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In Defense of a Probabilistic Theory of Causality

Germund Hesslow has argued recently [2] that a probabilistic theory of causality as advocated by Patrick Suppes [4] has two problems that a deterministic theory avoids. In this paper, I argue that Suppes' probabilistic causal calculus is free of each of these problems and, moreover, that several broader issues raised by Hesslow's discussion tend to support a probabilistic conception of causes. Hesslow begins his paper with definitions of the rival theories. A deterministic theory is taken to be a theory which requires that any event having a cause have a sufficient or complete cause. In characterizing a probabilistic theory, Hesslow turns to Suppes' 1970 monograph where, among other things, a cause is viewed as raising the probability of its effect. Hesslow uses Suppes' definition of a primafacie cause to represent Suppes' probabilistic theory. Specifically: