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Book Review: China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy

China’s New Nationalism is a timely book. It addresses head-on what could be one of the most important determinants of the international order in the 21st century—the direction and intentions of modern China. Gries wastes no time in getting to the heart of the matter. In his introduction he asks bluntly what China is—“an evil dragon, or cute panda?” The two extremes frame views of China in the West. Conservative media, such as the Weekly Standard, refer to China as “violent and primitive ... a regime of hair-curling, systematic barbarity.” Meanwhile, many others, including Henry Kissinger, see China as a practitioner of realpolitik—interested only in integration with the world community, and imbued with only “the best of intentions” (p. 2). Gries maps out the polarity, noting that most in academia are firmly in the latter camp— “romanticizing” China’s economic reforms and gradual liberalization, while shying away from China’s continuing human rights violations. On the other end of the spectrum is a strange collection of politicians, celebrities, and journalists—like Nancy Pelosi, William Triplett, and Richard Gere—who have made “China-bashing” a kind of cottage industry, particularly in the United States. Gries notes that the only way to avoid both extremes is through careful analysis of the Chinese themselves, and particularly the voices of China’s youth. He begins by linking modern Chinese nationalism to Confucianism, which according to some scholars reinforced notions of cultural superiority, even racism. Gries then turns to the fascinating question of language, diction, and imagery—which have long played roles in shaping China’s relations with other countries. Here Gries details from personal experience the difficulty a white man has in studying Chinese nationalism. Derisively referred to as laowai—“whitey”—he is often regarded with suspicion. But beyond this is the problem of sifting through Chinese views of China and the world, which can be just as diverse and complicated as anything in the West. From this introductory discussion, Gries lays out eight chapters in a remarkably busy book. The first deals with Chinese reaction to the 1999 US bombing of Belgrade, in which Beijing’s Embassy was damaged and three Chinese killed. Gries argues that the widespread, angry reactions by Chinese against the USA stemmed not just from the bombing, but rather a long line of perceived Western “aggressions” against China. This, coupled with the Book Rview s