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The Mad Cow Problem in the UK: Risk Perceptions, Risk Management, and Health Policy Development

Mad cow disease or bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is a fatal neurological disease of cattle first recognized in the United Kingdom (UK) in 1986. Until recently, the UK government considered the chance of a human becoming infected with the BSE agent to be extremely remote. As a result of new developments, alarmist media attention, bureaucratic mishandling of the issues, scientific uncertainty, bickering among technical experts, and a dearth of easily assimilated and balanced information on the problem, wide-spread fears that affected cattle could enter the human food supply and transmit the disease to humans have periodically erupted, causing social, economic, and political consequences of tremendous magnitude. Better management of the mad cow problem could have minimized the magnitude of the epidemic among cattle, the risk to humans, and the public outrage. Trust in the British government was seriously eroded, an entire industry crippled, and international relations severely tried. Although the scientific data concerning BSE and its transmissibility to humans are still not conclusive, a growing body of (still largely circumstantial) evidence suggests that BSE may be transmissible to humans.Unfortunately, policy decisions cannot wait for a final scientific answer. Therefore, high-stakes decisions must be made in the face of this uncertainty. Such decisions should be made with the primary purpose of protecting the public, and not preferentially the economics of an industry, political alliances, or other considerations. Given that the risk to humans from BSE was (and still is) unknown and may be high, and that the perceived risk among the British public was (and still is) extraordinarily high, policies should support more aggressive interventions. Of necessity, such interventions will be preventive, as there is presently no available treatment. Such policies should be modified as necessary as the developing scientific data warrants.