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The Puzzle of Plural Obligation

This chapter deals with plural obligation. Here, the idea of Prime Requirement, upon which the idea of Prime Justice depends, is committed to there being such a thing as a moral requirement of some kind over multiple agents even where they are not a group agent, and even apart from whether any of those agents is thereby under any moral obligation. For that reason, the puzzle of plural obligation is an important challenge. The chapter emphasizes that the problem does not arise particularly from the idea of Prime Justice, or from its being a high, or nonconcessive, or unrealistic standard, but is entirely independent of those features. The problem arises for the very idea of social justice: if requirements of justice—be they idealistic or concessive—require members of society to do or refrain from certain things, the puzzle of plural obligation raises its head, since their all acting that way is not something that any agent can perform.