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France in Search of a Foothold in Post-Gaddafi Libya

Historically, Libya was not part of the French sphere of interest and influence, the core of which was traditionally Francophone Africa. Since the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, security issues in the countries of the Sahara - Sahel region have become particularly important for France. The article is preceded by a brief historical account of Franco-Libyan relations up to and after the fall of the Gaddafi regime, when the situation within and along the Libyan borders deteriorated and became a matter of growing concern in France and internationally. The relevance and novelty of this study lie the examination of the French attitude towards the Libyan crisis in close conjunction with the need for forceful counter-terrorism actions and security measures in the Sahelю The aim is to analyse the evolving situation in the region, identifying the motivation for and the nature of France's actions in and around Libya, as well as in the context of a future post-conflict settlement. In writing the article, the author relied on historical-genetic and historical-analytical methods, drawing on national and international monographs, articles published in academic periodicals, and official documents of international organisations. He concludes that France had limited resources and capacity to stabilise Libya. He argues that the involuntary reliance on Khalifa Haftar as a fulcrum for security in southern Libya, the border areas, and for reducing the projection of the terrorist threat into the Sahara-Sahel region was unwarranted. It is also demonstrated that France has critically underestimated the potential of other influential parties to the current Libyan crisis, which, in the circumstances, has reduced its ability to influence the intra-Libyan and regional balance of power.