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Uniform Treatment of Symmetric and Asymmetric APV Models of First Price Sealed Bid Auctions

We present a new approach of APV models that eliminates the need for separate treatment of symmetric and asymmetric bidders, and removes the ‘curse of dimensionality’ suffered by the current nonparametric kernel estimation methods for first price auctions with asymmetric bidders. The new approach leads to a significant reduction in sample size requirements for estimating the underlying distribution of bidder valuations. For example, required sample sizes are reduced by a factor of 3.5 if there are two bidder segments, and by 40,000 if ten bidder segments.