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On the Subjectivity of Welfare

In "The Subjectivity of Welfare" L. W. Sumner hopes to, among other things, accomplish two important goals.1 First, he wants to "develop the appropriate interpretation of subjectivity (and objectivity)" (p. 765) in theories of well-being. Second, he wants to argue that subjective theories of well-being have decisive advantages over objective theories. Despite the many significant virtues of the article, I will, perhaps somewhat perversely, focus on arguing that each of these two goals has not been fully achieved. Sumner suggests that the subjective/objective distinction is an important one for theories of well-being because objective theories cannot capture the subject-relativity of well-being which is essential to the concept. Objective accounts of well-being, according to Sumner, are embarrassed by their inability to explain adequately what makes an agent's well-being especially hers. Thus he hopes to show that all objective theories of well-being are inadequate.