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Evolutionary Game Study on the Supervision Strategy in the Operation Phase of Green Public Buildings Based on System Dynamics Simulation

In the energy performance contracting (EPC) mode, an effective way to achieve green public buildings, the information asymmetry among stakeholders in the operation phase is critically adverse to the energy-saving effect of green public buildings. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model between energy users and energy-saving companies (ESCOs) in the operation phase of green public buildings under the premise of limited rationality. Vensim PLE software is used to build the corresponding simulation model to simulate the strategy evolution of players under different initial strategies. Typical scenarios with different government punishment, penalties from energy users, and opportunistic gains of ESCOs, respectively, are set up to conduct sensitivity analysis. The results show that dynamic alternation exists in the strategy evolution of players during the operation phase of green public buildings under the EPC mode, and it is influenced by the simulation period and players’ initial strategies. And the evolution in different typical scenarios is influenced by the aforementioned parameters with different significance. This study can provide a basis for the supervision strategy of ESCOs in the operation phase of green public buildings by local governments and energy users thus promoting the energy-saving operation of green public buildings for final carbon reduction.