{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.021505376344086023, 'fraction_numerical': 0.014336917562724014, 'mean_word_length': 5.211111111111111, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
The 1967 withdrawal from NATO — a cornerstone of de Gaulle’s grand strategy?

No event better defined Charles de Gaulle’s complicated relationship with his Western allies than his 1966 decision to withdraw France from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Predictably, the story of this unilateral move has been very well documented; but how de Gaulle’s policy towards NATO interacted with other key elements of his grand strategy, namely his attempts to build a Western political union or to promote East–West dètente, has not received the same attention.