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Inferring the Nature of Semantic Processes by Varying Priming Procedure: A Reply to Koivisto and Laine

Koivisto and Laine (2000, this issue, henceforth KL) describe two semantic priming experiments in support of a new theory of semantic processing across the cerebral hemispheres. According to the model, automatic meaning activation spreads only within the left hemisphere (LH), and the LH is needed to activate word meanings within the right hemisphere (RH). Next, a LH expectancy process focuses attention on relevant meanings and suppresses irrelevant meanings; as no such process is available to the RH, close and distant meanings remain activated there. If LH processing does not produce a coherent interpretation, then the RH integrates distant or unexpected meanings into the context. This is a provocative account, deserving careful scrutiny. KL report priming data using weakly related category members to support two premises of this theory: (1) when semantic priming occurs within the LVF/RH, this is attributable to postlexical semantic integration, and (2) when priming can be attributed to automatic meaning activation, it only occurs within the RVF/LH. I argue here that KL's data cannot support these claims.