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Various Forms of Differentiation and Majority Voting as an Alternative

This chapter sets out the different forms of differentiation and asks whether qualified majority voting in the field of taxation would be a practical and suitable alternative to differentiated law-making. The first sections show that enhanced cooperation is not the only flexibility mechanism within the European Union. Member States can also establish differentiation through primary EU law, secondary EU law, or by using partial international agreements. Partial international agreements may be a real alternative to enhanced cooperation law-making as they grant Member States the possibility to introduce rules which are only binding between some Member States. However, these sections reveal the clear differences between enhanced cooperation laws and partial international agreements which allow a protection of enhanced cooperation laws within the EU’s legal framework. Based on constitutional legal theory, in particular consociational democracy, the second part of this chapter argues that qualified majority voting should not be pursued in the field of taxation because it may lead to a European Union plagued by internal frustration and conflicts. The people of Europe are too heterogeneous, and unlike many other subject areas, taxation is a vehicle to pursue sensitive national policy objectives. Taxation is not only a revenue raiser, it is also a nuanced tool to steer taxpayers’ behaviour, achieve justice and equal opportunities through redistribution, and address economic needs.