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Philosophy in Moral Practice: Kant and Adam Smith

Let me state at the outset that my concern in this essay is not merely to bring out an historical connection between two eighteenth century figures: if I can show that Adam Smith was an important influence on Kant, I will be in a position to reinterpret the purpose of Kant's moral philosophy. But the historical connection is interesting in its own right, and curiously overlooked by most scholars. I shall take this scholarly oversight as an excuse, in section I, to survey the hard evidence for Smith's influence on Kant. In section II, proceeding on the assumption that misinterpretation of Smith has helped draw attention away from his importance for Kant, I shall present my understanding of the central point, and main contribution, of the Theory of Moral Sentiments (= TMS). I will attempt to show in section III what we can gain by reading Kant's Groundwork in the light of TMS. And in section IV I will discuss where Kant differs from Smith, and why.