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Habermas’s discourse ethics and Hegel’s critique of Kant

In this article I follow James Gordon Finlayson who claims that a Hegelian criticism applies both to Kant and also to Habermas, namely, the criticism of the will as a tester of maxims. The issue is that Kant cannot connect the will of morality and the will of the particular agent and this leaves the empirical will unaffected. According to Finlayson, Habermas can be charged with this criticism, insofar as he draws a distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. The upshot is that in Discourse Ethics the empirical will seems to be left also unaffected by the moral will. In light of an analysis of ideal role taking, and rational discourse, I claim that Habermas can rebut the Hegelian criticism. Nonetheless, I show that these concepts are incompatible with the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons. Hence, either the concepts or the distinction have to be removed. Habermas can only afford to discard the distinction, and indeed this modification answers the criticism. The final issue that arises is why does Habermas maintain the distinction? And what would be the consequences for his moral theory if he discards it? At the end of the article I sketch some of the implications and challenges that this alternative could have for Habermas’s Discourse Ethics.