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Counterinsurgency and the rule of law in Afghanistan

ABSTRACT A major aspect of the United States’ war efforts in Afghanistan over the past two decades has been the waging of a counterinsurgency campaign. This article analyzes the extent to which the United States and other Western intervening nations developed and implemented rule of law support missions as a component of the overarching counterinsurgency mission. This article evaluates the successes and failures of the rule of law missions, analyzing the lessons learned from two decades of conflict to provide a foundation for the policymakers and strategic planners who will be tasked with executing counterinsurgency campaigns in the future. The article focuses in particular on the social, political, and cultural factors of the Afghan people that impacted the viability of the Western counterinsurgency and rule of law missions.