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The hollowing-out of the liberal peace project in Afghanistan: the case of security sector reform

Security sector reform (SSR) has been described as a linch-pin of the liberal state-building and peace-building processes in Afghanistan. The process was originally framed in accordance with the core liberal principles of the SSR model, prioritizing good governance, respect for human rights, sustainability, and democratic civilian control. However, as time passed and security and political conditions began to deteriorate on the ground, the process would gradually revert to a more conventional train-and-equip form, with its core liberal principles stripped away. The slide toward expediency experienced by the SSR process in Afghanistan demonstrates the deeply flawed manner in which the liberal peace project was advanced in Afghanistan. SSR donors became increasingly ambivalent about the human-security objectives of SSR, which were superseded by exigencies of the counterinsurgency, regional security, and domestic pressure for withdrawal. The Afghan experience has raised further doubt about the viability of the orthodox SSR model in conflict-affected countries, already the subject of significant critical debate.