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The National Effects of Subnational Representation: How Parties’ Access to Regional Parliaments Shapes National Elections

According to scholarly wisdom, party competition at the subnational level plays a negligible role in national elections. We provide theory and evidence that qualifies this view. Subnational elections determine entrance into subnational assemblies, which is accompanied by organizational resources. Since in most cases the same political actors compete at all levels of government, they can make use of region-specific resources to improve their status in national party competition. We test our argument employing the discontinuities generated by the five percent electoral threshold in German state elections. We find that parties that marginally cross the threshold for state parliamentary representation perform better in subsequent national elections in that state. We also present evidence regarding the mechanism: Consistent with organizational explanations, bottom-up effects take some time to materialize, are more pronounced where parliamentary parties receive more resources, and as a result of entering subnational parliament, state party organizations recruit more members.