{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.028416779431664412, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0027063599458728013, 'mean_word_length': 5.379310344827586, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Making an exception: the general superintendence of all charitable uses1


 The Supreme Court’s endorsement in Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF) (UK) v Attorney-General2 of the exceptional, public nature of charities had a proper place in its reasoning that members of charitable companies owe fiduciary duties. However, while it was unsatisfactory for the majority to insist the case could be brought within an orthodox application of the “non-intervention” principle, Lady Arden JSC’s more persuasive approach, which the majority were content to accept as an alternative, took charitable exceptionalism too far. This analysis ought not and need not have led the court to invoke the court’s special jurisdiction over charities.