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Cognitive Paradigms in the Arms Race: Deterrence, Détente and the 'Fundamental Error' of Attribution

This essay represents an attempt to apply some of the concepts and insights from the branch of cognitive psychology known as attribution theory to the classic problems of the arms race. The author identifies sets of nearly axiomatic assumptions - referred to as arms-use paradigms - concerning the nature of the adversary, the efficacy of various types of threats and sanctions, the nature of the values thought to be at stake, and the sources of each side's behavior. The rational consistency and armament policy effects of three basic paradigms (pure deterrence, mutually-managed deterrence, and the spiral model) are considered. Attention is directed to problems of a psy chological nature associated with movement from one paradigm to another and to the possible contributions of attribution theory in pointing out systematic psychological biases that may impede the shift to paradigms less characterized by self-reinforcing, positive feedback effects and thus prevent the development of more benign, con trollable arms policies.