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On nonsense in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus: A defense of the austere conception

(1) What is the Tractatus’s notion or theory of ‘nonsense’? No doubt such a startling claim can be taken to suggest that we should try to find some ‘special’ Tractarian conception or theory of nonsense. But be that as it may, by then condemning as nonsensical its own propositions and by suggesting that philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity, the Tractatus forces us to ask, about our answer to (1), (2) Isn’t that account or theory itself nonsense? And, (3) How can we reconcile that account or theory with the idea that philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity of clarification, that philosophy does or should not result in a set of ‘philosophical propositions’? (4) These questions give rise to a series of ‘foundational’ paradoxes that any account of nonsense in the Tractatus has to eventually face, and its capacity or