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The Independence Of The European Court Of Auditors

This article considers the independence of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) from a formal, legal perspective. It argues that the primary constitutional justification behind such independence is the ECA’s need to act on behalf of and defend the EU interest. The paper discusses several dimensions of independence, including the appointment process, the number of ECA Members, and independence in the ECA’s functions (both from the Member States and the EU institutions). Proposals for amendment of the existing legal framework are also explored, the most important being to put the European Parliament on an equal footing with the Council in the appointment process. Underlining that independence should not be conflated with inaccessibility, the ECA is invited to further improve its communication policy and disseminate its findings in a more effective way.