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Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naïve Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind Jennifer Hornsby Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997, xii + 265 pp.

Propounders of care ethics make a stronger point: that reflection and deliberation in such situations, and many others, when what is called for is for us to act on inclination, would seriously call into question our capacities as moral agents. Korsgaard's unsatisfactory treatment of the role of personal attachments and commitments arises from the excessive rationalism of her account of moral agency. The problems resulting from her elevation of reason and common humanity over desire/emotion and particular attachments and commitments recur throughout the book. The objections raised against this are familiar features of critiques of Kantian ethics. While her innovative treatment of this tradition will give much food for thought, she does not come to grips with some of the most fundamental objections which have led many ethical theorists to turn away from this tradition and seek out alternative theories which they believe give both emotion and reason their rightful place in moral agency.