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Barriers to Collecting “Secret Intelligence” in the Bahamas

ABSTRACT In 2014, many Bahamians were outraged to read that they were among targets of a purportedly foreign surveillance program: SOMALGET. Richards (2014) pointed out that in the tradecraft of secret intelligence, one does not very often hear about smaller countries such as The Bahamas. Surprisingly, this archipelago has emerged as “the new kid on the block” in this extremely sensitive enterprise that is often employed in the shadows. However, The Bahamas is a novice in comparison to the “usual suspects” of intelligence communities; therefore, its secret intelligence link presents security and intelligence scholars with a very fertile case study. Accordingly, this article explores the principal barriers confronting the Bahamian security apparatus’ collection of secret intelligence. It draws upon open source data and relevant academic perspectives. The analysis of the barriers aims to make a valuable contribution to academia and the Bahamian national conversation on secret intelligence gathering. It is proposed that analyzing these barriers in their proper context could provide Bahamian policymakers and intelligence tradecraft practitioners with a more viable “culture of prevention” for any number of national security threats (Chalk & Rosenau, 2004).