{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.020012706480304957, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.361616161616162, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Voter Verified Paper Ballots : Seat belts for Election Safety

Secure, reliable, usable, accessible , and verifiable voting systems are critical to ensure accurate, transparent, fair, and inclusive elections. A number of states and local jurisdictions have deployed systems that meet all of these goals, but others have had substantial problems, particularly with Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) touchscreen systems. There is overwhelming evidence that currently-deployed DRE voting systems suffer from security vulnerabilities, reliability problems, and usability issues that put the integrity of our elections at risk and erode public confidence in election results. Procedural solutions that only address the physical security of voting machines are inadequate to protect against these risks. As the experience of many states and local jurisdictions has demonstrated, the only effective voting solution available today is a system of voter-verified paper ballots (such as precinct-based optical scan voting systems combined with accessible ballot marking devices), that are used to conduct compulsory manual audits of electronic tabulations. Some touchscreen systems that produce individual ballots as well as accessibility for voters who are disabled or do not speak English have proven to be useful supplements to optical scan systems, but poorly-designed and crudely-built voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT) DRE printers that are unreliable have put requirements for voter-verified paper audit trails into question. As a result of failures in paperless DRE voting technology, significant numbers of eligible voters have already been denied their right to vote, e.g., because they were turned away from their polling place because of inoperative voting machines. Failures in VVPAT technology have meant such machines failed to properly record votes that were correctly cast. As a result, some election results have been compromised due to such failures of DRE technology -failures that could have been prevented had computer scientists' earlier warnings been heeded. In light of the very serious security, reliability, usability, and verifiability problems with recentlydeployed, HAVA-mandated voting systems that have become apparent during subsequent elections in a number of States, it is time for Congress to revisit HAVA and enact legislation to ensure that all voting systems enable eligible voters to cast their votes and have those votes counted in a manner that is secure, accurate, verifiable, accessible, and reliable. Any updates to HAVA must also ensure end-to-end transparency so that all aspects of the voting process are open to and observable by the public, from the testing and certification of machines through the final tabulation and canvass of the ballots. Voter confidence in our electoral process will only be restored if citizens are able to monitor and verify the process by which election results are reached. Durable paper ballot records are like seat belts. We need to use them to prevent serious injuries to our democratic system when inevitable and sometimes serious incidents occur. Just as some early