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Neuroscience and Metaphysics

In “Imaging or Imagining? A Neuroethics Challenge Informed by Genetics,” Judy Illes and Eric Racine (see this issue) argue that “traditional bioethics analysis” (TBA), as developed in the field of genethics, is insufficient to deal with moral and metaphysical challenges endemic to recent developments in neuroscience. They claim that “the link between the brain and the self is far more direct than the link between genes and personal identity. . . . [Neuroscience] will fundamentally alter the dynamic between personal identity, responsibility, and free will in ways that genetics never has. Indeed, neurotechnologies as a whole are challenging to our sense of personhood . . . ” (2005, 10). There are at least two different readings of these claims: