{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.04339051463168517, 'fraction_numerical': 0.03363605785401951, 'mean_word_length': 5.195833333333334, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
When right meets left: on the progressive rhetoric of far-right populist parties in Europe

The ascendancy of far-right populist parties (FRPPs) in Europe has been nothing short of remarkable. Seen as the ‘fastest-growing party family’ in the continent (Golder, 2016, p. 477), FRPPs have won significant numbers of seats in national elections in recent years and assured for themselves a place in governing coalitions as partners or outright leaders. This has happened in a long and varied list of countries, ranging from Italy to Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovakia.1 Even when electoral successes have not translated into government roles, they have constituted major achievements. In France, for instance, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (known as National Front until 2018) stunned the political establishment by reaching the final run-offs in the presidential elections, where it lost to Emmanuel Macron’s Forward! party. Meanwhile, in 2017, the Alternative for Germany won seats in 14 of 16 state parliaments, and became the third largest party in the Bundestag (the first time a far-right party secured any seats there since 1957). In Spain, Vox scored an expected victory in the general elections of November 2019 by coming in third. FRPPs have done well at the EU level too: the Danish People’s Party, the United Kingdom’s UKIP and France’s National Rally scored unprecedented victories – for instance, at the 2014 European Parliament elections (Brack, 2015). While the subsequent elections in 2019 did not represent major victories for all major FRPPs, they did so for the Alternative for Germany, France’s National Rally and Italy’s League. These successes have had consequences. From immigration to taxation to support for the EU, FRPPs have directly shaped programs and priorities. They have also forced parties from the center to veer to the right to retain voters. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s reversal of her 2015 open-door immigration policy for Germany offers a good example. The victories have also helped relegate historically dominant mainstream parties to secondary roles, as in France and Italy. The rise of FRPPs has logically puzzled casual observers and academics alike. What can explain it? Numerous accounts have been offered. Media commentators have stressed factors such as economic distress, immigration and fears of cultural and identity dilution (Aisch, Pearce & Rousseau, 2017; Der Spiegel, 2010; Lebor, 2016; New York Times, 2016). Academic arguments point to these and other factors (Carter, 2005; Cochrane & Nevitte, 2014; Lubbers & Coenders, 2017; Mieriņa & Koroļeva, 2015; Stockemer, 2017). For example, Golder (2016) offers a useful categorization of those arguments, in line with previous research (see Halikiopoulou, Mock, & Vasilopoulou, 2013; Kitschelt, 1995; Norris, 2005; Van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2005). He identifies ‘supply-side’ argu-