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The American Search for Mideast Peace (review)

The author argues that Sadat was excessively inclined toward wishful thinking, often failed to distinguish between personal (social) and state (professional) relations, and was too uninterested and even lazy to deal with detail; high-ranking Egyptian diplomatic figures are quoteq on these last points. One of them, an Egyptian foreign minister Butrus Ghali, expressed matters succinctly to Telhami: "Sadat was a real amateur. He often moved hastily and unpredictably." An important conclusion by the author is that Israel's bargaining behavior at Camp David more closely corresponded to optimal bargaining than did that of Egypt or the United States. Butrus Ghali, however, concluded that even if there had been a different given optimal Egyptian bargaining behavior the results could not have been substantially different because "'objectively speaking, our relative weakness was out there for the whole world to see.'" While Telhami belabors his methodology and bargaining systems typologies, he has brought forth a well integrated and intellectually sophisticated study that is a worthwhile contribution to the methodological and subject matter fields involved. Scott D. Johnston Department of Political Science Hamline University