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Equality and Equity

The terms equality and equity are widely con fused. Despite their phonetic similarity and philological connections, they are quite distinct. The equality of a distri bution of income or wealth is basically a matter of fact and is, therefore, basically objective. The equity of the same distribution is basically a matter of ethical judgment and is, therefore, basically subjective. The discussion attempts to avoid extraneous issues, such as whether the particular poor— at any time or place—are apt to be morally superior, or in ferior, to the particular rich; and whether economic, as dis tinguished from ethical, maldistribution can cause, or has caused, economic depression. The paper begins with the valiant attempts by the marginal-utility economists of the turn of the century to frame an objective case for income equali zation and with A. P. Lerner's later extension of this case. It then moves on to the rebuttals of conservative opponents. Three more recent attempts—under the headings of ( 1 ) inter dependent utility functions, (2) limiting the domain of in equality and (3) John Rawls' recent theory of justice in generalized ethics—are then summarized. The discussion ends, however, on a skeptical note.