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Explicating the epistemological role of simulation in the development of theories of cognition

In this paper, we argue that simulation introduces a completely new quality to the process of theory development. One of the main methodological characteristics of cognitive science (compared to other disciplines studying cognition) is the extensive use of simulation models. In the first part of this paper the foundations as well as implications from the perspective of epistemology as well as of philosophy of science will be developed. It will be shown how the method of simulation becomes an integral part for the process of theory construction in cognitive science. The second part of this paper is concerned with the question of identifying the adequate level of abstraction for computational models of cognition. The strength of cognitive models with high explanatory power lies in providing mechanisms on a conceptual level; i.e., on a level of abstraction which respects the structure of underlying (physical) mechanisms, but reduces the empirical details of these mechanisms in such a way that the resulting model sufficiently approaches the behavioral functionality.