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Spatial Distribution of Bargaining Power: Binding Arbitration in Connecticut School Districts

Traditionally, negotiations in Connecticut concerning teacher contract renewal are conducted at the local level between members of the district board of education and members of the district teacher union. However, with the adoption in Connecticut of ‘issue last offer’ binding arbitration, there has been an acceleration in the use of professional bargaining representatives, including attorneys and Statewide union agents. The proliferation of professional representatives, together with the introduction of professional arbitrators, helps explain many of the phenomena associated with the early years of this new procedure: namely, an initial increase in the proportion of school districts going to arbitration rather than settling during an earlier negotiation phase; an upsurge in the standardization of collective agreements at the expense of innovation and situational responsiveness; and, more important, a loss in the local ‘flavor’ of the negotiation process. This paper will critically examine the implications of these trends both for the political nature of educational dispute resolution in Connecticut and for the spatial distribution of bargaining power.