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Duns Scotus's Third "Volitional Posture" and a Critique of the Problem of Moral Indifference in Our Time

Prior to Scotus,1 the question of the nature of the distinction between willing and nilling had remained essentially unasked, and the response, consequently, undeveloped. Until Scotus, it was taken for granted by theologians, almost universally, that goodness once considered must be willed, and evil once considered must be nilled—that is to say, actively rejected by the will. An object, like most objects, which is intrinsically good, but with some admixture of evil, some privation in itself, or some danger to the wilier, can be either