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Interrogative Reasoning and Discovery: a New Perspective on Kepler’s Inquiry.

In recent years, serious study of scientific discovery has begun to flourish again. Although the discussion has cleared up some issues, the field still is in need of a new kind of systematic approach. Such an approach should locate and justify the epistemic role of discovery within a larger theory of scientific practice, and its basic claims should receive support from historical and contemporary reports of actual scientific practice. Few proposals have even tried to realize these desiderata. Historical case studies do not usually address the systematic goals, while systematic studies are too abstract and idealized to accommodate the details of historical studies. Thus, models which attempt to mediate between these poles are needed. In this paper, I shall introduce a model which accords fairly well with the desiderata. Its conceptual core is the interrogative model of inquiry (I-Model, for short) which laakko Hintikka and his associates have been developing in recent years. I shall argue that the 1model offers a promising theory of scientific inquiry, and, in particular, that it can bring light to the structure of reasoning employed by working scientists. The main argument for this goes as follows. The model is founded on a precise logical theory. As a logical model of knowledge acquisition it can offer us something that the historical case studies of scientific discoveries have not offered: a logic of scientific discovery. On the other hand, I-model's account of the discovery process is less idealized than in previous systematic models of discovery. It thus captures more details of historical episodes. Consequently, the I-model forms a kind of synthesis between historical case studies and previous accounts of