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A Note on Murphy's “A Paradox in Locke's Theory of Natural Rights.”

P Murphy may be forgiven for saying in his article on Locke's theory of natural rights (DIALOGUE, Sept. 1969, Vol. VIII, No. 2, p. 271): "Now Kant, we all know [!], believed that revolution and resistance to government is never justified"; for in joining this opinion—of certainly grave implications—he is in as illustrious company as that of Karl Jaspers, who probably had easier access to the original Kant than Professor Murphy. (I have discussed Jaspers's wrong account of the matter in "The Right of Resistance", Ethics, Vol. LXXIV, No. 2, Jan. 1964). That Kant rejected a right of the people to revolution is quite true, since he was logical enough to discard the concept of a sovereign that is not sovereign. Of resistance, however, he said: "In a constitution which is so organized that the people, through its representatives (in parliament), can lawfully resist the executive and its representative (the minister)—which is then called a limited constitution—nevertheless no active resistance (of a deliberate coalition of the people to compel the government to a certain active procedure, thus committing an act of the executive itself) but only a negative resistance, i. e. refusal of the people (in parliament) is provided and permitted, not always to comply with the demands which the government allegedy finds necessary for the administration of the state; rather, if the latter took place, it would be a sure sign that the people is corrupt, that its representatives are venal and that the head, in the government through his minister, is despotic, the latter himself a traitor to the people" (Doctrine of Law, § 49.)