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Client-contractor bargaining problem in the context of multi-mode project scheduling with limited resources

This study focuses on the client-contractor bargaining problem in the context of multimode resource constrained project scheduling. The bargaining objective is to maximize the bargaining objective function comprised of the individual NPV maximizing objectives of both the client and the contractor. Although the well-known multi- mode resource constrained project scheduling problem has been under investigation from various dimensions in the literature, this thesis proposes a two-player setting to this problem. The solution procedure takes the objectives of both players into account. One other proposal we have in this thesis is the bargaining weights concept we have used in the model, which is used to determine the bargaining power of each player through the negotiation process. The effect of bargaining weights assigned to each player on the solution has also been analyzed. Different payment models have also been investigated in this thesis. We have used progress payments, payments at equal time intervals, and payments at activity completions in our tests. Simulated Annealing Algorithm and Genetic Algorithm are proposed as solution procedures. Also the solution set of the problem is investigated by further analyzing the nondominated solutions. We have conducted sensitivity analysis among different parameters we have used in the model. These parameters are profit margin, interest rate, and bargaining weights. The bargaining objective function we have used has been an important part of the model itself. We have investigated different solution approaches by using two different bargaining objective function formulations in our tests.