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Epicurus’ Non-Propositional Theory of Truth


Scholars typically distinguish at least two different Epicurean conceptions of truth: (1) an account that pertains to the truth of perceptions or impressions and (2) an account that pertains to the truth of opinions. This paper addresses the relationship between the truth of perceptions (and by extension: preconceptions and feelings), on the one hand, and the truth of opinions, on the other. It offers an account of what these determinations of truth amount to and how they interact with each other. In doing so, the paper rejects a propositional understanding of Epicurean truth. It instead argues that the Epicurean conception of truth can be explained by relying on images and their combination.