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The War Film (review)

★ 895 what they had done to Croatia. After the conflict began, a lack of coordination and intense rivalry among the components of the fledgling Bosnian army further hampered efforts to mount a viable defense. While secular and fundamentalist Muslims fought for control of an increasingly Muslim army, Bosnia’s Croats distanced themselves, withdrawing into their own military units, which nonetheless continued to operate as part of the ARBH until early 1993. Hoare is less concerned with military operations than with the internal dynamics of the ARBH and the effect of external events and agents on its development. For example, he concludes that rather than promote peace, the Vance-Owen Plan of January 1993 “undoubtedly encouraged both Bosnian Croatian irredentism and Muslim separatism,” and he concludes that the PDA used the ARBH to create a “Muslim parastate” in reaction to Serbian and Croatian efforts to extend their territories. But if Serbian and Croatian designs on Bosnia-Herzegovina pushed the PDA to react in kind, Hoare notes that the Bosnian army became the agent of Muslim nationalism, not of Muslim fundamentalism. This is a distinction that some will question, but he perceives a basic difference between the two phenomena, and he includes an appendix on the role of mujahedin in Central Bosnia, arguing that they were a minor irritant, not a major player. Hoare’s study will upset both Serbian and Croatian partisans, and it will discomfort others as well. He suggests that Srebrenica fell because the ARBH declined to defend it, and he argues that Bosnian and Croatian ground forces, not NATO aircraft, forced the Serbs to the bargaining table in 1995. Indeed, Hoare implies that the ARBH would have continued its advance, had the United States and Europe not forced them to halt. For a short study, this is an important book. It is well-researched, thoughtful, and provocative, and it should be required reading for anyone interested in the Bosnian conflict.