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The Operational Use of Intelligence: What to Avoid

Abstract : Military experience throughout history has had numerous examples of effective deception and surprise. Results of the surprise usually means destruction of military forces caught unaware. The reasons for the unawareness lies in a failure to heed intelligence information or incomplete analysis in the intelligence process. This paper looks at four areas of the intelligence process from an operator's perspective. Acquisition, Analysis, Dissemination, and Acceptance of Intelligence is examined while linking these areas to historical accounts from World War II and post World War II events/battles. These comparisons shed some light on areas where the intelligence process goes wrong. The goal of the paper is to examine the limitations of intelligence and make both operators and intelligence personnel wary of the problem areas. The intent is to make operators as well as intelligence personnel aware of areas that lead to traps and how either asking for, or providing the correct information will help military operations. It is not only important to understand what intelligence can do, but what it cannot do as well.