{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.02662037037037037, 'fraction_numerical': 0.013888888888888888, 'mean_word_length': 5.223021582733813, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
The Ottoman Crisis of May 1915 at Gallipoli

The article first considers the difficulties and potential of researching the Gallipoli/Canakkale campaign in the General Staff archives in Ankara, Turkey. Attention is paid to the Ottoman (Turkish) crises in early May 1915. Normally, historians use English-language sources to focus on Allied problems, but Ottoman, Turkish and one German source in particular allow an investigation of two Ottoman crises. One relates to the extreme disorganization of the two Ottoman attacks in early May, and the other to the disagreement over tactics between Liman von Sanders (commanding Ottoman forces in Gallipoli/Canakkale), and the Ottoman supreme commander, Enver Pasa. Ultimately, the two crisis are resolved. It is argued that historians generally undervalue the difficulties faced by the Ottomans (Turks) in early May 1915.