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Moral Economy as Critique

Radical political economy aims to be critical not merely of rival economic theories, but of economic practice itself. Any critique presupposes critical standpoints, from which it can be argued that certain phenomena may be problematic in some respect. Inasmuch as radical political economy has declined, this is arguably a consequence not only of the decline of socialism and the rise of neoliberalism, but also of the fact that these have exposed the longstanding neglect of its critical standpoints. In this essay I review the potential of ‘moral economy’ for strengthening them. ‘Moral economy’ may sound like an oxymoron because economic behaviour is strongly associated with power and the pursuit of self-interest, and economic forces often act regardless of moral concerns. Nevertheless, all economic institutions are founded on norms defining rights and responsibilities that have legitimations (whether reasonable or unreasonable), require some moral behaviour of actors, and generate effects that have ethical implications. Moral norms are not merely conventions, but embody assumptions about what well-being consists in, and these can be evaluated. In abstract, normative terms, the point of economic activity is to enable us to live well, though in practice particular forms of economic organisation may be driven by other goals and have other effects, such as profit or the interests of men at the expense of women. I argue that political-economic analysis may claim to be ‘critical’ if, implicitly or explicitly, it shows that particular economic processes and forms of organisation are harmful to wellbeing or that actors’ understandings of them are inadequate. This involves relating morality to everyday life and the experience of well-being and ill-being without reducing it to a matter of individual subjectivity or social convention, as tends to happen in sociology and economics. It also implies a rejection of the reduction of critique to mere reflexivity or opposition to constraints, as in post-structuralism. I will focus on both old and recent moral economic literature incorporating (or consistent with) objectivist approaches to well-being, viewing it as an objective state which we fallibly seek to discover and create. Examples of this are Adam Smith’s approach to morality and economic life, John O’Neill’s New Political Economy, Vol. 12, No. 2, June 2007