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Book Review: Ramon Lull and Lullism in Fourteenth-Century France

supposition not only of Christian perfection but of all human values. The Spiritualist tendency of Olivi leads him to see Aristotelian philosophy as a threat not only to the gospel but to any philosophy of man. His is an extremely voluntaristic position worked out in a strongly polemic style. The will is a self-moving power and is not moved to act by something outside itself. S. presents a very brief statement of a number of other authors, but the burden of his argument is found in his treatment of Walter of Brügge, Peckham, and Olivi. The treatment sheds light on the position of Scotus in a new way, for it now becomes clear that the Scotistic position is not as radically new as it sometimes appears to be. Rather, it is rooted in a tradition the inner logic of which Scotus brings to a high point of coherence and articulation. Through the entire development we find the Franciscan concern for the will as an active force, an immanent power of self-determination in contrast with the Aristotelian view that sees the will as a passive potency brought to act from without. For the Aristotelians, the fundamental characteristic of spirit resides in its immateriality; for the Franciscans, it is to be found in its freedom. Thus, for Scotus, if man were endowed only with an intellect, he would be an intellectual animal, but an animal nonetheless. The true dignity of man lies in his power of self-determination. S. views this section of history as an exemplary case of the development of ideas. In an excellent final chapter he offers a summary of the main lines of development, indicating how the content of the Aristotelian terminology undergoes a radical change reflecting the different metaphysical position of the Franciscan School. Not only does such a study shed light on the Franciscan School itself, but it helps us gain new insights into the view of Aquinas, who approached the problem in a much different way. S.'s work reveals the thoroughness of methodology one has come to expect from the publications of the Grabmann Institute. This book is a much-needed addition to medieval research, filling out at least partially what had been a vast lacuna and thus helping to clarify more precisely the historical position of Scotus as well as that of Aquinas.