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Review Symposium : Laudan's Problematic Progress and the Social Sciences

Should theories in the philosophy of science be reflexive? Can Laudan’s theory of what constitutes progress in science, i.e. increase of solved problems, be a solution to problems in the philosophy of science? Laudan endeavours to persuade us that science is a problem-solving activity, and that the progress of science is to be measured when a solution (theory) solves more empirical problems than any competing solution, while at the same time failing to generate new anomalies and conceptual problems. Does Laudan’s philosophy of science itself represent progress; does it solve more (empirical) problems in the philosophy of science and generate fewer anomalies (and conceptual problems) than its rivals? To commence this comparative assessment we need an agenda of problems to be solved and a list of competing solutions. Laudan’s title is clear enough: Progress and Its Problems. The overall problem Laudan wishes to solve is, ’how does science progress?’ The subordinate problem is, ’in what does scientific rationality consist?’ The rival views of science that Laudan wishes to supersede are those of Popper, Kuhn, Feyerabend and Lakatos. Each of them offers a view on the problems of progress and rationality, positive or negative, and each of them is vulnerable to one or other of four claims or charges (pp. 2-3). These are: (1) that philosopher’s models of rationality are not exemplified in the process of scientific activity; (2) that science appears to be neither true, not probable, nor progressive, nor highly confirmed; (3) that irrational factors appear to be involved in several episodes of scientific decision making; and that (4) the progress of science may be irrational or illusory. Laudan believes the criticisms (anomalies [2], [3], conceptual problems [ 1], [4]) render these rival philosophies of science unsatisfactory, so he proposes a new analysis of the rationality of science, namely his theory of progress through solving problems. If philosophy of science is rational and makes progress Laudan would say this is because it solves problems. What sort of problems? Well, perhaps the kinds of inconsistency between expectation and reality found in (1), (2), (3) and (4). Not quite, because Laudan thinks problems are questions not inconsistencies. But which questions? Questions over which research traditions are in difficulties as in (1), (2), (3) and (4). Research traditions are the basic organizing feature of Laudan’s picture of science. Solutions to problems in a domain (such as the philosophy of science) do not emerge ex nihilo, but dwell within research traditions. This means that the solutions to problems in the philosophy of science of Popper, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos and Laudan himself should be situated in the research traditions to which they belong. Laudan does not do this, thus making it difficult to assess his philosophy by his own criteria. What Laudan neglects to tell us I