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An Experiment: Voluntary Separation in Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Many economic and social relationships, such as employment and marriages, are subject to voluntary separation -- each party can unilaterally quit the relationship any time. This study experimentally investigates cooperative behavior of people in such environment. Subjects play an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game in a reputation-free setup, in which they are randomly rematched with another person upon separating from their partner. People are more likely to cooperate when they can voluntarily separate, especially when separation is costly. Uncooperative subjects and those who are open to cooperation coexist, and voluntary separation functions as a sorting mechanism. Initially uncooperative plays leading to a long-term cooperation, a highly-counter intuitive prediction made by Fujiwara-Greve & Okuno-Fujiwara(2009), are observed in the data. Teaching and learning between subjects, which resembles socialization, emerge as a prominent pattern as well.