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Explaining Scientific Beliefs: The Rationalist's Strategy Re-examined

Boundary disputes within the academic world are as tiresome as anywhere else. But they can also be just as important. When intellectual and sociologically-minded historians argue about the need for social explanations of scientific beliefs, it is tempting to reply that the issue is one for empirical research, not philosophical debate. The type of explanation required depends on the nature of the case under investigation; it cannot be decided by fiat. This response, however, leaves unexplained the persistence of the dispute. Why is it that intellectual historians and most sociologists of science consider their view to be virtually self-evident, whereas sociologically-minded historians think it indisputable that social explanations are always required? The apparent incommensurability of the two viewpoints suggests that the debate is at least partially a conceptual one. Positions as radically divergent as these most probably reflect radically different ways of thinking about science.