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Minimum-Service Requirements in Real Estate Brokerage: A Reply to Darryl W. Anderson

In my prior article, I described the advocacy efforts by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice in opposing minimum-service requirements for real estate brokers. These requirements force consumers to choose between purchasing a larger bundle of real estate brokerage services than they would otherwise desire, or forgoing the help of a real estate agent altogether. Anderson responded that, rather than limiting consumer choice and restricting competition, minimum-service requirements are procompetitive because “they solve the asymmetric information problem that is otherwise exacerbated by [limited-service brokers (LSBs)].” He posits that without such restrictions, a consumer who hires an LSB is vulnerable to harm from “lock-in.” Once a consumer has entered into an exclusive agency agreement with an LSB, she effectively is locked-into that broker to purchase all additional brokerage services that she may subsequently decide she needs. He states that, “the exclusive services agreement makes the LSB a monopoly brokerage provider to the particular customer, and she is subject to monopoly pricing if she seeks to purchase additional brokerage services after she had already entered into the limited-service agreement and signed the exclusive agency agreement.”