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The End of Balance-of-Power Theory? A Comment on Wohlforth et al.'s `Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History'

The balance of power is one of the oldest and most venerable concepts in the study of International Relations. Few concepts have had a comparable influence on both scholarship and statesmanship, and few have been so fiercely contested. In a recent article, `Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History' (EJIR, June 2007), Wohlforth et al. set out to test balance-of-power theory against 2000 years of world history. Although their article has considerable merits, I highlight three main weaknesses in their approach. First, I argue that they misstate balance-of-power theory. Second, the competing theoretical hypotheses they offer are (a) not novel, (b) too vague to enable productive empirical testing. Third, the historical evidence they present, based on the study of ancient international systems, is too scant and impressionistic to be probative for the causal mechanisms they seek to evaluate. As a result, balance-of-power theory is neither refuted nor significantly refined.