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Three Accounts of R-facts

This chapter introduces three novel accounts of the R-relation. The first two are monistic accounts on which there is a unique R-relation: the symmetric dependence relation, and the necessitation relation, respectively. The third account we consider is a pluralist account on which there are multiple R-relations, each of them a correlational relation and each of various strengths. We defend these accounts against the objection that there are instances of these relations that do not seem explanatory, by pointing out that on the accounts we offer the presence of such relations is necessary, but not sufficient, for the presence of an everyday metaphysical explanation. We also show how a worldly conception of everyday metaphysical explanation can accommodate the psychological aspect of the phenomenon.