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Amicable Settlements in Investor-State Disputes: Empirical Analysis of Patterns and Perceived Problems


This article empirically analyses investor-State arbitration cases that settle amicably after the arbitration has commenced but before the final award is rendered. The study investigates whether, and to what extent, some common criticisms of amicable settlements are evident in practice. It examines four questions that correspond to the major critiques of amicable settlements in investor-State dispute resolution: (1) Are certain types of investor-State disputes unsuitable to be settled amicably? (2) Do amicable settlements impede transparency? (3) Do amicable settlements pay less compared to when investors win? (4) Is the non-enforceability of settlement agreements a problem in practice? The findings suggest that in practice, not all of these purported problematic aspects of dispute resolution mechanisms that result in amicable settlements are as evident as is commonly believed.