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Representing God at the Statehouse: Religion and Politics in the American States

treated as exogenous (11). However, the initiative was not randomly allocated among the states; early in its history it was adopted mostly in western states and, more recently, by Wyoming and Florida (1968), Illinois (1970), and Mississippi (1992). To the extent that a state’s choice to have the initiative (or not) was a product of stable characteristics (e.g., culture, constitution, ideology) in its political system, Boehmke’s findings may properly be a function of those characteristics, rather than the initiative, per se. Since it is unlikely that history has erased many of the initial differences between initiative and noninitiative states, Boehmke’s analysis systematically overstates the institutional importance of the initiative. This problem could have been addressed with an appropriate twostage regression model or more thorough historical analysis. Without such analysis, however, the reader is left to suspect that the initiative and interest group behaviors may actually be driven by unidentified common causes. My criticisms notwithstanding, Boehmke’s study contributes usefully to theories of interest group strategies and popular initiatives. Methodologically, it illustrates nicely how to combine a formal model, large-N empirical analysis, and multiple data sets when addressing a single topic. Most significantly, the book affords ample inspiration for future research. For example, the indirect effects of other institutional innovations (perhaps state-level 527 organizations) might be evaluated using a similar approach. Or, the formal model might be modified incrementally to allow for multiple, competing interest groups and/or divided chambers in the legislature. Thus, I predict that an indirect effect of The Indirect Effect of Direct Legislation will be to stimulate new insights on the relationship between institutional arrangements and interest group behavior for years to come.