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CEO Power, Governance, and Tax Avoidance

I provide strong evidence that powerful CEOs positively affect firm level tax avoidance. This result is robust to various alternative specifications, including endogeneity concern, firm-specific omitted variable bias, and controlling for various internal and external monitoring mechanisms. I also show that powerful CEOs generally extract more rent through higher tax avoidance. Overall results show that powerful CEOs present a significant monitoring challenges to the firm.