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Executive Reorganization and Presidential Power

The attention paid in recent years to the question of legislative veto, rather than the problem of executive reorganization from which the issue of legislative veto derives, is a curious transformation of perspective. The opening sentence of Joseph and Ann Cooper's study of the constitutionality of the legislative veto makes the point for us. "Over the past several decades Congress increasingly has become concerned with and put emphasis on its role as overseer of the executive branch."' To a historian, the statement itself is an oddity. The battle over the president's power to reorganize the executive agencies and departments goes back into the nineteenth century. The issue has always been that of congressional oversight. The power of reorganization has been grudgingly and reluctantly given, on short-term grants, and renewed only when the president has requested it and has been willing to fight his way past