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Lessons from VOSTOK-2018: free-play manoeuvers are overrated and mission-command needs to be bounded*

Analyzing Russia’s VOSTOK 2018 strategic level field-exercise (or “strategic manoeuvers”) in the West from a Western perspective is hard. A key reason for this is that Western and Russian perspectives on war and the use of military force have grown apart. By this, Russia is still focused on traditional notions of mass, i.e. massed troops and firepower brought to bear on the enemy to achieve tactical/operational victory. Conversely, most Western states have turned their thinking to effect precision engagement, using high-tech situational awareness and C4 capabilities with small(er), professional and highly lethal forces. For the last 25 years, much of the Western focus on warfare has highlighted force-protection and the avoidance of collateral damage in expeditionary operations that have little to do with vital national security interests. This deviates completely from the Russian perspective: causing maximal casualties and destruction in order to prevail in the battlefield (to wit: observe Eastern Ukraine). In short, today the very expensive Western precision warfare meets attrition warfare and decisive battles would enjoin to produce the ultimate use of violence. Understanding Russia’s military formations –Guards Tank Army and many Combined Arms Armies – is a difficult task in particular for European military analysts since most European states have during the last 25 years disbanded army-, corps – and divisionlevel units. In fact, to be truthful, even manning a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) these days would be a struggle for many Western states. Battalion-based battlegroups have been the way to go within Europe, as operations have been planned and executed in the name of military crisis-management, humanitarian interventions, counter-terrorist operations, and counter-insurgency operations. In short, many Western analysts have difficulties in comprehending one state (Russia) fielding tens of thousands of troops in field exercises – and doing so every year. Within the West it takes NATO – a military alliance of 29 states – to organize something even resembling the size of what we witnessed in VOSTOK-2018. In VOSTOK-2018 – as in any other recent Russian strategic level field-exercise – it is noteworthy that C2 arrangements included the top political level and moved down to the units in the operational – and tactical-levels. Based on the number of participating troops in the exercise, this meant orchestrating operations of an army/army corps level unit. Even though Russia still lags behind the Western states in the level of available C4-technology,