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Uruguay and France

Uruguay and France are examples of cases situated somewhere in-between the two extremes of resilient and fragile democracies. The case study of Uruguay shows that crisis could in fact terminate interwar democracies, even if they had a pre-war legacy of electoral competition for political power. This was possible because civil society was underdeveloped vis-à-vis the parties. However, the Uruguayan case also shows how democracy was quickly reintroduced in such a situation, once the economic crisis was over. French democracy was more challenged than those of Denmark and the United Kingdom in the crisis-ridden 1930s. However, despite less institutionalized parties, especially on the right, and a somewhat less organized civil society, the regime could still rely on the broad recognition of republican ideals among key political actors. Indeed, our analysis of the French case questions the widespread notion that this was a ‘near miss’, where democracy came on the verge of breaking down in the 1930s.