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News in brief

Two studies on the transmissibility of avian influenza H5N1 into humans have sparked a controversial debate over health benefits versus risks of H5N1 research, and forced researchers to step back and assess the potential threats of their findings. The research, conducted by the University of Wisconsin, USA, and Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, The Netherlands, describes production of an H5N1 strain that is more transmissible between mammals than naturally occurring H5N1. Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 is an important public health concern for the WHO, estimated to cause death in 60% of humans infected. Currently, humans are rarely infected, but there are major concerns that a mutation in H5N1 could make it highly transmissible. If this were to occur, it is estimated that a pandemic rivaling the 1918 –1919 Spanish flu outbreak, which killed 40 million people, could ensue. The controversial papers describe research that has produced an H5N1 strain that may be a step towards this level of transmissibility. In a letter published in Nature, initiated by the lead researcher of one of the papers, Ron Fouchier, and signed by 39 researchers, they revealed that “viruses possessing a haemagglutinin protein from highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza viruses can become transmissible in ferrets”. However, they also assure us that they ensure minimal risk of virus release from the laboratory. They go on to explain their decision to postpone research for 60 days and hold an international forum to discuss and debate the risks and benefits of such research. Despite the controversy surrounding it, research into the H5N1 transmissibility is undoubtedly important. The reason, as stated in the Nature letter, is to acquire knowledge of virus transmissibility so that scientists can contain and control H5N1 if the unthinkable were to occur. Aside from the concern of viral escape from the laboratory, bioterrorism also poses a significant risk. These concerns were highlighted last December, when the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) asked the researchers to remove key details from the papers. The researchers acquiesced on the condition that the NSABB found a way to provide these details to trusted health professionals. The crackdown on these papers has caused much criticism, with some claiming that it may hamper future efforts to contain an H5N1 pandemic. Regardless of the controversy surrounding them, publication of these papers, with censorships, is still expected to occur. However, this case has highlighted the risks involved with influenza research, and will undoubtedly lead to higher observation of research in this area. Nevertheless, the importance of such research must not be overlooked, and one day we may thank the foresight of these researchers, particularly if it leads to the containment of a potentially catastrophic pandemic.