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Using Systems Theory to Address Complex Challenges to International Spent Nuclear Fuel Transportation

Simply looking at a world map suggests new, more complex set of risks and threats will challenge successful international spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation operations. Whether related to multimodal transfers of SNF casks or inconsistency in multijurisdictional control measures, international SNF transportation represents a clear example of new threats and risk stemming from a multifaceted, globalized operating environment. In response to recent work out of Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) suggesting that new, system‐theoretic analysis techniques better ensure safe, secure and safeguarded international transportation of SNF, this paper explores the ability of basic systems theory concepts—interdependence, hierarchy and emergence—to better understand and address these complexities in system analysis.