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Mixed Nash Implementation with Finite Mechanisms

This paper studies full implementation problems in (pure and mixed) Nash equilibrium in finite environments. We restrict the designer to adoptfinite mechanisms, thus ruling out integer games. We provide a condition, top-D inclusiveness, that together with set-monotonicity is sufficient for mixed Nash implementation with finite mechanisms in separable environments. Top-D inclusiveness is an efficiency condition.