{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.02631578947368421, 'fraction_numerical': 0.028130671506352088, 'mean_word_length': 5.684848484848485, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Safeguarding against Capital Account Crises: Unilateral, Regional and Multilateral Options for East Asia

Referring to the Mexican crisis of 1994–95 and the Thai crisis of 1997–98, Montiel (1999: 41) observed that ‘the similarities between Mexico and Thailand mattered much more than the differences, and the policy message from the two experiences is the same’. Two similarities stand out: devaluation seemed to trigger an outright financial and economic collapse; and recessionary impulses were transferred from ‘ground zero’ countries (Mexico and Thailand) to neighbouring countries. An important point underscored by these new financial crises is that sound macroeconomic policies and robust domestic financial systems are certainly necessary but clearly insufficient to make a country resistant to the effects of sharp reversals in capital flows of the type experienced by East Asia between 1996 and 1998. The severity of these crises, in terms of both depth and breadth, are important characteristics of ‘capital account’ crises. Stanley Fischer (2001a:2) recently made the following observation: