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A Framework for Modeling and Structural Vulnerability Analysis of Spatial Cyber-Physical Power Systems From an Attack–Defense Perspective

This article provides a framework for modeling and analysis of spatial cyber-physical power systems (CPPSs). Previous studies on structural vulnerability analysis of CPPS mainly focused on network topology without any spatial information. In this article, we first propose a hierarchical information system evolution model for spatial power grids. Then, a spatial CPPS model is established by combining power and information systems that accounts for overlapped power and information lines. Finally, the structural vulnerability under global and localized failures is investigated based on direct current (dc) power flow. Under global failures, different types of components have distinguishing effects, and the power-node failure is the most serious case. For localized failures, key zones can be identified by the cascading failure scale, and similarly, different failure modes affect different areas. Furthermore, considering power system scenarios with only defenders and those with both attackers and defenders, we investigate two resource allocation situations. For defenders, increased resources and appropriately dispersed allocation can work effectively. However, in the attack–defense scenario, the perfect subgame equilibrium suggests that both attackers and defenders must concentrate all their resources on the most vulnerable zone. These findings may establish a foundation for future efforts to model and protect spatial CPPSs.