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Globalisation and distributive justice: Evaluating the moral implications of coercion and cooperation in world trade

In recent years, there has been a move within political philosophy to steer a middle path between cosmopolitan (or globally egalitarian) and statist (or nationalist) accounts of the normative demands of global distributive justice (see e.g., Miller 2010; Vernon 2010). One of the motivations for this move has been the thought that if cosmopolitan accounts (Beitz 1999; Caney 2005; Moellendorf 2002) present us with too demanding an ideal, requiring us to do more to address existing economic inequalities between countries and across borders than is really justified, statist accounts (Miller 2007; Nagel 2005; Rawls 1999a) are not demanding enough. Many political philosophers have also found it dissatisfying that neither approach accommodates, or accommodates easily, the thought that globalisation bears on the content of our distributive ideal (rather than merely figuring as a factor to be weighed instrumentally when attempting to determine how this ideal might best be approached) (Julius 2006; Øverland 2013). Does it not make a difference to our moral evaluation of global inequality that some people are poor on account of losing to competition in newly integrated transnational markets, and others are poor despite their feverish labour to produce goods for the global affluent? Australian Journal of Political Science, 2014 Vol. 49, No. 2, 363–375, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2014.906563