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Is there any effect of market discipline on China’s bank supervision?

This study finds that implicit deposit insurance in the four original state banks, undermines market discipline and creates moral hazard. The differences of degree in market discipline in different banks depending on their ownership structure result from varying coverage by implicit deposit insurance. Chinese bank supervisory authorities should reform polices to enhance market discipline.