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The Limits of Judicial Review of Executive Action—Some Comparisons between Australia and the United States

The new administrative law in Australia dates from the implementation, over a period of more than a decade, of the substance of the proposals advanced by the Kerr Committee and its successors in the early 1970s.1 The now familiar legislation swept away many of the procedural obscurities associated with the prerogative writs, codified the general principles governing judicial review of administrative action and provided for independent merits review of administrative decisions.2 These reforms paved the way for the emergence of what commentators have described as a "distinctively Australian jurisprudence in public law".3 It is hardly necessary to say that Sir Anthony Mason played a pivotal role in the development of the distinctive jurisprudence, both through his membership of the Kerr Committee and his judgments in the leading administrative law cases of the 1980s and 1990s.