{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.024337866857551897, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0014316392269148174, 'mean_word_length': 5.2690582959641254, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Some Ways of Thinking About Equality of Opportunity

M ANY RECENT discussions of the issue of social equality have suggested that there are two polar concepts of equality " equality of opportunity" and "equality or results" and that we must choose between these mutually exclusive normative principles.1 While this outlook has been most characteristic of supporters of "equality of opportunity" (or, more accurately, a certain conception of equality of opportunity), it can be found among advocates of "equality of results" as well.2 I shall argue in this paper that such an approach is fundamentally misleading and is based upon conceptual confusion regarding the principle of equality of opportunity. Just as there is not a single, essential concept of "equality," neither is there a single, essential concept of "equality of opportunity." Like the more general concept of equality, the meaning of the concept of equality of opportunity depends upon its context in a particular theory of distributive justice. Moreover, the relationship between "equality of opportunity" and "equality of results" will differ in the context of different substantive theories of distribution. Whether or not the two principles are mutually exclusive will depend upon the particular conception of equality of opportunity which is being invoked. There is more than one way of thinking about equality of opportunity.