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The Russian Navy: Myth and Reality. By Eric Morris. New York: Stein and Day, 1977. 150 pp. Map. $9.95.

As might be expected in such an ambitious undertaking, the volume contains some textual inaccuracies as well as debatable judgments which, in some cases, reflect the arms control bias of the editors. For example, on page 65 the reader is told that "undoubtedly one of the reasons the Air Force continues to press for aircraft and the Navy for surface ships is that duty in a missile silo or Poseidon submarine is boring," implying that conventional forces, in particular, U.S. conventional forces, have no real modern military function except as a very high cost form of recreation. This has clearly not been the case since the end of World War II, is not now, nor is it likely to be in the foreseeable future. In addition, the authors may have allowed their enthusiasm for arms control to cause them to be overly sanguine about the arms limitations achieved by SALT I. The United States and the Soviet Union did not forgo as yet undeveloped weapons technologies for exotic ABM systems (p. 204) ; they did agree (in Agreed Interpretation E) that, in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems would be subject to discussion and agreement between the two sides. The ABM Treaty did not solve the problem of defining the difference between ABM and air defense systems (p. 138), but established areas in which ABM components may be deployed. Moreover, the signatories of the treaty undertook not to give ABM capabilities to missiles, launchers, or radar systems, other than specifically ABM missiles, launchers, or radars. The two sides also agreed that only ABM systems could be tested in an ABM mode, thus providing a verifiable means of declaring any system so tested an ABM system. These appear to be reasonable safeguards against the possible upgrading of an air defense system. However, estimating system capabilities in this way can hardly be called defining the difference between the systems. The limitations on silo dimensions did not alleviate U.S. concerns over the dangers that might arise if high-yield weapons were made more accurate and MIRVed so as to be effective against Minuteman missiles (pp. 202-3). The 10-15 percent increase in silo dimensions, the development of MIRVs, and the improvements in reentry vehicle accuracies—all authorized under the Interim Agreement—have, as readers of the daily press are aware, raised questions about the survivability of fixed ICBMs. In most respects, however, the book provides a balanced presentation of the complexities of arms control negotiations, whether between the superpowers or between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The chapter on the institutions of arms control, based on a lecture by Ambassador James Leonard, is particularly useful in its explanation of the terms "inspection" and "verification." The institutions discussed, unfortunately, are primarily U.S. institutions. Although information on parallel Soviet institutions is sparse, the text would have been improved by at least an attempt to describe them.