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Risk modeling of communications, navigation, and surveillance complex systems of systems for future aviation

The planned integration of Communications (C), Navigation (N), and Surveillance (S) by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) would convert their currently safely coordinated operations into a single vulnerable interdependent and interconnected CNS complex systems of systems (Complex SoS). We model the ensuing vulnerability of planned Complex SoS by tracing specific new interdependencies and interconnections manifested by their shared/common (i) States (variables), (ii) Decisions, (iii) Decision makers, and (iv) Resources (cyber‐physical) among the three C, N, and S systems?. Other contributions stem from our exploiting the use of fault trees (without the reliance on reliability data). Exploiting fault trees enabled us to quantify the accrued knowledge of interdependencies and interconnectedness tabulated in Tables 1–4 in terms of AND Gates (systems connected in Parallel), and OR Gates (systems connected in Series); and to discover dangerous shared C, N, and S systems on the critical path. Namely, if all systems (subsystems) in the minimal cut set fail, then the entire CNS Complex SoS would fail. Significantly, this modeling approach alerted the FAA on “what not to do” by identifying subsystems early in the planned integration of C, N, and S that would result in a single catastrophic failure of the planned CNS Complex SoS.