{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.015400410677618069, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 4.416666666666667, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Future People, the All Affected Principle, and the Limits of the Aggregation Model of Democracy

Contrary from what seems to be the received wisdom in political theory, there is no way that we can affect future people, at least not people who live several generations later than we do and who are not taken care of by our standard concern for our close descendants. This is good news for the all affected principle. The fact that we cannot involve future people in our present decision-making does not mean, then, that we have to depart from the requirements of the all affected principle. And this principle is natural to adopt if we conceive of democracy as a way of aggregating interests. So the principle remains a live option in that sphere of democratic theory. However, its role is limited by the fact that we have to make moral decisions about the future. Here an epistemic notion of democracy is more to the point than the idea of a method of aggregating interests.