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Johnson and European integration: A missed chance for transatlantic power

Focusing on the dilemmas connected to transatlantic relations and European integration in the Johnson years, this article argues, first, that Washington did not neglect the European situation in 1964–68, but a clear analysis of Allies' policies fostered growing doubts in some sectors of the administration about the wisdom of supporting them when they could directly damage the national interest of the US; and second, that though such changes help explain the general reassessment of American policies vis-à-vis Europe carried out by the Nixon administration, Johnson's policy remained pro-European and genuinely favourable to the integration process in the old continent, despite the internal doubts and the open criticism it encountered both at home and abroad.