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Mechanisms to Coordinate Storage Investment and Network Expansion in Distribution Networks

In this paper we propose a bi-level equilibrium model that allows to analyze the impact of different regulatory frameworks on storage and network investment in distribution networks. In our model, a regulated distribution system operator decides on network investment and operation while he anticipates the decisions of private agents on storage investment and operation. As adjustments of the current regulatory framework, we consider curtailment of renewable production, the introduction of a network fee based on the maximum renewable feed-in, and a subsidy scheme for storage investment. The performance of the different alternative frameworks is compared to the performance under rules that are commonly applied in various countries today, as well as to a system-optimal (first-best) benchmark. To illustrate the economic effects, we calibrate our model with data from the field project "Smart Grid Solar". Our results reveal that curtailment and a redesign of network fees both have the potential to significantly reduce total system costs. On the contrary, investment subsidization of storage capacity has only a limited impact as long as the distribution system operator is not allowed to intervene in storage operation.