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Security of current mobile IP solutions

Due to the operation of an IP's addressing and routing algorithms, mobile nodes (such as notebooks, portable workstations and palmtop computers) cannot currently participate while roaming without being reconfigured in tactical wired and wireless networks, strategic networks or the Internet. A node's IP address encodes the network access point to which the node is connected. This prevents IP packets from reaching the node if it moves to a new location and tries to connect to its home network from within a different network. Changing the IP address of a node when it moves is not possible while keeping existing transport level connections open. This change requires the termination of all current network activity and the user making a number of configuration changes followed by rebooting of the node. There are a number of proposed solutions for supporting mobile nodes (leading approaches are: mobility support in IPv4, route optimized mobile IP for IPv4, and mobility support in IPv6), that are compatible with the TCP/IP protocol suite. This paper addresses the security needs for IP mobile hosts in the tactical battlefield, the security capabilities and deficiencies of these solutions, and proposed solutions for identified security deficiencies.