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Meritorian and Equialitarian Justice

It has been suggested recently' that there are two concepts of justice, a meritorian concept according to which a just distribution is typically an unequal one, and an equalitarian concept according to which justice demands equal treatment for all regardless of merit. It has also been suggested that our present political and legal practices reflect both these concepts of justice. Thus we think that punishment should be proportionate to the seriousness of the crime (meritorian justice), but we also think that all should receive equal protection from the laws (equalitarian justice). Finally, it has been suggested that these two conceptions of justice conflict and that many contemporary controversies over social policy can be traced back to the conflicting demands of meritorian and equalitarian justice. The concept of justice is a complex one, and, as generally understood at present, justice does include both meritorian and equalitarian components. But it is not clear that there are literally two conflicting ideas of justice. And it is not clear that there is any meaningful alternative to meritorian justice, as a concept of distributive justice, when "merit" is understood in a reasonably broad sense. My argument in the following discussion is aimed, therefore, at refuting the view that there are two fundamental and conflicting ideas of justice: meritorian and equalitarian.2