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Nothing to Hide, Nothing to Fear?

Demand for surveillance technologies often assumes that these technologies would accurately identify those guilty of crimes and only those guilty of crimes. But how accurate are surveillance technologies as “diagnostic” tools? Surveillance technologies have not been tested for accuracy in the manner we expect for medical diagnostic technologies. Tests of medical technologies are designed to address sensitivity (How many of those affected by a disease does the test identify?) and specificity (How many unaffected by the disease does the test show as healthy?). Even for tests with more than 90% sensitivity and specificity, the majority of test positive results are false. Using value estimates for facial recognition and DNA identification, this article estimates the answers to these questions for crime surveillance technologies. The vast majority of test positive results would be false. In other words, even those of us with “nothing to hide” may have much to fear from crime surveillance technologies.