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Does the Speedy Trial Guarantee Apply to the Sentencing Phase? Betterman v. Montana (2016)

In Betterman v. Montana, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial guarantee does not apply to the sentencing phase. However, the Court did note that defendants may be protected from long delays in sentencing by the Due Process Clause. Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion, and there were two concurring opinions, one written by Justice Thomas and joined by Justice Alito, and the other written by Justice Sotomayor. In Betterman, the defendant pleaded guilty to bail jumping and then waited in jail for over 14 months before he was sentenced to seven years in prison. Betterman appealed, arguing that the 14-month delay between his conviction and sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. According to the Court, the speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment applies only to the period of time between arrest or indictment and conviction, and, in fact, “the right detaches upon conviction” (Betterman, majority slip op. at 3). The Court reasoned that the reason for guaranteeing a speedy trial is to protect “the presumptively innocent” (Betterman, majority slip op. at 4). The Court relied on the intent of the framers, noting that historical understanding was that “the innocent shall not be worn and wasted by long imprisonment, but...speedily come to his tria[l]” (Betterman, majority slip op at 5). The Court also relied on the text of the Amendment, specifically focusing on the words “accused” and “trial.” The word “accused” clearly describes a defendant before conviction, and “trial” means something different from “judgment.” Furthermore, according to the Court, the only remedy for a violation of the speedy trial clause is that the charges against the defendant are dismissed. This remedy makes sense before conviction; however, after conviction a dismissal would be “an unjustified windfall” (Betterman, majority slip op at 7). The Court refused to entertain Betterman’s suggestion that his sentence be reduced by the 14-month delay. The Court also relied on federal and state speedy trial guarantees, noting that they match the Court’s interpretation of the clause. Finally, the Court recognized that defendants are protected against long delays between conviction and sentencing. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that sentences must be imposed “without unnecessary delay,” and states have similar provisions, some even giving specific time limits (Betterman, majority slip op. at 10). And even though the defendant did not argue that the delay violated the Due Process Clause, and thus the Court “express[ed] no opinion on how he might fare under that more pliable standard” (Betterman, majority slip op. at 11), the Court did leave open the possibility that the Due Process Clause would protect a defendant from a long delay between conviction and sentencing. Justice Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion, arguing that the Barker factors, which include “the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant” (Betterman, Sotomayor concurrence slip op. at 1), should be used in the future when analyzing delayed sentencing. Responding to that concurring opinion, Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Alito), disagreed with Justice Sotomayor. “I would not prejudge that matter. The factors listed in