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UPWARD RATCHETING OF CEO COMPENSATION IN LARGE CANADIAN CORPORATIONS: ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Anecdotes, business press, and some empirical studies suggest that the 1993 OSC requirement for executive salary disclosure, coupled with traditional market forces, has led to information efficiency of executive labor market, resulting in an upward ratcheting of CEO compensation in large Canadian public corporations. Based on the tenets of managerial power, social comparison, and hidden action, we maintain that the information efficiency-based argument is partial, and that psychological, organizational, and social forces are even more powerful influencers of upward ratcheting. We present the case of a board’s compensation committee as an ideal context for supporting our argument.