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Amici Curiae and Strategies for Gaining Access to the Supreme Court

In the process of case selection in the U.S. Supreme Court, lawyers try to secure space on the justices' plenary agenda; through briefs amicus curiae, interest groups try to advance their policy views. Thus, both seek access to the Court. What brings lawyers and organized interests together? In this article, I develop a model which examines when and why lawyers who represent petitioners build coalitions with groups. Using survey data from the 1986-87 Term of the Court, I show that lawyers-particularly lawyers with expertise in the agenda setting process-actively recruit the support of interests as amici curiae. Solicitation of amici most often occurs when lawyers and interest groups share similar goals, specifically, the desire for the justices to speak authoritatively on an issue of national importance. Con sistent with the literature on organized interests, the results serve to explain why so few lawyers seek the support of amici curiae, despite their impact on the justices' decision making.