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What Law Must Be Able to Do: The Coercion Thesis and the Need to Keep the Peace

Chapter 4 begins the second step of the modest analysis undertaken in this volume with an argument grounded in a claim about the function something must be able to perform to be properly characterized as a system of law. It argues that it is a conceptually necessary condition for something to count as a system of law that it is reasonably contrived to keep the peace among rationally competent self-interested subjects like us in worlds of acute material scarcity like ours by regulating behavior through the governance of norms metaphysically capable of guiding behavior. But the only way that an institutional normative system could be reasonably contrived to do this is by backing some mandatory norms prohibiting assaults on persons and property with the threat of a coercive sanction.