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No Religion is an Island: Abraham Joshua Heschel and Interreligious Dialogue (review)

Weiss' interpretation, however, calls for a closer scrutiny of Maimonides' views on knowledge. Weiss is right in disagreeing with the noncognitive .interpretation recently offered by Marvin Fox (Interpreting Maimonides). For Maimonides, the only justification for moral injunctions is not divine command reinforced by tradition. But neither are "commonly held opinions" that fall short of demonstrative certainty the only justification. The dichotomy between theoria and praxis and the accidental role that moral behavior has in the development of human perfection, in Weiss' interpretation, suggests the view that "practical wisdom" does not count as knowledge at all for Maimonides. But that view seems to overlook Maimonides' epistemic distinction between true beliefs and necessary beliefs and his hint that a necessary connection between means and end, in some cases at least, is a matter of demonstration (Guide III, ch. 28). The implication seems to be that practical wisdom does fall under knowledge and that laws are rational, at least in their generality if not in their particular application. The encounter between philosophy and religion remains an intriguing, yet troublesome, issue-in both the twelfth and the twentieth century. Weiss gives a clear account of that struggle in the moral thought of Maimonides. Joseph A. Buijs St. Joseph's College University of Alberta