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Why the Parts of Absolute Space are Immobile

Newton's arguments for the immobility of the parts of absolute space have been claimed to licence several proposals concerning his metaphysics. This paper clarifies Newton, first distinguishing two distinct arguments. Then, it demonstrates, contrary to Nerlich ([2005]), that Newton does not appeal to the identity of indiscernibles, but rather to a view about de re representation. Additionally, DiSalle ([1994]) claims that one argument shows Newton to be an anti-substantivalist. I agree that its premises imply a denial of a kind of substantivalism, but I show that they are inconsistent with Newton's core doctrine that not all motion is the relative motions of bodies, and so conclude that they are not part of his considered views on space. 1. The Arguments2. The Identity Argument2.1. Identity of indiscernibles for individuals2.2. Identity of indiscernibles for worlds and states2.3. Representation de re3. Kinematic Relationism4. Conclusion The Arguments The Identity Argument2.1. Identity of indiscernibles for individuals2.2. Identity of indiscernibles for worlds and states2.3. Representation de re Identity of indiscernibles for individuals Identity of indiscernibles for worlds and states Representation de re Kinematic Relationism Conclusion