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Postscript Shared Attributes and Monism Revisited

Chapter 3 (“Ethics 1p5: Shared Attributes and the Basis of Spinoza’s Monism”) develops replies on Spinoza’s behalf to two objections (the “Hooker-Bennett objection” and the “Leibniz-Bennett objection,” respectively) to his demonstration in Ethics 1p5d that substances cannot share an attribute. Both of these replies appeal to a positive aspect of the priority of substance over its modes: that modes are in and conceived through their substances. In his important 2002 article “Spinoza’s Substance Monism,” Michael Della Rocca develops replies to the objections that appeal instead to a negative aspect of the priority: that substances are not in or conceived through their modes. This postscript argues that neither of the negatively based replies is satisfactory on its own within the argumentative structure of the Ethics and that the positively based replies of Chapter 3 are more likely to capture Spinoza’s own thinking about the impossibility of shared attributes