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Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East Glassman Jon D.Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975, pp. viii, 243

the rest of economic policy and the important role agriculture now plays in our prosperity. Of particular interest to political scientists is Warley's description of differences in Canadian and United States agriculture policy in the postwar years (10-19), his rejection of "food power" as a profitable strategy for American foreign policy (22-25) and his discussion of the necessary sacrifices by the Canadian and United States governments to expand further their food exports (40-72). Beginning with policy differences, prior to 1972 Canadian domestic agricultural policy involved markedly less government intervention than its United States's counterpart although, after 1961, US policy began to shift toward increased emphasis on market forces (11-14). Since 1972, US policy has come to minimize governmental interference and rely on market forces while in Canada there has been a move from dependence on the market toward comprehensive government support policies (17, 18). The positions of the two countries concerning the role of government in agriculture policy have thus been reversed since 1972. Warley cites a variety of factors as deterrents to the use of' 'food power" or food as a weapon but places greatest emphasis on the impact this strategy would have on the perceived reliability of the exporting nations as long-term sources of food. He also claims that trade concessions will have to be made to the underdeveloped nations to permit them to afford increased imports of North American food. Warley's volume is less convincing in its political analysis. Forexample, his critique of food as a weapon strategy is ingenuous. Although it is true that the major potential markets for American food exports are Western Europe and Japan (59) against whom food is unlikely to be used as a weapon, many other countries might still be the object of such a strategy. Cynics are likely to remember the CIA report released in August 1974 ("Potential Implications of Trends in World Population, Food Production, and Climate"). Further, Warley does not sufficiently distinguish the gains forthcoming to the US from expanded food exports from those likely for Canada. Warley indicates that Canada's capacity to expand its agricultural production is limited (26). This suggests the likelihood of less substantial gains for Canada from concessions made to promote food export markets. Whether or not you agree with Warley's analysis, this is a useful volume for public policy courses because it states its arguments clearly.