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Does Corporate Governance Prevent Corporate Debacles?

The renowned agency theory and thus most of the corporate governance (CG) regulations stress upon the independence of corporate boards and its various committees such as nomination and audit, among others. However, the review of the specific previous empirical literature does not fully support this public myth by unveiling that independence-related CG practices such as separate leadership structure, the majority of independent directors on the board, and independence of the nomination and audit committees could not escape the demise of Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing in the USA. Also, these CG practices could not avoid the fiasco of the Linear Corporation, Kenmark, and Sime Darby in Malaysia at the dawn of the twenty-first century. The review infers that despite a pivotal role, it is not only the independence of the board and its committees that avoid corporate failures. Overall, this review has important insights for governments, regulators, policymakers, corporate boards, stock exchanges, and shareholders of both the developed and developing countries around the world.