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Terrorism Early Warning and Counterterrorism Intelligence

Contemporary terrorist networks challenge state institutions and global security. The 11 September 2001 attacks on New York City and Washington, DC, the M-11 (Eme Once) attacks against the Madrid Metro, and the 7 July 2005 attacks on the London Underground highlight the threat posed by transnational terrorism. Extremist organizations, exemplified by al-Qaeda and its affiliates, are complex, nonstate actors. They undertake operations using transnational networks that draw upon a galaxy of like-minded individuals and sympathetic groups. These operations transect traditional boundaries between national security and criminal law enforcement, exploiting the legal and bureaucratic seams between crime and war. In operational terms, the difference between terrorist networks and criminal gangs is actually diminishing as terrorists turn to criminals to help finance their activities, and as criminal gangs come to see terrorists as a new and lucrative market for their goods and services. The inability of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence organizations to meet this threat is well understood and has been the subject of repeated investigations by blue-ribbon panels and congressional committees in the decade leading up to the 11 September tragedy. Seams clearly existed