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Dare to Think?

The previous two chapters argued that beliefs are pervasively outsourced to other people and to the environment, and that belief revision often occurs in response to changes in the cues that scaffold our beliefs. In light of these facts, we need to ensure the scaffolding of better beliefs. We need, that is, to manage the epistemic environment. Many people are uncomfortable with this suggestion, and urge that instead we should improve beliefs by promoting better reasons. This chapter examines the prospects for better individual reason, focusing on virtue epistemology. It argues that individual cognition is extremely unreliable, however virtuously it is conducted. Focusing on Quassim Cassam’s recent book on intellectual vices, it works through case studies, from climate denial and from historical scholarship, to show just how limited individual cognition is. It argues that even genuine experts are at severe risk of error when they stray outside their own sphere of expertise, and that spheres of expertise are much narrower than we tend to think.