{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.02400548696844993, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0006858710562414266, 'mean_word_length': 5.028925619834711, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
The Other First Philosophy and the Question of Givenness

As out of date as it might seem, the topic of first philosophy is fraught with stakes, as real as they are symbolic, and still occasions polemical and passionate discussion. This should not be surprising since establishing a first philosophy is neither optional nor outside the orbit of philosophy considered as such. In fact, philosophy, when it does not resign itself to joining the ranks of ordinary sciences-founded (or finally without foundation, a possibility that remains within the horizon of the foundation), derived, in short, secondary--should stake a claim to primacy, or at least to a certain type of primacy, in its very definition. Philosophy will remain true to its own essence only by claiming itself to be, in essence, a first philosophy. For a second philosophy either becomes a regional science (the science 0outcfil in Aristotle) or simply loses its philosophical status. In fact, the two terms are equivalent-without the adjective, the substantive vanishes. One therefore cannot reproach philosophy for claiming primacy since lacking this primacy it would disappear as such. Therefore, if the primacy of philosophy presupposes first philosophy, the difficulty should consist less in the legitimacy of this primacy than in determining its type. At once the nature of the difficulty changes: from now on it concerns defining and establishing the primacy that philosophy must exer-