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The Expressive Power of Voting Rules: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Different voting rules are commonly used to settle collective decisions. A promising way to assess voting rules, for which little is known, is to compare the expressive utility that voters derive from voting with each rule. In this paper, we first propose an ordinal theory of expressive voting that allows us to compare voting rules in terms of the expressive utility that voters derive from voting (their expressive power). Our theory provides a novel testable implication according to which expected turnout increases with expressive power. We then ran an online experiment to test this implication in a controlled environment. We find that if voters are made aware of different voting rules, turnout is higher in voting rules with higher expressive power. Our results also suggest that, all else equal, the higher the expressive power of a voting rule the higher the expressive utility derived from voting and the better the voting rule represents voters’ actual preferences. These results suggest that the expressive power of voting rules is a relevant criterion when deciding which voting rule to use in economic and political decisions.