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The Nature of Psychoanalytic Knowledge

EARLY TWO DECADES AGO the relationship of psychoN analysis to the philosophy of science was the subject of a published symposium (Hook, 1969). At that time psychoanalysts were placed on the defensive and were asked to prove that psychoanalysis was, as Freud had asserted, a science. Philosophers such as Ernest Nagle held to their unassailable positivistic doctrine that in order to qualify as science a theory must be able to be not only confirmed but also negated. Sidney Hook asked what kind of evidence psychoanalysts were prepared to accept that would lead them to declare that a given child did not have an Oedipus complex. In the absence of what the philosophers considered to be a definitive reply from the psychoanalysts, their general opinion of psychoanalysis could be summed up in Nagle’s state-