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Practical limitations of sliding-mode switching attacks on smart grid systems

Switching attacks in smart grid systems have gained some recent attention by the research community. Based on understanding the structure of the physical system and accessing the system variables, effective sliding-mode switching attacks can be used to disrupt the normal operation of the power grid. This article investigates the practical limitations of such attacks. Sliding-mode switching attacks on a single-machine infinite-bus system are considered in this work, and the impact of some practical limitations is investigated. These limitations include sampling period, quantization level, signal-to-noise ratio, hysteresis margin and minimum time to switch of a circuit breaker, and communication latency. Results of this work detail the effectiveness of the sliding-mode switching attacks under different practical limitations.