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A rapprochement of the operant-conditioning and awareness views of biofeedback training: the role of discrimination in voluntary control.

In order to adequately evaluate Cott, Pavloski and Black's claim that the discrimination of a physiological response is not necessary for the voluntary control of that response, this commentary presents a set of formal articulations and clarifications of intentional action, voluntary control, discrimination, awareness, and physiological response. It is concluded on logical grounds that Cott et al. are necessarily mistaken and that the conceptual foundations of the issue have not been clearly articulated heretofore. Based upon this discussion, a rapprochement is offered of the operant conditioning and awareness views of biofeedback training, demonstrating that the awareness view is essentially a tautology that aids us in understanding what is meant by "voluntary control of the physiological response." Finally, the issue of mediation in biofeedback-augmented self-regulation is reconceptualized and it is argued that the search for a "neurophysiological mechanism" of voluntary control is meaningless, reflecting a misappropriation of the concept of voluntary control.