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A leap into the past—in the name of the ‘national interest’

Since assuming office in 1996 the Howard government has proposed the ‘national interest’ as the central ordering principle of its foreign policy. Seven years later, after innumerable public utterances, several ministerial statements and two White Papers, all extolling the virtues of the national interest, what are we to make of this conceptual point of departure? How much order and coherence has the centrality accorded to the national interest brought to the way Australia conducts its external relations? How much clarity does it offer to domestic and international constituencies as to the government’s objectives and understanding of the world? How helpful has it been to government and to the wider community in navigating the turbulent waters of international political and economic life? This article argues that the answer to each of these last three questions is: ‘not very much’. If light is to be shed on the underlying dynamic of Australia’s foreign policy, we may do better by examining the politics of alliance management and the psychology of dependence on ‘great and powerful friends’. First, however, we must delve a little more deeply into the deficiencies of the ‘national interest’ rationalisation that has come to dominate official discourse. Any attempt by government to make the concept of ‘national interest’ the centrepiece of foreign policy brings with it an obligation to grapple with the contentious issues that have bedevilled all national interest discourse. Political leaders and civil servants cannot reasonably be expected to be versed in the complex theoretical controversies surrounding the concept. They can nevertheless be expected to explain what they understand by ‘national interest’. Such an explanation would presumably offer answers to four key questions: What is meant by ‘national’? What is meant by ‘interest’? Who has the competence and authority to define the ‘national interest’? Can the national interest be operationalised in ways that are conducive to intelligent policy debate and policy formulation? All four questions are critical to the task of defining Australia’s identity and place in the world.