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Freedom Incorporated: Anticommunism and Philippine Independence in the Age of Decolonization

Long’s discussion of U. S. relations with Britain is especially interesting. British and U.S. policymakers shared the aim of keeping Singapore “safe,” but the British, as the power officially in charge, expected to maintain a working relationship with Singapore in the long run and therefore could not appear to rule by force. Nor could Britain compromise its sovereignty by cooperating officially with the United States against internal subversion. For instance, British troops and police backed the repression of unions initiated by the Singaporean government in 1956, but a year earlier British Chief Minister David Marshall had refused to summon British military reinforcements against strikes. For the same reason, although Britain secretly allowed the CIA to use Singapore as a base for subversion against Indonesia from 1954 to 1961, the British and U.S. intelligence services had informally agreed in 1954 not to interfere in each other’s sphere of influence: Britain would not act in the Philippines, and the United States would not act in Singapore, Burma, and Malaya. (The CIA broke this agreement by funding the Socialist Labor Front of Lim Yew Hock for the municipal election of 1957.) Singaporean politicians were not privy to the unofficial military cooperation between Britain and the United States. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization’s defense plans, which called for the use of nuclear bombs against the PRC and North Vietnam in case of invasion, implied the secret deployment of British nuclear warheads on Singapore, starting in 1962. Britain always denied the existence of these bombs, not only to the public but to the government of Singapore as well. This is a rewarding book. It could have provided more in-depth analysis of local opinion, and it certainly lacks a comparative analysis of other parts of Southeast Asia—relations between the United States and French authorities in Indochina, for instance—but as a monograph it is excellent.