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Cryptanalysis of A Mutual Authentication Scheme for Smart Healthcare Systems under Global Mobility Networks Notion

Authentication and key agreement scheme is an important mechanism for legal users to access the services of smart healthcare systems under global mobility networks notion. However, the design of authentication and key agreement schemes is still quite a challenging problem. In this paper, we analyse a novel mutual authentication scheme for smart healthcare systems under global mobility networks notion proposed by Wu et al. in 2018, and point out the scheme is vulnerable to malicious user impersonation attack, offline guessing attack and suffers from low efficiency.