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Sociology and the Logic of Theoretical Research

This article deals with problems of the philosophy of science in terms of its concrete development in sociological theory. Parsons' theses on theory building and Alexander's redirectioning of some of its fundamental tenets are discussed. It is shown that Alexander's ideas are consistent with the so-called post-positivist philosophy of science that is linked to Popper and Kuhn, but that he is oblivious to other strands that are much more in tune with Parsons' first approach to the issue. Bachelard, Piaget and Bhaskar furnish elements that account better, both factually and normatively, for the coupling of empirical data and theory in the sciences in general and in sociology in particular, than Alexander's, Popper's and Kuhn's perspectives. They offer the underpinnings for a dialectical epistemology, which can relinquish the principle of uniformity or determinism, dealing with creativity and the fluidity of social life, without giving up general theories, concepts and causal correlations. Concrete controversies are also discussed in order to illustrate this epistemological strategy.