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When the unanimous voting rule is NOT the corollary to market exchange

The unanimous voting rule is generally viewed as analogous to voluntary market exchange. I demonstrate that when third-party pecuniary effects exist, this analogy breaks down because unlike markets, unanimous voting requires compensation for these effects. Thus, the outcomes will be necessarily, and fundamentally, different. This compensation renders the political process less efficient, and gives rise to rent-seeking behavior. Because of one-person-one-vote and high transactions costs of bargaining, this compensation is generally unfeasible, meaning an efficient market outcome will be rejected by the unanimous voting rule. This serves as another reason why a less-than-unanimous voting rule may be optimal.