{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.029017857142857144, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0078125, 'mean_word_length': 5.361702127659575, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Theory and Fact in Antitrust Doctrine: Summary Judgment Standards, Single-Brand Aftermarkets and the Clash of Microeconomic Models

In the United States, neither antitrust doctrine nor microeconomic analysis has achieved consensus long enough to establish a stable ground for antitrust policy. Whether one attributes this state of flux to the common law method, the vagaries of politics, or the variety in microeconomic theory, the fact remains: judges, enforcement officials, and scholars have engaged in a longstanding debate about the law and economics of antitrust policy. Because the economics informing U.S. antitrust for the past 80 years has been microeconomics, debate has often addressed the discipline's fundamental concepts of market definition and market power. Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, Inc. (1992),1 a good