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Book Review: Containing the Cold War in East Asia: British Policies towards Japan, China and Korea, 1948-53

became even more tightly restricted. First, it was forced by American pressure to adopt a ruinous rearmament programme which strained its already feeble economy to the limit. Second, despite the opposition of the chiefs of staff, the cabinet agreed to the dispatch of British troops to Korea in order to demonstrate to the Americans Britain's loyalty as an ally and, it was hoped, to exercise some influence over United States policy. Third, Bevin's efforts to persuade the Soviet Union to cooperate with the West in the summer of 1950 in ending the war in Korea collapsed after strenuous objections by Dean Acheson. Fourth, the British detested Syngman Rhee's regime in South Korea while, despite its own reservations, the United States generally supported him. Fifth, in October 1950, when the United States decided that the United Nations forces should cross the 38th Parallel, the cabinet overruled strong strategic objections by the chiefs of staff against going north. When the cabinet realized its mistake after the Chinese intervention, it was of course too late, and its proposal for the creation of a demilitarized zone in the north fell on deaf ears in Washington. Sixth, when in January 1951 the United States wanted to introduce into the United Nations a resolution condemning Communist China for aggression, dissenters within the cabinet led by Kenneth Younger at first wanted to vote against the resolution but then climbed down after Hugh Gaitskell had pointed to the dire financial consequences of such a move. Seventh, Truman's dismissal of General MacArthur in April had nothing to do with British protests about the General's activities in Korea. Eighth, inevitably Britain was not represented on the United Nations Command's negotiating panel for the cease-fire talks which was dominated by the United States. As Lowe points out, 'the relative decline in Great Britain's importance was made even more conspicuous in its treatment by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations in the course of the talks' (p. 239). Finally, on 23 June 1952, the United States failed to inform or consult the British government in advance when it bombed the Yalu power stations, even though the minister of defence, Viscount Alexander, and the Foreign Office minister of state, Selwyn Lloyd, were visiting Washington for talks on that date. Of course, the British military role in Korea was minuscule by comparison with the massive American efforts there, while squabbles over Korea took a decidedly second place to Britain's anxiety to ensure an expanding American military and political role in Western Europe. In the end it was the American leadership's unwillingness to expand the war and the Chinese decision to compromise over the prisoner-of-war issue, despite Syngman Rhee's provocations, which determined the course of events. Britain had no influence on these decisions. There was nothing special about the 'special relationship' in East Asia. This judicious analysis will remain the standard interpretation of British policy towards East Asia in the period for many years to come.