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A Catastrophe Surface in Mutual Deterrence Theory: Arms Limitation and Crisis Instability

Originally, the doctrine of deterring aggression by threat of overwhelming retaliation--assured destruction--presumed the necessary retaliatory capability must survive any counterforce attack an aggressor could mount (cf. Hearings 1965). We earlier studied a model of maintaining such a policy multilaterally using forces of strategic missiles in hardened silos (Kupperman and Smith 1971a,b, 1972a,b). Our studies indicated that although such a policy could be maintained between two parties with the technology of the 196O’s, it would be economically infeasible with more parties or more effective offensive technology. Recently (Kupperman and Smith, 1977), we considered relaxing the condition that the retaliatory force must sit out counterforce attack, allowing for a counterforce duel. That paper presented results in mathematical terms. Our purpose here is to present them in more qualitative fashion, to explore some consequences, and to point out new types of analyses implicit in our considerations.