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Incentive Based Assurance

Public policy has created powerful incentives to entrust our retirement to the financial service industry. This in turn creates a peculiar agency problem that can remove a resource provider from a service provider many times over. Most developed countries have responded to this problem with government agencies, self-regulatory organizations, and audits by public accountants. These “Gatekeepers” have a common characteristic; they are not controlled by the individuals they are designed to protect. This paper argues that such a detachment creates poor incentives and exploits the negative aspects of behavioral norms. In contrast, this paper proposes an investor controlled association that would manage the payment and direction of a different breed of Gatekeeper. Such an association would capture the benefits of social norms and give investors the authority they deserve in the assurance process.