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Book Review: Love and Instinct

argument on behalf of the information-processing approach is that it can be adopted irrespective of assumptions about the specific way in which the body works. Martindale plumps decisively for a hierarchical feature-analysis model which he derives largely from Konorski's theory of cognition. Different analysers are postulated. Each has four to six layers (corresponding to the layers in the cortex); and each layer has a lot of cellular cognitive units. The existence and operation of some of the analysers, like the 'episodic analyzers' and the action system, is especially speculative. Important principles at work among units are vertical excitation and lateral inhibition. A basic principle underlined by Martindale is the match-mismatch principle; but he also emphasizes the importance of regularities like those expressed in the Yerkes-Dodson law and the Wundt curve. In fact, Martindale devotes a whole chapter to the important topic of arousal theory and cognition. Other distinctive attributes of his book are in the form of an entire chapter on episodic memory, another on narratives and a third on cognitive evolution. Of course, a substantial chapter like the one on states of consciousness would not be found in every recent book on cognition; and, as Martindale's very title promises, it is a very important section of the book. The great problem of psychology is the problem of consciousness. What is consciousness? Martindale gives a kind of answer. It is in terms of bodily events. He equates consciousness with 'the set of cognitive units that is activated at a given point in time'. He concentrates his discussion of consciousness on the primary-secondary process continuum (primary process thinking is associative and autistic; and secondary process thinking is purposeful and realityoriented). A good deal of his own research has been concerned with the two types of thought. (Elsewhere in the book, his contributions in the areas of narratives, and creativity and arousal, are also detailed in an illustrative and informative way.) An appealing feature of the book is the energetic presentation of hypotheses and stimulating suggestions. Plenty of individualistic comments occur. There is, for example, Martindale's observation that a quick way of sizing up someone's creativity is to watch his reaction to a novel idea: the creative person will respond excitedly and enthusiastically, while the uncreative person will pick it apart and often react angrily. Very little obstructs the smooth and frequently sparkling flow of material. One minor snag occurs in the presentation of the tilt illusion. The figure illustrating the illusion lacks the a and b labels that are referred to in the text. Again, the treatment of feature analysis is not clear as to whether a place has to be found for a 'decision demon' like the one discussed in the outline of the pandemonium model. S.-Afr. Tydskr. Sielk. 1983. 13(1)