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Sobre el derecho constitucional y su fundamentos (tercera parte). El constitucionalismo de los derechos e interpretación de la Constitución

In a paper published shortly after the conclusion of the Nuremberg trial, Herbert Wechsler completed his analysis of the decisions taken there, challenging the argument that the Allied Tribunal had administered victorious justice and was therefore partial and imbued with a desire for political revenge. For the author of the theory of "neutral principles" in the interpretation of Constitutional Law, the Nuremberg trial, to an even greater extent than the San Francisco Charter, had represented, on the contrary, the solemn assumption of an obligation: that of building a just system of law, applicable to all and with institutions strong enough to carry it out. If we succeed in this great task," Wechsler concluded, "and no nation can do this alone, Nuremberg will go down in history as the cornerstone of the house of peace. But if we fail, we will have to hear, from the mouth of devastated Germany, that the Nuremberg trial has been a second diktat like that of Versailles. And I fear - I added - that, despite the goodness of our intentions, we will have been left without an answer.