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Desire and Action

Aristotle held, it is argued, that desire, like anger, is to be defined as inextricably psycho-physical process (or activity), a specific type of bodily change. It is the realization of a goal-directed essentially material capacity. This is the type of capacity required if desire is to be the efficient cause of bodily movements, their origin and controller. Its form, if constituted by this capacity, needs to be, in its own nature, an enmattered form to be their cause. This account of desire is an instance of the Impure Form Interpretation developed in Chapters 1 and 2. It is argued that this interpretation best capatures Aristotle’s own positive theory and his critical remarks on alternatives, such as the ‘harmony theory’. Attempts to understand his account of desire in terms of two definitionally distinct components, one purely psychological, one purely physical, are rejected as inadequate because they cannot properly accommodate the efficient causal role he attributed to its form.