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Burning corpses in the streets: Russia's doctrinal flaws in the 1995 fight for Grozny

Russia's capture of the Chechen capital of Grozny in the winter of 1995 proved to be a Pyrrhic victory. Despite having a strategic doctrine that incorporated the tenets of measured response and precision fires, Russia's armed forces were incapable of conducting operations in cities, without resorting to the indiscriminate use of massive firepower. As a result, Russia's merciless pounding of Grozny only served to solidify Chechen resolve to resist, while eroding its own public support for the war. As long as the Russian military fails to translate its strategic doctrine into operational doctrine and tactics, Russia will continue to have difficulty translating its tactical victories into strategic ones.