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Volunteer Work, Inclusivity, and Social Equality

This chapter argues that current attempts in employment law to distinguish volunteers from employees on the basis of volunteer work’s civic, humanitarian, or charitable character are premised on overly narrow views of the moral significance of work. The chapter proposes that the law distinguish volunteer work from employment on the basis of the work’s merit inclusivity—inclusivity with respect to skill and ability. By offering people access to a broader range of social projects than their skills might offer in the labour market, merit inclusive volunteering opportunities can lessen the risk that skill and ability will confine people to particular social roles. Distinguishing volunteers from employees on the basis of merit inclusivity can thus create a more principled volunteer–employee legal boundary and can preserve legal space for work that lessens inegalitarian effects of the labour market on opportunities to participate in social life.