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Redesigning Land Forces for Wars Amongst the People

Contradicting centuries of Western practice, the problem of future wars is one of learning to fight wars amongst the people. Currently, Western armies are optimized for fighting the wars of a previous age. This has begun to change. The United States Army particularly has moved very rapidly from being a force that fundamentally abjured irregular warfare and nation-building to one which is beginning to embrace them as core activities. Still, organizational, structural, and cultural change is slow and uneven. Moreover, argues this paper, a major failing is that the current orthodoxy suggests that the future force ought to be either medium-weight or bifurcated between light and heavy units. Both approaches are mistaken: the first will lead to a force disadvantaged in both regular and irregular warfare; the second reinforces an erroneous conception that war-fighting and nation-building are distinct and separate endeavours. Instead, the challenges of contemporary use of force require a fundamental reorientation of thinking, organizing, and equipping regular land forces to reflect the increasingly apprehended fact that regular warfare is growing more and more irregular.