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The Laws of War, Common Conjectures, and Legal Systems in International Politics

The laws of war have a mixed record of limiting violence during war. I explain these treaties as the codification of the common conjecture of an equilibrium of a game theory model of war. These laws succeed only when the parties comply on their own or reciprocal sanctions dissuade parties who are willing to violate the agreement. Treaties support reciprocity by specifying when reciprocal sanctions are appropriate, by controlling the response to violations outside the control of state parties, and by screening out states that are unwilling to abide by a treaty through their refusal to ratify it. I discuss the design of the laws of war: why they are multilateral and general rather than bilateral and specific to each war, why treaties are separated by subject matter, why they devolve responsibility for individual violations, and the difficulties in determining how strict these laws should be.