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Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Political Logic of the Universal Welfare State . By Bo Rothstein. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 254p. $59.95 cloth. $19.95 paper.

Political Economy Approach," Journal of Urban Affairs 15 [1993]: 1-29). The model emphasizes cooperation between political and economic interests in order to develop electoral coalitions and to govern. The conflict between opposing economic and political interests is resolved through the creation of governing regimes. The model suggests that the local political context frames policy choices, and the governing regime is a primary determinant of policy choices. By contrast, the economic determinism model developed by Paul Peterson in City Limits (1981) emphasizes an economic approach to policy choices. It suggests that larger state and national economic forces impose certain policy choices upon a city. Peterson argues that cities have a unitary interest in promoting economic development. Reichl focuses on the management of conflict among different economic, cultural, and ethnic interests, which leads him to reject the economic determinism model. He acknowledges that "the overwhelming predominance of support [for redevelopment]... might reasonably approximate the kind of broad-based support for development described by Peterson" (p. 142), but he suggests that this support was politically constructed "by means of a coalition strategy that centered on cultural politics," which recast the political debate in away "that predisposes higher-income urban residents to support redevelopment" (p. 142). Ultimately, Reichl argues, economic factors alone do not explain the process of postindustrial restructuring experienced by many American cities. "The argument presented here is that political factors play a central causal role in changing patterns of urban redevelopment" (p. 10). Yet, Reichl presents valuable evidence that supports Peterson's economic determinism model. For example, the economic potential of Times Square was vastly underdeveloped: "No new construction had occurred in the immediate environs of the Forty-second Street project area . . . since 1931. Consequently property taxes generated from the area. . . were but a fraction of the potential, in fact the total tax revenue was less than that received from a single building a block east at Sixth Avenue" (p. 67). Reichl found that business, civic, and political leaders were convinced that real and perceived problems, such as "crime, drugs, pornography, prostitution and menacing African-American and Latino youths," threatened the "economic and social health of the entire west side of midtown Manhattan" (p. 5). The decline of the city's real estate market in the 1990s was in part the result of the stock market crash of 1987. Reichl's analysis also makes clear that the emergence of a postindustrial economy in New York City widened the gap between rich and poor, which was a factor contributing to the push for redevelopment. The growth of the global economy led to the emergence of the postindustrial economy in New York. At times Reichl blurs the distinction between political regimes and growth coalitions or growth machines. "I use the term 'pro-growth coalition' and 'pro-growth regime' to refer to the enduring coalition of interests that were unified behind a broader pro-growth agenda for New York City" (p. 190, n. 56). The urban development literature generally differentiates between growth coalition and regime. Both approaches focus on cooperation between public and private elites. In Urban Fortunes, The Political Economy of Place (1987), Logan and Molotch argue that the politics of local economic development are driven by the vested interests of property owners who seek to realize their economic interest through a progrowth coalition. The emphasis of urban regime analysis on cooperation between political and economic interests in order to develop electoral coalitions and to govern. Reichl calls for some alternative to corporate control of public space through the "theme-park experience" (p. 179). He believes in the "importance of pursuing democracy and authenticity in urban development" (p. 177), "areas of cultural diversity" (p. 181), and "a more enlightened vision for the future of cities" (p. 181). Reichl does not explain how an opportunity-expanding regime is to be created in New York City, how political support for urban diversity is to be achieved, or how opposition is to be overcome. In Reconstructing Times Square we begin to see some movement toward integrating conflicting urban policy models. It is hoped that Reichl will continue in the work he started.