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Sufficiently Secure Peer-to-Peer Networks

Threat models in computer security often consider a very powerful adversary. A more useful model may be to consider conict in which both sides have economic considerations that limit the resources they are willing to devote to the conict. This paper examines censorship resistance in a peer-to-peer network. A simple game theoretic model is examined and then elaborated to include multiple publishers, non-linear cost functions, and non-trivial search heuristics. In each elaboration, we examine the equilibrium behaviour of the censor and the publisher.