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There Is No Empirical Evidence for Critical Positivity Ratios: Comment on Fredrickson (2013)

Fredrickson and Losada (American Psychologist, 2005, 60, 678-686) theorized that a ratio of positive affect to negative affect (positivity ratio) of 2.9013 acts as a critical minimum for well-being. Recently, Brown, Sokal, and Friedman (American Psychologist, 2013, 68, 801-813) convincingly demonstrated that the mathematical work underlying this critical minimum positivity ratio was both flawed and misapplied. This comment addresses Fredrickson’s (American Psychologist, 2013, 68, 814-822) insistence that, regardless of the incorrect mathematical work, substantial empirical evidence exists both for critical minimum and maximum positivity ratios and, more generally, for a (unspecified) nonlinear relation between the positivity ratio and well-being, by first noting that there was a mismatch between Fredrickson and Losada’s (2005) theory and the data used to test it, then describing the methodological and statistical problems of Fredrickson and Losada’s empirical study (2005), and, finally, examining the other studies that Fredrickson (2013) cited as empirical evidence.