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Pricing Carbon and the Beneficiary Pays Principle: Framing Market-Based Incentives around Compensation Obligations

Alexandre Sayegh argues that his account of carbon pricing ‘need not be tied to . . . compensation’ because ‘a large array of tools are necessary’ for compensation (Sayegh, 117). He motives this view in light of the polluter pays principle. His account ofmarket-based incentives is marginally associated with the notion of compensation: he calls this ‘restricted compensation’ (Sayegh, 117). I will identify one plausible version of beneficiary pays and then argue that this version sidesteps some of Sayegh’s problems for polluter pays, whichmight reveal that his view isn’t as ‘restricted’ as he might think. Sayegh shows that his account of market-based incentives is more restricted than ‘general argument[s] about compensation’ in three ways: (1) there’s no duty to compensate all past climate harms ‘when implementing “polluter pays” principles’ (Sayegh, 117), (2) revenue from carbon taxes will not fully fulfill a right to energy, (3) not all participants are responsible for past emissions (from dead ancestors). He then identifies two additional problems with building compensation – based on polluter pays – into carbon pricing: it’s unclear whether the recipients of these taxes are the rights bearers and whether the individuals paying carbon taxes are themselves polluters. I will address these below, but first, consider a plausible version of beneficiary pays: