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The Hegemony of Critique

Part IV turns to an extended engagement with the academic study of religion, which is often constitutively hostile to any form of theology. Chapter 13 concerns the role of “critique” in the academic study of religion, where “critique” is understood as a specific discourse—something more than mere criticism. Critique remains valuable, but in the contemporary religious studies academy, it has become hegemonic, to the point where it threatens to crowd out other equally legitimate methods of inquiry. Analytic theologians are well positioned to grasp the limitations of critique precisely because critique’s moves and methods are so different from those of analytic theology. I argue that the academic study of religion needs to supplement critical inquiry’s “epistemology of power” with a more analytic “epistemology of truth,” one that allows us to assess religious adherence as a form of rational behavior. At the same time, analytic theologians have much to learn from the tradition of critical inquiry.