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Why Hope Cannot Be an Intellectual Virtue: Rationality of Hope Considered from an Analytic Perspective

In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke writes: “hope is that pleasure in the mind, which every one finds in himself upon the thought of a profitable future enjoyment of a thing, which is apt to delight him.” Also in Thomas Hobbes” Leviathan, hope is defined in favourable terms as an “appetite with an opinion of obtaining,” which is part of more complex virtues such as courage and confidence. However, that “appetite,” or “pleasure in the mind,” proves not so obviously desirable on a closer look, and it did receive equivocal evaluation in the Western philosophical tradition. The disposition of hopefulness was often assessed negatively as fundamentally irrational and gullible; grounded in insufficient knowledge and emotional bias, it prevents the human agent from thinking rationally and grasping properly her situation. Invariably accompanied by fear, hope is the cause of “superstition and false beliefs.” It is described as “folly of the