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Electoral and Congressional Incentives and Arms Control

This article presents and tests two arguments about how the democratic institutions of the United States influence arms control bargaining. Principal-agent models of elections with retrospective voters form the basis of a formal model linking elections and arms control. It implies that the United States offers additional concessions as economic conditions deteriorate, but also that this effect declines as conditions get worse. Congress' control of the defense budget provides a way to affect the Soviets' reservation level for negotiations. But if the Soviets anticipate congressional actions, the only effects are reduced Soviet concessions immediately before critical votes on defense and a response to the outcome of the vote. An empirical examination of U.S. and Soviet bargaining behavior during the 1970s supports these hypotheses. The United States increases its concessions as inflation heightens. The Soviets reduce their concessions during periods with critical votes on defense in Congress, offer additional concessions after prodefense votes pass, and offer fewer concessions after prodefense measures fail.