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From regulation to projection: Reliance on regulatory mode in predictions about others

Much of social life hinges on the ability to infer others' thoughts, feelings, and states. For example, imagine having to hire a new team member and wanting to gauge to what extent a candidate might be motivated by a transactional relative to a transformational leader or be inclined to reconcile after interpersonal conflict. You might also want to know whether she has a humorous temper or is prone to nostalgia. Despite lacking substantial information about this person and not having direct access to her mind, you could rely on a useful proxy: your own mind. In doing so, you would not be alone: People generally tend to overestimate the degree of similarity between others and themselves and use the self and self-knowledge as a starting point when making social inferences and predictions (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Nickerson, 1999), projecting their own inclinations and preferences onto others (Krueger, 2000, 2007; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). This proposition that people's default strategy when they infer other people's feelings, preferences, attitudes, and more is to generalize by drawing an analogy between themselves and the other person underlies various approaches to egocentrism and projection in social judgments (e.g., Alicke, Dunning, & Krueger, 2005; Ames, 2004a, 2004b; Epley et al., 2004; Heider, 1958; Holmes, 1968; Krueger, 2000, 2007; Mussweiler, 2003; Nickerson, 1999; Tamir & Mitchell, 2013; van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003, 2005; but see Karniol, 2003). Indeed, relying on self-knowledge may be a reasonable heuristic when faced with limited information (Dawes, 1989; Krueger, 2007). The present research examined whether social predictions are shaped by people's own regulatory mode (Higgins, Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000). As detailed below, self-judgments in the opening example's domains are sensitive to people's regulatory mode on locomotion (concerned with movement from one state to another) versus assessment (concerned with making comparisons and judgments before acting). Specifically, as a consequence of having a stronger locomotion rather than assessment orientation people prefer a transformational to a transactional leader (Benjamin & Flynn, 2006) Received: 10 January 2019 | Accepted: 31 December 2019 DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.2660