{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.0234375, 'fraction_numerical': 0.022879464285714284, 'mean_word_length': 4.976666666666667, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
The Threat of Terrorism, Presidential Approval, and the 2004 Election

This paper tests the conventional wisdom about the effect of the threat of terrorism on voting decisions in the 2004 election. We draw on two national surveys and a series of surveys in the state of Michigan conducted between late Fall 2001 and mid-June 2004. As a first step, we examine trends in popular perceptions of the terrorist threat since late 2001. We track these perceptions using a core indicator of “sociotropic threat” that is common to both the national and Michigan surveys. We also examine whether major post-9/11 events and terror warnings (“Orange Alerts”) have affected people’s sense of threat. Those warnings do generally raise people’s concern about another attack; but they have no impact on presidential approval. We then examine the relationship between perceptions of threat and approval of George Bush’s performance as President. We show that this relationship changed fundamentally between the immediate post-9/11 period and the middle of 2004. While shortly after 9/11 those who expressed greater concern about terrorism were more likely to approve of Bush’s presidential performance, by April-June 2004 this relationship had reversed: those who were more concerned about terrorism were less likely to approve of Bush’s performance. Finally, we examine the relationship between perceptions of threat and the voters’ choice between Bush and Kerry, based on a statewide survey conducted in Michigan in late Spring 2004. We test whether perceived threat matters after we take into account the voters’ foreign policy and economic views as well as their ideological and partisan orientations. We show that the sense of threat does matter, and that it works against the re-election of George Bush.