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Introspection and Mindreading as Mental Simulation

Introspection and Mindreading as Mental Simulation Paul Bello (paul.bello@navy.mil) Office of Naval Research, 875 N. Randolph St. Arlington, VA 22203 USA Marcello Guarini (mguarini@uwindsor.ca) University of Windsor, Dept. of Philosophy, 401 Sunset. Windsor, Ontario Canada N9B 3P4 Abstract Introspection: Phenomenology We present a sketch of a computational account of the relationship between certain aspects of introspection with aspects of third-person ascription of mental states (mindreading). The theory we propose is developed in large part as a reaction to what we perceive to be a lack of precision in the literature and a lack of experimental techniques to properly inform the debate on the relationship between 1 st and 3 rd -person ascription. We first discuss the set of phenomenology associated with self-ascriptions and other- ascriptions before briefly mentioning patterns of deficits associated with each. We sketch the very beginnings of a theory of mindreading in both the 1 st and 3 rd person within a computational cognitive architecture having mental simulation as one of its core operations. The theory we develop provides computationally-grounded explanations that are compatible with both clinical data and the phenomenology of 1 st -person attribution. Keywords: Mental Simulation; Cognitive Architecture; Metacognition; Mindreading; Philosophy of Mind. Introspection and Mindreading The ability to predict and explain behavior, both self- and other-generated, is a defining feature of human intelligence and a crucial phenomenon to be accounted for at the process-level; especially for those of us interested in computational theories of cognitive architecture. One of the major constituents of this ability takes the form of being able to ascribe mental states in service of behavior prediction and/or explanation. We will refer to mental state ascription more colloquially as “mindreading.” Typically, mindreading is mentioned as being related to predicting and explaining the behavior of others, but what of our ability to report on our own mental lives? This ability is generally termed introspection, and one important scientific task will be to clarify its relationship (or lack thereof) to mindreading. After presenting some of the generally agreed-upon phenomenological features of introspection, we briefly summarize the theoretical options for the mindreading- introspection relationship and some of their immediate entailments. Finally, we present our own account of their relationship in terms of a computational cognitive architecture capable of both 1 st and 3 rd -person ascription via mental simulation. Characterizing the nature of introspection has been one of the most active areas of epistemology and the philosophy of psychology. This being the case, many distinctions have been made in the process, as definitions of what it is to introspect become ever-more specialized. While some of these distinctions have arisen from a priori philosophical analysis, the advent of novel experimental procedures and the further development of neuroscience have added a substantial amount of data on introspection that is providing constraints on what our theories of self-ascription look like. Even with its many distinctions, there seem to be a few phenomenological features that all parties agree to be related to, if not constitutive of introspection (Schwitzgebel 2010). While there is a minority who believe that either we have no mental states like beliefs to introspect or that self- attributions are only unconscious, automatic processes of self-interpretation (Carruthers 2009); the majority of others agree that humans have a window on their mental lives. Most philosophical work in the area has been dedicated to clarifying the role, function, and features of introspection. Following the discussion in (Schwitzgebel 2010), what mostly seems to be agreed upon is that: 1. Introspection is about the mental/internal, and thus not about the non-mental/external. 2. Introspective judgments are accompanied by a strong sense of certainty, even stronger than judgments about other forms of sense data. 3. Introspective judgments are relatively direct in the sense that they occur directly without needing to be inferred from other supporting data, supporting a distinction between detecting versus reasoning about one’s mental states. 4. Introspection occurs in the “specious present,” comprised of a very short time period just before and just after the introspective act. 5. While effortful and non-automatic, introspective judgments about one’s own mental life seem easier to produce and less prone to subjective feelings of uncertainty than judgments about the mental lives of others. Whatever sort of theory we intend to develop ought to at least coarsely capture these features and preferably provide