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Camp David and the Al-Aqsa Intifada: An Assessment of the State of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, July-December 2000

This article examines the Al-Aqsa Intifada and its impact on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. It is argued here that the Intifada was the result of long-term frustrations of the Palestinian people with the lack of change as well as the short-term need of the Palestinian leadership for an exit strategy after the Camp David summit. Palestinian strategy aimed at shifting the blame for the failure of Camp David from Yasser Arafat to Ehud Barak and to create maximum international solidarity to pressure Israel into concessions. Yet, closer analysis reveals that despite early successes, the Intifada strategy is one of diminishing returns. Conversely, Israeli crisis management, while taking some initial blows particularly in terms of public image, has proved relatively successful at preventing the erosion of Israeli positions on the ground. Ultimately, however, neither Palestinians nor Israelis will be able to achieve their respective aims of statehood and security without returning to the negotiating table.