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Review of Murray Clarke ’ s Reconstructing Reason and Representation

Reconstructing reason and representation is a no small ambition. Is Clarke up to it? His basic theoretical postulate is the massive modularity hypothesis, one of the Founding Articles of High Church Evolutionary Psychology (hereafter EP). Clarke defends the massive modularity hypothesis against its critics – well, to be precise, against Jerry Fodor. Fodor’s main argument is that cognitive modules cannot do nondemonstrative (abductive) reasoning in an effective and economical way. The problem is that, given a particular problem and given that we have access to some large library of general knowledge, there seem to be no tractable rules for determining which items in the library are specifically relevant to the process of solving this particular problem. The trick is to know how to select, from the vast sea of irrelevant information in the library, the few bits of information that are relevant here and now. Modules don’t face the problem of selecting relevant information from a large library of accessible information. They solve the relevance problem noncognitively: information encapsulation puts walls around a body of information and gives the modular system free access to everything inside the room.