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Seeking a path toward missile nonproliferation

The genie of missile technology is so far out of the bottle that getting it back in is simply unworkable, if not completely impossible. More than two dozen states have already acquired the scientific, technological, and industrial capacity to produce ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or both (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2015). Much of the technology in question is more than 70 years old. Much missile-relevant technology, knowledge, and materials have by now become dual-use – meaning that their civilian and commercial applications are legitimate and widespread. Efforts to restrain the spread of missiles are undermined by the passage of time. This is true in particular for export controls – a wide variety of arrangements meant to curb the flow of both finished missiles and relevant technologies and materials to nations that do not already possess them. Everexpanding global trade is eroding, day by day, the effectiveness of export and technology controls. Easy, affordable cross-border travel is doing likewise. So are stunning advances in the storage and dissemination of data, visible in such everyday applications as the internet. Adding to the strain, some states heretofore viewed as “good guys” on the nonproliferation scene are developing a keen interest in conventionally tipped missiles – both ballistic missiles with relatively short ranges and cruise missiles with relatively long ranges. South Korea (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2016) and Turkey (Bekdil 2016) are two such states. Others may join the list soon. Why are these nations pursuing these technologies? Conventional wisdom used to maintain that ballistic missiles, unless coupled with nuclear warheads, were so inaccurate that they could not provide a tactically useful alternative to air power. Any state without ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons, yet with ample financial resources and the political standing needed to access advanced elements of air power, would therefore prefer combat aircraft. But not anymore. Why the shift? In Seoul and Ankara, part of the explanation is exasperation with rivals next door – with persistent missile development in North Korea, Iran, and Russia, and with those nations’ diversifying, everexpanding missile arsenals. But equally, if not more, important is progress in a number of technologies that enable missile development. These include data processing and computing, miniaturization of electronics, navigation, and advanced materials. Strides in these areas are giving rise to a new generation of cruise missiles and tactical (shorter-range) ballistic missiles with greater accuracy, reliability, and affordability than their forebears of the infamous Scud generation. Shorter-range ballistic missiles, with their accuracy measured in meters, have become effective tools for taking out high-value, well-defended targets inside an adversary’s territory. Once such a missile is fired, impact on the target is virtually guaranteed. The same can hardly be said of strike aircraft. So, if technological advances are transforming ballistic and cruise missiles into useful, affordable assets in conventional warfare, and a strong demand-side pull is the result, are the days of export and technology controls over? Is it time to stop worrying about such controls altogether? No; giving up on controls would not be wise. Export and technology controls continue to make life difficult for existing and would-be proliferators. They increase costs, lengthen development times, and erect political and psychological barriers. But today’s controls, which were devised more than three decades ago under the scope of the Missile Technology Control Regime, are in need of refocusing and readjustment. The regime’s blanket restrictions are not keeping up