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The unity of consciousness: Clarification and defence

In 'The Disunity of Consciousness' [9], Gerard O'Brien and Jon Opie argue that human consciousness is not synchronically unified. They suggest that the orthodox conception of the unity of consciousness admits of two readings, neither of which they find persuasive. According to them, 'a conscious individual does not have a single consciousness, but several distinct phenomenal consciousnesses, at least one for each of the senses, running in parallel' [9, p. 387]. They call this conception of consciousness the multi-track account. I make three points in reply: (1) O'Brien and Opie's characterisation of the orthodox conception of the unity of consciousness is problematic; (2) their arguments in support of the multi-track account are unpersuasive; and (3) the phenomenon of inter-sensory integration suggests that O'Brien and Opie are wrong to claim that 'the only sense in which it is con'ect to talk of a 'unified' consciousness...is that in which the representational contents of the various components coincide' [9, p. 387].