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Intuitus and Ratio in Spinoza's Ethical Thought

According to Spinoza, all human beings are to some degree in bondage, subject to the passions, and at the mercy of the fortunes. However, in so far as an individual is virtuous he is able to avoid and overcome dangers, and bear calmly those misfortunes he lacks the wherewithal to escape. The source of this power over the passive affects is understanding. ‘A man’, Spinoza says, ‘cannot be said to act from virtue in so far as he is determined to do something because he has inadequate ideas, but only in so far as he is determined because he understands’. All adequate knowledge is not, however, equal. While both ratio (reason or the second kind of knowledge) and intuitus (intuition or the third kind of knowledge) are adequate, intuitus has greater power over the passionate affects than ratio. Ratio is not impotent, it is effective and useful as far as it goes, but ‘the greatest striving of the mind, and its greatest virtue is understanding things by the third kind of knowledge’ because ‘of how much more powerful it is than. . .knowledge of the second kind’. The distinction between the second and third kinds of