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A Review of “Why Iowa? How Caucuses and Sequential Elections Improve the Presidential Nominating Process”

and that the hundreds of billions lent to banks under the TARP program had been lost (despite reports that nearly all the funds would be recovered and some elements of TARP would show a profit)” (162). There is a promising research question here, on the extent to which such misimpressions were due to presidential ineptness or to an extraordinarily harsh environment for shaping public opinion from the White House. The evidence compels us to ask: Is the pulpit still bully? Second, several of the authors offer some variation on the theme that crisis empowers the president (73, 89, 117)—thus, at least by implication, heightening the magnitude of the administration’s shortcomings by suggesting that the 2008 financial crisis opened the way for a transformational presidency that did not come. Yet perhaps it is the case that not all crises are equal. As Joseph White hints (184), given the timing of the financial collapse within the fixed political calendar, Obama inherited a situation that looked more like 1930 than 1933. That contention leads to the disquieting prospect that Obama’s political time resembles more closely Herbert Hoover’s than FDR’s.