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Great Expectations: The EU and Domestic Political Competition in East Central Europe

In postcommunist East Central Europe, the promise of European Union enlargement has brought with it enormous potential for political and economic integration, new freedoms to travel and to work, and many other public benefits. It has also led to improvements in ethnic minority rights, freedom of press, and anticorruption efforts. But enlargement is not without its domestic costs—and not just in the inevitable concessions during negotiations between the member and candidate countries. The scope of EU conditionality is far larger for the East European countries than for their Mediterranean predecessors. This set of “great expectations” that the EU has of the candidate countries regarding their conformity to its laws, regulations, and norms has preempted much of the public debate over the nature of policy in the region. As a result, it has had not only the benign effect of foreclosing the basic debates over desirable regime types (democracy and its alternatives), but it has eradicated both detailed and ideological debates over many areas of public policy. It is this perception that “there is no alternative” that also underpins the rise of anti-EU politicians who substitute populism in lieu of substantial debate over ideology or policy in the new democracies of East Central Europe. In short, the demands of enlargement have both constrained responsive and accountable party competition and, as the character of enlargement became apparent, encouraged populists and demagogues.