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PIT’s Status as a Theory of Intentionality

This chapter considers several objections that aim to challenge PIT's status as a theory of intentionality, including the objections that PIT should not be considered a theory of intentionality in terms of consciousness rather than a theory of consciousness in terms of intentionality, that PIT is trivial or uninteresting, and that considerations of naturalism tell against PIT. This chapter responds to these worries, arguing that what makes PIT a theory of consciousness in terms of intentionality is that it "fits" intentionality to consciousness, rather than fitting consciousness to intentionality, that PIT is not trivial or even a priori, and that naturalism is a virtue indicative of the truth of a theory only because it is a special case of a more general virtue that both naturalistic theories and PIT, which may or may not be naturalistic, have.