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Evolutionary game analysis of clean heating governance in rural areas of Northern China

The attainment of clean heating in the rural areas of northern China is of great significance for environmental governance and the realization of the dual carbon goal. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this study constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of the central government, local government, and farmers, introduces key parameters, such as the local government’s governance strength, central government’s inspection strength, and two levels of government subsidy strength, into the model, systematically deduces different possible strategy combinations of the three parties, and analyzes the possible scenarios and stability conditions of each scenario. Finally, the study numerically simulates each scenario and analyzes the influence of the key parameters on the strategies of the three parties. The study conclusions are as follows. 1) The system is optimized in Scenario 6 (1,1,0). 2) The strategy of the local government has a decisive influence on farmers, and the central government’s inspector strength has a weak effect on farmers. 3) The cost of clean heating over coal-fired heating has a significant effect on farm households but not on the two levels of government. 4) The low perception that farmers hold regarding the benefits of the indoor environment weakens the government’s subsidy effect. This study provides effective practical guidance and policy references for governments to promote clean heating in rural areas.