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Some remarks on Geach's predicative and attributive adjectives

Peter Geach [3] has challenged moral philosophers with a series of 'insights' intended to show the merit of the derivability thesis (i.e., that one can derive moral Oughts' from purely descriptive statements, that evaluative terms are logically dependent on certain descriptive terms), and thereby cast aspersion on the 'Oxford Moralists" (e.g., Hare,Nowell-Smith, etc.) who disavow such a thesis. In formulating such a program, Geach draws a distinction between (logically) predicative adjectives and (logically) attributive adjectives: (1) if A is an adjective qualifying a noun By then A is a logically predicative adjective if the predication 4s A B' splits up logically into a pair of predications 'is a B'; and 'is A' (e.g., the proposition 'something is a red book,' (lx)(Bx Λ RX), splits into 'something is a book' and 'something is red');