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4. Divergent Trust and Dissonant Truths in Public Health Science

This chapter is based on research conducted in the pseudonymous city of Tianmai between 2008 and 2014. It takes note of public health science after the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) breakout was supposed to “save” China in part by promoting the reputation and standing of China's public health community throughout the world. With regard to this promise, the young, well-educated scientists who worked at the Center for Disease Control (CDC) in the Pearl River Delta in the years following the 2003 SARS epidemic were largely disappointed. They had arrived at their new posts full of idealism and ambition, but by the end of the decade they were voicing frustration, boredom, and embarrassment. What bothered these young scientists most of all was their feelings of powerlessness with regard to acting on this knowledge. The lingdao must still receive his statistics, the money must be spent, and the migrants must be counted and vaccinated. In this vein, the most commonly repeated phrase heard from the younger generation of scientists was one of fatalism: there is nothing to be done, it is all determined by the leaders. Modern science was contrasted with traditional clientelism to produce an ideal that felt impossible to attain.