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Retributive Sanction in the Liberal State

The chapter discusses several versions of retributivist conceptions of punishment and distinguishes the version defended from them. The view, as is the case with some other retributivist views, includes a morally proper role for resentment. It also responds to many of the objections to retributivism, showing that in several cases, they are based on misconceptions or misrepresentations. The chapter also explains how and why retributivism communicates the values and principles of liberal democracy and why consequentialist conceptions of punishment are seriously flawed.