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Transatlantic threat perceptions

No terrorist atrocities on the scale of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have occurred since 11 September. The military campaign in Afghanistan and the post-11 September global counter-terrorist mobilisation have probably compromised al-Qaeda's operational capability. The strategic attention of the US has thus expanded from countering transnational terrorism to stemming the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). President George W. Bush confirmed this policy evolution when he included Iraq, Iran and North Korea in an 'axis of evil' in his 29 January State of the Union message. At the same time, fuelled by broader concerns about American unilateralism, Washington's European allies and partners have re-asserted their preference for diplomacy in handling threats that the US tends to consider more amenable to being neutralised through force or threatened force. These transatlantic differences in threat perceptions and responses have potentially significant implications for the campaign against transnational terrorism, dealing with 'rogue states' and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Most gaps, however, are not unbridgeable.