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The Dead Hand: Commentary on Baars on contrastive analysis

Behaviorism still threatens consciousness research. On the surface, Baars' "contrastive analysis" may look as if it reduces first-person consciousness to a third- person construct. But once its tacit behaviorism is isolated and overcome, contrastive analysis turns out to give empirical support to the primacy of the first-person stance for the scientific investigation of consciousness. 1.1 As a pragmatic method for organizing experimental results, contrastive analysis is extremely useful. It underlies Baars' A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness (1988), in my opinion the most important single book on consciousness since William James' Principles of Psychology (1890). But to grasp the great strength of Baars' method as he uses it, it is best to read his book. 1.2 Paradoxically, Baars' "A Thoroughly Empirical Approach to Consciousness" (1994) rests on a theoretical elaboration of contrastive analysis. This moves Baars toward a philosophical (or at least methodological) tar-baby: the first-person/third-person dispute that now sticks to so much thinking about consciousness.