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Domestic Support for Wars

This study examines the differences recorded in transatlantic relations from the viewpoint of mass public opinion in the United States of America, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom concerning military engagements in the post-Cold War era, namely the Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraqi (2003) wars. Theoretically, this study builds upon the analysis of the “domestic support for wars” from three mainstream theories of public opinion concerning the use of force; namely, the “principal policy objectives,” “ends and means calculus,” and the “leadership effect.” It also offers a multidimensional approach by introducing a number of variables such as risk, halo effect, multilateral participation, legitimacy, escalation, and self-defence concerning wars. Taking a comprehensive view of the existing polling data on public opinion (1998–2004) an aggregate analytical method is devised and a quantitative analysis of the aggregate polling data is employed to map out correlations between trends in warfare and trends in domestic support for wars.