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The Fractured Ideal

The previous chapter explored the deep dilemma at the heart of the “normalized” approach to ideal justice: the very normalization that defines the “correct” perspective in political philosophy leads to the conclusion that this correct perspective on justice cannot effectively identify its own ideal. This chapter analyzes ways to ease this tension—abandoning a fully normalized perspective in favor of various partial normalizations. It shows that when a partial normalization generated enough diversity to drive effective searching it ultimately engendered disagreement on the ideal itself. It would seem—at least on first inspection—that we must choose between full normalization, which yields a definite theory of justice but makes it most unlikely that we can find the ideal, and relaxing normalization, which improves the chances that many will find better alternatives, but which yields disagreement about what ideal justice is.