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Does High Labor Mobility Always Promote Trade Liberalization?

Labor immobility (high adjustment cost) has been regarded as a major obstacle to trade liberalization, and it has been argued that higher labor mobility promotes trade liberalization. However, this is not the case when we take into account conflicts of interests between politicians and voters that are inevitable in representative democracy. We construct a simple two periods model including both election and sectoral adjustment, and show that the non-monotonic relationship between labor mobility and trade liberalization exists due to the principal-agent relationship. Higher labor mobility prevents trade liberalization in some cases.