{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.01833976833976834, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.209580838323354, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
ABOUT ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN ECONOMIC MODELS

The informational structure, which subsists in a game run, receives specific connotations when particular contexts are analyzed, not only the theoretic ones. Under risk, the distorted perception of a situation, by the decision makers who are loss averters or by those who care about their image, is present especially in the case of probabilities having values close to extremes (low odds or high odds). For instance, the children or teenagers often take risky actions only as a challenge, in order to prove that they are not afraid. The concern for reputation could explain a wide range of behavioral anomalies. When skill shakes hands with chance, the success or failure changes the informational structure related to the decision maker’s behavioral endowment. Resuming the main economic models of asymmetric information within a risky context is one of our goals. The second objective consists in reviewing some specific problems regarding the computer implementation of these models.