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EARLY CHRISTIAN ‘PHILOSOPHY’

‘immediately conscious of itself’, but that it can know itself only by way of a rational understanding of the external world. Since many readers of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations have taken him to say the former, most notably Augustine, the question about the meaning of a premise of a Ciceronian argument for the immortality of the rational soul suddenly becomes charged with historical and philosophical relevance (via Augustine’s influence on Descartes). This makes the chapter an exciting reading: is the mind transparent to itself? Wynne is able to make a very good case for his reading on philological and on philosophical grounds. But to what extent are we entitled to interpret Cicero’s – or indeed any ancient author’s – views about the rational soul as claims about the mind? Wynne is aware of the difficulty, refraining from translating Cicero’s terminology into ‘any contemporary language for the philosophy of mind’ (p. 200). Much remains to be done. This collection is highly commendable. It contains penetrating and sophisticated discussions of various themes of the Hellenistic debates about the soul and its relation to the body. It is representative of the best current research in the area and deepens our understanding of a period in the history of philosophy that remains intriguingly close and at the same time elusive to us.