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Conceptualizing the “Self” in Neuroethics: An Appeal to Philosophy of Mind

The ontological and metaphysical status of the “self” and self-identity involves contentious debate in philosophy of mind and has great implications in neuroscience and neuroethics. Indeed, contemporary conceptions regarding selfidentity may have significant impact on the practice of medicine and bioethics, particularly surrounding the moral considerations for individuals in compromised or diminished states of consciousness and for those affected by neuropsychiatric treatments. It is thus appreciated that Anderson-Shaw and colleagues (2010) have sparked a discussion regarding the conception and role of the “self” and self-identity in medicine, particularly in relation to our ethical response to the clinical dysfunction of these concepts. Anderson-Shaw and colleagues ask us whether we lose our “self” if we can no longer remember our past or have the ability to plan for our future, or if there is dissonance between our present experience and previous conceptions of ourselves. The authors recognize the “untidy” nature of the concept of the “self”; however, I feel that without providing a clear understanding of such a concept, the implications for neuroscience and neuroethics become elusive. This is not to fault the authors, though, as these conceptions are indeed untidy, and for pragmatic reasons, some assumptions are necessary for these discussions to exist. However, as we move forward in the burgeoning field of neuroethics it will be important to thoroughly address and evaluate these assumptions. Moreover, as neuroscience, neurotechnology, and cognitive science provide us with arguments and evidence that may profoundly alter our theories regarding fundamental concepts of the “self” and self-identity, it is imperative to reflect this progress concomitantly in neuroethics. As a testament of this imperative, in the following I point to the contentious nature of the concept of the “self” and show how the invocation of such concepts in current neuroethics discourse makes presuppositions that do not represent consensus in philosophy of mind. Thus, I also suggest that, in order to adequately address such concepts in neuroethics, it will be necessary to appeal to philosophy of mind to provide insight and theoretical discussion into these foundational issues.