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Disagreement and Convergence

The main problem in the first five chapters is that of explaining why it is that many possible users of moral language disagree with one other, rather than talk past each other. There are other problems about moral disagreement which relate to the core claims of the realist view that I have defended. These problems center on the notion of convergence: many users of moral terms do not appear to be disposed to agree, or converge, on moral matters, even after extensive reflection. Some argue that non-converging users of moral language cannot refer to the same property. Others claim that if convergence does not obtain, then moral knowledge is not possible. This chapter shows how the realist view developed in the previous chapters should reject these claims. It should hold that reference magnetism allows for non-converging speakers to co-refer, and that the possibility of a non-converging speaker does not show that moral beliefs are at risk of being false, and so not knowledge.