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Aleksandr Dugin and the ideology of national revival: Geopolitics, Eurasianism and the conservative revolution

This article examines the emergence of Aleksandr Dugin as the leader of the Eurasian Movement and later Party in Russia. For much of the 1990s Dugin was a prominent intellectual among the Russian nationalist‐communist opposition, moving from the position of ideologue of a fringe political party ‐ Edvard Limonov's National Bolsheviks — to advisor to the communist speaker of the State Duma, Gennadiy Seleznev. Dugin's ideology combined an anti‐Western interpretation of geopolitics with mysticism, Aryanism, conspirology, authoritarian statism and Eurasianism. Dugin's expanding set of Internet sites became an ideological empire of a virtual society. In 1999, in the aftermath of the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, Dugin saw an opportunity to move from the marginal opposition to the ideologue of the post‐Yeltsin president. In this capacity, Dugin and his Eurasian Movement emerged as prominent supporters of Vladimir Putin, whom Dugin identified as the embodiment of the ‘Eurasian capitalist’ model of statist development. Dugin developed a close working relationship with Gleb Pavlovsky, a spin doctor for Putin's Kremlin. In the aftermath of 11 September and Putin's move towards supporting the United States in the war on terrorism, Dugin has continued his nominal support for the president, even as he has criticized his pro‐Western policies as anti‐Eurasian and a threat to Russian interests.