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An Independent Bank of England

This article traces the schemes for an independent Bank of England in the British political process in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Treasury examined the issue of central bank independence on four separate occasions. Furthermore, the Bank of England held a series of internal discussions about its autonomy and about how such a reform could be implemented. Using recently released material disclosed under the 2000 Freedom of Information Act and interviews with former Treasury and Bank of England officials, these schemes are examined together with other corresponding discussions that pervaded the political process. It is shown that the debate surrounding an adjustment to the status of the Bank of England in terms of its structure and functions was embedded in the political and monetary institutions several years before the `sudden' implementation of the reform. Furthermore, the Labour Party's policy for central bank independence contained many features that originated in the preceding schemes.