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A Mixed Logit Model of the Relationship between Unionization and Right-to-Work Legislation

In a recent paper in this Journal, Lumsden and Petersen (1975) presented a model of the supply and demand for union services in which the presence of a right-to-work law (RTW), which imposes costs on union organizing, adversely affects the equilibrium quantity of union membership. In order to disentangle the effects of community tastes and preferences (as reflected in the passage or nonpassage of a RTW law) and the law itself on the extent of union membership, Lumsden and Petersen estimated separate cross-section regressions for time periods before and after the adoption of the law by 13 states. Direct impact of RTW laws on unionization required significantly different coefficients on the RTW variables across the two time periods-a result which they rejected. The relationship between the extent of unionization and the presence or absence of RTW legislation has been the subject of several previous statistical inquiries. For example, Palomba and Palomba (1971) used one-way analysis of variance to investigate the influence