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Search, Layoffs, and Labor Market Equilibrium

The paper has two purposes: (1) to extend the theory of job search to include the case in which job prospects are characterized by layoff risk as well as the wage and (2) to synthesize the search and implicit-contract approaches by using the former to model the supply side and the latter to model the demand side of a labor market. The result is a simple and consistent theory of labor market equilibrium under conditions of imperfect information and uncertain derived demand. The theory purports to explain both search and layoff unemployment as market equilibrium phenomena.