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Questions toward a Peircean phenomenological description of association

Abstract According to the philosopher and scientist Charles Peirce (1839–1914) phenomenology is fundamental to all scientific inquiry and association is the only force that exists within the intellect. However, Peirce only gave his reader a hint about the relationship between phenomenology and association. In this article we will try to follow that hint and point towards a couple of main questions that can guide a Peircean phenomenological description of association. Hence, the conclusion of the article will not be a phenomenological description of association but rather a couple of main questions trying to determine how such a phenomenological description can begin in the first place. Our hypothesis is that the questions depend for their construction on the inter-relatedness and interdependence of certain central Peircean phenomenological concepts – especially, Thirdness, Secondness, and Firstness.