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The Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement

The British government only agreed to Nigerian independence once the colonial secretary and the minister of defence had secured a Nigerian commitment to a defence agreement in 1958. But by setting a date for independence, Britain lost a substantial degree of leverage. Meanwhile, the Nigerian government came under pressure; indirectly from the rise of pan-Africanism and non-alignment, and directly from the emergence of an opposition following the elections of 1959. The negotiations for the actual defence agreement thus became more arduous for the British. The combined strength of the ruling parties, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), eventually assured its safe passage in the Nigerian parliament. But simultaneously, it exposed the Balewa government to criticism that it undermined Nigeria’s independence and declared foreign policy of non-alignment.