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The Iranian Nuclear Debate: More Myths Than Facts

ABSTRACT: Much of the public debate surrounding US policies regarding Iran has been distorted by myths that obscure the actual status of Iranian nuclear programs. Similarly, discussions about the implications of a nuclear-armed Iran are often built on questionable assumptions requiring more thorough examination. This article dispels these myths, questions these assumptions, and draws important implications for US policymakers in this critical strategic debate. ********** International negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program are once again in limbo. At the conclusion of the February talks in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Iran's Foreign Minister All Akbar Salehi characterized them as a significant "milestone" that had reached a "turning point," and left him "very optimistic and hopeful." (1) Meanwhile, reactions from representatives of the so-called P5+1 (United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany) were notably more measured, but hinted at an optimistic assessment as newly confirmed US Secretary of State Kerry characterized the February sessions as "useful." (2) As so frequently happened in the past, however, subsequent talks in April crashed against the reality of significant gaps in the substantive negotiating positions of the P5+1 and Iranian teams. The European Union representative to the talks, Catherine Ashton, cast a decidedly downbeat assessment of the April sessions observing that "the positions of the [P5+1] and Iran remain far apart on the substance.... We have therefore agreed that all sides will go back to capitals to evaluate where we stand in the process." (3) This pause in negotiations offers American policymakers the opportunity to reassess strategic options regarding Iran's nuclear program. The recent election of Hasan Rouhani as President of Iran gives the Obama administration another reason to reconsider America's current approach. A coherent strategy requires the establishment of clear objectives and a design for employing the nation's instruments of power to achieve those objectives. In the case of Iran, the overriding strategic objective of current US policy has been made exactingly clear by President Obama and Vice President Biden. In his speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee one year ago, President Obama said the objective of US policy is "to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon." (4) Vice President Biden reiterated this position nearly verbatim to the same audience on 4 March 2013 saying the goal of US policy is "to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon." (5) While others outside the White House have suggested alternative US policy objectives ranging from preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability to ousting the current regime in Tehran, these statements by the President and Vice President have effectively ended this portion of the strategic debate. US policies under President Obama will be guided by the paramount objective of preventing Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Nevertheless, the public and internal debates over how the United States can best marshal its diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments of power to accomplish this expressed policy objective will continue for some time. The default option would be to maintain the current US dual-track approach of offering negotiations while imposing ever-tightening economic and financial sanctions in the hope of compelling Iranian concessions on its nuclear program. Others have made the case for preemptive military attacks designed to destroy Iran's existing nuclear facilities or facilitate a regime change in Tehran. (6) Still others have advocated a strategy emphasizing a diplomatic approach exchanging United States and international recognition of Iran's right to enrich uranium in return for commitments from Tehran to limit enrichment activities and subject them to an intrusive international inspection regimen ensuring nuclear materials are not diverted to military purposes. …