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The effect of conglomerate mergers on changes in industry concentration

Especially since the conglomerate merger "wave" of the mid-tolate 1960s, the effects of conglomerate mergers on competition have been the subject of much controversy among academic economists and public policy makers and enforcers. Many of the theories that have been suggested and debated were developed in the context of diversification by large firms, whether accomplished via conglomerate merger or internal diversification. In the late 1960s, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) used some of these theories to successfully prohibit certain types of conglomerate mergers under amended section 7 of the Clayton Act. However, court decisions in the mid-1970s required more evidence than previously of the likelihood of possible anticompetitive effects of conglomerate mergers. In reaction to this change and, more generally, to slow the trend toward increased aggregate concentration, several proposals were offered for federal legislation prohibiting most large