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How Wide is the Scope of Hold-Up-Based Theories of Governance? Shipper-Carrier Relationships in Trucking

Previous researchers have established that hold-up-based theories of governance (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1979, 1985)) can have predictive power. The scope of their predictive power is an outstanding empirical issue. I investigate this in the context of trucking. The nature and degree of relationship-specific investments differs for short and long hauls. I find that long-term contracts are used more relative to spot arrangements when local markets are thin for long hauls, but not short hauls. For long hauls, the relationship between governance and local market conditions is strongest in states in which inbound markets are thin. The predictive scope of the theories extends beyond circumstances where investments are large and sunk over long horizons, but not to those where quasi-rents are small and appear only in the very short run.