{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.015235457063711912, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.127118644067797, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Lotteries in Student Assignment : The Equivalence of Queueing and a Market-Based Approach ∗

Lotteries are often used in allocation processes because of considerations of fairness. This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in an assignment problem involving public resources. One example of this problem is from the centralized process by which students are assigned a high school seat in New York City. The main result is that a mechanism which places students in a queue based on a single lottery, random serial dictatorship, produces a distribution of matchings which is equivalent to a market-based mechanism based on multiple lotteries, the core mechanism from random property rights.