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The Japanese consumer finance market and its institutional changes since the 1980s

Abstract We assert, in this article, that the joint transformation of public perception about households’ over-indebtedness and financial deregulation had important implications on the government decision to reform overall consumer credit between 2005 and 2010. On the one hand, the development of collective actions by groups of lawyers to defend borrowers from moneylenders’ abusive practices represents a source of change in the public opinion about over-indebted individuals in the context of long economic stagnation. A systematic press article analysis from 1977 to 2006 shows that the rising number of these collective actions since the early 1990s may have gradually increased the political salience of social issues related to the unsecure loan market. On the other hand, financial deregulation has been a source of change by allowing banks to enter the consumer finance market since the early 2000s. Banks entry into this market transformed the logic of complementarity among traditional consumer credit actors (Shinpan, credit card companies and sarakin) in a general context of legal consumers’ protection reinforcement. Thus, evolution of Japanese consumer finance's regulation is particularly relevant to illustrate the forces of institutional change and its consequences.


Introduction
Since the 1980s, excessive household debt has gradually become a serious social and political challenge in many advanced countries. The number of personal bankruptcies increased in the United States as well as in countries with a more 'conservative' private debt policy, such as France and Germany (Sullivan et al. 2000, Niemi and Whitford 2009, Garon 2011, Logemann 2012, Trumbull 2014. 1 In addition, many governments responded by revising their insolvency procedure in order to ease the process and at the same time reduce formal rules and informal practices, we look at the rise of several social issues, especially households' over-indebtedness, leading to personal bankruptcy. We analyze more precisely the collective actions organized by groups of lawyers to help indebted persons by providing financial and legal counseling services and how their actions changed the public's perception about over-indebted individuals.
The article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the literature on consumer credit and introduce briefly the concept of political salience. In Section 3, the chronological and historical perspective allows us to analyze in parallel the rise of the consumer finance market as well as social issues related to over-indebtedness. Section 4 analyzes the evolution of the public debate about the sarakin mondai, with a particular focus on collective actions organized by borrowers' advocates and the press coverage. A final section provides a conclusion.

Literature on consumer credit and political salience
This section engages with the literature on consumer credit and personal bankruptcy by focusing on the institutional changes that affected the historical complementarity between bank and non-bank sectors in Japan. We also propose to connect the literature on collective actions and social mobilization to analyze the rising influence of the lawyers who represented the borrowers' interest in the legislative and judiciary arenas.

The Japanese consumer credit
Informal small loans in rural popular finance (shômin kinyû) have been widely analyzed in the Japanese economic and financial history literature. Historically, moneylenders assumed an important role as an alternative form of informal credit to peasants, individual entrepreneurs and family businesses (Shibuya 1972(Shibuya , 2001. Pawnshops also developed in urban areas at the beginning of the twentieth century, taking opportunities from the rise of the consumer society and lack of regulation (Shibuya 1972, Sala 2015. In the postwar period, many shichiya changed their core business to enter the new market of unsecured personal loans (sarakin); however, research about this market and its development faded (Gelpi and Labruy ere 1994). In comparison, installment sales credit was analyzed much more, especially by historians. Gordon (2006) shows how consumer credit companies developed in the prewar period in collaboration with department stores to propose installment sales credit to the emerging middle-class consumers. Since the 1950s, consumer credit companies developed new credit facilities to consumers with bank accounts 6 (Partner 2000, Gordon 2012. The apparent paradox between Japanese households' high saving rate and the rise of consumerism is partly due to this easy-access to consumer credit during the high economic and income growth period (Partner 2000). Simon Partner shed light on the gap between lower and higher income households' access to mass consumer society as lower income households had very few savings and bought consumer durables on credit, whereas higher income households could be both savers and consumers. These studies show that the economic and social history of the Japanese consumption society is closely related to consumer credit's development in the prewar period (Francks & Hunter 2011, Gordon 2012. In many ways, consumer credit sustained the rise of mass consumption, as observed in other industrialized countries (Calder 1999, Glickman 1999, but the Japanese consumer credit market also shows several institutional characteristics.

Institutional characteristics of Japanese consumer credit
We observe the historically low participation of banks, except during the bubble period of the late 1980s, and a highly segmented overall market which is dependent on the type of credit provided (credit card, installment sales, unsecure loan, mortgage loan). This segmentation has reduced the consumer credit market's efficiency by creating niche markets under different regulation and public authority supervision. Adding to these specific aspects of regulatory and economic landscape, the lack of a centralized credit bureau has contributed to increasing the risk of over-borrowing as well as an excess of lending from small loan lenders who charged legally high interest rates. Although, in comparison with other industrialized countries, Japanese households' ratio of debt to income was low until the end of the 1970s, it significantly increased during the 1980s and then stabilized during the 1990s (Horioka 2012). Nevertheless, we observe a paradox between the aggregate level of secure household debt and the micro-level data showing a rapid increase in the number of bankruptcies in the late 1990s following the reform of the insolvency law (1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004). A study of personal bankruptcies factors reveals that the majority of cases are related to over-borrowing on the unsecure loan market (sarakin) (Higuchi & Banno 2004). Since the 1980s, groups of lawyers within the Nichibenren (Japan Federation of Bar Associations) have carried out several lobbying campaigns demanding more stringent small loan regulation to protect borrowers from an excess of lending at high interest rates on the unsecured loan market.

Collective actions and political salience of Japanese households' overindebtedness
Japan is characterized by a State and Industry coalition that reduces civil society's influence over policymakers (Stigler 1971, Trumbull 2014). This approach is nuanced by other studies that are specific to the Japanese case of consumer protection. For example, Maclachlan (2002) argues that, in the rare cases where the interests of politics, bureaucrats and industry are in conflict, consumer groups can find a way to voice their grievances in the public arena and gain political support. However, when there is a strong cohesion of interests between those three groups (politics, bureaucrats and industry), the government pays little heed to consumer groups, even when the public supports them. Calder (1988) highlights a very similar process in favor of consumers during a period of economic crisis in contrast to the general tendency of the Japanese government to privilege producers over consumers. Nevertheless, these studies did not mention how to measure the evolution of the public opinion's interest in the consumers' cause. For example, the concept of political salience gives insights into the variation of the public interest by identifying the importance of a subject for the average voters in comparison with other political issues (Kollman 1998). In a context of high salience of a particular issue, political parties will begin to pay attention to that issue, as will public opinion (Baron 1994). In this context, interest groups will also start launching campaigns to mobilize public interest (Kollman 1998). Based on a large volume of literature concerning interest groups and collective actions, Culpepper shows that in a context of low political salience, concentrated interests have more influence over politics than diffuse interests (Olson 1965, Wilson 1973, Culpepper 2010. The next question, then, is how does a matter of low salience become a matter of high salience? Wilson (1980) argues that public interest can be mobilized more effectively when scandals are covered by the media, especially in periods of economic crisis. The level of media coverage of an issue provides politicians with an indicator to understand which information the public cares about (Patterson 1993). This dynamic approach is helpful to understand how, during the 1990s, collective actions organized by lawyers and covered by the media, gradually influenced the political salience of social issues related to CFCs and small lenders' informal and abusive practices, leading to several scandals.

The rise of the Japanese consumer finance market
In the postwar period, banks focused on secured business loans and had little interest in consumer credit. The 1950s saw the emergence of moneylenders, known as danchi kinyu (condominium finance), who followed in the legacy of the traditional shômin kinyû (popular finance) (Shibuya 2001). Moneylenders could take advantage of a gray zone, created by the legal gap between the interest rate ceiling of 20 per cent, set by the Interest Rate Restriction Act (IRRA, No 100, 1954) under the civil code and the 109.5 per cent ceiling for the interest rate set by the Investment, Deposit and Interest Rates Act (IA No 195, 1954) under the penal code. Both of these laws governed the consumer finance industry. In the 1960s, the number of urban small lenders increased rapidly in the context of consumer and wage-based society's boom. Consumer finance companies provided small and unsecured loans to wage earners. These companies were called sarakin, a popular abbreviation of 'salaryman' C 'loan' (kinyû). They provided loans that required only an identification card and a self-declaration of income. The market was virtually unregulated, and continued to grow during the 1970s and the 1980s, dominated by four major consumer finance companies, Promise, Acom, Takefuji and Aiful, but also including a large number of small lenders in charge of proving loans to individual entrepreneurs, family business, and retailers (TAPALS 2006).

Social issues and legislation's ambiguity
During the 1970s, numerous scandals involving high interest lending practices and harsh collection tactics forced the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to adopt regulatory measures in order to address the problem known as sarakin mondai, associated with over-borrowing, usury and illicit practices, which in the worst cases led to debt-related suicides. 7 After almost six years of debate, the Money Lending Business Law (MLBL) was passed in 1983 as proposed by the Liberal Democrat Party (LDP). The law set an objective to reduce over time and at 'a future date' the maximum interest rate at 40.0004 per cent. The law also enacted the 'voluntary payment provisions', 8 which remained in force until the Supreme Court definitively ruled against the application of this provision in 2004 (Pardieck 2008) (see Figure 1).

Figure 1
The grey zone of lending from 1954 to 2010 Source: FSA Opposition parties and several lawyers argued that the law was likely to enlarge the usury pot and was tilted towards protecting the interests of moneylenders. 9 Rules were established in favor of moneylenders' interests, resulting in self-regulatory measures and upholding of the Supreme Court's decisions (1964 and 1968) in favor of borrowers' protection. An accurate study of the Upper house finance committee preceding the vote on the law proposed by the deputy Ohara (DPL) shows that, despite their presence in the legislative arena, borrowers' defense groups (consumers associations and lawyers) could not voice their arguments in favor of more protective legislation for borrowers and a lower interest rate cap ceiling by abolishing the gray zone. The final law was unpopular with the scholars and lawyers involved, partly because of the provision in Article 43 stating that, where the borrower 'voluntary paid interest' in excess of the maximum interest rates and the borrower received the necessary documentation, that payment would be 'deemed a valid payment of interest on the debt'. 10 Article 43 was designed to allow lenders to continue charging higher interest rates during an unspecified period of time. The political collusion between the conservatives (DPL) and the CFCs (sarakin) was highly criticized in the newspapers. 11 The historical informal complementarity between bank and non-bank sectors, which consisted of addressing the demand for credit from high-risk borrowers (SMEs, VSEs, entrepreneurs and family business) to whom banks could not lend, was re-used in the early 1980s to let CFCs make profits by lending large amounts of personal loans at high interest rates to a wider range of consumers. Since the late 1970s and despite the historical complementarity with non-bank lenders, banks have attempted to expand the consumer credit market and shape consumer demand. They became strong advocates of credit access policies. The MoF encouraged banks to practice consumer lending, and revised the banking law in 1984. This coalition was also intended to help shape the consumer finance market by pushing illicit small loan lenders out of the market. 12 By the mid-1980s, consumer credit became more universal and competitive, resulting in a reduced number of peripheral players. For a short period of time, banks became key players in consumer finance and increased their market share on the personal loan sector, whereas CFCs experienced a significant decrease of their business (see Figure 2). The debt (including consumer credit and housing loans) to disposable income ratio increased steadily up to the 1990s (e.g. 77 per cent in 1980, 88.8 per cent in 1985 and 131.5 per cent in 1990). 13 Different factors account for this: growth of personal income, demand for consumer durables, availability of technology providing a better management of credit transactions, as well as financial institutions looking for underdeveloped markets for their accumulated funds (Arthur & Alexander 1989).
At the end of the 1980s, the overall consumer finance market increased significantly as did credit card debt and subprime loans. 14 After the bubble burst, overindebtedness and personal bankruptcy increased rapidly in a deflationary and economic downturn period. 15 Banks rationed consumer credit, thus providing new market opportunities for consumer finance companies (CFCs) to develop their own markets. Unsecured loans increased again during the so-called lost decade (1992)(1993)(1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004). During this period, CFCs and commercial banks developed strong financial ties and re-enacted the traditional institutional complementarity. The burst of the bubble in a virtually unregulated market led to unintended consequences in favor of Consumer Finance Companies.

Rise of consumer finance companies during the lost decade
After the bubble burst, the relationship between banks and CFCs changed as banks' market shares dramatically decreased in the consumer finance market and CFCs' market shares significantly increased 16 (see Figure 3).
In 1991, in response to several financial scandals, which occurred during the bubble period, the government revised the Investment Act by lowering the ceiling to 40.0004 per cent. As compensation to moneylenders, the MoF authorized CFCs to raise funds directly on the financial market by issuing commercial paper (CP) and bonds. Then, in 1999, the revision of the Non-Bank Bond Law allowed the CFCs with capital in excess of 1 billion yen to issue corporate bonds. 17 They were registered as Certified Finance Corporations. During the mid-1990s the major CFCs were also listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and by the end of the 1990s, they were accepted into the Keidenren. 18 According to Forbes' ranking of the wealthiest people in 2004, there were the four top CFC's directors, ranking second, fifth, sixth and tenth. 19 By the 1990s, banks and CFCs had built strong financial ties, and banks became the CFCs' principal fund suppliers, lending to them at low interest rates (1.70 per cent and 2.50 per cent), and joining them as shareholders. 20 The rise of the CFCs can be attributed to their business model, characterized by a strategy of aggressive credit distribution based on high volume of high-risk borrowers.
At the beginning of the 1990s, advances in telecommunications transformed the economic logic of the sector. CFCs developed an Automatic Teller Machine distribution system to provide credit contracts. This new system increased the number of new clients, lowered the cost of credit, and enhanced easy-access credit. From 1998, the CFCs also improved their distribution network by using convenience store payment terminals and cash withdrawal systems. 21 By the late 1990s, the CFCs had diversified their products strategy by increasing home equity loans, SME loans and equity funds, as well as credit cards. 22 Promise formed an alliance with the Sanwa Bank (then UFJ) to launch Mobito, a consumer credit company targeting middle-risk consumers and in 2000, the Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank developed its credit card, Cash One, in association with Acom. During the same period, the government lifted the ban on advertising and the

Social issues and scandals in a period of economic downturn
Since the 1990s the consumer finance market has been an oligopolistic market with more than 70 per cent of outstanding loans held by a few major CFCs, even though more than 90 per cent of the total number of lenders are small lenders and more than half of them lend money to SMEs. 24 Although the legislation is the same for all moneylenders, this highlights the strong heterogeneity of the market in terms of size and type of borrowers (consumers, SMEs). The role of the Money Lending Business Law was to set rules and regulations to establish control over the lenders. However, the self-regulatory provisions and the lack of government financial control led, again, to a virtually unregulated market. The Japanese government did not enforce any regulation to protect consumers who borrowed money. For example, borrowers' protection in the following three areas of credit market regulation was deficient: there was a lack of transparency in consumer credit contracts, a lack of provision to limit excessive or extortionate lending, and insolvency proceedings were overly long and costly. Although most of the advanced industrialized countries dramatically revised their personal insolvency law, beginning in the mid-1980s, it was the case that the Japan Personal Insolvency Law was only revised in 1996 and fully implemented in 2004. The purpose of the revision was to facilitate the process of filing for personal bankruptcy and to reduce the social stigma associated with it. 25 In addition, there was no regulation of national credit rating agencies: there were four main credit bureaus and, in 2005, only 2079 out of 14,000 registered moneylenders were members of a credit bureau federation. 26 This meant that a large number of lenders were not using established credit bureaus and their borrowers were not included in official statistics. 27 In the context of economic stagnation and banking crisis, the 1990s bore witness to several scandals. As of 1998, when banks started to ration credit, unsecured loans to SMEs increased, as well as illicit and harsh practices leading to the so-called shôkôron mondai. The government took action by lowering the ceiling on interest rates to 29.2 per cent in 2000, but it did not abolish the gray zone, neither did it revise the credit policy to provide better access to credit as well as legal protection for borrowers. In response to the lower ceiling on interest rates, large CFCs sought more volume in order to maintain their profits (Utsunomiya 2007). Low regulation and lack of a centralized data system (credit bureau) led to an excess of lending: in the worst cases, borrowers were receiving credit from more than ten lenders (Suda 2006). 28 Debtors, who found themselves in trouble, having borrowed money from CFCs, often went to smaller lenders to borrow money to reimburse the previous loan, and in the worst cases they borrowed from predatory lenders, known as yamikin. 29

Collective actions and political salience
An increase of over-indebtedness may threaten the expansion of the virtually unregulated consumer finance market as a result of an increasing general concern over the problem. In addition, the media coverage of the CFCs' high profits may also increase public sensitivity about the lenders' lack of morality. In the following subsection we analyze the press coverage for the sarakin mondai to emphasize the evolution of the public interest and its perception of the problem.

Press coverage analysis-methodology 30 and results
We analyzed the press coverage for the sarakin mondai from 1977 to 2006 by selecting articles from Asahi shinbun and Nikkei shinbun. We performed a search using the key word 'sarakin' and obtained more than 4000 articles. We chose to keep the term 'sarakin' instead of consumer finance (shôhisha kinyû) as 'sarakin' describes the reality of moneylenders' abusive practices. 31 We found that political salience was high during each period that was marked by scandals related to the sarakin and that the government usually reacted by lowering the ceiling on interest rates, except in 2004 (Predatory Lending Act, which did not include a revision of the ceiling on interest rates) 32 (see Figure 4). However, this apparently high level of political salience does not explain why the government did not regulate the market in favor of better borrowers' protection until 2006. In order to understand the subjects covered by the Asahi Shinbun, we have sorted the articles into sub-categories (see Figure 5).
(1) The category 'short news items' includes all articles covering issues of crimes, frauds, and hold-ups related to borrowers who have taken credits from sarakin. (2) The category 'laws and regulation' includes all articles covering topics related to the legislative and regulatory processes including political and financial collusion between political parties and sarakin. (3) The category 'civil society actions' includes all articles covering a broad range of topics related to over-indebtedness, personal bankruptcy and collective actions organized by borrowers' defense groups based on legal expertise. These actions increased during the 1990s in response to the rising number of scandals involving moneylenders (CFCs, small lenders, shôkôron, etc.). (4) The category 'consumer credit market' includes all articles covering issues of CFCs business model, growth strategy, etc.
During the initial period of enactment of the Money Lending Business Act (1978)(1979)(1980)(1981)(1982)(1983)(1984), the number of articles covering over-indebtedness as a social issue and civil society actions in defense of borrowers was low compared with the number of articles covering the burning issues of borrowers' crime, fraud, and hold-ups. We can deduce from this analysis that general concern about the problem of over-indebtedness was low in the late 1970s to the 1990s. The newspaper nature of coverage of the issues related to sarakin had also nourished a negative perception of indebted borrowers among public opinion.
This low level of interest from journalists regarding the problems of overindebtedness and personal bankruptcy may be explained by the economic context of stable growth until the mid-1980s, followed by the bubble economy (1989)(1990)(1991), the maintenance of a high rate of saving and the accumulation of wealth by Japanese households (Horioka 2012). Personal bankruptcy was seen as an individual problem caused by over-borrowing, attributable to hedonistic behavior on the part of irresponsible consumers. 33 The public did not see personal bankruptcy and over-indebtedness as social issues of general concern. This low perception of the public opinion is also due to the lack of impact of borrowers' advocates to voice their interests in institutional arenas. During the 1970s and the 1980s, local consumer associations and groups of attorneys did not have sufficient experience and knowledge to organize and mobilize the defense and representation of the borrowers' diffuse interests. As we can see in Figure 6, the newspapers coverage of social issues related to sarakin was low, apart from a period during which the implementation of the Moneylenders Law was on the political agenda, in 1978 and then in 1983-1984. Utsunomiya Kenji, one of the leaders of the group of lawyers, who organized the defense of borrowers and victims of predatory lending in the early 1980s, pointed out that Japanese lawyers were lacking the experience and training needed to defend consumers in general, and borrowers in particular. 34 This was partly due to the low level of consumer protection rights as mentioned by Kimura Tatsuya, another lawyer involved in the movement against sarakin's abusive lending practices. 35 Utsunomiya also highlighted the fact that, as many lenders were linked to the Japanese mafia (bôryokudan), articles about the sarakin were widely diffused by the media as a result of the great number of scandals. Although this aspect of the market represented an obstacle to civil society in its effort to mobilize consumer defense, at the same time the high media coverage helped lawyers to communicate more easily through the newspapers about their actions to prevent borrowers from falling victim to illicit practices, and thus becoming over-indebted. 36 However, as our research shows, the newspaper coverage of these topics was very irregular until the end of the 1980s, reflecting low interest in the public opinion.

Collective actions organized by groups of lawyers
After the bubble burst, borrowers' defense groups composed of local consumers associations, local bar associations, as well as lawyers from the Nichibenren began to better structure their actions at the local and national levels in response to the first significant increase of over-indebtedness and personal bankruptcy caused by over-borrowing (mainly due to credit cards) following the bubble period. By the 1990s, they provided more and more counseling and legal support at the local level, and organized several series of seminars and conferences to mobilize and inform the public about the risk of over-indebtedness, moneylenders' illicit practices and the options for legal recourse available to protect debtors from harsh collection practices. In Figures 7 and 8 we have sorted all articles related to civil society action and crimes. We observe a decreasing number of articles listed in the category of crimes related to sarakin and, on the contrary, an increasing number of articles listed in the category of civil society actions that might reflect a rising impact of borrowers' defense groups' collective actions. This rising number of articles related to civil society actions also shed light on the possible influence of lawyers over the judiciary power when defending borrowers' cases in courts. Since 2003, judicial power progressively decided to protect more systematically the borrowers.
Between 1996 and 2004, the government passed the Personal Bankruptcy Law's reform to ease the process of insolvency declaration. This reform helped lawyers to defend over-indebted individuals. During the 1990s and the early 2000s, the number of over-borrowing consumers grew. Data on Japanese bankruptcy filings reflect the growing financial vulnerability of households at the bottom of the income ladder. These data show that the increased rate of bankruptcy filings was mainly due to over-borrowing on the unsecured loan market (see Figure 9). 37 Borrowers' defense groups pointed out that illicit practices and excess lending mainly caused the rising number of individuals filing for personal bankruptcy.
The increase in the number of articles covering those social issues was also the result of the Courts' series of decisions since 2005, especially the Supreme Court's final decision in January 2006, putting an end to the gray zone lending, which meant that borrowers could claim a refund for excess interest charges. This is known as a 'kabarai' claim (see Figure 10).
Scholars at the Waseda University Institute for Research in Consumer Financial Services pointed out, in a survey on the rise of personal bankruptcy filings, that the problem was not caused directly by over-borrowing or by high interest rates, but rather because of economic reasons such as lower wages, and unexpected events such as job loss or health issues (Higuchi & Banno 2004). These results are consistent with other studies published on the problem in the USA. For example, M. White argues that the rise in the number of bankruptcy filings is less a question of financial deregulation than of an economic downturn leading to job loss, lower income and, thus, a heavier burden of debt (White 2007b). She also mentions the case of individual company and small business owners who suffered greatly during the economic crisis and eventually declared personal bankruptcy. In France as well, the government has recognized, since 2003, the problem of passive indebtedness (surendettement passif) due to unexpected events such as job loss, bad health or divorce, making the borrower unable to reimburse his or her loan (Gloukoviezoff 2009). In Japan, we observe that borrowers' defense groups led by highly popular personalities such as Utsunomiya Kenji, who became a political entrepreneur at the head of the movement for sarakin victims, incorporated their political discourse into a broader context of rising inequality (kakusa shakai), increasing poverty and the phenomenon of the working poor. 38 The kabarai procedure implemented by the Supreme Court allowed many indebted people to temporarily escape their debt.

The new law of regulation (kasei kashikingyô hô) and its limits
In 2006-2010, the government revised its policy for protecting consumers. This protection included measures to ensure transparency in consumer credit contracts, to limit excessive or extortionate lending and to ensure better collection and distribution of consumer credit histories, including the centralization of Figure 10 Increasing number of articles about people filing suit Source: Data collection by the author from Asahi Shinbun 1991Shinbun -2006 data, and better control over the privacy of personal data. On one hand, since 2010, Japan's regulations regarding consumer debtors provide a high level of protection across four areas: restrictions on credit advertising, borrowers' rights in contracting (usury cap) and repayment, recourse in case of over-indebtedness, and protection of private financial data, although the establishment of a positive data center for better access to credit is still only under consideration. On the other hand, the full implementation of the revised Money Lending Business Law in 2010 worries academic scholars. As a result of the legal amendments, consumer finance companies have tightened their credit standards for high-risk borrowers and a significant portion of borrowers are excluded from the market, including SMEs. (Domoto 2014) points out that regulating interest rates has evident side-effects as access to credit is reduced and causes borrowers who are considered high-risk (small business owners, temporary workers, etc.) to be excluded from the market. He observes that the new regulation resulted in an increase of informal loans (family loans and requests for loans on the black market). He also points out the lack of credit counseling services for those who are in difficulty from over-borrowing. Indeed the kabarai provision helps those who are heavily indebted in the short term but cannot solve the general problem of overindebtedness. He argues that lawyers and judicial scriveners have a virtual monopoly in the area of debt adjustment; in a kabarai claim they receive a contingency fee of 20 to 30 per cent of the amount recovered from the moneylenders, encouraging attorneys and other legal professionals to continue to offer kabarai claim services (Domoto 2014). Following the Supreme Court decision, the seven major CFCs returned almost 1.6 trillion yen and 400 billion of this may well represent the amount received by the attorneys (Ramseyer 2013). Most of the CFCs went bankrupt. Attorneys and legal professionals who deal with debt adjustment made huge profits as the number of kabarai claims increased from 2006. 39

Conclusion
In this article we have analyzed the changes that gradually transformed Japanese moneylenders business since the 1970s to the 2000s by focusing on the gap between the formal rules and informal practices of lenders that led to an excess of lending, abusive and illicit practices as well as over-borrowing and, in the worst cases, debt-related suicides. Our results are as follows. First, the revision of the Moneylenders Business Law (2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010) is the result of an accumulation of collective actions organized by lawyers to defend borrowers' interests, covered by the media and sustained by the judiciary power, as over-indebtedness became a subject of general concern in a period of economic downturn, an awareness of rising inequality (kakusa shakai) and growing poverty, resulting from greater economic insecurity. The media coverage of several scandals related to moneylenders and CFCs' abusive practices also changed the public's perception of social issues related to sarakin mondai.
This re-regulation is also the result of gradual institutional changes over a period of 30 years, highlighting a shift in power relations such that the groups of lawyers who were not involved in the original design of the law in the late 1970s to early 1980s, then they took it over and turned it to new ends (Streeck & Thelen 2005). Indeed, by relying on the kabarai procedure, lawyers helped indebted or liquidity-constrained individuals to gain access to liquidity in the short term. As Ramseyer (2013) argues, lawyers and judicial scriveners won a virtual monopoly in the area of debt adjustment and made huge profits with this new business. The growing legal experience of lawyers to defend borrowers as well as consumers, in general allows them to increase their influence in the legislative arena. It also reveals a greater capacity for civil society to organize the provision of better weak interests legal protection. But we also observe that lawyers' collective actions did not contribute to promoting social change.
In fact, the group of lawyers argued that over-borrowing was mainly due to unsecured credit lenders' illicit practices. Their arguments have focused on the major CFCs, which have made large profits by charging high interest rates. As a result, the public was more concerned about the lack of morality and justice in the sector than about the structural factors of the increasing financial vulnerability of lower income households, irregular workers, small business and VSEs.
Finally, the new regulation has radically modified the complementarity between bank and non-bank sectors by putting out of the market almost all lenders (first the small lenders, followed by the large CFCs). However, moneylenders assumed historically a social and economic function by providing loans to highrisk borrowers, mainly small business. Since the mid-2000s, commercial banks have entered the consumer finance market through acquisition of the large CFCs, but they don't provide small loans to high-risk borrowers such as small businesses and consumers, unlike many moneylenders who used to do it at the local level. This lack of efficiency of the credit sector to adapt to the characteristics of the Japanese economy and its financial system reveals the limit of the new law, which was mostly a response to a historical contradictory conflict of interests between two social groups over a profitable business: the loan business followed by the debt adjustment business.
In our current research, we are now focusing our attention on analyzing the dynamic that would explain the discrepancies between the moral objective of a cooperation between weak interest and lawyers, and the outcomes in term of new business opportunities supported by political parties, as well as a new type of collective action and its efficiency in bringing about social change or not. For example, the judiciary procedure -kabarai -was also used as a measure of social policy's substitution by the government to solve the problem of rising overindebtedness in the short term. It seems that the coalition of interests between moneylenders and dominant political parties has changed in favor of the group of lawyers whose political influence has increased since the mid-2000s.