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States, Proxies, and (Remote) Offensive Cyber Operations

This chapter addresses cyber proxies and offensive cyber operations. The market of cyber force is a complex and dynamic relationship between the state and actors detached from the state that can target a third party beyond a state’s border with unprecedented ease. Only hacking, also known as ‘remote cyber operations’ in the military bureaucracy's vernacular, makes global reach possible at such low cost. Research identifies three main types of proxy relationships between a state and non-state actors: (i) delegation, (ii) orchestration, and (iii) sanctioning. How to manage effectively both proxies and the market for cyber capabilities, both tools and services to the degree they can be separated, is not only of interest for academic scholarship but also for practitioners and policymakers. While a state may face significant challenges in affecting another state’s proxy relationships, it can exercise greater control over its own relationships with cybersecurity companies, hacktivists, and those breaking the law either at home or abroad.