{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.02696629213483146, 'fraction_numerical': 0.006741573033707865, 'mean_word_length': 5.30188679245283, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Thinking the Impossible: French Philosophy Since 1960

determining at what stage Kant started to engage with Spinoza and Spinozism). It concerns rather the question of the main point dissociating Kant from Spinozism: whether the question of immanence should take the lead of our inquiry. While emphasizing immanence is extremely fruitful – Lord’s work demonstrates this beyond doubt – Kant’s rejection of Spinozism seems not to depend on a rejection of immanence. On the contrary, throughout his career Kant seems to find this doctrine plausible, and he eventually rejects ontological immanence because of its dogmatism (roughly: the attempt to draw metaphysical conclusions from concepts). Consider this comment in one of Kant’s lectures: ‘All conceptus of entia limitata are conceptus derivativi and the conceptus originarius for our reason is that of an ens realissimum. If I deduce the existence of an ens realissimum from its concept, this is the way to Spinozism’ (AA 28:706). It appears that the question of Kant’s objection to Spinoza’s dogmatism should receive more attention, along-side the question of immanence, when evaluating Kant’s relation to Spinozism. Nevertheless, Kant and Spinozism breaks new ground in its approach to Kant’s transcendental idealism and deserves serious attention from anyone working in the field.