{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.03247373447946514, 'fraction_numerical': 0.004775549188156638, 'mean_word_length': 4.985714285714286, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Factortame Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Transport

Third, where the cause of action is found to be "based upon" "commercial activity," the third clause also specifies that there be a "direct effect" within the United States. Both America West and Rush-Presbyterian required that the effect be "substantial and foreseeable" to be "direct." In America West, the court adopted this standard after analyzing the legislative history of the third clause of FSIA section 1605(a)(2) and legal precedent adopted by the other circuits. In Rush-Presbyterian, the court used roughly the same standard, noting that many circuits had found the "direct effect" test to be satisfied where there was financial loss to a U.S. corporation and a "legally significant act" took place within the United States. These two cases, following the Zedan decision, may mark a trend among the circuits toward requiring increased "contact" with the United States before the courts will recognize an exception to sovereign immunity for a specific commercial activity under the third clause in section 1605(a)(2). While it appears that most "legally significant acts" that take place in the United States would satisfy an inquiry for "substantial and foreseeable" effect, it is not clear that the reverse would also be true. Arguably, an effect within the United States could be "substantial and foreseeable" without necessarily constituting, in the context of the particular case, a "legally significant act" within the United States. Such a case might have existed if Airmotive had overhauled the engine knowing that it would be delivered to a U.S. airline, or had begun repairs after delivery of the airplane to AWA. In such a case, jurisdiction would most likely obtain in both the Ninth and Seventh Circuits under the direct, substantial and foreseeable test. Thus, it appears that the Second Circuit's holding in Texas Trading has been narrowed or reinterpreted by other circuits to remove any argument that, even in commercial cases, financial loss in the United States without more will ever satisfy the third clause.