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Economic reform after the financial crisis: a critical assessment of institutional transition and transition costs in South Korea

This paper assesses the structural reform after the financial crisis in Korea by investigating its benefits and costs to the economy. It argues that Korea's rapid economic recovery in 1999–2000 was a Keynesian recovery, not a reform-led one. It also argues that, despite the fact that there has been a significant advancement in formal changes in institutions, economic costs arising from attempting a radical institutional transition have been unduly large. We attribute this disappointing performance mainly to the fact that the radical reform has created a vacuum in the risk-taking function in the economy and therefore resulted in a continued credit crunch in the corporate sector. The Korean case suggests the importance of diversity and incrementalism in designing institutional transition, rather than attempting to implement ‘global standard’ policies and institutions.