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Genoa and the Sea: Policy and Power in an Early Modern Maritime Republic, 1559-1684 (review)

The appearance of a volume in English about the early-modern history of the Republic of Genoa, nearly ten years after Epstein’s treatment of the medieval period, is reason to rejoice, particularly in this case.1 Kirk tackles the economic history of Genoa in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, spanning the period famously described by Braudel as the “Century of the Genoese” and so far neglected by the historiography in English.2 Kirk provides a kind of cultural history of Genoa’s political economy during this period by concentrating on the various projects that were proposed as solutions to its perceived economic crisis. His central argument is that these projects were “rhetorical exercises made to demonstrate a given political position” (187), and are “more easily understood if viewed as a genre in political discourse” (191). This interpretive angle is a new and interesting spin on the well-established tenet of the history and historiography of Genoa that views the relationship between the Republic and the sea as the central axis of its identity. The interesting paradox running through the “Century of the Genoese” is that part of Genoese society perceived the successes of its ananciers as promoting “private interests to the detriment of public good” and damaging the Genoese economy by draining capital away from trade (63). The Genoese involvement in the aeld of international anance was therefore considered a sort of betrayal of the original vocation of the Republic. Kirk convincingly argues for an internal division within the ruling class of the Republic—united in a “single order” since the events of 1528— between “the nobili vecchi, increasingly involved in anance, and the nobili nuovi, involved primarily in manufacturing and trade” (47), acting as a stimulus for economic planning and activity. He is not equally convincing in his underplaying of the role played by the close relationship between Genoa and Spain during the period; despite their undeniable interdependence, the dominant partner was never in doubt. Kirk declares Jauss’ “reception theory” a useful analytical tool for investigating the Republic’s governmental agencies’ reaction to these proposals for economic reform.3 However, because he does not fully weave his inouences into the narrative, certain potentially interesting considerations like “‘horizons of expectations’ as a political equivalent to the intepretative ‘horizon of reading’” receive only brief mention in a footnote, interdisciplinary opportunities are lost. Nonetheless, the book 454 | M A R I A F U S A R O