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Patterns and Predictability: The Soviet Evaluation of Operation Linebacker II

Linebacker II, the United States air operation against North Vietnam during December 1972, remains a controversial operation. The campaign succeeded in forcing North Vietnam back to the negotiating table before the US Congress could convene to force a unilateral US withdrawal. However, the price was high. The USAF Strategic Air Command (SAC) made some serious mistakes, suffered serious losses and their campaign came close to failure, yet after the war they launched a massive media and public relations blitz (and internal witch hunt) to prove that Linebacker II was an unqualified success that unfolded as planned. The North Vietnamese, glorying in their unprecedented destruction of USAF B-52 bombers, hailed Linebacker II as the “Dien Bien Phu of the Air”-despite their heavy losses to the bombers. Incredibly, the most-objective observers and commentators of Linebacker II may be the Soviet advisers attached to the North Vietnamese air defense forces. They recorded their observations in official after-action reports which remained classified and inaccessible until recently. They provide a professional assessment of both belligerents during Linebacker II.