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Under What Conditions Is Recognition Adopted?

This chapter tests a theory that emphasizes ethnic power configurations to explain the adoption or non-adoption of ethnic recognition in conflict-affected countries from 1990 to 2012. The analysis focuses on the adoption of ethnic recognition in constitutions or comprehensive political settlements. The main finding is that minority ethnic rule strongly predicts non-adoption. When a country is under minority rule, recognition is adopted only 24 percent of the time, as compared to plurality rule, under which recognition is adopted 60 percent of the time. This relationship is robust to controlling for a large number of potential confounding factors related to both domestic and international conditions. The relationship is strongest in countries where ethnic fractionalization is low, in which case minority groups differ most in their demographic share from plurality groups. The findings support the idea that ethnic power configurations are crucial for understanding the adoption of ethnic recognition.