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The DNA Database Search Controversy Revisited: Bridging the Bayesian–Frequentist Gap

Summary Two different quantities have been suggested for quantification of evidence in cases where a suspect is found by a search through a database of DNA profiles. The likelihood ratio, typically motivated from a Bayesian setting, is preferred by most experts in the field. The so‐called np rule has been suggested through frequentist arguments and has been suggested by the American National Research Council and Stockmarr (1999, Biometrics55, 671–677). The two quantities differ substantially and have given rise to the DNA database search controversy. Although several authors have criticized the different approaches, a full explanation of why these differences appear is still lacking. In this article we show that a P‐value in a frequentist hypothesis setting is approximately equal to the result of the np rule. We argue, however, that a more reasonable procedure in this case is to use conditional testing, in which case a P‐value directly related to posterior probabilities and the likelihood ratio is obtained. This way of viewing the problem bridges the gap between the Bayesian and frequentist approaches. At the same time it indicates that the np rule should not be used to quantify evidence.