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Analyzing Soviet Strategic Arms Decisions

Abstract : This paper addresses the basic question of why Soviet decisionmakers make the strategic arms decisions they do by examining the nature of those decisions, assessing the capabilities and limitations of such analyses, and suggesting ways to enhance their usefulness to policymakers. The importance of providing 'answers' to policymakers in this highly complex and data-poor field generates a particular need for analysts to maximize the use of available data and to be aware of the analytical assumptions they bring to the task. Therefore, it is suggested that multiple-approach analyses would be more useful than the reliance on a single analytic view. Three approaches that might be pursued in juxtaposition in examining individual Soviet strategic arms decisions are presented. These are the rational strategic actor approach, the pluralistic approach, and the national leadership approach. The first two decision-making approaches basically reflect two broad schools of thought on the Soviet-US strategic arms relationship that stress, alternatively, responsiveness to the international threat and internal bureaucratic and organizational processes as shapers of strategic arms programs. The third approach represents a middle ground between them that has not been emphasized heretofore. These three approaches are put forth without extensive elaboration or refinement to give an initial indication of the possibility and the utility of juxtaposing discrete sets of analytic assumptions in addressing the whys and wherefores of a particular Soviet strategic arms decision.