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The Revolution in Military Affairs and Strategic Thought in the US Military, 1991–2003

A recurring theme of post-World War II US military history is the fixation of American policy-makers on technological solutions to strategic challenges. In the wake of the 1991 victory in the Gulf War, American military leaders embraced a Revolution in Military Affairs combining guided munitions with advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems to provide war-winning capabilities for US forces. Although Army experimentation in the 1990s and early 2000s had much to commend it, senior Army leaders lost sight of the connection between strategy and military operations and virtually ignored any type of war other than the one for which the Army's powerful conventional forces were designed. In the aftermath of regime change in Iraq in 2003, US commanders struggled to develop concepts suitable to achieve the nation's strategic goals. Having all but ignored other types of conflict, Army leaders proved incredibly resistant to embracing counterinsurgency operations in Iraq until defeat stared them in the face. In the future, the US Army needs to integrate information networks, ISR systems, and guided munitions into a broader warfighting framework that military leaders can adapt to whatever type of enemies they may face, rather than counting on fighting a mirror-imaged enemy.