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CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HUMAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Contributions to the behavioral sciences tend to be evaluated against the background of the spectacular technological achievements of institutionalized and organized science. From these arose the great expectations rooted in a conception of man as a problem-solving class of life. To solve a problem means to find a course of action that will transform an actual state of affairs into a desired one. Science, by revealing causal connections between events and conditions, is supposed to provide foci of leverage, where purposeful intervention will set in motion the chain of events leading to the goal envisaged. This is the paradigm of science applied to technology, and it has worked. The extrapolation of this paradigm to human affairs seems natural enough. The assorted ills of social and political life are easily conceived as problems. The phrase “human engineering,” coined two generations ago, carried at that time the prestigious connotation of technology rooted in science. That was when technology was still viewed by most people, at least in technologically developed countries, as the fountainhead of blessings: liberation from backbreaking toil, a cornucopia of abundance, a shield against a hostile environment; in short, a weapon that empowered man to master nature. Human behavioral science was expected to enable man to master his social self. Today, the term human engineering evokes in many the anti-Utopian visions of Aldous Huxley and George Orwell. No doubt, the monstrous manipulation of human masses by the totalitarian regimes of the 1930s have infused these visions with a frightful realism. The more subtle but no less insidious exploitation of the mass psyche by the promotion industries, particularly in the United States, contributed to the feeling of repugnance against any sort of tampering with individual autonomy, whether coercive or persuasive. Nevertheless, the hope persists that a behavioral science can be adapted for humane purposes, not by providing means of manipulating human beings but by enlightening them. This hope rests on the liberal creed that man is rational. Having discovered the basic laws of nature, man has apparently learned to put them to work in helping him to realize his goals. Having learned the causes of many diseases, man has learned to prevent, control, or cure them. Similarly, it is argued, if behavioral science can uncover the basic causes of wars, social strife, mental illness, economic dislocations, and so on, ways will be suggested to eradicate these ills. Thus, we have two opposing attitudes toward the potentials of the human behavioral sciences: hope and mistrust. This is the ethical dimension spanning opposing views on the desirability of developing behavioral science and its applications. Somewhat related to this dichotomy is another, methodological one. Some maintain that science is all of a piece, so that the way to construct a behavioral science is to follow in the footsteps of the physical scientists, who deal with hard, quantifiable data and extract from them reliable, publicly verifiable knowledge, and who evaluate theories in terms of their potential to predict events under specified conditions. Others declare that human behavior, being a manifestation of consciousness, purposefulness, or free will, is not subject to the sort of deterministic causality that governs the events in the inanimate world. Hence a be-