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Normative Disagreements and Choice of Legal Concepts .

The paper provides a commentary on the theses of the German jurist
Lorenz Kähler on the formation of legal concepts. The author eliminates truth-characterization of normative judgments because there are no justification for these judgments. However, if we consider normative judgments as one of the factors in the
choice of legal concepts in the formation of a legal text, then the subjects who find
themselves in a situation of disagreement on any of the concepts should refer to the
normative facts (values, reasons, and obligations). Therefore, by allowing this type of
disagreement, we implicitly accept normative realism as true. The author did not indicate what a normative anti-realist should refer to in controversial situations. Since
Lorenz Kähler himself is anti-realistic about normative facts, his position is either contradictory or not good elaborated for understanding.