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Verkuil, Paul R. Valuing Bureaucracy: The Case for Professional Government

was trying to convince reporters of the merits of the peace treaty that ended World War I and when the president was pressuring the Senate to support the League of Nations. Even so, Startt demonstrates repeatedly that Wilson’s temper sometimes kept the president from taking advantage of the “bully pulpit” to maximum effect (294). One key aspect of Wilson’s public presidency that receives the attention it deserves in this book involves the president’s effort to shape international public opinion after the war’s end, particularly around the time of the peace treaty negotiations. Startt provides an extensive discussion of the efforts by Allied leaders to shape the daily news coverage of the European conference. He also notes how Wilson’s reticence to speak about the confidential discussions left him at a great disadvantage when compared to the more leak-prone delegations promoting the distinct interests of France, Italy, and the United Kingdom (256–257). This book might benefit from a bit more extensive discussion of Wilson’s prepresidential approach to the mass media as a way of putting his presidential news coverage into sharper focus. Although his earlier work, Woodrow Wilson and the Press: Prelude to the Presidency (2004), addressed this matter, a bit more of an introductory discussion of Wilson’s views on journalists and journalism before he became president would have been an asset to readers of Startt’s latest book. Scholars have long noted the large number of “what if” questions that surround the Wilson presidency, particularly relating to public relations. What if wartime censorship had been less intense? What if Wilson had done more to promote the position of the United States to reporters during the Versailles conference? What if Wilson had not exhausted himself in the nationwide whistle-stop tour to increase public support for U.S. entry into the League of Nations? What if Wilson had taken a more positive public stance regarding possible negotiations with the reluctant Republican senators over the provisions of the League of Nations’ plan? Overall, the extensive and high-quality evidence employed here forms the basis of very reasonable arguments regarding these and other vexing questions about the publicly oriented aspects of the Wilson presidency. Where the evidence is contradictory or inconclusive, Startt provides full disclosure of those limitations and justifiable interpretations.