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“A Theory of Coalitions and Clientelism: Coalition Politics in Iceland 1945-2000”

This article serves a dual purpose. First, it provides detailed information about coalition formation and termination in Iceland from 1945 to 2000 following closely the format of Wolfgang Muller and Kaare Strom (eds), Coalition Politics in Western Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), which considers the other Western European democracies. The political landscape of Iceland is surveyed, as is the institutional framework that structures the formation of coalitions, coalition governance and cabinet termination while providing complete data for each cabinet. Second, the effects clientelism has on coali- tion politics through the inflated importance of the executive office are considered. The pat- terns of coalition politics in the Nordic countries are compared to offer preliminary evidence supporting the theory. Coalition politics have received little attention in the study of Icelandic poli- tics, with only Grimsson (1977, 1982) covering coalition formation. Coalition formation in Iceland appears more competitive than in most of Western Europe. The contrast with the Nordic countries is especially stark. This is somewhat surprising because of a tendency to emphasize the similarities of the Nordic countries, but can be explained in part by the fact that Icelandic politics are rooted in clientelism. Clientelistic politics focuses on the delivery of particularistic benefits rather than public policies. The prevalence of clientelistic politics depends on factors such as politicians' ability to claim credit for their actions, opportuni- ties to provide such benefits and the relative costs of alternative political strategies. Rather than attempting to explain the importance of clientelistic politics (see Kristinsson 1996, 2001), its implication for coalition politics is focused upon here. It is argued that clientelism inflates the importance of cabinet membership as it provides the means to successfully pursue clien- telistic politics. This has important implications for coalition politics that are detailed below (for a comparative treatment of other countries, see Muller and Strom 2000).