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To what ends? Governmental interests and European Union (non-) intervention in Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo

Since the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy framework became operational in 2003, the Union has undertaken more than 20 crisis management operations. The drivers behind this activity remain debated. This article proposes a fresh interpretation based on governmental interests as defined by domestic political risks and opportunities. It argues that EU governments have tailored Common Security and Defence Policy action so as to satisfy domestic audiences. By way of illustration, this article examines the most ambitious Common Security and Defence Policy operation to date, the EU Force mission in Chad and the Central African Republic, as well as a deliberate non-intervention in a comparable case, in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in late 2008. By analysing the positions of the most relevant EU governments in each respective case, this article demonstrates how they corresponded to domestic political logic. Drawing on some 20 interviews with policy-makers, this article provides a theoretical account explaining the motives behind Common Security and Defence Policy decision-making rooted in original empirical evidence. The explanation for the haphazard pattern of Common Security and Defence Policy operations thus far can be found in the link between domestic politics and EU crisis management operations.