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Review: (Sub)Urban Sexscapes

auspices. She investigates whether DRCOG’s ability to influence local land use choices is greater than MAPC’s because of the MPO function, which should theoretically mean that local governments have a greater incentive to pay attention to DRCOG decisions. DRCOG has developed a number of regional smart growth policies, such as the Mile High Compact among jurisdictions to adhere to voluntarily established urban growth boundaries. However, Rosan notes that while local governments engage extensively in DRCOG decision making, their decisions reflect consensus choices and localities still determine land use on a voluntary basis. The integrated COG and MPO functions of DRCOG may serve to elicit more engaged participation by localities than in Boston’s MAPC, but this stronger institutional structure does not result in binding decisions imposed on reluctant localities. Rosan’s assessment of Portland Metro indicates that its land use authority enhances its effectiveness considerably. But Rosan does not attribute this outcome to Metro’s ability to impose mandates unilaterally upon reluctant localities. Instead, Metro’s land use authority, which derives from stateimposed requirements for regional–local plan consistency determination, ensures that joint decision-making is taken seriously. Furthermore, through its MPO function, Portland Metro directs resources for joint land use-transport projects and programs, such as transit-oriented development tied to new transit provision. Rosan finds that, notwithstanding its land use authority, Portland Metro still must mobilize effective strategies linking regional and local goals and priorities. The absence of revenue-sharing in the region means that local development choices still often aim to maximize local rather than regional benefits. Portland Metro is able to be more effective than the Denver and Boston regional agencies not through mandates imposed from above, but rather through leveraging its authority to promote a more deliberative, engaged planning process that mobilizes resources to integrate and achieve local and regional interests and priorities simultaneously. In other words, Metro’s authority enables but does not guarantee more effective planning outcomes. These lessons are useful at a time when other states, such as California, are experimenting with new policy approaches to strengthen regional planning while preserving local home rule control of land use. Rosan makes a convincing case that old debates that pit collaborative, voluntary means of regional coordination against more assertive top–down regulatory approaches are somewhat misplaced. MPO and COG authority and capacity derive from a complex interplay of federal, state, regional, and local policies and processes. Many more state regulations and incentives condition local land use choices than only explicit COG or MPO authority provisions. Furthermore, state policies that support regional plan goals and connect regional and local plans can benefit localities, not just regions as a whole. Rosan’s book provides an excellent in-depth case study of MPO and COG governing capacity. Future work should expand upon her investigation and address remaining gaps in knowledge. Rosan’s small number of case studies did not allow for exploring variation within the three tiers of decision-making structures she investigated, namely, COG-only, COG-plus-MPO, and COG-MPO-plus-land use authority. She does not address certain factors that surely influence MPO dynamics, such as numbers of local governments within regions (for her case studies, the number ranges from 101 in the Boston region, to about half that number in the Denver region, and only about one-quarter in the Portland region). Also, she could have investigated and compared more thoroughly the effect of federal and state mandates and incentives affecting regional planning outcomes, from air quality responsibilities and public participation and environmental review requirements for MPO plans, to fiscal constraints and powers, such as tax increment financing authority, afforded to localities, and other state policies influencing local land use choices, such as affordable housing incentives and mandates, which vary across US states.