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Putin's Moscow approach to Iran: between pragmatism and fear

Since the beginning of the post-Soviet era, Russia has engaged in various relationships with Iran. Similar to the US elite, Russian pundits see Iran as an essentially strong authoritarian/totalitarian state. Still, the Russian elite do not regard Iran as a medieval weakling that would collapse just after the first American strike or strong pressure. Thus, the dominant image of Iran for Russian observers is as a mighty state that in the future may be a grand empire, like ancient Persia, the Soviet Union of Stalin’s time or Nazi Germany, one that could not just withstand but actually challenge the USA. The interpretations of this image are different, even mutually exclusive. Iran is either a strong but reasonable state with which one can deal, or an absolutely irresponsible, mad state with which one must deal with great caution. The positive-to-neutral image prevails in the mind of the Russian elite and shapes its policy toward Iran. While geopolitical considerations, for example, flirtation with Iran as a counterbalance to the USA, are not excluded as a rationale, pragmatic considerations are more important. Approaching Iran from this perspective, the Russian elite stated that Russia will collaborate with Iran and try to prevent US attack or sanctions. Still, the image of Iran as a reasonable, strong state with raison d’état as the major framework for engagement is not absolutely dominant. It coexists with suspicion and fear, mostly due to the Russian elite’s troubling and increasingly tense relationship with its ownMuslim community. This prevailing cautious pragmatism defines the Russian elite’s approach to Iran. The elite’s willingness to engage in various deals with Iran is not dominated by some grand geopolitical consideration implying resistance to US influence or national prestige as a goal in itself. These geopolitical interests did play a role, especially at the beginning of Putin’s tenure, when ‘Eurasianism’, the assumption that Russia as a unique civilization of Slavs and mostly Turkic people could be a major global centre, was popular. By approximately the middle of Putin’s tenure, Eurasianism influence was declining; and Russian nationalism, mostly self-centred or pro-European, was increasingly dominant despite the recent (August 2008) conflict with Georgia. Elite members are quite suspicious and often plainly hostile to Muslims and Asians regardless of their ethnic and cultural–linguistic make-up. This has led the elite away from the grand Eurasian paradigm with its implied symbiosis between Orthodox Russians and Turkic Muslims.