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The dangerous tendency to essentialize cultural categories in academic psychology

This commentary welcomes Held’s (2020) article on epistemic violence in psychological science. When psychologists employ social categories, such as “Black people” or “the Japanese” as “fixed factors” in their experiments, they may ignore the social construction of these categories within a cultural context. This can lead to cultural conceptions being enshrined in a methodology that has a tendency to essentialize social categories, with their inferred psychological attributes simply becoming a question of their “accuracy” or “inaccuracy” and not about the history and ideologies within which they are formed. Cultural psychology and Indigenous psychologies challenge this ideological neutrality of social categories, which is illustrated by Hinton’s cultural model of stereotypes. Ignoring the evidence that traditional academic psychology is a cultural psychology (rather than an objective science) simply maintains the dominant ideological structures of epistemic violence within it.