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The Metaethics of Belief: An Expressivist Reading of “The Will to Believe”

We argue that an expressivist interpretation of “The Will to Believe” provides a fruitful way of understanding this widely‐read but perplexing document. James approaches questions about our intellectual obligations from two quite different standpoints. He first defends an expressivist interpretation of judgments of intellectual obligation; they are “only expressions of our passional life”. Only then does James argue against evidentialism, and both his criticisms of Clifford and his defense of a more flexible ethics of belief presuppose this independently‐defended expressivism. James puts forward his ethics of belief as healthy or appropriate, rather than as correct.