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Action types and act tokens in deontic logic of the ought-to-do-type

In this paper we argue that the distinction between action types and act tokens is relevant for a proper understanding of the distinction between prima facie obligations and all out obligations. After a discussion of the approach in which norms that deal with action types are analysed in terms of the deontic classification of individual acts, we explore the opposite approach. We take norms that deal with action types as primitive, and show how the evaluation of individual acts is influenced (but not determined) by the deontic status of the several action types which these acts instantiate. This view is formalised, first in a simple version which disregards exceptions to norms, and then in a more complex variant, which takes exceptions into account. Finally the distinction between action types and act tokens is used to characterise the distinction between weak and strong permissions.