{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.020278833967046894, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0025348542458808617, 'mean_word_length': 4.93984962406015, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Kant’s View of Imagination

We may easily be tempted to think that the notion of Imagination is inextricably tied to that of a mental image, and hence to suppose that imagining is, or must at least involve, mental imaging. The words themselves suggest such a view, and hasty reflection seems to confirm it. When we read Kant's characterization of Imagination (B 15l) äs "the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is not itself present," we may thus assume that he conceives of Imagination äs simply the capacity for the mental imaging of absent objects. When we encounter the further distinction between productive and reproductive imagination, we may be inclined to think that he intends to distinguish between two varieties of mental imaging, one that merely replicates the