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Explanation and Justification in Ethics

Ethical naturalism has recently been put on a new footing. I shall speak of the new approach as "confirmation theory" because it assimilates moral justification to scientific confirmation. It attempts to show how theories of empirical confirmation in science can be applied to yield a naturalistic account ofjustification in ethics. Certain naturalists who adopt a strategy of this sort see it as a way to vindicate a position they call "moral realism." I think it more fruitful to consider it as a strategy for vindicating naturalism, for there are other types of moral realism. Also, the new naturalism need not be committed to a "realist" account of science. Its fundamental claim, as I see it, is that morality and science are epistemologically on a par. Confirmation theory holds basically that a moral code or normative moral theory, such as a theory of justice, is justified just in case it is empirically confirmed according to the canons of scientific methodology. And a confirmation theorist would ordinarily hold that some moral theory can be empirically confirmed.'