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CORRUPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY: THE CASE OF BANGLADESH THE CASE OF BANGLADESH.”

: This paper highlights the view that corruption can be combated if institutional integrity can be put into practice, i.e. ‘institutional integrity’ has been considered as a key strategy to curb corruption. Based on literature review, the authors explain argument in three sections: in the first section, the article focuses on conceptualization of corruption, corruption & institutional integrity. In the second section, the article examines integrity-governance-corruption nexus in Bangladesh. Finally, it outlines initiatives of Government of Bangladesh (GoB) for curbing corruption with concluding remark .


Introduction
Corruption is a global problem and found almost in all countries of the world in varying degrees (World Bank, 1997; Pope, 2000; Saha, 2014; Transparency International Bangladesh Half Yearly Report, 2016). It undermines development because it lowers the ability of government to enact and implement policies in an appropriate manner (World Bank, 1997; Saha, 2014). Corruption prevents the rule of law, democracy, realization of human rights and citizen's access to basic public services and discourages foreign investment and impedes the effectiveness of aid (Saha, 2014). Corruption also affects the poor disproportionately since it directly increases the cost of essential public services targeted to the poor and indirectly reduces the prospect of poverty eradication (Todaro & Smith, 2003).
The search for effective methods of curbing corruption has provided a widely recognized idea that corruption is basically a problem of governance (Hellman et al., 2000). Since corruption has been viewed as a symptom of fundamental governance failure (Huther & Shah, 2000;Schacter & Shah, 2001;Shah & Schacter, 2004), combating corruption requires the establishment of good governance. A country cannot achieve sustained reduction in corruption without improving the quality of institutional governance. That is why, promotion of institutional governance and integrity should be considered as the key strategy to combat corruption.

Corruption
There is a well-developed literature on the definition and meaning of corruption, much of it arising from social anthropology which explores the nuances of bribery, nepotism, graft, extortion and so on, and reflects on the relationship between people and bureaucracies (Harrison, 2007;Aminuzzaman & Khair, 2017). The World Bank is aware of corruption in the private sector, although the bank is primarily concerned with corruption in the public sector. In spite of placing the public sector at the core of the definition of corruption, the bank is able enough to incorporate most of the forms of corruption it experiences because the bank primarily deals with government. Corruption in the public sector, particularly in developing countries, is a more serious problem than that of the private sector and creates burden on the private sector corruption (World Bank, 1997).
Corruption is not limited to bribery, but can assume a number of other forms such as extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, the use of speed money (money given to government officials for speeding up their consideration of a business matter falling within their jurisdiction), embezzlement etc. (Klitgaard, 1998). There are three broad forms of corruption: petty administrative or bureaucratic corruption, grand corruption and state capture/influence peddling. Petty corruption means isolated corrupt transactions by individual public officials who abuse their office; grand corruption occurs when vast amounts of public resources are devoured or abused by state officials usually members of the political or administrative elite and state capture/influence peddling takes place when actors of private sector operate in collusion with public officials or politicians for their mutual and private grain (Shah & Schacter, 2004). Corruption threatens the viability of democratic institutions and market economics. Corrupt environment allows resources to be diverted towards non-productive areas such as the police, the armed forces and other organs of social control and repression (Pope, 2000). Amaryta Sen cautions that a "high level of corruption can make public policies ineffective and can also draw investment and economic activities away from productive pursuits toward the towering rewards of underhanded activities" (Sen, 2000).

Corruption and Institutional Integrity: Exploring the Nexus
Integrity is derived from the Latin integer, meaning wholeness, completeness, conscientious coherence, or committed responsibility. Integrity can be defined as the quality of moral selfgovernance at the individual and collective levels (P. Werhane and R. Freeman, 1997). Integrity refers to: 1) moral conscientiousness and judgment between what is right and what is wrong; 2) moral commitment and character where individuals adhere to anchoring principles and readiness to act ethically; and 3) moral coherence and authenticity-based judgments, beliefs, expressions, and commitments based on reasoned principles (L. Paine, 1997). Integrity encompasses ethical behavior that adheres to the rule of law and includes aspects such as transparency, accountability and participation. Sometimes the term good governance is used in place of integrity, but the latter is more precise, indicating honesty and lack of corruption in government. Good governance refers not only to integrity, but also to efficient management of public resources and, for some commentators, to adequate public participation in decision-making (USAID, 2005).
It has now been established that there are strong relationships between governance, ethics, integrity and corruption, all of which are the product of a complex interplay of political, economic, social, and even psychological factors and forces (Laura Westra, 2000). Table-1 shows consequences of non-integrity. Lower coverage and/or quality of public service delivery Pain and costs associated with diseases and deaths Pollution or over-abstraction of sources Lower labor force productivity Lower investments in public services sector The National Integrity System in Bangladesh broadly consists of the following institutions: Parliament, Executive, Judiciary, Public Administration (bureaucracy), Local Government, Police (law enforcement agency), Comptroller and Auditor General (supreme audit institution), Election Commission, Anti-Corruption Commission, National Human Rights Commission, Information Commission, Political Parties, Civil Society, Media, and Business (TIB, 2014). The lack of political will has been a continuing stumbling block in the process of democratic and accountable governance in Bangladesh, there are other cross cutting issues that have a direct bearing on the current NIS which include weak oversight functions, insufficient resources, lack of incentives, dearth of technical and professional competence of concerned actors, politicization, nepotism, and corruption and an absence of exemplary punishment for corruption leading to a culture of impunity/denial. This is exacerbated by low awareness of citizens of their rights and inadequate access to information (Ibid). [136]

Corruption in Bangladesh: Issues and Experiences
Over the past few decades, Bangladesh has made remarkable progress in raising incomes, reducing poverty and improving social indicators.  Democracy is yet to be institutionalized in Bangladesh. Bangladesh was fated to experience autocratic rule owing to colonialism and military regime for a long time in the past and many of the country's corruption problems arose from earlier periods of non-democratic regime (World Bank, 1997). Political and administrative corruption is evident in Bangladesh during almost all political regimes after its independence (Khan, 2009). All the organs of government have become contaminated by corruption and state apparatuses have been used for personal and group benefits at the cost of citizens and the state. The public sector in Bangladesh lacks accountability and transparency; its decision making is mostly opaque. Corruption is endemic in the society and the civil service plays a vital role in keeping it up (Ibid). But it should be kept in mind that bureaucratic corruption does not exist in isolation and it reflects predominant behavioral modes and cultural mores in society and political leaders are also responsible for this because their corruption has a substantial demonstration effect throughout the public service (World Bank, 1997). Robert Klitgaard's following equation regarding corruption can be applied to depict rampant corruption in the public sector of Bangladesh: "C = M + D -A. Corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability" (Klitgaard, 1998 public officials (both elected leaders and bureaucrats) over goods and services and the discretion to use that power is large on the one side but accountability is weak on the other since the watchdog institutions such as the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Anti-Corruption Commission are not strong enough yet to fight against corruption which result in promotion of corruption and which is evident from the rampant corruption of the country (Khan, 2009; World Bank, 1997). Besides, the absence of the office of the Ombudsman is another encouraging factor for frustrating accountability. Since "power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely" (Pope, 2000), monopoly of power over goods and services needs to be circumscribed and discretion to use that power must be made clear and accountability and transparency must be enhanced by improving monitoring and ensuring access of the citizens to information (Klitgaard, 1998).
According to an estimation of the World Bank (2000), "If Bangladesh could reduce its corruption level to those prevailing in countries with highest reputation for honest dealing it could add between 2.1 and 2.9 percent to annual per capita GDP growth. This would contribute to a sustainable reduction in poverty" (quoted in Iftekharuzzaman, 2005   Transparency International Bangladesh's (TIB) National Household Survey 2015 revealed that 67.8% households became victims of corruption last year while some 58.1% had to pay bribe at an average of Taka 4,538. While the rate of corruption and harassment (67.8% versus 67.3%) in 2015 remained almost same in comparison to 2012, however, the households had to pay additional 1,500 crore taka compared to 2012. The most corrupt sectors identified in 2015 survey are: passport (77.7%), law enforcement agencies (74.6), education (Government and under MPO) (60.8%), BRTA (60.1%), land administration (53.4%) judicial services (48.2%), and Health (37.5%). The burden of corruption is higher on the low-income households compared to high-income households.

Anti-Corruption Initiatives by Government of Bangladesh (GoB)
Bangladesh has taken some concrete measures over the years that essentially demonstrate the Government's commitment to setting standards and undertaking the reform initiatives necessary for effectively promoting good governance and fighting corruption. The issue of the right to information had featured prominently in civil society advocacy, public discourse and media coverage for some time in Bangladesh. The concern was also highlighted by major political parties in their election campaigns. These various efforts finally led to the enactment of The Right to Information Act in 2009, pursuant to which the Information Commission was set up to receive, inquire into, and dispose of complaints relating to the right to information. Programme" (SPEMP) has been undertaken with the aim of building a more strategic and performance-oriented budget management process, and at the same time strengthening financial accountability across the expenditure management cycle.

Conclusion
A number of fundamental changes must be brought immediately to reduce deeply entrenched corruption in Bangladesh. Effective corruption control is certainly possible. Four mutually reinforcing drivers are indispensable. First is the political will at all levels, not only on paper but in practice without fear or favor. Second, the corrupt must be brought to justice ensuring equality of all before law irrespective of the identity and status of the person. Third, the institutions of the NIS must be transparent, efficient, accountable and effective, both individually and collectively. Fourth, conducive environment must be created for people at large, particularly media, civil society, and NGOs to raise and strengthen the demand for accountability and against corruption (Iftekharuzzaman, 2017).