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On Bayesian pragmatics and categorical predictions

Intuitions about pragmatic phenomena can sometimes be fuzzy. If a lecturer says that “All of my students solved some of the problems”, does he mean that none solved all? And if he adds that “Some of my students solved all of the problems”, what is the percentage of his students who did solve them? If there is a green square and two circles, a green and a blue one, and somebody is asked to bring the circle, which one would he choose? Experiments on pragmatic phenomena reveal a certain amount of variance among subjects, and rarely exhibit the clear distributions that would be predicted by formally oriented pragmatic theories. Michael Franke and Gerhard Jäger (this volume), henceforth F&J, outline an approach to pragmatic modelling that tries to account for this fuzziness. They aim at explanatory models that not only describe the uncertainty and variance found in pragmatic interpretations but that derive the observed behaviour from fundamental assumption about rational language use and the distribution of noise. Their approach replaces the categorical principles of neo-Gricean and grammatical approaches with probabilistic rules. F&J discuss two modelling techniques in some depth, the first employs discrete choice theory to explain the distribution of experimental outcomes in tests on referring expressions, and the second game theory to explain implicature about the speaker’s type in bargaining situations. Pragmatics as considered here is concerned with communicated meaning. Communicated meaning has many components. Well known is Grice (1989: Ch. 14) distinction between what is said and what is implicated, both of which are considered part of the intended speaker meaning. Besides this, there is a more fuzzy component consisting of expectations about what is likely the case. These expectations are not necessarily part of the intended speaker meaning. An example are the expectations raised by an utterance of “some A’s are B” about the exact number of A’s being B’s. The exciting new aspect of discrete choice