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Electoral Volatility and Turnout: Party Entry and Exit in Indian Elections

High levels of electoral volatility are common in new and developing-world democracies. In this article, we examine the implications of electoral volatility—more specifically, party entry and exit—on voter turnout. We hypothesize that new party entry should be associated with increases in turnout, as new parties mobilize previously apathetic voters through new party organizations and networks of canvassers. Further, we hypothesize that existing party exit should be associated with decreases in turnout as parties’ mobilization networks become dormant and cease contacting certain voters. We test these hypotheses on data from national elections in India from 1977 through 2004. Regression analysis using district-level fixed effects reveals consistent evidence in favor of our hypotheses. Furthermore, we find evidence suggesting that mobilization is, indeed, the link between party entry and exit and aggregate-level turnout.