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Executive–Legislative Relations in Poland, 1991–2005: Institutional Relations in Transition

This paper relates factors previously identified as significant for parliamentary governance to general developments in post-communist CEE and proceeds to assess their relevance to the development of executive–legislative relations in Poland. The Sejm was institutionally strong, while governments were inexperienced, internally divided, and unstable. Governments could not assume the support of their parliamentary parties. Tensions with coalition partners were rife, and only in the period 1993–97 did the coalition survive intact. Periods of ‘cohabitation’ with a relatively strong president complicated governance even after the new Constitution of 1997. These factors suggest weak government, amply borne out by the experience of the two minority governments of the first term. Yet governments gained greater control of the legislative agenda and, regardless of their type or extent of parliamentary support, they usually succeeded in enacting their legislation and proved highly successful in defending individual ministers from votes of no confidence. We explain this apparent contradiction by contrasting institutional weakness with an underlying consensus on broad outlines of both foreign and domestic policy. Despite a discourse of hostile confrontation between government and opposition, much legislation was passed with the broad endorsement of the legislature. Governments were receptive to modifications of policy. When needed, they could often rely on cross-party support or that of independent-minded deputies. Parliament thus remained a key legislative actor; it was never merely the pawn of majority governments. Governments also benefited from opposition disunity. The opposition proved incapable of defeating ministers, even of minority governments.