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The Bloc That Failed: Soviet-East European Relations in Transition Charles Gait Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990, pp. xiv, 226

defined the National Security Constitution as the public law governing the United States' national security decision-making. It includes the relevant portions of the US Constitution as construed by decisions of the US Supreme Court, legislative enactments and historical practice. Koh writes that the "National Security Constitution rests upon a simple notion: that the power to conduct American foreign policy is not exclusively presidential, but rather, a power shared by the president, the Congress, and the courts'' (4). While the label may be of recent vintage, Koh persuasively argues that balance among the three branches of government in the conduct of foreign relations was the explicit intention of the framers of the Constitution and has, accordingly, been the legitimate foundation of US foreign policy from the beginning. Koh regards those periods where policy has seemed to be the prerogative of the executive branch (in particular during the long reign of Franklin Roosevelt) as attributable to congressional acquiescence and/or judicial restraint or deference. Much of the argument for his constitutional design rests on the concurring opinion of Justice Robert Jackson in the 1952 Youngstown case (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer) where the President's authority was held to be at its height when executive action was pursuant to the wishes of Congress and at its weakest when presidential actions ran contrary to the expressed or implied will of Congress. The general and specific recommendations that Koh makes for omnibus legislation, congressional oversight and judicial review are manifold and laid out in meticulous detail. To some, the general reader for example, the extent of documentation—not far from one-third of the entire book—may seem excessive. But for the specialist or, indeed, for the congressman bent on reform, the evidence and the particulars will be most welcome. In sum, there is much to be considered and little to criticize in this informative and well-crafted exegesis. This is especially remarkable in that the book was published as a "fastback ." Yes, there are a few typos: what does "tionsess" mean (141)? The context does not suggest the intended meaning. And given his notoriety and the recency of his tenure, it is surprising to see Richard Nixon omitted from the list of people who "have gone on to win the presidency after serving as vice president" (304). Finally, there is a bit more repetition than really necessary, especially given the book's expected audience.