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Learning Under Fire: Progress and Dissent in the US Military

After initial successes, the US military suffered many painful years in Afghanistan and Iraq before undertaking the most significant retooling of any military while in active combat since the German Army in 1917. The change to a counter-insurgency posture was catalysed by a combination of junior leadership responding to the tactical problems that confronted them and senior institutional dissidents driving deep, controversial changes in doctrine and culture to meet the new requirements. Both components were necessary, but neither was sufficient on its own. They were the product of an institutional culture that strove to be self-learning, with varying levels of success. Specific recommendations recognise, preserve and advance this dynamic in anticipation of future requirements for rapid change in response to the next conflict.