tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post349236060190162778..comments2020-01-10T15:43:49.837-05:00Comments on Philosophy, et cetera: Parfit on Reasons and Normative FactsRichard Y Chappellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-87656406479759410172009-04-05T13:36:00.000-04:002009-04-05T13:36:00.000-04:00More simply: the disjunction of possible right-mak...More simply: the <I>disjunction</I> of possible right-making features is a natural property that is necessary and sufficient for an act's being right. Even non-naturalists grant this. But it <A HREF="http://www.philosophyetc.net/2006/05/limits-of-truth-conditions.html" REL="nofollow">doesn't follow</A> that this is an <I>analysis</I> of rightness, since (as the non-naturalist insists) there can be necessarily coextensive (but distinct) properties.Richardhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6642011.post-52084349289203092362009-04-05T10:55:00.000-04:002009-04-05T10:55:00.000-04:00I guess the truth value of Parfit's last claim in ...I guess the truth value of Parfit's last claim in the snippet would depend on whether or not there are natural facts constituting necessary and sufficient conditions for being a normative property. <BR/><BR/>For instance, an important necessary condition for the truth of the claim "A ought to X" is that A could fail to X. Take a statement of the individually necessary conditions that are jointly sufficient for the truth of the normative claim. This will give us an analysis of the normative claim, and we can use the analysis to pick out a natural property in the world that meets all of its necessary conditions. <BR/><BR/>E.g., the property of being a proper function, in Ruth Millikan's sense, might be such a natural property. In that case, there would not be non-natural irreducible normative facts in addition to natural facts.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com