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The Gülen Movement and the Transfer of a Political Conflict from Turkey to Senegal

ABSTRACT By 2013 the Gülen movement had opened over 100 schools in 50-odd countries across Africa. In so doing, it relied on collaboration with the AKP government, with each benefiting from the other’s support. But this strategic alliance came to an end, and the crisis became international, when conflict flared up between the two in December 2013, especially in the wake of the failed coup of 15 July 2016, attributed by the AKP-government to what it calls the ‘Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü’. The Turkish government has sought to expand its repression of the Gülen movement to Sub-Saharan Africa. Countries that are politically weakest and most dependent economically are, I suggest, more likely to follow Turkey’s recommendations. The Gülen schools in Africa were supposed to be taken over by a Turkish semi-public agency, the Maarif Foundation. One country that agreed to close the schools was Senegal, which I take as a case-study, arguing that transnational social movements based on secrecy and informality—while more exposed to the spread of repression—are also better suited to local re-appropriation and reconfiguration.