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Lukes and ‘substantive social scientific work’

I. INTENTIONALITY DEPENDENCE He is right to say that it can be misleading to use the word ‘observer’ in ‘observer dependence’ because it might imply a contrast between observer and participant. I did not intend any such contrast. As I wrote in my response to Friedman, ‘For me, the notion of “observer” is short for all of the forms of intentionality that human beings have in dealing with their environment. So, when I say that the existence of money is observer relative, by “observer” I mean observer, user, possessor, buyer, seller, borrower and so on’ (p. 82). A more accurate term would have been ‘intentionality dependence’, but that can also lead to confusion, because original, intrinsic intentionality itself is not intentionality dependent. ‘Participant’ can also be misleading because one can be part of the collective acceptance without any active participation. The point is that we need a contrast between those features of the world whose existence does not depend on our intentionality – hydrogen atoms and techtonic plates, for example – and those which do – money, governments and esthetic excellence, for example. I think once the point is understood that observer dependence includes participant dependence and so on, any confusion should evaporate.