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RESOURCE ENDOWMENTS, AGENCY PROBLEMS, AND MONETARY OUTCOMES IN TWO COLONIAL AMERICAN MINTS, 1600-1700


 This paper examines the role that resource endowments played in the performance of two New World coinages. Massachusetts Bay and the Viceroyalty of Peru provide a useful study in contrasts, having markedly different institutions and resource endowments. Both colonies originally emphasised the provision of «good» money, that is, the provision of a uniform coin (in weight and fineness) and of a sensible mix of large and small denomination coins that would support the domestic economy. Their outcomes, however, differed. We suggest that in Potosi, the sheer volume of the resource endowment (silver) incentivised fraud and the neglect of the provision of fractionary coinage in the viceroyalty. In contrast, in Massachusetts Bay, the scarcity of the resource produced incentives better aligned with the production of «good» money. The northern colony produced a trustworthy coinage that provided small denomination coins for the domestic market.