{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.016209476309226933, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.083333333333333, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Conference on Markets and Political Economy in collaboration with CEPR and sponsored by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung and LECC Conference Paper : Collusion , Bargaining and Welfare

I analyse the welfare effects of collusion when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or unions). I examine both the case where bargaining is over a uniform input price and the case where bargaining is over a two-part tariff and I allow for two different collusive rules. I find that collusion between downstream firms can often raise consumer surplus and overall welfare relative to the Cournot-Nash outcome. Whether this occurs or not depends on the type of collusive rule, the degree of product differentiation, the distribution of bargaining power and the upstream agents’ preferences.