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Pluralism about Global Distributive Justice 3. Anti-pluralism about Global Distributive Justice

Several theorists have recently advocated a move towards a more “pluralistic” approach to global distributive justice. What exactly would this move involve, and is it a good idea? This paper attempts to make some headway on these questions. I begin by distinguishing several candidate forms of pluralism in the domain of distributive justice. I next show how each of these forms is well supported, although for different reasons, within three widely endorsed approaches to distributive justice in general. I then vindicate the claim that current philosophical writing on global distributive justice in particular, by proponents of these three approaches among others, is at most weakly pluralistic in nature. I argue that this anti-pluralistic strain is both surprising in light of the theoretical consensus highlighted earlier, and counter-intuitive on its own terms. I finish by offering a set of debunking explanations for the force that anti-pluralism about global distributive justice exerts upon us, despite its apparently weak rationale.