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Virtue, Piety and the Law

This dissertation examines the concepts of virtue and piety in a sixteenth century Islamic manual of ethics and advice. The work in question is Birgivī Meḥmed Efendī’s (d. 981/1573) al-Ṭarīqa al-muḥammadiyya. Birgivī was an Ottoman ‘ālim, whose ideas would rise to great popularity, especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries CE. Best known for his call for a return to the pristine ideal of the community of Muḥammad, Birgivī’s work inspired a number of reformist movements and thinkers, ranging in outlook from the moderate to the conservative and, in some cases, even violent. By way of a close reading and analysis of the text of al-Ṭarīqa almuḥammadiyya, I attempt to elucidate Birgivī’s understanding of virtue, piety and the role of the law in the realization of a “good life”—a life, that is, that would ultimately lead to salvation. I contextualize Birgivī’s ethical system within the wider intellectual tradition of Islam, as well as within the particular social, political and religious conjuncture of sixteenth century Anatolia and Rumelia. My project thus represents an explication de texte in the widest sense of the word, with the aim of providing a case study in the development of Islamic ethics in the early modern period. This is particularly pertinent as the works of early modern Muslim scholars have rarely been examined in detail. In particular, I highlight the way Birgivī links questions of individual piety to issues of wider social and economic concern. In addition, I emphasize his deep mistrust of the passions of the human soul, which led him to prescribe a regime of self-examination of the underlying motives of a believer’s acts, thoughts and emotions that turned out to be so relentless it was almost impossible for believers to ever feel truly sure of not having acted insincerely. In his articulation of such a rigorous regime of social disciplining, I argue, Birgivī also played a crucial role in the negotiation of sixteenth century Ottoman “orthodoxy,” i.e. the formulation of what constituted ideologically and spiritually acceptable beliefs and practices.