{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.0236734693877551, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.287179487179487, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Decoding Algeria's ENP Policy: Differentiation by Other Means?

Algeria remains the only ‘normal’ southern Mediterranean country not to have signed up for the ENP through an Action Plan. The current abundance of its foreign currency reserves is often referred to as the factor defining Algeria's ENP policy. This article assesses the viability of this assumption by examining Algeria's parallel attachment to the Barcelona Process. It argues that the reductionism characterizing this assumption and the arguments based upon it overlooks the strategic thinking informing Algeria's ENP policy which derives from the country's reinvigorated foreign policy. The latter, it is argued, bears signs of a ‘Russian syndrome’ as far as its tenets of ‘indigenous democracy’ and energy assertiveness are concerned. Effectively reducing Algeria to a mere reactive actor in its relations with the EU not only precludes proper understanding of the country's EU policy-making dynamics, but also risks leading to neglect of policy initiatives on its part towards the EU. In this vein, it is argued that the proposed ‘strategic energy partnership’ should be seen as a reflection of Algeria's preference as regards its relationship with the EU.