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Towards a More Comprehensive Analysis of Warlord Politics: Constitutive Agency, Patron–Client Networks and Robust Action

Abstract This article serves as a critique of a recent American foreign policy formulation proposing to eradicate ‘warlordism’ and asserting that democratic institutions can be directly created out of the post-eradication anarchic chaos. Against this background, recent years have indeed seen a bourgeoning literature on ‘warlord politics’ in Southeast Asia. The majority commonly portray political actors as faithful followers of economic rationality and self-interest. Therefore, most are conceived as selfish predators who ruthlessly use violence for private gains at the expense of public interest. By suggesting that comparative studies on warlordism have been heavily influenced by the political economy perspective, the article develops a more comprehensive analysis of warlord politics. Along the lines of patron–client network analysis, insights from moral economy and agency-structure sociological dualism are considered. Contrasting case studies are used to illustrate how the alleged warlords of Southeast Asia do not fit entirely into the political economy perspective. Caught in a vast patron–client network of competing interests and diverse powers across state and society, one's agency is constantly constituted by discursive arrays of contending interests, juxtaposing rationalities and multiple intentions. In state building, this complication is regarded as paradoxically necessary for compelling the alleged warlord-actor to re-define and elevate multiple private interests into public interest.