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Short sight in extensive games

The paper introduces a class of games in extensive form where players take strategic decisions while not having access to the terminal histories of the game, hence being unable to solve it by standard backward induction. This class of games is studied along two directions: first, by providing an appropriate refinement of the subgame perfect equilibrium concept, a corresponding extension of the backward induction algorithm and an equilibrium existence theorem; second, by showing that these games are a well-behaved sub-class of a class of games with possibly unaware players recently studied in the literature.