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9.4.2 Incorporating Security and Survivability into the System of Systems Architecting

System of systems (SoS) security and survivability issues have found prominence in the wake of increased importance of such large scale interconnected systems. The threats and risks associated with SoS architectures present unique challenges to system architects. SoS security and survivability practices are needed to ensure the performance and survival of the system under an intrusion. Current security engineering activities are performed independent of the system architecting process, leading to ad hoc solutions and after‐the‐fact reactions to vulnerabilities as discussed in (Evans et al. 2005). Literature on security and survivability oriented system architecting activities is far and few in between. This paper studies the major classes of threats and risks associated with SoS and the response to such vulnerabilities. Existing works were researched to outline the key characteristics of an effective security and survivability process that can be integrated with systems engineering activities. Overviews of three survivability architectures are provided on the basis of the identified criteria. Comments on the currently available solutions and future areas of emphasis are presented.