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A Nation of Emigrants: How Mexico Manages Its Migration

political personality, the organization of the White House, and the uses to which intelligence was put, especially in the run-up to the war in Iraq. The critiques are familiar—a president of notable certainty in his beliefs and unwillingness to consider second thoughts, a White House organized for action rather than review, and selective uses of intelligence designed to bolster preconceived ideas rather than to reassess them. Among the third set of chapters, Blinder’s stands out as an innovative effort to reexamine the power of presidents to rhetorically frame issues and prime audiences by “going public,” as Bush did so successfully in the run-up to the midterm election of 2002, invoking anxiety among the public and thus pressuring congressional Democrats to vote on a war resolution. Blinder might have noted that such priming by Bush was only partially responsible for the submission of congressional Democrats, many of whom were chastened by their previous opposition to the 1991 Gulf War, and who thus felt compelled to support Bush’s Iraq War in order for Democrats to regain credibility as a party “strong” on national security. In a similar vein, Kumar’s chapter analyzes the Bush administration’s vaunted communications team, arguing that while it was effective in putting out the president’s message, it was ill-equipped to play defense and to adjust to adverse situations. In the final section, Jones invites us to view possibilities for presidential leadership from the vantage point of Congress rather than the president. From this perspective, while Bush no doubt succeeded in mobilizing a compliant Republican Congress to accomplish much during his first term, the Senate’s nonmajoritarian rules often impeded Bush’s presidential appointments and his policy agenda, as it earlier had that of Newt Gingrich’s Contract with America. And during his second term, Bush’s misreading of his political resources, and his pressing of issues that lacked consensus even within his own party, led to more pronounced congressional constraints on presidential power, culminating in a change of party control in 2006. Ross also highlights the limits of Bush’s power. Detailing the fecklessness of his efforts to alter Social Security in the aftermath of his 2004 reelection, Ross claims that Bush had little, if any, chance to make an appreciable dent in a program that had much popular support and indeed represented an entrenched “policy regime.” Each of these three books, in its own fashion, deals with the interplay of history, political context, and presidential personality. Surely, from the vantage point of political science, the political context of a presidency must be regarded as primary. At the same time, presidential leadership styles interact with these settings and sometimes influence them, rather than merely being determined by them. Leadership styles, among other things, powerfully dictate how presidents decide. And how presidents make decisions is likely the single most important aspect of the presidency. Furthermore, given the role of presidents in U.S. politics and the preeminent role of America in the politics of the world, the question of U.S. presidential leadership styles is sure to remain a topic of great interest far beyond the confines of the study of American politics.