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ASSESSING PATTERNS OF EXECUTIVE REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS

This paper examines the concept of executive disproportionality, which serves as a complement to standard notions of legislative disproportionality. Legislative disproportionality measures the collective discrepancy between electoral vote and legislative seat share among the parties in a political system; similarly executive disproportionality measures the collective discrepancy between electoral vote and cabinet seat share (called ED1) and legislative seat and cabinet seat share (called ED2) for parties in a political system. Formulas for the two types of executive disproportionality are derived from Gallagher's Least Square's index and data from several countries is presented. A possible inverse trend between legislative and executive disproportionality is also explored.