{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.029166666666666667, 'fraction_numerical': 0.004166666666666667, 'mean_word_length': 5.537414965986395, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Delusions and the Non-epistemic Foundations of Belief

In her paper “Shaking the Bedrock,” Bortolotti (2011) acknowledges that our bedrock (or what we prefer to call ‘background’) theory of delusion contributes to the understanding of what is delusional about some delusions, but questions whether it has the broad scope we intended for it. In this response, we begin by rehearsing our understanding of the non-representational ‘bedrock’ of our belief as first articulated in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, before elaborating on the bedrock or background theory of delusion and defending it against Bortolotti’s objections. Our aim is to show that the radically non-epistemic, non-representational, non-propositional, and particularistic account of the bedrock articulated by Wittgenstein and developed by Searle avoids the objections which Bortolotti offers while also allowing for an account of the delusionality of delusions, which is indeed general in scope.