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Reliable Usable Signals to Prevent Masquerade Attacks

In the nineties the disconnection between physical experience and the digital networked experience was celebrated - individuals were said to move into cyberspace, become virtual and leave the constraints of the physical realm. Despite the very real existence of tracking and surveillance software, it remains the case that identity assertions online remain problematic at best. While there are many benefits to this relative anonymity online, it also creates a serious problem of distinguishing between valid merchants and criminal enterprises, between reliable web sites and sites that install malware. The paucity of information exacerbates poor understanding of the risks involved in particular transactions, exposing users to losses and driving out parties who would otherwise engage in productive behavior. This paper describes a mechanism to create highly usable economic signals that enable users to evaluate sites on the Internet, and in particular to specifically identify masquerade attacks. By integrating both peer production and centralized information, the system utilizes both personal local histories and centralized information sources. Limiting the distribution of personal histories to user-defined social networks enables users to constrain and control their own information.