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Peirce on facts, propositions, and the index

Abstract Peirce holds that our logic should be the basis for our metaphysics. He also thinks that facts and propositions are structurally isomorphic. However, unlike many theorists who take propositions such as snow is white and grass is green as their paradigmatic examples, Peirce takes it rains (Latin: pleurit) and similar propositions as his paradigmatic examples. I explore how his analysis of such propositions and the way in which they convey meaning becomes more complex from 1895 to 1909, how this impacts his metaphysics, and how he can claim that something like the common environment of two interlocutors can itself be an index.