{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.025423728813559324, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.752380952380952, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Learning and Diffusing the Lessons of Counterinsurgency: The U.S. Military from Vietnam to Iraq

Abstract The U.S. military entered the conflict in Iraq intellectually and organizationally unprepared for counterinsurgency, initially engaging in operations that were often counterproductive. The difficulties in learning and diffusing counterinsurgency strategy stems both from the complexity and poorly understood nature of counterinsurgency, and from the organizational identities of the U.S. armed forces, which lead them to focus on high-tech, mechanized warfare. This makes the learning of counterinsurgency techniques a cyclical process, with periods of “forgetting” following periods of rapid learning.