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Bodies, Matter, Monads, and Things in Themselves

There is a tension in Leibniz’s mature metaphysics that has received considerable attention in the last several decades of scholarship. On the one hand, there are texts that support a phenomenalist reading, according to which bodies are simply the coordinated phenomena of minds. On the other hand, there are texts that support a realist reading, according to which bodies are aggregates of the real constituents of the world, monads. Likewise, there is a structurally similar tension in Kant’s metaphysics between “two world” and “one world” interpretations of transcendental idealism. This chapter develops an interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics that does justice to both his realism and his phenomenalism, and then shows how that interpretation can be applied to Kant’s transcendental idealism.