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Pakistan's Kashmir policy: voices of moderation?

This paper focuses on Pakistan's Kashmir policy in the 1990s. It argues that this policy has been embedded in the context of negative imagery in India and Pakistan of the ‘other’. But it has not been devoid of pluralism; different views exist in Pakistan on the appropriate approaches to resolving the dispute. While the Orthodox and the Islamists favour a combative approach, the moderates favour accommodation and negotiation with India on Kashmir. While the Orthodox–Islamist nexus dominated Pakistan's Kashmir policy for most of the 1990s, gradually moderate voices have been heard favouring a different approach to resolving the issue. This plurality of views has continued, even after the military took over power in October 1999, causing it to adopt a managerial position. The Pakistan government has been engaged in an act of balancing and addressing different ‘constituencies’ on Kashmir. The process has not changed after the terrorist attacks on the United States and the Indian Parliament in September and December 2001, respectively. Operating in a new international environment that identifies terrorism as a major global threat, and prompted by its renewed strategic relationship with the United States, the Pakistan government has attempted to curb the activities of the Islamists. However, its ability to fully achieve this goal is limited. The Indian government needs to appreciate this, and to work creatively with Islamabad within the framework of Pakistan's limitations.