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Inside the Inclusive Government: Interparty Dynamics in Zimbabwe’s Power-Sharing Executive

This article contributes to the debate on the merits and perils of interim executive power-sharing as a means of conflict management by examining the functioning of Zimbabwe’s power-sharing government during the interregnum of 2009–13. Based on the insider accounts of numerous executive members, the article argues that the inter-party dynamics in the Government of National Unity were characterised by selective co-operation and obstruction. The extent of co-operation between ministers from the three parties in the coalition varied depending on the domain of governance and constellation of officials involved, rather than being exclusively determined by party strategies. New government organs introduced to the existing executive structure to enable power-sharing failed effectively to balance power between the three parties. The Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU[PF]), which had dominated government since the introduction of majority-rule democracy in 1980, consistently flouted government protocol. Yet inter-party relations within government improved gradually, and the power-sharing parties generally co-operated on economic, social and infrastructure policies. Democratic gains were minor, owing to ZANU(PF)’s resistance to reform, but the power-sharing process considerably reduced polarisation and fostered dialogue among hostile political elites. Zimbabwe’s Government of National Unity thus illustrates that interim power-sharing can have a significant peace-building effect at the elite level. Yet it also shows that an interim governance process is unlikely to achieve decisive democratic reforms where parties lack commitment, engage in power-sharing with ulterior motives and undermine reforms from within. Although interim power-sharing may foster dialogue and ease hostility, conflict actors who internalised coercion and authoritarianism in their habitus are unlikely to adopt a democratic political culture.