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Lessons from Financing the EU’s ‘Silent’ Eastern Enlargement of 1990

On 3 October 1990, the unification of Germany produced the first eastern enlargement of the European Union (EU). In contrast to all previous enlargements, this was managed without protracted negotiations. On the day of unification, the entire Community law entered into effect for the Neue Länder, with brief transitional periods in the fields of agricultural, structural and environmental policies. The experience of eastern Germany’s economic reconstruction may thus help in formulating advice on how to finance further eastern enlargements without either ruining the budget of the EU or those of the Central and East European countries (CEECs). This commentary does not aim at an evaluation of financial aid to eastern Germany, nor at an evaluation of the EU’s structural policy.1 Its central question is instead: what lessons can both the EU and the applicant CEECs learn from the EU’s ‘silent’ enlargement of 1990? To answer this question, I proceed in three sections: