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Constructing Grievance: Ethnic Nationalism in Russia's Republics

tell us much about the actual logic of interaction between given actors without considering the actual interaction and resulting practices. Concerning the nature of wider international society, there are limits to fostering post-sovereign institutions in a largely sovereign world. Russia’s insistence on its sovereignty can also be explained by the challenge the EU poses to it. It is interesting to read the author’s conclusion about the limits of post-sovereignty in a mostly Westphalian world and the role of world-views in hindering the institutionalisation process of EU–Russia relations, since it has major implications for the relationship. Arguing that worldviews are slow to change and in the past two decades of institutional cooperation hardly any improvement has been seen, Haukkala seems to imply that the actors are necessarily pathdependent and deterministic, undermining EU–Russia relations for the foreseeable future. This train of thought is enforced by the empirical finding of the lack of double-loop learning that could potentially influence world-views. World-views are indeed hard to change, but the example of the EU shows that with the necessary political will and clear goals in mind it is possible for states to delegate part of their sovereign qualities to the level of integration. According to the results of the book, in treating Russia with the same political conditionality as prospective member states the EU assumes a certain degree of commonality that is clearly not there and the limitations of this path should also be clear to the EU at this point. Haukkala’s book is highly recommended to experts on EU–Russia relations and those interested in its theoretical background. The implications of this volume might suggest that if the EU does not want to be marginalised and alienate Russia, the way forward should perhaps be a more traditional institutional relationship built on interest-based bargaining that could eventually lead to a higher degree of commonality with which Russia would not feel its sovereignty challenged at every turn of the road.