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The Pot Blaming the Kettle : Bureaucratic Integration and Anticorruption in Chinese Provinces Qingjie Zeng

How to combat corruption while maintaining absolute power is a central dilemma facing rulers of authoritarian countries. External monitoring institutions such as independent judiciary and enforcement agencies are incompatible with the structure of authoritarian regimes, whose anti-corruption strategies are often limited to methods of oversight and control within bureaucratic organizations. This paper studies whether the one-party regime in China can employ top-down bureaucratic integration to achieve the intended effect of enhancing anticorruption effort. Using a variety of measures of anticorruption enforcement, the empirical analysis reveals little evidence that rotation or co-optation of provincial officials into the Politburo plays any part in strengthening anticorruption. Meanwhile, enforcement levels are higher in densely populated municipalities but lower in ethnic minority regions, showing the regime’s deep concerns about political stability. It is suggested that the failure of routine bureaucratic procedures to tackle corruption might be attributed to the prominent role of informal politics that conditions the operation of formal institutions.