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From manipulation to integration: the strategic transformation of grassroots control in China

Abstract How to control local officials is a basic concern among the state governance issues. This problem contains two reciprocally restricted dimensions: how to keep the officials loyal to central authority and accountable to citizens. Election recognized as a powerful method to control local officials has been deployed by many authoritarian governments. Especially, the party-state of China has implemented grassroots election for decades, which attracts a great deal of academic attention. Our field work and research find that compared with the election manipulation in the early stage, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been pushing forward the institutionalization of grassroots election. Meanwhile, several measures have been employed by the CCP to integrate the power-exercising of grassroots self-governance into the party–state system. This paper aims to demonstrate how the tension between loyalty and accountability structures the strategic transformation of grassroots control in China.