{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.019138755980861243, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.340909090909091, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 1, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Internal Conflict and State Development: Evidence from Imperial China

We analyze the conditions under which internal conflict can promote or impede state development. Our study exploits original micro-level data across more than half a millennium in imperial China. We find that, traditionally, the central state improved its monopoly over violence in response to mass rebellion. The mid-nineteenth century marked the start of a new geopolitical era in China, when the central state's costs of external military defense rose greatly. In turn, we find evidence for a shift in security leadership toward local elites in response to mass rebellion, reducing the central state's monopoly over violence. Our analysis implies that the relationship between internal conflict and state development depends on the specific geopolitical context.