楼主: 郭国汀


 楼主| 发表于 11/12/2014 02:57:44 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/12/2014 03:34 编辑

Jacques Guillermaz, translated by Anne Destenay, The Chinese Communist Party in Power 1949-1976, (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press 1976, pp. 207-241.

China imported grain Australia and Canada 60 million tons were brought in 1961(worth $350 million). in May 1962, 200000 Cantonese peasants, tired of hunger, reached Hong Kong.

at first bad weather conditions alone were responsible for the difficulties,more than 60million hectares out of 106 million were affected, 26 million of these seriously(230). (Editorials of Dec 29, 1960, and January 1, 1961), People's Daily.)

in view of the serious natural calamities that affected agricultural production for two successive years(230).

Mao told Francois Mitterand that calamities that had been "unknown for a century" had stuck the country; he denied the existence of famine, but admitted to a " scarcity"(L' Express,  January 23, 1961). a few month later, speaking to Field Marshal Montgomery, Mao stated that the grain harvest for 1960 had been 150 million tons.Sunday Times (Magazine Section), London (October 15, 1961).

Kang Chao, Agricultural Production in Communist China, 1949-1965(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970) chapter 10. from 1958 up to 1965 for grain (in million tons): 205, 170, 150, 160, 170, 182, 195, 200.

Li Fuchun's report to the national people's congress on march 30, 1961, gives teh last firm figres published before 1970. show that grain harvested in 1959 was 270 million tons, 1962, 250 million tons(236). in Li fuchun's report, agricultural production in 1959 at 78300 million yuan (16.7 percent more than in 1958)!

Li Xiannien read teh state budget for 1959 ( income 54,160 million yuan, expenditures 52,700 million yuan) and including 500 million yuan to aid to foreign countries(239)!
 楼主| 发表于 11/12/2014 04:44:30 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/12/2014 15:53 编辑

Jonathan D.Spence, The Search for Modern China, 2ed, W.W. Norton & Company, New York.London 1999 pp.544-564

the grain production figures had been disastrously over inflated. teh announced total for 1958 of 375 million tons of grain had to be revised downward to 250 million tons (Western economists later guessed that actual production was around 215 million tons) p.550.

Mao declared openly that "If the worst came to the worst and half of mankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist"(545 quoted at Stuart Schram, The Political Thought of Mao (New York, 1972)pp.408-409)

the huge people's militia that was developed during the GLF. allegedly 220 million militia , and 30 million furnished with modern or primitive firearms, provided a potential rival to the PLA(550).

Mao claimed at Lushan that "I will to to the countryside to lead the peasants to overthrow the government. if those of you in the PLA won't follow me, then I will go and find a  Red Army , and organize another liberation army." "the chaos caused was on a grand scale and I take responsibility. comrades, you must all analysze your own responsibility if you have to shit, shit! if you have to fart, fart! you will feel much better fort it. "(552)

Mao insisted on the heightened extraction of a dwindling peasant surplus. in 1959 grain exports to the soviet union were also increased to pay for more heavy machinery. the average amount of grain available to each person in china's countryside,which had been 205 kilos in 1957 and 201 in 1958, dropped to a disastrous 183 in 1959, and a catastrophic 156 in 1960, 154 in 1961. the result was famine on a gigantic scale, a famine that claimed 20 million live or more between 1959 and 1962. many others died shortly thereafter from the effects of the GLF(553).

In June 1961, Chen Yun made a crucial investigation in Qingpu Shanghai, who came up with five basic recommendations.sent 30 million peasants back to countryside; thousands inefficient GLF industrial enterprises dismantled; 6 % land restored to peasants as plots; private markets reopened; individual households responsible for fixing of output quotas. Liu, Zhou and Deng forward Chen's report to Mao, relactuntally Mao aggred(560).

Great leap famine sparked corruption. given enormous local autonomy in decision making to meet unrealistic national quotas, cadres adjusted to famine conditions by ruthlessly protecting themselves and those in their favor, while confiscating grain from the weaker or those they did not favor(561).
 楼主| 发表于 11/12/2014 18:58:02 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/13/2014 01:52 编辑

John K.Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China A new History, enlarged Ed, Harvard University press Cambridge, London 1998.pp.368-382.

In 1958-1960 some 20-30 million people lost their lives through malnutrition and famine because of the polies imposed upon them by the Chinese Communist Party(368), is one of the greatest of human disasters.

the steel campaign begun in July 1958 to produce steel form backyard furnaces . some 50000 reported set up by the end of July. 190000 in August, 700000 by the end of september, and a milion in Octoer! more than 100 million people were engaged in this "battle for steel"(371).

the state statistical bureau claimed that in 1958 production of food crops and cotton had doubled than 1957, the Central Committee set ambitious targets for 1959 to increase again by 50%! In 1959 grain produce in fact drop down but statistical boasting doubling of output, state requisitions further highter, Mao in March 1959 order to procumate 30% of grain, which led to a first class manmade famine(372).

the higher than usual mortaity did not become known until the statistics were worked out. not until 1960 was it finally realized that many peasants were starving and the whole economy had been thrown into a shambles.(372-3)
 楼主| 发表于 11/12/2014 22:52:35 | 显示全部楼层


杨继绳：人的生命需要能量维持，生命的活动就是能量的循环。机体静卧在摄氏20度的环境中，完全处于休息状态，既无体力劳动，也无脑力劳动， 肠胃也不蠕动。65公斤体重的男子，24小时需要的能量是1560千卡。农民在野外从事重体力劳动，一天需要能量在3400－4000千卡之间。在大饥荒期间，中国农村平均口量定量为每天0.35斤大米，折合热量618千卡。农民每天差2000多千卡的能量。人体的能量入不敷出时，首先动用体内储存的“糖原”，。体内存储的“糖原”可以维持一天。下一步就消耗体内的脂肪。完全依靠脂肪产生热量可能发生代谢性酸中毒。体内存储的脂肪消耗完毕时，便开始分解体内各器官、肌肉中的蛋白质。蛋白质被分解，使各脏器萎缩：肾脏萎缩出现肾功能不全；胃肠道黏膜萎缩，使营养消化吸收减少······由蛋白质组成的各种抗体、各种酶也迅速减少，这就会出现一系列疾病。生命力顽强的人，在这个过程中没有死，最后因心脏的蛋白质被分解，就因心肌萎缩心力衰竭而死。什么叫饿死？是在人体能量严重短缺的情况下，在消化人体自身的过程中，产生一系列的疾病而死。
杨继绳：没有反对声音，谁敢有反对声音？那时我们到鱼塘角大队修水库，路经一个村庄，看到几个小孩站在路边喊：“大跃进，饿肚睏! 大跃进，饿肚睏！”，这是我听到的唯一反对声音。
东方历史评论： 你当时认为写这个口号是正确还是错误？
为什么伟大的理想造就了“伟大”的悲剧？也可以从哈耶克的著作里找到答案：因为中国的革命者是按照“伟大的乌托邦”（哈耶克语）构建的制度。这个制度是“根据某些有意识构造的‘蓝图’对我们的一切活动加以集中管理和组织。” “每一件事都由独一无二的中心加以指导。”这个制度企图“组织整个社会及其资源达到单一目标，而拒绝承认个人目的至高无上的自主领域。”这个“单一目标”就是“伟大的乌托邦”——共产主义。


 楼主| 发表于 11/12/2014 23:06:06 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/13/2014 03:14 编辑

Harry G.Gelber, The Dragon and the Foreign Devils : Chian and the World, 1100 BC to the Present, Bloomsbury London 2007.pp.355-363.

a new social revolution ws needed to galvanise the people, hasten China's development and overtake Moscow as socialism's champion. that drive culminated in teh great leap forward, a gigantic experiment in social enginaeering and mass mobilisation; a franzied drive for both industrialization and rural reform(355-6).

many western enthusiasts cheered it all. the French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre thought Mao's great leap forward was " profoundly moral"(356).

in 1959/1960 matters were made much worse by bad weather(357). there were huge famines between 1959 and 1961 in which some 30 million people or more died. in short, the great leap was a disaster a man made catastrophe.


 楼主| 发表于 11/13/2014 04:04:13 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/14/2014 00:49 编辑

O. Edmund Clubb, 20th Century China, New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1964.pp.352-367. Mr. Clubb is the last US Consul General in Peping,has llectured on Chinese history at Columbia U, New Your U, Brooklyn College.

in Nov 1957 at tortieth anniversary of Soviet revolution communist world celebrated, Mao made speech " the East wind is prevailing over the west wind" , and he magnanimously said:" thesocialist camp should have a leader, and that leader is the societ union. "(352)

at the feb 1958 meeting of the National People Congress a call for performance of " a great leap forward" in economic developments during the next three years.

forced keeping the sparrows in flight by noise and movement from the ground until they fell exhausted and killed. It claimed a billion sparrows had been liquidated(358). Mass mobilizzation of 100 million peasants between Oct 1957 and June 1958 for work on irrigation projects. on Oct 1, 1958, People's daily made a pround claim: "with the great leap forward in production, communism has already begun to push forth sprouts in our actual life". china was entering the stage of communism in the Marxian process before the Soviet Union! at the end of the year, The CCP announced tremendous production increases. agricultureal production was up approximately 100 % over 1957!with the output of grain and cotton both doubled.

China in 1953 t0 1957 emphasis on heavy industry. which means that capital funds for industrialization should be squeezed from the peasantry, but the margin of surplus was exceedingly samll. in past Chinese peasants enjoyed men had averaged 200 days, women 100 days of work under the old system. under the GLF, they were not even given enough time for sleep(361).

Right after the 1958 harvest Beijing had taken note of peasant unrest and various shortcomings in onnection with the GLF(361).The various malfunctionings in agriculture naturally did not entirely escape the Party's attention(362). From Wuhan Resolution of Dec 10, 1958 commune members were again going to be made responsible for their own basic support. " we should not declare that communes will enter communism immediately...emphasis on money wages  in relation to free supply. return to the incentive doctrine. proposed that peasants homes, personal property, personal savings and vegetable patches be returned to them. permitted engage in side activities.as for the mess hall, peasants might eat at home if theychose(363). the resolution provided for the dispatch into the countryside of tidying up commissions which were charged with investigating the operation of the communes...some ten thousand such investigators went to work in each province. Mao and Liu went on tours of investigation. corretions of the excesses began(364). From Dec 1958 to Aug 1959, there was extensive reappraisal of the communes with various adjustments of detail. the truth could no longer be hidden , and it was now announced that the grain production in 1958 had not in fact been 375 million tons as claimed, but only 250 million tons ( in fact only 205 million tons ! and expert opinion has computed the 1958 grain production to have been actually about 190 milliom tons. but the cost had been tremendous (365). steel production had not been 11 million tons but only 8. and it was admitted that 3 million tons of steel turned out by the backyanr furnaces had proved useless(364).
next undertook measures of fundamental adjustment. system of three levels of ownership. commune, production brigde, and production teams.after the harvesting of the 1959 crop there was a further adjustment of wages: a maximum of 40% of the peasant's income would be in the form of supplies, and 60% in cash wages(365). which is not equal compensation, but accordance with work outut and political attitudes.

the significance of the whole development was that there had been an increased transfer of responsibility for the care of movable farm property and for the raising of crops back to the peasantry, and incentives had been built into the structure of the counnes no longer would the peasant be compensated according to his need(365).

the target figure for grain output in 1959 first exuberantly fixed at 525 mt; then cut down to 275 mt; at the end Peking asserted that the country had produced 270 mt, thus exceedign the alleged production of 1958 by 20 mt(365). actual figure is believed to have been some 180 mt(366). weather condition during the crop season had been bad, and the claim was undoubtedly spurious, as indicated by domestic food supply conditions and the contry's export position.

No figures were issued for 1960 production in agriculture, but it is known that grain output dropped approximatedly 155 mt. Peking was forced to ask the Soviet Union to grant China postponement of payment of $300 million due on its trade account for 1960. then in early 1961, it entered the world market to buy grain and contractrd for the purshase of some 10 million tons of food grains from Canada, Australia, Argentina, Franceand Burma(366).

Peking blame teh existing situation in the main on natural calamities but never memtion any Soviet forced China to pay debts neither memtion the famine in his work which published in 1964(366-7).

 楼主| 发表于 11/13/2014 16:24:10 | 显示全部楼层

郭德宏 林小波


(博讯北京时间2010年9月15日 转载)

 楼主| 发表于 11/14/2014 01:02:59 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/14/2014 02:29 编辑

Jack Chen, Inside The Cultural Revolution, New York, London, MacMillan Publing Co.,Inc 1975 pp.123-151 in the title " Two Lines in conflict 1958 -1962. Jack Chen, son of Eugene Chen , twice foreign minister of China

communes mobilized labor capital began thousands of basic capital construction projects: building water conserfancy and irrigation and drainage systems, terracing hillsides, sinking wells raising dams, builiding dykes, digging reservoirs, leveling fields(125)." with an almost unbrokenrecord of past successes to its credit, the Party had enormous popular prestige."(125)

"when the natural calamities of 1959 -1961 cut down harvest yields, worried leaders took to raiding peasant homes to ferret out needed food and fodder(129). "farming in 1959 was hit by an unexampled run of bad weather and natural calamities: drought, floods, typhoons, hailstorms, and pests that played havoc with what harvests there were(132)." " but again that year(1959) all kinds of natural disaters beset China's farms(133)". "bad weather continued into 1960, and it was only in 1961 that the country began to get back onto an even keel(133).

when the real figures were extracted , China's 1958 harvest was under 200 million tons of grain(129).

In Nov and Dec 1959 sixth plenum of the eightth central committee adopted urgent measures to offset the growing xrisis. Private trade permited in country markets; individual households rebuilt their stoves and kitchens and their pigsties and chichen coops allocated small private plots 5-7% of coummune land(132). 240000 communes were split into 70000.

the initial mistakes made in organizing the communes and the horreous bad weather, in fact threow China's economy into a crisis that took three years to overcome. the nation was brought to the verge of famine(133)... though various self help, along with the centralied organizatin of the communes and a strict rtioning system, pulled the country through the crisis without grave loss of life. yet there was serious malnutrition in some places, and the birthrate dropped sharply as ill nourished women ceased to conceive(133).

by 1962... all debts to the Soviet U were paid off. these included payments for all the Soviet weapons and munitions used during the Korean war. domestic bonds were all redeemed, and the country without either internal or external debts(134). " we learned the full truth we all realized better that the basis of any great leap must be self reliance(135). " when "three years of difficulties" plagued the nation in the wake of the GL(135)

liu Shaoqi joined his voice to the chorus of opponents of the communes. the peasants " had gained nothing from the collective economy in the last few years". Liu in a speech to cadres going to the grass roots level, July 18, 1962. Deng Xiaoping's famous remark that so long as it raises output, ' going it alone is permissible. whether cats are wite or black, so long as they can catch mice, they are good cats."

in July 1959, speaking off thecuff to a group friends during the festival of literature and art of the PLA, Zhou Yang charged that the GLF has "exploited the enthusiansm of the masses"(146)
 楼主| 发表于 11/14/2014 02:55:17 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/17/2014 14:06 编辑

Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade, implications for U.S. Policy, New York, Toronto, London McGraw Hill Book Co. 1966( professor of economics at the U of Michigan, author of The National Income of Communist China)

" Mistaken policies combined with unfavorable weather led to the agricultural crisis in China(57). all the blame was officially placed on nature. before 1949, China was largely self sufficient in performing the supplied food to the population and provide raw materials for the food producing and textile industries function. not served as the principal bulwark of the exports(57)

state statistical bureau in 1958 claimed that the jproduction of food crops and cotton nearly doubled in one year, i.e., increased from 185 mt and 1.64 mt respectively in 1957 to 375 (claimeed on April 15, 1959 People's daily but on August 27 revised to 250 mt; see Eckestene 63)and 3.35 mt in 1958. thus the targets of the 12 year program for agricultural development enunciated in 1956 were allegedly atttained by 1958 !(p. 61 and see Zhou Enlai's "Report on Government Work" at the first session of the second National people's congress on April 18, 1959 ( New China semimonthly) no. 9, May 6, 1995, p.2.) on this base, the central committee went ahead and set extremely ambitious targets for 1959 as well, 525 mt for food crops and 5 mt for cotton.( People's daily Dec 18, 1958; )

In 1958 the Chinese press constantly reported food shortages...there is no indication taht mainland China's storage and warehousing facilities could have accommodated about 40 million tons of grain. neither is there any evidence of an ambitious program of warehouse construction. If so much food had been stroed in 1958, and more added in 1959, there should have been ample stocks to cope with the officially admitted farm production shortages in 1960 and 1961 and the resultant food crisis(64).

China claimed grain production in 1958 was 375 first then revised to 250 mts, and 275 then revised to 270 mts in state statistical bureau, see Ten Great Years, Statistics of the Economic and Cultural PRC (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960),p.119. which indicate that food crop production incresed by 35 % in 1958 and by another 8 % in 1959. but after releasing the annual communique for 1959 plan fulfillment in January 1960, The SSB stopped publishing annual production results(64). however, it has been admitted officially that production declined after 1958(65). By 1963 it mayhave recovered to only about 75% of its 1957 level(66).

all indictions point to 1960/61 as the most critical year. the foood situation in China reached its low point in the spring of 1961 (67). Grain imports were stepped up 5.8 mts in 1961/1962 as compared to 2.6 mts in 1960/1961(68). the average per capita caloric intake in China has traditionally been low 2000 to 2200 calories a day(67). a 10-20 per cent reduction can have deleterious effects. Such a decline was already in process well before 1957(67). during the period of the first five year plan the average per capita consumption of pork, other meats, and eggs in Shanghai and Tientsin reportedly droped. (p. 67 see Dagong Bao Tianjin sept 1, 1956. People daily November 27, 1958).

" acute economic crisis of the early 1960s"(1) and China's agricultural crisis of the early 1960s"(6)."agricultural difficulties and a subsequent crisis in the food supply"(9)."acute food crisis of the early 1960s"(67). rising "incidence of nutritional diseases"(68) which have been most widespread in 1961. while the food crisis has been serious there have been no indicaton of mass famines(68) ! the winter of 1960/1961 was so serious thtat even military rations had to be cut.  in some areas there were apparently peasant uprisings and almost complete disintegration of local administration and authority(68).see the top secret Bulletin of Activities of the General Political Department of the Chinese PLA for January 1-August 26, 1961.

the govenment's capital investment in agriculture, forestry, and soil and water conservation averaged around 9 % of total investment during the 1950s(68) which sank below 5 % in the mid fifties. India devoted 32 % then 20 % at roughly the same stage of China.

in the construction of irrigation canals, dams, and other water conservation projects. land reform,mutual adi teams, collectives, communes. thus Chinese agriculture was in a state of constant instaility between 1949 and 1956. shift of resources, incentive rewards, egalitarian wage system, each according to his need. shifting of labour disruption of agricultureal production. production brigades, production team, private garden plots, raise livestock, communal mess halls abandoned. creat a system which would permit the regime to extract the maximunm supluses from agriculture without interfering with farm production(78).the central purpose of collectiviation was to create institutions which would bring about a hight rate of saving inthe economy(79).

the GLF was launched on a series of miscalculations, errors in plan design, and serious mistakes in plan implementatin. the depression reached its depth in 1961. In spite of the recent setbacks and just by virtue of its sheer size, China must be ranked among the 10 leading industrial powers in teh world. in terms of total industrial production capacity, althought not in terms of per capita product. China has the economic capability to support a military establishment of such tange and scope that she will be able to pursue her great power ambitions on the Asian continent. the GLF and its aftermath have tarnished the image of success, but not as much as one might expect. increasing foreign adi commitments to underdeveloped countries, coupled with technical assistance and deliveries of industrial equipment, have to some extent at least obscured Chinas economic setback. (84-86)

 楼主| 发表于 11/15/2014 03:57:03 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/17/2014 06:32 编辑

The Memoirs of Mao's personal physician Dr.Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, translated by Professor Tai Hungchao, New York Random House, 1994,pp.198-398.

Mao told Li" I never realized they(democratic parties) were so unreliable ". "They are nothing but a bunch of bandits and whores" he said(201). Mao, I know now, was being disingenuous, his strategy of using the intellectuals to criticize his foes within the party had backfired(202). Deng Xiaoping was put in charge of the anti-rightist campaign. what vengeance Deng conducted the anti-rightist campaign and how viciously he attacked those who would unermine the party's rule(207). in July 17 1957, Mao published "the political conditions in teh summer of 1957" said the tusk was to supass the US economically within forty or fifty years(209)."if we were to add up all teh landlords, rich peasants, conterrevolutionary, bad elements and rightists, reach thrity millions, they are enemies of the people.mao said to Li(217).

how little the lives of his countrymen meant to Mao. "we have so many people we can afford to lost a few. what difference does it make? Mao ask Li(217).

In November 1957 Mao return to Moscow triumphant, Khrushchew was firendly and respectful to Mao, personally escorting him to the Kremlin palace where he was to stay(220). "look how differently they are treating us now" what snobs!" Mao said. "wihin fiteen years China will overtake teh Great Britain in the production of steel and other major industrial products. whole world would be ripe for the communist revolution." Mao said to the assembled delegates(224). Mao neither has basis for asserting nor knowledge of waht the capitalist world was like. A new strategy was germinating in his mind. the seeds of his great leap forward the most utopian and misguided of all his polies had been sown(225).

in Juanary 11 1958 at Nanning conference, the majority of party planners did not share Mao's goal of catching up with England in fifteen years,and Mao spent much of the eleven days attacking the cautious leaders in charge of planning, development, and finance. few escaped his whip even Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun were criticized( 229). Bo Yibo, the chairman of the state economic commission., known for his caution, under Mao's gun he too was under great psychological strain. Huang Jing, the chairman of the state technology commission, cracked under the strain, he lying in bed, staring at the ceiling, muttering incomprehensibl, "save me, save me" he kept beggin Dr. Li(230). He knelt down before Li Fuchun and kowtowed , begging Li to free him and spare his lilfe. He was put in a hospital in Guang Zhou, where he tried to escape by jumping form a window and broke a leg in teh process, he died in Novermer 1958.

Mao has faith in teh young and the unschooled or uneducated. He said that Sun Yat sen was not a man of learning. he hasd only a hight school education when he began his revolution. " the great scholars hav always been overthrown by the young and uneducated"(235).  "Intellectuals are unstable, swinging with the wind" they read a lots of books, but they are ignorant of real life". Mao at Chendu conferance said to Li (236). To express skepticism about the unrealistically high output targets was to risk being labeled a rights. the force of Mao's will gradually silenced those who disagreed, and those who pandered to him began to lie, agreeing to higher targets even when they knew those targets were impossible to obtain, claiming to have reached those targets even when they had fallen short. the party was beginning to lie, an dMao seemed to like best the most outageous liars(236)

I was astounded Deng Yingchao was not honest, and she had cousulted with Zhou Enlai, I realized that Zhou was Mao's slave, absolutely, obsequiously obedient. everythng he did was designed to court favor with Mao. and be loyal to Mao. Neither he nor his wife had a shred of independentthought(258).

Jiang Qing said to Li "Doctor, you donot understand the Chairman, he is very loose with his love life. his physical pleasre and his mental activity are separate, and there are alwys women willing to be his prey. you have to teach these young nurses something about morality. they should be courteous to their leader, but they should also be careful in their contact with him"(260).Jiang saw reality clearly Mao's appetite for sex was enormous, and sex and love were separate.

Mao returned the extravagant hospitality given him in the Soviet U with a slap in Khrushchev's face(261).On July 31, 1958, He received him by the side of his swimming pool, clad only in his swimming trunks. Khrushchev did not then acknowledge the insult. Mao was deliberately playing the role of emperor , treating Khrushchev like the barbarian come to pay tribute. Mao told me on teh way back to Beidaihe it was a way of sticking a needle up his ass"(261). their real purpose is to control us. they are trying to tie our hands and feet. the Soviet proposed the creation of a joint fleet and wanted to build a long range radio station in CHina.  He want a promise from China not to attack Taiwan. he also criticizing China for beginning a program to amalgamate the agricultural collectives into huge peoples communes(262). Mao told him the joint fleet with his ships and our captains. Taiwan is our own domestic affair. we will definitely give the communes a try(262). "Khrushchev wants to improve relations with the US? good, we'll congratulate him with our guns. our cannon shells have been in storage for so long they are becoming uselss. so wy donot we just use them for a celebration? let us get the US involved. Maybe we can get the US to drop an atom bomb on Fujian. Maybe ten or twenty million people will be killed(262). " let us leave Taiwan alone. Taiwan keeps the pressure on us. it helps maintain our internal unity. "262

by early 1958, with Mao's efforts to whip up party support for his approach, Internal Reference had turned 180 degrees, glorifying the great advances that were taking place throughout the country. "this is an extraordinary event the term people's commune is great. " Mao said.

Mao's political secretary Tian Jiaying always exceptionally well informed, not just from the reports that came in through Internal Reference but because he was continually receiving confidential background material from the provinces and from his friends and lower level political secretaries all over China. He point out that when advanced cooperatives were introduced in 1956, the peasants complained that we were going too fast. commune economically unsound, a way for the provincial leaders to escape Mao's whip, a new method of courting favor with the Chairman(266). Tian said the provincial leaders wanted to show the they were doing their best to carry out the decisions on Chengdu and Nanning, they used all sorts of tricks to get the central authority's attention and went into a frenzy competing with each other to increase production targets. they all wanted to be in the vanguard(266).

on August  23, 1958 Mao's answer Khrushchev by shells Quemoy island. seeing Khrushchev's efforts at world peace as an attempt to control him an China, Mao deliberately tried to trip up the game. Mao was convinced that Jiang Jie shi wanted the US todrop an atom bomb on Fujian and Mao would not have minded if it had. His shelling of Quemoy was a dare to see how far the US would go. Khrushchev thought he wanted to retake Taiwan. but that was never Mao's intention(270). the game Mao play was a terrible gamble, threatening the world with atomic war and risking the lives of tens of millions of ordinary Chinese(271).

Mikoyan came to meet Mao in Hangzhou in 1957 to talks on CHina's proposed development of nuclear weapons. the discuss with Mao shaken him, and greatly distressed by Mao's nonchalance about the massive loss of human life(206). Mao argued that China could afford to lose tens of millions of people in a nuclear war.Mikoyan described the horrible destructiveness of the atom bomb. hoped China would learn from the experience of the Soviet U and cease trying to build the bomb. the costs millions and millions of rubles, and the debilitating illness aplastic anemia.

on september 19, 1958 at Hefei Mao was beginning to talk about establishing a free food supply system in teh rural communes, so people could eat all they wanted without have to pay. he talked about taking cadres off salaries and returning them to a free suppy system similar to the one that had existed until 1954(274). Mao thought the problem could be solved by establishing communes in the cities too(275).Mao had doubts the backyard steel furnaces and whether such small scale millis were to catch up with Great British in fifteen years."why do foreigners build such gigantic steel mills? are forigners really s stupid?"(276)

Tian Jiaying argued that it is absurd to think we can march into a communist society by dragging a naked and starving population along with us. peopld are telling lies, boasting. they have lost their sense of shame. some of the reports coming in from the provinces, were claiming average grain yields per mu of ten thousand pounds. " this ridiculous it is shameful" Tian said.(276) He blamed the deceit on teh atmosphere created by Mao. " when the king of Chu was looking for a consort with a pretty figure, all his councubines starved to death trying to lose weight". Mao was accustomed to sycophancy and flattery. top level officials put pressure on the lower ones, and lower level cadres coplied both by working the peasants relentlessly and by reporting what their superiour wanted to hear. In the later summer of 1958 China was stuk with a mass hysteria fed by Mao. Mao began believing the slogans, casting caution to the winds.  Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, and Chen Yi, speaking with a single voice and that is Mao's . everyone was caught in the grip of this utopian hysteria(277).

every communes Mao visited provided tesimony to the abundance of the upcoming harvest.  Mao's earlier skepticism had vanished. The Party secretaries had ordered furnaces constructed everywhere along the rail route, stretching out for ten li on either side, and the women were dressed so colorfully, in reds and greens. because they had been ordered to dress that way. In Hubei, party secretary Wang Renzhong had ordered the peasants to remove rice plants from faraway fields and transplant them along Mao's route, to give the impression of a wildly abundant crop. All China all the people performaers in an extravaganza for Mao(278)

Li had seen in Anhui the finished steel that Zeng Xisheng claimed had been produced by the backyard steel furnace was fke, delivered there from a huge modern factory(278).Lin De said that the newspapers were filled with falsehoods, they would not dare tell the public what was really happpening". but Li did not really believe Lin Ke. He was swept away by the dream of the GLF, caught up in its delusions. He still trusted the party , Mao, the People's Daily. (279). No one, even the cloest to him dared to speak out. Li said even in October 1958, He doubted theat Mao really know the truth. on November 2 to 10 Henan conferance, Mao now was trying to slow them down he was putting a brake on the most fantastical claims. but about the production figures and the backyard furnaces. he had no complaints. (280)

From November 28 to December 10 1958 Wuhan the Sixth Plenum continued the effort to bring more reality to the Great Leap Forward. Zhou flattery Mao said that "Today we have that kind(one day equals twenty years ) of productive power"(282).Ke Qingshi followed suit" Haven's we already outdone Marx in both theory and practice?"

Agricultural production in the fall of 1958 was the highest in China's history. but by mid December, the nation was seriously short of food(282).in fact, a large portion of the huge harvest lay uncollected in teh fields. for massive peasants had been transferred from the fields to work in the backyard steel furnaces.  in fact, Li did not know it then, China was tottering on the brink of disaster. the leading cadres of the party and first party secretaries in the provinces were ingratiating themselves with Mao. disregarding the welfare of hundreds of millions of peasants.  taxed according to their faked reports some places were delivering all they had produced to the state.  Ironically, much of the grain that was sent to the statte as taxes was exported. repaying its debts to the Soviet U Mao could not admit that the communes Khrushchev had so vigorously opposed were anything less than a success(283).

to minimize their losses and keep enough food to eat, communes were saying that they had been struck by natural disaster. their harvest had been abundant, but the weather had destroyed it(283). Dec 1958, Tian Jiaying was the best informaed and the most honest, he was in Henan, investigating the situation there(284) . In Dec 1958 at Changsha, Zhou Ziaozhou was the first to cirticize Mao. then In Dec 26 at Guangzhou, Mao wondered occasionally whether land really could produce ten thousand pounds per mu and was also susicious about the quality of steel being produced in teh backyard steel furnaces. "is that steel really useful"?

in the new year 1959, beijing was in panic, rumors that ruban communes were soon to be established had swept the city(288).Mao heard the hue and cry of the urban residents and soon abandoned his plan for urban communes. Tian Jiaying warned that this was only the beginning. the wholes nation faced a serious shortage of food. and no end was in sight(290).

In Late January 1959 Mao went to northeast to see both steel factories and coal mines and conclusive. high quality steel can be produced ony in huge modern factories using reliable fuel, like coal. but he gave no order to halt the backyard steel furnaces(291). when the seventh Plenum of the eighth party central committee met in shanhai form April 2 to 5 1959 Mao was still optimistic. Mao blain the party leadership for the dislocations of the GLF. false reports and inflated statistics were rampant. "there are so many lies" he said to Li" when there is pressure from the top  there will be lies from the bottom"(295). but the real pressure had come from Mao. he himself had created the atmosphere that made it so difficult for party leaders to tell the truth, Mao saw the fault not in himself but in other leaders, In mid April 1959, congress accepted Mao's resignation as chairman of the republic. Elected Liu in stead(297).

at the end of May 1959, Mao went to Wuhan again, Wang Renzhong claimed the the famine was the result of natural disasters. but there had been no natural disaster in Hubei. the weather in 1958 and 1959 had been splendid. much of the abundant crop had simply not been colleted(299).then Mao back Shaoshan, "if you can not fill your bellies at the publich dining hall then its better just to disband it" Mao said " if you cannot produce good steel , you might as well quit"(304).Mao stll did not want to do anything to dampen the enthusiasm of the masses(304). a horrible famine was sweeping the country.

Tian Jiaying described the famine in Sichuan. the government's efforts to alleviate the crisis had been inadequate. the overly optimistic target for steel production in 1959 had been cut form 20 mt to 13 mt. in July ,,but 60 million able bodied peasants, strong and healthy men who ought to have been at work in the fields, were still working on the backyand steel furnaces(306). Tian was distressed not only because so many people were starving but because so many in authority were lying. people speaking falsehoods are being praised ; the ones who tell the truth are being critiized. Mao was a terrible economist. Wang Jinxian began telling us about Mao's many girlfriends, his private life was shockingly indecent. Wang said(307).

Ke Qingshi, Wang Renzhong and LiJingquan joined our conversation wondering waht we are discussing with such intensity. "we are talking about the famine people are dying of starvation" Tian replied. Li responded " which dynasty has not witnessed death by starvation "? but in 1959, China was supposed to be in teh GLF. even as people starved official propaganda was msking fantasti claims(307). Wang, Ke and Li, under pressure from Mao to increase production or lose their jobs, sacrificed truth on the altar of Mao. they extolled the GLF and mininized their economic problems, feeding the central authority unrealistic ecnommic statistics because they knew what the center wanted to hear. they were supported by central ofiicials like Luo Ruiqing, and Yang Shankun, whose official responsibilies were unrelatedto economic questions but who were attuned to Mao's policy preferences , has been criticized. early teh GLF Bo Yibo resisted setting such unrealistic production targets, but later under pressure from Mao, he had caved in and done everything he could to push his subordinates to meet them. When he realized how serious the econmic crisis was, he instructed is staff to prepare an honest and comprehensive report detailing the problems. but he balked at submitting the report. He dared not challenge Mao. He refused to speak out. Bo never publicly criticized the GLF, nor did Li Fuchun(308). even Tian Jiaying, who has been on inspection tours and know the truth, or provincial leaders like Zhou Xiao zhou, who know the extent of the crisis and was privately critical of both the GLF  and of Mao. were reluctant to challenge Mao directly. at Lushan conferance, Mao know there were proplems with the GLF and he believed measures were being taken to correct those problems .Mao praised the achievements of the GLF. his confidence in the GLF remained unshaken, I do not know how much of the real situation Mao know when he spoke then. He certainly know that something had gone awry and that there were major shortages of food. he hkew that in many places there was no rice to eat, and he was willing to isuss those problems and work to slve them. but I do not think that when he spoke on July 2 1959, he know how bad the disaster had become, and he believed the party was doing everthing it could to manage the situation. " IN short, the situation in general is excellent. there are man problems, but our future is bright". Mao said(310).

on July 10, 1959, the general line, he argued referring to the policy of the GLF and catching up with GB, was completely corredt. the achievement of the past year were great, it is nine achievements and one failure(313). Mao said we have to pay a certain tuition for the experience. the nation had lost some 2 billion Yuan in the endeavor to build steel furnaces. Peng Dehuai handwritten a letter to Mao on July 14, waste huge both natural resoursces and manpower the losses were greater than the gains. Leap has fostered leftist tendencies. a petit bourgeois fanaticism.

Deng Xiaoping was in Beijing hospital receiving round the clock treatment from a young nurse originally sent from Shanhai to Beijing to serve Mao. Shi shuhan told Li that the young woman became pregnant during this time and was trasferred back to Shanghai and forced to have a ahortion(315). Zhang Wentian responded by saying that he would rather die telling the truth than live in misery.

Tian Jiaying Chen Boda, and Hu Qiaomu had been setn to the provices to investigate the results of the GLF. all had witnessed economic disaster and widespread death by staration. Tian in Sichuan, Chen in Fujian, and Huin Anhui. all reported honestly(319).on August 16 1959, Mao wrote that a great struggle had occurred at the Lushan conference " it is a class struggle, a continuatin of the life and death struggle between the two great classes."

corruption within the party grew worse even as the food crisis deepened and more people died. in early January 1960, production targets went up steel production was to increase to 18 mt. irrigation projets would be expanded. large pig farms established. famine finally hit Zhongnanhai. our rations had been reduced to sixteen pounds of grain a month. meat, eggs, and cooking oil were nowhere to be had. Mao know the severity of the crisis. the cocuments he received every day now allowed him no escape from the truth. reports were coming in from all over the country, and by the summer of 1960, he become so depressed tht he took again to his bed. I told him that edema and hepatitis were everywhere(339). Mao did make one concession to the famine. He stpped eating meat. "everyone is starving. I cannot eat meat" he said(340).his gesture won him the admiration of everone who know. Mao believed that counterrevolutionaries were undermining production .

to this day, ruthless though he was, I believe Mao launches the GLF to bring good to China. but he had no modern education and no idea of what the modern world was or how China might join it(351)." I hate the hypocrisy around me, the communist leaders' public carping against the corrupt bourgeois life style, the touting of their hight and lofty communist moral principles ,while they themselves were living lives of luxury asthe masses suffered and toiled and died(354).

in march 1961 the most important issue facing China was the nationwide famine then claiming the lies of millions of peasants by early 1961, some 10 million Anhui peasants were on the verge of starvation and million s died in the ensuing months. hundreds of thousands, those with sufficient energy, were fleeing in search of food. Zeng Xisheng's enthusiasm for the GLF now desperately trying to restore agricultural productinon . he had beguin distributing small plots of communal land to indiviual peasants, who agreed to farm the land in returen for paying the commune a specified portion of their crop(375). Deng support of Zeng s proposal " I donot care if its a white cat or a black cat, it is a good cat so long as it catches mice?Chen Yun said the peasants are doing nothing now but complain, all we have to do is give the peasants their own land disband the communes . Tao Zhu said " if this is capitalism then I prefer capitalism . Liu Shaoqi said we have to go into maximum retreat in both industry and agriculture. we need to dopt the system of household contracts and individualized frming." In 1960 Mao meeting with British Marshal Bernard Montgomery, " if you cannot push everything else aside and fight ruthlessly for your goal, then you will not reach it. you have to know exactly what you want and then rehtlessly remove every obstacle standing in your way. " " all the good party members are dead the only ones left are a bunch of zombies".(380) Mao never admitted thant he was in disgrace never openly acknowledged that the GLF had failed.

In Jaunary 1962 mao support within the party was at its lowest. Liu refused to accept Mao's official explanation that the country's economic disasters had been caused by the weather" natural dissters hit only one region of the country, manmade disasters strike the whole country, we must remember this lesson".  with Mao's retreat the basic level cadres were able at last to end the pretensions of the GLF(386). Mao was forced to admit that at least some of the responsibility for the disaster was his. Mao was loath to admit his mistakes.  Chen Boda had written well and extravagantly in priaisse of the GLF. asserted that with the GLF the dawn of communism had arrived. China was accomplishing in one day what took twenty years to accomplish under capitalism. communism was around the corner(390).with massive starvation during the GLF, Chen dismissed the millions of daths. " this is an unavoidable phenomenon in our forward march" he declared. he absolved Mao of responsibility for one of the greatest catastrophes the country had ever faced. a catastrophe for which Mao's policies were directly responsible. Chen Yun was convinecd that the only solution was a dissolution of the communes nad a returen of land to hte peasants.

Many formal fighters of freedom had contribute all of their energy even life, but China still under teh herous dictatorship tyrant ruling, it is shame of every Chinese!



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