{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.0297029702970297, 'fraction_numerical': 0.016973125884016973, 'mean_word_length': 5.316964285714286, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
ТHE “COLOURED REVOLUTIONS”: REGIME STABILITY AND CHANGE AS A MATTER OF ELITE DEFECTION

Why did «coloured revolutions» in Georgia (2003), Kyrgyzstan (2005) and Ukraine (2004) happen? To answer the question, the paper focuses on the shared feature of post-Soviet states – regime cyclicity, explained by the existence of the entrenched patronal presidentialism institutions. At critical moments when the incumbent turns into a lame duck and her departure is mostly expected, the regime runs the risk that elites become disunified and strong opposition consequently emerges. Then the relationship between the incumbent’s designated successor and elites revolves around the possible defection of the latter to the challenger. The article models such a situation in the form of a repeated game, where elites appear as a receiver in the «bargain» during the presidential campaign. Depending on who is preferred – the successor or the challenger – an outcome is either regime perpetuation or a “coloured revolution” caused by mass elite defection to the opposition. The derived hypotheses are tested on the cases of presidential elections in Russia (1999-2000) and Ukraine (2004). As analysis reveals, the three theoretical expectations draw sufficient empirical support, while a special role in determining a winner is ascribed to candidates’ popularity, which becomes of utmost importance closer to the end of the race.