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Policy and theory in Quincy Wright's international relations

Looking back in personal recollection on the teaching of Quincy Wright, I am struck by the extent to which he combined broad theoretical interests and concern for policies and problem-oriented studies. The criticism is frequently made by reviewers of the corpus of international relations literature that theorists are indifferent to problems and students of foreign policy care little for scientific or philosophical generalizations. It is suggestive to compare the situation in economics with that in international relations. Harry G. Johnson, in delivering the prestigious Richard T. Ely lecture at the 1970 annual meetings of the American Economic Association, made a "slashing attack on the Chicago school of monetarism." At the same time he indicated his agreement and differences with the "New Economists of the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations" (New York Times, December 30, 1970). Professor Johnson described monetarism as a counterrevolution to the dominant Anglo-Saxon economics derived from Lord Keynes. This counter-revolution was inevitable because the Keynesian approach failed to solve the problem of inflation. The cardinal tenet of monetarism was that moderate and steady growth in the supply of money was capable of solving both the problem of inflation and unemployment. The Friedman school had little doubt that monetary policies would determine the level of economic activity and of prices. They timed their counter-attack to coincide with the escalation of the Vietnam war and the apparent failure of the New Economists to control inflation. The Keynesian defense was that not their theory but the politicians, who spent too much and taxed too little, should be held accountable for inflation. Whatever the merits of these two contending views, the most striking characteristic about them both is a supreme confidence that their respective doctrines and views could be applied directly in the economic market place. Neither saw their theories as divorced from practice; both were convinced that direct and measurable effects would follow with respect to policies and problems. Few would make this claim for theories of international relations today. The link between theories of, say, decision-making or community-building or integration and what actually occurs in the field of policy is far more difficult to ascertain. For one thing, there are myriads of theoretical propositions competing with one another in any review of a policy question. The decision to intervene in Korea, or subsequently in Vietnam, must have been based on a wide variety of views and dogmas. More importantly, the theorist today claims for himself a certain measure at least of detachment and separation from the real world. The notion is widely held that theorybuilding or model-building involves the abstraction from reality of some portion,