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Introduction – Strategy of ‘Stay-Behind’

Over 23 years have passed since Christopher Andrew and David Dilks published a seminal book in which they pointed to studies of the role of intelligence as the missing dimension of international history. Since then many efforts have been made to fill that gap. A growing community of international scholars has developed a large body of literature that tries to grapple with this most elusive subject in a serious, rigorous fashion. Still there remains a certain uneasiness, not to say suspicion, among the broader community of students of international relations about incorporating the findings of intelligence specialists in the mainstream of international research. The subject is still regarded by many as slippery, replete with ambiguities, and often too prone to manipulations and misgivings. The issue we have tried to discuss with this collection of essays is as good an example as any of all these difficulties. The existence, during the Cold War, of a stay-behind (SB) or occupation preparedness network in Western Europe was publicly disclosed by Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti in August 1990. This opened a veritable Pandora’s box of allegations, accusations, and speculations which in several countries led to official investigations into the matter. In Italy, a country which had been ravaged by a dreadful series of terrorist attacks for almost 20 years, parliamentary committees were established to