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If you believe in positive facts, you should believe in negative facts

Substantial metaphysical theory has long struggled with the question of negative facts, facts capable of making it true that Valerie isn't vigorous. This paper argues that there is an elegant solution to these problems available to anyone who thinks that there are positive facts. Bradley's regress and considerations of ontological parsimony show that an object's having a property is an affair internal to the object and the property, just as numerical identity and distinctness are internal to the entities that are numerically identical or distinct. For the same reasons, an object's lacking a property must be an affair internal to the object and the property. Negative facts will thus be part of any ontology of positive facts. Many of us think that the world consists of facts, structured entities constituted by objects and properties. We think that such entities are needed to account for the existence of various structures - causal, physical, mathematical, semantic say - by accounting for the similarities, differences, identities and distinctnesses that seem to be necessary for the existence of such structures. And we think that if it is true that Valerie is