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Theorizing Federalism in Iraq

Abstract The debate regarding whether federalism can manage, prevent or resolve conflict in deeply divided societies while maintaining the territorial integrity of existing states is ongoing—both on the ground and in the theoretical literature. This paper explores one central facet of the debate about federalism through an exploration of the case of Iraq. It is argued that institutional features of federalism and realities on the ground make Iraq uniquely vulnerable to secessionist pressures. However, not all federations (and not all federalisms) are equally vulnerable to secessionist pressures. By exploring features of Iraqi federalism and the Iraqi state that will make it vulnerable to secessionist pressures, this paper provides some direction in resolving the paradox of federalism—the contradictory finding (and assertion) that federalism seems to both facilitate and prevent secessionist conflict.