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Res Gestae in the House of Lords: Concoction or Distortion?

and that the applicants should succeed on the first question, but they disagreed as to the reasons. May L.J. said the "omission" had to be a failure in some duty or to fulfill some legitimate expectation, which, fortunately, the applicants did have. Bingham and Nicholls L.JJ., however, refused so to limit "omission." They would look only to the employer's "purpose" in not treating all employees similarly. Whether a penalty was directed purely against an individual or purely against the union itself is an old problem (Post Office v. Crouch [1974] I.C.R. 378, Carrington v. Therm-a-Stor [1983] I.C.R. 208). Both sides have defensible positions in such cases, for neither "purely" collective nor "purely" individual interests exist. Undermining unions invariably makes individual members more vulnerable; but weakening individuals also weakens the collective. The majority solution in Ridgway (May L.J. dissenting) is that since employees receive wages through their individual contracts, which, though influenced, are not constituted by collective bargains, pay discrimination is "individual." The majority assumed that this would exclude Crouch, where the applicants complained only that they were refused facilities for union activities. But this is not necessarily so. City and Hackney H.A. v. N.U.P.E. [1985] I.R.L.R. 263 shows that agreements to provide unions with facilities are capable of incorporation into individual contracts.