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Post-crisis Reform at the IMF: Learning to be (Seen to be) a Long-term Development Partner

It is by now clear that for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the global financial crisis has been spectacularly good for business. And whilst the recently announced doubling of the Fund's concessional lending resources and renewed commitment to “poverty reduction” are intrinsically important developments, they also serve to shed light on the politics of change within the organisation. By placing recent developments in their historical context, this article outlines the evolution of competing views amongst key internal actors over how and when the Fund should lend to low-income countries, and highlights the limited ability of US representatives to achieve their aims in this policy area. In line with a series of historical precedents, advocates of a “developmentalist” IMF have again drawn upon a period of crisis to overcome the more “minimalist” views of the US. By doing so, space has been opened up for the IMF to gain traction over “poverty reduction” through the use of ring-fenced spending. With these changes the IMF is gradually learning to become a development partner.