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Prediction Model of Brain and Consciousness

Is the prediction model of brain relevant for consciousness? The prediction model of brain is based on predictive coding that focuses on contents as associated with stimulus-induced activity. Stimulus-induced activity itself is conceived in a cognitive (rather than sensory) sense in that it is supposed to result from the interaction between predicted and actual inputs, i.e., the prediction error. The central question in this chapter is whether contents and the cognitive model of stimulus-induced activity can sufficiently account for the contents in consciousness. Based on empirical evidence, I argue that predictive coding can only account for the selection of contents in consciousness including the distinction between accurate and inaccurate contents. In contrast, predictive coding remains insufficient when it comes to the association of any given content with consciousness. Hence, the prediction model of brain and its cognitive model of stimulus-induced activity cannot be extended to a cognitive model of consciousness. Put simply, consciousness is different from and extends beyond its contents and our cognition of them.