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INSTITUTIONAL VARIATION AND THE EFFECTS ON DISTRICT COMPETITION: THE CASE OF SOUTH KOREA

How do alterations in electoral rules shape competition? This article analyses district level competition in six legislative elections in South Korea (1988–2008) to identify whether Duvergerian pressures are restricting the number of competitors. South Korea provides a unique opportunity to analyse variation in mixed election rules, where seats are allocated in both single-member districts (SMDs) and a nationwide list by proportional representation (PR), as the country has used three different electoral formulas over the time period. Through quantitative analysis, evidence of a gradual reduction in the number of candidates is evident, despite a history of regional voting, thus resembling Duvergerian expectations.