{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.021230266739248774, 'fraction_numerical': 0.002177463255307567, 'mean_word_length': 5.2517006802721085, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Pricing strategies for O2O business model considering service spillover and power structures

In contradistinction to the traditional dual-channel retail model, the online and oﬄine channels are two business units of a single retailer in an online to oﬄine (O2O) business model. The service-related eﬀort of the oﬄine channel has a spillover eﬀect on the online channel. This paper establishes three game-theoretic models to analyze how service spillover and power structures aﬀect supply chain members’ performance in the O2O business model. The main results are as follows. First, a service spillover eﬀect is always beneﬁcial to the manufacturer’s proﬁt due to the increasing wholesale price and total demand in all three scenarios. Second, unlike the traditional dual-channel model, service spillover does not inevitably cause price competition in the O2O dual-channel model. Under diﬀerent power structure conditions, the spillover intensity has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the retailer’s proﬁt and service strategy. When the manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader, the eﬀects of spillover on a retailer’s proﬁt depend on online channel acceptance level and service level. A service diﬀerentiation strategy can help the retailer increase proﬁt margins under certain situations. When the manufacturer and retailer have the same power, retailer’s proﬁt increases with spillover intensity, and a service consistency strategy can be implemented. When the retailer is a Stackelberg leader, the retailer’s proﬁt decreases ﬁrst and then increases, and a service mixed strategy will reduce the loss of retailer’s proﬁt. Finally, the switch in dominant power between manufacturer and retailer has no impact on retail prices and demand. The total supply chain proﬁt in two Stackelberg models is also equivalent, but lower than that in the Nash model.