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Counterfactuals and Closeness

The semantics for counterfactuals builds on Lewis’ theory and similarity weighting, with two principal aims. The first of these is to resist those who argue that appeal to counterfactuals in the analysis of causation is circular because their semantics must appeal to causal facts (specifically, in the similarity weighting for worlds). The second of these is to secure the semantics for counterfactuals for a possible account of causal non-symmetry in terms of counterfactual non-symmetry. As a result, weight is rightly placed upon perfect match as an important aspect of similarity although this is moderated to deal an indeterministic version of Fine’s Future Similarity Objection. A more precise understanding of the role of approximate match is developed appealing to a type of probabilistic independence.