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Claus Mueller
Associate Professor*
Department of Sociology
Hunter College/City University of New York
New York, New York


Germany has a long tradition of relying on foreign labor, commencing

with Polish farm hands working on East Prussian estates in the late 19th
century.1 The German coal and steel industry could not have been built early in
the last century had workers who had migrated from Poland and Italy decided
not to stay in Germany. Between 1910 and 1920 there were about 1.2 million
immigrant workers in Germany and they constituted about two percent of the
population. The expansion of the Third Reich and the occupation and
exploitation of most of Europe was made possible by a large foreign labor
force reaching in August 1944, about one third of the German labor force.2
After World War II, the economic reliance on foreign labor continued into the
1950s prior to Turkey becoming a source of cheap labor, Italy provided
manpower to fuel the German economic miracle, the Wirtschaftswunder. As
distinct from the neutral term immigrants applied to workers coming to the
United States, the terms used by Germans are loaded and clearly denote
migrant workers as outsiders. Initially called Fremdarbeiter, or foreign/alien
workers, they were later labeled Gastarbeiter or guest workers, denoting in the
German meaning of the term, their alien or temporary status.
The issue of viewing Turkish immigrants as outsiders signals an
exceedingly volatile topic in Germany. At the core of this topic is a concern
with German national identity and how to deal with all foreigners, not just
Turkish immigrants. A number of policy strategies have been attempted,
including integrating the Turkish population into mainstream German society,
and limiting the number of immigrants entering Germany.
Integration itself is an interesting concept from German perspective.
Essentially, it means turning Turks into Germans. Pluralism or
multiculturalism has no say in the matter. The purpose of this paper is to raise
and discuss several important topics concerning the current German view of
integrating the Turkish community.

Work, Citizenship and Ethnicity

The Recruitment Agreement for Labor of 1961 assured a steady

supply of Turkish male laborers which had risen to close to one million of the
2.6 million foreign workers by 1973 when Germany entered a recession and
stopped importing immigrant labor. Contrary to the expectation that migrant
workers would return to Turkey, most decided to remain in Germany. All
policies adopted by the German government, including cash bonuses, failed to
induce their return to Turkey. Their failure to come home was not opposed by
the Turkish government since it alleviated high unemployment in Turkey, and
provided Turkey with a steady source of hard currency. As many Turks
working in Germany sent money home to their families.
Life in urban Germany appeared more comfortable than the rural
Anatolian countryside from which most migrant workers came. During the
second phase of the growth of the Turkish community in Germany, which
lasted until the early 1980s, family unification prevailed, resulting in a sizable
influx of spouses and children. The third and current phase denotes German-
born members of Turkish families. This includes spouses imported by young
Turks from mainly rural areas since Turkish women from local German
communities are considered to be too Western3.. Furthermore, there is the
politically motivated migration of Kurds from Turkey to Germany and some
illegal economic migration as well. To date, there are more Turks coming to
Germany than are leaving. In 2002, seventeen percent of German Turks were
born in Germany; fifty three percent came to Germany in the context of family
unification, and only thirty percent came to Germany as migrant workers 4 . In
late 2002, there were about 2.5 million Turks in Germany, by far the largest
and best established foreign group in Germany. The present Turkish
community in Germany includes first, second and third generation German
residents of Turkish origin of whom an estimated 500.000 hold a German
passport 5. In major Metropolitan areas, such as Frankfurt, the share of
foreign-born individuals is 28 percent of the residential population, with cities
such as Berlin, Cologne, Munich, and Stuttgart. The metropolitan belt of the
Ruhr region also shows a high proportion of foreigners among the resident
If Muslims from other nationalities are added, a total of 3.1 million
Muslims live among the residents of Germany, thus the country has, after
France, the largest concentration of Muslims outside their countries of origin.
In late 2002 the percentage of foreigners in Germany amounted to about nine
percent of the total population and was the second highest in the European
Union after Austria 6. This persistence of a large group of foreigners continues

despite their having an unemployment rate of 14.9 percent, which is twice as
high than the 8.8 rate experienced by ethnic German workers 7.
As of January 2000, the legal basis for citizenship has been modified.
Under the old law, ius sanguinis, citizenship was determined by biological
origin. Before the change about 100,000 children born each year in Germany
to foreign parents could not become German. The new but restrictive
regulations bestow citizenship without proof of German ancestry by the
applicant, though under cumbersome and bureaucratic rules. Thus children
whose parents are foreigners acquire automatic temporary German citizenship
if born in Germany, provided that at least one parent has lived legally in
Germany for eight years and has held the residential permit for unlimited stay
for at least three years. They also acquire the citizenship of their parents and
must decide at age of 23, which citizenship they prefer to hold. Like Austria,
Germany does not permit dual citizenship. A Turk who becomes a naturalized
German citizen must give up his Turkish passport. Apart from not
experiencing being German this is one of the principal reasons why relatively
few Turks start the process of becoming a German citizen. This reluctance was
reinforced, until 1996, by Turkish regulations depriving individuals of property
rights if they abandon their Turkish citizenship. Under Turkish law foreigners
can acquire but are not allowed to inherit property. Turks who become
Germans solved the problems by applying for pink cards from Turkish
authorities to preserve their rights to inherit, but these cards were not
automatically issued. Further, there is fear among Turks living in Germany of
having no place to live if conditions in Germany deteriorate. Thus by early
2002 only about 470,000 Turkish migrants held a German passport 8. A
loophole in this system was closed in 1997. Before that year, Turks desiring a
German passport would officially abandon their Turkish citizenship, become
German citizens and then reapply and receive their Turkish citizenship again.
In effect this meant having a dual citizenship. The Kohl government put an end
to that practice.
The official German governmental position on dual citizen ship
maintains that the goal of politics is not to create dual citizenships, a view
shared by the conservative opposition. Yet German-Turks are affected by it
and deplore the loss of their Turkish citizenship, which results from the new
regulations. As the President of the Federation of Turkish Communities in
Germany, Hakki Keskin suggested--the first and second generation Turks
living in Germany will not give up their Turkish citizenship since it is part of
their identity and the surrender of this identity cannot be legislated. Dual
citizenship continues therefore to be a central demand of the Turkish
community 9.

A second major point of friction is the religious factor. Though
German basic law assures the right of all children to publicly sponsored
religious education, such education is only provided to Catholic and Protestant
and, as of late, to some Jewish pupils. In 1987, the Islamic Federation of
Berlin applied for permission to provide religious instruction in some public
schools. It took more than twenty years to move the claim through the German
legal system until the highest administrative court decided in favor of the
Federation. Today in spite of this decision, there are only a few German public
schools in Berlin offering religious education to Muslim students. Throughout
Germany, virtually every Muslim student receives such training outside the
school setting. Similar unequal treatment can be observed in other ethnic
areas. German agencies do not provide financial support to the numerous self-
help organizations, social service agencies, and other nonprofit groups
operated by and for Turkish migrants. Since the Muslim faith has no legal
status in Germany compared to other major denominations for which the state
collects church taxes, Muslim religious communities are not entitled to such
service or public subsidies. The Suessmuth Commission suggested that the
introduction of regular Islamic courses in German represents an important step
toward equal treatment compared to the already established religious
communities in the area of schools offering general education.... the Islamic
religious courses play an important role in sustaining the identities of Muslim
children and young people growing up here.10 Needless to say, religious
instruction in German schools serves the goal of integration better than
instruction in the Turkish language in private Koran schools. Such schools
escape state supervision and their instruction would not be understood anyhow
since very few German teachers have a working command of the Turkish
language. This is also tied to the fact that Koran schools, as Islamic
organizations, are not recognized under corporate law.
The failure of legally acknowledging the Muslim faith is in part caused
by the fragmented nature of the Muslim communities in Germany. There
seems to be no internal common denominator among the 2,400 mosques in
Germany. They represent many different religious orientations of the Sunni
and Allevite branches of Islam. More significant, however, is the widely held
view that the Muslim faith cannot be reconciled with Western traditions, that
public support for Muslim institutions would foster separatist tendencies and
possibly fundamentalism. Ironically, the opposite may apply. Once recognized
as a legitimate religious faith, fiscal support for mosque affiliated Turkish
communities and self-help organizations can set in. Such fiscal support could
in turn serve to support the peaceful economic integration of Turkish migrants
and their descendent into German society and remove the foreign stigma
from their faith.

As in France and the United Kingdom, where more Muslims attend
services in the mosques than British citizens do in the High Church of
England, there is a gradual process of Islamization taking place among the 3.2
million Muslims living in Germany today. For young Turks who joined their
families during the second phase, the period of family unification, the Muslim
faith can compensate for the declining attachment to the Turkish state and
relatively weak link to Germany and help shape a sense of identity and meet
the desire for a sense of community among German-Turks. The third
generation, young Turks who were born in Germany and are better educated
than the other generations, perceives and experiences more acutely
discrimination, and the status of being outsiders. They can achieve a sense of
belonging to a community by joining a local mosque. This possibility is
enhanced by the umma , (the community of Muslims) principle, unknown in
other denominations: a Muslim can join any mosque and benefit from the
services it provides.
Lastly, age plays a role since the longer the German-Turk lives in
Germany, the more likely it is that he embraces religion. 11. It should also be
noted that the German Turks consider religion much more frequently as an
important factor in their lives than do native Germans from the same age
Certainly the number of fundamentalists totally rejecting integration
into Western societies is very low. Most German-Turks aspire to economic
integration and access to employment, housing and other social service. A
desire quest for cultural and social integration is the least of their concerns. As
Cem Ozdemir a former member of the German parliament views it, as long as
Muslims respect the German constitution, speak a bit of the language and
accept the values of society, which are universal and not specifically Christian,
their readiness to fit in should not be questioned. 12 Cultural and social
integration have become relevant for upscale Turkish migrants, but it is of
secondary importance for most Turks with low incomes and for those who are
part of the underclass in Germany. Listening to Mozart and reading Schiller
would appear strange to the more than forty percent of the adult male Turkish
population in Berlin who are unemployed. The same holds for the German
lower class, though conservative politicians never suggested that it adopt the
German Leitkultur. Culture cannot be a top down proposition and attempts to
do so will fail, as the French experience with Andre Malrauxs maison de la
culture showed.
The ethnic networks within which most Turks in Germany are
embedded play a significant role. They are constituted by a frequently well
functioning extended family, the ethnic neighborhood, community based

groups, self-help organizations, and the mosque. In the Ruhr valley of North
Rhine Westphalia, a major industrial state with a declining industrial base and
a large migrant minority group, more than one-in five hundred self help
organizations serve the half million Turks living in the area.13 These networks
serve to reinforce the foreign, that is to say Turkish identity, specifically for
those who cannot and do not want to become integrated into German
institutions. The positive functions of this ethnic network are generally not
covered by the German media.
Rather there is a media obsession with the Turkish family, depicted
negatively with its traditional, repressive, and collectivistic aspects which
cannot be reconciled with the individualism associated with the fragmented
German nuclear family. The frequently extended but much maligned Turkish
family has more stability than the German family, if the large number of
children, low divorce rates, and the solidity of marriage are the principal
organizing elements used in making such judgments.
The stigma of being a Turkish migrant follows the low acceptance
public opinion accords to German Turks and to those seeking asylum in
Germany, whereas, individuals from member nations of the European Union
do not face this kind of negative stigma. As Andreas Goldberg observes,
through 1996 there has been a rise in the public approval of discrimination of
non-EU foreigners German-Turks. Close to half of the German population
would outlaw immigration and consider foreigners a burden on the German
welfare system, forty percent believe that foreign workers cause
unemployment for German workers, thirty percent would deport foreign
workers in periods of recession and outlaw any political activity in which they
are engaged, and twenty percent would make marriages between Germans and
Turks illegal. 14 Compared to other ethnic immigrant groups, such as Greek,
Italian, Yugoslav, and East European nationals, Turks fare worst in terms of
negative evaluations and attributions.
In light of economic deprivation and discrimination, it is not surprising
that Turkish immigrants in Germany and members of their families assert their
identities both as Turks and as Muslims. They also express their attraction to
the services provided by multiple Islamic organizations even if they were born
in Germany. These Mosque-affiliated groups offer housing, employment,
education and leisure services, which Turks have a difficult time accessing in
the larger German community. That these organizations do not emphasize
integration comes as no surprise. After all, the average German cannot
reconcile integration because foreigners have the label of an Auslaender, and
are also different in terms of appearance and lifestyles. Further, the largest
agency providing services to Turkish immigrants is a Turkish governmental
agency, the DITIB, the Turkish Islamic Union of the Institution for Religion.

It is part of the Turkish government's office for religious affairs and provides
most of the Imams teaching the Koran in Islamic communities. As the
Economist notes ...the DITIB does not do much for integration. On the
contrary, since its main concern is the pursuit of Turkeys national interest, it
encourages Turks in Germany to think of themselves as Turks. 15

Ethnic Politics in Germany

To date, no major political party has openly played the ethnic hand in
federal elections. As the last federal elections in Germany in 2002 showed, few
substantive issues were articulated, such as economic growth, foreign policies,
and the environment. Ethnic issues were kept in the background, though they
are played out at the state and local level. Small right wing parties openly
appeal to anti-foreigner sentiments and have lost about one million voters in
the September 2002 Federal elections.
Even state level electoral results are contradictory. In North Rhine
Westphalia, attempts to capitalize on perceived anti-Israeli sentiments by a
senior political leader of the Liberals, the FDP, proved counter-productive.
Also counter-productive was the conservative CDU Slogan Kinder statt Inder
(children instead of Indians) used in a prior local campaign in this state. The
slogan, slyly suggested that computer experts from India working in Germany
may deprive German children from attaining such jobs. Yet the center-right
Christian Democrats successfully mobilized political resentment against
foreigners in 1999 in the state of Hessen, capitalizing on the widely shared
view in Germany that there are already too many foreigners living there.
Germany, like Austria, does not grant dual citizenship and makes
obtaining German citizenship difficult. Attempts to change the citizenship
policy by the current government were defeated by the Christian Democratic
opposition with the influential Bavarian Christian Social Union pushing for the
exclusion of Turkey from the European Union part of their party platform. For
Cem Oezdemir, the interpretation of the European Union as Christian-
European, reflects traces of racism according to the motto ....the Turk as an
old Barbarian is not suited for democracy and civil rights.16 This resentment
is by no means restricted to the older generations. Thus Stefan Gaitanides
refers to 61 percent of the youth interviewed in the representative annual Shell
study as reporting that the number of foreigners is too high. Other indicators
cited for the general German resentment of foreigners in their country are the
rejection of higher immigration rates, the refusal of the dual citizenship system
noted earlier, and the hostile reaction to the principle of cultural pluralism by a
large proportion of the population. 17

Another widely shared belief by conservatives before it was slowly
dropped is the notion of a Leitkultur (defining or guiding culture). This
Leitkultur, covering knowledge of the principal components of German
culture, ranging from Mozart to Schiller though not necessarily Marx, was
supposed to guide the integration of migrant workers. The concept conveys
the notion of a society with cultural homogeneity in contrast to the idea of a
multi-cultural society with ethnic and/or religious configurations shaping
components of an individuals identity. In a multi-cultural society various
groups can co-exist with the integrating component provided not through
culture but through adherence to universally valid principles, such as those
embodied in a democratic social system. Whereas multi-culturalism allows for
the further differentiation of ones culture, a German Leitkultur would have the
goal of cultural assimilation. Multi-culturalism would accord equal status to or
at least tolerate alien religions and cultural formations compared to the
dominant German culture. It goes without saying that such acceptance of
Islam and Arab music is difficult for most Germans who are raised in the
Christian occident tradition, the christliches Abendland.
Germanys view of foreigners is exacerbated by the traditional
economic West-East divide, which unification failed to bridge. Whereas
individuals living in West Germany had limited experience of post-war
democracy, the East German population never experienced such a democratic
political system. Overt racism and violent acts against foreigners were strictly
controlled in the old socialist regime. Certainly, xenophobic tendencies can be
observed in both parts of Germany, but hatred of and open acts of violence
against foreigners are much more common in East Germany than in West
Germany; which is somewhat ironic because few foreigners actually live in
East Germany. These conditions are also fueled by a peculiar historically
rooted German phenomenon: self-hatred and hatred of Germany as a nation.
As Thomas Schmid pointed out The hatred of foreigners stalking Germany
today has also to do with the traditional German hatred of themselves and of
each other. Because the Germans have not yet come to terms with themselves
[as Germans] they cannot come to terms with foreigners.18 The constrained
integration of German speaking Dukedoms and Principalities under Prussia,
guided by the iron chancellor Bismarck in 1871 did not generate a strong
sense of nationhood. Whatever nation-building was able to achieve, sentiments
in the fifteen years of the Weimar Republic was tainted by the atrocities of the
Third Reich and World War II.
The ongoing East-West German schism aggravates the problem.
Germans residing in the old states, the Wessies (West Germans) have a hard
time accepting those from the new States, the Ossies (East Germans). If both

groups have the commonly observed wall in their heads [Mauer im Kopf], a
sentiment running in both directions, how can it be expected that Germans
would move beyond the mere toleration of foreigners speaking German with
an accent and limited comprehension of German culture?. Integration assumes
that a society is open and characterized by tolerance of divergent life styles. In
short, that there is a collective conscious and acceptance of multi-culturalism.
Unfortunately, this is not case in present day Germany.

Immigration as an Economic Necessity

As distinct from the high birth rate in the Turkish communities where
two thirds of the members are less than 40 years old and the nuclear family
structure is fairly stable, German families appear to be fragmented with
birthrates far below the replacement rate. The average German-Turkish family
has more than three children, its native German counterpart barely one. At the
current birthrate of about one child per family, Germanys current population
of 82 million will fall to less than 60 million by the year 2050. In addition, the
drastic aging of the German population will have dire consequences for the
social security system. To use the words of the Governor of Saarland, Peter
Mueller, Germany is steering into a demographic catastrophe. The
workforce is estimated to shrink from 41 to 26 million, a development which
will lead to the collapse of the pension system unless steps are taken to
replenish the labor force. 19 Put differently, for advanced industrial societies
with a high level of medical care, a reproduction rate of 2.1 live birth per
female is necessary. In Germany that rate has declined to 1.3 and mirrors the
tendency in most European countries.20 Globalization could solve the problem
if the relatively free flow of money and information were accompanied by a
free movement of labor and if transnational migration were facilitated by the
rise of trade zones and the suspension of national borders. However, these
conditions have not transpired. Globalization appears to generate restrictions
on the movement of labor.
Fostering immigration will have to be an essential part of German labor
policies. Some steps have been taken in this direction by the coalition
government of environmentalist and social democrats. Thus Germanys green
card system permits selective immigration for highly skilled labor from the
information and communication technology sectors. In spite of unemployment
rates running close to ten percent, Germany has more than 1.7 million open
positions which cannot be filled, including a shortage of knowledge workers
estimated to be as high as 440,000 (21). Though backed by the trade unions,
industry federations, and other major German lobbies, enabling green card

legislation by the government was fiercely opposed by the opposition
CDU/CSU parties, though the legislation passed in August 2000.
Given the restrictions attached to the card, by April 2001 only 6,200
green cards had been issued, which was far below the goal of 20,000 permits
the quota permitted.21 The constraints of the card included limitation of the
work period to five years, the exclusion of spouses, and the required
possession of a university diploma. If the applicant lacked a University
diploma he must prove that his past income amounted to at least $50,000, a
rather steep figure for individuals from the Third World. Though Germany is
the European country most in need for knowledge workers, she is not a
favorite work destination for skilled professionals. Germany remains a country
of last choice or a transit station on the way to the United States, Canada, and
France, Scandinavia, the United Kingdom or other countries that are more
adept in competing for the scarce resource of knowledge professionals.
Furthermore, foreign knowledge workers residing temporarily in Germany are
not the only ones to leave. According to estimates by the Federal Department
of Research, about twenty percent of recent native German university
graduates with doctoral degrees are leaving Germany mostly for the United
States, and frequently without the intention of returning.22
A law based on the green card experiment which opens up Germany to
more skilled workers and makes residence easier to obtain for foreign students
and self-employed migrants, was passed by the lower house but was
overturned by the court in response to suits filed by opposition parties. What is
striking is the political failure by German conservative parties and most of the
population to realize that economic growth for most advanced industrial
societies is tied to a successful immigration policy. The United States which
has been receiving one million legal and illegal immigrants per year (though
immigrant labor is also a hotly debated topic) has been having a higher
economic growth over the last ten years than advanced industrial European
countries, and is certainly more successful in attracting and retaining
knowledge workers than Germany. Nonetheless, Stephen Baker estimates that
there will be labor shortages in the United States by the year 2010, and
suggests that Germany must increase the number of immigrants twenty fold 23
in order to avoid an implosion into a geriatric society and offset low birthrates.
It seems that without sharply increasing immigration Germany will continue
having a permanent recession.
Given the popular ignorance of these facts and the reluctance of
politicians to speak up it comes as no surprise that most surveys report the
majority of Germans believe that Germany has too many foreigners. Certainly,
there is a high concentration of foreigners in German metropolitan areas which
may prompt this view. For those who have applied for asylum, processing

takes about one year during which the applicant cannot work and must stay in
the town to which he is assigned, thus reinforcing the stereotype of the lazy
alien taking advantage of the German welfare state. It is estimated that in
addition to the 3.4 million non-German nationals, there are about one million
undocumented alienshence, illegal migrants living primarily in major
metropolitan German centers (compared to an estimated 3 - 6 million illegal
immigrants in the USA).
The visible presence if foreigners, Germanys economic problems, and
the failure of the political system to communicate to the public the important
economic need for foreign labor have contributed to distrust and resentment of
migrant groups, which are reinforced by the recent events of terrorism carried
out by Muslims. It is a truism that trust and positive sentiments toward aliens
are difficult to build in an atmosphere of fear and anxiety. German observers
and officials were critical of U.S. politicians and government officials
maintaining the sense of crisis and impending disaster through constant
warnings of imminent terrorist acts, the preventive imprisonment of hundreds
of Muslims, and the curtailment of civil liberties. German officials
downplayed the terrorist threat and were skeptical of U.S. claims. Yet since
the murder of numerous German tourists and the abduction of others by
alleged terrorists in Tunisia and Indonesia, German officials now propagate
Germany as a likely target of terrorist threats. Against the background of a
deteriorating economy, such threats indirectly foster fear of radical Muslims
among the German population and the general perception that foreigners are
potentially a menace.
Specifically, among those coming from the elusive yet powerfully
entrenched background of a Christliches Abendland there is a fear and latent
distrust of foreigners. This Christian Occident is for most Germans
synonymous with Western culture. Friedrich Merz, the former whip of the
Christian Democratic Union, suggested that immigrants assimilate to the
German Leitkultur, or guiding culture. The wide discussion of this Leitkultur
emphasizing the difference between migrant workers and Germans struck a
chord and added to latent dislike of the aliens. Though there have been
numerous federal initiatives enacted since September 11, 2000 to minimize
radicalization of Muslim communities and foster cooperation between ethnic
groups, it remains to be seen if these initiatives will be effective. Similar to the
popular press in the United States, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center were presented in the German media as an attack on Western
civilization. As numerous incidents indicate, relations between the Turkish
and German communities have deteriorated ever since. 24

Violence against foreigners has frequently erupted in Eastern Germany.
Such strategies are fed by resentments about unemployment, which runs at
twice the West German rate, and wages that are lower than those in West
Germany. Ironically, similarly to Turks in Germany, East Germans have a
sense of being politically or economically second-rate citizens since they had
little control over the political order imposed on them and tend to lack the
economic clout of West Germans. What happened in Germany can be
observed in most of Europe. A right wing drift and rise of xenophobia can be
found in most European countries since the golden age of European prosperity
came to a dead halt in the late eighties. This vast social drift was fueled by the
prospect of massive immigration from East European countries after the break
down of communism in 1989 and its implicit threat to what remains socially
and economically in Europe. Such perceived apprehension is tied to the
Eastward expansion of the European Union and the fear of cheap labor
flooding into Western Europe.25
Most Turks living in Germany are gainfully employed. Those without
work are better off than living unemployed in Turkey, and have an optimistic
view of the future. Nonetheless, up to 75 percent feel they are treated like
second-class citizens and consider the equal treatment of all foreigners as their
principal political goal.26 Also adding to the sense of alienation among
migrant Turkish labor is that virtually all other foreign born groups have better
legal status. Among the groups enjoying a better legal and socio-economic
standing, are political refugees, individuals displaced by violent conflicts,
those seeking asylum, millions of individuals from East European countries
with German origin due to a distant ancestor (based on the ius sanguinis), and
about 1.8 million individuals with passports from European Union member
states. There is the stark contrast between the third generation Turk who
speaks fluent German but could not become a German citizen until fairly
recently, and the third generation German from Russia without any knowledge
of German who was able to receive instant citizenship and access to all
services of the German welfare state until German authorities imposed a
language requirement in the mid nineties. Whereas Germans spent about $ 1.5
billion in 1997 to ensure integration of the 3 million ethnic Germans, funding
for the integration of German-Turks fell far below the billions spent on ethnic
Germans. The same holds for German language training. In 2000, about $150
million were used for that purpose, primarily for ethnic Germans and Jewish
immigrants with virtually no significant amount spent on Turks. Yet,
according to the federal secretary for foreigners, meeting the language needs of
that group alone will require close to $600 million a year.

Educational Barriers

Compared to German youth, many young Turks in Germany are more

likely to grow up marginalized in an economically deprived environment with
restricted educational opportunities and a limited command of the German
language. Turks in Germany, more than any other ethnic group, have been hit
by the pervasive German recession and experienced declines in their living
standards. For the young German Turk, including those from families who
have been in Germany for three generations, the most important issue is
unemployment; they have a hard time competing with young Germans. Above
and beyond the discrimination to which they are exposed, there is the
accumulation of educational deprivations impacting their fate. Specifically,
linguistic deficiencies have been identified as a major factor reinforced by a
German school system and regulations that do not adapt to the needs of
Turkish children. Though the Turks are the single largest minority group in
Germany, and constitute the majority of the population in many school
districts, there are currently few German teachers who are proficient in the
Turkish language. There are no large scale initiatives to establish a bilingual
educational system or language programs for German-Turkish students and
their parents.
In many Turkish communities in Germany, German is not often
spoken. A Turk who is a legal resident in Germany, even if naturalized, and
fetches a bride from Turkey, will see his spouse moored at home for one year
before she can apply for a work permit. This means she will spend most of her
time at home, watching Turkish television programs transmitted via satellite;
she will virtually have no exposure to Germans and their language. Given the
recession in Germany, such a process is likely to continue for a couple of years
when she has children. The children in turn will spend their formative years
consuming Turkish television programs. To a large extent it is vicious cycle.
Young Turks whose parents are un- or underemployed do not have
sufficient opportunities to engage in upward mobility and enjoy the good
western life, as defined by more consumption and more leisure time. Rather,
lacking economic independence, they are forced into a dependency relation
with their families and the larger Turkish community that serves as their
support system. It is little wonder than that in the recent study Life Worlds:
German Turks 2002" the family was ranked highest in the values held by
Turks, followed by the desire for true friendship, and a satisfying occupation.
As distinct from Germans the value of an exciting life did not score high
among German-Turks.27 The long taken for granted German mantra of Kinder,
Kueche, Kirche (children, kitchen, church) and its consequences no longer

holds for most young Germans, and is more suitable to apply to the Turkish
community in Germany.
More than 75 percent of the students in basic primary schools in major
metropolitan areas, such as Berlin and the Ruhr Valley metropolitan belt where
Turkish communities tend to concentrate, are of Turkish origin. Most of the
first-graders do not master the German language since they grew up in settings
where Turkish was mostly spoken. In Kreuzberg, a district in Berlin, 63
percent of all children born to foreign parents do not speak a single word of
German when they enter the first year of school. Also, four out of five Turkish
first-graders have no knowledge of German, which severely hampers their
ability learn in German schools.28 Eighty percent of their parents cannot
participate in parent teacher conferences since their command of German is too
limited. This linguistic deficit is rarely overcome in the school setting and is
therefore a significant barrier for students to acquire knowledge in other
subject areas. Though the powerful narrowing of life chances through
restricted language command is obvious, and had been demonstrated by Basil
Bernstein and other socio-linguists long ago, the German educational
establishment did not focus on the language problem of the Turkish
community until after the publication of the infamous PISA study.
Close to fifty percent of all foreign students attend schools which do
not allow them, after graduation, to continue training in advanced schools.
Only 20 percent of German students graduate from those schools. Further, the
drop out rate among Turkish students is much higher than among German
students. Even Turkish students who graduate find it difficult to enter the trade
apprenticeship system practiced in Germany, which combines onsite skills
training for three years with mandatory education in a vocational school. Thus,
40 percent of all Turkish school graduates do not succeed in getting
occupational training compared to eight percent of German students.
The linguistic divide shapes the scholastic progress. In the basic
primary schools, about 12 percent of all students are of foreign origin. By the
time students reach the academic high school, the Gymnasium, the percentage
has melted to about four. Moreover, there is a severe under-representation of
Turkish students in the university system for which an Abitur, or academic
high school certificate, is mandatory.29 In the recessive economy of
contemporary Germany with its ample supply of labor, the Abitur has become
a prerequisite for apprenticeships in white collar occupations. But of the small
percentage of Turks with the academic high school certificate not one had
secured, in 2003, an entry level position with the largest German bank, the
Deutsche Bank.30

What contributes to these conditions is the German educational system.
Children start schooling at the age of six or seven while in most other
European countries children start schooling at least one year earlier. Children
from migrant families in Germany tend to start later since they are retained in
earlier grades for academic reasons. In these circumstances, social factors
seem to be compounded by ethnic factors. Recent research on children in
some Berlin school districts revealed that two-thirds of the children from
disadvantaged families require supplementary language training since their
German was deficient. However, whereas one-half of disadvantaged German
children required more training, an amazing 90 percent of children from
migrant families need such help.31
It is little wonder that Germany falls well below the average of
advanced industrial societies in comparative educational studies such as
PISA.32 To quote the Spiegel magazine, The proportion of extremely weak
students is especially high as is the disparity between extremely high and
correlation between social origin and scholastic achievement. Whereas 50
school [Gymnasium] only ten percent comes from the working class.33
Needless to add, the structural underachievement of minority students played a
significant part in Germany scoring so poorly.
In light of the above, the 2001 report by the Independent Commission
on Migration headed by Rita Suessmuth, suggested the need for urgent reform
in the education and training policy areas. To improve the educational and
linguistic standing of migrant populations and to facilitate their integration,
specific measures were proposed including mandatory language training in
German with costs to be borne in part by immigrant, participation in the
education and vocational training system for the young, more immediate
access to the labor market for those likely to gain permanent residency, greater
engagement of the public service in the training of immigrants, and assistance
programs for self-employment among foreigners.34

A Parallel Society

It is suggestive but not accurate to use the term ghettoization for the
Turkish communities in Germany. To begin with, there is no forced residential
segregation of the Turkish population, and their communities have a
transparency and dynamism absent from ghetto settings. They permit exchange
and interactions with the larger society in which they are embedded. Apart

from the work setting, there are cultural and social isolation, vis a vis German
society, but such isolation can also be observed among German blue-collar
workers or the German underclass. What is more significant is the withdrawal
into traditional cultural and, sometimes, religious values. Thus, there is a Back
to the Turkish Roots phenomenon as exhibited by the increasing number of
young Turks from Germany who get their spouses from Turkey and the low
rate of marriages between a Turkish and a German, hovering around five
If inter-marriage is taken as an indicator for integration, Turks in
Germany are probably the least integrated group. The micro census of 1995
revealed that 98 percent of married Turkish women and 95 percent of all
married Turkish men had partners from the same nationality. Equally
significant is the divorce phenomenon involving mixed marriages between a
German and a foreign spouse. Data from the 1991-1995 period show that
couples involving a Turkish and a German partner have the highest divorce
rates compared to couples with a Yugoslav, Greek, Italian, Greek or Spanish
partner. Thus, 63.8% of all German women married to a Turkish man will
seek a divorce, and 31.2% of all German men are married to a Turkish woman.
Divergent life styles as reflected in cultural and religious differences
apparently doom many of these marriages to failure.35
These findings conform to data about inter-generational socialization.
There is an amazing high synchronization of intergenerational values, with
young Turks reporting that their values and normative orientations are identical
to those of their parents. Martina Sauer reports from a representative survey
that only four percent of young Turks aged 18-29 enumerate values conflicting
with their parents orientation. More than ninety percent of those identified as
having traditional values come from families sharing these values.36
The return to the roots, or what has been aptly called Euro Turkism is
a functional adaptation to socio-economic and cultural factors that lead to
marginalization and discrimination by and from the German society. This
process is reinforced by linguistic factors that limit social interaction or
integration between Turks and Germans, especially in leisure activities.37
Numerous studies report that primary interaction takes place within the context
of the extended family, followed by contacts in the neighborhood. Being
meshed into Turkish culture communities, with very few identifying
themselves as German and most expressing religious affiliation, many Turks
live in a context that structurally inhibits social interaction outside the
High unemployment rates contribute to isolation from the German
community and withdrawal to the Turkish community. Thus, unemployment
among Turkish adults is about 22 percent. In 2001, 40 percent of Turkish

males residing in Berlin were unemployed, most of them under the age of
forty.39 Of the 35 000 unemployed in Cologne in late 2001, 20 000 were
foreigners and, in turn, 90 percent of these foreigners were Muslims with
German-Turks in the overwhelming majority.40
Reinforcing this rift between the German demand for fairly complete
integration and the Turkish response of a parallel society are the structural
processes post-industrial societies are currently experiencing, such as de-
industrialization, the rise of the service sector, and the shift towards a
knowledge and information based economy requiring sharper cognitive skills.
These structural processes victimize those who are least prepared, young
Germans from the underclass and members from Turkish communities without
an education or trade certificate. It should be no surprise that those affected
rely on their communities, which are well established in fairly stable ethnic
neighborhoods. Even if employment is secured it would be difficult to move
or escape given the housing discrimination against Turks.
It is noteworthy that the gradual process of Islamization did not
commence until the eighties both in Germany and Turkey. In Turkey, failure
of the political parties to offer meaningful alternatives and motivating symbols
opened the door for the Islamic party which provided both political programs
and an account of the Turkish malaise. In Germany, after family unification
was completed, some of the third generation German-Turks turned to Islam as
a satisfying system of meaning. Islam proved plausible and met their
psychological and social needs, the needs of marginalized groups excluded
from meaningful political and social participation in the larger German society.
In Turkey, the rise of religious political sentiments, or moderate
fundamentalism, as reflected in the stunning election victory by the Justice and
Development Party in the Fall of 2002, poses a threat to the secular
foundations of the Turkish state. The party leader Recep Erdogan, for
example, embraces the rule of the Sharia, religious law, and makes no secret
out of his disdain for democracy. This is bound to shape television broadcasts
from Turkey to become more conservative. For many Turkish migrants,
information about Germany are derived from Turkish rather than German
media which are very critical about Germany, the decision by the European
Union to postpone consideration of Turkeys application for membership is a
case in point. The Turkish language press in Germany is actually more
nationalistic than their counterparts in Turkey. The Turkish language news
paper Huerriyet is the most popular daily followed by Bild (German equivalent
to the Post), and claims to be read by 80 percent of the German-Turkish
community. The German RTL and Pro Sieben television channels which are
primarily entertainment-oriented are the most popular in the German-Turkish
community, with the Turkish state broadcast TRT-INT garnering third-place

having 34 percent of the German-Turkish audience.41 The content of Turkish
print and electronic media can contribute to the isolation of the Turkish
community from larger German society unless alternative sources of
information are used.
This view is not universally held in Germany. Hans Juergen Weiss
argues, for example, that about half of the Turkish community, the younger
and better educated ones, are well integrated, whereas the remainder have
the potential for integration or are poorly integrated. He suggests that the
majority of the German-Turkish population do not live in ghettos. Though a
large proportion of German-Turks surround themselves with Turkish culture, it
is the sense of a second living room which one leaves again.42 Evidently,
this suggestion does not take into account that most Turks have only one living
room and cannot dispense with their identity like changing their wardrobe.
Further, a growing similarity in consumption patterns between the more
affluent Turks and their German counterparts reflects one of many factors
signaling an emerging integration. The pragmatic act of purchasing a garment,
even if it is status enhancing, can hardly be equated with the normative act of
participating in a family ritual, being exogamous, or acquiring a job in an open
labor market.
Yet there are no indicators that the current generation of German-Turks
is becoming radicalized and that the gradual establishment of a parallel society
is in and by itself dysfunctional. The significant potential for adopting an
Islamic-fundamentalist belief system is frequently misread as an actual
indicator of fundamentalism. If indeed, as Heitmeyer suggests, half of the
Turkish youth consider their religion to be superior and prefer traditional
values, it is mere speculation that they would act on these values.43 (Moreover,
one needs to take stock of what values characterize various religions. It may
be that there is considerable overlap in such values, e.g., family-oriented,
strong work ethic, values of honesty and responsibility.) Pari passu, most
practicing Protestants, Catholic, or Jews consider their religion to be superior
to, a simple function of maintaining cognitive balance. Of the German-Turks
who have decided to join a mosque community, only 8 percent opted for a
fundamentalist branch whereas seventy two percent were more at home with a
moderate orientation.44 This low-level of religious radicalism is also reflected
in data provided by the German Department of Justice which estimated in 1999
that about 40.000 German-Turks are members of extremist Turkish groups, a
miniscule percentage. It is noteworthy that the discourse of these radicals was
primarily shaped by political events in Turkey and not by events in Germany.45
Though Germany has not recently experienced race or ethnic conflicts
on a societal level, the rise of ethnic conservatives and some academics view
the rise of ethnic consciousness in the Turkish community with severe

misgivings. This reflects the fear of a parallel society, According to Tilman
Meyer, a Professor at the University of Bonn; ethnic fragmentation is a
regression of the political culture, and would result in the formation of ethnic
colonies causes conflicts and underclass juvenile delinquency. As he phrases
it, A cultural re-orientation into the Islamic sphere can lead to militant
tendencies of Islamisation, strengthen[s] the formation of urban colonies and
constitute a conflict potential which we know from the past... an ominous
threat indeed.46
Rather than viewing an enhanced ethnic consciousness as a political
regression, the rise of a parallel Turkish society in Germany can be
conceptualized as a logical response to two social processes of post-industrial
society: privatization and the quest for a sense of identity. These processes can
also be observed for other segments of German society, though paradoxically it
is easier for young Turks to satisfy the desire for identity in a Turkish
neighborhood surrounded by a large German city than would be the case for a
young German. The latter tends to be barely linked to such communities since
the bonds have become frail. In many cases, the individual is no longer linked
to an extended or even nuclear family. The Christian faith may not be an
option because it fails to offer the broad individuation that Islam allows. The
Islam does not separate the sacred and the profane; the religion thus plays a
central role in the everyday life of the individual. The faith has therefore a
decisive impact on the identity and life of the Turkish Muslim, as Andreas
Goldberg notes.47
Research by Rolf-Peter Loehr of socially problematic quarters in 200
urban areas did not provide strong evidence for a process of ghettoization,
however tendencies for the formation of parallel societies are unmistakable
among Turks.48 This is reinforced by their concentration in urban areas.
Apart from class-specific patterns of residential segregation, customary for
most societies, we now observe in Germany ethnic residential segregation, a
fairly new phenomenon. Thus regional studies showed for 2001 that about 20
percent of all Turks live in predominantly Turkish neighborhoods, five percent
in city sections where foreigners prevail, fourteen in mixed neighborhoods and
the remainder in predominantly German sections.49 But even if physical
proximity is missing, the new electronic media permit Muslim cyber
communities and communicative interaction with other Turks. The most
prominent website,, provides informational services and has
about 100 000 hits each month, with a noticeable increase after September
Compared to the other approximately 100 different nationalities living
in German urban areas, the Turks have the critical population mass necessary
to develop a parallel society and have been in Germany long enough to do so.

This is clearly evidenced in the rise of an institutionalized social infrastructure
in the Turkish community, permitting an individual born into a Turkish family
to live in Turkish communities until death without ever speaking a word of
German. These institutions range from soccer clubs, to service industries, such
as the restaurant business, from locally produced media to satellite transmitted
television and print media from Turkey, from religious institutions to computer
and internet clubs. By the year 2001 there were more than 2,200 mosques in
Germany organized by religious associations, incorporating many schools
teaching the Koran with a tendency toward fundamentalist indoctrination
among the Mullahs trained in Turkey. As noted by Loehr these schools have a
particular appeal for young Turks searching for identity and support.
Integration of the Turks into German society as a political goal of the
1980s has been a failure, specifically if it is posited as cultural assimilation
under the German Leitkultur and understood as social integration into the
larger society. According to recent research on cultural consumption patterns,
most members of Turkish communities consider themselves Turks, and only 3
percent perceive themselves as fully German. By and large the command of
the German language is inferior to the command of Turkish. The preference
for Turkish books and music is much higher than for German cultural products.
It is noteworthy that this preference persists among second generation German-
Turks that have a better grasp of the German language.51
From a more modest perspective, economic absorption into the labor
force of most Turkish migrant workers has been attained. However, this
economic integration does not apply to a fairly large proportion of the
Turkish minority in Germany, which has become a dependent, underclass
population. This underclass survives through public welfare and the resources
of their communities and is a constant irritant to many native Germans.
Unemployment is twice as high among foreign workers than among Germans,
and highest among Turkish workers. During the recession of 2001/2002 in
Germany one-third of employed Turkish workers lost their jobs. The social
distance between Turkish migrants and the German population has become
larger with the exception of the relatively small group of upper-middle-class
Turkish migrants, and a small cadre of technical and cultural intelligentsia,
which by virtue of their class position has closer contact with their German
counterparts. According to some observers, the upscale German-Turkish
groups feel more at home with their German counterparts than with poor and
marginalized members of the Turkish community. So there is an emerging
class-based rift within the Turkish community.
The process of "distantiation" of the Turks from the German society
has been subsumed in Germany under the term Re-Ethnisierung, the return
to the ethnic roots and the development of a corresponding cultural and,

sometimes, religious framework. As Rita Suessmut, the chief of the
governmental commission on immigration phrased it,We have been living for
years with many Turks in Germany, our knowledge of the Muslim culture and
religion is so minimal that we hardly know each other. According to our legal
order we are not a country of immigrants, thus have not systematically pursued
the task of integration. Rather we have given the message to the migrants that
they should have gone home long ago.[Italics added.]52 The reality has been
that most migrants decided to make their Turkish home in Germany and
develop a network of institutions shaping the Turkish community.

Changes: Anti-Discrimination Steps

Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam stipulates that all members of

the European Union must pass anti-discrimination legislation by July 2003,
though in 1996 Germany signed the UN agreement calling for the elimination
of racism. In June and November of 2000, the European Council promulgated
guidelines to create a uniform basis for anti-discrimination measures. These
measures set the framework for national anti-discrimination legislation by
members of the European Union. The June Guideline, number 43, sets forth
actions necessary to combat discrimination on the basis of race or ethnic origin
in the employment, educational, and social sectors, including access to publicly
provided goods and services, such as apartment rental sector. For cases where
discrimination can be reasonably ascertained, the guideline suggests a shift of
burden of evidence from plaintiff to the accused party.
Among other actions proposed by the guideline are a social dialogue
between employer and employee to generate measures reducing
discrimination, a discourse with non-governmental organizations concerned
with discrimination, and the establishment by each member state of appropriate
governmental agencies or offices charged with ensuring the equal non-
discriminatory treatment of all people.53 Guideline number 78 addresses more
specifically the framework for ensuring equal treatment in employment. In
addition to race and ethnicity, religion, disability, age and sexual orientation
are enumerated as possible factors prompting discrimination and require
appropriate actions. Further, the guidelines specify that they apply to the
public and private sectors, including the government and cover access to
education and employment, as well as conditions of work and employment.
Among the measures the guidelines direct member states to create
conditions facilitating the employment of handicapped workers, to provide
adequate legal recourse for those who have been discriminated against, and to
remove administrative and legal provisions which run counter the guidelines

promulgated by the European Community. They reaffirm in section 10 that the
burden of proof is shifted to the accused party. Put differently, those accused of
discrimination must show that the refusal to provide services and goods was
legitimate and not prompted by illegal motives. December 2003 is set as the
deadline by which member states must have implemented through laws and
administrative procedures the guidelines covering anti-discrimination.
However, an extension of three years can be granted commencing
December 2003, though those granted such delay must provide an annual
report describing the steps the government has taken to reduce
discrimination.54 The country not carrying out the stipulation is subject to
being fined. Guidelines developed by the European Community specify that
member states must establish by July 2003. Organizations and offices that
have the task of fostering and monitoring equal treatment of citizens need to
start the relevant research and their monitoring activities.
These guidelines pose particular challenges to Germany since their
anti-discrimination policies have been delayed by ten to twenty years. Further,
not only is the legal basis [for such policies] lacking in [German] civil law but
the politically well anchored conception and praxis of legally bestowing
inequality [by according the official status of a foreigner] is one of the causes
for a rather limited moral consciousness with respect to unjustified
discriminations on the basis of race, ethnicity, religious, or political beliefs.55
The guidelines stipulate that the creation of a societal consciousness for
ending discrimination requires making the public at large more sensitive
towards the issues involved, working closely with nongovernmental
organizations in that area, enlightening the potential victims of discrimination,
and educating policy and decision makers from the private and public
sectors.561 As noted, the administrative structures necessary for this massive
anti-discrimination educational effort do not exist, and may be established
gradually, if at all, given the current economic plight in Germany.
In spite of the liberalization of the citizenship laws most descendants of
immigrant laborers have remained resident outsiders whether from the first,
second or third generation. Most of the Turkish minority in Germany has no
civil rights, e.g., voting or adequate political representation. Though they
constituted about three percent of the population only three of the more than
600 members of the German parliament were of Turkish origin in 2002. Turks
in Germany experience systematic discrimination in the employment, service,
and housing market, as numerous studies carried out by the Center for Turkish
Studies have pointed out. In most of the conflicts between Muslims, thus
Turks and Germans, Turks and not Germans experience discrimination and
rejection. Put more bluntly, in Germany it is against the law to publicly deride
a foreign ethnic or national group, but there is little or no legal recourse if

members of this group are refused access to employment, housing, and
services, whereas the opposite holds for the United States. (Though, by no
stretch of the imagination is the United States a perfect role model in terms of
race and ethnic relations.) In the United States, one can openly articulate ones
hatred of foreigners and disdain for ethnic groups but is punished for
translating these views into action, up to including bias crimes
As Carolyne Frederickson points out, German courts have declined to
protect women and minorities from job discrimination by invoking the
freedom of contract doctrine holding that people should be free to chose their
contracting partners and determine the content of an agreement.57 Though the
German Basic Law appears to protect against discrimination, it does not give
full protection to foreigners. Article 1, Paragraph one stipulates that, The
of all state authority. In Article 3, paragraph 3 it states that, No one shall be
his homeland, and origin, his faith or his religious ore political opinions In
her analysis of these provisions Miriam J. Aukerman argues that:

they [the articles] are limited in several crucial respects. First, neither article
has been interpreted to apply to interactions between individuals and third
parties, and both are typically limited to interactions between the individual
and the state. Second, Article 3.3 has been interpreted to prohibit intentional
discrimination by the state, but de facto or indirect discrimination - as when
state regulations unintentionally compromise religious observances. Third,
while Article 3.3 forbids discrimination against foreigners because of their
sex, parentage, race, language homeland, or origin, faith or religious or
political opinions, it does not prohibit discrimination against foreigners
because they are not German citizens. Since most of those discriminated
against do not have German citizenship, it can be difficult to prove that
discrimination occurred on account of the individuals ethnicity, or race as
opposed to his or her foreign status.58

It is noteworthy that anti-discrimination and or related legislation have

been passed in numerous countries like France, Holland, Great Britain,
Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Canada, and the United States, countries
which also have much better track records attracting and retaining skilled
migrants. Some of these countries were forced to adapt to the transformation
of their societies into multi-ethnic entities when the loss of colonies resulted in
an influx of former alien citizens after World War II. In others like Canada,
the United States, and in a more limited sense Switzerland, there was
acceptance of the notion of being immigration countries. For the Scandinavian
countries, long democratic traditions paved the way for anti-discrimination
legislation. In Sweden for example the first discrimination laws were passed in

1986 and included the challenge to employers and workers to foster ethnic
diversity and are now refined to the point that discrimination of individuals
wearing a turban is outlawed.
Germany lacked the democratic tradition and the understanding of
being a country of immigrants though she had a long history of employing
foreign labor. Nor did she have to face the demographic consequences of
colonialism. Thus, German restaurant owners can still refuse service to
foreigners without impunity, whereas a Dutch restaurateur would see his
establishment closed down by the authorities for such an act. Since Germany
has no effective anti-discrimination legislation it would be unrealistic to expect
that Germany will adopt affirmative action legislation in the near future given
popular opposition to such measures and the emergence of an influential
political right wing. But one could expect that Germany would void current
laws that institutionalize discrimination and prevent discriminatory regulations
from being enacted by the European Community. For example in the area of
employment preferential treatment is provided to nationals from member
nations of the European Union. With the enlargement of the European Union,
many under- or semi-skilled German-Turks who decide not to be naturalized,
would rank second compared to workers from Poland and other East European
countries. German-Turks would not be able to search for employment in other
European Union countries. Unless there is a radical change in German laws
governing citizenship, the Eastward expansion of the European Union will
result in a dramatic increase of unemployment among German-Turks and an
increase in the size of the German-Turkish underclass.
Current German legislation lawfully discriminates in several areas
against foreigner though they may have been living in Germany for a long
time. There are regulations which apply to foreigners: the reduction of claims
to social services when no such reductions are applied to Germans or holders
of the European Union passport, the possibility of being deported since a claim
for social welfare was filed, and the limited access to higher education.59
Thus, a third generation of young Germans of Turkish descent who decide to
opt for a Turkish citizenship while residing in Germany can, technically
speaking, be deported when they apply for welfare.
. Passage of anti-discrimination legislation would be a clear signal for
migrants living in Germany that the German political elites, if not the German
population, supported their protection under the law. It would also signal their
assured equal access to education and labor, open housing and service markets.
It would also have gone a long way to create confidence, if not trust, among
members of the German-Turkish community. As designed by the governing
red-green coalition, the law to prevent discrimination in civil proceedings
[Gesetz zu Verhinderung von Diskriminierungen im Zivilrecht] was meant to

implement the guidelines from the European Union discussed earlier; to halt
discrimination on the basis of handicaps, ethnic origin, race, sex, and religion
in the areas of housing, services, etc., and shifts the burden of proof from
plaintiff to defendant. Yet, shortly before submitting the law to parliament
towards the end of the 2001/2002 legislative period, the governing parties
withdrew their proposal, though its passing was part of the coalition agreement
between the governing green and social democratic parties of 1998.
This decision was prompted by the proximity of federal elections and
the possibility of the legislation not passing in the upper house since the
conservative party and its allies were organized to block its passage. But the
single biggest obstacle was the provision of the law precluding religious
discrimination. There was support for the provision by the Central Council of
Jews in Germany, yet Catholic and Protestant churches objected. The new law
could have prevented preferential treatment of members of their denominations
in the provision of educational and other services. The conservative opposition
construed the proposed legislation as, ...a policy of equalization of minorities
placing them on an equal status [with the German majority], which de facto
represents being placed into a better position [Besserstellung] than the
population constituting the majority, and to introduce into economic life
compulsory contracts.60 . It is no surprise that the housing and property
association (Zentralverband Haus & Boden) rejected the
legislation since it could interfere with rental and sales. Federation of
employers made their opposition to provisions of the law known that would
force them to provide evidence of non-discrimination if laying off staff. But it
is ironic that economic associations such as the Deutsche Industrie- und
Handelskammer which otherwise deplored the shortage of highly skilled labor
in Germany, were opposed to the introduction of anti-discrimination laws. The
legislation would have removed some of the obstacles to attracting such labor
to Germany. Even after the government tried to work out a compromise,
Churches did not provide support for the legislation for fear of being sued if
the groups they served did not include minorities. Further, the legal expert,
Norbert Geis, of the Bavarian opposition party, the Christian Social Union
suggested that the anti-discrimination legislation interfered with the
constitutionally guaranteed principle of private property.61 Interest groups,
property holders and employers rejoiced when the current government failed to
introduce its anti-discrimination law during the last legislative period.
In Germany, the widespread failure to respect cultural differences and
thus the right to be different makes the development of successful immigration
policies, as required by economic needs, very difficult. Since anti-
discrimination legislation has not been passed it is unlikely that affirmative
action policies can be developed ensuring migrants equal access to educational

and occupational opportunities. If no action is taken, the socio-economic
disparities between the native Germans and the German-Turks will continue to
Germany is facing a period of economic stagnation and dwindling
resources. In that context, the absence of effective migration policies and anti-
discrimination legislation will result in large segments of the German-Turkish
communities becoming part of a permanent underclass. The German
governing elite is caught in the dilemma posed by the xenophobia of large
segments of the German population, large Christian parties, and the objective
need for policies fostering economic integration precluding the marginalization
of German-Turks. Framing the issues in terms of assimilation and
acculturation or exclusion and segregation may be helpful, but mystifies the
socio-economic and political context. Culture, religion, fundamentalism, the
Koran, are readily invoked, deplored or re-conceptualized to avoid facing the
emerging underclass claiming an ethnic identity of their own
If the German government were to apply the policies it recommends to
the Islamic World to the Muslim minorities living in Germany, such an ethnic
underclass would be no problem. Among these policies are the priorities of
economic development, fair distribution of equal opportunities,
participation in the political process, raising the standard of education, and
engaging in a serious dialogue. This remedy suggested by the German State
Department to Islamic countries would be essential in resolving the dilemma of
integrating Turkish communities.62 In conclusion, the best prescription are
effective policies leading to an improvement of the educational and
occupational standing of German Turks, thus to their economic integration

*Also, to be published by the Zentrum fuer Tuerkeistudien, University of
Essen, in Zeitschrift fur Tuerkei Studien. The research for this chapter was
made possible by a Fulbright grant and support from Hunter College.

1) see Max Webers opposition to German farm hands being displaced by

Polish migrant labors prompted by his nationalistic fear of Ueberfremdung,
the domination of German culture by the inferior Polish one. Inaugural
Lecture at the University of Freiburg, 1895.

2) Philip Martin, Germany Reluctant Land of Immigration, in German Issues

Vol. 21, 1998 p.7

3) A Spiegel report suggests, that in Berlin about half of all Turkish males
look for a bride in Turkey.. March 4, 2002

4) Andreas Goldberg et al, Migrationsbericht des Zentrums fur Turkeistudien

Lit Verlag Munster-Hamburg-Berlin-London, 2002, p.15

5) The Economist, 12/07/2002

6) Ibid

7) Wall Street Journal, 5/6/02, p 15

8) Der Spiegel; on line 2/24/2002

9) Welt am Sonntag, August 5, 2002

10) Structuring Immigration / Fostering Integration, Summary p.13,

Bundesministerium des Inneren, Berlin: 2001

11) Migrationsbericht, op. cit., p.78

12) The Economist, August 10, 2002, p22

13) Projekt Ruhr: Ethnisches Mosaik des Ruhrgebiets, ZFT (Zentrum fuer
Tuerkeistudien), Essen: 2003, p.98

14) Migrationsbericht, op.cit. p.38

15) The Economist, August 10, 2002, p. 23

16) Ibid.

17) S. Gaitanides Die Legende der Bildung von Parallelgesellschaften." See

the website:

18) Thomas Schmid, Civil Society and Xenophobia in Germany. Comments

on a Country which is a Stranger to itself, undated mimeo from the early

19) Business Week, Sept. 17 2001, p.53

20) Dieter Oberndoerfer, Immigration liegt im Eigeninteressse, Das

Parlament, p.4.

21) Most of the green cards were obtained by Indian nationals followed by
those coming from the former Soviet Union

22) Spiegel on line,, March 05, 2001 citing data from the Bitkom labor market

23) Die Zeit, Geschlossene Gesellschaft, 13/2002

24) The Coming Battle for Immigrants, Business Week August 26, 2002

25) See for example. Die Zeit, Dossier 41/2001, Ihr seid an allem schuld
[you are responsible for everything.]

26) There is objective merit to the fear, since the subsidies provided by the
European Union to severely underdeveloped or economically deprived areas in
the new German
states (East Germany) and West Germany will now be going soon to areas in
the new member states which are worse of. This is of grave concern since most
of the West German areas have a high concentration of unemployment, thus
concentration of Turkish communities, specifically in North Rhine Westphalia

27) Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Tuerken in Deutschland, February 2002

28) Der Spiegel on line, 2/24/2002

29) ib. March 4, 2002 Die Rueckseite der Republik

30) Jochen Boelsche, Pfusch am Kind, Der Spiegel, 20/2002.

31) Dr, Stefan Schneider, Deutsche Bank Research, June 12, 2003
personal communication

32) Bericht ueber die Lage der Auslaender in der Bundesrepublik

Deutschland, Drucksache 14/9883, Berlin: 2002, p. 98 .referring to: Berlin,
Senatsverwaltung fuer Schule Jugend und Sport (ed.): Vergleiche: Ergebnisse
der Sprachstandserhebung Baerenstark, Berlin, 2002

33) Deutsches PISA-Konsortium (Hrsg.): PISA 2000 - Basiskompetenzen von

Schuelerinnen und Schuelern im Internationalen Vergleich. Opladen: 2001.

34) Der Spiegel, 20/2002).

35) Structuring Integration, op.cit. p. 12/13

36) Nadja Milewski, Partnerwahl von Zuwanderern unpublished Masters

thesis, 2002 pps 41, 61,62, and personal communication June, 2003.

37) Martina Sauer Kulturell-religioese Einstellungen junger tuerkischer

Migranten in Deutschland, ZTS, Essen: 1999

38) See Klaus Boegner, FU Study on Integration, 2002

39) See for example, Bernhard Nauck, Verwandtschaft als Soziales Kapital:
Netzwerkbeziehungen in Tuerkischen Migrantenfamilien, in Verwandtschaft,
Michael Wagner et al, Stuttgart:1998; Ulgur Olat, Soziale und Kulturelle
Identitaet Tuerkischer Migranten der 2, Generation in Deutschland, Kavac-
Verlag, Hamburg:1998; Martina Sauer Der Islam Etabliert sich in Deutschland,
ZTS, Essen:2000; Alois Weidacher, et al. DJI Auslaendersurvey, Deutsches
Jugendinstitut, Muenchen: 2000.

40) Das Parlament p. 7

41) Die Zeit, Dossier 41, 2001, op.cit.

42) Spiegel on line June 16, 2001

43) Spiegel on line June 16, 2001

44) see Verlockender Fundamentalismus: Tuerkische Jugendliche In

Deutschland, Wilhelm Heitmeyer, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt: 19976

45) Migrationsbericht, op.cit. p.87

46) Verfassungsschutz Bericht 1999, Bundesministerium des Innern, Berlin, p.


47) Konfliktpotentiale in Migrationsgesellschaften, presentation for the

German Society of Demography, Wiesbaden:March 2003

48) Migrationsbericht, op.cit. p 74

49) Das Parlament, 27.April 2001

50) Projekt Ruhr, op.cit.

51) Sueddeutsche Zeitung , December 4, 2001, Eine Welt, ganz fuer sich

52) ZTS 2003 unpublished research


54) Amtsblatt der Europaeischen Gemeinschaften, July 19, 2000, L 180 22-25,
Richtlinie 43

55) Amtsblatt der Europaeischen Gemeinschaften, November 2, 2000, L 303

16-21, Richtlinie 78

56) Auslaenderbericht, op.cit. p. 131.

57) Ibid.

58) Germany in Transition, Gale A. Mattox et al. eds, Westview Press, 1999,

59) Miriam J Ackerman Discrimination in Germany: A Call for Minority
Rights p. 172, in Germany in Transition, op.cit.

60) Hakki Keskin, Stuttgarter Schlossgespraeche, August 4, 2002.

61) Jurgen Ganzel, www: deutsche-stimme.de04-02

62) Sueddeutsche Zeitung, April 9, 2002

63) Address by Ambassador Dr. Gunter Mulack, Commissioner for Dialogue

with the Islamic World, German Foreign Office, Relations with the Islamic
World: Dialogue or Confrontation?, p.2, New York, November 18, 2003


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