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[Research Biomedical Ethics and Practical Wisdom].

As is well known, in the field of Biomedical Ethics some methodological proposals have been put forward. They try to provide some guidelines in order to take proper decisions. These methodologies are quite useful insofar as they supply reasons for action, but they are essentially insufficient. In fact, taking a good decision requires a special skill that goes beyond sheer technique, and this skill is traditionally called practical wisdom. Not in the usual and more outlying sense of sheer caution, but in the more central one of phronesis or prudentia. Although it is not a new notion, it usually appears blurred in biomedical decision-making theory, playing the wrong role, or in a marginal or indefinite way. From this postulate, we will try to make a double analysis. First, we will try to show the need for a proper understanding of the core role that phronesis plays in decision making. Second, we will try to get the original meaning of Aristotelian phronesis back. For reasons of space, in this paper the second question will be just partially addressed.