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Non-punitive supervision and performance of independent directors Empirical evidence based on inquiry letters send by Stock exchange

The effectiveness of the performance of independent directors has always been an important issue in the field of corporate governance. Taking A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2019 as samples, this paper uses STATA15.0 software to establish a linear regression model, conducts panel fixed effect regression analysis, adds propensity score matching method (PSM) to improve the robustness of the model, and conducts an empirical study on whether the regulatory inquiry system has a good external governance effect on the performance of responsibilities of independent directors of listed companies. The main regression results show that independent directors will express more opposition in the board motion after receiving the investigation letter. The more the number of inquiries, the more likely the independent director is to leave before the expiration of his term of office. In the further study, it is found that the nature of company property rights, age structure and salary level of independent directors will significantly affect the correlation between the inquiry letter and the performance of duties of independent directors. The conclusion of this paper provides new evidence and new ideas for the innovation of corporate governance and the intelligent regulation of capital market.