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The Ultimate Compendium of Classical Neuropsychological Syndromes

The primary strength of the book is its ability to make the reader think about PD related impairments in a new light. The book is novel in its supposition that PD impairments are related to disorder of the agentic self, which has four basic properties: 1) intentionality; 2) forethought; 3) self-reactiveness; and 4) self-reflectiveness. In general, the agentic self acts with intention of future goals, which Dr. McNamara hypothesizes has six basic serial cognitive causal operations: 1) identifies values; 2) prioritizes them into long term goals; 3) decides which goals to pursue; 4) develops plans to attain those goals; 5) initiates goal pursuit by inhibiting valuation and responding on impulse alone; and 6) monitors and adjusts such plans. Problems in any one of these causal operators, which Dr. McNamara proposes all have neurologic foundations, and particularly the fifth one, lead to the common PD impairments such as apathy, lack of initiation, depression, anxiety, and personality changes (e.g., novelty seeking). The chapters on the agentic self are thought provoking and may prove to be worthwhile when planning future and specific research in this area. Besides the competing emphasis on the neuropsychiatry of PD and the agentic self, another weakness relates to the book’s attempt to differentiate between the agentic self and the ‘‘minimal self’’ (a less planful but more impulsive self). To bolster the conceptualization of an agentic self, it would also have been helpful for a chapter to discuss how other brain disorders/injuries, and not just PD, would affect the agentic self and its related impairments for other disorders (maybe such a book is in the works?). For example, do psychiatric disorders associated with depletion of dopamine or dysfunctional basal ganglia, frontal lobes, and substantia nigra lead to similar impairments (and not just in PD). In addition, it would have been interesting for him to compare his model of the agentic self with other more commonly accepted neurologic models of the self which are based on research that has demonstrated that the right hemisphere injury, and particularly right parietal lobe dysfunction, are associated with ‘‘disorders of the self’’ (Feinberg, 2001; Feinberg & Keenan, 2005). Specifically, after reading his book questions arise as to whether or not impairments in the agentic self are related to anosagnosia, left sided neglect, Capgras syndrome, for example, and how so? Comparing and contrasting his model of the agentic self to other conceptualizations of the self would help bolster his argument that an agentic self exists. As to whether or not to read the book, the answer depends on one’s interest. If one is solely interested in learning the basic neuropsychiatric causes, impairments, and treatments of PD, as the title of the book suggests, then this book is not for you and other common texts will meet your needs. However, if one is interested in considering a novel model of the self for understanding the manner in which individuals with PD demonstrate common cognitive, personality, and mood impairments, then this is likely to be a rewarding and intellectually stimulating book.