{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.015984405458089667, 'fraction_numerical': 0.016374269005847954, 'mean_word_length': 5.529262086513995, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Varieties of realism and their bearing on psychology

David Maree’s Realism and Psychological Science is an important piece of scholarship on the philosophy of scientific realism and its potential for improving psychological metatheory. The author has two principal objectives: to show that the images of psychological science provided by popular variants of positivist and social constructionist metatheory are myths; and to argue that a proper understanding of science is to be found in (the varieties of) scientific realist philosophy of science. Although the subject of considerable criticism, scientific realism remains that most favoured outlook in professional philosophy of science. It is also the tacit philosophy of most working scientists, perhaps including psychological scientists. Yet, scientists make little explicit use of realist metatheory in thinking about the nature of their disciplines. This is certainly true of psychology. Given this state of affairs, the author is to be commended for bringing psychologists into contact with scientific realism. The author outlines his book project in Chapter 1. In Chapter 2, he examines the methodological distinction between quantitative and qualitative research methods, arguing convincingly that the quantitative/qualitative divide is untenable, as is the tendency to accord it the status of competing paradigms. Chapter 3 critically examines the influential Scientist–Practitioner model in clinical psychology and the modifications that have been made to salvage its core belief that good clinicians should be both researchers and practitioners. The author canvasses the literature, which shows that this model is an unworkable ideal. At the same time, he reasonably criticizes this literature for ignoring relevant developments in mainstream philosophy of science. In Chapter 4, the author paves the way for embracing the philosophy of scientific realism by critically examining the metatheories of positivism and constructionism in their various forms. It is heartening to see him make constructive use of important scholarship in relation to both outlooks— something that is quite rare in theoretical psychology. Chapters 5 and 6 are given over to an examination of different versions of scientific realism and their relevance for psychological science; I briefly discuss their contents below. It is a pity that the book does not have a proper concluding chapter, nor an index. Given the wide-ranging nature of the 1063840 TAP0010.1177/09593543211063840Theory & PsychologyReview review-article2021