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Multinational land forces and the NATO force structure review

Abstract : One should empathize, if not sympathize, with NATO force planners. Since 1991, standing and mobilization forces made available by nations to the Alliance have been steadily reduced. This particularly has been the case for land forces. Equally important have been the structures the Alliance has created into which national contributions would fall on deployment. Military Committee (MC) 317, accepted by nations in 1991, provides the framework by which the Alliance organizes its forces. However, the author of this study argues that the structures and envisaged deployment framework for land forces are a hopeless muddle. While there are arguably sufficient reaction forces to support NATO Ministerial Guidance, there are numerous weaknesses that would, and indeed have, inhibited the efficient and effective deployment of land forces in crises. More specifically, there are insufficient deployable reaction headquarters, both at the corps and component command level, that would support a commander of a NATO Combined Joint Task Force. And perhaps even more vexatious is the continued existence of what has become atavistic "practices" of nations that impede and inhibit the employment of multinational land forces by an Allied commander.