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The Cambridge History of China. Volume 12: Republican China 1912-1949, Part 1

power after 1976. Instead there was a suspicious balance of power as conservative economic and radical cultural officials increasingly diverged. Dittmer offers a lively analysis of factional scheming, making it clear that Mao was an active intriguer who had not been rendered passive by his illness. Deng Xiaoping was also busy as a plotter against the left on the eve of Mao's death, not merely an innocent victim of Jiang Qing's venom. The scope of Dittmer's book is so great that it will not please all readers. For instance, its use of the language of psychotherapy to explain Chinese politics may be resisted by some. Many readers will also have alternative explanations for specific events. For instance, Dittmer attributes Mao's attacks on consumerism in the 1960s to his disappointment with the Great Leap, but one might also argue that Mao then needed a particularly austere version of Marxism as he sought to mobilize Chinese into the harsh labor of Dazhai-style economic development. Dittmer's tone is somewhat detached, not partisan to any group in China but intellectually empathetic to the situations faced by politicians as different as Mao and Deng. He shows refreshing skepticism toward the Chinese sources he mines so effectively, and he writes with less desire to find a villain than is true of some recent work on the Cultural Revolution. His book is a richly documented, well-reasoned study that will be read by all students of Chinese politics.