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Ahmet Evin, ed., Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, for Deutsches Orient-Institute, 1984. Pp. 164.

More seriously, readers will quarrel with their statement that "the cause of the Shah's demise was neither a revolution nor an Islamic movement" (p. 104). This rather remarkable statement is made in the context of an argument that maintains that the Shah was responsible for his own downfall and that those who seized power began talking about Islamic government and economics only after they came into office. This is somewhat quixotic reasoning, since: (1) the Shah's mistakes could still (and in my view did) bring about a revolutionary movement; and (2) the fact that the revolutionaries only thought about Islamic rule after the seizure of power—even if true (and I do not accept that it is)—hardly excludes the possibility that Islamic groups played a key role in the Shah's overthrow. To sum up, this book provides us with the first in-depth investigation of the important but little understood issue of planning in the public policy of a large Middle Eastern country. Future scholarship, it is to be hoped, will examine yet more closely the dynamics of decision making in the planning process. In the meanwhile, the present book contributes to our understanding of revolution quite apart from its focus on planning. It seems to validate once more the famous proposition associated originally with Alexis de Tocqueville that revolutions occur after relatively long periods of prosperity, followed by a sharp reversal of trends affecting strategically located social forces. The Shah made all the mistakes necessary to create a "demand-pull" inflationary spiral and then proceeded to treat it as if it were a "cost-push" problem. The solutions, including anti-profiteering campaigns, show trials, price controls, and the like managed to offend virtually every key group in society. The final result was the greatest social upheaval in the Middle East since the Algerian Revolution.