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Kant and the Criminal Law of War

The chapter focuses on Ripstein’s account of a doctrine that has caused a great deal of trouble to moral philosophers of law over the years: the equal criminal immunity of combatants. Thorburn sets out the contours of the Kantian approach to the morality of law, which begins with the relationship of public authority and only later proceeds to the evaluation of how that authority has been exercised. He then considers Ripstein’s application of that approach to the legal equality of combatants in war. Although Ripstein’s account suggests a comprehensive justification of the doctrine of equal criminal immunity, Thorburn shows that Ripstein’s chapter does not spell this out fully, though he outlines a way in which Ripstein can do so.