional arrangements that permit private groups (predominantly industry associations and firms) to petition for the initiation of trade disputes, propose agenda items for multilateral negotiations in the World Trade Organisation, and conduct negotiations on proposals for regulatory reform outside state-to-state channels. These include the United States' Section 301, the European Union's Trade Barriers Regulation, formal consultation processes surrounding WTO negotiations, and the Transatlantic Business Dialogue. We explore the reasons why governments have opened up these new access points for industry, draw comparisons among the institutions and between the US and EU experience of them, and outline patterns of industry use of the petition mechanisms by broad industrial classification. Along with building theory on comparative private-sector policy substitutability, we consider some of the normative issues raised by institutions for privatised commercial diplomacy. Copyright 2006 The Authors Journal compilation 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd .