{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.015971148892323546, 'fraction_numerical': 0.004121586810922205, 'mean_word_length': 5.367213114754098, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Reforming Equalization: Balancing Efficiency, Entitlement and Ownership

In this paper, we provide an overview of the equalization grant system in Canada and the issues that have been raised concerning the reform of the fiscal transfer system. Any reforms to the equalization grant system have to balance three concerns — “efficiency” effects that arise through federal financing of transfers, and the incentive effects on provincial fiscal policies, “entitlement” to reasonably comparable public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation, and “ownership” of resources and independence of fiscal policies by provincial governments. Five proposals for reform of the equalization system are discussed. With regard to the inclusion rate for resource revenues in equalization formula, we argue that the rate should be reduced from 50 per cent to 25 per cent and that ceiling on total equalization payments should be eliminated. We argue against the proposal to exempt from the calculation of equalization entitlements that are deposited in provincial sovereign wealth funds because this would not reduce total equalization entitlements in present value terms, it would be complex to implement if it extended to all forms of savings by provinces (such as debt reduction), and it would not alter the resource rich provinces’ incentives to save more of their resource revenues. We argue against a proposal to reduce CHT and CST to provinces with above average fiscal capacities because this would reduce their incentive to develop and tax their resources, and it would be counter to the purpose of these block grants, which is to reduce the vertical fiscal imbalance between the federal and the provincial governments. We review the Gusen (2012a) proto-type model for incorporating variations in costs and needs in the computation of the equalization entitlements and argue that this procedure seems feasible and merits further analysis.