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From West to South to North

It is hardly surprising that Russia's foreign policy is to a very large degree concerned with relations with its immediate neighbourhoods, which are uniquely diverse and often rich in violent conflicts. This short-range policy is a direct consequence of the country's enormous longitude, which provides it with more neighbours than any other state in the world. Obsession with relations with the United States constitutes an important exception to this pattern, but this pivotal political dimension has to remain outside the scope of this article. Another massive omission is the ambiguous nature of Russia's relations with its far eastern neighbours, primarily China. Following advice from Dirty Harry, this author acknowledges the need to know his limitations.What is really striking about Russia's concentration in dealing with its neighbours is that it reaches such a degree where there is little attention left for a wide range of global issues, even those that directly impact its wellbeing. This explains the sincere lack of interest in Africa, even if Putin has to endure long discussions about increasing aid at the G8 meetings. Hence also the lack of attention to climate change problems after ratifying the Kyoto protocol in 2004; it is widely assumed that Russia would not suffer that much from global warming (even if the oil and gas producing areas in western Siberia might). Landmines and small arms ring no political bells. What becomes less easy to explain is Russia's non-engagement in key international economic and financial institutions. Putin did proclaim the goal of joining the WTO, but its non-achievement has barely registered. Among the more current global economic issues, it is possible to point out that, during the second half of 2007, the consensus in Moscow was that Russian banks would not be affected by the US sub-prime crisis; it was only the sharp fall of the stock market in January 2008 that informed the political elite that Russia was not insulated from the continuing shocks. Even that awakening has not changed the dominant perception that a country that holds the third largest gold/hard currency reserves in the world does not have to play any role in regulating global finances.This article starts with indicating these peculiarities and oddities in order to cut them off and isolate its main aim-to provide a provisional assessment of whether the proactive policies in the western, southern, and northern neighbourhoods have secured for Russia the status of a "regional great power." The desire for such status originates in the evolution of Russia's political regime, and that is where the analysis begins. Energy exports constitute the resource base for-and the key content of-these policies, and the role of energy is evaluated in the next section. Then, five key theatres in Russia's foreign policy operations are examined: Europe (essentially the EU), Ukraine and Belarus, the Caucasus, the Caspian area, and the Arctic "frontier." The conclusion draws a very provisional balance of achievements and setbacks that could show whether Russia is indeed turning into a bona fide revisionist power.DOWN WITH DEMOCRATIZATIONRussia's political evolution inevitably determines the key content of its relations with its neighbours, and this evolution gives more and more ground for serious concern. Portraying Russia as an incorrigible state returning to its traditional authoritarian ways and inherent imperialistic policies would be not only an over-simplification but a misrepresentation of the complex and controversial political processes. At the same time, there is hardly any doubt that Putin's second presidential term signified a profound retreat from the path of democratic reforms and modernization that Russia had embarked upon with the implosion of the USSR in late 1991. This article will not examine the incoherent substance of the emergent overcentralized (but thoroughly corrupt) petro-bureaucratic regime, but it appears essential to emphasize some of its features that are particularly pertinent to the theme under investigation. …