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The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime

At the close of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the US has demonstrated that even though it can easily achieve military victory in war, winning the peace has been more difficult although it is just as important. When the US Army’s Third Infantry Division reached downtown Baghdad on April 9, 2003, cheerful crowds inundated the streets, looted stores, ransacked government buildings, and plundered residences of officials of Saddam Hussein’s regime. With no Iraqi police to maintain law and order and with US military forces standing by and watching the celebratory chaos was replaced by armed gangs and organized criminal groups that continued to dismantle shopping centers and public institutions of anything of value, including the National Museum of Antiquities, where irreplaceable ancient collections were stolen, and the wards of Baghdad’s hospitals, where mobs removed patients from their beds and carried off vital medical equipment that was in use to treat the wounded. The 17,000 soldiers from the Third Infantry, a mechanized division with tank crews neither equipped nor trained to conduct foot patrols to police an urban environment, had orders not to intervene because looting was not viewed as a military threat. Crime and lack of security thus became the primary concerns of most Iraqi citizens. Things might have gone differently. Retired US Army General Jay Garner and the staff of the Pentagon’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs, who were responsible for planning and managing the post-conflict phase of operations, recommended prior to the intervention a coalition of US-led international constabulary and police forces to help reestablish the rule of law; however, the Bush White House and Department of Defense officials rejected this suggestion, instead repeating the assumption that Americans would be welcomed with flowers and candy. Lessons that should have been learned from both the failures and the successes concerning policing in previous US military interventions went unheeded. This important book by two seasoned and respected criminal justice experts, David H. Bayley and Robert M. Perito, should provide practical guidance about the role of police for politicians, military commanders, and operational decision-makers charged with securing the peace in the immediate aftermath of future military interventions. Although not a book on military ethics as such, its proposal for a form of policing that both protects and earns the support of local populations is congruent, I think, with recent attention being given by just-war theorists to jus post bellum criteria and commitments. Moreover, while Bayley and Perito do not articulate an explicit moral theory, they offer a policing model they call it core policing, and I would associate it with what has been named by others, myself included, just policing that they regard as consistent with the values of human rights and democracy, along with clear rules governing and limiting the use of force. ‘In order for governments to gain public support,’ they write, ‘the responsibility for security should be entrusted as much as possible to police deployed among the