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1 Does Venture Capital Syndicate Size Matter ?

This paper empirically investigates the impact of venture capital (VC) syndicate size on the IPO and post-IPO performance of investee companies. After controlling for endogeneity problems, we provide evidence that firms backed by larger VC syndicates experience greater underpricing and lower post-IPO profitability. We suggest that this might be the result of coordination problems and conflict of interests that characterize large VC syndicates. Additionally, we find that the impact of VC syndicate size on IPO underpricing is mitigated by the existence of alternative monitoring mechanisms such as leverage and bank loans. This indicates that the certification role of leverage and bank loans is able to curb the costs associated with large VC syndicates.