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Wittgenstein and Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Perspective . By Derek L. Phillips. (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1977. Pp. xiv + 248. $17.50.)

Although Wittgenstein's later philosophy has contributed both to the decline of positivism or logical empiricism in Anglo-American philosophy and to the emergence of nonpositivist analytic political theory, his work has had little visible impact on the still-dominant behavioral and implicitly positivist tradition of empirical political science. One major reason may be the hostility of some of Wittgenstein's interpreters, most notably perhaps Peter Winch, to developing any law-like generalizations independent of the cultural perspectives of the relevant political actors. In fact, however, Wittgenstein's work is at least consistent with the important empirical, quantitative work of a pragmatist (rather than positivist), generation of Key, Schattschneider and Pritchett. And if Wittgenstein's influence on empirical political science increases, it will provide a philosophical rationale for a return to this earlier version of a scientific, empirical political science.