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On Biting in Sport—The Case of Luis Suárez

So the Uruguayan footballer Luis Suárez has confessed, apologised and given assurances as to future good behaviour, after his 2014 World Cup assault on the Italian defender Chiellini. There were three immediate excuses and mitigations offered, which we dismiss: that it was inconsequential; that it was no different from many other ‘assaults’; and that it was not particularly serious. Our central question has a different focus: what makes biting in sport such a bad thing, especially since it does not seem always to threaten as much harm to opponents as some other practices? We examine the place of biting in sports rules, especially in combat and contact sports, and the role of consent and criminal liability, before considering when and why biting is seen as unacceptable. We consider arguments from harm (direct and indirect), skin penetration (bodily integrity and transgression), ‘dirty fighting’ and animalism. Finally, we consider the topical case of Luis Suárez, distinguishing reactive from proactive biting, and reactive from instrumental behaviour. We also consider arguments that offer psychological and cultural mitigation, and we assess the justice of FIFA’s punishment. We suggest that biting is different from other types of assault; was possibly intended to be consequential; is the kind of assault to the possibility of which participants do not consent, so that it is actionable in criminal law; and that, whilst psychological and cultural ‘explanations’ may shed some light on background, motivations and attitudes, they do not affect the above points, and provide no excuse or mitigation. Our further explanations for the unacceptability of biting in sport raise moral and aesthetic issues, since it threatens harm, is ‘dirty’, transgressive and animalistic. These indicate ways in which such practices might raise issues of vulgarity and disgust; and might compromise the potential of sport for moral education. Finally, we argue that Suárez’ punishment was neither unfair nor harsh, that no issues were raised in employment law, and that FIFA bore no responsibility for the treatment and rehabilitation of the player. Indeed, the onus is on Suárez to demonstrate that he can prove to be an acceptable opponent.