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The Just Price: The Aristotelian Tradition and John Rawls

In Aristotle’s view, commutative justice required that a contract of exchange be made at a just price, that is, at a price which enriched neither party at the expense of the other. Writers in the Aristotelian tradition identified the just price with the market price under competitive conditions. They recognized that changes in the market price would make the parties richer or poorer, but they believed that these fluctuations had to be tolerated for the market to adjust to factors which they called need, scarcity and cost. That was no reason to allow one party to charge a higher price because he was able to exploit the other party’s ignorance or necessity. I have defended a version of this theory. Martijn Hesselink has objected that because it draws on Aristotelian moral philosophy, it violates the rules of public discourse as set by John Rawls who believed that public discourse must remain neutral among differing “comprehensive views.” I argue that my use of Aristotelian philosophy does not violate the limits set by Rawls, and that even if it did, no one should have to observe these limits. Résumé: Selon Aristote, la justice commutative requiert qu’un échange contractuel se fasse au juste prix, c’est-à-dire à un prix qui n’enrichit aucune des parties au détriment de l’autre. La tradition doctrinale aristotélicienne devait ensuite identifier le juste prix au prix du marché concurrentiel, reconnaissant cependant que les fluctuations du marché seraient source d’enrichissement ou d’appauvrissement. Si de telles fluctuations étaient tolérables car elles permettaient au marché de s’ajuster à des conditions de rareté et de coût, elles ne devaient pas permettre à l’une des parties de demander un prix plus élevé en exploitant la faiblesse de l’autre ou de la contrainte dont elle fait l’objet. J’ai défendu une version de cette position. Martijn Hesselink m’objecte qu’en tant qu’elle est fondée sur la philosophie morale d’Aristote, elle viole la règle du discours public tel qu’exposée par John Rawls qui postulait que ce discours devait rester neutre devant différentes perspectives. Mais je réponds ici que la façon dont j’utilise la *Corresponding author: James Gordley, Tulane Law School, 6329 Freret St., New Orleans LA 70118, USA, E ˗ Mail: jgordley@tulane.edu ERCL 2015; 11(3): 197–219