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Opposition in a Consensual System - The Case of Germany

This paper analyses opposition in the German political system and contrasts it to the interaction of the ruling party and Opposition in Westminster style assemblies. In Germany, opposition activities unfold in a complex setting that deliberately aims to avoid the concentration of power with only one institution or party. Within the Bundestag, Germany’s federal parliament, extensive participation rights for parliamentary party groups (PPGs) limit the power of the executive while the potential veto-role of Germany’s Federal Council, the Bundesrat, which represents the interests of Germany’s Lander, may force the government into bargaining over legislation. Adding to this are a range of other instruments, such as the opposition’s potential to ask the Federal Constitutional Court to scrutinize a legislative bill according to its constitutionality, or – on a Lander level – the possibility to initiate a referendum to get a contested bill approved. The intertwined and overlapping system of decision-making that is characteristic for German politics frequently demands building large coalitions that bring together interests from all sides of the political spectrum and involve both the federal government and the state governments. It is only in the context of these particular aspects that the scope and impact of parliamentary opposition in Germany can be fully understood.