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For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914–1941 . By Charles Chatfield. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1971. Pp. 447, $11.95.)

There are some small publishing flaws that are particularly annoying to someone using the book for reference purposes. The type face used on subheadings is inconsistent, as is the numbering of appendices. The other chapters in the book are really ancillary to the first two. Part two (chaps. 47) are, as the author says, "highly specialized" (p. xix). Each is important and useful but less so to casual readers than to students of some special aspect. Chapter 3 explores the claims and counterclaims for exemptions and shows that deferments, in anything but a total mobilization like World War II, create more costs and problems than they solve. Chapter 4 is a short but esoteric discussion of factors to be considered in "costing out" military manpower. Chapter 5 is an in-depth treatment of the existing military pay system, its budegtary costs, and the costing of a volunteer military. The constant influx of cheap draft-induced labor, efforts to raise professional pay over the years, and poorly perceived income-in-kind to professionals led to a badly skewed military pay system. No one, not even the careerists and retirees whom the system relatively favored have been satisfied. The author insists that this picture can be reversed and better aligned with civilian practices at lower costs than most economists and the Department of Defense have estimated. Chapter 6 considers the budget cost of a volunteer military. The author claims that his estimates ($2.1 to $2.5 billion) are much lower because of a methodology that considers longrun cost implications. Chapter 7 is a short one reviewing the faulty assumptions and the air of unreality in which decision makers in military manpower have operated since World War II. It re-emphasizes the book's dedication to reestablishing a lost equilibrium between military and structure and domestic goals. Canby himself may have provided the best characterization of his work in an off-hand and ingenuous remark on the Harvard faculty seminar! "In recent years several groups and authors have come forth with menus of domestic goals related to military manpower procurement. The most famous has been the Marshall Commission; the most comprehensive, the Harvard faculty seminar on selective service." The same can be said of Canby's book. It is certainly the most comprehensive work on the subject to date.