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Kierkegaard’s Cobcept of Motion: Ontology or Philosophy of Existence?

On the basis of Kierkegaard's concept of motion (κί,νησις) this paper discusses the relationship between ontology and existential analysis. When Kierkegaard defines motion as the transition from possibility to actuality, these categories have an existential meaning. "Possibility" is the horizon created by the conflict between the self s projection into the future and the givenness of its past. It marks a mode of existence in which the individual does not coincide with himself. Motion, thus, does not come about through the actualization of a possibility of a previous moment, but rather through the annihilation of possibility. Kierkegaard's concept of motion shows that his ontological claims derive from his existential analysis, and that his way of doing ontology is, therefore, closer to that of Heidegger than to traditional natural ontologies. Kierkegaard scholarship, in as far as it considers the basic questions of philosophy important for Kierkegaard's thought, has suggested at least two distinct ways in which the relationship between ontology and existential analysis can be understood. Some scholars argue that Kierkegaard has a traditional conception of ontology which is neutral with respect to existential analysis. His understanding of existence, it is argued, presupposes his understanding of the general structure of actuality. This neutral ontology is developed in passages such as the "Interlude" to Philosophical Fragments and Chapter Three of The Concept of Anxiety. Others argue that if Kierkegaard has an ontology at all, it is not detached from his existential analysis; rather his ontological claims derive from his understanding of what it means to This view is, for instance, expressed by Poul Liibcke who argues that Kierkegaard in contrast to Heidegger's "Ph nomenologische Konstitutionstheorie" has "eine traditionelle Fundierungsontologie." "Die Ontologie des Geistes bei Kierkegaard hat eine Natur-Ontologie als ihre Grundlage" in Modalit t und Zeit bei Kierkegaard und Heidegger, (Text und Kontext, Sonderreihe, vol. 15) Copenhagen 1983, p. 128. Kierkegaard's Concept of Motion 293 be an existing human being. This paper attempts to provide an argument in support of the latter view.