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Equality, Luck and Hierarchy

In a recent article in this journal, Professor Samuel Scheffler criticizes what he takes to be an important new movement in political philosophy: “luck egalitarianism.” He identifies me as a luck egalitarian, and I challenge that characterization here. But I have a more general worry about his thesis. He complains that luck egalitarians subordinate social and political equality to economic equality: he says that my own account of economic equality, for example, is “administrative” and presupposes a hierarchical society. He, on the contrary, takes social and political equality to be fundamental, and supposes that economic inequality is objectionable only if and to the extent that it undermines that social and political equality. The impulse to see one or another dimension of equality as fundamental is misconceived, however. A genuine society of equals must aim at equal stake as well as equal voice and equal status for its citizens. We must build conceptions of these different dimensions of equality that fit with and draw upon one another, not suppose that either economic or political or social equality is more fundamental than the others.