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Social choice and preference protection: towards fully private mechanism design

With the growing number of electronic markets on the net, there comes a growing demand for protection of privacy in electronic mechanisms. Instead of simply having to rely on the trustworthiness of system operators, cryptography provides the tools to ensure privacy in other ways. This extended abstract intends to bring the fields of mechanism design and secure multiparty computation together by generalizing some results already obtained in the area of cryptographic auction protocols [1]. We point out that secure social choice mechanisms can be constructed by distributing the mechanism computation on the participants themselves. This is achieved by using multiparty computation that is not based on any trusted fraction (threshold) assumptions. We show that the main reason for thresholds in the cryptographic model is a robustness requirement that can be loosened in our case. As a consequence, the correct and private execution of mechanisms can be guaranteed in the absence of trusted third-parties. In [2] the first (and, to the best of our knowledge, only) scheme to privately evaluate mechanisms has been proposed. Besides some similarities, their approach substantially differs from ours as they use two third-parties that are assumed not to collude. The aggregation of conflicting preferences in a group of agents is one of the central topics of economics and multiagent systems. Two major problems have been considered in this context so far. The social choice problem is to find a function that “fairly” aggregates conflicting preferences. The mechanism design problem is to construct mechanisms that urge self-interested agents to reveal preferences truthfully.