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Server-side detection of malware infection

We review the intertwined problems of malware and online fraud, and argue that the fact that service providers often are nancially responsible for fraud causes a relative lack of incentives for clients to manage their own security well. This suggests the need for a server-side tool to determine the security posture of clients before letting them transact.
 We introduce an exceedingly lightweight audit mechanism to address this need -- permitting for post-mortem infection analysis -- and prove its security properties based on standard cryptographic hardness assumptions. We describe a deployment architecture that aligns the incentives of participants in order to facilitate quick adoption and widespread use of the technology. Our approach is exible enough to protect even low-end computing devices like mobile handsets, which future malware will target heavily, but whose power and bandwidth limitations result in poor effectiveness for traditional anti-virus solutions.
 A contribution of independent potential value is the enabling of a centralized analysis of malware-related events, which promises to extend the power of detection in comparison to what today's decentralized paradigm allows.