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Regulatory Uncertainty and Inefficiency for the Development of Merchant Lines in Europe: A Legal and Policy Discussion

The development of the cross-border electricity transmission network is insufficient in Europe. Until now, restructuring has not succeeded in building a regulatory framework able to incentivize the required increase in interconnection capacity through regulated investment. Regulated investment faces the national bias of regulators and the conflict of interests of some integrated companies. In theory, unbundled, independent and well regulated transmissions service operators (TSOs) which coordinate with each other such that network users feel they face a single TSO over the interconnected network is the best way to organize the power transmission grid. For the moment, such organization has not been implemented in Europe and interconnection capacity continues to limit cross-border exchanges which remain the main potential source of competition between European incumbents in the new oligopolistic environment.