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Pricing Problem in the E-Commerce Low-Carbon Supply Chain under Asymmetric Fairness Preferences

Given the different fairness preferences of online retailers and their investment in emission reduction and revenue sharing with manufacturers, an e-commerce low-carbon supply chain decision model was established using Stackelberg game theory under three circumstances: no fairness preference, symmetric fairness preferences, and asymmetric fairness preferences. Results reveal that the asymmetric fairness preference behaviors of online retailers weaken the manufacturers’ profits, where the online retailer’s utility is negatively correlated with its asymmetric fairness preference coefficient. The real fairness preference coefficient of the online retailer estimated by the manufacturer is negatively correlated with the manufacturer’s wholesale price and carbon emission reduction. The revenue sharing proportion of the manufacturer presents a positive correlation with its wholesale price but shows no correlation with the retail price, the green degree, or the supply chain profit. Within a feasible region, the proportion of the online retailer’s investment in emission reduction is positively correlated with the manufacturer’s profit, the online retailer’s utility, the total utility of the supply chain, the carbon emission reduction, the product’s retail price, and the product’s wholesale price.