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Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (London, HarperCollins, 1995, £25). Pp. 660. ISBN 0 00 255262 0.

Professor Andrew, the author of Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (1986) and (with Oleg Gordievsky) of KGB: The Inside Story (1991), has now turned his attention to the United States. The sub-title of his new work is well justified. America's first president was a firm believer in the need for good intelligence. His first experience of battle, Braddock's attempt to seize Fort Duquesne, demonstrated the folly of advancing on a foe without first ascertaining his strength. Thereafter, and throughout the revolutionary war, he showed himself adept at gathering and interpreting information passed on to him by agents. Two hundred years later American visitors were intrigued to see a copy of a letter of his commending the need for good intelligence and the value of secrecy gracing the walls of Britain's MI6 headquarters. For the next century, however, presidents showed considerably less aptitude. Rumours that Lincoln might be murdered on the way to his first inauguration led to his arriving in Washington in somewhat furtive circumstances. This gave rise to many stories which, in turn, may well have contributed to the poor security that allowed his assassination in Ford's Theatre. Military intelligence during the Civil War was often inept. Not until the Great War did Americans give serious attention to such matters and even then with disappointing results as the success of German sabotage operations in US munitions factories and dockyards demonstrated. Mostly Americans relied on information fed to them by the British whose motives were more devious than its recipients realized. The notorious telegram from the German foreign minister Arthur Zimmermann offering Mexicans the return of Texas and New Mexico in the event of a wartime alliance against the United States was not, as Americans were led to believe, obtained from an agent in Mexico City, but intercepted from the transatlantic cable along which American diplomatic messages also passed. Nothing demonstrated Americans' dependence more graphically than the way in which Sir William Wiseman, technically the head of Britain's New York intelligence operation, became a trusted member of President Wilson's inner circle.