{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.02203856749311295, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.411764705882353, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Overview: Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe in Former Communist Societies

This article reviews studies on civil-military relations by David Betz (Russia), Daniel Nelson (Romania and Bulgaria), Natalie Mychajlysyn (Ukraine), Marybeth Ulrich (Czech Republic), and Mark Yaniszewski (Poland and Hungary). All note minimal progress in developing a cadre of civilian defense experts who can end the monopoly of ministries of defense on policymaking. Those states that are candidates for NATO membership have made much more drastic cuts in the size of paramilitary and internal security forces than have Russia and Ukraine. They have also moved toward postures and doctrines based on coalition security policies, which have all but ruled out the internal use of armed force on the model that Milosevic developed in the former Yugoslavia and Tudjman attempted to develop in Croatia. In Russia and Ukraine, the strong presidential systems have at their disposal large internal armed forces that could be available for targeting domestic political opponents or minority groups.