{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.014925373134328358, 'fraction_numerical': 0.003980099502487562, 'mean_word_length': 5.023952095808383, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Getting There is Half the Battle: Military Mobilization and the Escalation of Demands

When a state in a diplomatic crisis with a rival mobilizes its military, it pays in advance some of the costs of fighting a war since military movements are a necessary first step in actually fighting. However, this act of sinking costs during negotiation alters the bargaining environment. This is because the set of possible negotiated outcomes mutually-preferred to war is determined by the joint costs of war, and part of the cost of war includes mobilization. Mobilization reduces the remaining marginal cost of war for the mobilizing side, thereby raising the mobilizer’s minimum demands for a negotiated settlement. Case studies of British mobilization in the Crimean War and U.S. mobilization against Iraq prior to March 2003 demonstrate the effect of mobilization on the course of negotiations. We conclude with some implications for the credibility of great powers who mobilize against distant weaker states.