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The RSA (Revenu de Solidarité Active) and Back‐To‐Work Incentives in France

Using an inventory of local and/or non-statutory transfers (droits connexes) in 13 French towns and cities, the article first measures the gains from returning to work for recipients of national, statutory means-tested benefits (Revenu minimum d'insertion— RMI, and Allocation parent isole— API) by type of household before 2009. The reforms of national, statutory benefits carried out during the 2000s, especially those affecting the working tax credit (Prime pour l'emploi— PPE), failed to ensure that the recipients of means-tested benefits always stood to gain financially from returning to work. The effects of the reforms were offset by the effects of other measures. The article then simulates the effects of the introduction of the Revenu de solidarite active (RSA) in place of the RMI in 2009, and takes into account the way that local and/or non-statutory transfers are modified by increases in national, statutory transfers. We observe that the RSA eliminates the financial disincentives to returning to work for almost all localities and types of household. The article shows that the marginal tax rate of 38 per cent chosen by the government is very close to the upper limit compatible with a back-to-work incentive.