{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.008977900552486187, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0006906077348066298, 'mean_word_length': 5.527027027027027, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Ivan A. Sag and Jorge Hankamer toward a Theory of Anaphoric Processing 0. Introduction

Linguistics and philosophers have long been concerned with the problem of formulating a precise theory of pronouns and other anaphoric elements or expressions in natural language. Proposed treatments have been quite diverse, but a common assumption in formal accounts of anaphora appears to be that anaphoric elements in general can be treated analogously to variables in logical languages whose semantic role is explicated by rules of interpretation which constitute a recursive definition of truth or meaning for the language. Such definitions are highly idealized rule systems which abstract away from any particulars of the psychology of those who make use of them. In this paper, we suggest that a fundamental dichotomy among anaphoric expressions in natural language cannot be properly understood solely with reference to such an abstract semantic system. We argue that the properties of distinct types of anaphora can be understood only by distinguishing between those that reference specifically linguistic objects (and hence are essentially substitutive in nature) and those that reference more general sorts of mental representations, to understand the properties distinguishing the two classes of anaphoric expressions, one must understand that they are processed and assigned interpretations on the basis of distinct kinds of psychological objects.