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The UN 2001 Conference: A Useful Step Forward?

A the 2001 UN Conference on Small Arms a large majority of states would almost certainly have supported a stronger and more comprehensive international Program of Action (PoA) than the one to which the conference parties finally agreed.1 But a potentially dominant coalition never properly mobilized. Moreover, the parties’ strong desire for consensus allowed a cluster of states— most notably the Arab League, the United States, and China—to block several important commitments. In light of this somewhat weak PoA, the value of the conference is open to debate. Was it worth all the effort? The 2001 UN Conference negotiating process reveals that complexity of issues to be addressed, and the resulting PoA reveals that key issues, such as controlling arms transfers and arms marking and tracing, require follow-up negotiation. Nevertheless, the Conference established important international principles and standards, providing a basis on which we can build. By organizing and fractionalizing the agenda for action, it focuses attention on areas for cooperative action as well as for further negotiation.