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Religious freedom and strength of belief in Bayle

Abstract This is a study of how Bayle in his Le Commentaire Philosophiquemakes paradoxical use of sceptical arguments in an effort to produce practical results by means of theory. It is the strength and unassailable nature of belief, which enables religious freedom to be maintained by the famous argument of the rights of the erring conscience. Religious freedom, then, is grounded on a form of need that the conscience has to adhere to its own reason. It is only possible to demonstrate the need for religious freedom and the need for tolerance by making indirect use of sceptical arguments, which aim to question the arbitrary nature of beliefs, from which one cannot always separate oneself.