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The Problem of Free Mass: Must Properties Cluster?

Properties come in clusters. It seems impossible, for instance, that a mass could float free, unattached to any other property. David Armstrong takes this as a reductio of the bundle theory and an argument for substrata, while Peter Simons and Arda Denkel reply by supplementing the bundle theory with accounts of property interdependencies. I argue against both views. Virtually all plausible ontologies turn out to be committed to the existence of free masses. I develop and defend the view that the clustering of properties is a mere contingent truth, on grounds that properties can be subtracted one-byone. This opens the door not just to the (unsupplemented) bundle theory, but also to any plausible account of the relation between objects and properties. Properties come in clusters. Everything that has mass also has shape, color, and a full array of other properties. Why? Why can’t the mass of this page break free, and wander off by itself, leaving its whiteness and smoothness behind? What ontological principle, if any, binds properties together? I argue that lone properties such as free masses are metaphysically possible-the clustering of properties is merely a contingent fact. Not only do virtually all plausible ontologies countenance free masses, but a positive case can be made for their possibility via principles of property subtraction.