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Some (Western) Dilemmas in Managing Extended Deterrence

It is argued that extended deterrence in the bipolar subsystem has contributed to the prevention of war in the past. It makes sense to assume that past success repeats itself in the future, if past success is theoretically well understood and the expectation of future success theoretically defensible. But most deterrence theorizing suffers from a decisive flaw, its inability to maintain a consistent attitude to the rational action assumption. Even if this shortcoming could be overcome, there still are other problems. The stability of extended deterrence between blocs rather than merely between the superpowers requires not only a stable balance of terror nullifying hopes for victory, but keeping the blocs together. In essence, bloc stability is not compatible with social and political change which undermines the affiliation of some nations with the American bloc and of others with the Soviet bloc. Still, such events might occur. In addition to strategic rationality dilemmas and social change dilemmas, there are collective action dilemmas. The assumption that nations behave, as if they were (represented by) unitary and utility-maximizing actors is questionable. If this simplifying assumption is dropped, then the achievement of stable deterrence becomes even more doubtful or miraculous.