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Army Civil Affairs Functional Specialists: On the Verge of Extinction

Abstract : World War II marked the beginning of the greatest use of Civil Affairs (CA) functional specialists in U.S. history. CA personnel utilized civil sector expertise to help rebuild governments in both the European and Pacific theaters. Since its establishment as a U.S. Army Reserve branch in 1955, CA has been conducted by Army Reservists who employ their civilian-acquired skills to provide expertise in civil sector systems and functions such as public administration, economics, public health, public safety, agriculture, and public utilities. CA has been touted as a key capability since the Department of Defense elevated the importance of stability operations to be on par with major combat operations. In the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the demand for CA units has far outpaced the supply. Since September 11, 2001, the CA force will have more than doubled from an authorized strength of approximately 5,631 to 11,718. Unfortunately, the growth in CA force structure has not been accompanied by a corresponding effort to increase the quality of the force. CA gaps in capability and capacity are evident by difficulty filling requirements in multiple theaters, use of in lieu of fills from other services for current operations, the stand-up of ad hoc CA-like capabilities, and the unavailability of CA functional experts. This paper will address the challenges associated with fielding fully trained Army Reserve CA functional specialists. The Army CA force lacks the functional specialist capacity and capability required to support stability operations activities of the Joint Force Commander as well as broader USG programs aimed at building the capacity of a partner nations' government in the areas of rule of law, economic development, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education. This paper explores the reasons for the capability gap and provides recommendations for a way ahead.