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Violations of Belief Persistence in Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium

Abstract Belief persistence is a standard rationality axiom in formal models of belief change. It requires that new information be accommodated with the smallest possible change to existing beliefs. This note shows that violations of belief persistence are possible in J. Eichberger and D. Kelsey's (1999a, “Signalling Games with Uncertainty,” unpublished, University of Birmingham; 1999b, in Beliefs, Interactions and Preferences in Decision Making (M. J. Machina and B. Munier, Eds.), pp. 135–157. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic) Dempster–Shafer equilibrium ( DSE ), a solution concept for signaling games based on Choquet expected utility. Such violations may lead to implausible equilibria, so a refinement of DSE is proposed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D81.