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Scepticism, Causation and Cognition

Ever since Kant made the claim in the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics that would be a Science that Hume awoke him from his previous ‘dogmatic slumber’, there has been an interest among Kantians in understanding Hume. This interest can take one of two possible forms. The first traces in Kant’s own writings the basis for the view that Kant provides some kind of ‘answer’ to Hume’s alleged scepticism concerning causation. The second type of response, by contrast, presents a reading of Hume himself that locates a basis within Hume’s work for an alleged Kantian position to which Hume would have had to assent if he had been aware of it. The latter type of response is more challenging in one important respect, which is that it will be scrutinized more intensively by both those concerned with Kant and those philosophers who are in the Humean tradition. It is, however, the type of response that Henry Allison has opted for in this book and which provides an outstanding example of this type of reading, focusing, as it does, on all the major sections of the first book of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. Allison’s status among contemporary writers on Kant is certainly high, since his view of transcendental idealism is decidedly one of those that is currently most prominent and which continues to provoke debate. Prior to