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Military Rule with a Weak Army: Myanmar's Late Expansion

Abstract:Under Ne Win's rule, Burma lacked a strong military. The army's capacity was only upgraded considerably in the late 1980s and early 1990s. What accounts for its late expansion? I argue that Burma's military upgrade depended on a threat to the regime that would incite autocrats to divert limited resources toward strengthening the army. That threat did not materialize until military rule was unsettled by a social revolution in 1988. Lacking the technology to produce warfare, military development also required strong ties to a state with the capacity to support Burma's expansion. That state was China. The ebb and flow in diplomatic relations between Rangoon and Beijing in the 1960s and 1970s, and China's isolation and military weakness under Mao Zedong made it unlikely to provide military support to Burma then. By the late 1980s, however, Rangoon and Beijing's relations had improved significantly, and China's capacity as a weapons provider had also increased. Burma could, from then on, easily access China's arms market.