{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.021341463414634148, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.042944785276074, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
The base-rate fallacy and its implications for the difficulty of intrusion detection

Many different demands can be made of intrusion detection systems. An important requirement is that it be effective i.e. that it should detect a substantial percentage of intrusions into the supervised system, while still keeping the false alarm rate at an acceptable level.
This paper aims to demonstrate that, for a reasonable set of assumptions, the false alarm rate is the limiting factor for the performance of an intrusion detection system. This is due to the base-rate fallacy phenomenon, that in order to achieve substantial values of the Bayesian detection rate, P(Intrusion|Alarm), we have to achieve—a perhaps unattainably low—false alarm rate.
A selection of reports of intrusion detection performance are reviewed, and the conclusion is reached that there are indications that at least some types of intrusion detection have far to go before they can attain such low false alarm rates.