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An allocatively efficient auction market for payment entitlements?

Abstract We discuss the allocative efficiency of the market for the so-called Payment Entitlements (PEs) that resulted from European Union regulation no. 796/2004 of the European agricultural policy. In particular, we consider the existing market in Denmark and discuss the design of an allocative efficient auction market. The complexity of the market follows directly from initial construction of the PEs, which resulted in a very large number of different PEs. Although the valuations of the different PEs are highly interrelated, they are separate goods that should be priced separately. We show how this complexity makes an allocative efficient auction market practically impossible and we discuss a simplified auction market that may improve the pricing and the transparency on the market for PEs.