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Post-Westgate SWAT : C4ISTAR Architectural Framework for Autonomous Network Integrated Multifaceted Warfighting Solutions Version 1.0 : A Peer-Reviewed Monograph

Police SWAT teams and Military Special Forces face mounting pressure and challenges from adversaries that can only be resolved by way of ever more sophisticated inputs into tactical operations. Lethal Autonomy provides constrained military/security forces with a viable option, but only if implementation has got proper empirically supported foundations. Autonomous weapon systems can be designed and developed to conduct ground, air and naval operations. This monograph offers some insights into the challenges of developing legal, reliable and ethical forms of autonomous weapons, that address the gap between Police or Law Enforcement and Military operations that is growing exponentially small. National adversaries are today in many instances hybrid threats, that manifest criminal and military traits, these often require deployment of hybrid-capability autonomous weapons imbued with the capability to taken on both Military and/or Security objectives. The Westgate Terrorist Attack of 21st September 2013 in the Westlands suburb of Nairobi, Kenya is a very clear manifestation of the hybrid combat scenario that required military response and police investigations against a fighting cell of the Somalia based globally networked Al Shabaab terrorist group.


Introduction
An autonomous weapon may be mobile or stationary, it is distinguished from manned weapon system types by way of preloaded heuristics to undertake its C4ISTAR(Command, Communications, Control, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) and target interdiction functions.
Preloaded heuristics in an autonomous weapon system is designed to process data-streams from its sensors and to output a data-stream that induces a physical response in its actuators, that interact with the operational environment ( Figure A -Appendix A: The Exploratory Study). Automated control systems architecture must specify the sensitivity of its sensors, the nature and data-stream from its sensors and the desired possible actuated response ranges.
Inevitably there are many forms of electronic/electrical "noise", that are found on a system and prevent its perfect functioning. These errors are minimized or eliminated by way of processing of control system feedback, thereby ensuring that original control objectives are obtained. Alternatively filter systems remove the disturbances that are electrical/electronic "noise" from a circuit.
Of greatest concern to a weapon systems engineer are exceptional interference to control objectives as a result of : 1. hardware malfunctions 2. computational errors 3. inadequacies in pre-loaded heuristics 4. jamming by a third party 5. hacking or any for of subversive control In this monograph the automated control and information systems described are of tactical types for military/security operations. They are robots of many different forms and functions in warfighting, that are challenged by way of dynamic and hostile environments, in addition to exceptional unforeseen occurrences Norms, exceptions, instability and environmental parameters are obtained by sensors and channeled as data-streams to an automated controlling system that bears the relevant pre-loaded heuristics.
The desired characteristics of feedback or incoming data-streams from sensors: 1. minimum sensitivity that is representative of signal signatures of the operational environment 2. data channels should have sufficient bandwidth/capacity to allow for realization of high fidelity datastreams. 3. Noise must be filtered out of the data-streams wherever and whenever possible 4. Sensors should be specified and developed with the intention of error reduction Actuators of mechanical types should have degrees of mechanical freedom that are sufficient for reaction to signal datastreams. Some factors considered are: 1. Can the actuators ensure that an autonomous vehicle/robot/device moves to a desired position and in the desired direction?
2. Does the automated system have projectiles, missiles, devices that could be launched in various missions? How far would such projectiles or vehicles travel from the mother-ship? With what accuracy would they execute mission parameters? Are these dependent vehicles also autonomous or are they dependent on the mother-ship for guidance and/or control?

3.
How powerful are the actuators in implementation of control decisions? Are they robust or unstable?

4.
What are the energy consumption levels of actuators and a whole autonomous device? Significantly low energy consumption rate translates to lower battery or fuel consumption hence a lighter design.

Background
An important consideration in the design, development and fielding of autonomous weapons, is their anticipated missions.
These missions are based upon threat modeling and threat characterization the scope of which could include ground, air and/or naval operational environments. For example on the ground environment the anticipated threat could be those such as armed humans or main battle tanks, while in naval operational environment a submersible vehicle/robot may have a specific purpose, e.g. disarming of naval mines. Some autonomous systems could be wholly expendable when they engage a target, while others may be designed in such a way that they track and engage several targets simultaneously before returning to the base.
The focus of the resultant architectural framework is to conceptualize the ways and means for maximizing the desired performance of an autonomous weapon within a wider C4ISTAR set-up. It shall enable the nodes that are autonomous agents to tap into resources of the wider network, while at the same time contributing to the overall situational awareness and actualization of the desired goals in tactical security/military operations.

Contemporary Perspectives on Lethal Autonomy
Autonomous lethal weapons may be categorized into three groups: Group (1) : Those that are dependent upon the absence of friendly forces or neutral elements in an area of operations if an attack is to succeed.
Group (2) : Those that are dependent upon identification of friend or foe systems borne by elements in a battle-space or area of operations Group (3) : Those that have humanitarian algorithms and machine learning hence the ability to respond to unforeseen contingencies in the battle-space thereby preserving/protecting friendly or neutral elements in the battle-space.
With these designs there are additional specifications that are borne by a lethal autonomous weapon to assist its owners in obtaining its tactical objectives, e.g.: 1. Autonomous nodes that act in conjunction with other autonomous weapons 2. Effective and robust navigation systems that are equipped with varying levels of redundancies 3. Centralized command centers monitoring various fielded autonomous weapons 4. Autonomous systems that provide commanders with broad-spectrum situational awareness 5. Autonomous systems that can act in collaboration with other autonomous weapons and/or fielded forces 6. Autonomous weapons that have concise awareness of their tactical objectives and the evolving operations area 7. Autonomous weapons that can survive attempted seizure or destruction by adversaries Given the network integrated nature of many autonomous systems, there is always the risk that cyberwarfare shall be the ways and means of subverting [3] many such weapons, especially if they are dependent upon an open or easily accessible communication medium. This perception by system designers is the basis of what may be known as an ISOLATION POLICY.

THE TENETS OF ISOLATION POLICIES
Threats of cybercrime and cyberwarfare [4] must be considered when designing the data-links of autonomous weapon systems to command centres, these are: Rule 1 : Autonomous warfighting robots shall not have provisioning for interactive remote use, resetting or control from mainstream networks, communication media or communication protocols Rule 2 : Feedback data-streams from autonomous warfighting robots shall be only one way type from the robot/weapon to the Command Centers.

Rule 3 :
Encryption of all feedback to command centres from autonomous robots shall be by way of predetermined onetime key sets for digital encryption. Isolation policies ensure that military/security forces that use autonomous warfighting robots, isolate them in a technically sufficient way to reduce or eliminate their dependence of publicly accessible communication networks. The embrace of "isolation" in autonomous warfighting robot networks, may contradict developmental objectives of certain open architectural frameworks in the long run. However they offer some level of assurance that the reliability of critical Page 9 of 52 autonomous robot warfighting networks shall not be compromised by way of a cyberattack from an adversary [5].
Remote controlled weapons were used by Germans in World War I when remote controlled electrical motor boats were deployed for littoral area C4ISTAR duties [6]. These were not autonomous weapons, notably the challenge of use autonomous weapon system comes about primarily when the systems are deployed without 'a human in the loop' -this introduces the perception of moral disengagement of the combatants (who can be the user, the buyer, programmers, analysts, commanders, etc.). To this extent some schools of thought propose that such systems only be utilized for defensive purposes.
There are many International Humanitarian Law rules [7] such as the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions, Rome Statutes, Responsibility to Protect, etc. many of these apply readily in the domain of automated warfighting. The underlying humanitarian concepts therein are: 1. Target identification and discrimination before an attack is carried out 2. Use of military force that is proportional to the threat that is posed by an adversary 3. Ability to abort an attack when target status changes, e.g. a surrender 4. Avoidance of mistreating the wounded Given the detailed demands of International Humanitarian Law, an autonomous warfighting agent must not only perceive its environment but also detect, designate and track potential targets therein. It must have a way of establishing if it is necessary to engage the target with its weapons. Perception of a target does not only involve physical identification, it also includes determination as to whether the potential target in question is a friend, foe or neutral.
Missions undertaken with use of autonomous warfighting agents may be viable if it is equipped with a wide range of sensors, such as: millimetre wave radars, thermal imaging, acoustic signature detection, seismic sensors, olfactory sensors, etc. The process of targeting would take the following stages: With such a technique improvements could be rendered by unmanned aerial vehicles communicating with unmanned ground vehicles, using techniques such as quantum optronics to further codify projector messages, to geo-specific projection areas while at the same time minimizing problems such as projection area boundary region data corruption.
The scope and applicability of autonomy in warfare is broad, its applications are multifaceted, and there is an "astronomically" big potential for innovation.

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Chapter Two

The Architectural Framework
Architectural Frameworks [9] in the domain of military/security, ensures that weapon systems obtained(by way of design and development or purchase) meet and/or supersede the specified mission requirements. Weapon systems are too important to be procured by way of hunches, intuition and impulse, and the consequences of their malfunction and under performance has a detrimental effect on their user's national sovereignty. It is prudent to obtain empirically justifiable reasons to back any weapon systems procurement decision.
Mission requirements for a weapon system include concepts such as: logistical support, reliability, durability, survivability, interoperability, etc. Architectural frameworks allow for comprehensive evaluation of weapon system performance and make all components and aspects borne on such systems easy to subject to an audit/evaluation in the event of an accident, malfunction, or under performance.
Frameworks enable an establishment to compare and qualify systems offered by different suppliers in response to a particular mission requirement. Over the systems service lifespan, Architectural Frameworks could be re-stated to facilitate for the implementation of upgrades, retrofits and maintenance, ensuring that the system in question remains relevant/compatible with ever changing mission requirements.

Threat Characterization
Weapons are tools specifically for neutralizing threats of aggression against our beings or interests. The likelihood of vulnerabilities being actualized by threats is known as the risk. Many states today find themselves confronted by hybrid threats [10] that deploy regular(conventional) warfare methods in addition to irregular(terrorism, crime, asymmetric, illicit trade, etc.) methods. This implies that to confront an adversary of the hybrid nature, a state must deploy both military means and policing/law enforcement methods -this increases the complexity of autonomous lethal weapon development due that the fact that there is not only the requirement of compliance with military law and battle-spaces but an additional requirement for compliance with criminal law and an appreciation of day to day social norms.
A prominent example of a hybrid threat in the region of the Horn of Africa is the Al Shabaab Movement based in Somalia.
Other international examples of hybrid threats include the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, etc.
Some of the issues that create the felt need for lethal autonomous weapons are: 1. The calculation that experienced warfighters are not worth exposing to the risk of death in the hands of less experienced persons in the course of military/security operations 2. Awkward position of responding forces in a battle-space in cases where an adversary initiates hostile actions 3. Greater propensity of commanders to accept risk exposure of autonomous lethal weapons that are searching and securing a building hence the likelihood to end a siege/hostage situation much faster than a human-fighter 4. An autonomous weapon system can acquire, retain and exploit total knowledge of a battle-space layout Even with the above listed tactical advantages there are the challenges such as: 1. Non-combatant identification 2. The ability of autonomous robots to rescue hostages, e.g. to carry away children from a hostile environment, win the confidence of victims, handle infants, give first aid to injured persons, and remove injured persons from hostile environments 3. Autonomous conduct of hybrid human and autonomous robot tactical operations 4. Energy issues : battery/generator types, fuel and/or battery energy densities, etc.

Mean Time Between Failures
Threats are not only perceived by an autonomous system, they are borne and created by the same. Intrinsic threats are the most difficult to handle as they are not detectable by the autonomous platform in most cases. Extrinsic threats may be characterized in the following fashion: 1. Frequency of their effective projection and execution by an adversary 2. Consequences of their execution e.g. fatality, lethality, incapacitation, etc.
3. Distance from which they can be projected and executed to achieve an adversary's operational goals 4. Ready availability/existence of the threatening entity 5. Vulnerabilities of the threatened 6. Ability of a threatening entity to impair critical functioning of targeted entities 7. Survivability of a threatening entity, its ability to use counter-measures against attack or to evade attacks 8. Level of sophisticated reasoning and planning borne by a threatening entity For entities engaging in irregular warfare such as terrorists [11] there are many more factors to be consider by the programmers of lethal autonomous weapons that operate against them. Some of the issue to be considered are: 1. Ability of an organization to carry out its activities in multifaceted environment(eg. Air, ground and sea) 2. Mental and doctrinal inclination of combatants 3. Ability of a threatening entity to implement an unanticipated and extraordinary conversion of an apparently 'innocent' item to a lethal weapon, e.g. the use of civil airliner as missiles in the 9/11 attacks in New York 4. Organization structure and discipline or the lack of the same Page 13 of 52 5. Profile of targets and victims who are attacked or terrorized Even with all their characteristics threats do not just occur at random, they are developed and actualized by persons who have specific knowledge, intention and resources. These are persons who are of interest to developers of lethal autonomous weapons, as they may constitute a hybrid threat aspect that demands for computer algorithms and machine learning capabilities for irregular warfare.

Systems Architecture Framework
Information Systems including those that are at the centre of autonomous lethal weapons must comply to Local and International Legal requirements. There may be an exception to this requirement as pertains to Information Systems controlling lethal autonomous weapons, that are owned or used by Intelligence Agencies which have quasi-criminal organizations and are only loyal to their paymasters. There are many detailed expert opinions on issues pertaining to International Humanitarian Law, Information Systems and lethal autonomous weapon. Schmitt [12] gives a perspectives that has now become widely accepted within the ranks of the United States of America Armed Services. It lays out details of characteristics, requirements and consequences of lethal autonomous weapons and their controlling systems.
The pursuit of "smart" systems in warfare is not unlimited but constrained, in the recommendations of McCullough et al [13] on Strategic and Leadership Recommendations there is the strong opinion that "strong artificial intelligence" should not be deployed on unmanned systems to the extent that resultant weapon systems can learn of their own tactical decisions and make completely independent final decisions without any pre-loaded constraining heuristics. This view is rendered to the effect that "strong artificial intelligence" would result in completely autonomous and unpredictable weapon systems and situation that cannot be allowed to occur by any responsible Commander.
Lin, P, et al [14] was an early attempt to specify without codifying the algorithms, heuristics and/or modules that should be borne by a well-engineered information system that is at the core of any wholesome lethal autonomous weapons system. Upon review the key process identified in the document may be laid out in a flow-type diagram, as in Figure 1 on the next page.

Figure 1 : Key Processes in a Generic Autonomous Lethal Weapon System (Intuitively Labeled)
The higher the frequency that a lethal autonomous agent can go through the processes in Figure 1, starting with its world view -the faster its execution of its "Observe, Orient, Detect and Actions" Loop. A faster OODA loop implies that a system is more effective when fielded against to similar system but with a lower OODA loop frequency rate while performing the processes laid out on the flow chart.
Another important parameter would be the size of the "world view" of the information system, how much relevant information does it have? Lack of sufficient "world view" dimensions would render the usage of the system to very limited situations, while too expansive a "world view" would imply that a system has been implemented using "strong artificial intelligence" and is able to independently set out its tactical objectives obtain them and determine its own mission parameters. Complete autonomy of the "strong artificial intelligence" kind is undesired in the realm of International Humanitarian Law for reasons that systems of such nature would be unpredictable and potentially lethal or damaging to the owning military force.

Assessment of executed tactical objectives
Systems development reviews are important in the course of implementation of a Systems Architecture, they guarantee that an autonomous agent shall be tested and realistically calibrated in an operational environment that is similar if not the same as that of its eventual deployment. Compliance with International Humanitarian Law in systems heuristics is also improved and secured by pre-deployment systems reviews.
Additional codification efforts should be undertaken in the domain of the autonomous robots' perception. Their "world view" must not only be extensive but also fine grained and intensive. The robots must: 1. Recognize human beings There is a possibility that a lethal autonomous system that has "weak artificial intelligence" could develop "strong artificial intelligence" on its own accord if it is endowed with sufficient Genetic Algorithm Mechanisms and Machine Learning Capabilities. In this regard a system that is fairly predictable and well tuned to adhere to the tenets of International Humanitarian Law may become self "willed" and unpredictable in the long run. To prevent the possibility of self-evolving rogue autonomous lethal weapons, a requirement must specify the use of fixed/robust algorithm rule sets in addition to machine learning technologies on a platform. All said and done there are some common military concepts that are not easy to codify into an information system e.g. acknowledgment of commanding authority, proportionality in combat -avoiding overkill, and justification of missions.
Schmitt and Thurnher [12] demonstrates that the legitimacy of military technologies from the perspective of International Humanitarian Law is based upon the prevailing technologies and their availability at the time being considered. Technology that may be discriminate and proportionate today may very well be considered to be an indiscriminate overkill in the future.
To ensure compliance with International Humanitarian Law autonomous lethal weapon system require continuous legal reviews before manufacturing, during manufacturing, during use and during maintenance. Without effective legal reviews a simple software upgrade in control heuristics of a lethal autonomous weapon could very easily result in a completely or partially illegal autonomous control system. A Command Center inevitably brings about the issue of the data-links that enable it to control and co-ordinate various field entities. The specification frameworks for such data-links is laid out on the Technical Architecture section of this monograph.
Data-link requirements are laid out on the basis of available technologies and System Architecture, the key considerations are that the data-links must facilitate transfer of generated information from the lethal autonomous robot to the Command Centre. Information required by commanders and generated by a weapon would include navigation, targeting, rate of consumption of on-board resources, malfunctions, sensor data-streams, etc. Given the probable likelihood of Information Overload at a Command Centre, "strong artificial intelligence" may assist commanders in fully exploiting what may be difficult to discern and high tempo information -these are likely to be "wasted" if left for handling by way of unaided human capabilities.

Page 17 of 52 2.3 Technical Architecture Framework
A wide range of standards and conventions ought to be actualized if truly lethal autonomous weapons are to be realized.
There would be the initial hardware platform and software environment issues, these would be at the core of the system. An autonomous lethal system would be required to address a certain level of Problem Complexity -depending on the technology available for on-board computing, this would have a direct impact on the weight, dimensions, functionality, and size of the weapon in question. Some basic technical modules on-board a lethal autonomous weapon would be: There are however great limitations on the ability of many anticipated lethal autonomous weapons to carry on-board the requisite computational power that would allow for the resolution of exponential time computational difficulty type problems within desired time ranges. These functions would inevitably be resolved by computation power that would be resident at a Command Centre, this technical challenge adds to the burden of developing a secure and tamper proof datalink to facilitate full and proper functioning of a lethal autonomous weapon that utilizes off-board computational power in some cases.
There shall never be sufficient computational power on-board a lethal autonomous weapon and the temptation to source for more computation power externally shall create both technical and information security challenges for systems architects.
Relative to advances in the scientific world even if all the computational power in the world today could be compressed onto an on-board platform of some military robot, by the time that such an advance became possible, there would be even more external computational power available for lethal autonomous weapons.

Page 18 of 52 Figure 2 : Key Technical Standards required in a Generic Autonomous Lethal Weapon System
Feedback Signals Actuation Signals Mother-ship Layers : Layers 1 to 6 are found within the primary device/vehicle that is why they are classified as the "Mother-ship" Layers. Layer 7 is the "Force field" layer it comprises of radio-frequencies, audio sonar signals, lasers, gases, liquids and/or substances, that are projected into the Operational Environment by the Mother-ship and are used to make measurements/detections of various kinds. The final layer comprises of sub-ordinate vehicles or devices that are borne by the Mother-ship and deployed in the operational environment outside the Mother-ship and are manipulated, control or communicated with via the active Force field layer. Sub-ordinate vehicles/devices may be a swarm that works in synchronized fashion via artificial intelligence or a collection of vehicles/devices that work in tandem as a signal relay.
An example of operations conducted by sub-ordinate vehicles/devices would be an unmanned aerial vehicle dropping small crawling robots on to the ground for target verification and assessment. Given that some of the target may be inside buildings, the crawling robots may position themselves such that some go into the building and some remain outside the building as signal relays. Once inside the building a crawling robot would take a photo, DNA sample, etc. and send the results via a signal relay of other crawling robots to the Mother-ship that is an unmanned air vehicle. There is no limit to this concept as a sub-ordinate vehicle/device could also be a Mother-ship to other sub-ordinate vehicles/devices. The selection of data-links for these multifaceted operations would depend of factors such as energy densities of battery technologies, prevention of jamming and interference, etc.

Functions of the Layers:
Layer 1 : Tactical objectives the desired outcomes issued to an autonomous lethal weapon by its owners/users Some level of independent decision making is expected from an autonomous lethal weapon, this implies that an adversary must develop a specific attack type if the autonomous lethal weapon system is to be subverted. These specific attack types are directed at specific layers of the system, hence a requirement that specific layers must have specific in-built countermeasures. The following are some attack types vulnerabilities that an autonomous weapon system designer should anticipate and work to prevent on the fielded system: Layer 1 Attacks : Attacks against programmers and commanders, these can be physical or mental Layer 2 Attacks : Sabotage embedded into the system inform of hardware, software, firmware at procurement With standards come the additional challenges of testing and calibration, verification and validation, once as system is deployed there is the continuous practice of monitoring and evaluation. In practice not only are current threats and issue for concern but new and emerging threats that may render an autonomous system obsolete or inefficient in its domain of operations. Various retrofits of sensors and actuators are undertaken, in addition to upgrades of both hardware and software components. Upgrades may be easily undertaken if an autonomous weapons system was built in modular fashion, such that older components can be unplugged and new components plugged in, followed by rebooting and reconfiguration. Hybrid implementation : a combination of macroscopic, microscopic and/or nanoscopic circuit types for to meet a specific design requirement or to overcome the challenge of procurement of rare or unavailable components.

Layer 5 Integrators
The key concept behind the "molecular" topology is that system failure in one domain would not result in overall system failure which may have catastrophic effects. For example if one auto-pilot module reads questionable data, other auto-pilot modules designed in different ways may read different data altogether. The confidence modules would then allow through various reading that would be worked on by the "integrator" which would in effect only accept operational parameters that are of very high confidence levels, strange or outlier parameters shall be discarded.
Another approach would be for example if an auto-pilot module in one chipset fails completely, data and functionality could still be obtained from other auto-pilot modules in the same or other chipsets. No function or capability of the autonomous weapon would depend upon a single on-board component leading to a robust and highly dependable system. To further improve the survivability of an autonomous lethal weapon platform, the "molecular" topology chips would be located on different parts of the platform, each with its own range of modules and a network of integrators to read their confidence levels all through the platform -thereby only executing the most appropriate parameters.
In the "molecular" topology a chipset performs some function(s), the integrity modules then filter out absurd or erroneous data from further consideration and application within the system. After filtration of outlier data/parameters, the confidence module compares data-streams from a wide range of chipsets and gives a determination as to the level of confidence based upon its scoring frequency. For example if several confidence modules working in synch make the determination by 89.9% that a vehicle is on the equator, then it is overwhelmingly probable that it is in the defined navigation area. But levels of confidence may depend on the sensitivity of an operation, e.g. in some operations a 50% level of confidence may be acceptable while in other operations a 95% level of confidence may not be sufficient. In future designs a chipset shall simulate brain neocortical column [24].
Data-streams that are marked via encapsulation as being sufficient are thereafter utilized for execution of actuator in navigation, control decision and tactical operations. The implementation of "molecular" topology is not fixed and could take many other forms and components as its statement in this monograph is purely at conceptualization and basic functions level. More complexities would inevitably crop up in the pursuit of "molecular" topologies for lethal autonomous weapons design, the most difficult would be the development of software for running the systems which in many cases would be Architecture view of an autonomous lethal weapon system, Figure 4 gives a higher-level Operational Architecture view of an autonomous lethal weapon system (Mother-ship) that has deployed sub-ordinate vehicle 4 to search inside a building and to relay its findings via the electromagnetic spectrum to a sub-ordinate vehicle 3 which then repeats the signal that is strong enough to be received by the mother-ship. The mother-ship relays its signals via terrestrial radio-frequencies repeaters or satellite data-links to the command center for monitoring and evaluation.

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Repeater Command Centre High Performance Computing Centre The mother-ship has on-board two more sub-ordinate vehicles that it can deploy for similar purposes, these extend its capabilities of target search and interdiction as without the sub-ordinate vehicles it would not be in a position to discover or verify the status of persons or objects in a building. The set-up would further enhance enforcement of International Humanitarian Law by way of reducing civilian/non-combatant casualties, allow for better assessment of proportional use of military force and if well designed it could assist in the conduct of physical battle damage assessments, that have previously been only possible by way of aerial and satellite photography. The design assumption is that a sub-ordinate vehicle is equipped with the appropriate actuators and sensors -there is also the possibility that a sub-ordinate vehicle could be the mother-ship of another type of sub-ordinate vehicle.
Even with technologies that are currently in the market the various data-links can be specified for purposes of demonstrating With an unlimited supply of power a robot fielded in combat may transform itself into a different entity or to use its power pack for camouflage illusions. There are many things that a human fighter can do that many of the fighting robots in the market today cannot. For example a human-fighter may create relationships with adversaries or non-combatants, yet a robot may not achieve the same. The human-fighter is able in most instances to carry away wounded persons and to win their confidence, a robot may also fail in this respect -a robot may have the power to carry the wounded but may lack the sensitivity to avoid inflicting more injuries. Other similarly challenging operations for a robot may be those such as picking locks, using objects found in its environment as weapons, breaching walls and doors, etc.
Weizman [16]  Weizman [16] brings in the concept of full and unhindered autonomous movement in the urban realm, to the extent that a warfighter is able to breach any obstacle/impediment to movement. With fully autonomous movement capability a warfighter would easily outmanoeuvre adversary forces in the urban realm as they would not expect to be attacked from a new direction of approach that did not exist prior to the fighting. An autonomous lethal robot designed to implement "lethal theory" should have the ability to interpret architecture and civil structures, without restrictions of avoidance of walls, floors, roofs, and other non-transit areas. At the same time progress of the robot would be reported to high command via some implementation of high-level operational architecture. In effect an efficient autonomous lethal robot would not comply with an adversary's expectation for pre-specified transit route.
Each and every data-link relaying commands and information to and from the robot/weapon requires specification for a particular range of tactical operations. Specification of interest would include but not be limited to : Transmission power; type of computing processes, actuators and sensors that are communicating with off-board systems -as these would describe the information being exchanged; security and counter counter-measures implemented in the data-link; amount of information exchange required internally and externally for efficient operation of the robot/weapon; tempo of work that is generating the information; rate of consumption of the information by external systems; ability of robot/weapon to establish data-links with other systems to facilitate interoperability; etc. Note: the greater the information throughput the higher the energy consumption

Potential Applications
In the course of research work of this monograph the Westgate [17]  Deoxyribonucleic Acid profile. Allowing for positive identification of adversaries before they are killed or captured.

6.
The ability of an autonomous robot to search the building would be much faster due to its greater propensity to expose itself to risk of destruction or damage, than human willingness to expose oneself to harm/injury or death when searching a building or other battle-space type 7. Ability of an autonomous robot with in-built electronic warfare suite to intercept and exploit terrorists communications via phone or radio. During the siege, security/military forces did not have full exploitation on the electromagnetic spectrum, ie. They did not have an 'Electronic Order of Battle' mapping out the electromagnetic signals in the vicinity. In addition to 'identification friend of foe systems' an electronic warfare suite in an autonomous robot may end a siege faster by tracking down adversaries as they use radio-frequencies and prevent incidents of friendly fire by detecting presence of friendly forces.
8. An autonomous robot fighting within a city or a building could be plugged into the close circuit television system to give it an augmented perception of the battle-space, in turn the robot may also communicate with the hostages and terrorists via data-links with the building intercom system or the phones or radios that they are using during the incident There are very many limits to use of the 'Westgate Terror Attack' as a benchmark for feasibility of potential deployment of lethal autonomous weapons. Notably the terrorists were restricted to ground fighting which did not have a naval aspect - Other innovations that are gaining rapid acceptance in the market are "throwables" [19] that are robots that can be deployed into a building/battlespace via an awkward and unplanned throw. If equipped with appropriate artificial intelligence a throwable robot could search for and locate items and persons, map out buildings, avoid/breach obstacles to allow for the odd "look-around-the-corner". With appropriate data-links throwable robots would promptly furnish their users with audio, video or other data as pertains to conditions in its operating environment.
Throwables by their very nature as robots are rugged and retrievable, on the extreme end of the robot spectrum are the "One-way-Ticket" drones/robots [20], once launched or deployed into a battle-space these use various homing techniques to lock on to target signatures and navigate to their locations before attacking. In the resultant attacks the drones/robots as well as the target are destroyed. There are many drones with this capability such as the Israeli Harpy and the German TARES.
Given the nature of these drones, they are usually deployed against high value targets such as radars and command installations.
The growth of tactical internet [21] technologies provide an open standard for connecting to, configuring and manipulating With rapidly evolving technologies eg. Further miniaturization of microchips and more efficient actuators and sensors, there is the promise that long endurance autonomous robots, shall be critical actors in today's battle-spaces.

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Chapter Three

The Findings
In this monograph it has been clearly demonstrated that sufficient knowledge and technology exist for the development of lethal autonomous weapons. Extent of technical details is dependent upon many factors such as: interests", freewill and personal advancement, concepts which are currently only known to be embraced by living organism especially of the human type. Some proponents assume that this state of affairs shall be possible within the next ten years or few more years -when the "Human Brain Project" of Henry Markram [24] and his peers manages to simulate a complete and realistic neocortical column of the human brain.
A simulated complete human neocortical column should enable the computer scientist and systems engineer to "implant" or install some measure of independent thinking into robots. Whether this may be of immediate benefit to human owners of robots is highly debatable, as robot may make the independent decision that are its own robotic best interests and not that of the human owners/commanders. With a model brain on-board an autonomous lethal weapon, many forms of thinking and decision processes become possible as a robot develops and evolves its own sophisticated world view. Decisions would enhance its perception to the extent that there is either negative, positive or neutral feedback from its operational environment that feeds the learning processes of the robot "brain".
Even with the best on-board robot "brain" there is need as in human society for a person to consult experts for greater clarity on complex issues. Lethal autonomous weapons shall utilize data-links of send complex queries to command centres and high performance computing establishments with the expectation of yielding efficiency.
A notion that International Humanitarian Law is sufficient in its current format to meet and address all challenges of lethal autonomous robots in warfare would only hold if it assumed that a robot is not a soldier. If one is to assume that a robot is a

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soldier many questions would arise as to the legitimacy of the following in conflict: 1. Self assembling robots that could reconfigure themselves into seemingly neutral objects  around the circle that is brown, that marks the domain of "everything possible that can go wrong" in a mission undertaken by way of a lethal autonomous weapon. A segment of this white background is further demarcated by way of a non-linear line, this is the space of things that actually go wrong or do not occur as planned during any particular mission. The whole non-linear line segment cutting into the brown circle is indicative of the mission complexity and requirement issues that come up during an mission for which a lethal autonomous weapon is not optimized to react to but it can detect and record.
The non-linear line segment in the light blue circle is indicative of challenges that a lethal autonomous weapon encountered and reacted to appropriately due to its design.
The extent of the Architectural Framework is indicated by way of the two tipped light green arrow in the centre of the light blue circle(the Architectural Framework). These are the primary design variables that influence design, engineering/implementation of a lethal autonomous weapon. After a security/military mission, computer programmers and systems analysts attempt to cover an ever wider scope of mission complexity/requirements before the next mission is undertaken -inevitably the extent of the Architectural Framework is expanded. Improvements result in ever greater design complexity, these in turn increase the scope of catastrophic failures that may occur during a mission. An expanding Architectural Framework seeks to deploy more redundancies in a bid to boost fault tolerance which inevitably increases the complexity and types of pre-mission testing and maintenance tasks.
Some schematics capability provided for via a Project Management software application can facilitate for the layout of similar conceptual frameworks in the course of lethal autonomous weapon projects. Such provision would render a visualization that would aid budget allocation for mission challenge/problem solving. Visualization of a project related conceptual framework may aid in the determination of most effective project teams at various stages. In the absence of project management applications the same nature of analytic overview and task visualization could be achieved by way of a Spreadsheet application package. The conceptual frameworks of similar scope and type may also be sourced from information systems for tactical analysis that simulate performance and functions of weapons.
A periodic analysis of conceptual framework scope for different projects but sourced from the same methods and systems would be a pointer to overall project implementation efficiency. Information Systems professionals would be in a position to determine how to optimize the performance of project teams and to minimize wastage and task duplication. In this respect the conceptual framework has got theoretical as well as practical implications/applications. In the above described conceptual framework the variables are described as follows:

Intervening variables -Systems Analysis & Design (SAD) work
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Discussion
In the "mind and thinking" of a lethal autonomous weapons the Mission Complexity/Requirements are actually a series of Computational problems, that assessed and analyzed with varying degree of Computational Difficulty. The Computer Science domain of Computational Complexity has a role to play in meeting and superseding the challenges of Mission Requirements/Complexity. There is an additional task of discovery of unknowns and contingencies that cannot be resolved by on-board autonomous reasoning capabilities of the weapon and that are therefore sent off-board to command centres and high-performance computing facilities for determination. Secure communication via data-links of these scenarios is part and parcel of autonomous function off-board. The Weapon Use Domain indicates the performance parameters within which the weapon responds to a mission as designed.
Demaine [26] lays out the basic concepts of computing in terse clarity, these are important when considering the "hows and whys" of computation capabilities in future autonomous weapons. Of great interest is his assertion that there are more decision problems than computer algorithms/programs to solve them. An assumption is made that a computer program is a finite string of binary bits, hence its is assumed that the number of computer programs are countably infinite |N| while decision problems are denoted by |R| are uncountably infinite. |R|>>|N| therefore indicates a special problem for designers of lethal autonomous systems, to the extent that there are ever more decision problems to be solved in an operation than are the number of computation tools/systems to resolve them.
With the |R|>>|N| assumption and considering lethal autonomous devices/weapons are in effect systems that undertake to resolve decision problems, it is safe to assume that their designs shall always be inadequate unless and until something beyond normal computing is developed e.g. development of "spontaneous" algorithms to handle the infinite chaos arising from signal noise and relevant signals. These "spontaneous" algorithms would further be mutated by way of genetic algorithms with a view of optimizing their performance. The critical challenge to the concept of a "spontaneous" algorithm would be that of sensor and actuator efficiency, as such partially-efficient or incomplete perception signals from sensors shall result in generation of erroneous and/or hazardous spontaneous algorithms.
"Spontaneous" algorithm solutions are classified as non-deterministic polynomial time problems in Computation Theory. If an autonomous weapon system encounters a NP -hard problem (one that manifests all forms of computational challenges found in the NP problems) or other #P -complete problem(one that is more hard than an NP-complete problem), it would depend on external computational capacity to resolve it. The NP -hard problem would be discovered and packaged before being sent of via a secure data-link to a high-performance computing facility. The size and scope of autonomous lethal weapons contemplated in this paper assumes that they cannot carry such computational capabilities on-board, this shall remain true to the extent that quantum computers in particular are not mobile and/or portable.
Even the seemingly autonomous fielded human soldiers are dependent upon expertise of other persons not physically present in their immediate area of operations, the availability of these requirements for consultation are is accessed via Page 33 of 52 military radio tactical radios -that in many instances offer some form of secure data communications.

Conclusion
New and emerging ideas have the challenge of overcoming the resistance that is the current Establishment. New thinkers often lack the ways and means for propagating their new ideas. With a lot of investment into the human soldier and manned weapon systems, the logic of unmanned autonomous systems has a ready-made market barrier. In general barriers for adoption of lethal autonomous systems technology include: 1. Some commanders may prefer manned systems Data-links and data-communications security against problems such as jamming, interception, alteration.

Statement of the Problem
In today's conflicts it is ever more difficult to distinguish whether military force or police-based law enforcement suffices to neutralize an adversary, especially of an asymmetric-type. Given that the area of operations in an asymmetric conflict may be expansive and the actors sparsely situated within the battle-space, there is a need to utilize "smart" methods that embrace network-integrated sensors, social network visualization, human intelligence analysis, computers, actuators and systems, to increase the efficacy in tactical operations. A commander not only seeks to conduct operations, but also needs to ensure detailed data outflows are obtained from tactical operations to aid future operations and/or training sessions e.g. by way of deploying solutions based on Bayesian Modeling Deployment of autonomous war-fighting agents whose functions are based upon computing information systems is likely to meet and exceed expectations of a command, but only if these vehicles are designed within the appropriate Architectural Frameworks. The multifaceted nature of conflict today in land, air and naval environments demands that automation in combat aggregates disparate gains to obtain an overall military objective.
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Research Question
The general question is: What would be a generic architectural framework for designing, developing and implementing autonomous war-fighting agents for aggregation of gains obtained via multifaceted tactical environments, be? The practicality of the same would have to be demonstrated by way of analysis. Robust and versatile functionality would be critical in the realm of military/security operations.

Objectives
The research project arising from this study, establishes a C4ISTAR Architectural Framework for designing, developing and

Justification
The research work shall establish and layout vital concepts that ensure that its generic autonomous war-fighting agents are safe to use and effective in executing any prescribed tactical operation. The originator of the study is cognizant of the fact that Kenya, the country within which the research is to be done is considered to be a third world and underdeveloped nation.
The architectural framework to be prepared shall have a stimulating effect in creating well engineered systems and products such as : unmanned aerial vehicles, missiles, advanced radar systems, jet-engines, electronic computing systems, robots, sensor-technologies, and many other potentially low-cost investment but high return systems. When these components are  Logistics demands precision timing, navigation, essential payload and optimal workload.

A Sample of the Data-set
Efficiency in war-fighting has a deterrent effect on potential adversaries but pursuit of Total Dominance via the Autonomous war-fighting track has got its firm opponents. KRC ("Killer Robots Campaign") Statement [4] lists some of the most vehement opponents of autonomous robots in warfare. But warfare of the autonomous type is not very easily defined, the "split hair" arguments are the basis of highly discriminative application. To the common man an autonomous robot moves around continuously searching for targets, after which it automatically qualifies and interdicts the target. One would imagine a robot moving and shooting at individuals. But even a passive homing anti-tank missile without control from the launcher is an autonomous robot once it is fired at a target -it is a robot which has a course of action(s) based on preloaded heuristics, and so are "smart" artillery munitions or even seismic sensing detonated munitions. We may extend personnel/people issues to those of honesty or otherwise -what is the credibility of the persons taking part in an operation? Credibility is critical because in the realm of fully lethal autonomous weapons, there are no soldiers or operators, they may only serve in roles as programmers, analysts, and designers who pre-load the autonomous weapon system with the relevant programming algorithms and logistics. Vertegaal [7] renders a system analysis and design concept developed in an era where the human user, was the "termination" and "initiating" point in military tactical networks. This concept also holds true for Hon [8], with the critical difference being that the prosecution of multifaceted warfare in a network-integrated manner was to be conducted by operatives linked to knowledge-based elements. Though not explicitly mentioned therein, it is not difficult to conceive a network in which those elements are lethal autonomous weapons or their supporting systems.
With growing demand for network-integrated tactical systems, the integrity of data-links is an issue, for example: 1. Credibility of equipment/services suppliers 2. Technologies availed by suppliers

Standards set by government bodies
Ruppersberger [9] also touches on the dimension of supplier credibility as is the report [5] of the United States Senate Armed Services Committee, analyzing the infiltration of counterfeit electronic components into the U.S. Military Supply Chain, there was special scrutiny given to suppliers from sources outside the United States of America. In this report [9] it was the Telecommunication Service Providers who came in for special scrutiny, the likelihood of espionage and sabotage via their networks and related equipment is evaluated. Systems and technical architectural frameworks must address supply chain risks if operational risks are to be minimized.

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Over open networks such as the Internet, or any other potentially open communications media and protocols, the likelihood of adversaries seeking to subvert the systems functions arises. The downing of a United States Air Force drone over Iran is a demonstration of this norm [10]. These challenges are likely to come in two different forms, that may be combined in some instances, they are: 1. Use of malware to subvert an autonomous system 2. Interactive interventions by a human person via a network which is connected via electromagnetic waves The first type of these is detailed by Sabovich and Borst [11], that advocates for the deployment of various systems engineering techniques, in preventing or containing malware challenges. Research arising from this study shall also cover a The concept of allowing for the redirection and reprogramming of autonomous lethal weapons that are fielded is important.
Even with the inherent risks of hacking and malware, there are benefits in "flipping the script" and "shifting the goal posts" via a data-link when the "game" that is war is well underway. Implementing Lethal Autonomy with the current technological limitations implies that systems are not as highly discriminative when picking and engaging targets as may be desired by a commander. They may require the input of humans "in the loop" to make a final decision in some cases, while other systems like fully automated anti-ballistic missile defense system may not need human input though they do offer the option. Military weapons and/or their uses must meet certain critical International Humanitarian Law criteria: technology for remote credibility analysis of humans are being developed and deployed e.g. stress analysis via thermal imaging but these are not yet robust to the extent of being used with consistently good results. Contrary to popular belief there are a wide range of fully autonomous weapon systems that are currently in use by military forces e.g. Sensors that detonate explosive charges when they are interfered with, but of the current fielded systems there is none that can readily tap into the human mental process and know how to harness its feedback.
A critical point of interest for most military and security forces in the domain of war-fighting would be safety and reliability issues, autonomous robots remove the human user risk. But the variables are still very many, and it is too difficult to determine which technologies shall result from the current emerging experiences in the course of tactical operations.
Human beings are capable of harnessing fine grained ethical and legal decision making processes that are difficult to technically replicate, this is the major challenge to developing lethal autonomy, there are operational circumstances that are difficult to predict/foresee and codify until they actually occur. The potential broad spectrum applicability of lethal autonomy shall disadvantage any military/security force that has its State ratify any "global" ban. Arguments about the benefits and paybacks of deploying or not deploying autonomy are becoming mainstay in evermore domains of human life, for knowledgeable non-state belligerents lethal autonomy is an option.
Currently the United States of America's Department of Defense was one of the first institutions to come up with a directive policy [14] for autonomous weapon systems usage. It answers the question that is the yearning of many i.e. A human in the loop at the point of firing a weapon on an autonomous platform, but as robots become ever more fast in decision making, this cardinal principle shall inevitably be compromised with a view to interdicting threatening targets before they can do harm to interests protected by lethal autonomous weapons. There shall be a much faster target acquisition and interdiction loop, may be in the scale of milliseconds and human contribution to the same shall be minimal if not impossible.

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Chapter Three

Research Methodology
Lethal autonomous weapons are spinoffs of technical advances in fields such as robotics, computing, navigation, etc.
Versatility, flexibility, ingenuity and urgency of deployment of newly emerging technologies inevitably applies pressure on weapons systems engineers to come up with appropriate systems integration/engineering concepts that exploit advances in the domain of sci-tech. This inter-disciplinary approach to providing autonomous agents has a lot of traction with commanders who can get ever greater tactical payoffs with ever diminishing human risk exposure. Searches for information and data that actualizes the benefits of lethal autonomy takes place over diverse specialties and various experts may not be forewarned of the use of their research in this domain.
To come up with a comprehensive and broad spectrum Architectural Framework for lethal autonomous weapons, a lot of white papers, journals, books, theses, and other research materials shall be reviewed repeatedly by the researcher.

Qualitative analysis of the Research Problem
The objective of the proposed research work develop a C4ISTAR Architectural Framework that guides in the development of weapons that manifest lethal autonomy. There is already an ever growing body of literature on lethal autonomy, that is broad and rich in insights. The method adopted for the study is the Qualitative Analysis. The specific approach shall be the Grounded Theory Method of Qualitative Analysis.

Research Methodology -Grounded Theory Method
Research work undertaken by way of the Grounded Theory Method shall be done as follows: 1. Conducting a relevant literature search from libraries, databases, digital libraries, media monitoring, etc. to produce an initial examinable data set. Consultations with various experts shall be undertaken during the whole course of my research work.

2.
This initial data-set shall be reviewed by the researcher for relevance and potential utility, with a view of scoring the sources for relevance and making a determination as to the sufficiency of the data-set.

3.
The qualified data-set shall then be obtained and stored in hard or soft copy format and cataloged/indexed by the researcher for easy/quick reference.

4.
This qualified data-set shall be reviewed severally with a view to enabling the researcher to understand its contents and contexts, and to draw-up initial working summaries to be used in the qualitative analysis [17].

5.
More sources shall be sought to support or disprove the initial working summaries.
6. An initial research paper is then drawn up by way of qualitative analysis of the refined data-set is the Grounded Theory [20] developed by way of appreciating and integrating the contexts and contents of the disparate research sources. In line with the principles of Leshem [21] a conceptual framework is drawn-up based upon the research

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work, that details the interactions between the variables discovered in the course of research.

7.
The initial research paper is then reviewed by selected Academic Readers, to determine the extent to which the initial research study is manifested via the research work and if the work is adequate in terms of form, contexts, contents and knowledge.

8.
Readers give the researcher feedback which is incorporated into a review of the paper after which the Paper upon approval is submitted for publication

Dissemination Strategy
The research work shall be published in several papers, some of these shall have direct peer-review, and others published on expert refereed online platforms or online platforms that allow for peer citation counts. The major by-product of the research shall be robust lethal autonomous weapons systems, these shall be conceptualized, designed and developed by outfits selected by the researcher and used in accordance with existing laws. Academic conferences and seminars shall also offer the researcher a mode of peer-reviewed dissemination. Academic work such as training and education shall also provide a powerful method for the research dissemination.

Conclusion
There was a wide range of potential research resources, this made it feasible for the research work to be undertaken. Some may view the Grounded Theory Method of conducting research as a subversion [18] of quantitative methods, but that is not the case as the research data-sets obtained qualitatively also contain quantitative and empirically generated data-sets that can only be analyzed by way of their original quantitative analysis mechanisms within a Grounded Theory Method. Research is basically a learning process [19], and in all likelihood new approaches and knowledge that was not envisioned in the initial objectives may be obtained.