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Santa Anna of Mexico (review)

During the past decade or so I have appraised several of Will Fowler’s books about nineteenth-century Mexico, but the work under review, which aims to “understand [General Antonio López de] Santa Anna in as sober, detached, and balanced a way as possible” (p. xi), is by far his finest. This superb monograph should go a long way toward stamping out the still-dominant perception of Santa Anna as the individual responsible for all the calamities that befell early republican Mexico Many aspects of Fowler’s book make it noteworthy, but given space limitations I will mention but three. First, he demonstrates the significance of Santa Anna’s relationship with elites and commoners in the region of Veracruz. The personal, political, and economic ties that he established, as well as his success as a major landowner, allowed him to consolidate his status as a regional strongman and helped him gain national prominence. Second, Fowler places Santa Anna’s supposed political opportunism in historical context. He shows that as early as 1828 Santa Anna had carved out a role as “an impartial mediator” who represented a “standpoint that was above factional interests” (p. 108). This stance served him well during his long career in the public eye, particularly as he cemented his ties with the army and tried to turn the military into an institution solely devoted to Mexico and above any kind of political infighting. Third, Fowler convincingly dismisses the charges of treason that have been leveled against Santa Anna over the years. He demonstrates that Santa Anna’s military failures during the Texas revolution of 1835-1836 and the war with the United States in 1846-1848, as well as his subsequent decisions to favor a monarchy and to acquiesce to the Gadsden Purchase, need to be understood within the circumstances that Santa Anna faced at those particular moments. Fowler’s meticulous research effort helped him unveil new perspectives and unearthed nuggets of information that allowed him to better contextualize previously known facts and/or events. For instance, the information he garnered from several repositories in Veracruz enabled Fowler to shed new light on Santa Anna’s activities in that region. He also conversed with the local historian from the town of Xico, who offered a different take on the well-known story about the Indians who early in January 1845 attempted to cook Santa Anna alive. Fowler too gained access to Mexico’s Archivo de la Defensa Nacional. This archive yielded numerous new details about the caudillo’s life as well as the minutes of a May 20, 1847 meeting in which nearly all high-ranking Mexican generals decided to continue the war with the U.S. The document, as Fowler puts it, illustrates “the reasons used by Mexico’s top [military] brass to explain the U.S. victories” until that time (p. 270). Fowler has produced an elegantly-written and engaging study about one of Mexico’s most notorious and misunderstood leaders. His evenhanded assessment of Santa Anna as more than just a power-hungry, opportunistic, and corrupt politician makes this biography a most welcome and valuable addition to Mexican historiography.