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The Changing Governance of Renewable Natural Resources in Northwest Russia

traditionally associated with nineteenth century liberals like Mill or Richard Cobden, but Hobson argues that after 1989 a similar vision of the West as embodiment of an ‘End of History’ underwrote a ‘liberal neo-imperial civilising mission’ (p. 31). ‘Western-realism’ was less triumphant and more fuelled by angst. Thinkers like Daniel Pipes, Samuel Huntington and Robert Kaplan re-imagined the Third World as a zone of permanent warfare, different civilisations and an endless reservoir of northern-migrating Muslims, Africans and South Asians to overwhelm the West. This angst underwrote a vision of ‘the West as provider of global order and container of Eastern threats’ (p. 43). The West possessed ‘hypersovereignty’ to intervene in ‘failed states’—not to colonise them but rather to contain them. The third tradition he identifies, of ‘Western idealist-realism’, represented by Fukuyama, Michael Ignatieff, Anne-Marie Slaughter, John G. Ikenberry and others, retains the notion of Western hyper-sovereignty but loses the triumphalist or pessimistic tone of the two other schools. ‘Democratic Peace Theory’ supported the argument for institutions like a ‘Concert ofDemocracies’ that could supersede the UN. Regimes like the Non-Proliferation Treaty needed reform to focus less on proliferation per se and more on proliferation by certain kinds of states. I find Hobson’s analysis of post-1989 international thought compelling, but the lack of extended discussion of midcentury internationalist thought (say, Wendell Willkie, Jan Smuts or Nehru) to put post-1989 thought into greater context makes the claims of grander continuities seem more shaky. Other highlights of the volume take the reader on a global tour of the world in 1989 and can serve as guides for future research programmes in international history. The late Fred Halliday traces the impact of 1989 on the extra-European socialist world, exploring how the Soviet collapse gave way to ‘national reconciliation’, the financial starvation of the communist left, the unexpected democratisation of authoritarian anti-communist regimes (South Africa, Chile, El Salvador), and the emergence of reform socialism on the Left (Lula, Bachelet and Fernández in the Dominican Republic). Richard Saull covers the Middle East. He argues that if the Cold War there was at first broadly defined by the argument between Nasserist or Saudi-style modernisation, after Sadat the rules changed. The basic challenges for Arab regimes were still the same: ‘the construction of a stable basis of socio-economic support for the regime’ (p. 194) and some solution to the problem of Israel. The battle for legitimacy was no longer between Western capital and radical nationalism or communism, but rather between ‘pro-Western authoritarian states committed to capitalist development and integration into the ‘‘civilised West’’ and Islamist forces committed to expelling Western influence’ (p. 194)—a dynamic that continued until, arguably, spring 2012. In short, while The Global 1989 is not the last word on the matter, it fulfils its aim of turning attention away from navel-gazing accounts of Europe’s self-liberation in 1989 to a far more complex story of the 1980s that spans the entire globe. True, scholars still have to wrestle with the task of producing the Gesamtkunstwerk of modern history—multilingual, global, with an eye towards long-term processes—that a rigorous account of 1989 demands. But with any luck, The Global 1989 will find itself in the citations of this coming wave of scholarship.