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Knowledge and Evidence

This is an ambitious and frustrating book. Among the many virtues which Moser claims for it are all of the following: (a) it answers the need to counteract certain “epistemologically harmful muddles with careful distinctions and arguments” (p. 2); (b) it provides the reader with a “forceful” reply to both justification scepticism and knowledge scepticism and argues that both can be “effectively challenged, if not refuted” (p. 3); (c) it “solves” the Gettier problem (p. 233); and (d) it not only removes the “normative mystery” from epistemic concepts such as knowledge and justification, but provides a meta-justification which will allow us, the readers, to see why the theoretical account offered in its pages is preferable to its competitors (p. 2–3). It is worth mentioning that the competitors over whom Moser claims his theory has a “dialectical edge” (p. 3) include accounts authored by Chisholm, Lehrer, Goldman, Alston, Bonjour, Rorty, Foley and Stroud. As I said, this is an ambitious book.