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The life and teachings of Sai Baba of Shirdi

turn, they sought to draw the Chinese into the area between those territories under British control and those claimed by Moscow. China's lack of interest in the area and inability to effectively administer it, coupled with the internal political turmoil that accompanied the decline and collapse of Manchu rule, prevented them from taking the British bait. An "Agreed" Frontier is an unromantic work of diplomatic history, free of the anecdotes that cloud most accounts of the events surveyed. In identifying British aims and related actions, Mehra exhibits studied objectivity with regard to the historical record, his analysis extending only so far as is born out explicitly by relevant treaties, maps, and diplomatic correspondence. He takes no liberties in this regard, offering a wealth of historical and geographical detail with minimal interpretation. This Spartan treatment is the work's greatest strength and distinguishes it as the best available distillation of British strategic thinking about Ladakh, Kashmir, and Hunza. The only notable gap in the analysis is that differences in the perspectives of British authorities in London and those in India are an underdeveloped subtheme. However, Mehra's work is deceptively dispassionate. In exploring the tactical shifts in Britain's pursuit of its strategic aims, he comments on Russian and Chinese activities and motivations only so far as is necessary to make British responses comprehensible. Important aspects of China's interests are raised, inadequately developed, and ultimately dismissed. While describing the region's sparse, unruly population, inhospitable geography, and marginal economic worth with great accuracy, Mehra overstates China's inability and unwillingness to extend effective control, thereby diminishing any ultimate Chinese claims there. This slant is made less understandable by the author's clear knowledge of China's preference for administering distant domains less rigorously than the British. Though it may reflect a lack of access to relevant Chinese sources, this bias is rooted in the author's unquestioning acceptance of British assumptions about Chinese intent and capability. This uncritical approach to British diplomacy of the period is consistent with the author's narrow interest in the origins and instruments of British policy. Unfortunately, the poorly qualified dismissal of Chinese interests oversimplifies the historical record of territory that remains contested and neatly serves the interest of independent India in the dispute. The glossing over of the status of Aksai Chin is notable. Though the book's narrow focus and presentation make it unsuited for classroom use, a close reading is indispensable for those seeking to understand British intentions and methods in playing the Great Game. Of particular note in this regard are the seven maps, fifteen appendices containing relevant treaties and excerpts from pivotal diplomatic exchanges, and extensive bibliographic notes. Beyond the solid factual core of Mehra's work, the extensive inclusion of supporting materials gives it tremendous reference value. An "Agreed" Frontier should be in all major South Asian collections and on the shelves of Raj historians everywhere.