Popular support v. constitutional power

As this blog post is being written, representatives of the president of El Salvador, Nayib Bukele, are meeting with the Political Commission of the country's Legislative Assembly.    They have come together to negotiate a new emergency law to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic and the reopening of El Salvador's economy.    The starting points for the negotiation are a law passed by the Assembly on May 18 which Bukele says he will veto and a counter-proposal which Bukele delivered to the Assembly last Thursday, May 21.

In this negotiation, the balance of bargaining power sets the popular support of the president just completing his first year in office against the constitutional prerogatives of the Legislative Assembly as the sole lawmaking body.   The popular support of Bukele is exceptionally strong according to opinion poll results released May 24 by La Prensa Grafica.   84.5% of those polled strongly approve of Bukele's handling of the pandemic and another 11.2% somewhat approve. 

LPG Datos

In contrast, the Legislative Assembly and the traditional political parties who fill its seats continue to be held in low esteem by the public.  Their power lies in the fact that the opposition, when united, has enough power both to pass legislation and to override vetoes.  And some of Bukele's actions have even managed to unite in opposition ARENA and the FMLN, something which would have been unthinkable two years ago.   Thus the power of the Assembly stems from the "rules of the game" in El Salvador's constitution, and the willingness of the country's supreme court to enforce those rules.

For Bukele, reaching an agreement with the Legislative Assembly has positives and negatives.  An agreement allows him to regain some international stature and show that he does respect the rule of law.   On the other hand, conceding very much in a negotiation is inconsistent with his demonization of the Legislative Assembly as filled with "los corruptos" and "los mismos de siempre."

For the Legislative Assembly,  the risks of no agreement are greater.   For the Assembly, a failure to reach an agreement, resulting in Bukele proceeding alone, would point out how powerless the Assembly is.   After all, Bukele has the police.   Bukele has the Armed Forces.   Bukele has the Ministry of Health.   If Bukele continues to implement his version of a strict quarantine using the security forces, the Assembly is probably powerless to stop him, and Bukele would not lose a significant amount of popular support.

Evaluating a negotiation always means assessing who needs an agreement more.   In today's El Salvador, the populist president holds almost all the cards.   The Assembly needs an agreement to stay relevant and so, in the end, they will accede to Bukele's demands and produce a new emergency law very close to Bukele's original position.