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Guerrilla, Mobile, and Base Warfare in Communist Military Operations in Manchuria, 1945-1947

Historians have explained the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war (1945-49) in terms of either "standard" or "guerrilla" warfare. Analysis of the Communist experience in Manchuria, 1945-47, demonstrates that the Communists initially adopted a conventional war strategy and doctrine. As the situation developed, the Party faced a contradiction between economic and political necessity on the one hand and strategic reality on the other that sometimes put Communist forces into indefensible positions. After setbacks, the Communists recovered and developed a decisive hybrid strategy and doctrine that enabled them to turn the tide of the civil war and to make a second, more successful transition from guerrilla to mobile and base warfare.