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Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics Timothy J. Colton Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979, pp. xi, 365

meticulous research is skillfully combined with his forceful analysis of both Hungarian society and the Communist party. He has succeeded in his attempt to keep the monograph well balanced. It is possible, however, to disagree with Kovrig's evaluation of Kadar. While Kovrig precisely characterizes the phenomenon of Kadarism, he maintains that Kadar was and is a faithful disciplined Communist apparatchik always leaning towards a centrist position between the hardliners and right-wing reformers. Yet, if Kadar were a mere centrist, could he have initiated, and quite intentionally at that, such a crucial systemic change as the recent transformation of Hungary's command economic system into a sui generis socialist market economy? And second, if Kadar were a mere apparatchik, he could not have intentionally replaced the (theoretically totalitarian) political system by a tolerant (and therefore bearable) liberalized authoritarianism which respects not only the private lives of citizens but their noncommitment as well. A more plausible explanation is that Kadar is a Machiavellian who mastered politics as the art of the possible. Within geopolitical limits, he was capable of winning a kind of contemporary Ausgleich for his nation despite all the odds he had to face after having made his fateful decision on November 4,1956. Without a defeated revolt, Kadarism could be judged as a mere political barter in which Hungary accepted a limited sovereignty for being allowed a kind of internal "Finlandization." After the 1956 defeat, however, Kadarism was perhaps the least of possible evils. That is why Kadar is a kind of statesman rather than an ordinary apparatchik.