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The moral dimension of intentionality judgments

Joshua Knobe (2003a, b) presented data that suggest people’s judgments of a behavior’s intentionality may be significantly influenced by moral considerations. In particular, Knobe (2003b) argues that when people judge the intentionality of an action with moral consequences, they fail to consider an important component of intentionality — the agent’s skill (Malle & Knobe, 1997) — that they do consider when judging an almost identical action with neutral consequences. This finding raises a number of issues about the consistency of intentionality judgments and perhaps even the unity of the folk concept of intentionality. Moreover, it raises the specter of a bias in people’s thinking, namely to ignore important information when judging morally significant actions, which, if true, would have considerable impact on legal proceedings.