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A Model of Conflict and Constraint

This chapterdescribes a model of conflict between dissidents and the government under some potential for domestic legal consequences for rights violations. Governments decide whether to obligate themselves to international law in expectation of domestic conflicts over policy and the potentiality of dissent and the motive to repress. This chapter explains the scholarship underpinning the formal model and the logic that produces the insights of the following chapter. How does the leader balance the increased probability of paying costs associated with HRTs against the incentives to repress citizens who might challenge policies? Does the population respond differently to leaders who have adopted HRTs than those who have not committed themselves under international law? Under what conditions do human rights treaties alter the conflict behaviors of these actors?