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The second section is more constructive, rather than historical, in its focus. Rediehs seeks to expand the concept of experience/empiricism by looking at emo-

Rediehs seeks to expand the concept of experience/empiricism by looking at emotional, moral, aesthetic, teleological, and relational ‘senses’, before briefly discussing religious and mystical experiences (part ). She creatively argues that this Quaker ‘experiential empiricism’ can be seen as a version of Ian Barbour’s category of ‘integration/synthesis’ in the science and religion dialogue. However, she also maintains that the ‘experiential empiricism’ – unlike other synthesist approaches, such as process theology or theology of nature – ‘makes no a priori metaphysical assumptions’ (). This is a somewhat surprising claim as the previous section has identified various core theological beliefs and assumptions which seem to deeply inform Quaker epistemology. In part  Rediehs compares Quaker epistemology with feminist epistemology, and argues that both emphasize the holistic, communal, and relational nature of knowledge. She finishes the work by applying the insights of her distinct epistemology to what she calls ‘Today’s Crisis of Truth’ and the problem of incommensurability between different paradigms (, part ). In sum, this short book is illuminating. It is probably of particular value to those interested in the history of Quaker philosophy in the context of wider European intellectual culture. The book also makes a contribution to the ongoing discourse of articulating and developing tradition-specific rationalities. As the work is a minimonograph, Rediehs’s arguments are often suggestive and not developed in detail. Indeed, I hope that she and others will go on to develop some of the concepts identified in the work. For example, a future task might be to bring Quaker epistemology into a critical dialogue not just with certain schools of philosophical thought, but also with other experiential religious epistemologies (e.g. the biblical pragmatism of the Pentecostal movement).