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A Review of Hydro-Hegemonic Dynamics on the Transboundary Harirud River Basin: 2001–Present

In the absence of a transboundary water agreement between riparian states of Harirud River Basin, downstream states—Iran and Turkmenistan—have adopted a resource-capturing policy through the construction of Doosti Dam in the lower Harirud River Basin when the upstream state—Afghanistan—was engaged in social unrest during 1980s to the early 2000s. While Doosti Dam has a high potential of supplying water for major cities in Turkmenistan and Iran, its flow has declined due to climate changes and drought in the basin. The paper found that Iran accuses Afghanistan of blocking the flow of water through the construction of Salma Dam, whereas some Afghan and Iranian scholars critique Iran’s water management approach for water shortages through construction of dams and employment of unsustainable irrigation approaches in the lower Harirud River Basin. Additionally, the hydro-hegemony theory was critiqued as the theory under-estimates the broader role of outside basin players in influencing and reshaping the hydro-politics of a shared watercourse. Finally, it was concluded that the rapid drawdown of the US forces from Afghanistan along with the establishment of a fragile, weak, and politically unrecognized government-Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan—under Taliban administration—helped Iran to reinforce its hydro-hegemonic potential in the basin.