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A more palatable epicureanism

The Epicurean position is well known: if a person ceases to exist when he dies, then death isn't bad for him. Where there is no one to have an interest, no interest can be frus trated. Given that the dead don't exist, they don't have any interests that can be thwarted. The Epicurean stance towards death can be maintained independently of Epicurus's personal adherence to hedonism. The point that your death cannot be bad for you holds even if it is accepted that there are non-ex periential, relational harms such as someone talking poorly about you behind your back or preventing some good from reaching you that you forever remain ignorant about. The Epicurean can claim that even non-experien tial harms need a subject of harm and at death that subject ceases to exist.' While Epicureanism is thought to be plausible enough to warrant a response, re spondents are generally skeptical. Typical is the claim of Ben Bradley, who endorses the assumptions of Jeff McMahan (McMahan 1988: p. 33; 2002: p. 104), "that the view that death is bad for the one who dies seems to me to be what McMahan calls a 'fixed point' or 'starting point' in ethics-a conviction that would require extremely convincing argu ments to overcome if it could be overturned at all" (Bradley 2004: p. 18). Sharing such an attitude is Hafry Silverstein, who writes that "the morality of killing is another area where the Epicurean view has implications that are seriously disturbing, its acceptance would wreck havoc, in my opinion, with our considered judgments" (Silverstein 1980: p. 413). The threat to our commonsense un derstanding of the morality of killing is that if death isn't bad for people, then the usual explanation that it would be wrong to kill them because they would be harmed doesn't apply. It might seem that the wrongness of killing someone would then have to be due to the effects on survivors and that seems to erroneously leave the wrongness of killing hostage to the existence of friends and family (the latter of whom must be fond of you). Or our commonsense ethics might have to be replaced with consequentialist considerations such as the loss of overall utility. Not only are these utilitarian judgments notoriously capricious-allowing at times for very coun terintuitive claims-but when they do cohere with commonsense judgments, they seem to supply the wrong reason for the right judg ment about the wrongness of killing. It is not just the morality of killing that is threatened by Epicureanism but also the rationality of prudence. Silverstein writes of Epicureanism that "just as it does deny