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Liability, Responsibility, and Harm

In his intriguing paper, "Responsibility, Liability, and Incentive Compatibility," Talbot Page argues for what he calls "the responsibility principle."' The responsibility principle states, "When A's actions impose costs on B, A should be made responsible, by paying for these costs" (p. 242). The responsibility principle is presented as a prima facie moral and legal principle, which may be overriden by other concerns. Page argues that the responsibility principle should play a fundamental role in our thinking about liability because it is deeply entrenched in our way of thinking about harms and because, at least in many circumstances, it is not only consistent with considerations of efficiency and utility but also contributes to them. Given the responsibility principle, Page argues that chemical companies whose products or processes cause harm should be held strictly liable. Strict liability is justified because it helps to avoid problems of misrepresentation and because, given the responsibility principle, it is not unfair or unusual. Central to the whole discussion is the notion of imposing costs or harming. Although Page notes that the notion of harm is problematic (p. 242), he does not attempt any definition.2 Yet there are at least three notions of harm that are relevant to his discussion. First one might take A to harm B whenever A diminishes B's budget set or A interferes with or damages any of B's capacities. B's budget set is the set of all possible outcomes obtainable by B, provided that B's capacities are unimpaired. To simplify somewhat, one can take A to harm B whenever A limits B's options. This notion of harm as limiting options contrasts with two other notions: harm as decreasing utility and harm as violating rights. One might argue that A does not harm B if A merely limits an option of B that B would never choose. When others buy up the whole stock of canned eels at my local supermarket, they limit my opportunities. I can no longer purchase canned eels there. But since I would never think of