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THE PERCEPTION OF CAUSALITY: INSIGHTS FROM MICHOTTE'S LAUNCHING EFFECT, NAÏVE IMPETUS THEORY, AND REPRESENTATIONAL MOMENTUM

A convergence of findings regarding Michotte’s launching effect (the attribution that a moving object that contacts an initially stationary target is responsible for the subsequent movement of that target), naive impetus theory (the theory that setting a previously stationary object into motion involves imparting to that object an impetus that then dissipates), and representational momentum (a forward displacement in the remembered location of a moving target) suggests observers do not perceive causality. Studies of the representational momentum of targets in launching effect displays and in several control conditions suggest forward displacement is decreased if target motion is attributable to an impetus imparted from another stimulus. This decrease occurs because observers expect motion of a launched target to stop when impetus drops below the level needed to maintain motion, and forward displacement is decreased when observers expect a target to stop. Impetus does not correspond to a valid physical principle, and so any role for impetus in the launching effect suggests observers do not perceive causality.