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On Justifying and Being Justified

We commonly speak of people as being ''justified'' or ''unjustified'' in believing as they do. These terms describe a person's epistemic condition. To be justified in believing as one does is to have a positive epistemic status in virtue of holding one's belief in a way which fully satisfies the relevant epistemic requirements or norms. This requires something more (or other) than simply believing a proposition whose truth is well-supported by evidence, even by evidence which one possesses oneself, since one could entirely miss the relevance of this evidence and hold the belief as a result of wishful thinking or for some other bad reason. My topic in this paper is the notion of being justified which precludes beliefs flawed in this way. I will take the notion of something's telling in favor of the truth of a proposition—that is, the notion of evidential support—for granted. In addition to being (or not being) justified in holding beliefs, we also engage in the activity of justifying: we sincerely articulate what we take to be good reasons for our beliefs, commit to holding our beliefs for those reasons, and attempt to meet objections, all in order to establish our right to hold our beliefs. This activity is often conversational, though it can also take place in private meditation. Either way, if one is taken to have performed successfully, then one's interlocutor (who may be oneself) will conclude that one is justified. It would seem, at first blush, that the state of being justified can't be fully distinguished from considerations pertaining to the activity. In particular , many people find it natural to think that if you can't justify a belief, then you aren't justified in holding it. Imagine, for instance, a case in which your interlocutor insists upon a surprising claim. He offers some reasons which manifestly fail to support the truth of his belief, and he has no satisfactory reply when this shortcoming is pointed out to him. His belief isn't justified, or so it would seem; he really shouldn't be so certain about