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Adorno’s theory of philosophical and aesthetic truth

and objective dimensions’ (143). Rockmore’s chapter on Hegel, while the longest, is also the most jammed – too many ideas are left undeveloped and not worked out with careful textual analysis. In his conclusion, Rockmore appears to endorse a quasi-Hegelian form of constructivism as an epistemic project for largely pragmatic reasons: it is a fallible cognitive approach that does not pretend to grasp immutable, transhistorical or non-revisable truths about reality (174). Rockmore tackles, no doubt, an important topic in German Idealism. He has a breadth of knowledge about the period and the history of philosophy. Many readers will find useful insights and summaries of challenging texts. One hopes his book will inspire more extensive reflection on the role of constructivism during the period, both in its theoretical and practical aspects.