*Le bateau C-Star, qui veut repousser les migrants dans la Méditerranée, émet un appel de…


  • Seven sailors missing, three injured after U.S. Navy destroyer collides with container ship off Japan | Reuters

    Seven sailors are missing and three injured after a U.S. Navy destroyer collided early on Saturday morning with a Philippine-flagged container ship south of Tokyo Bay in Japan, the U.S. Navy said.

    The Japanese Coast Guard said the destroyer was experiencing some flooding but was not in danger of sinking, while the merchant vessel was able to sail under its own power.

    The U.S. Navy said in a statement the USS Fitzgerald, an Aegis guided missile destroyer, collided with a merchant vessel at about 2:30 a.m. local time (1730 GMT), some 56 nautical miles southwest of Yokosuka, a rare incident on a busy waterway.

    Three aboard the destroyer had been medically evacuated, including the ship’s commanding officer, Cmdr. Bryce Benson, who was reportedly in stable condition after being airlifted to the U.S. Naval Hospital on the Yokosuka base, the Navy said.

    The other two injured were transferred to the hospital to treat lacerations and bruises, it said. The Fitzgerald, the Japanese Coast Guard and Maritime Self-Defense Force were searching for the seven missing sailors.
    It was unclear how the collision happened. “Once an investigation is complete then any legal issues can be addressed,” the 7th Fleet spokesman said.

    The USS Fitzgerald suffered damage on her starboard side above and below the waterline,” the Navy said in a statement.
    Japan’s Nippon Yusen KK (9101.T), which charters the container ship, ACX Crystal, said in a statement it would “cooperate fully” with the Coast Guard’s investigation of the incident. At around 29,000 tons displacement, the ship is about three times the size of the U.S. warship, and was carrying 1,080 containers from the port of Nagoya to Tokyo.

    None of the 20 crew members aboard, all Filipino, were injured, and the ship is not leaking oil, Nippon Yusen said. The ship was due to arrive at Tokyo Bay around 4:30 p.m. (0730 GMT), the Coast Guard said.

    • USS Fitzgerald: missing sailors found dead in flooded area of ship | US news | The Guardian

      Japanese and US officials were discussing how to conduct the investigation. Japan is permitted to investigate since the collision happened in its waters, but under the countries’ status of forces agreement the US has primary jurisdiction over incidents involving vessels such as the Fitzgerald.

    • U.S. destroyer almost foundered after collision, bodies found: Seventh Fleet | Reuters


      The U.S. Navy said the collision happened at about 2:30 a.m. local time (1730 GMT Friday), while the Japanese Coast Guard said it was 1:30 a.m. local time.

    • An hour passed before Japan authorities were notified of Fitzgerald collision | Reuters

      The incident has sparked as many as three investigations by the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard, and two by Japanese authorities.




    • Excellent et long article d’un marin sur l’abordage et les responsabilités

      The USS Fitzgerald Is At Fault. This Is Why. – gCaptain

      While the media, with a very little hard data, attempts to understand the erratic maneuvers of the containership ACX Crystal on the night of her collision with the Destroyer USS Fitzgerald… professional mariners are certain that a long investigation will find the US Navy ship at fault.

      Is this conclusion the result of professional arrogance? Or maybe because of resentment and jealousy over the fact that Navy captains are praised and decorated by the public and media while merchant ship captains live mostly unnoticed. Or is it because they are correct?

      As a ship captain along with years working with the U.S. Navy both aboard ships and ashore – here are the reasons why I believe they are correct. The USS Fitzerald was at fault.

      Despite recent advancements in electronic collision avoidance tools like automatic identification systems (AIS), the three most important tools for avoiding a collision are a Captain’s eyes, tongue and ears.

      • Eyes, looking out the windows of his ship, are important because they can process information – like erratic course changes – faster and more accurately than electronic RADAR and charting systems that take time to aggregate data.
      • A tongue because the quickest and most effective way to predict how a ship is going to maneuver in the minutes before a collision is to call the Captain of the other ship on the VHF radio and ask.
      • Ears are important because language barriers and cultural differences are prominent at sea and you must listen intently to the other ship’s reply if you want any chance of understanding her intentions.

      It is likely that USS Fitzgerald’s Captain used only one, or possibly none, of these tools when communicating with the ACX Crystal.

      Avec cette question que je me suis immédiatement posée quand j’ai appris que le commandant avait été blessé parce que… bloqué dans sa cabine par la collision : qu’est-ce qu’il f… dans sa cabine ?

      Son navire était dans un endroit au trafic intense – depuis plusieurs années des voix s’élèvent pour y réclamer l’instauration de rails (ie Dispositif de Séparation de Trafic) – et le commandant se reposait !

      Why Was The Navy Captain In His Cabin?

      On peut ajouter que sur un navire de guerre la veille en passerelle est un impératif majeur.

    • U.S. Coast Guard interviews container ship crew after warship collision | World | Reuters

      “We are scheduled to interview the crew members,” said U.S. Lieutenant Scott Carr told Reuters, referring the crew of the merchant ship. The USS Fitzgerald crew will also be interviewed.

      The U.S. coast guard, which is undertaking the investigation on behalf of the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, will gather electronic data and ship tracking information from the USS Fitzgerald and ACX Crystal.

      The investigation will also look into a time discrepancy in the ACX Crystal’s initial report of the incident south of Tokyo Bay, said Scott. “There is a contradiction. It will be part of the investigation,” Carr said.

      The Japan Coast Guard has already spoken to the Filipino crew and is also probing the inconsistency. It is in talks with the U.S. Navy for access to its crew members and data from the destroyer, a spokesman for the organisation said.

      The U.S. Navy did not immediately respond when asked if it would release tracking data to the Japan Coast Guard.

    • Investigators Believe USS Fitzgerald Crew Fought Flooding For An Hour Before Distress Call Reached Help

      Investigators now think Crystal was transiting to Tokyo on autopilot with an inattentive or asleep crew when the merchant vessel struck a glancing blow on the destroyer’s starboard side at about 1:30 AM local time on Friday. When the crew of Crystal realized they had hit something, the ship performed a U-turn in the shipping lane and sped back to the initial site of the collision at 18 knots, discovered Fitzgerald, and radioed a distress call to authorities at about 2:30 AM. U.S. Navy officials initially said the collision occurred at around the time of the distress call at 2:30 AM.

      Voilà qui expliquerait le « tiroir » observé sur l’enregistrement du Crystal

    • Du même article :

      View of the stateroom of Cmdr. Bryce Benson after the collision with ACX Crystal.

      Meanwhile, when Crystal’s port bow hit Fitzgerald, the warship was performing a normal transit off the coast of Japan, USNI News understands. Above the waterline, the flared bow of Crystal caved in several spaces in the superstructure, including the stateroom of commanding officer Cmdr. Bryce Benson.

      The impact not only ripped a hole in the steel superstructure in the stateroom but also shifted the contents and shape of the steel so Benson was “squeezed out the hull and was outside the skin of the ship,” a sailor familiar with the damage to the ship told USNI News.

      He’s lucky to be alive.

      Fitzgerald sailors had to bend back the door of the stateroom to pluck Benson from the side of the ship and bring him inside. He and two other sailors were later evacuated from the ship via a Japanese helicopter to a Navy hospital at Yokosuka.

    • La mise en cause du commandant de l’USS Fitzgerald a déclenché une véritable tornade. Réponse de l’éditeur, avec entre autres, un aperçu de l’état des relations entre MarMar et Royale outre-Atlantique.

      Why The USS Fitzgerald Is At Fault, Part 2 - Questions And Answers – gCaptain

      The recent editorial “The USS Fitzgerald Is At Fault. This Is Why.“ has been read 103,667 times, shared by 9,699 people via social media and ignited a firestorm of over 500 facebook comments, forum posts, emails and phone calls to gCaptain HQ. Feedback I have received from Navy brass, journalists, pilots and Merchant Mariners working aboard commercial ships has been positive. We also received some highly negative comments from both current and former members of the U.S. Navy Surface Warfare community. This is my reply to them… specifically to Navy sailors who have stood watch on the bridge of a warship.
      Naval destroyers have never been, and never will be, the first American ships to be attacked during times of war… that distinction has always been, and will always be held by the US merchant fleet.

      The Navy flew me literally half way around the world last year to advise them on why gCaptain gets some on scene information before Naval Intelligence does. And the reason is that merchant mariners and offshore workers are the eyes and ears of the ocean and gCaptain simply gives them a platform to share that information. If the navy wants civilian mariners to send them the information before posting it to gCaptain, then they must start by acknowledging the fact that the US Navy does not have the market cornered on the subject of naval war, combat and national defense because THE US MERCHANT MARINE also plays a vital role in both.

    • Il a fallu une semaine, mais il commence à circuler des interprétations loufoque dont une « théorie du complot » délirante… Je ne mets pas le lien, je résume :
      – initialement, une attaque électronique effectuée par le Crystal a rendu inopérants tous les systèmes de l’USS Fitzgerald, l’assaillant poursuit sa route
      – ayant transmis l’information du succès de l’attaque, il reçoit des instructions des « méchants » (nord-coréens, chinois ou russes, va savoir) de venir achever le destroyer désemparé
      – il aurait d’ailleurs visé spécifiquement la cabine du commandant
      – mais n’arrive pas à le couler et signale alors « l’accident »

      Variantes :
      – c’est un drone qui a lancé l’attaque électronique
      – c’est une attaque sous false flag qui aurait échoué le bâtiment états-unien aurait dû couler sans survivants, ce qui aurait permis de lancer des représailles contre l’auteur putatif de l’attaque (choisir dans la liste des méchants ci-dessus)

    • Je n’ai que les éléments qui émergent dans la presse (et que je rassemble ici) une expérience (lointaine…) d’officier de quart en passerelle pendant mon service national sur un bateau qui naviguait beaucoup et, indirectement, celle de mon père, commandant dans la marine marchande. Je penche assez pour l’analyse de gCaptain : responsabilités partagées avec un gros bout pour le philippin.

      Il est probable que la veille en passerelle de l’ACX Crystal (20 hommes d’équipage) était défaillante, c’est un reproche récurrent – ils dorment –, certains évoquent même l’idée qu’il aurait été en pilotage automatique. Cela expliquerait l’étrange tiroir de la trajectoire : ils ont continué, ont mis un certain temps à se rendre compte du problème, envoyer quelqu’un à l’avant du bateau et constater que le choc ressenti ne pouvait en aucun cas être causé par la rencontre d’un conteneur flottant à la dérive mais par un abordage. Ils ont fait demi-tour pour s’enquérir du navire abordé, réflexe normal de marin, et quand ils ont découvert l’USS Fitzgerald qu’ils ont donné l’alerte. Le Crystal a ensuite repris une route vers Tokyo ce qu’il n’a pu envisager qu’après avoir constaté que le Fitzgerald pouvait se passer d’assistance (ou s’être fait intimer l’ordre de s’éloigner…)

      Sur l’USS Fitzgerald il y a vraiment un GROS problème. On peut à peu près supposer qu’il était en conditions de route normales puisque le commandant se reposait dans sa cabine. Et là, en passerelle, on a du monde ! y compris une veille optique sur chaque côté et un des boulots de l’officier de quart, c’est de veiller aux veilleurs… Alors se faire aborder en plein travers, c’est assez difficilement concevable.

      Le problème c’est qu’il n’y a aucune information sur l’USS Fitzgerald. Est-il possible qu’il ait perdu toute source d’énergie lors de la collision (plusieurs compartiments inondés par la brèche provoquée par le bulbe du porte-conteneurs) ? La Navy dit que le bâtiment a failli couler, ce qui laisse entendre que ses moyens d’assèchement (les pompes) soit ne suffisaient pas à étaler la voie d’eau, soit étaient hors d’état de fonctionner. En tout état de cause, il a certainement prévenu de l’abordage dès qu’il a été en l’état de le faire. Quand ? ça, il faut le demander à l’US Navy

      Ceci dit, pour une catastrophe dans la Navy, il y a un (lointain, 1923) précédent célèbre …

    • Première version émanant de l’abordeur philippin (du rapport du commandant de l’ACX Crystal à son armateur)

      Exclusive : U.S. warship stayed on deadly collision course despite warning-container ship captain | Reuters

      In the first detailed account from one of those directly involved, the cargo ship’s captain said the ACX Crystal had signalled with flashing lights after the Fitzgerald “suddenly” steamed on to a course to cross its path.

      The container ship steered hard to starboard (right) to avoid the warship, but hit the Fitzgerald 10 minutes later at 1:30 a.m., according to a copy of Captain Ronald Advincula’s report to Japanese ship owner Dainichi Investment Corporation that was seen by Reuters.

      (l’abattée à droite est parfaitement attestée par les enregistrements AIS)

    • Point de vue – tranché – d’un «  vieux crabe  »

      USS Fitzgerald - Stop, Analyze, Dissect And Let’s Figure Out What Went Wrong – gCaptain

      Regardless of how much vessel traffic exists, or how many background lights exist, or state of visibility, etc, a deck watch officer should be trained to successfully stand a watch. Most of us who have been at sea have sailed through fog, night, storms, high-density traffic, currents, rain, sandstorms, etc and done so successfully. That is what we do, that is what we are bound to do. If you call yourself a mariner, then you don’t have collisions with other vessels. Period. You cannot make excuses. If you cannot stand a competent watch, then don’t assume the watch.

    • On s’en doutait un peu, mais ça se précise : on sort les arguments juridiques…
      U.S. Likely to Bar Japan Investigators from Interviewing Fitzgerald Crew, Official Says – gCaptain

      The United States will likely bar Japanese investigators from interviewing USS Fitzgerald crew manning the guided missile destroyer when it was struck by a cargo ship in Japanese waters killing seven American sailors, a U.S. navy official said.
      The U. S. Coast Guard, which is investigating on behalf of the National Transportation Safety Board, has interviewed the crew of the container ship.

      But the U.S. navy official, who declined to be identified, said warships were afforded sovereign immunity under international law and foreign investigators were not expected to get access to the U.S. crew.

      It’s unlikely Japanese or Philippine authorities will have direct access to crew members,” said the U.S. official.

      The U.S. Coast Guard would instead provide summaries of crew interviews to the Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB), which would share them with the Japan Coast Guard (JCG), he said.

    • Navy struggles with approach to fix crippled destroyer Fitzgerald, as investigation continues

      The bulbous bow of the ACX Crystal left a 12x17-foot hole beneath the waterline, per three Navy sources who spoke on background, an enormous breach that rapidly flooded three spaces.

      Passage en cale sèche dans une semaine pour évaluer les dommages :
      • peut-on le retaper suffisamment pour qu’il rentre par ses propres moyens aux É.-U. ?
      • est-ce que l’antenne tribord de son super-radar a été atteinte ? ce qui ferait exploser le coût de remise en état (et… ce qui est très probable au vu du gauchissement du panneau concerné…)

      Un précédent, la remise en état de l’USS Cole après l’attaque du 12 octobre 2000 au Yémen (coût 250 M$), à noter l’unité de mesure de la dépense, le F-35…

      Once the ship is in dry-dock, the Navy will complete a thorough assessment of what is wrong with the ship and will get estimates of how much it’s going to cost. In the case of the Cole, it cost the Navy about $250 million – or about two-and-a-half F-35s – to complete the repairs.

      ici lors de son rapatriement sur plate-forme (autre élément de coût…)

      550 tonnes de tôles posées plus les 2 machines, mais, semble-t-il pas les radars.

    • U.S. Navy temporarily relieves commander of ship struck in Japanese waters.

      The U.S. Navy on Tuesday said on Tuesday it has temporarily relieved, for medical reasons, the commander of a warship involved in a crash with a container vessel in Japanese waters that killed seven American sailors.
      Cmdr Bryce Benson, who is recovering from injuries sustained during Fitzgerald’s June 17 collision with the merchant vessel ACX Crystal was relieved temporarily,” the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet said in a press release.


    • Entrée en cale sèche pour poursuite de l’évaluation des dégâts. Note : on ne voit pas grand chose, l’ouverture dans les œuvres vives ayant été aveuglée et renforcée par des moyens de fortune…

      Damaged Destroyer USS Fitzgerald Moves to Dry Dock in Japan -PHOTOS – gCaptain

      U.S. Navy photo by Daniel A. Taylor
      Released by FLEACT Yokosuka Public Affairs Office

      The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) entered dry dock July 11 at the Fleet Activities (FLEACT) Yokosuka base.

    • U.S. warship crew found likely at fault in June collision : official

      The crew of the USS Fitzgerald was likely at fault in the warship’s collision with a Philippine cargo ship in June and had not been paying attention to their surroundings, according to initial findings in an investigation, a U.S. defense official told Reuters on Friday.
      The official said that in addition to crew members not paying attention to their surroundings, they did not take action until it was too late.

      While the investigation is not complete, the official said crew members had given statements and radar data had been gathered, and it was unlikely the findings would change.

      On s’en doutait un peu (cf. supra) mais voir confirmer que la veille en passerelle est aux abonnés absents la nuit dans une zone fréquentée sur un navire de guerre états-unien, ça fait quand même quelque chose.

      Bon, mais il paraît qu’après l’abordage, ils ont tous été exemplaires. Ouf !

    • U.S. to haul stricken destroyer from Japan back to U.S. for repairs

      The U.S. Navy on Tuesday said it will haul the guided missile destroyer severely damaged in a collision with a freighter in Japanese waters back to the United States for repairs as soon as September.

      The collision killed seven sailors aboard the USS Fitzgerald and ripped a hole below the vessels waterline. Naval engineers in Japan have patched up the destroyer but extensive damage that nearly sank the warship means it is unable to sail under its own steam.

      The Fitzgerald may be moved in September but it could be later than that,” a spokesman for the U.S. Seventh Fleet said.

    • USS Fitzgerald, les sanctions arrivent… le commandant, le second, le chef mécanicien, plus divers autres (j’imagine toute l’équipe de quart en passerelle)

      Dozen U.S. sailors to be punished for June collision -U.S. Navy

      About a dozen U.S. sailors are expected to face punishment for a collision in June between the USS Fitzgerald and a Philippine cargo ship, including the warship’s commander officer and other senior leaders of the ship, the Navy said on Thursday.

      Admiral Bill Moran, deputy chief of naval operations, told reporters that the ship’s commanding officer, executive officer and master chief, would be removed from the vessel because “we’ve lost trust and confidence in their ability to lead.

      Moran said that in total close to a dozen sailors would face punishment without detailing the exact punishment.

    • Warship captain in collision that killed 7 to lose command - The Washington Post

      Adm. William Moran, the vice chief of naval operations, told reporters Thursday that the top three leaders aboard the USS Fitzgerald, which was badly damaged in the June collision off the coast of Japan, will be removed from duty aboard the ship. They are the commanding officer, Cmdr. Bryce Benson; the executive officer, Cmdr. Sean Babbitt; and Master Chief Petty Officer Brice Baldwin, who as the ship’s command master chief is its most senior enlisted sailor.

      The collision was avoidable, and both ships demonstrated poor seamanship,” the Navy’s 7th Fleet said in a statement, noting that “flawed” teamwork among those assigned to keep watch contributed to the collision.

      The actions are being taken by Rear Adm. Joseph Aucoin, commander of the 7th Fleet, based at Yokosuka, Japan, because he lost confidence in the three, Moran said.

      The Navy said the three had shown “inadequate leadership.” Separately, seven junior officers were relieved of their duties because they had shown “poor seamanship” and bad teamwork, 7th Fleet spokesman Cmdr. Clay Doss said Friday.

      Administrative penalties were handed out to seven others that were members of the watch teams, he said, without giving details. All 14 remain in the Navy, but they will be assigned to other jobs, he said.

    • Le rapport préliminaire de l’US Navy sur les effets de la collision, la gestion des dégâts (damage control) et détails de l’intervention des équipes de sécurité à bord de l’USS Fitzgerald. Daté du 17/08/17.

      Avec schéma de l’abordage et photos intérieures. Rapport caviardé.

      Parmi les infos, dans l’annexe reconstituant le déroulement :

      | ~ 0130 | Collision with the ACX CRYSTAL on the starboard side.    |
      |        | Berthing 2 is flooded within 30-60 seconds.              |
      | 0135   | Commanding Officer reported trapped in his stateroom.    |
      | 0146   | Commanding Officer freed from his stateroom              |
      |        | and brought to the bridge.                               |
      | 0150   | Commanding Officer reported as “down and XXXXXX”         |
      |        | Medical team called to the bridge to assist.             |
      | 0200   | FTZ makes initial report of collision at sea             |
      |        | to CDS 15 via personal cell phone at approximately 0220. |

      Il a fallu une demi-heure pour que le bâtiment informe son commandement de l’abordage. Mais le commandant était très perturbé (son état est censuré) il est vrai qu’il vient de rester 10 minutes accroché à l’extérieur de la coque de son navire.

      Et on notera l’incohérence entre l’heure de l’entrée dans le déroulement et celle mentionnée dans le texte.

    • Sans surprise, attaque à boulets rouges par le rédacteur en chef de gCaptain contre le rapport préliminaire sur l’USS Fitzgerald

      Red Over Red, The Failure Of U.S. Navy Leadership – gCaptain

      The question is… why was this document released and to what benefit? The answer is that this document was written and released for one primary purpose: Public Relations.

      Decades ago each major media outlet had dock reporters; journalists who wrote exclusively on maritime affairs and had an extensive list of high level maritime contacts as well as a working knowledge of ships. Today I only know of one journalist with this background, Carl Nolte of the San Francisco Chronicle. All the rest are generalists who are too easily confused by complicated facts and too susceptible to emotional triggers. As Ryan Holiday, author of “Trust Me, I’m Lying: Confessions of a Media Manipulator” says in this bestselling book… “today’s most effective public relations firms oversimplify facts and compensate by giving the public what it craves: an emotionally compelling story.

      The US Navy’s “Deaths of Seven Sailors Aboard The USS Fitzgerald” is just that, the vapid telling of a story about a few brave and honorable sailors fighting floods, destruction and death itself with a cursory acknowledgement of fault. It does nothing to prevent future collisions at sea and everything to send the message to the fleet that mistakes will not be tolerated and junior officers will be punished.

      As a work of fiction it would be praised for pitting man against machine and for well painted characters – with strong wills and moral courage – placed in extraordinary circumstances to save the lives of shipmates and friends. But this is not a work of fiction or, at least, it is not supposed to be. It is supposed to be a preliminary investigation report filled with hard facts and harder questions that remain unanswered. This report contains very little of either.
      It is maritime tradition which states the Captain is the primary party at fault for all failures aboard ship and for good reason. But maritime tradition does not extend blame down the ranks and not to non-commissioned officers like the USS Fitzgerald’s master chief petty officer who has been removed by Admiral Moran.

      Those who are responsible for the events leading up to the collision, not just those involved in the collision, are those who steered the naval fleet towards these errors. The U.S. Navy has experienced four major failures in navigation this year alone. The men who are cumulatively responsible for these incidents are the same men who are responsible for other troublesome oversights, like the widespread and pervading ignorance of US Naval Officers as to how merchant ships operate at sea. These men have not been called to face “administrative punishment”. At the very least they include Adm. John Richardson, Adm. Bill Moran, Admiral Scott Swift and, the author of the Damage Control Inquiry, Rear Adm. Charles Williams.

      With four collisions in under ten months, when is the Navy going to “lose confidence” in it’s own ability to decide who should be in command?
      This is a poor excuse. If this document has nothing to do with the collision itself then why release it alongside statements conceding “poor seamanship” and a loss of faith in leadership ability of the ship’s officers?

      If the document is supposed to provide a focused look at “the crew’s damage control activities” then why is it so lacking in information about the challenges and failures the crew experienced after the incident?

      Numerous problems of significant scope and size where barely mentioned in the report. Major problems, such as number 16: “The collision resulted in a loss of external communication and a loss of power in the forward portion of the ship”, are not explained at all. The most basic of commercial ships are required to have redundant emergency power systems. How then does half of the complex ship loose power completely? More importantly, why is this not explained? What lessons learned about this power loss could have been transmitted to the USS McCain? And how, in 2017, when any civilian can purchase a handheld Iridium satellite phone for less than the price of the latest iPhone and a portable EPIRB for much less, could the communications system of a US Naval warship be so damaged and the ship’s leadership so shaken, that it takes the ship a full thirty minutes to transmit a Mayday (via Cell Phone no less)?

      Another important question that goes unanswered is… did the damage control efforts result in a reduced situational awareness after the collision? If not then why did it take two and a half hours to identify the name of the ship they collided with? What would have happened to damage control efforts if this had been a terrorist attack or enemy combatant?

      Those facts are not even the most troubling. Both the civilian and military continue to fail to consider the design and construction of the ship itself. No experts from the vessel’s builder, Bath Iron Works, or the architect or the Admirals in charge of approving the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer design were mentioned. The report completely fails to mention the damage control done aboard the ACX Crystal because that ship suffered relatively minor damage. What design and construction tradeoffs were made that resulted in a the hull of a billion dollar warship having much less intrinsic strength than a Korean built containership that was delivered for a fraction of the cost?

      Where is the independent analysis?
      Because, one thing we have learned during the past few centuries is this: no organization can work alone, no ship owner – not Olympic Steamship, not Tote and certainly not the US Navy – can be 100% objective when investigating itself. Any attempt to do so is the result of ignorance or corruption or both.

    • De sérieuses questions sur la survivabilité des destroyers et donc sur leur conception. En revanche, la comparaison avec celle des navires marchands abordeurs, il exagère un peu :
      • dans les deux cas, c’est le bulbe d’étrave qui a percuté. Même s’ils avaient été détruits, ce qui n’est absolument pas le cas, les dégâts n’auraient absolument pas mis en danger les navires
      • à l’inverse les navires de guerre ont été abordé de plein flanc, apparemment, et heureusement pour eux, sous des angles assez fermés (ce que montre le rapport pour le Fitzgerald et qu’on devine assez nettement vu la forme de la brèche du McCain)
      • structurellement, un navire marchand n’a pas à prévoir de circulation entre ses compartiments

    • Sur l’incompétence des commentateurs, je remarque qu’aucun n’a fait la remarque que le navire de guerre coupe la route d’un bâtiment de commerce dans un rail…

      L’hypothèse d’une cyberattaque relève du délire. Mais peut-être que les hackers russes ou chinois dont déjà capables aujourd’hui de liquéfier les cervelles d’une équipe de quart en passerelle, après tout de quoi ne sont-ils pas capables ?

      Si le GPS est tombé en rade ou a été piraté, on dispose d’autres moyens de navigation, mille sabords, notamment en vue de terre. Bon sang, l’abordage a eu lieu à 5 miles du principal phare de la région et à 10 miles de la côte ! Si la passerelle a besoin du GPS pour naviguer, il y a lieu de s’interroger sur les compétences requises pour être officier de quart dans l’US Navy.

      Mais, de fait, on en est bien là : couper la route d’un navire dans le rail (je sais je me répète, mais ça ne passe pas !…)

      EDIT : là, en fait, je mords sur le fil du McCain

    • Et pour finir, le titre Red over Red fait référence à une maxime anglaise pour retenir les feux de signalisation

      Red over Red
      The Captain is Dead

      et de jour

      Vessel not under command

      cf. il n’y a pas longtemps, mais dans un tout autre contexte :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/621727#message621731 Navire non maître de sa manœuvre

    • Je viens de regarder pour le McCain. C’est pas mal aussi. C’est surtout l’analyse de la vacuité des rapports officiels qui m’a intéressé ainsi que la manière dont les médias orientent leurs papiers pour intéresser sans pour autant fournir du contenu digne de ce nom, je veux dire, du travail journalistique, « à la papa » comme dirais davduf