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The Rise of Kim Yo-Jong in the North Korean Regime

The state narrative of North Korea, the story that keeps the Kims in power and the population uncomplaining, is built as much around international politics as it is domestic. In the mid-1990s, soon after the first transition of power from Kim Ilsung to Kim Jong-il, the country and the regime was in crisis. Always looking at themselves through the lens of South Korea and the need for reunification, official propaganda had been building an idea that their Southern brothers and sisters were impoverished in comparison and desperate to join with the North once again. In 1994, a series of steadily compounding mistakes in planning all cleaved together into a nationwide famine, and this lie suddenly became impossible to believe. Something was needed to explain away this economic inferiority, and justify the continuation of the regime. This would be Songun—or ‘Military First Policy’. The everyday suffering of North Koreans was now due to aggressive international enemies, particularly the United States, trying desperately to destroy the Korean race. In this battle for survival, the Kim dynasty was all that was still keeping the wolves from the door. But it would have to come at a cost—money and resources would be diverted from the people for the military effort. They would have to take care of themselves. And it worked! North Korea found its modern identity in a right-wing race-based nationalism, and importantly in an ever-menacing external enemy. For all the talk of Juche, of independence, of self-determination, North Korea was increasingly defining itself by the outside world. On December 17, 2011, Kim Jong-il suffered what state media would describe later as a ‘severe myocardial infarction along with a heart attack’, and died almost immediately. But none of this was announced until December 19. For two unbelievably tense days, the North Korean succession plan hung not on the whims of the Kim family, but on the regime elite who briefly held the power to shift the direction of their country. Kim Jong-un, the third son of Kim Jong-il, with his sister Kim Yojong at his side, waited and worried. Whatever the internal machinations were, this inexplicable delay in announcing the Dear Leader’s death eventually came, and through all the fanciful media reports of animals coming to Pyongyang to express their grief and the ice of Lake Paektu cracking ‘so loud, it seemed to shake the Heavens and the Earth’, there was also the announcement of the ‘Great Successor’ and the comfort of ‘absolute surety that the leadership of Comrade Kim Jong-un will