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The Big Screen: Club Theory and the Chinese Communist Party

This paper shows how a club model could be applied to the CCP. It adapts the club literature on economics of religion to fit political parties. It defines club goods as co-produced, excludable goods, and examines mutually advantageous social networks as club goods. It looks at the changes in CCP membership requirements over time, and discusses these in relation to the club model. It examines how improving members’ alternative opportunities would affect the club, and how prohibitions should increase but sacrifices lessen as non-club opportunities become relatively more attractive. It discusses the effects of a disinterested government on screening behaviour, how the club model could explain partitioning between the CCP and social groups such as religious groups, and how a non-club good can augment a club’s output to mimic a subsidy to the group and induce greater sacrifices. This paper then posits a new two-factor screening model with broad implications for all kinds of clubs. It develops the new model, offers two alternative decision mechanisms, and examines the different member utility functions that might support each mechanism. It then looks at rent seeking, association goods and tournament theory as possible extensions of the club model.