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Privatization of Law Enforcement


 
The year 2020 ushered in growing calls to defund the police. In Canada, as in other countries where the movement to defund the police has gained momentum, activists demand transferring money from police departments to social workers, reducing the number of police officers, and increasing police departments’ democratic accountability. This last group of reform initiatives is, perhaps, the least controversial one because it calls for improving the familiar structures of democratic oversight over police departments, such as municipal councils, independent police oversight boards and complaints bodies, and others. 
The demands for greater accountability of police departments to the public are a symptom of a deeper problem - there is a growing discrepancy between the goals of policing and the consequences of the police’s actions. This discrepancy materializes when the police’s attempts to ensure public safety result in the marginalization of racialized communities, particularly in larger cities across Canada. In order to understand why laudable policy goals lead to deeply problematic consequences, it is necessary to analyze the policing process in our cities. While it has traditionally been assumed that this process is left to the discretion of separate police departments, this paper demonstrates that externalities, such as data generated by private technologies, play an important role in undermining the goals of policing. Reliance on private data and technology does not absolve the police of accountability for resulting human rights violations. However, it has important implications for the reform of public oversight over the police. In an era when non-governmental actors are taking part in law enforcement through procurement contracts, democratic control over the exercise of the police’s contracting powers is an important, albeit often overlooked, instrument of police reform. Relying on contracts for predictive policing technologies as a case study, this paper argues that communities should condition the funding of police procurement on ex ante assessment procedures, technical specifications, and contract enforcement rights. Also, local elected representatives should have an opportunity to approve any data and technology sharing arrangements as well as federal standing offer arrangements that extend predictive policing to their communities. 
 
