{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.02464332036316472, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.126984126984127, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Reconnoitering Combatant Moral Equality

Abstract
 This essay scouts the conception of combatant moral equality in the preceding papers by Dan Zupan and Jeff McMahan, and especially in the recent interchange between McMahan and Michael Walzer. With McMahan, I deride the idea that aggressor combatants have some moral right to kill, but, unlike him, I deride the idea of such a legal right. I accept only a presumption of blamelessness, and argue that Zupan actually agrees. Combatant moral equality, I argue, has import only for conscientious objection, and (contra McMahan and Walzer) not for our war conventions or just war theory. Walzer is criticized for over-emphasizing our collective responses to war conduct and slighting our personal, extra-political responses.