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Democracy and the Skill-Bias in Trade Policy in Developing Countries

A growing body of research suggests that democracy promotes trade liberalization in developing countries. We argue that democracy in developing countries generates a "skill bias" in trade policy where democratic incumbents have incentives to increase tariffs on high skilled goods but reduce trade barriers on low skilled goods. Our model analyzes how electoral competition and interest group politics in the Heckscher-Ohlin economy of a democratic developing country affects trade protection on low and high skilled goods. It predicts that electoral competition induces the government to reduce trade barriers for low skilled goods to maximize the utility of the abundant factor, namely the low skilled median voter, who optimally prefers a reduction in tariffs for low skilled goods. At the same time, electoral politics also engenders lobbying pressure and campaign contributions from the scarce factor in the polity – the owners of skill-intensive industries (the interest group) – who prefers more trade protection for high skilled goods. The government rationally responds to contributions and electoral dividends generated by protecting skill-intensive industries from import competition by increasing tariffs on high skilled goods. Empirical tests conducted on a novel disaggregated industry-level dataset of trade protection for 92 developing countries from 1978-2004 provides robust statistical support for our theoretical predictions.