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Resilience and Decline: Civil Liberties in Pakistan

This chapter continues the analysis of the Pakistani case by testing whether the two conditions stated in Hypothesis 2—religious parties in government, and highly institutionalized religious organizations—predict a decline in civil liberties in Pakistan. It identifies two distinct periods corresponding to the presence of religious parties in government in the (i) absence and (ii) presence of highly institutionalized religious organizations in Pakistan. According to the argument articulated in Hypothesis 2, civil liberties should only decline for religious reasons starting in 2009, when the religious Jamaat-e-Ulema-Fazlur party joined the ruling coalition and religious organizations finally achieved moderate levels of socioeconomic institutionalization. In this context, Hypothesis 2 predicts a moderate decline in de facto civil liberties. The chapter uses additional evidence from the survey of 150 Pakistani politicians, analytical narratives from Pakistani political history, and quantitative data to test support for Hypothesis 2 and its corollaries in Pakistan and finds strong support for them.