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The Construction of Ignorance and the Evolution of Knowledge

During the last few decades, scientific research conceived as the empirical pursuit of truth and objectivity has been put on trial. For many, scientific knowledge has lost its prestige, integrity, and quasi-transcendence, and has come to be variously considered as a set of rival incommensurable theories similar to ideologies and religions, unstable configurations of power and authority prone to irrational changes, or even fictions generated by self-delusion, if not deliberate deception. Landmark works in this critical process include those of Kuhn (1970), Popper (1972), Feyerabend (1975), and Lakatos (1978). Their criticisms have triggered many debates (e.g. Suppe 1977; Serres 1989) and have permeated our 'episteme' in more or less radical forms. Scholars from all fields have subsequently transferred these arguments from the natural to the social sciences (e.g. McCloskey 1986; White 1986), and, more generally, have questioned any intellectual endeavour inspired by the modern scientific ethos or modelled o...