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How Contestation Moderates the Effects of International Institutions: The International Criminal Court and Kenya

A broad class of theories, applied to a wide array of substantive issues, argues that international institutions facilitate compliance by mobilizing procompliance domestic groups. I develop a general model of political contestation over compliance policy in which institutions mobilize both pro- and anticompliance groups. The model predicts that institutions have the greatest ability to induce compliance when the groups have similar values to winning a compliance contest or costs to effort, ex ante. Institutions have a weaker marginal effect when groups are imbalanced. I demonstrate features of the model using the Kenyan experience with the International Criminal Court. The ICC cemented the political alliance of two anticompliance candidates. The ICC’s indictments had the greatest effect on support for the most prominent indicted candidate in regions of Kenya where pro- and anti-indictment forces were balanced. Features of domestic political contests are a key moderator of the effectiveness of international institutions.