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New power, new priorities: the effects of UNCLOS on Canadian Arctic foreign policy

The accession of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) by Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway and Russia has led to a geopolitical shift that has resulted in the five Arctic Ocean coastal states becoming major powers in the Arctic region. Typically, states are major powers as a result of military, economic and political power and influence in the world. At present, however, in the case of the Arctic region, the Arctic Ocean coastal states are major powers because of their ability under UNCLOS to determine the rules in the region. The coastal states possess this power regardless of whether or not they possess any of these trappings of a traditional major power. Canada is an Arctic Ocean coastal state and despite many commitments from various governments over the years, it does not have a high degree of military power in the Arctic. However, due to Canada’s physical geography and the application of UNCLOS to the Arctic region, it finds itself in a position of significant power. The position of power in the Arctic region in which Canada finds itself has led to changes in Canadian Arctic foreign policy. In recent years, Canada has placed a much greater emphasis on military security and the defence of Canadian Arctic sovereignty and has engaged in multilateral discussions on Arctic issues outside the Arctic Council. In the 2010 Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, the Government of Canada indicated that it considers the Arctic Council “the primary forum for collaboration among the eight Arctic states”, however, it is also clear that Canada has pursued and intends to continue to pursue other multilateral Arctic fora. As Canada continues to diversify Canadian Arctic multilateralism and emphasize traditional military security at the expense of other “low” forms of security, it will be interesting to observe what effect this will have on Canada’s contribution to the Arctic Council. This article will examine how these changes in Canadian Arctic foreign policy have taken place. It will also assess what implications a new Canadian Arctic foreign policy will have for the Arctic Council as Canada is set to assume Chairmanship of the Council for the second time in 2013.