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The John Locke Lectures 2009 Being Realistic about Reasons

Lecture 1: Introduction Contemporary discussion in metaethics differs in two important ways from the discussion in the 50s and 60s, and even in the later 70s, when John Mackie wrote Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. In that earlier period, discussion focused entirely on morality: on the proper interpretation of claims about moral right and wrong, and other forms of moral evaluation. Today, although morality is still much discussed, a significant part of the debate concerns practical reasoning and normativity more generally: the proper interpretation of claims about reasons for action, and, even more broadly, claims about reasons for belief and other attitudes, which are increasingly recognized as normative, and as raising questions of the same nature as those about reasons for action. The metaethics of the mid-twentieth century also gave the central place to the question of motivation. With respect to morality in particular, the question was how agents can be motivated by their moral judgments. In The Possibility of Altruism, Thomas Nagel was attacking the prevailing Humean orthodoxy, and he considered requirements of ethics and prudence to be rational requirements. But he presented the problem he was addressing as a problem about motivation. Thus he wrote, “I conceive of ethics as a branch of psychology. My claims concern its foundation, or ultimate motivational basis.” Today, although motivation is still mentioned, questions are more likely to be put