{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.013513513513513514, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.583333333333333, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 1, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Jurisdictional integration: A framework for measuring and predicting the depth of international regulatory cooperation in competition policy

This article takes a new approach to international regulatory cooperation by developing a concept of the depth of cooperation, jurisdictional integration. A dataset of international competition policy agreements is compiled and ranked against an ordinal index of the depth of de jure cooperation in enforcing competition policies. There has been both a deepening and broadening of de jure cooperation over time. Statistical analysis finds that common membership of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development is a strong predictor of the depth of agreements to cooperate in enforcing competition policies; that we can be confident that the depth of agreements is low when signatories' substantive competition laws are dissimilar; and that the depth of de jure cooperation is a strong predictor of whether an agreement is “intergovernmental” or “transgovernmental.” The article puts forward a new way to map and measure international regulatory cooperation, and a new variable for use in research on its causes and consequences.