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An approach to discriminate GNSS spoofing from multipath fading

GNSS signals are vulnerable to various types of interference including jamming and spoofing attacks. Spoofing signals are designed to deceive target GNSS receivers without being detected by conventional receiver quality monitoring metrics. This paper focuses on detecting an overlapped spoofing attack where the correlation peaks of the authentic and spoofing signals interact during the attack. Several spoofing detection and signal quality monitoring (SQM) metrics are introduced. This paper proposes a spoofing detection architecture utilizing combination of different metrics to detect spoofing signals and distinguish them from multipath signals. Experimental results show that the pre-despreading spoofing detection metrics such as variance analysis are not sensitive to multipath propagation and can be used in conjunction with post-despreading methods to correctly detect spoofing signals. Several test scenarios based on different spoofing and multipath cases are performed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed architecture to correctly detect spoofing attack ands distinguish them from multipath.