{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.015384615384615385, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.04424778761062, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
I. Rhetoric, Morals, and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens

Greek legal and political theory typically established a close connection between private morals, civic virtue, and the stability of the polis. While I have elsewhere discussed the ways in which this insight led to the legal regulation of particular spheres of conduct, in this paper I will focus instead on the conceptual framework within which such regulation would have operated). More specifically, I will begin by examining Aristotle's account of the nature of political associations and his treatment of the role of judicial judgment in one particular kind of association, the polis. From this role, I will argue, there necessarily follows a particular conception of the function of law in the social and moral order of the political community. This conception I will call the oligarchic censorial model of the rule of law. Further, this conception in turn provides the basis for the Aristotelian critique of the licentiousness and disorder of extreme democratic societies like classical Athens. From this critique, the paper will move from the realm of political theory to that of a different ideological conceptualization of the rule of law and of its relevance to litigation and judicial judgment in classical Athens. The argument will suggest that the radical democratic conception of the rule