{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.018257261410788383, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0016597510373443983, 'mean_word_length': 5.380952380952381, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Prefetch-guard: Leveraging hardware prefetches to defend against cache timing channels

Cache timing channels are a form of information leakage that operate through modulating cache access latencies and ultimately exfiltrate sensitive user information to adversaries. Among the many forms of timing channels, covert channels are particularly dangerous as they involve two insider processes (trojan and spy) colluding with each other to send out sensitive information, and are often difficult to detect or prevent. In this paper, we propose Prefetch-guard, an efficient and low-cost mitigation mechanism against cache-based timing channels. Prefetch-guard leverages hardware prefetchers to obfuscate the effect of timing modulation intentionally created by the trojan and spy. Our detection mechanism identifies the target cache sets that are being exploited for information leakage, and cache blocks are prefetched to fuzz the pattern of cache misses and hits created to construct timing channel between the trojan and the spy. With prefetch-guard, we observe that the cache timing channels suffer a 53% bit error rate which makes it very hard or impossible for the spy to decipher any useful information.