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Detection of spoofed GPS signals at code and carrier tracking level

Due to the large amount of different new applications based on GNSS systems, the issue of interference monitoring is becoming an increasing concern in the satellite navigation community. Threats for GNSS can be classified as unintentional interference, jamming and spoofing. Among them, spoofing is more deceitful because the target receiver might not be able to detect the attack and consequently generate misleading position solutions. Different kind of spoofing attacks can be implemented depending on their complexity. The paper analyzes what is known as intermediate spoofing attack, by means of a spoofer device developed at the Navigation Signal Analysis and Simulation (NavSAS) laboratory. The work focuses on the spoofing detection, performed by implementing proper signal quality monitoring techniques at code and carrier tracking level.