{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.02535421327367636, 'fraction_numerical': 0.002982848620432513, 'mean_word_length': 4.7844827586206895, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
UK Security Strategy: Clarity or Compromise?

If the security of the nation and its population is one of the primary responsibilities of government or perhaps, its ‘first duty’, then it stands to reason that the formulation of a strategy to support this is one of government’s most important tasks. The quote from Sun Tzu above suggests that this was recognised over 2,000 years ago. Yet it seems to be the consensus today that the United Kingdom does not ‘do’ strategy. It has been claimed that ‘there is an intellectual vacuum at the heart of British statecraft’ and that ‘the word ‘strategy’ has acquired a universality which has robbed it of meaning, and left it only with banalities’. Not only has the UK failed to formulate effective strategy, but it no longer understands the term and is confused about how to conduct strategy. These cannot be dismissed as the complaints of purist academics in ivory towers; military leaders comment that ‘we have let slip both the mechanisms and more importantly the grammar with which to conduct the relevant strategic discourse within and around defence’ and Parliamentarians have joined in the chorus of concern. If the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) can state that the UK has ‘lost an institutionalised capacity for, and culture of, strategic thought’ it seems obvious that there is a problem.