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Kant's Moral Theory

The status and nature of Kant’s moral theory is a topic of perennial interest. Until recently much work in this area was, however, narrowly focused, principally on the question of the formulations of the categorical imperative and the nature of Kant’s justification of it. While these topics are certainly interesting in themselves, the scope of Kant’s treatment was often missing in work that focused on them. In the works treated here, however, questions that concern both foundational matters of his ethics are presented but accompanied by important re-evaluations of the nature of what the import of his principles consists in. Richard Dean’s work concerns itself with the question of what is meant by ‘humanity’ when Kant argues that it is what possesses the characteristic of being an ‘end-in-itself’. His book is divided into two halves and in the first half he argues for the view that what possesses the characteristic of being an ‘end-in-itself’ is the good will, hence equating Kant’s notion of ‘humanity’ with the good will. This argument is then succeeded by an examination of the consequences of adopting this view in terms of a treatment of the duties that would follow from it and also a discussion of the differences between ‘humanity’ so understood and both Kantian and non-Kantian conceptions British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15(3) 2007: 581 – 593