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Revolution in Ethiopia

Stalinist tactics of conspiratorial secrecy and the discipline of the caucus and democratic centralism, penetrated the ANC's command in exile, manipulating policy conferences and controlling central and operational organs, especially MK and its Political Military Council. The SACP's major stumbling block to complete success in taking over was for a long time, until 1985, the ANC's time-honoured policy of excluding non-Africans from membership or voting rights in the central National Executive, plus the existence of strong ethnic rivalries within the organization that became still stronger with increasing prominence of communists in the controlling bodies. Nevertheless in the long run, it seems, the survival and energy of the ANC through the long night of exile probably owed more to the consistency, discipline and intellectual rigor of the SACP than to any other single source. The account of MK's guerrilla war and the SACP's drive for total control makes fascinating reading. It reveals classic problems of exile politics, the harm done by abuses of power, especially in the MK camps, and enervating struggles for dominance (particularly that between Chris Hani as Political Commissar and nonCommunist Joe Modise as army Commander). The gist of the story conveys a twofold appreciation of the SACP's effect on the ANC: its success in securing and increasing its grip on power, and the ways in which its Stalinist rigidity, secrecy and Machiavellian manipulations, by 'creating a culture of intolerance, intellectual thuggery and simple repression of unacceptable ideology' (p. 202), also weakened and hindered the effectiveness of the armed struggle against the South African state. In conclusion, Ellis and Sechaba suggest that the hold of the SACP on the ANC was to prove less than it appeared to be once the great transformation took place in 1990. Stalinist ideology and methods had given the party clarity in strategy, efficiency in tactics and strength in underground and exile leadership, but also left it unable to shift with the needs of the times in the hour of a ' victory' that took the form of rapidly changing fundamentals. The collapse of the Soviet system and the reconfiguration of international politics undermined its source of inspirational and material support. The restoration of legality and open activity within South Africa meant the resurgence of more traditional nationalist, democratic and popular social forces in the politics of the ANC. A socialist revolution, communist-style, could nowhere be seen in the South African situation. Having formally separated itself as a distinct party again, the SACP would have to 'negotiate a new relationship' (p. 205) with its former host. Above all, conclude the authors, it has yet to resolve the ideological problem of what defines socialism or communism in the post-Soviet world.