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Contractualism and Deontic Restrictions*

Dilemmas with the following structure play a central role in normative ethics: an agent must decide between doing harm to one person and allowing harm to befall several others. That is, he must decide whether to perform a minimizing violation. Moral theories diverge regarding when, if ever, minimizing violations are permitted. Direct act consequentialism, for example, often permits and sometimes requires them: the agent may maim another person whenever doing so is expected to promote the good (e.g., by minimizing total maimings). Most of us, however, believe it is wrong for the agent to maim in at least some such cases. This is to say that our ordinary morality includes certain deontic restrictions (“restrictions”). Defenders of restrictions (“restrictionists”) disagree among themselves about the nature of restrictions and the proper way to incorporate them within moral theory. More disturbingly, several philosophers have