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A Japanese perspective on missile defense and strategic coordination

In his May 1, 2001 address at the U.S. National Defense University, U.S. President George W. Bush called for a “new framework” of international security, based on a concept of deterrence that relies on both offensive and defensive forces.1 In subsequent months, the new framework would be implemented through increased U.S. investment in ballistic missile defenses (BMD); the signing, on May 24, 2002, of the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, also known as the Treaty of Moscow); and the U.S. withdrawal, on June 16, 2002, from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The new approach to deterrence outlined in President Bush’s speech also opened the possibility that strategic adjustments might follow in the Japan-U.S. alliance. Specifically, the Bush administration’s shift to an integrated approach to BMD that combined National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense (TMD) will likely pose new political, strategic, and technological challenges to alliance relations.