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The Matter of Minds By Vendler Zeno Oxford: The Clarendon Press (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy), 1984, vi+139 pp., £14.95.

to show why his 'Minimal Objectivism' should be accepted as a kind of Objectivism at all, largely because he provides no real discussion of the notion of objectivity itself. It is one thing to claim that principles can count as 'objective' even though they are rationally disputable: it is another—and more crucial—thing to show what this claim means, and to defend it against familiar Subjectivist arguments; and this latter task is not one which Fishkin really discharges. The main novelty claimed for the book is therefore its examination of the ways in which 'ordinary moral reasoners' are led towards Subjectivism; this should show how Subjectivism is generated by 'assumptions that are familiar elements of our common moral culture'. Such an empirical inquiry into the meta-ethical views to which people show themselves to be committed could indeed be interesting and instructive: but Fishkin's account does not really show us whether and how far Subjectivist ideas do actually inform the moral lives of his 'ordinary moral reasoners'. Apart from some doubts about whether he is not sometimes forcing his subjects into one of his selected categories (doubts which could only be resolved by a fuller account of his discussions with them), he pays no attention to the crucial question of how their responses to his questions relate to their actual moral lives: but it is surely a familiar fact that one who offers sceptical or Subjectivist views in the classroom, or in response to the kind of questioning involved here, may reveal herself to think, feel and act quite differently in her actual moral dealings with others. It is by no means clear that Fishkin's kind of inquiry will reveal the extent to which 'ordinary moral reasoners' are Subjectivists in their 'ordinary' moral life and thought. Antony Duff