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Property and the human body: a proposal for posthumous conception.

There is no greater error in law and bioethics than the continuing opposition to applying the concept of property to posthumous conception cases and the human body generally. The aim of this article is to challenge this error and the assumptions underpinning it. The language of property, conceived of as a "web of interests", can be used to capture and identify the social, moral and ethical concerns that arise in cases concerning the human body, a position that finds support from a correct reading of the early High Court of Australia's decision in Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406. However, a key issue on which the language of property is silent is how to quantify the various competing interests in the posthumous conception case: the concept is useful only insofar as it provides the device for capturing the entirety of the posthumous conception problem.