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Risk-based due diligence reporting in global mineral supply chains and the rule through transparency

ABSTRACT This article examines the operation of transparency as a technique of power and rule in the governance of global mineral supply chains. It focuses on reporting and auditing practices associated with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas. The due diligence regime sets norms to help corporations avoid the risk that their operations or mineral sourcing practices contribute to conflict and human rights violations. It manifests the widely held view that transparency is key to enabling the public to hold corporations to account for negative impacts of their practices. This article recasts risk-based due diligence reporting and auditing as techniques of rule ‘through’ law that are intrinsically unable to fulfil such normative objectives. In the minerals due diligence regime, ‘transparency’ is produced through the disclosure of risk management procedures, which involves a technical and abstract language that speaks to a corporate audience, but is unable to convey substantive information to stakeholders. Furthermore, the regulatory focus on risk management means that transparency techniques have an internal and procedural orientation towards the transformation of corporate systems of ‘internal control’. Risk-based due diligence reporting and auditing serve to disclose the corporation to itself and produce a perception of ‘responsible’ corporate subjects that improve risk management systems, while ‘the public’ is positioned as a passive audience of corporate performances of transparency and assurance. Thus, this article problematises the capacity of transparency-based regulation to facilitate the envisioned reflexive internal-external interaction between corporations and the public.