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Rationality and Religious Theism

[1] Joshua Golding’s Rationality and Religious Theism is a well-argued work in philosophical theism, which attempts to demonstrate the rational defensibility of religious theism in general, and of Judaism in particular. Since similar arguments to Golding’s own argument for the rational defensibility of Judaism can be constructed for other versions of religious theism, e.g., Christianity and Islam, Golding sees his book as providing a philosophical ground for a certain form of religious pluralism, which may acknowledge the rational defensibility of different religions, which make some conflicting claims and which involve different practices. [2] Golding’s apologetic, pluralistic project is based on a distinction between rationally defensible positions and rationally compelling ones: ‘A position is “rationally compelling” if it can be shown that any rational being ought to adopt that position. A position is “rationally defensible” if an argument can be marshaled to support that claim or position, and if criticisms and objections to that argument can be rebutted.’ (2). Such an argument, according to Golding, may not be compelling upon all rational beings; it may, for example, rest on certain assumptions, which are intuitively plausible to some persons but not others. Thus, two opposing positions may be rationally defensible for different people. An adherent of a particular religious tradition can, therefore, conceive of her own religious commitment as rationally defensible for her, while viewing the commitments of religious theists of traditions other than her own as potentially rationally defensible for them. The philosophical possibility for a pluralistic, tolerant, and respectful religious interchange is thereby established. [3] The book consists of four chapters: Chapter One consists of an introduction and clarification of the project as well as of a short presentation of Pascal’s Wager. Chapters Two and Three contain the main argument of the book. In Chapter Two, Golding defines religious theism; in Chapter Three, he argues that it is rationally defensible. He concludes, in Chapter Four, with a consideration of the rational defensibility of Judaism; he defines what it is to be a religious Jew (a definition, which ostensibly lacks the criterion of being a Jew), and proceeds to argue that it is rationally defensible to be one. [4] ForGolding, one is a religious theist if and only if one fulfills the following conditions: 1) One has a conception of God as a Supreme Person, 2) One has a conception of the good relationship with God as supremely valuable, 3) One has