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The Foreign Policy-Making Process in Britain, 1934–1935, and the Origins of the Anglo-german Naval Agreement

Studies of the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935 have so far failed to provide a complete analysis of the factors which prompted the British government's decision to sanction German naval rearmament. Diverse views on the causes of this British decision have included the interpretation that the naval agreement represented the beginning of appeasement, that it was an attempt to curry favour with Hitler's Reich at the expense of France and other continental powers, or that it was intended to become part of a general international system of naval arms limitations but because of unforeseen difficulties remained simply a bilateral agreement. The severest critics of the agreement suggest that British statesmen were the victims of Hitler's guile and of their own ignorance and credulity which blinded them to the serious consequences their conduct had for British foreign relations.