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Hope: Conceptual and normative issues

Correspondence Catherine Rioux, Faculté de philosophie, Université Laval, 2325 Allée des Bibliothèques, Québec, QC G1V 0A6, Canada. Email: catherine.rioux@fp.ulaval.ca Abstract Hope is often seen as at once valuable and dangerous: it can fuel our motivation in the face of challenges, but can also distract us from reality and lead us to irrationality. How can we learn to “hope well,” and what does “hoping well” involve? Contemporary philosophers disagree on such normative questions about hope and also on how to define hope as a mental state. This article explores recent philosophical debates surrounding the concept of hope and the norms governing hope. It also underlies hope's significance for the philosophy of emotion and the ethics of interpersonal relations.