{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.03963963963963964, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0018018018018018018, 'mean_word_length': 4.616161616161616, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Trust in an N-Player Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (iPD) is a standard problem for the evolution of cooperation. Published work so far dealt mainly with the 2-player case, which is neither very realistic nor very relevant for applications , as societies, in a general sense, usually are made of more than two agents. We present novel results where cooperation co-evolves with trust in an N-player iPD. In doing so, trust is expressed by group-formation, i.e., agents evolve preferences for other agents with certain markers.