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Generalizing square attack using side-channels of an AES implementation on an FPGA

We show how to attack an implementation of AES on an FPGA where all bytes are processed in parallel. We introduce a new way of retrieving information, mixing algebraic properties and physical observations. The attack is based on a generalization of the Square Attack. We focus on the electromagnetic side-channel, but our results are still valid for power consumption analysis as they reflect a global phenomenon inside the chip; and so, this contrasts with situations where eavesdroppers take advantage of local electromagnetic emanations.