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Can Recession Feed Inflation? A Conflicting Claims Framework

Abstract This paper develops a rationale for the recession-induced inflation hypothesis. Within a conflicting claims framework we present a model in which both price leaders and organized workers set their nominal prices on the basis of a desired profit rate and a real wage target respectively. We argue that an absolute cost advantage in concentrated industries (for instance in fixed costs) may provide oligopolistic leaders sufficient margin to raise prices and restore a desired level of profitability during a recession. The resultizng unstable income distribution will set off an inflationary spiral if the firm's advantage in selling its output imparts an upward bias to the flexibility of input prices (specifically wages). Taking into consideration different scenarios for workers' bargaining power we present a simple simulation experiment to analyze the inflation and real wage paths of the economy after a negative output shock. When we endogenize output, we show that for a high degree of the bargaining power, output is likely to converge to a higher steady-state value.