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Antitrust Anachronism: The Interracial Wealth Transfer in Collegiate Athletics Under the Consumer Welfare Standard

Under an illusory nexus to education, intercollegiate athletics in the United States represents a multibillion-dollar enterprise that extracts economic rents from the majority Black athlete labor to the benefit of overwhelmingly White constituencies. Under the aegis of “amateurism,” member universities of the National College Athletic Association (NCAA) collude to fix maximum athlete compensation at cost-of-attendance and strip athletes of the economic rights over their own name, image, or likeness. While this anticompetitive restraint encumbers all athletes competing under the NCAA umbrella, it imposes a disparate impact on Black and other minority athletes who represent a majority of the labor in the largest revenue sports: football and basketball. Although White coaches are the most visible beneficiaries of this anticompetitive restraint, the scope of amateurism’s interracial distributional effects has largely remained uncovered. This article seeks to fill this gap in the literature. Leveraging data from multiple sources, including institutional financial reports and the NCAA Demographics Database from 2007–2020, this article quantifies the NCAA’s wealth transfer away from primarily Black athlete labor to institutions and overwhelmingly White constituencies. Under the NCAA’ restraint, we estimate that Black football and men’s and women’s basketball athletes at the Division I Power 5 Conference level have lost approximately $17 billion to $21 billion in compensation from 2005 to 2019 or roughly $1.2–$1.4 billion per year. The antitrust status quo’s failure to enjoin the NCAA’s collusive wage-fixing restraint, which causes such obvious antitrust injury and harm to athlete labor, underscores the fundamental shortcomings of using the consumer-welfare standard as the exclusive lodestar to investigate and enjoin anticompetitive conduct; it also exposes the divergence between “amateurism” as described in Board of Regents and the modern-day realities of college athletics.