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Extended Cognition, Trust and Glue, and Knowledge

This chapter has two goals: one clarificatory and the other cautionary. The first clarificatory point is to draw attention to the way in which Clark’s conditions of trust and glue have figured into some of the arguments epistemologists have given for the implications of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC). The second cautionary point is to provide some new reasons for thinking that the conditions of trust and glue do not provide a plausible account of when cognitive processes extend. Also addressed are externalism, the philosophy of mind, and the work of such thinkers as Palermos, Carter, Kallestrup, and Pritchard.