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Three theories of the unity of grounding

One of the distinguished theoretical advantages of the concept of grounding
 is its ability to unify various cases of the metaphysical dependence and
 determination relations. That presupposes that the concept of grounding is
 itself unified. The unity of grounding was usually tacitly presupposed among
 grounding theorists, but it gradually became a subject of discussion because
 of various skeptical challenges. In this article, I will examine three most
 general theories of the unity of grounding: 1) singularism: the view that
 the unity of grounding is based on the idea that there is a single relation
 of grounding; 2) generalism: the view according to which grounding should be
 understood as a generic notion; and 3) the view that the unity of grounding
 rests upon an objective resemblance between different grounding relations.
 Special attention will be given to the third option which was a largely
 neglected view. Our considerations will show that this standpoint, due to
 its inherent theoretical virtues, deserves more serious treatment in
 metaphysical disputes on grounding.