{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.005925925925925926, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.201834862385321, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Strategic Delegation and Dynamic Competition

The separation of ownership and control in firms brings up the issue of how and what to delegate to managers. There exists a large body of literature that analyzes strategic delegation in which owners understand the incentives that managers face when they operate in imperfectly competitive product markets. In this paper we analyze strategic delegation under the assumption that firms operate in dynamic oligopolies. We derive the optimal strategic incentive in this setting and point out that the dynamic incentive can be replicated by a static one in which firms play a conjectural variations equilibrium in the output market.