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The Vice President in the U.S. Senate: Examining the Consequences of Institutional Design

ABSTRACT The constitutional placement of the vice president as the president of the Senate gives procedural control of the Senate to an individual who is not elected by the chamber. We argue that because the vice president frequently acts against the wishes of Senate majorities, senators have been reluctant to allow chamber power to be centralized under their largely unaccountable presiding officer. This fear has had a major influence on Senate development, preventing the Senate from allowing its chair to reduce dilatory action, as the House has done. Accordingly, delay, via the filibuster, has become commonplace in the Senate. Such delay has reduced the Senate's efficiency, but has largely freed it from the potential influence of the executive branch.