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Workshop on Foundations of Intensional Logic and Natural Language Semantics: Introduction (draft)

A very broad range of foundational issues is relevant for this workshop. We can, roughly and incompletely, enumerate the following. First, the paradoxes such as Russell's paradox and the Knower paradox; second, intensional contexts and their substitutivity problems; third, the logic of the notions that generate intensionl contexts, eg, doxastic logic, modal logic and tense logic; fourth, the ontological nature of the entities somehow postulated in doing intensional logic and natural language semantics. There are no sharp boundaries, of course, segregating these issues from one another. In fact, the ontological issue is perhaps the most sweeping in cutting across the other ones. As regards it, it seems natural in our disciplinary context to postulate properties, relations and propositions (PRPs); but quite different accounts of PRPs can be given, as I shall try to illustrate today, by considering the approaches of Montague's (in PTQ) and Bealer's. Other ontological issues will be considered by Friedericke Moltman, who will talk tomorrow about properties and kinds, and by Marcus Kracht, who will talk next thursday about the meaning of plural noun phrases. Ontological issues will also be central in Hartley Slater's talk, to be given tommorrow. This talk will also touch on the knower-style paradoxes. Today, I myself shall try to provide a brief survey of solutions to the paradoxes of predication (such as Russell's). As regards intensional contexts, Ilhan Inhan will make a proposal to save the full generality of Leibniz's law, next Thursday. Time permitting, I myself shall consider this issue today, by comparing Montague's and Bealer's approaches to intensionality. Finally, as regards the logic of intensional notions, Renata Wassermann and Heinrich Wansing will talk about doxastic logic next wednesday, and Niko Strobach will talk about temporal logic, next friday. Before delving into the issues that I already promised to deal with today, let me try to demarcate somewhat more precisely the fields of natural language semantics (NLS) and intensional logic and to clarify why they are intimately related. Arguably, Montague semantics (1974), the PTQ approach in particular, constitutes the received view in this subject matter. Hence, PTQ will be the right place to start.