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Relational Formalism and the Construction of Financial Instruments

Legal formalism and legal relationalism are traditionally thought of as defining opposite poles of jurisprudential analysis. This study develops a new position, “relational formalism,” as it emerges from practices of commercial law and financial law in particular. As an interpretation of practice, relational formalism - although maintaining the precedence of formalist construction over functional analysis - does so while responding to practical concerns and interests entailed by relations. It argues that legal formalism needs not be an expression of positivistic commitments, and can be approached on relational grounds.The study empirically analyzes a well-known problem of financial instruments and negotiability (an area traditionally characterized as intensely formalistic) to support both the tenability of relational formalism and its theoretical and practical fruitfulness. It claims that tacit judicial divergence over formalism, rather than specific doctrinal differences, best explains conflicting outcomes in similar cases in various US jurisdictions. It then applies performative linguistics to sustain a relational construction of formalism independently of its normative appeal. Finally, it contrasts a view of private law as a “model for action” with its view as an interpretative, bottom-up lens for approaching practice.Endorsed as "Download of the week" by the Legal Theory Blog.