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The Subjectivity of Intelligence Analysis and Implications for the U.S. National Security Strategy

The language used to describe intelligence estimates as objective reflections of available evidence has led in some cases to a misunderstanding of the role of intelligence in supporting the decision to go to war in Iraq. Saying that the estimate that identified the threats was either "right" or "wrong" ignores the probabilistic nature of intelligence assessments and the necessary subjective elements that make them useful to policymakers. By making this clear in the case of Iraq, we can separate the crucial question of how policy should be decided in the face of increased uncertainty and even more elusive enemies than have been faced in the past. Only then does it make sense to say how intelligence can be made more useful, leaving behind the misguided question of whether the intelligence community was right or wrong on Iraq.