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The Ability to Substitute - The Game Theory Application for Analysis of the Control Over the Corporation

This paper discusses the ability of controlling shareholder to substitute stakeholders of corporations. I argue that the main feature and advantage of controlling shareholder over stakeholders is the ability to substitute every stakeholder at the table of the corporation, except the minority shareholders (we are not taking into account dilution cases). The ability to substitute any stakeholder ensures the power to control the corporation. The full control over the corporation is possible even there is no control over every coalition or stakeholder of the corporation. The controlling shareholder has to be viewed as a shadow director with duties to disclosure information and liabilities for the company's criminal behavior, incurred damages and insolvency. Cooperation with stakeholder provides the greater control of the controlling shareholder over corporation.