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Dynamic load altering attacks in smart grid

A load altering attack (LAA) is a cyber-physical attack against demand response and demand side management programs. It attempts to control and change certain unsecured controllable loads in order to damage the grid through circuit overflow or other adverse effects. So far, the focus in the LAA literature has been only on static load altering attacks, where the attack is mainly concerned in changing the volume of the load. In contrast, in this paper, we address dynamic load altering attacks (DLAAs), where we are concerned with not only the amount of the change in the load, but also the trajectory over time at which we change the load. Interestingly, we can prove that if a DLAA is closed-loop in a way that the load is changed in response to changes in power grid frequency, then we can introduce DLAA trajectories that make the power system unstable. This can be achieved without the need for increasing the scope or volume of the attack, compared to a static LAA scenario. We present simulation results based on an example six bus test system.