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Testing for Fiscal Illusion in Wisconsin Towns

Abstract Fiscal illusion, a theory of the impact of government revenue structures on voter decision-making, has been studied extensively by economists and political scientists; however, empirical verification has been limited. This study builds on Lowery's (1987a) work by examining the relationship between suggested illusionary revenues and measures of electoral stress. Here, electoral stress is measured as constituent contacting—one possible measure of voter influence—for local government officials up for re-election. Using a combination of survey data from over 1,000 Wisconsin town board members, audited fiscal data and U.S. Census data, we were able to test for fiscal illusion. Our findings show that when looking at five revenue types (conditional grants, unconditional grants, property taxes, user fees and charges, and debt service) there is some evidence suggesting officials seeking another term in office will tend to support fees and charges as a revenue structure over other structures. Overall, there is little consistent evidence suggesting that elected officials are manipulating revenue structures for electoral gain. Revenue structures are mostly influenced by social and economic factors, such as median household income, population changes, and per capita property valuation.