{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.02364066193853428, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.235294117647059, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Optimal R&D Outsourcing

We study optimal contracts when R\&D is outsourced to another company. We find that, when a realistic assumption holds, the optimal contract always leads in equilibrium to the lowest acceptable chance of having a successful technical innovation, given announced compensations. This assumption is significantly different from those used in the literature, and it is necessary for the result to hold.