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Essay Review: L'OEUVRE MATHÉMATIQUE DE NEWTON DE 1667 À 1673: The Mathematical Papers of Isaac Newton

grounded in the concept of historical recurrence, and his whole research may be said to have tended to expel what was left of Platonismin rationalism. The only philosophical difficulty which does not seem to have been solved was encountered when Bachelard tried to give to the psychology of scientific knowledge a status which would rid it of psychologism. The "investigations" which make the latter half of the book range from the philosophical to the scientific and culminate in a meditation on the nature of knowledge as can be deduced from what we know, after the most recent discoveries in genetics and animal psychology, on the relations between intelligence and life. Just as a reflection on life must decide, when dealing with monsters, between the concept of variety and that of variation, a reflection on knowledge implies an interpretation of the power to err. The difficulties one meets in doing so account for those which beset whoever tries to define the nature of psychology or that of medical ethics. The latter task is further complicated by a crisis precipitated by the dehumanising force of technology. And thus the argument comes full circle, ending on a discussion of the social implications of sciences which society was shown to determine in the first place. Together with more direct references, this clearly shows Canguilhem's intellectual family, thinkers like Foucault, Lacan or Althusser, who stress the part played by theory but insist equally on the conditions which make it possible. Thus the traditional link between 'history' and 'philosophy' of science, often embodied in a proximity of the institutions where they flourish, is no less real for being superficially loose. The history of science cannot but be philosophical; and it cannot be philosophical without being conscious of contemporary human realities, or, as it used to be called, "committed".