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Leibniz on plenitude, infinity, and the eternity of the world

Late in his career, Leibniz was faced with the charge, put forward by Clarke, that the underlying principles of his philosophy committed him to postulate an eternal world. According to Clarke, Leibniz is, wittingly or unwittingly, compelled by his own doctrines to conclude 'that the material world must be infinite and that it must have been from eternity and must continue to eternity' (4.40). In advancing this claim, Clarke had in mind Leibniz's views on compossibility and the principle of the best, as well as Leibniz's inference that the quantity of matter is, in virtue of compossibility and perfection considerations, unlimited. Within the context of early modern philosophy and natural theology, this allegation was not to be taken lightly, for the eternity of the world was a doctrine commonly associated with heterodox religious and philosophical positions. In some corners, the eternity of the world was taken as evidence of its ontological independence from God: 'Eternity is the mark of independence; thus it was necessary that the world have a beginning'. Others feared that the world's eternity would make it a necessary emanation from a God who could not have chosen freely to create or not create the world. Worst of all, openly postulating the world's eternity would have established a close connection between Leibniz's philosophy and the philosophical bete noire of the period: Spinozism. Fully aware of the metaphysical and theological heterodoxy of the eternity of the world, and refusing to be bested by the Newtonians,