{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.01787629603146228, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0014301036825169824, 'mean_word_length': 5.344671201814059, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Examining the Interventionist Logic in the Arab Uprisings

A t first glance, there was no coherent regional and international response to the transitions triggered in the Arab world since December 2010 as external players, both regional and international, had to confront with unceasing alarm the rapidity of change threatening to unravel in critical Arab states. However, as events in the region progressed, a pattern emerged to the external responses, one that was as predictive as it was differentiated. This was exemplified by the counter-revolutionary forces that were assembled against the transition in Bahrain on one hand, and the aggressively interventionist posture adopted towards Libya and Syria on the other. This inconsistency between activism and support for the supposedly democratic spirit of armed resistance groups, but inaction and silence towards the crushed non-violent public opposition elsewhere, clearly betrayed the interest-driven motivations of the external actors involved. Prior to the unrest, the affected Arab states, whether allies or not, had effectively served as the foundations of securing an appreciably stable and predictable geopolitical environment in a region known for its multi-layered conflict. Thus, what were at stake were the key security arrangements in the region, maintained through strategic balancing acts between allies and foes. It was towards preserving this induced balance and other interests in the region that multiple actors (ranging from the US and Britain to France and the larger EU to the region’s own Gulf monarchies and of late Iran, not to mention myriad non-state actors) have been persistently asserting their preferences in ways small and large. Initially, the rapidity of change meant that leaders, policymakers and governments were arriving at real-time responses instead of taking measured action. This led to several errors being unwittingly committed. There was a palpable failure to discern between a legitimate opposition force with an alternative credible structural paradigm (or at least an opposition leader possessing a vision beyond upsetting the status quo) on one hand, and a bandwagon of armed rebels seizing the opportunity to gain power on the other. This failure also emerged from the public legitimacy that had been bestowed upon the overthrow of universally recognised dictators and autocrats, despite democratic regimes having earlier supported them to secure key national interests. Some of the autocrats, however, were more quickly discredited than others (i.e. Gaddafi versus Mubarak). Furthermore, the momentum of protests in one Arab country was also seen to be an organic continuation of those in the previous country as a linear narrative began to dominate political commentary and media reportage.