Startseite Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction

Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction

Politicians and pundits have long disparaged their opponents with polemicist cries of "leftist!" or "rightist!" But with the fall of communism and the recent conservative ascendancy in the United States and Europe, many commentators have flatly declared that the traditional left/right distinction has lost its relevance. Now, even as political players scramble to redefine themselves with freshly "spun" labels, Norberto Bobbio asserts that the demise of the left/right distinction has been greatly exaggerated. Bobbio argues that left and right are not absolute terms, but represent a shifting map of the political spectrum, relative to the particular cultural and historical contexts of a given time. The distinction continues to endure because it reflects the essentially antithetical nature and dynamics of democratic politics. In his accessible yet provocative style, Bobbio constructs a historically informed, analytic division of the political universe along two foundational axes, from equality to inequality, from liberty to authoritarianism. He then charts the past and present tendencies of the left and the right, in both their more moderate and more virulently extreme forms. Ultimately, for Bobbio, the measure of post-modern democracy will indeed lie in where and how we situate ourselves relative to these critical left/right parameters, in whether we cast ourselves, our votes, and our era in terms of political expediency, social viability, or moral responsibility. A bestseller in Italy, where it sold over three hundred thousand copies, Left and Right is an important contribution to our understanding of global political developments in the 1990s and beyond.
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Left and Right

Significance of a Political Distinction
Norberto Bobbio

Translated and Introduced by
Allan Cameron

The University of Chicago Press

NORBERTO BOBBIO is Emeritus Professor of Legal and Political Philosophy at the
University of Turin and the author of Tlwmas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition,
published by this Press in 1993.

The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637
Polity Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom
This translation copyright © Polity Press 1996.
First published in Italy as Destra e Sinistra: Ragioni e significati di una distinzione politica

Copyright © Donzelli editore, Rome (first edition) 1994, (second edition) 1995.
All rights reserved.
Printed in Great Britain

04 03 02 01 00 99 98



1 2

3 4 5

ISBN: 0 226-06245 7 (cloth)
ISBN: 0 226 06246-5 (pbk)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Bobbio, Norberto, 1909[Destra e sinistra.

Left and right I Norberto Bobbio : translated and introduced by

Allan Cameron.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0 226-06245 7 (alk. paper).

ISBN 0 226-06246-5 (pbk. :

alk. paper)
1. Right and left (Political science)
3. Political science

320 5-c20


96 26392

This book is printed on acid free paper

2. Political sociology.

I. Title.


Preface to the Firs t Italian Edition
1 A C hallenge to the Distinction


2 Extremists and Moderates


3 The Left/Right Distinction Survives


4 In Search of the Criterion which Governs

the Distinction


5 Other Criteria


6 Equality and Inequality


7 Freedom and Authoritarianism


8 The Pole Star



Reply to the Critics (1995)



Intro duction

When this book was published in Italy j ust before the 1 9 94
elections which brought Berlusconi' s short-lived right-wing
alliance to p ower , it took the country by storm , s elling over
20 0,0 00 copies in a yea r , m aking it the overall bestseller in
Italy . It remained the bestseller in the non-fiction category
for;  m any months thereafter . As Norberto Bobbio himself
points out , if Italians were lqpking for assistance on how to
vote in Italy' s dramatically changed political landscape ,
they would have been sorely disappointed: the b o ok i s
purely concerned with an analytical di§iinction, a n d its
relevance goes far beyond Italy and its political vicissitudes .
The paradox which the author points out is tha t , while the
left/right distinction is increasingly being challenged in
Italy , the Italian parliamentary s cene has s hifted from a
spectrum of parties dominated by the centre to a more
polarized system in which two coalitions face each o ther , a
stark choice between left and right . Such a situation is , of
course , familiar in English-speaking countries which have a
marked preference for the first-past-the-post electoral
system (Italy abandoned proportional representation in
favour of this system before the last elections ) . In many
ways , Italy has acted as a barometer for Western Europe in



the post-war period , reflecting general trends in a more
acute form. When the Marxist left ' s star was rising in the
late sixties and early seventies , it seemed to rise higher in
Italy ; and when apathy and a general disorientation on the
left took over in the eighties , Italy seemed to outperform
other countries in its cynicism and its contempt for a
political system whose corruption was becoming increasing­
ly clear . While the left has been weak in America for some
time , this trend towards the s uppression of the left/right
distinction through an atrophy of the left is a more recent
development in Europe.
The eighties witnessed Republican control of the White
House and C onservative dominance in Britain ; and in 1982
Helmut Kohl became chancellor of West Germany, a position
he still holds . As a leading economist commented on the
British situation : ' Conservatism was not only hege­
monic , . ; . it seemed the only game in town anywhere.Ol Even
where the . left retained the reins of power, it was not in a
radical mood , and where it was in opposition , its socialism was
increasingly muted. Everywhere the right appeared to have
taken the initiative , and when the decade culminated with the
dramatic demise of communism , it was perhaps not altogether
surprising that some people began to talk with euphoria of ' the
end of history' and the final victory of a particular form of
state - namely, the capitalist 'liberal' democracy . This trend
continues, and today we see the left alliance in Italy , which is
dominated by the ex-communists , being led by an ex-Christian
Democrat technocrat and university lecturer, with a pro­
gramme of cuts in public spending, privatizations and greater
flexibility in the work-force .
Norberto Bobbio sets out in this book , first to refute the
idea that the left/right distinction is in any way a thing of



the p a s t , and then to argue for his own definition of that
distinction .

The challenge t o the left/right distinction and its survival
In times when the left and the right appear evenly balanced
with a more or les s equal possibility of holding the allegi­
ance of large sections of society and therefore attaining
power. the question of whether the distinction is relevant
does not really arise . But when either the left or the right
becomes so powerful that it seems to be 'the only game in
town ' , then both have their reasons to connive in the
destruction of the left/right distinctio n . The dominant side
clearly has an interest in arguing that ' there is no real
alternative' . Less obviously , the weaker side also has an
inte� est in rejecting or at least playing down the difference.
as can be seen from the tactics currently being adopted by
some p arties of the left . If it feels that its traditional policies
have attracted so much public opprobrip m , it may decide to
recycle itself as something totally new, s omething which goes
beyond the traditional distinction (neither left nor right , or
combining the positive values of both sides to produce a
modern , innovative movement) . While it is clearly the right
which has been in the as cendant in the eighties and nineties ,
Bobbio emphasizes that there have been periods in history
when it was the right that wished to dis solve itself in order
to surviv e . After the fall of Fascism , there was a wave of
s upport for collectivist ideals. p articularly in those coun­
t ries which had experienced Nazi occupation . In order to
become a powerful force in p olitics , such traditionalist
p arties a s the Italian Christian Democrats had to cast



themselves as neither left nor right , and p ay at least lip­
service to such values as social cohesion .
The fact that all these claims to have superseded the
left/right distinction fail to materialize once the parties in
question move from the realm of rhetoric to that of practi­
cal politics begs the question of why the distinction has
proved so enduring . The first and most important point
here is that 'left ' and ' righ t ' are not absolute terms, as
Bobbio discusse s at length in chapter 5. There is a clear
example of this fundamental characteristic in British p oliti­
cal history: Chartism is rightly considered a left-wing move­
ment of the first half of the last century , but fifty years after
its demise, its demand for universal manhood s uffrage
would have been les s than radical in light of the incipient
suffragette movement, and would now appear downright
reactionary . The simple fac t is that what is left or right in
one period is not necess arily so in another. This is proof not
of their emptiness as political term s , but simply of their
relativity . Left and right do not represent two s ets of fixed
ideas , but rather an axis which shifts considerably from one
generation to the next. All words change their meaning
slightly over time , but while socialism , fo r instance , is
anchored to some form of common ownership , the left/right
distinction existed before socialism became a maj or force in
European politics , and continued to exist in countries which
claimed to have adopted s ocialism as the basis for their
economic systems .
The distinction has also proved enduring because politics
is by its nature antithetical , and the development of demo­
cracy has assisted the formation of parties and the growth of
bipartisan systems , or at least the polarization around two
main political block s . B obbio often refers to the distinction



as a dyad , by which he means a distinction covering the
whole of the political universe (everything in politics must
be either left or right) whose twin components are antithe­
tical (nothing in p olitics can be both left and right at the
s ame time) .
The left/right metaphor originated in the French National
Assembly of 1789, and proved extremely appropriat e . Left
and right represent a spatial dyad with which we are all
familiar (an object must be either on our left or on our
right , and cannot be both ; furthermore , there is an area
directly in front of us where it is not very clear whether the
obj ec t in question is on the left or the right , and this can be
equated with the centre) ; but there is no reason to believe
that history could not have come up with an alternative
metaphor, and indeed the relative po sitions of the French
deputies in relation to the president were only chance
(although the position of mo re conservative nohles to the
right was perhaps a reflection of their dwindling privilege s ) .
Clearly the s uccess of left and right is due not to the felicity
of the metaphor, whatever its forcefulnes!" hut to the fun­
damental n ature of the p olitical distin�tion which it has
come to express .

The nature of the distinction
Having defended the distinction, Bobhio then moves on to
argue that the left tends towards equality and the right
tends toward s inequality . This theory has caused consider­
able debate in the Italian press , and the alternative propo­
sals are disc ussed in detail in Bobhio ' s ' Reply to the Critics'
at the end of the hook . A more recent example will suffice



to demonstrate the simplicity and effec tivenes s of Bob­
bio ' s suggested criterion for the dis tinction. When Ales­
sandro Pizzorno , a university professor, was interviewed
in February 199 5, he expres sed his disagreement with
the equality/inequality criterion, and suggested inclu­
sion/exclusion in its place .2 T he attraction of such a distinc­
tion in a world of increasing economic p olariz ation is cle a r .
The e ssential ques tion for Piz zorno is membership o f a
collective identity , but Bobbio ' s response was that although
inclusion/exclusion is a valid distinctio n , it is only partial ,
and i s in any case entirely covered by the equality/in­
equality distinction . Awarding full citizen ' s rights to immi­
grants could be seen as an example of inclusion , but it also
means that society no longer perceive s a difference of na­
tionality as j ustifying a different allocation of citizens '
rights , and is therefore also egalitarian.3 Inclusion/exclu­
sion c overs discrimination between discrete groups , but
cannot deal with more graduated distinctions . Free health
care is clearly an egalitarian policy , because it gives those
with lower incomes access to an essential service , but it is
not inclusion. Pizzorno put forward his criterion because of
a p articularly pres sing problem in the late twentieth cen­
tury , but practically accepted the limitations of his own
argument when he admitted that ' historically B obbio is
right ' .
Few political philosophers who have dealt with this s ub­
ject h ave failed to note the close association between
equality and the fundamental concept of justic e . Bobbio
argues that j ustice relates to two principles : legality ( a d­
herence to the law) and equality (treating like as like) .
While j ustice is a n ideal , equality is a reality. I n the seven­
ties he wrote :



It is not in itself either j ust or unj ust that two billiard b alls are
perfectly the same [uguali]. The realm of the applica tion of justice ,
or rather socially and politically significant equ alities, is to be
found in social relations between individuals and other indivi
duals, groups and other groups, or in dividuals and the group,
according to the traditional distinction which goes back to Aris
totle, between retributive justice (which involves relations between
the parts) and distributive j ustice (which involves relations
between the whole and the parts or vice versa). 4

Before exammmg Bobbio ' s criterion any further , it is
necessary to clarify the meanings of 'equality ' and 'in­
equality ' , and , as we are dealing with a translation, to be
sensitive to the original Italian and how this may differ from
the English. While in Italian there is nothing strange in
stating that billiard-balls are uguali, in English to say that
they are equal is nonsensical . An Italian dictionary will
give the first meaning of uguale as 'identical' or the same­
ness of two or more obj ects , while an English one will
start with ' of the s ame value or amount� . This ambivalence
has informed much of the debate over the nature of
equality , and poses the important quest� on of whether the
opposite of equality is 'inequality' or ' difference' . 5 Trans­
lation h a s spre a d debates , terms and ambivalences from one
language to another , particularly in the field of political
philos ophy , and ' difference' is now proposed as an opposite
to 'equality' in English , principally as an anti- or post-so­
cialist value . The confusion surrounding these terms ,
whereby equality , as the supposed opposite of difference , is
identified with uniformity and a single world-view , has
become the justification for the 'post-modernist' equation
of the left with totalitarianism . This has been countered by
arguments that equality and difference are entirely com­
patible .6



The question of whether the opposite of ' equality ' i s
' difference' o r 'inequality ' i s essentially a matter o f how
you define 'equality ' . Bobbio makes clear that only in
dogmatic utopian theories does equality ever mean ' e qu ality
for everyone in everything' , an imposed or regimented
' sameness ' across society , which appears to be something
similar to ' simple equality' as defined by Michael Walzer .
In fact, just as Bobbio argues that 'equality for everyone in
everything' is so impractical as to be meaningless, s o Walzer
states that 'equality literally understood is an idea ripe for
betrayal' .7 "Bobbio has invented the word egualitarista for
the advocate of this rigid formal equality , and t have
translated this as ' egalitarianist', which seemed the logical
parallel neologism in English.
E galitarianism can therefore be divided into a kind of
utopian regimentation and a more pragmatic appro ach
which asks three fundamental questions : Between whom ? In
what? On what basis? All social organization involves ele­
ments of equality and inequality , and the difference be­
tween left and right is a question of degree within a
particular cultural and historical context . While in­
equality may be considered the opposite of this pragmatic
equality , difference could be considered the opposite of
regimented equality. Difference is a positive quality , par­
ticularly in the affluent West , because it implie s the free­
dom of each individual to develop his or her particular
Norberto Bobbio is at pains to point out that feminism is
not about difference , but is in fact a classic example of an
egalitarian s truggle. Women won the right to vote bec ause
society acknowledged that there was no difference between
men and women in the fields of politics and citizens hip



which could j ustify their disqualification from voting rights .
Other forms of disqualification have gradually been
removed , a n d , leaving aside the question of how much
remains to be done , most people would agree that this
egalitarian s truggle has given women m ore freedom to de­
velop their own individual natures than in the past. Thus
egalitarianism too could fairly claim to create c onditions
for individual choice. B obbio quotes Massimo C acciari , a
leading Italian philosopher, who argues precisely this :
'Equality is a part of our quality of life , like income , the
environment and public services . . . . Equality makes
diversity possible, and makes it possible for every one to
count as a person , quite unlike that abs tract totalitarian
idea of equality which means the elimination of those who
are not the s ame. '8
Freedom is about the individual and the individual ' s
ability to be different or autonomous within clearly defined
limits which fall s hort of the state of nature . While equality
is a s ocial good, freedom is an individmll good, as Bobbio
convincingly argues ( ' I am free' is an intelligible statement ,
while ' I am equal' is not). Freedom may be claimed by
both left and right , but one of the central arguments of
this book is that freedom does not belong exclusively to
either .

The other distinction
Bobbio divides the political universe along two fundamental
axes : the previously discussed distinction between equality
and inequality , as expres sed by the terms 'left ' and ' right' ,
and the distinction between liberty and authoritarianism.



The ideal of liberty is the other great ideal which has guided
Europe since the Enlightenment . 9 Liberty , in the modern
sense , represents a complete break with the p as t and with
the organic concept of the state , the Aristotelian model
whereby the whole is more important than the p arts.
Bobbio is unusual on the left in perceiving individualism
not as a negative value , but as a product of the m odern
state , the rej ection of the organic concept of the state and
the development , however imperfect , of human rights .
Without going into all the c ategories of human rights which
Bobbio has defined elsewhere ,t° it will be sufficient for this
argument to state that the two p rincipal c ategories are
libertarian rights and social rights , which to some extent are
in conflict with each other . The left , which is generally
associated with s ocial rights , has long a ccused the right of
breaking up the community through its over-emphasis on
the individual's libertarian rights a t the expen se of the
community's wider interests ; while the right has accused the
left of the s ame thing, on the grounds that it is suppo sed to
have undermined religion and traditional v alues, which
bind society together . This latter argument is rather weak
because, as B obbio points out , there are plenty of right-wing
atheists and left-wing believers ; the ass ociation of the right
with traditionalis m is understandable , but often misleading.
More recently , the right has come up with the more coher­
ent argument that the implementation of social rights in the
modern welfare state has undermined the sense of com­
munity by removing an individual's personal responsibilit y
for his family and community . Leaving aside the question­
able c oncept of a previous golden age in which the c o m­
munity cared for all its weaker member s , it is certainly true
that the welfare state tends to treat each citizen as an



individual . It raises taxes from the individual at national
level, and distributes benefits to the individual, usually in
accordance with clearly defined national criteria . According
to Bobbio , increasing individualism relates to the abandon­
ment of the o rganic concept of the state and the rise of
human rights and democracy , wherein the individual citizen
exercises his political power in the total isolation and pri­
vacy of the polling b ooth . The rise of individualism there­
fore relates not to the left/right distinction , but to the
-distinction between liberty and authoritarianism . Once re­
ligious freedom had been accepted in the wake of the
religious wars following the Reformation , the wholly organic
state and the homogeneous community it governed ceased to
exist in their purest forms . The process has continued since
then , and b�th the left and the right feel an undoubted sense
of loss , the former because of a weakening in social cohe­
sion , the latter because of a weakening in s ocial hierarchy .
In spite of that shared sense of loss , neither the moderate
left nor the moderate right would wish to. return to a truly
organic concept of the state. In any case, community in its
more positive sense is a purely cultural phenomenon, and it
is difficult to see how it could ever be imposed (at best it can
be encouraged) .
It is thus an essential aspect of Bobbio ' s thought that the
modern political universe is made up of two entirely separ­
ate axes : left/right and liberty/authoritarianism . The rise of
liberty in its current , individualistic sense is the great
achievement of the modern era , and although it is not part
of the left/right distinction , it is its cause , because through
the establishment of the rules for a democratic political
contest , it has allowed the alternation of government be­
tween the left and the right .



Moderates and extremists
In Bobbio ' s theory , the two axes in politics combine to
produce four c atego ries : the extreme right, the . moderate
right , the moderate left and the extreme left . The extremists
are authoritarian , and do not accept the rules of demo­
cracy, and although the moderate left and moderate right
disagree over the question of equality , they accept the same
rules for the political game.
Obviously the political spectrum could be further fra g­
mented , especially if the centre is taken into account. How­
ever, these are B obbio ' s main categories , and he makes
clear his distrust of the centre , which wields disproportion­
ate influence by holding the balance of power , and is often
opportunist. On this point , he recently cited the example of
the Italian Socialist Party , an indeterminate political force
which allied itself with the right at national level and the left
at local level where this would give them political offic;e .
The equation of extremis m with authoritarianism is prob­
ably the most contentious aspect of Bobbio ' s model. B y
shifting between extremism i n the sens e o f autho ritarianism
and extremism in the sense of extreme policies , he implies
that an extreme egalitarian or inegalitarian position neces­
sarily involves contempt for the rules of democracy . He takes
several historical examples of extreme egalitarian views ,
particularly in relation to private property ; and according
to his model, the proponents of these views must also have
been authoritarian . Yet one of them at least was a thorough­
going democrat : Winstanley coupled his extreme egalita­
rianism with a belief in universal suffrage , yearly
parliaments and absolute religious freedom , while Cromwell



had more moderate views on the left/right axis , but never
believed in u niversal suffrage or religious freedom, and
ended up a dictator. Part of the p roblem may he the
application of the model to a historical period in which
democracy as we now understand it was itself a revolution­
ary demand . However, in defence of Bobbio ' s model, it
could be argued that Winstanley was more democratic be­
cause he did not enj oy political power , and that if he had
had the opportunity to impose his ideal society , he could
only have done so by force . Although he was an enlightened
revolutionary in that he did not believe that you could force
men to be free, he did dedicate The Law of Freedom to
C romwell with the words : 'You have the power . . . to act
for common freedom if you will: I have no power . 'll Win­
stanley was c ertainly aware of the army ' s political import­
anc e , and it is a matter of p ure historical speculation what
he would have s aid or done , had the diggers become a
serious political force . It certainly seems logical to suppose
that the further one ' s political po sition�oves to the left or
the right of the general consensus over the right mix of
equalities and inequalities in any given age or s ociety , the
more difficult it would become for that po sition to be
enacted through the democratic proces s . On the o ther han d ,
a distinction h a s t o be drawn between a political thinker
who describes an ideal society, although he knows that there
is little chance of it becoming reality in the immediate
future , and the revolutionary who wishes to impose his ideal
s ociety tomorrow , whether or not society agrees with him .
The question of consensus is clearly pivotal when it comes
to democracy . One could quite reasonably s upport the
collectivization of agriculture , while abhorring the brutal
way in which Stalin went about it. During the Second World



War and after it , many countries took the quite extreme
egalitarian measure of rationing staple products; but while
undoubtedly an irritant , this was not perceived as op­
pressive, because it enj oyed consensus .
One last note of caution in judging the possible extremism
of an egalitarian measure concerns the question of scarcity
in an economy (as in the case of rationing) . Most people
would recoil at the idea of a society in which everyone had
to wear the s ame clothes , the egalitarian measure which
most deprives citizens of their individuality (a common
feature in literary utopias and anti-utopias ) . However, in an
extremely impoverished country , even this Draconian
measure, which smacks of prison and army barracks , could
find some j ustification in that where res ources are scarce ,
they h ave to be distributed rationally and efficiently 80 that
all citizens can acquire such an essential commodity as
clothing , however drab .
As a society becomes more affluent, equality can shift
from being an equal lack of choice to a n equal freedom of
choice . This takes us back to C acciari ' s c ontention that
equality engenders freedom and to Walzer' s concept of
' complex equality ' . Clearly , inequality alters too in the shift
from economic s cardty to affluence .

The relevance of Bobbio 's left and right
It would be impos sible in a short introduction like this to do
justice to the complexity of Bobbio ' s views on human rights ,
democracy, equality and liberty . This book deals primarily
with the last two , but the first two are never far below the
surface . Liberty can only survive where there are both



democracy and human rights , and the latter must be posi­
tive rights recognized in law and preferably upheld by a
constitution . If equality is perceived on a global scale , its
task has barely begun , and that view parallels the view on
human rights expressed by Bobbio in The Age of Rights .
In the twentieth century , and perhaps for much longer ,
the history of Western Europe has involved a general trend
towards equality , which continues to this day . Of cours e ,
there have been set-back s , periods of rapid change and
periods of c omplacency . It is even argued that equality or
near equality has already been achieved in some indus­
trialized countrie s . However , Bobbio emphasizes in his con­
clusion that , apart from the persistence of clear inequalities
in the West , particularly in the economic field, the widening
gap between the Third World and the West continues to
present the left/right dichotomy in its starkest form .
The relevance of this book to the left in Europe could not
be more apparent. In Britain, the strategy of ' New Labour'
seems almost modelled on B obbio ' s definit�on of a third way
based on submerging the left/right distinction and s omehow
transcending it - an often repeated tactic which, according
to Bobbio , can never actually be put into practice, whatever
its efficacy as a means of s urvival when the other side
appears to be particularly in the ascendant. However , sup­
pression of one ' s political identity is no guarantee of success
at the polls : Alleanza Democratica , the left-of-centre coali­
tion in Italy presented a programme which included drastic
cuts in public spending , privatization , federalism and direct
elections for the executive , but lost an election it had
previously been expected to win . The electoral advantages
of dramatic policy shifts for tactical reasons have yet to be



Left and Right is not a moral tract , but the defence of a
pair of analytical categories and an investigation of the
criteria on which it is based. Once that distinction has been
reasserted , it is then possible to make an individual choice
between the two , a choice that is primarily moral . This book
also reasserts the belief that humanity has choices and the
ability to create its own future ; while the oppo site argu­
ment , which claims that the left has been defeated defini­
tively or is simply obsolete , means that there is no real
choice for the electorate , other than that between different
groups of technoc rats whose efficiency and honesty may
differ but whose fundamental approach is the s ame . De­
struction of the left/right distinction leads to alienation fro m
the political system , a s c a n be seen i n the United S t ates ,
which tends more than Europe towards an indistinct bip a r­
tisan s ystem . Ultimately , it would also undermine the demo­
cratic systems and related human rights which, whatever
their limitations , constitute the part of our often cruel and
wasteful history that we , as Europeans , can be proud of.
Allan Cameron

Prefa ce to the Firs t
Italian Edition

Never has so much been written against the traditional
distinction between left and right, which is now thought to
have run its course and to be completely without meaning,
always supposing it had one in the past. 1 At the time of
writing this work j ust beforeJhe Italian general election , the
political scene is witnessing an unprecedented polarization
between two alliances which proclaim themselves to be on
the left and the right , and are preparing to battle fiercely
for government of the country under these two banners .
S o do left and right still exist? And if they still exist and
hold the field , how can it be said that they have lo st all their
meaning? If they are still meaningful, then what is their
For m any y e ars , I have been collecting material on this
topic , which has fed an endless debate , and given rise to the
most varied and contradictory theorie s . Yet I fully realize
that this collection is like a few drops in an immense ocean .
Many of the pages of this book were written s ome time a go
and never p ublished , although the theories they put for­
ward have been p resented in seminars and public debate s .3



The current confusion has been added to by the fact that
the significance of ' left' and ' right ' , the two keywords in
this politic al debate , is continually being rej ected on the
basis of varying arguments , yet we still do not seem to be
able to do without them . Even today , these two words are so
charged with emotional significance a s to inflame s pirits on
both sides , and are used to laud one side or vilify the other.
I felt therefore , that this was a favo urable moment to look
over these idea s , put them in order, add a few notes and
publish them .
While performing this task, I have attempted to avoid the
influence of changing opinions, which are often extem­
porized in newspaper or magazine articles . If you were to
listen to these, you would run the risk of not understanding
why the left/right distinction has survived in spite of s o
many refutations o r , indee d , the loves and hates which
continue. to keep it alive .4 I have examined success ive argu­
ments for and against advanced by the various adversa ries ,
the j us tifica tions which from time to time are used in favour
of either the demise or the survival of the distinc tion ,- and
the criteria invoked by those who have defended it . I have
given particular attention to those writers who have de­
veloped a pers onal, well-documented analysis t o justify
their criterion .
A s a conclusion to t h e interpretations and ob s ervations
gradually developed throughout the book , I have explained
in the last two chapters5 what in my opinion is the irredu­
cible , inescapable core of the dichotomy , which is therefore
constantly recurring, as well as being ideal, hist o rical and
existential. I have examined things with a certain detach­
ment , and do not set about making a j udgement . I do not
ask myself who is right and who is wrong, becau s e I see no



point in confusing a historical assessment with my personal
opinions , although I make no secret of which side I feel
closer to.
N. B.
Turin, February 1994


A Challenge to the

1 ' Left' a n d ' right' are two antithetical terms which for
more than two centuries have been used habitually to sig­
nify the contrast between the ideologies and movements
which divide the world of political thought and action . As
antithetic al terms, they are mutually exclusive , and together
they are exhaustive within that eminently conflict-riven
universe . They are exclusive in the sense that no doct�ine or
movement can be both left-wing and right-wing at the same
time . They are exhaustive in the sense that a d octrine or
movement can only be either left-wing or right-win g , at least
as far as the more rigid application of the twin definition is
concerne d , as we shall see later .
The antithetical pair, left and right , can be put to descrip­
tive, axiological or historical use , as I have often said of
what I call the 'great dichotomie s ' which divide up every
field of knowledge . They are descriptive in that they can
s ummarize two sides of a conflict , evaluative in that they
can express a positive or negative value-j udgement of one
side or the othe r , and historical in that they can indicate the
passage from one phase to another in the p olitic al life of a



nation . Their historical u s e can , in turn , b e either descrip­
tive or evaluative.
The opposition between left and right represents a typi­
cally dyadic way of thinking, which has been variously
explained in psychological , s ociological , historical and even
biological terms . There are examples in all fields of thought ;
the all-inclusive distinction or dyad dominates every disci­
pline . In s ociology it is s ociety/community , in economics
market/planned , in law public/private , in aesthetics classi­
cal/romantic , and in philosophy transcendent/immanent .
Left/right is not the only distinction in the political sphere ,
but it i s encountered everywhere .
There are distinctions in which the two constituent terms
are antithetic al, and others in which they are complemen­
tary. The former interpret a universe as a composition of
divergent entities which opp o se each other , whereas the
latter interpret a harmonious universe composed of conver­
gent entities which tend to'fuse into a superior whole . The
left/right pair belongs to the first type . Given that triadic
thought is often generated from dyadi!i thought or repre­
sents , as it were , a development from it , the transition from
one to the other will differ according to whether the dyad
one starts from consists of antithetical or complementary
terms . I n the first case the transition occurs through a
dialectical synthesis or negation of the negation , in the
second case through composition .
The following reflections arise from the assertion that
there is no longer any relevance to the distinction between
left and right which , over the two centuries since the French
Revolution, has been used to divide the political universe
into opposing c amps , an as sertion which has been made
repeatedly in recent years , to the point of becoming a cliche .



It is now de rigueur to quote Sartre who , it appears , was
one of the first to argue that left and right were empty
vessels . They are no longer supposed to have any heuristic
or classificatory value , and emphatically no evaluative ap­
plication. Often they are referred to with a cert ain irrita­
tio n , as though they represent one of the many linguistic
traps which political debate can fall into.
2 There are various reasons for this opinion which is
gaining increasing currency , and countless examples could
be produced every day. Let us look at a few .
The first doubts about whether the distinction h a d disap­
peared , or at least ceased to have the same descriptive force ,
arose from the so-called crisis of ideology , and therefore the
pointlessness of contrasting the ideologies involved. The
objection which can easily be raised is that ideologies have
not disappeared at all, but are still very much with us . The
ideologies of the past have merely been replaced by others
which are new or claim to be new. The ideologic al tree is
always green. Besides , it has been shown repeatedly- that
there is nothing more ideological than declaring t he demise
of ideologies . Then again 'left' and ' right' are not j ust
ideologies . To reduce them to purely ideological expres sions
would be an unj ustifiable simplification : they indicate oppos­
ing programmes in relation to many problems whose solution
is part of everyday political activity . These contrasts c on­
cern not only ideas, but also interests and j udgements on
which direction society should be moving in ; they exist in all
societies, and it is not apparent how they could disappear.
Naturally , one could reply that such contrasting positions
exist , but they are not the same as those encountered when
the distinction was created , and during the period of its



success these positions have changed so much as to make the
old names anachronistic and therefore misleading.
Recently it has been argued that , since the concept of a
left wing has been so drastically emptied of its descriptive
powers as to be one of the leas t informative expressions in
political usage , the time has come to replace the old pair of
terms with a more appropriate one : that of progressives and
conserv atives. l But s ome have taken a more radical stance ,
rej ecting any residual dichotomy in their vision, and ar­
guing that this last dichotomy is one of those 'follies ' of
political j argon, which we must free ourselves from in order
to form new groupings , based not on positions , but on
problems .2
3 Secondly , it is argued that the division into two distinct

and opposing political camps has become inappropriate ,
and the resulting p olitical spectrum insufficient , in the
increasingly complex political world of large-scale societies ,
particularly large-s cale democratic societies which tolerate
and indeed presuppose the existence of a multitude of
pressure groups and interest groups which compete with
each other ( and which on occasion opp o se each othe r , and
on other occasions make common cause with each other ;
they converge on some p oints and diverge on others , like
dancers j oining together and then turning their backs in an
elaborate choreography) . Basically , the objection is that in
a multi-faceted democratic society , in which many forces
are at play , which agree on some points and not on others ,
and permit a great v ariety of alliances , problems cannot be
posed in antithetical form as one thing or another : either
left or right , and if it is not left�wing, it must be right-wing,
or vice vers a .



This obj ection strikes home, but it is not decisive. The
dis tinction between left and right does not at all preclude,
even in everyday language, the existence of a c ontinuous
spectrum which j oins the left and the right, or of intermedi­
ate po sitions where the left meets the right. Thes e positions
make up a central area between the extremes which is well
known as the 'centre' . If one wanted to flirt a little with the
terminology of logic, one could say that while the dyadic
concept of politics can be defined as the excluded middle,
according to which politics is divided into just two parts,
which are mutually exclusive , with nothing in between them,
a triadic concept can be defined as the 'included middle ',
according to which there is an intermediate space between
the left and the right which is neither one nor the other.
In the first case, the two terms, which have an ' either .. . or
.. . ' relationship, are contradictory; whereas in the second
case, in· which the intermediate area can be expressed as
'neither .. . nor . . . ', they are opposite s . No prohlem then :
black and white are divided by grey, and day and night are
divided by dus k . Grey takes nothing away from the distinc­
tion between black and white, and dus k takes nothing away
from the distinction between day and night.
4 The fact that in many democratic s ystems with high levels

of pluralism the 'included middle ' can become so a11embracing as to relegate the left and the right to the extreme
margins of the political system does not in any way invali­
date the original antithesis . As the centre is defined as
neither left-wing nor right-wing and cannot be defined in
any other way, its very existence and raison d'etre are
based on this antithesis. The duration of dusk v a ries ac­
cording to the season and the latitude, but its duration in



no way affects the fact that its definition depends on the
definition of day and night .3
Identification of this intermediate space allows for a more
graduated interpretation of the political system , as the
centre which is closer to the left , the centre-left , can be
distinguished from the centre which is closer to the right,
the centre-right. E qually , on the left , one c an distinguish
between a moderate left which tends towards the centre and
an extreme left which is opposed to the centre , and on the
right , a right wing which is attracted towards the centre and
a right wing which distances itself so much from the centre
as to be equally opposed to the centre as to the left . If it is
then c onsidered that whatever way the centre is divided up
there is still a centre which remains intact and could be
defined as the centre of the centre , a spectrum emerges with
a range of positions .
It need hardly be said that fragmentation of the political
sys tem is assisted by the adoption of proportional repre­
sentation . This fragmentation c an he clearly seen in a
chamber of dep uties shaped like an a .p,phitheatre, in which
the v arious positions are represented, moving from the
extreme right to the extreme left . However, the distinction
which divides the elected representatives in each sector i s
still b etween left and right . While i n the British parliament,
one has to sit either on the left or on the right, reflecting the
great left/right antithesis , representatives in a parliament
like the Italian Montecitorio are graded from right to left
(or vice vers a ) . However , the nostalgia for a first-past-the­
post electoral system (whether based on one or two ballots)
which has arisen in recent years and has led to repeated
attempts at reform and a referendum, reflects a desire to
return to a bipolar politic al system. This campaign , which



has finally achieved success through an act of parliament , is
proof enough that a dichotomous interpretation of politics
persists even in a fra gmented s ystem , whatever views might
be expressed , and leaving aside all doctrinal a rguments .
Besides , what better proof could there be of the persistence
of this dichotomy than the presenc e , even where there is
pluralism , of a left wing which tends to perceive the centre
as the right wing in disguise and a right wing which tends to
perceive the same centre as a cover for the left which does
not wish to show its true colours .
5 Allow me another digression: the 'included middle ' is not
the same as the 'inclusive middle ' . The 'included middle '
attempts to find its own space between two opposites , and
although it inserts itself between them , it does not eliminate
them , but draws them apart, prevents them from coming
into contact and brawling, and dispenses with the s tark
choice between left and right by providing an alternative .
T h e 'inclusive middle ' tends to go beyond the two opposites ,
incorporating them in a higher synthesis , and therefore
cancelling them out . In other word s , left and right cease to
be two mutually exclusive totalities like two side s of a coin
which cannot both b e seen at the same time ; they become
two parts of a whole , a dialectic totality . This can be
distinguished from a mechanical totality , which consists of
a combination of compatible parts that j oin together pre­
cisely because they are compatible , and from an organic
totality , in which the individual parts are a function of the
whole , and therefore not antithetical but convergent in
relation to the centre . Dialectical unity , on the o t her hand,
entails a synthesis of two opposing parts , one of which is
the assertion or thesis and the other is the negation or



antithesis . This synthesis is not a compound , and represents
something entirely new . While the 'included middle' could
be expressed by the formula ' neither . . . nor . . . ' , the 'inclusive middle ' could be abbreviated to 'both . . . and . . . ' .
In political deb ate the 'inclusive middle' is us ually
presented as an attempt at a third way - that is to say, as
something which transcends the politics of left and right ,
unlike the centre , which is simply in between the left and the
right. In p ractice , the third way is in the centre ; but in
theory , it claims not to be a compromise between two
extremes , but to supersede them both , and therefore it
accepts and suppresses them at the same time (in contrast
to the 'included middle ' , which rej ects and separate s ) . It is
not, then , a mediated third, but a transcended third , where
the first and second entities are brought together in their
interdepe ndence and suppres sed as unilateral assertions ,
rather th an being separated and left to survive in opposition
to each other. Every middle entity p
ence of the other two entities , but the 'included middle'
realizes its own es sence by driving the Ijl, out , and the 'inclu­
sive middle ' by feeding off them. The 'included middle' is
essentially p ractical politics without a doctrine , whereas the
'inclusive middle' is essentially a doctrine in search of a
practical politics , and as s oon a s this is achieved , it reveals
itself as centrist .
The history o f political thought - o r perhaps I should say,
political fantasy - can produce thousands of examples of
such third ways . I have insisted on this point , perhaps more
than necessary , because the c risis of the left has led to the
recent success of the ideal of liberal socialism, which is a
typical expression of 'inclusive middle ' thought. A triadic
combination is always the product of a crisis , and hence a



fear that an antithesis has exhausted its historic al vitality .
Every form of synthetic thought is somewhat paradoxical ,
because it attempts to bring together two opposing sets of
ideas , which have always proved to be incompatible , and
therefore alternatives . The paradox is justified by the fact
that all forms of synthetic thought always prove to be
fruitless once they are put into practice unilaterally .
Another example of this synthesis of opposites occurred
on the right , in an equally serious period of crisis . This was
the ideology of the conservative revolution which followed
the First World War as a response by the right to the
subversive revolution which had brought the left to power
in one vast country , and threatened to spread elsewhere .4
For the purposes of our argument here concerning the
opposition between left and right and its pos sible dis appear­
ance, the theory of the 'inclusive middle ' can be interpreted
as the synthesis of opposing positions with the intention in
practice of saving whatever can be saved of one ' s own
position by drawing in the opposing position and thus
neutralizing it .
6 A third reason for rej ecting the traditional opposition
between left and right and claiming its demise is the view
that it has lost a great deal of its descriptive valu e , because
the continuous development of society and the creation of
new p olitical problems (political in the sense that they
require solutions through the traditional instruments of
political activity - that is to say , activity aimed at collective
decisions which, once they are taken , become binding on
the entire community) have produced movements which
cannot be categorized in terms of the traditional opposition
between left and right , as claimed by the movements



themselves . The most interesting current example is that of
the Greens . Are the Greens on the left or the right? If we
use the criteria usually adopted for making this distinction ,
it appears that sometimes they are on the left and sometimes
on the right , or that they are neither left-wing nor right­
wing. The G reens could be defined as a transversal move­
ment , which has become a political buzz-word , albeit a
pej orative used in another context . This is because green
issues run through all the enemy camp s , and pas s effort­
lessly from one camp to another , thus proving that in
practice there is a third way of subverting the dyad , in
addition to being in the middle ( the centre) and going
beyond ( synthesis ) . This moving through the spectrum en­
tails a reduction in the authority of the dyad , rather than
its rej ection or obsolescence .
The best proof of the ubiquity of the green movement is
the fact that all parties have adopted the ecological theme
without c hanging any of their traditional political baggage .
They have perhaps merely added to i t . No one today would
dare to challenge the rights of nature , which are perhaps an
unconscious anthropomorphization of the natural world .
These are the rights which nature should expect of hu­
manity , and this relationship implies duties which humanity
must accord to nature (without entering into the a rgument
of whether a right p recedes an obligation , or vice versa) .
There are various explanations for this radical s hift in
attitude to nature (particularly in the West) from a percep­
tion of nature as something purely to be dominated and as
a passive instrument of human needs to the idea of nature
(even inanimate nature) as a subject, or at least an obj ect
which should not be used arbitrarily , but within the dictates
of reaso n . According to a somewhat metaphysical or reli-



gious interpretation , nature belongs to the world not cre­
ated by man , and , like man , is a free agent within it , a c ting
alongside other free agents . A more p ragmatic and utilita­
rian p oint of view asserts that since man is obliged to live in
a finite universe whose av ailable resources for survival are
limited, these resources should be used with due c onsidera­
tion to their eventual exhaustion . Given these different
philosophies based on opposing value systems a n d c oncepts
of the worl d , it i s quite possible that the spread of ecologic a l
movements will not make the traditional left/right split
anachronisti c , but tha t , instead, this split will be repro­
duced within the various ecological movements , which are
already troubled by internal divisions , despite their recent
appearance. It is a question of whether human b eings h ave
a duty to other beings besides themselves , or to other
human heings , in particular to future generatio n s ; or, in
other words , whether these restrictions are impo sed on
humanity from outside or are imposed by humanity on
itself. This ques tion will introduce a distinctio n between
right-wing greens and left-wing greens, and h a s in ' p art
already done s o .
7 Huma n ity ' s dramatically increased ability n o t only to

exploit nature and subject it to its own needs , but als o to
manipulate it and deflect it from its normal course ,
has created moral and legal problems (such as bio - ethics)
which will increasingly require political decisions (as pre­
viously defined) ; and as these will be completely different
from any decisions taken in the past, it appe ars that,
whatever their true nature , they will not fall into the tradi­
tional categories of left and right , which arose when these
problem s were unknown to political movements . As these



problems are eminently moral , responses to them have
reflected either laxity or severity , a distinction which gener­
ally divides the moral worl d . However, this dis tinction does
not fit well with the distinction between left and right . Is
laxity left-wing or right-wing? Is s everity left-wing or right­
There is severity on the left and laxity on the right , and
also vice versa . The two dichotomies c annot be superim­
posed . The most problematic example of this cro�s-over is
the question of abortion . In general , the abolition of abor­
tion is part of the right-wing political programmes, and the
left is prevalently pro-abortion . It has been p ointed out to
me that this attitude appears to contrast with one of the
general definitions of the left : that the left defends the wea k .
It could b e argued that of the mother and t h e foetus , the
foetus is the weaker of the two . In reply , it can be argued
that it is undoubtedly weaker than the mother , but that the
mother is weaker than the father , who , in most cases, has
forced her to become pregnant . It is no coincidence that the
p ro-abortion campaign was strengthened enormously by the
spread of feminism , which has been favoured by left-wing
partie s .
8 B u t these are all

secondary arguments . T h e p rincipal
reason for challenging the left/right distinction is much
more imp ortant from a historical and political p oint of view .
The two tet:ms of an antithetical distinction support each
other: if t here were no right wing, then there would be no
left win g , and vice vers a. In other words , the right exists
because there is a left , and the left exists because there is a
righ t . C o nsequently , proving the irrelevance of this distinc­
tion does not require proof of its inappropriateness (i . e .



there is no point in dividing the political world on the b a sis
of opposing ideologies if there are no more ideologies ) , its
deficiency (i .e. it is insufficient to divide the political world
into two poles when it has been shown that there is a middle
entity - whether it is intermediate or at a higher level does
not matter) , or its anachronism (i . e . new political pro­
grammes , problems and movements have entered the p oliti­
cal scene since the distinction was created , fulfilling a u seful
role ) . It is quite sufficient to diminish the authority of one
of the terms and cease to recognize its existence : if all is
left-wing, then there is no right win g , and conversely , if all
is right-wing, then there is no left wing.
Two terms in a n antithesis do not always have equal force ;
nor i s it necessarily the case that one is always stronger than
the other . Their respective force c a n change according to
the point of view and according to the criteria used to
measure, it. There are pairs in which the stronger term
remains the s ame : in the distinction between war and peac e ,
i t is w a r which, s o far , h a s remained the stronger term , and
the proof is that peace has traditionally been defined as
non-war , as something that c o mes after a war (as in Gro­
tius ' s De Jure Belli ac Pacis or Tolstoy ' s War and Peace) ;
and i n the distinction between order and dis order , the
stronger term is order. In the antithesis between left and
right, which is restricted to the political sphere , the respect­
ive force of the two terms is not established once and for all ;
it depends on the period and the circumstances , unlike in
biology , followed by religion and ethic s , where right is
considered the s tronger term. In Italian history , the right
was predominant after Unification ; but this was followed
by a period in which the left was p redominant . The two
parts continue to exist , and base their raison d 'etre on the



existence of the oth e r , even when one prevails over the
other , and the scales tip more and more in fav our of one or
the other . When Fascism, which was considered a right­
wing movement , came crashing down (and rightly so for the
maj ority of world opinion) , the star of the left rose so high
that the right seemed to have dis appeared , or at least to
have lost so much of its standing as to put into question its
s urvival .
In a situation of that kind , it is not at all surprising
that s ome of the minority groups and movements which ,
according to established political terminology , would have
been defined as right-wing , started to argue that the tradi­
tional left/right distinction no longer had any useful func­
tio n , that it had become obsolete , and that the political
struggle had to go beyond left and right. It should be noted
that this alleged obsolescence of the left/right distinction
was presented as its total repudiation and distortion , rather
than as a synthesis which incorporated two opposites
and , by incorporating them , hrought out the truth of each.
It is clear that in a situation in whI ch one becomes s o
predominant a s to leave little room for th e other to b e taken
seriously as a political force , undermining the left/right
distinction becomes an obvious expedient for hiding
one ' s own weakness. ' Has the right heen defeated?' 'But
what is the point of posing the question in these terms ' ,
asks the defeated side , 'if the distinction between left
and right has run its course ? ' In a universe in which the two
opposing p arts are interdependent , in the sense
that existence of one presupposes the existence of the other ,
the only w a y to invalidate the adversary is to invalidate
oneself. Where the whole has become what was previously a
part , the distinction has completed its tas k ; everything



must be started anew, and the distinction mus t be tran­
scended .
9 Every day we are now fin ding evidence that the strong
and weak parts have been inverted in the left/right distinc­
tion, following the dramatic events of recent years which
have dissolved the c ommunist regimes (for many y ears they
were held up as the relentless advance of the left in the
world , or were considered by those who had fought a gainst
them as the most radical expres sion of the left and the most
extensive historical implementation of the ideas and cam­
paigns of the left) . The left is on the way down , and the right
is on the way up . Now the argument that the old distinc­
tion should be put in the attic is mainly being put b y groups
and movements which claimed to be left-wing when the wind
of history appeared to be blowing in their direction , and
which were considered , j udge d , condemned and slandered
as such by their adversaries . Until not so long ago , you
could still ask the question : Is there still a right wing? After
the fall of the communist regimes , the same malicious ques­
tion c an be heard in an inverted form : Is there s till a left
I don't think anyone would be able to list all the con­
ferences and public debates that have taken place in recent
years in response to this question , such as : ' The C risis of
the Left' , ' Doubts on the Left and About the Left ' , ' The Left
in Difficulty ' , or ' The Death Throes of the Left ' . The
problem can best be summed up by the English title of a
conference held in Turin in December 1 9 92 , which used the
pun ' What is left? ' The responses varied from the radically
n egative opinion that 'The left no longer exist s ' or 'The left
has been buried under the ruins of the S oviet E mpire ' to the



hopeful , positive conviction that ' If the left is understood in
its o riginal meaning, then the collapse of the Bolshevik
system is a triumph for the left which will reopen the
possibilities b uried under a tyrannical system in 1 9 17 . ' 5
The collapse of the S oviet system did not b ring about the
end of the left , but simply the end of a left-wing movement
over a specific historic period. This much-debated aspect
begs the question of the many varieties of left-wing or, for
that matter, right-wing . 6 Clearly the argument that there
are many varieties of left wing supports the traditional
left/right distinction , and the dyad will survive its current
crisis . It has been correctly pointed out that the first
democratic elections in Eastern Europe occurred without
the competing parties dividing into parties of the left and
the right . But even those who have used this argument as
clear proof of the disappearance of the left/right distinction ,
hav� had to recognize the anomalous ness of the transition
from totalitarianism to democracy , and admit that when the
democratic institutions are more establishe d , it is quite
probable that the p arties will again group around the traditional pole s . 7
1 0 Finally , the las t , and perhaps most decisive , reason for
rejecting the left/right distinction does not refer to two
conflicting p arts of a whole which stand or fall together (if
there is no right wing, then there is no left wing) . It is the
claim that the two labels have become purely fictitious , and
that the left-wing and right-wing movements , faced with the
complexity and novelty of current problems , say more or
less the s am e things , formulate more or less the same
programmes for consumption by their electorates , and pro­
pose the same immediate ends . According to this argument ,



left and right n o longer have any reason t o exi s t , not
because at a certain stage one has excluded the o ther , but
because there are no longer the (alleged) differences which
would merit the distinction of different names . These names
therefore end up engendering a false belief in a distinction
which in reality no longer exists , and provoking artificial
and misleading disputes. This is particularly true of the
political conflict in Italy , where one increasingly hears the
opinion from observers not involved in the fray that there
is little reason for s uch persistent animosity , because the
opposing sides are a rguing for the same things ; or, rather ,
that the left i s in such difficulty that it has adopted the ideas
of the right in order to revamp itself, thus invalidating the
traditional differentiation.8
As c ould be shown by other accounts , this confusion on
the left and denial of their own existence does n o t en tirely
correspond to reality . For a definitive response , I refer the
reader to the final chapters in which I attempt to resolve
these doubts .


E xtremists and
Mo derate s

1 Whether or not the arguments against the left/right dis­
tinction examined so fa r are correct , one eminently verifi­
able fact appears to corroborate them , and facts are always
more stubborn than even the most s ubtle arguments . The
fact we are faced with is the way that thinkers , who are held
up as models to be lived 'by , and the .chosen few maitre a
penser drift from right to left , or vice vers a , according to
the wishes of their own disciples . It wil( be sufficient here to
refer to the most spectacular examples. Nietzsche , who
inspired Nazism (we are not concerned here with whether
this inspiration derived from an incorrect interpretation o r ,
as I believe , one o f the pos sible interpretations ) , n o w often
flanks Marx as a father of the new left . Carl Schmitt , who
not only inspired but for a period provided theoretical
guidance to the Nazi state , has been rediscovere d , at lea st
in Italy , and honoured especially by left-wing scholars be­
cause of his opposition to Hans Kelsen, the maj o r demo­
cratic �heoretician in the great constitutional debate of the
Weimar Republic . Heidegger's sympathies with Nazism
have been thoroughly documented, even tho u gh his ad-



mirers (on the left and the right) deny this or attempt to
play it down ; yet he is now considered to be the interpreter
of our time , not only in Italy , but also and especially in
France by philosophers who claim to be on the left . As i s
well known , there has been an attempt i n the opposite
direction , by a few theoreticians of the neo-Fascist right , to
appropriate the thought of Antonio Gramsci . Although this
attempt proved to be somewhat elusive and short-lived ,
there was a current called ' right-wing Gramscism ' among
those who tried to give the right a new image and a new
dignity .
C ontrasting interpretations of an author a re by no mean s
new, although they a r e more evident i n this difficult period
for the traditional ideologies and the subsequent doctrinal
confusion. George Sorel is the most famous precedent,
which can explain the apparent paradox . The author of
Reflections on Violence played an inspirational role for
left-wing movements , and this led to the creation of Italian
revolutionary syndicalism which had a few - v ery few moments of glory in the history of our socialist movement .
In latter years he became an admirer of both Mussolini and
Lenin , and many of his followers in Italy became Fascist s .
His greatest admirers in Italy were two honest conserva­
tives , Pareto and Croce , who have been given various
labels , hut could never be defined as ' left-wingers ' . I have
already referred to the conservative revolution, and Hitler
defined himself in an article for Volkische Beobachter of 6
J une 1 9 3 6 a s ' the most conservative revolutionary in the
world ' . Less well known is Alfredo Rocco' s speech to the
Italian parliament in which he asked ' to be rec o gnized a s
the antithetical conservative revolutionary ' (but the state­
ment shows that he was perfectly aware of the p a radox) .



The example of a revolutionary conservative like Sorel ,
and particularly the last two examples of conservative re­
volutionaries , allow us to question the way in which positions
both of the left and the right (according to a declaration or
interpretation mad e after the event) have been used to
inflict another blow on the left/right distinctio n . We are now
faced with a completely different p roblem , which needs to
be considered , especially in view of the importance I give it
in the final chapte r . What the revolution and the counter­
revolution have in common has nothing to do with their
belonging to two opposing sides traditionally termed left and
right . If this w e re the c a se , then people would be right to
say that we s hould abandon terms which can no longer
distinguish between antithetical cultural and political
positions . What revolutionary and counter-revolutionary
writers , and their respective movements , really have in
common is that within the opposing sides they both belong
to the extremist , rathe}':. than the moderate , wing. The
distinction between extremism and moderation does not
coincide with the left/right distinction ; in that it answers to
a fundamental criterion which is entirely different .
As s oon a s one considers the problem , it becomes immedi­
ately clear that the distinction between extremist and
moderate has very little to do with the nature of the ideas
professed , but rather concerns their radicalizatio n , and
therefore different s trategies for their implementation in
practice . This explains why revolutionaries (on the left) and
counter-revolutionaries (on the right) can tap into the same
writers , because they s hare them not as thinkers of the left
or the right , but as extremist s of either the left or the right ,
who are thus distinguished from moderates of the left or the
right . If the distinction between left and right is different



from the distinction between extremists and moderates , this
means that the opposing ideologies can have points of con­
tact and agreement at their extreme s , even though they are
still quite distinct in terms of the political programmes and
final objectives which define their position vis-a-vis the
left/right distinction . Ludovico Geymonat, who c alled him­
self an extremist (of the left) on the occasion of the s o-called
refoundation I of the Italian communist Party , entitle d a
collection of his political writings Against Moderatism.2 In
his opinion , the moderate parties which ",ere established
after the Liberation represent the s o-called constitutional
spectrum , which runs from the communists to the C hristian
Democrats , and they renounce revolutionary change of the
society inherited from Fascism and are happy with democ­
racy . The neo-Fascist Solinas wrote in the extreme right­
wing magazine Elementi: ' Our tragedy today is moderatism .
Moderates are our principal enemy . Obviously the mo der­
ate is a democrat . '
These two quotations clearly demonstrate that a left-wing
extremist and a right-wing extremist share a rej ec tion of
democracy (they s hare an object of hate , if not one of love) .
Their rej ection of democ racy brings them together , not
because of their position on the political spectrum , but
because they occupy the two extreme points of that s pec­
trum . The extremes meet. 3
2 The rejection of democracy is not the only point of

contact between the 'opposing extremes ' . From a philo soph­
ical point of view - that is to say , a more general interpre­
tation of the wori d and history - there is a s tr ong
anti-Enlightenment element in every form of political ex­
tremism. I refer not only to the anti-Enlightenment of



historicist origin , which found expression in a politically
conserv ative current from Hegel to C roce and a politi­
cally revolutionary current within Marxism (Italian
Marxism has always been historicist) , but also to an irra­
tionalist anti-Enlightenment current which is particularly
s ignificant at the moment . This irrationalist , anti­
E nlightenment current c an be divided into a religious
curren t , which includes such writers as De Maistre and
Donoso C o rtes , who are often much respected today , and a
vitalist current , which includes Nietzsche and S orel. It is
this latter current , which combines best with the left ,
while the former , fideistic current , is cons ciously and irre­
ducibly traditionalist and reactionary, precisely because it
o rigina ted as a ' reaction' to the breakdown in the
s acred historical order thought to have been created and
guided by an inscrutable Providence , and was a re­
evaluation noli altum sapere sed time ( ' do not know any­
thing but fear ' ) , as against Kant 's sapere aude ( ' know how
to be b old ' ) .4
If we look at the question in terms of the philos ophy of
history - that is , the forms and methods by which we
interpret historical development (progress or retrogression?
cyclical o r stationary movement?) - we find that moderat­
ism is gradualis t , and believes that action s hould be guided ,
metaphorically speaking, by growth of an organism from its
embryo according to a pre-established order; whereas ex­
tremism has a catastrophic vision , whatever its obj ectives .
Extremism interprets history as progres sing by sudden
leaps forward and clean breaks , which leave room for
human intelligence and forcefulness (in this sense it is les s
determinist than moderatism) . The ' c atastrophe' of the
October Revolution (an event produced by a conscious



collective will) could only b e remedied by the counter­
revolutionary 'catastrophe' (the warning signals of incipient
' action
Italian Fascism were the squadre d 'azione
squads ' ) : communism and Fascism feed into each othe r . The
theory of opposing extremisms (which for moderates are not
opposing but analogous) was substantiated on a small scale
during the peri od of Italian terrorism , the so-called years of
lead , during which Italian society was kept in a continuo us
state of alarm by terrorist acts perpetrated by b oth ex­
tremes of the political spectrum . On the much grander scale
of universal history , this theory of extremes is the b asis for
the historical deb ate over the ' E uropean civil war' , in
which , according to Nolte , a protagonist , Bolshevism and
Fascism (or Nazism) are interlinked , the latter being an
inversion of the former , the reaction which follows the
action , the revolution in reverse , but still a revolution , the
catastrophe which follows the catastrophe .

3 Naturally there is no sense in asking oneself which of

the two concepts of history is the true one : b o th are the
product of historical 'prophec y ' (in the sense that they
are based not on facts or conj e ctures , but on premonito ry
signs and extrapolations over long periods) . This is histo ry
whose metho d of evaluation is not the extent of the truth ,
but the extent of its power to engender action ; it thus has
nothing to do with the history of historians , which teaches
nothing. In o ther words , the more history is explanatory on
the basis of data and hypotheses , the less it is instructive .
At the very mos t , one can a dmit that various historic al
interpretations are themselves historically determined .
The history of last century was mainly peaceful, and during
that period, Europe carried through the first industrial



revolution, which was never a revolutio n in the true sense
of the w ord , and never appeared to be catastrophic . Indus­
trializa tion was accompanied by and interdependent with
an unprecedented development in the applied (or techno­
logically useful) sciences . The nineteenth century therefore
favoured the idea of gradual progress , with various irre­
versible stages which had to be pas sed through , as ar­
gued by such diverse figures as Kant , Hegel, C omte and
Marx , whatever form their prophetic history took in a
century which produced countless examples of prophetic
his tory .
The twentieth century , however , p resents a very different
picture : the first two total, world wars in the history of
humanity and a third war without armies actually fighting
(but still threateningly drawn up on the battlefield) , com­
munist revolutions in Rus sia and China , the violent creation
of Fascist regimes and their equally violent demise , the
rapid proce s s of decolonization following the Second World
W a r , and the disintegration of the communist world , which
was n o less rapid and unpredictable . �apere aude has now
assumed a ' demonic face ' . This century has therefore en­
couraged the antithetical vision of historical upheaval , or
catastrophe . which has even raised the fea r of an end to
history , or, if not an end, then an irreparable degradation
of beneficent nature (irreparable for human destiny) . This
historical view, which is even shared by les s apocalyptic
observers who wish to be impartial , is taken as evidence of
the end of the modern era, which has been characterized by
the idea of progress , and the birth of a new era which has
for the moment been designated as 'post-modern ' , though
one hopes that a more appropriate and meaningful name
will eventually be coined.



4 The extremists o n opposing sides also have much in

common on moral questions and in their doctrines of virtue ,
and have similar reasons for opposing the moderate s : the
heroic , warrior virtues of courage and boldnes s , as against
the virtues of prudenc e , tolerance, calculating reason
and patient mediation , which extremists consider dis taste­
fully commercial . However , the latter virtues a re essential
in market relations and in that more wide-ranging market
of ideas and conflicting interests which constitutes the es­
sence of democracy , given its reliance on compromis e . It is
hardly surprising that extremists of both the left and the
right despise democracy for the virtues it fosters and re­
quires for its survival . Their terminology agree s in defining
democracy as 'mediocracy' , meaning government both by
the middle classes and by mediocrities . Democ ratic medio­
crity was a typically Fascist theme , but it can be found in
revolutionary radicalism of any form . Piero Gobetti ' s asser­
tion is a particularly good example : ' Outside government , a
reason ably capable mediocracy , which decides in advance
that it can assume the role of assisting the people , attempts
to corrupt direct action with reforms and conciliation , and
to deceive rebels with conciliatory proposals which retain
their enlightened and educative role . ' 5 Mediocrity is thus
associated with reformism , the peaceful resolution of con­
flict and , more generally , a pragmatic view of politics
and political conflict. I happened to read an article hy a
left-wing writer who spoke of ' the idiocies of contractual­
ism' (a s tatement which practically made me leap out of my
chair) .
This contrast between the wardor and the merchant in­
evitably leads to the j ustification of violence, or p o s sibly
even its exaltation : for the revolutionary left , it is the



purifying violence which finally resolves humanity ' s prob­
lems , acting as the 'midwife of history ' (Marx) , and for the
reactionary right , violence is the ' only way to clean up the
world' (Marinetti ) , to quote j ust one of countle s s , monoto­
nous examples .
5 Although the radical rej ection of democracy a s a practice

and a value system is not the only p oint of contact between
extremists of left and right , it is certainly the most persist­
ent and significant. B efore Fascism came to power for the
first time in Italy , as a response to Bolshevik threat , it first
appeared as a radical ideology in France towards the end of
the nineteenth century , and was itself partly a response to
the Paris C ommune , a revolution which was not only threat­
ened , but attempted, altho ugh it was a general experiment
in a revolution that could never be . In an impo rtant study
of the history of French F a scism , Ni droite ni gauche ,6 the
birth of this ideology , correctly defined as p re-Fascist , is
typified by a fierce reaction against bourgeois democracy ,
which was equal and symmetrical to t h e same reaction by
maximalist socialism . For both sides the scapegoat was
s ocial democracy - or , in other words , the moderate version
of the left , because it had accepted the rules of bourgeois
democracy and had s ubsequently been corrupted by it.
In spite of all these similarities , which j ustify the use of the
same writers by both side s , and allow Barres to claim that
' S orel was the intellectual father of Fascism' , Fascism and
communism still represent the great antithesis between right
and left in this century . S trangely , not only have they failed
to eliminate the distinction , they have made it even sharper.
This is , I repeat , very strange . The only explanation , in my
opinion, is that the criterion whereby one distinguishes



between left and right does not coincide with the one where­
by one distinguishes between left and ri ght within the two
camps themselves - that is to say, between the extremist and
moderate wings . The fact is that Fascism and communism
are mutually exclusive , in spite of their common enemy ,
democracy , whose rules allow the left and the right to
alternate in government . They are mutually exclusive be­
cause they reproduce in a specific form the p rincipal fea­
tures of what so far has typified the left and the right (which
we will discuss later) .
6 Of the many third ways discussed , there has even been

one proposed between socialism and liberalism , but no one
has ever conceived of one b ridging communism and Fas­
cism, because it would be inconceivable . The one thing that
they have in common , which is to intensify the principal
features of their ideology and take them to their extreme
conclusions , is precisely what makes them doctrinally irre­
concilable and in practice incompatible . An alliance between
Fascists and conservatives , or the extreme right and the
moderate right is possible , albeit in a situation of force
majeure ; and Italian Fascism came to power as the result of
just such an alliance . On the opposite side , a similar alliance
between communism and socialism was only m o o ted in the
popular democracies , and accomplished somewhat more
fully in united action by Italian s ocialists and communists
after the Liberation . An alliance between communists and
Fascists would be a historical absurdity . The difference
between extremism and moderatism mainly concerns
method, whereas the antithesis between left and right
mainly concerns values . The difference over values is
stronger than the one over method s . This explains why in a



s erious historical crisis , an alliance between extremists and
moderate right-wingers can have some succes s , as occurred
with the Fascist regimes , where the moderate right felt
obliged to accept the s upremacy of the extreme right. This
kind of alliance would not be possible b etween right and left
extremists , because they would disagree on values , not
method s . Similar constraints explain why at the end of the
S econd World War , the fear of a return to the pre-war
sta tus q uo induced the socialists , at the cost of a painful and
destructive split , to ally themselves with the communists that is to s ay , the extreme left .
Of course , there was one spectacular example of an al­
liance between F a scism and communism : the non-aggression
pact and p artition to the mutual advantage of Hitler ' s
Germany and Stalin ' s S oviet Union , b u t i t w a s essentially a
short-lived tactical alliance , which had no ideological conse­
quences other than the formation of a few small groups of
Nazi Bolsheviks , who were 'lJOlitically insignificant . 7


The Left/Right

Distinction S urvives

1 The terms 'left ' and ' right ' continue to be very much

part of political terminology , in spite of all the arguments
from various quarters which are used to challenge it ; and
although the arguments have not changed , they are m o re
frequent in these confused times . The people who use
the words 'left' and ' right' do not appear to be u s ing
words unthinkingly , because they understand e ach ,o ther
perfectly .
A great deal of the debate between political writers o ver
the last few years has centred around the question : 'Where
is the left going? ' D eb ates on ' the future of socialis m ' or ' the
rebirth of the right ' have become so frequent as to be
repetitive and tedious . The old left is constantly being
reassessed in order to found a new left (but it is s till the
'left ' ) . Alongside the old defeated right has appeared a 'new
right' which seeks vengeance . Democratic s ystems with sev­
eral parties are still perceived as semicircles r a n ging fro m
right to left , or vice versa . Expressions such a s 'the right in
parliament ' , 'the left in parliament' , ' right-wing govern­
ment' or ' left-wing government' have not lost a ny of their



meaning. Within the parties themselves , the currents which
compete for the leadership in various periods and situations
are still defined by the old names of 'left ' and ' right ' . W hen
we discuss politicians , we have no hesitation in labelling
them as left-wing or right-wing. For example , Occhetto is on
the left and B erlusconi on the right.
There has always been a Christian Democrat left . The
leadership of the Movimento S ocialel has recently been
taken over by a faction (led by Pino Rauti) which claimed
that it wished to move to the left . E ven in such a minuscule ,
lifeless party as the Liberal Party ,2 the leaders have always
been divided between a left and a right.
The terms 'left ' and ' right' were little used , or used with
great care , during the breakup of the Italian communist
Party ; but this was due to the fact that only the word ' left '
h a d positive connotations within a p arty which assumed a
leading role within the international left-wing movement .
Neither of the factions contending for the leadership wo uld
willingly have accepted being defined as the right of the
party . It would in fact be difficult to e s iablish which faction
was the left and which the right , be � ause the old guard
which could be considered the right on the grounds that
c onservatism is right-wing and change left-wing could at the
s ame time be considered the left on the grounds of its
greater commitment to the struggle against capitalism . On
the other hand , the more innovative faction could claim to
be the left of the party because it is more favourable to
change , but its programme could be considered more right­
wing according to traditional criteria .
We are faced with a paradox : at the same time a s this
proliferation of writings which cast doubt on the left/right
distinction , rej ect it or often ridicule it for the reasons



examined in the previous chapte r , this same dis tinction now
has greater currency than ever before in Italian politi c s
and culture . T h e reason for this i s the referendum
which rej ected the electoral system which has until now
obstructed the alternation of governments which is essen­
tial to good representative government , and a dopted the
first-past-the-post system . It is now hoped that this reform
will bring about a drastic reduction in the number of
partie s , a definitive end to centrist governments, and the
introduction of the much-hoped-for alternation between
governments . But alternation between whom? Naturally, we
are talking about alternation between left and right , o r ,
more specifically , between a n alliance formed around the
Partito Democratico della Sinistra3 (which means the Demo­
cratic Party of the Left) and another alliance consisting of
the Northern League , Alleanza Nazionale (ex-Movimento
Sociale Italiano) and B erlusconi ' s Forza Italia .4 The former
can only be defined as the left , and the latter as the
right. The fact that not all those in the first alliance want to
be labelled left-wing , and not all those in the second alliance
want to be labelled right-wing (everyone choo s e s the label
which brings in the most votes) does not in any way disprove
the fact that Italy is moving towards a political system with
a more well-defined division between left and right . 5
2 It is not at all surprising that a dyad, or dicho tomy , is the

most common way of representing the political world , which
is , by its very nature , antagonis tic and divided into oppos­
ing sides (partie s , interest group s , factions , and in interna­
tional relation s , peoples and nations) . We can e asily recall
some famous historical examples : patrician s/plebeians ,
Guelphs/Ghibellines and Whigs/Tories.



War , an essential dichotomy (mors tua vita mea) , is the
most extreme manifestation of the ' friend/enemy ' distinc­
tion , which in turn is the most abstract way of representing
politics as something antagonistic . There is no room for a
third party in war , whether it is external or internal . A
third pa rty can only appear as an intermediary to end
hostilities and establish peac e . War , like a duel, can only
have two contendents (it does not matter whether they have
allies) , and one side must win , and one side must lose . A war
in which there are neither winners nor losers is a war which
has not fulfilled its purpose . T hird p a rties who do not get
involved are defined as neutral, in that they do not s upport
either side , and are not involved in the hostilities . From the
moment they become involved in the conflict , they become
allies of one side or the other. There can only ever be two
sides to the conflict , however many the allies .
Given the single great dichotomy between friend and foe ,
the inevitable reduction � f conflicts t o two opposing sides ,
or the attraction of various p otential contendents towards
just two poles , which could be ternied bipolarization , is
b ased on the principle that the friend of my enemy is m y
enemy , whereas the enemy o f my enemy is m y friend . Where
there are only two possible positions , and one must either
b e a friend or an enemy (for this best expresses a polarized
view of p olitics) , there are four pos sible combinations for
polarizing more than two initial contendents: a friend can
b e either the friend of a friend or the enemy of an enemy ,
and an enemy can be either the enemy of a friend or the
friend of an enemy . Seemingly unnatural coalitions and
alliances , both in international relations and between par­
ties within a single state , are in reality the natural conse­
quence of dichotomic logic . This dichotomy , which is clearly



expressed in war , a n extreme example o f human relations ,
is also found in traditional religious and metaphysic al per­
ceptions , including those of the natural world (light/dark­
ness , order/chaos and ultimately , God/Devil) .
3 It was pure accident that the names given to the two
political poles were ' left' and ' right' . As is well known , the
use of these two words goes back to the French Revolution ,
at least as far as national politics are concerned. I t is an
extremely banal spatial metaphor , whose origin w a s pure
chance , and whose sole function was to name the dichotomy
which has prevailed in politics for two centuries , and h a s
prevailed because i t i s essential. T h e name could change ,
but the original, essential dichotomy would remain .
The domination of the left/right distinction right up to the
present day , in spite of repeated challenges , does not pre­
clude the existence of other spatial metaphors , which are
less comprehensive and c oncern particular situations. A
high/low distinction is used for the upper and lower houses
of the British parliament , for the higher and lower clergy in
the ecclesiastical hierarchy , and for an extremely u seful
theory of government whereby p ower proceeds from bottom
to top or from top to bottom . According to a hierarchical
view of politics (which exists alongside the antagonistic one) ,
there is an in front/behind distinction. The princeps , a s
suggested b y the original meaning of the w ord , c omes in the
first row, and is followed by all the others , who are in fact
called 'followers' o r the ' retinue ' . From the Leninis t view­
point , which is literally a princely concept of politic s (as in
Gramsci's ' Mo dern Prince ' ) , the party is the vanguard of
the proletariat , and 'vanguard' necessarily implies the ex­
istence of a rearguard. The distinction which concerns the



visibility of power and the way in which c ollective decisions
are taken is between open and closed : the most relev ant
his torical example is the contrast between the visible gov­
ernment of democratic states and the invisible government
of a sovereign ' s secret cabinet which a dmitted only a few
trusted friends , since the affairs of state had to be completely
closed and inacces sible to the great mas s of subj ects . The
most common metaphor in relation to the difference be­
tween p r ogrammes and positions held in any given political
battle b e tween parties and movements is the near/far dis­
tinction , whereby the centre-right is close to the right , the
centre-left close to the left , the left is further away from the
right tha n from the centre , and so o n . In an extremely
fragmented party system such as the Italian one has been up
till now , the level of p olitical affinity becomes particularly
important after an election , when shifts in voting patterns
are as sessed, because shifts between parties which are
closer to each other are eonsidered more probable .
S ome of these metaphors , such as the high/low distinction ,
reflect a vertical universe , and some , su�h as the in front/be­
hind and near/far distinctions , a horiz � ntal universe .
4 The temporal metaphor , a s well a s the spatial one , holds

an important position in political terminology . It make s it
p o ssible to distinguish between innovators and conserva­
tives , progressives and traditionalists , and between those
who look t o the rising sun of the future and those who are
guided by the inextinguishable light of the past. There is
nothing to prevent the spatial metaphor which gave ris e to
the left/right distinction from corresponding to the temporal
metaphor as far as one of its more frequent meanings is
concerne d .



O f course , it has to b e s aid straight away , i n order t o avoid
pointless obj ections, that the prevailing use of the left/right
pair to designate the principal antithesis which governs all
the other political antitheses , does not mean that it is
univocal, or indeed that it remains unchanged through tim e .
Some conflicts become l e s s important , o r even dis appear,
while others emerge . As long as there are conflicts , there
will be polariz ation , although the principal antithesis may
become secondary , and vice vers a , as time p asses and
circumstances change . There is still polariz ation , even
though the great historic changes of recent times might quite
legitimately create the impression that much of the antagon­
ism has gone . One has only to think of the great antithesis
between the North and the S outh which will increasingly
dominate the political scene for the foreseeable future ,
although it is a simplification , like all distinctions applied to
complex relations in human s ociety .
5 S o far I have limited myself to establishing the continued
use of the distinction . I now wish to demonstrate that 'left '
and ' right ' have a descriptive meaning a n d an evaluative
meaning, which , as with all other political term s , are n ot
very precise , because o n the whole they are taken from
everyday usage . The descriptive meaning , although vari­
able , is never so variable as to take on two meanings which
are c ompletely contrary . Only under Big Brother do words
have the opposite meaning to that in their common usage,
but then the purpose of this distortion is to deceive the
receiver of the message and make communication im­
possible. C onversely , words used in current political j argon
can be ambiguou s , giving rise to different p ossihle interpre­
tations , and perhaps increasing the number of people who



would find the mess age palatable , but never to the point of
reversing the accepted meaning.
As far a s the evaluative meaning is concerned, the positive
c onnotation of the one must imply the negative connotation
of the o ther , precisely because the two terms describe an
antithesis . But which is axiologically positive and which
axiologically negative depends not on the descriptive
meaning, but on the two opposing value-j udgements which
a re made of the things described. This h a s considerable
c onsequences for the use of 'left' and ' right ' in p olitical and
o ther terminologies , such as religious usage , where ' right '
always has a positive connotation and ' left ' a negative one .
Not all dyads are axiologically reversible . The left/right pair
clearly are not reversible in common usage , although they
a re in politics .
To be precise , a polarized view of a given universe implies
that , taken together the two parts describe the whole of that
universe , in the sense that every entity within that universe
must belon g to o ne of the two parts , leaving no room for a
third alternative ; but at the same time , the two parts are
axiological opposites , because if you attribute a p ositive
v alue to one of them , then the other necess a rily assumes a
negative v alue . On the basis of this descriptive either/or ,
every entity within the universe belongs to one o r other part
of the dya d . On the basis of the axiological either/o r , each
part has the opposite sign to the other, b ut there is no
obj ective reason why one should always represent good and
the other always bad. The fact remains , howeve r , that as
soon as one is raised up to represent good in a given contex t ,
the other necess arily comes to represent bad.
The neutral observer , s uch as the historian or the s ocio­
logist , considers it his specific task to illustrate the descrip-



tive meaning ; consequently , h e will demons trate which
groups are considered by themselves o r others to be on the
right or the left in a given situation. Activists , on the other
hand , tend to attribute a po sitive value to their own p olitical
programmes and a negative one to those of their opponents .
This difference between the neutral observer and the activ­
ist means that repeated surveys of what is meant by left and
right are not always reliable , and their usefulness is there­
fore somewhat doubtful . Precisely because the left/right
distinction has very strong axiological connotations , p eople
who belong to either side will tend to define their own side
with words that are axiologically positive , and the other side
with words that are axiologically negative . To give a
straightforward and immediately understandable example ,
equality , which is a traditional element in the ideology of the
left , is considered levelling down by s omeone on the righ t .
Inequality, which for someone on the left is a statement of
fact without ideological connotations , becomes hierarchical
order for someone on the right.
However , in spite of the caution with which we must treat
these two term s , surveys confirm that the left/right distinc­
tion is still very much in use .


In S earch of the

C riterion which Governs
the Distinction

1 I f the distinction between left a n d right c ontinues to b e
u s e d i n spite o f repeated challenges , the problem shifts from
p roving its legitimacy �� an examination of the criteria
p roposed for that legitimacy . In oth;er words , what is the
reaso n , or what are the reasons , for .the distinction , given
that ' left ' and ' right' are used to designate differences in
thought and political activity? It should be remembered that
the left/right distinction was first attacked because it was
thought that the criteria that had been used until then were
not clearly defined, or had become misleading as time had
passed and circumstances change d . Luckily , there are not
only detractor s , but also many more exponents than in the
past , who have put forward their own answers to the
question of the possible criterion or c riteria ; and as there is
more consensus than dissent , the distinction is to some
extent reinforced .
Laponce , a professor at Toronto University , wrote the
principal work on this s ubj ect in 1 9 8 1 . The book , Left and



Right. The Topography of Political Perceptions ,l s um­
marizes previous analyses , and constitutes a basis for fur­
ther researc h . He makes some general , thought-provoking
observations about the spatial metaphors used in political
language , mainly distinguishing between the vertical spatial
axis (higher/lower) and the horizontal one (left/right) . As I
pointed out in the previous chapter , there are others , but
for the moment we will limit ourselves to these two .
Laponce considers the vertical axis to be more dominant
than the horizontal one , which originated with the French
Revolution , when the horizontal was supposed to replace
the vertical . It should perhaps be observed that although in
reality the names 'left ' and ' right' were c oined during the
French Revolution , this was certainly not the o rigin of the
horizontal concept of politics , if by this expression we mean
the conflict between two opposing sides which is the essen­
tial and therefore persistent aspect of political strife or
politics as strife . The vertical and horizontal dimensions of
politics are separate , as they represent two different, inde­
pendent relationships in the political universe . Normally
both dimensions coexis t , but either one can dis appear in
extreme situations : the first can disappear in a civil war ,
and the second in a despotic system in which there is a s ingle
power at the top and divisions are not permitted at the b as e .
Laponce s tates only that the horizontal metaphor has never
completely eliminated the vertical one . It should be added
that it has never eliminated it for the simple rea son that it
could never eliminate it . The two metaphors have different
descriptive functions , and the total sphere of political rela­
tions is only represented by both together.
Another curious and arguable notion is that the leftl
right distinction is particularly important in a democracy ,



because elections divide t h e competing groups into two
opposing camps . Leaving aside the consideration that it is
only a p articular type of electoral system , rather than
electoral systems in general , which fos ters the division into
two opposing camp s , it is a much more universal principle
than the electoral sys tem wh