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Electoral Rewards for Personal Vote Cultivation under PR-STV

Generally the assumption is that legislators act to maximise their chances of re-election, with their optimal behaviour determined by the party-centred or candidate-centred nature of the electoral system in use. Existing evidence of the impact of members' actual behaviour on subsequent electoral performance is inconclusive. This research explores whether or not legislators who choose to focus on cultivating personal votes reap rewards from the electorate under the Single Transferable Vote (STV) electoral system. Exploring electoral reward under STV is particularly significant because some legislators face intra-party competition for votes while others do not – a key determining incentive for cultivating personal votes. This study uses a survey of Irish legislators in 2002 and 2007 to measure constituency orientation and effort. The data suggest an electoral reward for personal vote cultivation, although the relationship between intra-system incentive and reward is apparently not always as expected.