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RESULTS OF THE 1921–1922 WASHINGTON CONFERENCE SEEN BY THE BRITISH: PUBLICATION OF THE NEW ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

The article aims at defining the key estimates made by the British political leadership in relation to the Washington conference, held in 1921–1922. Four documents, taken from the UK National Archives and published for the first time, formed the “skeleton” of the research. A commentary is attached to each document. The author also used other archival materials and published diplomatic evidence to reconstruct the context of the British estimates. The author concludes that the perception of the Washington conference’s results made by the political leadership of the UK and the Foreign Office correlates with the ideas that dominated in the historiography. The conference was seen mainly as a success, enabling London to achieve interconnected aims, i.e. to lessen Anglo-American tensions, to escape the naval armaments race, and to redistribute resources and money for financial and economic reconstruction. However, it would be misleading to see the Washington conference as the date of the birth of Pax Anglo-Americana, or to superimpose the realities of the post-1945 era on the interwar period. The decisions of 1921–1922 did not preclude the Anglo-American struggle for supremacy, and British leaders were not prepared to become the U.S. junior partners, as it would happen later.