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Positivism Is the Organizational Myth of Science

Traditional philosophy of science is by no means a unified edifice of beliefs. There are realists who believe that theoretical notions such as "electron" correspond to real entities, positivists who insist that only observable indicators of electrons are real, and pragmatists who argue that "electron" is simply a convenient shorthand for organizing experience. There are inductivists who believe we can arrive at true knowledge, and falsificationists who claim that we can only know for sure when our knowledge is false. Instrumentalists think that the whole obsession with truth is misplaced and suggest that technical control and intervention should replace representation as the prime concern of philosophy. 1 But despite these obvious differences and debates, it seems possible to identify a core of shared assumptions about science in traditional philosophy of science (see Hacking 1983, pp. 5-6). Most important, science is seen as a privileged system of knowledge and discourse? It may justly claim a special cognitive status that sets it apart from other, more "mundane" ways of knowing." This special status is founded on the superior rationality and objectivity of scientific knowledge, which are themselves due to the rules of scientific