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Evolutionary game analysis on contributing factors of confirming storage financing mode's credit risk

This paper constructed an evolutionary game model which reveals the lending behavior between commercial banks, core suppliers and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) under the confirming storage financing mode. It turns out that under confirming storage financing mode, short-term commercial bank lending rates, storage and regulation cost, probabilities of joint loan fraud within SMEs and their counterparties, probabilities for counterparties to abide by the repurchase agreements, pledge's ending price, SMEs' profit margin and penalties supply chains enforce to SMEs for default are significant factors, which have influence on SMEs' default probabilities and probabilities of commercial banks' credit supply. Meanwhile, lending rates, probabilities of joint loan fraud between buyers and vendors within the supply chain and penalties supply chains enforce to the default party are playing a significant role for the strategy choice of commercial banks and SMEs.