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The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses: Reply to Fitelson and Waterman

Fitelson and Waterman's ([2005]) principal objection to Strevens's ([2001]) Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses rests on a misinterpretation of Strevens's central claim about the negligibility of certain small probabilities. The present paper clarifies and proves a very general version of the claim. 1. The project2. Clarifications3. The negligibility argument4. Generalization and proof The project Clarifications The negligibility argument Generalization and proof