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A Separation of Convenience? The Concept of Neutrality in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights1

Abstract The article examines the strategies the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) employs to apply the concept of neutrality in relation to Article 9 (freedom of religion or belief) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Having explored the theoretical background of the concept of neutrality and its specific application in the case law, the authors argue that neutrality is often used to display a bias towards a particular world view or societal paradigm, rather than representing unbiased perspectives of legal reasoning. The article studies the specific justifications for such biased approaches in the context of relevant ECHR cases and argues that in this way neutrality has discredited itself as a credible legal tool and as a form of legal argumentation. Furthermore the difficulty of handling the complexities of Article 9 claims by applying the principle of neutrality has led to a stronger trend of avoiding Article 9 by dealing with Article 9 claims through other Convention articles. Finally the authors discuss possible new approaches to legal reasoning which could take on board the dynamics of freedom of religion or belief through independent reasoning beyond the myth of neutrality.