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Functionalism and the Balance of Interests in the Law of the Sea: Cuba’s Role

How adequate is functionalism as a comprehensive theory of international politics and law? In its classic version, functionalism posits that, as economic and technological interdependence grows, diplomacy and the elaboration of international legal rules will be shaped increasingly by functional concerns and less and less by ideology and “high politics.” While such a trend is evident in some areas of international relations, such as the European Community, it is less so in others. In many negotiations and disputes around the globe, even though the issues may be amenable to a functional approach and resolution, states continue to give great weight to ideological and political considerations in their diplomacy and legal stances. Proponents of functionalism have assumed that the growing tide of functional links and relationships eventually will dominate international relations and render political and ideological conflicts less significant, if not mostly irrelevant. But in many cases, the reverse has happened. International organizations set up for functional purposes have been inundated by political and ideological rivalries, and international legal issues of a functional character have been seized upon by states to advance their ideological and political objectives. Cuba’s policy towards the law of the sea serves as a case study of this problem.