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Is self-governance of the commons feasible in the PRC? A case study of pasture governance in Zhua Xixiulong township, Gansu province

The concept of the “tragedy of the commons”, as articulated by Hardin (1968), has had a huge influence on the protection and management of pastures in countries where ecosystems of grasslands and livestock co-exist, including in the People’s Republic of China. In order to avoid “the tragedy” and to establish clear property rights, a policy was adopted in China under which winter pastures were contracted to households, while summer pastures remained “common”. The effect of this policy on pasture protection has been controversial. Some have argued that the capacity of herders for self-governance has been ignored since, according to Ostrom’s (1990) theory of self-governance, under certain conditions herders themselves should be able to govern pastures efficiently without external constraints. The findings of the present case study – conducted in Zhua Xixiulong township, Tianzhu county, Gansu province – temper this argument. They show that complete self-governance is not feasible in practice, because self-governance principles such as graduated sanctions and minimal recognition of rights to organise are not fully satisfied.