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Unclear and present danger: Russia’s geoeconomics and the Nord Stream II pipeline

Russia’s geoeconomics has long been successful in keeping the EU divided in its dealings with Russia. However, Russia’s shift to traditional geopolitics in Ukraine undermined this “wedge strategy” and produced a relative increase in EU unity. This article looks at the features of geoeconomics as a foreign policy strategy, how it differs from geopolitics, and how it gives rise to ambiguity and depoliticization. Faced with the prospect of more rigorous counter-balancing, Russia may soon try to revive its geoeconomic power projection, spearheaded by energy projects in EU. From a technical perspective, the Nord Stream II pipeline could enhance some aspects of the EU–Russia gas trade. However, politically and strategically, Nord Stream II has the potential to undercut Germany’s new leadership role in EU foreign policy, erode general solidarity within the EU, and create substantial policy incoherence for the EU vis-à-vis Ukraine.