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Incomplete Democracy: Political Democratization in Chile and Latin America (review)

The author makes his case by considering two examples of presidential (rather than parliamentary) systems of governance: Argentina and the Philippines. The institutional difference between them is that in Argentina the electoral system is party-centered, whereas in the Philippines it is candidate-centered. In the former, politicians build their careers on political party loyalty and thus, in addition to constitutional powers, the President as party leader has partisan powers in his hands, which he can use to good effect. In the latter, parties and party affiliations are weak and thus politicians survive by building personal reputations based on their ability to claim credit for policy favors granted to constituents. As a result, legislators are not overly willing to give up such particularistic powers, resisting pressures to "simplify and streamline."