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Is Determinism a Vacuous Doctrine?

The question as to whether the world is strictly deterministic has continually been of the highest interest to all thinking people. Some have insisted that future scientific developments are going to vindicate their belief in complete Laplacean determinism; others have argued that in the light of the results of contemporary physics, full determinism on a microscopic level can no longer be held to be true, while yet others have gone further and maintained that the universe is replete with random events on any level. As we know, however, Russell has argued that regardless what our universe is actually like, it is quite a trivial task to construct functions that will describe the behaviour of all the physical systems we have observed. All we need to do is compile a list of the corresponding values of any two variables of a given system and this will automatically furnish a mathematical function-which of course is likely to be rather complicated containing as many terms as the results to be accounted for, but which will be satisfied by all our data (Russell [19631). Are we thus to conclude that the doctrine of determinism, which does not rule out any conceivable state of affairs, is vacuous and therefore that the hundreds of papers debating its status are pointless? Or are we justified in believing that the questions of determinism is a substantial one, for we may-as apparently have hundreds of people who have written on the subject-simply ignore Russell on the assumption that he is wrong?