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On Vagueness in the Language of Science (A reply to A. Rosenberg)

M ROSENBERG (Dialogue, this number) raises some interesting objections to the account given in Experience and Theory (London, 1966, 1969) of the relation between observational and theoretical predicates. In order to answer his criticisms clearly and briefly, it seems best to begin with a rough outline of the criticized position, to turn next to his principal objections and to conclude with an indication of relevant developments.