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How the Interagency Process Really Works: U.S. Response to the Albanian Insurgency in Macedonia

Abstract : In February 2001, the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) launched an insurgency in Macedonia. The conflict did not affect vital U.S. national interests, but potentially threatened vital interests of our European NATO allies. As Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Macedonia from 1999-2001, I helped implement the U.S. response to this crisis. I perceived a U.S. strategy to have our European allies lead efforts to resolve the crisis, as a step toward getting Europe to eventually take over the U.S. role in Kosovo. In investigating the inter-agency process, however, I found that there was no strategic decision to have the Europeans take on a greater role. Rather, the U.S. response was the result of interaction among: -- mid-level U.S. officials who saw a need to manage the crisis; -- the President's desire to limit the U.S. role in the Balkans, including the number of U.S. troops; -- the greater level of European national interests at stake; -- mixed opinions within the U.S. Congress over whether the Albanians or Macedonians were to blame for the violence; -- Albanian-American interest groups; -- media coverage; -- the desire that events in Macedonia not disrupt more strategically important efforts to bring stability to Kosovo and Serbia; and -- events on the ground. As fighting worsened, these factors pushed the United States to higher-level engagement to support EU and NATO-led efforts, while preventing the United States from seeking to lead those efforts.