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Memo on Positive Theory and the Study of Empire

In this respect, the claim made by some influential international-relations theorists that the primary axis of debate in international-relations theory is between “rationalists and constructivists” may be misleading. One can believe that significant elements of international politics are socially and historically contingent and deploy various forms of rational-choice analysis. The question of “constructivism versus rationalism” hinges, then, on a number of different considerations. For example: Does a given constructivist believe that the image of decision-making used in rationalchoice analysis is itself socially and historically contingent, and thus that rational-choice analysis unacceptably “naturalizes” a social fact? Does she believe that rational-choice analysis is somehow illsuited to study processes of social construction, and thus eschew its use in her own particular empirical investigations? Does she believe that the social-scientific foundations for rational-choice theory are inadequate, i.e., that as-is assumptions do not accord with human decision-making and that as-if approaches lack sustainable epistemological warrants? Too often these issues are subordinate to a general antipathy among constructivists to the formalism of positive perspectives. In turn, pragmatic considerations of the specific utility of rational-choice analysis get lost within, in essence, disciplinary posturing. My own view is largely pragmatic. Rational-choice analytics, like any attempt to cut into the complexity of social, political, and economic life, are more or less useful under certain circumstances. They paint an incomplete picture of politics—in this case international hierarchy— but this does not distinguish them from any other frame of inquiry. As should be clear from my own manuscript, my views on empire are profoundly shaped by positive approaches to hierarchy— including Alex Cooley’s and David Lake’s. For the purposes of discussion, I will take David Lake’s important and deeply insightful “relational contracting” approach as a touchstone for further reflection. One of the great advantages of Lake’s arguments about the formation of hierarchy in international politics is that they highlight—in very elegant ways—the incentives and conditions that might lead actors to opt for various forms of relational hierarchy. He specifies a set of utility curves relating to such factors as governance costs, fears of defection, and the specificity of assets that all actors face when they decide what kind of relationship of control they wish to pursue vis-avis other actors. He also has created spare typologies of different forms of international hierarchy. Regardless of the merits of his overarching arguments, the strength of his typologies alone has, in my view, “blown open” the study of hierarchy in international politics and will continue to shape the emerging research program on hierarchy in international-relations theory. On their own terms, his arguments concerning when actors will opt for various forms of hierarchy are very persuasive. The risks posed by his theories for future analysis of hierarchy are the same as any comprehensive rational-choice account: subsequent researchers may become so wedded