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Critical Theory and Positivism: Popper and the Frankfurt School

This paper attempts to outline and discuss some of the principal areas of conflict between Popper’s critical empiricism and the Frankfurt School’s critical theory. In 1961 the meetings of the German Sociological Association at Tfbingen began what has since been called the positivist-dispute in German Sociology: however, despite the bitterness with which this debate was conducted, it really sheds little light on the issues which separate Popper and the Frankfurt School. Giddens described the controversy as being like ’Hamlet without the Prince’, since Adorno’s ’reply’ to Popper, instead of attacking the latter’s position, set out an alternative, and the confrontation never got off the ground. However, Habermas, who was dissatisfied with this ’strategy of mutually shrugging ones shoulders’ has since engaged in a more fruitful interchange with Hans Albert, which has considerably clarified their differences.’ Consequently the Habermas-Albert controversy is referred to extensively here. The Popperian position and that of critical theory are substantially opposed on questions of the methodology and objectives of social science, about what constitutes knowledge in the social sciences. This position is maintained here despite recent suggestions that critical theory, and Habermas in particular, is converging with Popperianism. These will be considered at the end of this discussion. Popper and Albert argue that their demarcation between science and non-science (which is implicitly a demarcation between knowledge and