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Leveson, the Public Interest and Press Freedom

What is the public interest in a free press? Is the value of a free press simply the value of freedom of speech, as the press would have us think, so that we can use the terms ‘free speech’ and ‘free press’ interchangeably? This issue is important because it is a central battle ground not only in relation to the merits of press regulation, but also in terms of the linked issue of how press freedom should be balanced with other rights, such as privacy and reputation. If we regard press freedom as merely an aspect of freedom of speech, or see the two freedoms simply as equivalent, then we might be inclined to see the proposed regulation of newspapers, which on any judgment will reduce their freedom,in the sense of freedom-from-interference, as a bad thing. On the other hand, if we regard the value or role of speech in the mass media as somehow different from the value of individual free speech, seeing it as less concerned with the rights of the ‘speaker’ and more to do with the benefit obtained by the audience, then we might be more open to the view that regulating the press could actually enhance its value, from an audience perspective. This might be particularly so, if we had reason to believe, following the findings of the Leveson Report, that the unrestrained freedom of the press could be—and had been shown to be—a sometimes destructive force both for particular individuals and for the quality of public discourse overall. In short, the view taken of the nature of,