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Restricting Access to Legal Content in House Rules: The Platform’s Freedom To Conduct a Business as a Counterargument To Limit Users’ Freedom of Expression

This chapter focuses on platforms’ protection against (unjustified) interference with the free drafting of house rules, viewed through a lens of European fundamental rights protection. It discusses the difference in protection of two fundamental rights in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights: article 16’s freedom to conduct a business and article 17’s right to property. The articles’ subject of protection (“the essence of the right”) will be mapped by analyzing the CJEU’s case-law between respectively 1974 and 1979 until 2020 and the outcome of this analysis will be applied to the process of running a platform. 
 
It will show that article 16, rather than article 17, covers platforms’ house rule-drafting. However, it is unlikely that restrictive measures will interfere with the freedom’s essence. To be justifiable, measures that do not interfere with the essence must live-up to the principle of proportionality. Therefore, subsequently, the question arises whether potential measures live up to this principle. To prevent a purely normative answering of that question - due to the fact that a standardized test does not exist - the Unfair Contract Terms Directive’s unfairness test will be used as interpretational guidance. It is concluded that measures limiting a platform’s contractual freedom can, and most likely will, be justifiable to protect platform users’ freedom of expression. That opens the door for future legislation. 
 
Outside the direct realm of platforms, this chapter demonstrates that the freedom to conduct a business has been reduced to an empty shell, or rather, a shell that has never been inhabited. Apart from the situation where an undertaking would be able to demonstrate that a proposed measure would mean the end of the business, the freedom to conduct a business does not provide any effective protection.