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Enforcement of Excessive Price Competition Provisions in the Airport Sector: An Overview

Pricing policies applied by airport managers are unlikely to be found as excessive price under Article 102 TFEU due to the traditional caution of competition authorities in starting investigations into exploitative practices. Yet in 2008 the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) fined the managers of the airports of Rome (ADR) and of Milan (SEA) for excessive price. The ICA decisions are well worth a careful reading in that in only a few cases acting competition authorities succeeded in establishing excessive pricing in the airport sector. This article in particular examines in detail the methodology employed by the ICA to examine the ADR and SEA pricing. The ICA applied the United Brands excessive price test and, to administer the price/cost comparison limb of the test, it relied on regulated costs as a proxy for the economic value of the services supplied by ADR and SEA. Using proxies in excessive price investigation is consistent with the practice of the European Commission. However, that approach requires regulated undertakings to have in place sound accounting systems since regulated costs are calculated by the civil aviation regulator on the basis of accounting data furnished by the airports.