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A Distributed Mechanism for Non-transferable Utility Buyer Coalition Problem

Online buyer coalition formation problem is an application of e-commerce and distributed agent technology. Most existing works in this topic involve social utility based approaches that assume the agents' utilities to be transferable. However, we argue that there are situations where the transferable utility model is not well suited for the problem, and that coalition stability is a more important solution concept than social utility. In this paper, we study the problem from a non-transferable utility approach where the focus is on achieving stable solutions in term of the core and Pare to efficiency. A new distributed mechanism is proposed where agents are allowed to propose incremental improvements toward a stable solution. We show by experiment that our mechanism is able to reach core-stable solutions in over 99% of the cases, which suggests a big improvement over the existing approaches.