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Can we do without pragmatic encroachment

And John Hawthorne (2004) and Jason Stanley (2005) have argued that what it takes to turn true belief into knowledge is sensitive to the practical environment the subject is in. These authors seem to be suggesting there is, to use Jonathan Kvanvig’s phrase “pragmatic encroachment” in epistemology. In this paper I’ll argue that their arguments do not quite show this is true, and that concepts of epistemological justification need not be pragmatically sensitive. The aim here isn’t to show that (PC) is false, but rather that it shouldn’t be described as a pragmatic condition on justification. Rather, it is best thought of as a pragmatic condition on belief. There are two ways to spell out the view I’m taking here. These are both massive simplifications, but they are close enough to the truth to show the kind of picture I’m aiming for. First, imagine a philosopher who holds a very simplified version of functionalism about belief, call it (B).