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Endogenous Monopoly Market Segmentation

The standard monopoly pricing problem is re-considered when the buyer’s type (e.g. age, income, experience) can be credibly disclosed at some cost. In the optimal sales mechanism with costly disclosure, the seller posts a “sticker price” available to any buyer, as well as a schedule of discounts available to those who disclose certain types. Unambiguous welfare implications are available in the limiting case when the buyer’s type is fully informative. (i) The buyer is better off and the monopolist worse off when disclosure is more costly. (ii) When discounts are sufficiently rare, total welfare is strictly less than if the seller could not offer discounts.