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The portfolio analysis of electricity market with transmission constraints

In this paper, we define the portfolio of a generation company as the coordination of a set of generation units, which differ in production cost, capacity, and geographical location. A portfolio allows a generation company to coordinate its generators to bid strategically to earn profit more than what can be achieved without coordination. In a constrained transmission network, for example, a generation company can raise the electricity prices at a particular zone by congesting the inbound transmission lines through importing electricity from neighboring zones where other cheaper generation units of the company located. Understanding generation companies' bidding behaviors under such situation is therefore crucial to ensure market fairness. In this paper, we use an agent-based approach to model the electricity market as a multi-player game and investigate how the transmission capacity and installed capacity of generation companies affect their bidding strategies under both a monopoly market and a non-monopoly market. We demonstrate conditions under which generation companies will prefer a coordination strategy over a non-coordination one.