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The Politics of Electoral Reform in Italy

Italy's 1993 electoral reforms were forced on parliament, and on the dominant party elites, by elite outsiders using the referendum instrument. The resultant parliamentary electoral system was the product neither of a rational process of institutional engineering nor even of conflicting party strategies. Whilst parliament was forced to legislate, the established parties were unable to reassert control over the reform process even during its final, legislative phase. The parties' conflicting and uncer tain interests, and above all their spectacular loss of legitimacy in the face of massive corruption scandals (Tangentopoli), allowed the reform movement to insist on certain general terms being respected. These terms, however, had themselves been forced on the reformers by the exacting constitutional requirements of the referendum process. A democratic political mobilisation had, nevertheless, been achieved and further reform was possible, even likely, as new and old parties competed to consolidate a new party system.