{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.033707865168539325, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0149812734082397, 'mean_word_length': 4.944444444444445, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Now You See It, Now You Don’t: Commentary by Nicholas Humphrey (London)

Those of us who have been arguing for some years for the position that Francis Crick and Christof Koch arrive at in this paper, namely, that phenomenal consciousness occurs only at the level of sensation, and that higher mental processes (including thinking and perception) have no conscious phenomenology at all, have made singularly little impact on the current debate. In 1992, in A History of the Mind (Humphrey, 1992), I summarized my own views as follows: