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Guest Editor's Introduction

| International Journal | Autumn 2008 | 797 | The George W. Bush administration has been at the forefront of recent efforts to develop military options, up to and including nuclear use, designed to counter and neutralize the dangers posed by an adversary’s weapons-ofmass-destruction capabilities. New nuclear counterforce capabilities have been prioritized, and expanded target sets and flexible nuclear war plans developed against WMD proliferators and potential near-peer competitors. These revisions have the potential to augment an already impressive “counterforce” capability, nuclear and nonnuclear, designed to eliminate the strategic military assets of potential adversaries. A significant milestone was the 2001 nuclear posture review, which introduced the strategic concept of the “new triad.” The traditional nuclear triad consisted of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea-launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear-armed bombers. The new triad envisions an “offensive strike” leg that combines existing (and further modernized)