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Liberal Legitimacy and the Question of Respect

In a modern pluralist society, the idea of liberal legitimacy as proposed by John Rawls offers a promising foundation for the further historic advancement of democracy. However, liberal legitimacy still seems to lack one key element - a unique type of respect at its foundations - without which such democratic advancement may not be achieved. Nor, on closer inspection, could the idea of liberal legitimacy succeed without this particular type of respect. When further refined at its foundation, arguably liberal legitimacy could open doors to previously unattainable improvements in democracy and legitimacy.