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The Chinese Internet

Abstract As more claims surfaced regarding the Internet becoming increasingly monopolistic internationally and becoming an intranet in China, I saw a growing need to test and substantiate the claims. So I searched and analysed most recent published industry data, which I analysed in relation to three research questions: 1) What is the breadth and intensity of monopoly? 2) What is the identity like of the monopolisers in the Chinese Internet? 3) What are the likely consequences the monopoly? I found that the Chinese Internet indeed became a monopoly board separate from the international Internet. International ISPs are either absent/irrelevant or are retreating out of China. Furthermore, some internationally well-known ISPs are banned in China. In their absence, a range of geo-politically dedicated companies are filling up the Chinese monopoly board. Reflecting on this separate emerging monopoly board, I believed that two familiar conditions which had prompted China to lock out the world in the Ming, Qing and Mao eras were again ripening. One was self-confidence (with a self-reliant Internet and a self-sufficient range of ISPs) and the other was the fear of invasion by the outside world. These two conditions were prompting China to again wall itself in virtually, if not physically.