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Trade and Public Health: The WTO, Tobacco, Alcohol and Diet by Benn McGrady Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011

motives to attempt to stem gold outflows. He rejects the oft-stated premise that ‘competitive devaluations’ were undertaken in an effort to improve countries’ competitiveness, and instead argues that devaluations (and increased tariffs) were chosen because of reserve losses. Irwin believes that there was much less increase in protectionism in the Great Recession than there had been in the Great Depression, although some have questioned that conclusion pointing to non-tariff protective measures having become increasingly prominent because WTO rules precluded tariff changes. However, Irwin attributes what he believes to be less protectionism to the fact that many fewer countries’ exchange rates were pegged in the Great Recession. He also notes the increased importance of intra industry trade, direct foreign investment, an increased share of services in employment and WTO rules, making it harder for countries to adopt protectionist measures. If Irwin’s conclusions are accepted, there still remains the political economy question: What factors led to the choices of policy instrument made by different countries? Why did Germany and the central European bloc choose exchange control? And what were the different pressures leading to tariff increases or abandonment of gold? Analysis of that question must await yet another contribution to our understanding of the political economy of the Great Depression. Both books are eminently readable, and will be of interest to all those concerned with trade policy and the trading system, as well as being valuable for upper division undergraduate seminars. The particulars of the political arguments for and against SH, the quotes of opinions of policy makers, and the marshalling of evidence regarding policy choices and attempts at international cooperation make the period come alive and simultaneously enable a balanced assessment regarding the role of trade policy and its determinants. The two books will almost certainly alter the views of those who attribute the Great Depression largely to trade policy and Smoot–Hawley.