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Bank Encryption Standards: Insecure Future?

Silly as the name may sound, the clipper chip is nothing to laugh at. The clipper chip--a computer chip that can scramble voice or data messages during transmission to protect the information from being tampered with--is at the heart of the Clinton Administration's new voice and data security system that's poised to change the way privacy and security are defined in the future of electronic commerce. Recent controversy surrounding the clipper chip is coming to a head, as Congress reviews the adoption of it as a standard for telecommunications. That's because the new chip would replace codes such as the digital encryption standard (DES) currently used to scramble electronic transactions. A major source of contention over the proposed encryption standard is that Uncle Sam himself would hold the master keys to each clipper chip. Many industries are concerned about government intervention overstepping the boundaries of a citizen's right to privacy. (In recent weeks, further concerns have been raised over clipper's weaknesses, after a computer scientist at AT&T Bell Laboratories discovered a design flaw in the code that would affect computer versions of it.) Monitored transactions? The new encryption method would enable the government to decode any telephone, fax, or computer communication that is encrypted with the clipper chip. Bankers fear this would enable the government to monitor electronic transactions such as automated teller machine use. That's why the American Bankers Association has asked that the American National Standards Institute approve the new bank encryption standard only if the federal government's ability to capture electronic banking data is limited. "What the banks want to know is simply that there's a standard that they can use to fulfill their obligation to use due care and to protect the security of their transmissions," says Robert Fougher, general counsel for Cylink Inc., one company opposed to the government's current proposal. Too costly to update systems Bankers are also concerned about the costs and effort involved in converting their systems to clipper and its attendant algorithm (called skipjack) within the next five years. The government recently re-certified DES as a cryptographic algorithm for government use for only five more years. Currently, DES is the primary means used by the financial community to ensure the confidentiality of sensitive business activities such as electronic funds transfers. "A lot of retail banks and credit card companies use DES as a means of sending the [personal identification numbers] that go back and forth from automated teller machines," says Steven R. Katz, a banker who sits on the ABA Information Security Committee. "With the volume of [electronic] transactions going through those networks, that's major money, because even if you're looking at a cost of implementing the new [encryption code] at a hundred dollars an ATM, given the number of ATMs that are out there, the number of cash machines or card readers, and the amount of money would be astronomically high." Indeed, the high volume of funds transfers that are handled by banks daily makes it clear that a change in cryptographic standards for the banking industry in this one area would be cost-prohibitive with the proposed five-year time frame. Bankers' concerns must be addressed The ABA maintains that any change from DES to the clipper chip/skipjack encryption scheme or to any escrowed encryption technique cannot be supported unless the following concerns are addressed: 1. …