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NEVER BEFORE, ALWAYS ALREADY: Notes on agamben and the category of relation

relate, just as we cannot relate to that which has always already been.1 The moment we relate to that which was never before, we have transformed it into something recognizable, as if it had always already been. The moment we relate to that which has always already been, we have transformed it into something new, as if it had not been before. Hence, to say of something that it was never before or that it has always already been, amounts to saying that it cannot be said, that it precedes all saying and that, from its sudden or endlessly repeated beginning, it constitutes a remainder. At the same time, however, we can only relate to a remainder, to that which must remain unrelated. For if that to which we relate did not remain unrelated, we would no longer relate to it but, in a sense, coincide with it. Insofar as a remainder remains unrelated in our relating to it, it proves to be absolutely unique and absolutely divided. A remainder is relational within itself because each time we try to grasp that which constitutes a remainder, it keeps relating to that which it is not; and because, as it renders the relation impossible, it challenges us to relate to it, giving itself away and keeping to itself at once. This paradoxical logic of the category of relation is the logic of deconstruction. For what the deconstructionist calls iterability, the relationship between a repetition without an origin and an alteration without an original, corresponds to the very idea of an undecidable, both possible and impossible, relationship between that which has always already been and that which was never before. It is hardly surprising, then, that deconstructionists tend to think in terms of the proposition Òonly non-X is, or allows for, or can be XÓ: only the impossible is possible, only the undecidable allows for decisions, only the unforgivable can be forgiven, etc. In relating to something we engage in iterability, effecting a repetition and an alteration. Thus, the remainder, the impossibility of a relation, does not simply precede the relation it makes possible on the uncertain grounds of its own impossibility. It also results from this relation. To speak of Auschwitz as a remainder means neither to attribute to it the uniqueness of a never-before nor to identify it with the ubiquity of an always-already. It simply means to relate to it, to prevent it from becoming Òunsayable,Ó2 and thereby to exceed identification and attribution. Or, given the difficulties inherent in all attempts to identify the relation itself, it means not not to relate to Auschwitz. To the extent that Auschwitz cannot precede the relation, it is created, or brought about, by this relation. A testimony must come after Auschwitz, and yet it also comes before Auschwitz. Perhaps a denial of the holocaust is inscribed in any possible relation to it.