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International Co-Operation and Loss Avoidance: Framing the Problem

Individuals, organizations, and states routinely co-operate across a broad range of activities. Much of this co-operation is the product of harmonious interests and does not require explanation. More puzzling is co-operation that occurs despite divergent interests, or when convergent interests have to be identified and coordinated before the parties can achieve jointly what they could not accomplish individually.' This kind of co-operation is the focus of this volume. In this collection, we explore how political leaders think about international co-operation. We then examine three explanations of how, when, and why leaders decide to co-operate. Advocates of liberal, realist, and cognitive explanations all concur that assessments of gains and losses are central