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Interpreting the World: Kant's Philosophy of History and Politics William James Booth Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986, pp. xix, 189

authority in the crown, but the hypothetical willingness of some hypothetical men to establish and obey an absolute sovereign is no good reason why we must do the same (37). Locke's internally coherent argument that consent obliges figunders as we turn from his Treatises to his moral theory and his theology for further explication of the Law of Nature (107-08). In its pursuit of precision, utilitarianism fails to reconcile the greatest happiness of the group, which it demands, with the egoism of individuals, which it assumes, wrongly supposes the commensurability of several kinds of mental state, and reduces politics to an incomprehensible technical activity (157-58). The "contextualist" mode of justification, which Herzog recommends, emerges less clearly through scattered remarks and the discussion of three exemplars of this mode. "Contextualism" employs criteria as given by the specific social context to overcome the (for Herzog) logically valid distinction between "is" and "ought." Its arguments are historical if not historicist (215). Thus Smith's case for capitalism is not that it is the "natural system of liberty" but that it was superior to feudalism; his case against primogeniture that it has become useless illustrates the "genuinely critical force of historicism" (213). Smith and Hume view society as an "arena full of unintended consequences"; for the latter, the English constitution, which as the rule of law secures liberty, is the largely fortuitous outcome of decades of religious fanaticism (210). Hume argues for political obligation, that a system where people are taught (by trickery) that they ought always to obey the law will be better than one where they are not taught this. Though he doesn't show us why civil disobedience must have "horrible consequences," his argument is at least open to meaningful debate (188). Although Herzog's critique of foundationalism is often compelling, his central claim is not. The dichotomy of "foundationalists" and "contextualists" means that he does full justice to neither—Herzog would reply that he does not mean to tell us what Hobbes or Locke or Hume intended but rather to deal with their theories as "ideal types" (28), though his practice cannot always conform to his principle (for example, 97). Treating Hobbes and Locke as "foundationalists," Herzog disregards substantial elements of their writings that might appropriately have been juxtaposed to what he admires in Hume. To ignore Locke's treatment of the legislative and executive powers, for example, is to ignore a possibly fruitful comparison and to distort Locke's own teaching. Again, to ignore the classical, or Aristotelian teaching which Hobbes and Locke mean to replace, and treat their works only in relation to those of Hume and Smith is to neglect the actual "context" of all four writers and ignore what may be the fundamental alternative to "foundationalism." A more obvious indication of the inadequacy of Herzog's categories is his identification of Marx as one who happily reveals that contextualism and radicalism are compatible. Marx wins Herzog's favour because his critique of capitalism is supported by no abstract theory of justice. Yet surely it is this same fact that precludes "meaningful political dialogue" between those who subscribe to this critique and the followers of Adam Smith.