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Roman law tradition in three cases of first impression

One of the aspects of the effective judicial protection is the stability of law and its certainty. This stability is always disturbed when there is a lack of a particular solution or when the law in a particular case is ambiguous. This may be especially burdensome in a legal system based on the precedent, like the English law. In such a situation, it is necessary to ask a question about the possible sources of argumentation and reasoning in an unprecedented case. The article shows one such source, i.e. the reference to the legal tradition of ancient Rome. Such solution is not only a theoretical matter, but it is used in practice. The subject of the analysis are three cases decided by the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords: Keighley, Maxsted & Co. v. Durant (1901), National Bank of Greece and Athens S.A v. Metliss (1957) and DPP v. Jones (1999).