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A new design criteria for hash-functions

The most common way of constructing a hash function (e.g., SHA-1) is to iterate a compression function on the input message. The compression function is usually designed from scratch or made out of a block-cipher. In this paper, we introduce a new security notion for hash-functions, stronger than collision-resistance. Under this notion, the arbitrary length hash function H must behave as a random oracle when the fixed-length building block is viewed as an ideal primitive. This enables to eliminate all possible generic attacks against iterative hash-functions. In this paper, we show that the current design principle behind hash functions such as SHA-1 and MD5 — the (strengthened) Merkle-Damg̊ard transformation — does not satisfy this security notion. We provide several constructions that provably satisfy this notion; those new constructions introduce minimal changes to the plain Merkle-Damg̊ard construction and are easily implementable in practice. This paper is a modified version of a paper to appear at Crypto 2005.