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KNOWLEDGE AND REASON

1. Internalist and externalist conceptions of knowledge and reason As John Skorupski (2010) says , " Perhaps the most pervasive conviction within the Western epistemological tradition is that in order for a person's belief to constitute knowledge it is necessary (though not sufficient) that it be justified or warranted or rationally grounded, that the person have an adequate reason for accepting it. " Traditionally the question of the role of reason within our knowledge has been taken to be the question whether knowledge is based upon rational principles which are independent of experience and which are grounded in the faculty of Reason. Another traditional issue is whether rational belief can be independent of knowledge, understood as entailing certainty and truth. Contemporary philosophers have, however, tended to concentrate upon an apparently less ambitious question. They are concerned with the role of our concept of reason when we ask such questions as: what are our reasons for believing this or that? In what sense can there be good reasons to believe, and when does having a good reason for believing amount to knowledge? Does knowledge need rest on reasons at all? In this chapter I shall be myself concerned with this more limited question. If one accepts the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB), there is an obvious link between having (propositional) knowledge and having reasons: one knows that P if and only if one has good, conclusive reasons, for believing truly that P. The concept of reason seems to be coextensive with the concept of justification. Isn't knowledge, as Sellars (1963) famously put it, in " the space of reasons " ? There are, however, two opposite ways of understanding this requirement. On the one hand, reasons are such that the subject is able to have access to them, and to articulate them in order to justify his beliefs. Reasons in this sense are typically propositional contents which are available, at least potentially, to a subject. Indeed they seem to be essentially reflective and accessible to consciousness: how could one have a reason and be unable to figure out what it? Reasons account in this sense for the normative dimension which is often associated with the concept of knowledge: one is justified in one's if one has the beliefs which one ought to have or if one obeys the relevant epistemic norms. On this internalist reading of the …