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Prologue as Future: What Central Europe Needs to Do

History has tested Central European nations and states to the extreme. The revolutions of 1989 mark the third time in the 20th century that Central Europe has embarked on a political, economic, social, and defense and security "return to Europe." In the five years since the 1989-90 revolutions, Central Europeans have made enormous progress. If NATO follows its December 1994 mandate, it will draft a study that will establish criteria for expansion of the Alliance. While it is assumed that active participation in NACC and PFP, and some reasonable demonstration of the successful performance of democratic political institutions, privatized economies, and respect for human rights will be among the necessary conditions for NATO membership, it is also likely that effective civilian control of the military as well as some minimal degree of military capability and NATO compatibility will be necessary conditions. Though NATO will find it difficult to define these criteria because each state has its own history, culture, and unique set of institutions, it will be especially difficult to define and achieve consensus on what constitutes "effective" democratic control of the military. This study suggests the following four conditions for consideration as being necessary for a state to exert effective civilian oversight of the military; (1) The constitution and/or its amendments and laws must establish a clear division of authority between the president and government (prime minister and defense minister). The law should be clear for peacetime authority (e.g., who commands and controls the military and promotes military officers); and for crisis (e.g., emergency powers) and transition to war. (2) Parliament must exert oversight of the military by exercising control of the defense budget; also it's role must be clear in deploying armed forces in emergency and war. (3) The civilian defense ministry should exercise peacetime government control of the military (General Staff and military commanders) including preparation of the defense budget; access to intelligence; involvement in strategic planning, force structure development, arms acquisitions and deployments; and military promotions. (4) Citizen confidence in the military must be restored to the armed forces in order for them to be an effective institution. Society--having emerged from the communist period when the military was often used as an instrument of external or internal oppression--must perceive the armed forces to be under effective national control. Military training levels and equipment must also be sufficient to protect the state. If NATO comes to define these four conditions as necessary for exercising "effective" democratic control of the military, most Central European states would n o t meet these standards. When examining Central Europe's civil-military progress since the 1989 revolutions, it is clear that much has already been achieved. It is equally clear that much remains to be done! What Needs to Be Done? Poland: Government crises and lack of effective civilian oversight of the military will continue until Poland has adopted a new Constitution. Poland's civil-military crisis must be resolved because Polish society holds the military in very high esteem, and because the military has been often used for internal and external purposes historically. The absence of any clear command authority and of civilian control over the military is a recipe for disaster. Poland has come a long way in restoring prestige to the military; and Parliament has reassumed effective oversight of the defense budget, if it did twice equivocate on whether the president or defense minister controls the military and fail to reform the law. Onyszkiewicz began to restructure the armed forces to be compatible with NATO. Though Kolodziejczyk continued this process and stemmed the defense budget slide (since 1986), the military still has a way to go to achieve NATO compatibility. …