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Constitutional Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures in the European Union: Prospects and Limits

The concept of 'constitutional dialogue' has become a focal point of US and Canadian public law scholarship. This concept sees judicial review not as a check on majority preferences but instead as part of a deliberation between the legislative and judicial branches over how constitutional commitments and general political objectives can be integrated. This article will explore the prospects and limits of developing the dialogue concept in the context of the present-day European Union (EU). The article will present a two-part argument: While the EU's political and legal diversity make the idea of a 'shared responsibility' for constitutional interpretation between judges and policy-makers normatively attractive, the existing institutional structure of the Union limits the incentives necessary for legal and political actors to constitutionally engage.