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In the Name of State Sovereignty? The Justification of War in Russian History and the Present

This chapter shows that the Russian philosophical and legal traditions regarding war have advanced along a number of different tracks. In Imperial Russia, some thinkers adopted pacifist positions; others regarded war as a necessary evil. A similar bifurcation of thought can be seen in the Soviet era. The Soviets expounded a belief in the principles of non-interference and peaceful coexistence. At the same time, they also sometimes portrayed war in a positive light. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian scholars and political leaders have generally supported state sovereignty and rejected attempts to justify humanitarian interventions, regime change, and preventive war (on these Western strategies, see Geis/Wagner, Stohl, and Jahn in this volume). Nevertheless, they have on occasion resorted to very similar language themselves. Russian narratives thus oscillate between favouring pacifism and sovereignty as means of preserving the status quo and, as an exception, supporting military interventions when these are required by the transient goals of Russian foreign policy.