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Comprehension, Demonstration, and Accuracy in Aristotle

: This paper discusses the relation between νοῦς (the knowledge of scientific principles) and ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική (the knowledge of demonstrable truths) in Aristotle’s philosophy of science. I argue against “rationalist” interpretations, dominant in the secondary literature, which claim that the principles can be known as such independently of their causal connections to demonstrable truths. However, alternative interpretations imply that νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική are somehow interdependent, a view that seems in conflict with the fact that νοῦς is, according to Aristotle, more “accurate” than ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική. Thus, I offer a construal of the relation between these two cognitive states and explain in which sense they can be taken as interdependent without contradicting Aristotle’s claim about their “accuracy” or rendering his theory viciously circular.