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Automated discovery systems and the inductivist controversy

Abstract The paper explores possible influences that some developments in the field of branches of AI, called automated discovery and machine learning systems, might have upon some aspects of the old debate between Francis Bacon’s inductivism and Karl Popper’s falsificationism. Donald Gillies facetiously calls this controversy ‘the duel of two English knights’, and claims, after some analysis of historical cases of discovery, that Baconian induction had been used in science very rarely, or not at all, although he argues that the situation has changed with the advent of machine learning systems. (Some clarification of terms machine learning and automated discovery is required here. The key idea of machine learning is that, given data with associated outcomes, software can be trained to make those associations in future cases which typically amounts to inducing some rules from individual cases classified by the experts. Automated discovery (also called machine discovery) deals with uncovering new knowledge that is valuable for human beings, and its key idea is that discovery is like other intellectual tasks and that the general idea of heuristic search in problem spaces applies also to discovery tasks. However, since machine learning systems discover (very low-level) regularities in data, throughout this paper I use the generic term automated discovery for both kinds of systems. I will elaborate on this later on). Gillies’s line of argument can be generalised: thanks to automated discovery systems, philosophers of science have at their disposal a new tool for empirically testing their philosophical hypotheses. Accordingly, in the paper, I will address the question, which of the two philosophical conceptions of scientific method is better vindicated in view of the successes and failures of systems developed within three major research programmes in the field: machine learning systems in the Turing tradition, normative theory of scientific discovery formulated by Herbert Simon’s group and the programme called HHNT, proposed by J. Holland, K. Holyoak, R. Nisbett and P. Thagard.