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SPIDERNet: the Security Policy Derivation for Networks Tool

The construction of a security policy becomes increasingly difficult because of the complexity of the factors to consider. As long as networks were composed of closed infrastructures, security relied on models based on the end-systems access control. Today, if these models still remain typical, they must be completed by the definition and usage of “security models for networks”. The design of such models must allow to approach the security concerns in a pragmatic way rather than relying exclusively on the expertise of the network administrator. For this objective, we raise the question : when do we implement network security mechanisms? After shedding light on the weaknesses of the access control models, we show the strong tie between the policy defined by the system administrator and that defined by the network administrator. Then we define modelling tools and rules that start from the users rights to determine constraints on the filtering rules and encryption mechnisms to be used. A prototype called SPIDERNet implemented in PROLOG language validates our appoach.