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Book Review: Britain and Ireland: The British State and the Northern Ireland Crisis, 1969–1973: From Violence to Power Sharing

The recent history of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland has provided an extremely fertile ground for academics to focus their studies upon almost every aspect of the working of the modern nation state. On the North, Smith concentrates on the outcomes of British government policy responses to violent conflict during the late 1960s and early 1970s, while the volume by O’Malley and MacCarthaigh seeks to provide a fresh analysis of the way in which all aspects of national government are organised in the South – particularly in view of the recent collapse of the Irish economy. Smith focuses on four distinct case studies of policy development in Northern Ireland: the decision in August 1969 to reform the police service; the introduction of internment in 1971 as part of a new coercive approach by the recently elected Conservative government in response to an increase in violent rioting and protest; the suspension of Northern Ireland’s devolved administration in March 1972 and its replacement with direct rule; and the emergence during 1972–3 of a comprehensive strategy to sustain political accommodation of power sharing with an Irish dimension. The basic argument as proposed by Smith is that the tools of policy analysis can be a useful guide for steering interested parties through the complexities of political decision making. He argues that four broad traditions of policy analysis – the rational model, the cognitive process model, the political model and the organisational model (all of which he applies rigorously to his case studies) – will add to our understanding of the British government’s policy choices in relation to the ‘Troubles’ throughout this period. Interest in Smith’s book lies within the detail he has managed to unearth from archive sources in London, Dublin and Belfast. He concludes that although there appears to have been a mixed record of achievement for British policy towards Northern Ireland overall, his analysis shows that while until 1972 that policy was based upon the aim of minimising British intervention, since 1973 a contrasting aim of continuity and participation has been achieved. Importantly, Smith is interested in what has worked and what has not worked – and why – in Northern Ireland and he argues for the application of this particular kind of policy illumination to what he calls ‘sustained internal disorder’ in other parts of the world. O’Malley and MacCarthaigh provide us with a different kind of study within an entirely different historical context, with chapters from a range of Irish scholars. They argue that, as in the case of most Western democracies, the Republic has moved inexorably from ‘cabinet government’ to ‘delegated governance’. During this process, the nature of Irish government and policy making has been transformed from what was seen as a stable democracy and an exemplar of centralised government into one facing economic catastrophe and, consequently, the raising of numerous questions about the effectiveness of Irish political institutions. The book considers a number of themes, including the way in which cabinet government operates, the relationship between ministers and their departments, the impact of social partnership and the interaction between the Irish government and the European Union, as well as examining the courts and the media. In two key chapters the Treasury and the concept of ‘government monitoring’ are closely scrutinised. John Considine and Theresa Reidy argue that the lens through which the Treasury is viewed now needs to be focused on policies and procedures rather than the people who had traditionally led the department in their ministerial or administrative roles. They argue that the historical narrative upon which the development of the department was based needs to change into a more probing examination of institutional culture and budgetary practices and an acceptance that systemic failure was the reason for the economic crisis, as evidenced by the official reports on the Irish banking crisis. Shane Martin recognises the conventional wisdom that formal ongoing monitoring of the Irish government by the legislature is weak, but argues that the move from single-party government to a norm of BOOK REVIEWS 317