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Intuitions in Metaphysics

In everyday life, many of the decisions and actions we take happen unconsciously. Many of our judgements rely on what we call intuitions. This term is used in a variety of different contexts: We might find the handling of a new mobile device intuitive. A brilliant chess player might have great intuition for finding the best move. Or we might intuitively connect better with people who are similar in character. In philosophy, there exists an extensive literature on the significance of intuitions in (philosophical) arguments. When formulating arguments in our daily lives as well as in academic practice, intuitions are often employed as preliminary assumptions. On the dialectical level, when somebody makes an intuitive claim, she is typically not required to provide any further reasons for the claim made. While intuitive claims might have some inferential justification, they appear not to require any further justification since they simply seem to be true. Intuitive claims have thus been characterised as non-inferential dialectical justifications and have, in this sense, been said to serve as the premises of arguments. The use of intuitions is adequate and even necessary in any domain of research. For instance, the assumption that memory is generally reliable is needed whenever the outcome of an experiment or an argument is evaluated with regard to the initial setup or assumptions. However, an excessive use of intuitions appears worrisome in any research domain for several reasons: Propositions that appear intuitive might still be false, they might stand in conflict to other people’s intuitions and they often lack further justification. Although many authors have argued that intuitions are a successful tool for philosophical theorising, several have criticised the use of intuitions in metaphysical practice. This paper analyses the use