{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.020594292438952635, 'fraction_numerical': 0.00176522506619594, 'mean_word_length': 5.2157221206581355, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
International Mobile Roaming in the Arab World

International Mobile Roaming (IMR) in the twenty-two countries of the Arab League presents the conventional problems of addressing persistently high charges with retail and wholesale markets in different countries. It must also address pan-Arab nationalism and ancient patterns of religion-induced travel, as well as contemporary demands of trade and tourism. Analysis of IMR prices was conducted by AREGNET, the network of Arab telecommunications regulators, in 2006-07, finding high and very high charges with seemingly random variations. It has subsequently made a sequence of proposals to improve the transparency of prices and a mechanism to cap prices. However, the Arab Council of Ministers has yet to agree to implement these measures. The most recent proposal is a draft memorandum of understanding amongst the regulators, agreeing to cut wholesale prices and to cap retail mark-ups. Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have already imposed transparency measures on operators licensed there, requiring them to send an SMS with pricing information to their roaming customers. Together with the four other countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), they are pursuing the AREGNET price reduction plans. The approaches taken have little or no basis in economic analysis, for example, there have been impact assessments, nor are there consumer surveys or market data (except for some commercial data). Instead the Arab regulators have relied on variations of the proposals developed by the European Commission. However, they do not have the rigorous consultations and legislative processes of the European Union. The lack of an economic grounding has made it difficult to adjust proposals to the market developments. There are significant risks of waterbed effects, with complaints that some operators have already increased their wholesale prices, notably those trying to “recover” revenues lost by the EU Roaming Regulation. Zain, the Kuwait-based international operator group, abolished IMR surcharges starting in East Africa and extending to several Arab states, including deals with Mobinil in Egypt and Paltel in Palestine. Customers can buy local top-up cards and pay their home tariff, including receiving calls for free. This “One Network” offer has been extended from voice and SMS to “One Office” with data and Internet access. While few other operators match the geographic coverage of Zain, several have responded on key travel and trade routes, for example, around the Persian Gulf and from there to Egypt. This has required companies that are otherwise rivals to collaborate, offering each other discounted wholesale rates. Attempts by the operators individually and collectively through the GSM Association to block price controls have been resisted by the regulators. However, they have had more success with the ministers. It is unclear whether the Arab Council of Ministers will ever adopt binding legal measures or indeed whether they can, given the diversity of their institutions, the limitations of the available legal instruments and their mixed motivations. The two approaches, of price caps and discounted tariffs do not fit easily together. An alternative regulatory approach would have been to analyse the market in order to identify structural remedies that might have been used to mandate access for IMR.