{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.024114319738017267, 'fraction_numerical': 0.009824352485858886, 'mean_word_length': 5.210720887245841, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 1, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Propaganda in the digital age

Media revelations about the alleged use of social media networks by the Russian government for influencing the presidential elections in the United States in 2016 or, more broadly, for disrupting electoral processes in Europe have noticeably shifted the public and academic discourse towards discussing and investigating the “dark side” of the digital diplomacy. The optimism from the early days of the “Arab Spring” about digital platforms empowering the powerless, has given way to the pessimism induced by the proliferation of the echo-chambers of hate and the rise of post-truth politics. It is therefore important to take stock of these developments and ask ourselves what exactly we know about digital propaganda, what we do not know, and what should we know so that we can contain, if not prevent, its disruptive effects? What we know? To begin with, what we positively know by now is that state-sponsored propaganda has exploded with the rise of social media and the numbers are staggering. For example, according to the congressional testimony of Facebook, Google and Twitter representatives, more than 150 million people were likely exposed to the Russian disinformation campaign prior to the 2016 presidential election. To put it into context, only 20.7 million people watched the evening news broadcasts of ABC, CBS, NBC and Fox stations in 2016 (Lang, 2017). We also know that the classical understanding of propaganda as the “management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols” (Lasswell, 1927, p. 627) still stands. What has changed is the way this manipulation takes place as the digital medium comes with its own intrinsic features. Algorithmic dissemination of content and the circumvention of traditional media filters and opinion-formation gatekeepers, make disinformation spread faster, reach deeper, be more emotionally charged, and most importantly, be more resilient due to the confirmation bias that online echo-chambers enable and reinforce. Finally, we know not only what and how, but also why digital propaganda has become such a phenomenon. From a broader geopolitical perspective, digital propaganda, as the “Gerasimov Doctrine” points out, is an effective non-military means for achieving political and strategic goals, in a way that exceeds the power of force of weapons (cited in MacFarquhar, 2016). In other words, the weaponization of information via digital propaganda has come to be seen by some states as the optimal instrument for correcting power asymmetries in their global standing. What we don’t know? Intriguingly, despite the explosion of channels, botnets and content involved in digital disinformation, what we do not firmly know, is whether digital propaganda is actually successful. Certainly, the promotion of echo-chambers of hate and the online escalation of political polarization are tangible effects of digital propaganda, which cannot be ignored. What is more difficult to assess is the nature of the impact these digital effects has on the opinion and behaviour of the people exposed to them. For example, studies have shown that junk news “outperformed” real news on social media in certain states during the United States presidential elections, and the proportion of professional news content being shared hit its lowest point the day before