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A More Flexible Army and a More Stable World

U.S. soldiers from Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 111th Infantry Regiment, 56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania National Guard, Multi-National Division-Baghdad conduct an essential services survey in various locations around Nadeem Village, Iraq, 9 April 2009. The soldiers are also delivering payments for several governmentapproved micro grants. (U.S. Army SGT Jacob H. Smith) T NATION’S CURRENT obsession with budget austerity along with the redeployment of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan is leading us to a more fiscally constrained environment and a desire to dramatically cut the end-strength of our Army. In addition, the nation’s policy of a “Pacific pivot” is facing constraints based on the reality of the situation in Africa. Recent journal articles have discussed the flexibility and cost-effectiveness of a cyclic-based as opposed to a tier-based deployment model for long-term commitments. The cyclic model (known as the Army Force Generation, or ARFORGEN model) allows units recently returned from deployment to turn in their equipment to other units (so they can deploy more quickly) and saves the Army large amounts of money on equipment costs. The traditional tierbased deployment model, in which forces expected to deploy quicker receive more funding than other forces, relegates the Army National Guard fewer resources, and limits it to an unused strategic reserve force (as was the case throughout the Cold War and into the 1990s). Of these two models, the tierbased deployment model costs significantly less but is not able to effectively support long-term commitments. Since 2001, the National Guard has made it known that it will not allow itself to return to being an underfunded strategic reserve force. Their lobbying efforts have recently gained a seat at the table of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The establishment of a National Guard position on the Joint Chiefs should eliminate any vestigial beliefs that the Army can significantly decrease National Guard funding. Meanwhile, as the war in Iraq has ended and the war in Afghanistan is in its closing stages, the issue of what our Army should train for has arisen. Typically phrased as “fighting the last war,” the question is whether or not the training of our forces and our doctrine should focus on counterinsurgency A More Flexible Army and a More Stable World