{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.026915113871635612, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0027605244996549345, 'mean_word_length': 4.870445344129554, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Hannes Grandits, Nathalie Clayer, and Robert Pichler, eds. Conflicting Loyalties in the Balkans: The Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire and Nation-Building. London: I.B. Tauris, 2011

With a little generalization, one can claim that there are three major shortcomings in modern Balkan historiography: The first—part of a global problem—a tendency to swing between two extremes of socioeconomic and cultural bias by opting for either a class-based analysis or an identity-politics paradigm. The second failure can be described as a lack of synthesis between the achievements of the ever growing blocs of Ot toman studies and Balkan studies. While these two shortcomings can be observed both in the historiography of each country of the region and more generally in Western historiography, the third one is more often and clearly observed in the Turkish historiography on the history of a country, people or sub-region of the Balkans focusing only on the period under Ot toman rule. Territories (countries) tend to disappear in the historiography in the period after their separation ("independence") from the Ot toman Empire. This problem can be observed in the historiographies of the Balkan countries, on the other hand, as a lack of interest in the Ot toman Empire after the partition, even though the legacy of the Empire was so vital in those new nation states of the nineteenth-century that each of them can be regarded as a "mini-Ottoman state."