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Objective Being as Non-Identity

In other words, any criticism of Hegel has to reflect its object’s unique relationship between, so to speak, „method“ and „system“: the elements that are formal and general as well as those that are particular, content-related. Any attempt of a reductio ad absurdum starting from contents (for instance, the putative apology of the Prussian state in the Philosophy of Right) must determine what exactly has to be reduced. Conversely, a destructio of Hegel’s principles must show itself in the details in order to be concrete. A failure to do so carries as much prime theoretical interest as a success would. The young Marx is a paradigmatic example. In his first dealing with Hegel, the so-called Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right of 1843, his irony is directed primarily against specific aspects of Hegel’s political philosophy, such as bureaucracy, corporations, private property, monarchy, the right of majority and so on; however, a general line of philosophical accusation is present at the same time. All these empirical mistakes, namely, are shown as following from a major piece of theoretical nonsense, the famous „subject-predicate inversion“. This formula, which Marx clearly uses in the spirit of Feuerbach, expresses the process of abstraction by which Hegel putatively transforms the real subject of history, concrete individual human beings, into mere epiphenomena of thought, which is in fact no more than their attribute or „predicate“. As others have previously noticed,2 in the manuscript of 1843 Marx’s insistence on inversion does not yet primarily concern the epistemological relationship between thought and sensibility, but rather that between method and empirical data. If thought, or as Marx calls it, the „Idea“, becomes the subject of history, then historical reality is not investigated for its own sake and counts as nothing but the mere confirmation of a previously developed ideal logic: „[Hegel’s] philosophical moment is not the logic of fact but the fact of logic [nicht die Logik der Sache, sondern die Sache der Logik]. Logic is not used to prove the nature of the state, but the state is used to prove the logic“.3 On the contrary, „true philosophical criticism [...] does not, as Hegel thinks, consist in everywhere recognizing the determinations of the logical concept, but rather in grasping the proper logic of the proper object“.4 This „proper logic“, according to Marx, is precisely what Hegel fails to grasp because of his subverted conception of logic itself. This leads him to explain empirical data by subsuming them under an abstract self-repeating mechanism, which in fact does not explain anything. Obviously enough, this critique of Hegel is deeply Hegelian: what Hegel is accused of, quite paradoxically,