{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.045965770171149146, 'fraction_numerical': 0.029339853300733496, 'mean_word_length': 4.930434782608696, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Reply to Iddo Landau

In his article “Sexual Harassment as ‘Wrongful Communication,’ ” Iddo Landau (2003, this issue) offers an enlightening critique of my article, “Sexual Harassment and Wrongful Communication” (Wall 2001). In that article, I presented a revised set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of sexual harassment based on an earlier article (Wall 1991). Early on in his article, Landau finds that my article (Wall 2001) fails to establish any logical connection between my critique of Catharine MacKinnon’s views and my critique of the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission’s (EEOC’s) definition of sexual harassment (Landau 2003, p. 226). Let me confess that I did not make the connections clear. Landau’s demand that the connections be laid out is surely helpful. Let me also say, though, that the connections are in fact implicit in my article. Landau quotes the EEOC’s definition right in his own article as did I (Wall 2001, 527). The definition begins as follows: “Unwelcome sexual advances. . . .” If Landau consults some of the works referenced in my article, he will find the following (Wall 2001, 536-37). MacKinnon has long been a staunch supporter of the view that merely “unwelcome” sexual advances can constitute sexual harassment, as opposed to the approach that limits the sexual advances to those to which the alleged victim does not “consent.” This has been a hot debating point for scholars interested in sexual harassment. MacKinnon and many other feminists support the EEOC’s “unwelcome” formulation. In my article, I explicitly argue for a “consent” formulation (Wall 2001, 531). At one point, I conclude, “The fundamental point here is that the victim does not consent to the communication” (Wall 2001, 532). I specifically argued against the “unwelcome” formulation in the earlier article (Wall 1991, 378), and, of course, my second article is based on the earlier article. In the earlier article, I argued that the “unwelcome” formulation could lead to unjust accusations against the innocent.