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The Problems of Knowledge in Policymaking

Securitization does not happen in a vacuum. Key functional actors can play a very important role in helping the securitizing actor to understand the nature of the threat to the referent object. In foreign policy, this is particularly true when the policymakers are not familiar with the issue at hand and, therefore, there is ample room for other actors to influence them. This chapter, however, shows that the Chinese foreign policy bureaucracy and the community of experts was only partially able to do aid this securitization. These findings emerge from an examination of the development of the Chinese diplomatic system in terms of regional expertise, personnel, resources, and political standing. As for the scholars in Chinese universities and think tanks, they lacked either the skills or the influence to warn the government about the risks brewing in North Africa and the Middle East. At most, they were able to shape the government’s response to the crisis in those regions only after it took place.