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A Mis-signalling Problem? The Troubled Performance Relationship between Credit Unions and Local Government in the UK

This article argues that the development of British credit unions is being held back by the unclear objectives and performance measures set by different external stakeholders. Credit unions are particularly vulnerable to contradictory accountability requirements, because they can serve a number of different socio-economic purposes. They may therefore face multiple lines of managerial and political accountability in a situation where they remain highly dependent on external stakeholders for funding. Survey evidence shows that the measures widely used to gauge credit union performance are not consistent with the policy objectives of the key stakeholders setting them. Taken together, they also fail to provide a balanced scorecard to support effective internal management decision making and external scrutiny. It is contended that key stakeholders need to compensate for the currently skewed performance scorecard with indicators that are sensitive to credit unions' specific objectives and to the stage they have reached in the credit union life cycle of development. Proposals for a wider and more appropriate suite of performance indicators are therefore outlined.