{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.012057272042200452, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.234741784037559, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Applying the Analogies: Permission and Risk; Benefit Production and Harm Avoidance

Using an ethical framework constructed out of the two variables of whether an agent causes, permits, or risks horrendous evils, and whether she does so in order to bestow pure benefit or in order to avert greater harm, some of the major theodicies in contemporary philosophy of religion are categorized. This chapter identifies theodicies that depict God as permitting horrendous evil for pure benefit, risking horrendous evil for pure benefit, and permitting horrendous evil for the aversion of greater harm. Each theodicy is summarized and an evaluation is made as to whether it is structurally promising with respect to horrendous evils, where structural promise denotes that God is ethically in the clear on the assumption that the explanatory story told by the theodicy is true. The conclusion drawn is that the theodicies depicting God as permitting horrendous evils for pure benefit are structurally deficient; they do not depict God as ethically perfect even if they are true. Structural promise is identified in theodicies that depict God as risking horrendous evil for pure benefit and permitting horrendous evil for the aversion of harm. In the next chapter the plausibility of these structurally promising approaches is considered.