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State Neutrality and Psychopharmacological Enhancement

In the article “State Neutrality and the Ethics of Human Enhancement Technologies,” the author John Basl (2010) introduces the principle of neutrality of justification, according to which policies are neutral with respect to justification when they are consistent with all reasonable conceptions of the good incorporated in a liberal society. Central to this text is the assumption that in those situations in which there are no neutral reasons for justifying any policy option under consideration, the state should take default policy positions. With regard to research on enhancement technologies involving nonhuman animals, the author characterizes the default policy position to be nonfunding and nonregulation. The aim of this commentary is to investigate the implications of the principle of neutrality of justification in the case of psychopharmacological enhancement, i.e., concerning the use of cognitive enhancers within society. In particular, it will reflect on the question of what might be legitimate reasons to override the default policy position of nonfunding and nonregulation. The principle of neutrality of justification clearly endorses individual autonomy, which undoubtedly is a basic assumption in the debate on cognitive enhancement. Individual autonomy—or cognitive liberty, as has been put forward by Wyre Sententia (2004)—implies the claim that it is up to the individual person to decide on whether or not to avail herself of psychopharmacological enhancers. Based on this, several authors argue against banning or criminalizing cognitive enhancement and for free access to brain-boosting drugs (Sententia 2004; Greely et al. 2008). So, with regard to the use of cognition-enhancing drugs within society, respect for individual autonomy and state neutrality seem to favor a condition dominated by the default policy position. In good accordance with this is the situation currently prevailing in several countries: Cognitive enhancers are taken clandestinely in a rather unregulated context. Most often, there are no regulations or policies concerning cognitive enhancement. In those cases where regulations exist, the current forms of illicit and off-label drug use are indicative of their weakness and of the difficulty to enact them. Although psychopharmacological enhancement seems to be rather widespread in the United States, in most countries it is not even known whether or to what extent psychopharmacological enhancers such as methylphenidate and modafinil are actually used in a given social context. In addition, currently, the short-term consequences as well as the long-term consequences of cognition-