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BIGSAS Working Papers 2/2012: Trends, Discourses and Representations in Religions in Africa
Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers
The “Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers” report on
ongoing projects, the results of current research and matters
related to the focus on African Studies at the University of
Bayreuth. There are no specific requirements as to the
language of publication and the length of the articles.
Contributions to this series may be submitted directly to the
editors; they can also be submitted via university lecturers
and professors or via the Institute of African Studies.
Acceptance is decided by the editors.
The “Bayreuth African Studies Working Papers” is chronicled
on the OPUS document server at the university library:
An electronic version of each volume is available on the IAS
Institute of African Studies
Executive Director: Ute Fendler
Vice Director: Ulrich Berner
Chief Editor: Manfred von Roncador
Universität Bayreuth
Institute of African Studies
95440 Bayreuth
Phone: +49 (0)921 555161
Fax: +49 (0)921 555102
Bayreuth International Graduate School of
African Studies (BIGSAS)
Since the year 2007, BIGSAS is part of the competitive ‘Excellence
Initiative’ by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the
German Council of Science and Humanities (WR). The basic aims of
BIGSAS are to bring together excellent young African and nonAfrican scholars to work jointly in the field of African Studies and to
offer a centre of creative and innovative PhD training and research.
On 15th June 2012, BIGSAS was one of the successful DGF funded
‘Centers of Excellence’ which were granted support for the next 5
years. BIGSAS has more than 100 junior fellows from 25 African,
American, Asian and European countries. BIGSAS builds on this
experience and offers a multi- and interdisciplinary research
environment based upon three clearly defined general Research
Areas which are:
A. Uncertainty, Innovation and the Quest for Order in Africa
B. Culture, Concepts and Cognition in Africa: Approaches through
Language, Literature and Media
C. Concepts and Conflicts in Development Cooperation with Africa
and Coping with Environmental Criticality and Disasters in Africa
The Research Areas allow for challenging theoretical studies
sensitive to emerging basic problems; they also take into account
practical questions and problems of the African continent. Thus, the
BIGSAS Research Areas encompass basic, strategic and applied
research. BIGSAS also contributes to the creation of an African
universities’ network. It brings together African and European
networks and fosters partnership not only between the University of
Bayreuth and universities in Africa but also between the universities
in Africa themselves. Six African Partner Universities, namely the
University of Abomey-Calavi, Cotonou (Benin), Moi-University,
Eldoret (Kenya), Université Mohammed V-Agdal, Rabat (Morocco),
Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo (Mozambique), the
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban (South Africa), and Addis Ababa
University (Ethiopia) cooperate closely with BIGSAS in recruitment,
selection, training and mentoring of doctoral students. Other partners
are the Universities of the Africa-Europe Group for Interdisciplinary
Studies, AEGIS.
PhD training in BIGSAS is based on various strategies which ensure
a quality in the field of African Studies: multi- and interdisciplinary
research with a multidisciplinary mentorship; specialist academic
training with a cross-disciplinarily focus; clearly structured Individual
Research Training Plans (IRTP). Also of high importance are: the
offer of employment-oriented transferable skills, individual career
planning, early integration into the international academic community,
shorter time-to-degree with structural and financial encouragements
or specific support of female Junior Fellows.
Over the past 20 years Bayreuth has amassed considerable
experience in co-ordinated research programmes, integrating various
disciplines into a stimulating research in the field of African Studies.
The Institute of African Studies (IAS) promotes 63 researchers and
coordinates African studies at the University of Bayreuth in 12 subject
groups distributed over four of the six faculties of the university.
Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies
Dean: Prof. Dr. Dymitr Ibriszimow
Vice Dean: Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Seesemann
Vice Dean: Prof. Dr. Martin Doevenspeck
Universität Bayreuth
Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies
95440 Bayreuth
Phone: +49 (0)921 55 5101
Fax: +49 (0)921 55 5102 e-mail:
BIGSASworks! aims at offering Junior Fellows at the Graduate
School of African Studies a platform for publishing research-related
articles. This new online-journal provides an excellent platform for
representing and promoting the idea of BIGSAS. It opens a space for
showcasing ongoing research, creating transparency of the work
carried out by Junior Fellows and providing a space for trying out
articles and working jointly on them towards further publication. Each
issue focuses on a certain thematic field or theoretical concept and
Junior Fellows from any discipline are invited to submit papers,
enabling common interests beyond the predetermined BIGSAS
research areas to flourish. At the same time BIGSASworks! offers its
work group participants deeper insights into and practical experience
of what it means to be an editor. Last but not least BIGSASworks!
makes BIGSAS and its research(ers), visible before their theses are
Bayreuth, August 2012
Meron Zeleke, Halkano Abdi Wario
Editors of this volume
Meron Zeleke is a Social Anthropologist who completed her PhD
study in BIGSAS in June 2012. The title of her dissertation is
‘Faith at the Crossroads: Religious Syncretism and Dispute
Settlement in Northern Ethiopia’. She obtained her MA degree in
Social Anthropology from Addis Ababa University and BA degree
in history from the same university. Her areas of expertise are
Gender, Traditional Institutions of conflict resolution, Religion and
peace. Meron has worked for three years as coordinator of the
work group of Religion in Contemporary Africa in BIGSAS
together with Halkano Abdi and have co-organized two
international workshops on Religion in Africa.
Halkano Abdi Wario is in the field of Islamic Studies and finished his
studies in April 2012. His research project was titled ‘Networking
the Nomads: A Study of Tablīghī Jamāʿat among the Borana of
Northern Kenya’. He did Bachelor and MPhil degrees at Moi
University in Kenya. His research interests include transnational
Islamic movements, religion and spatiality, religious reformism
among pastoralist communities of the Horn of Africa, Muslim
personal law courts and religion and media. Halkano has also
been a co-coordinator of the work group of Religion in
Contemporary Africa.
Foreword by Professor Ulrich Berner
Prof. Dr. Ulrich Berner
The first issue on religion in this journal deserves special attention
and appreciation. It comprises contributions from BIGSAS students
and alumni, representing different disciplines: Anthropology, Islamic
Studies, Religious Studies, Literature, and Economics. This collection
of articles mirrors the interdisciplinary composition of the BIGSAS
religion-workgroup, and such an interdisciplinary workgroup is a very
conducive, indeed ideal context for doing Religious Studies. As an
academic discipline, Religious Studies (or History of Religions which
would still be preferable as an equivalent for Religionswissenschaft)
should be done not in isolation but in collaboration, since its object –
religion – is not an entity of its own alongside literature, music, and
so on, but an aspect of human activities crossing the boundaries of
these various sections of culture. Therefore, the discipline of
Religious Studies has to be contextualized in the framework of
cultural studies.
In the past, Religious Studies has often dealt with its object in such a
way as isolating it from its historical context, in order to focus on and
take care of the specific “religious” character of the phenomena. In
more recent times, Religious studies scholars, as, for instance, Bruce
Lincoln, have rightly criticized this “decontextualizing” approach to
the study of religion. Taking into consideration the full context of
religious phenomena, means, according to this new critical approach,
focussing on conflicts and taking into account causes for conflict that
lie outside the religious field. This requirement for Religious Studies,
the contextualization of religious phenomena, is perfectly met by the
collection of articles in this issue of the BIGSAS works online journal.
The focus on conflict, however, must not lead to neglecting or even
ignoring cases of peaceful coexistence or even cooperation among
adherents of different religious traditions, as it is described in the first
contribution, based on fieldwork in Ethiopia. Thus the collection of
articles clearly shows the ambivalence of religion as having the
potential for intensifying conflict as well as strengthening peace or,
more precisely said: the divergent interpretations and appropriations
of a given religious tradition by its adherents.
The interdisciplinary composition of the religion-workgroup in
BIGSAS, corresponds well to the study and research program of the
department of Religious Studies (Lehrstuhl für Religionswissenschaft
I) at the University of Bayreuth, based on collaboration of experts in
different fields of Religious Studies: History (Ulrich Berner),
Anthropology with a focus on Ritual Studies (Magnus Echtler) and
Sociology with a focus on Media Studies (Asonzeh Ukah). Joint
seminars, for instance, on “Bourdieu in Africa”, or on “Witchcraft in
Africa and Europe”, have brought together students from a great
variety of disciplines. It should be mentioned that a junior fellow of
BIGSAS is integrated into a research project on “The Economy of
Sacred Space in Durban, South Africa”, covering classical African
Initiated Churches (M. Echtler), new African migrant churches (A.
Ukah), various Muslim communities (F. Kogelmann), and various
Hindu communities (Z. Kopecka).
It is part of the program of this department to invite Religious Studies
scholars representing the various strands of this discipline –
historical, phenomenological, and sociological approaches to the
study of religion. To name but a few colleagues: Prof. James Cox
(University of Edinburgh), Prof. Richard Kieckhefer (Northwestern
University), and Prof. Bruce Lincoln (University of Chicago) followed
the invitation to give lectures and offer private consultation to junior
fellows of BIGSAS. Just this intention to present, in a balanced way,
the various approaches to the study of religion, is perfectly mirrored
in this collection of essays. It is perhaps worth mentioning that Afe
Adogame, Senior Lecturer in World Christianity at the University of
Edinburgh, who attended several workshops of the BIGSAS religion
workgroup, holds a Ph.D. in Religious Studies from the University of
Ulrich Berner
Chair: Religious Studies (Lehrstuhl Religionswissenschaft I), Faculty
of Cultural Studies (Kulturwissenschaftliche Fakultät), University
of Bayreuth
Berner, Ulrich: ‘Contextualization of Religious Studies and of religious
phenomena’, Religion 41 (2011), pp. 149-157.
Cox, James: A Guide to the Phenomenology of Religion. Key
Figures, Formative Influences and subsequent Debates
(London/New York 2006).
Lincoln, Bruce: Gods and Demons, Priests and Scholars. Critical
Explorations in the History of Religions (Chicago/London 2012).
Table of Contents
Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS)
Meron Zeleke Eresso and Halkano Abdi Wario
Moulding and Shaping Space: Editorial Cartoons, Terrorism and
Duncan Omanga
Politics of Islamic Banking: A Hindrance on the National Unity of
Ahmed Elhassab Omer
Faith versus Reason: The Place of Religion in the Socialization
Process as Depicted in two Kiswahili Novels: Kufa Kuzikana and
Magdaline Wafula
Stock taking in a Transnational Islamic movement: Accounting for
Halkano Abdi Wario
Pilgrimage at Islamic Sufi Shrines in North Eastern Ethiopia ......... 103
Meron Zeleke
The Fragmented Entity: Conflict and the Emerging Faces of Jos .. 121
Timothy O. Baiyewu
Traditional Religious Practices in Axum Town, a Sacred Christian
Serawit Bekele
Final Word: The Religious Situation in Contemporary Africa.......... 162
Kupakwashe Mtata
List of Maps, Figures and Pictures
Figure 1: The Standard, Aug. 11, 1998.
Figure 2: The Standard, Aug., 12, 1998.
Figure 3: The Daily Nation, Oct. 23, 2001.
Figure 4: The Daily Nation, Oct. 25, 2001
Figure 5: The Daily Nation, Nov. 30, 2001.
Figure 6: The Daily Nation, Dec. 24th, 2001
Figure 7: The Daily Nation, Dec. 24th, 2001
Figure 8: Tablīghī territorial and administrative structure
Map 1: A map of Kenya showing the three Tablīghī
zones of operation
Table 1: Waso area karguzari report
Table 2: Kenya country Karguzari report
Picture 1: Pilgrims singing on their way to the Shrine
Table 3: Profile of Male Pilgrims
Table 4: Profile of Female Pilgrims
Map 2: Map of Jos showing different administrative
Meron Zeleke Eresso and Halkano Abdi Wario
Religion in Africa has for long been a woven cultural fabric of life, a
great moving force that guided people’s behavior, interaction and
action since time immemorial. A decade after the United States
experience of the 9/11, the unfortunate event has set the landmark
for a geopolitics in contemporary Africa that securitizes religious
movements and that identify them with the so-called global war on
terror, a phenomenon within which most African nations play a
significant regional role. The current wave of developments related to
religion in the contingent became fossilized through religious
manipulation and politicization in the post-colonial era
One of the most dramatic news event in recent past was destruction
of some century old Sufi shrines and tombs in Timbuktu by Ansar
Dine, an insurgent militant group that agitate for establishment of
strict Islamic law in the restive region of northern Mali that aspire to
form an independent Tuareg majority state. The group views the
UNESCO cultural heritage sites as idolatry and sacrilege to the true
faith as based on their interpretation of the fundamental of faith.
Similarly a ragtag militant group called Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna
Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the
Prophet's Teachings and Jihad) popularly known as Boko Haram has
waged attacks against the Nigerian state institutions and a wide
range of Muslim and non-Muslim targets in order to achieve its
ultimate goals that ranged from avoidance of western education,
separation from and annihilation of non-members, to institution of
‘proper’ Islamic law in northern Nigerian Muslim majority states.
Similar smal scale protests have also been reported in other SubSaharan countries such as Sudan and Ethiopia. The last two years
have also witnessed emergence of popular protests fueled by long
standing political disenchantment dubbed the Arab Spring that led to
the fall of northern Africa’s long serving leaders from Mouammar
Gadhafi to Hosni Mubarak. All these events though appearing
disconnected often depict entanglement of religious and sociopolitical discourses in everyday struggles and the embedded nature
of religious faith as fundamental for mobilization of groups, formation
of identities, agitation for recognition and negotiation for state
resources and opportunities.
In everyday circumstances, the evangelical pastors or popular imams
on a popular religious broadcast in Africa yield immense power and
influence over their constituencies, as do political leaders. From state
governments’ involvement in global war against terror to mundane
issues such as drawing up national constitutions, religious groups
and individuals constitute pivotal stakeholders in everyday life in
Africa. The question then moves from the motivation behind such
resilience to how such groups pervasively imprint their influence in
society. To better understand the impact of religious groups and
ideas, we need to move beyond the search for the reasons behind
the resurgence of religion and examine the manifestation of
interconnected phenomena that intricately display increased
presence of religion in daily life.
Therefore three thematic concepts have been identified, i.e., religious
trends, cultural discourses and representation, in order to capture
some of the most contemporary issues of concern to Muslim,
Christian and indigenous religious communities in Africa. The call for
abstracts and papers for this issue of BIGSAS Works! hence targeted
current doctoral researches from a wide range of disciplines and
successfully integrated a cross-disciplinary approach to appreciate
the complexity of faith matters in the continent , Africa, which is a
focal point of the graduate school, BIGSAS.
The issue is a culmination of workshops, informal discussions, guest
lectures and seminar presentations organized by a BIGSAS workgroup, Religion in Contemporary Africa (RiCA), initiated by the
editors of this issue. The work-group brings together junior fellows in
BIGSAS interested in the theme of religion as part of their research
concerns. As can be seen in the profiles of the authors, the authors’
thematic interest cuts across such diverse religious denominations as
Christianity, Islam and African traditional religions within a
multidisciplinary environment that includes anthropology, sociology,
religious studies, geography, and media studies. Apart from serving
as a platform for junior fellows to exchange field experiences and
their preliminary understanding of research findings, the work-group
also availed forum for interactions with invited guests and senior
fellows. In June-July 2011, a lecture series titled ‘Missionization,
Revivalism and Creation of Transnational Communities’ brought
together invited guest scholars, senior and junior fellows and other
interested students to discuss topics such as transnationalization of
African Christianity in diasporic communities, changing gender roles
in transnational Islamic movements, rapid rise and challenges of
Islamic banking sector in East Africa, media and missionization, and
emerging issues in informal dispute settlement in Sufi communities in
the north of Africa. In June 2012, the work-group brought together
senior researchers and junior fellows in a oneday workshop titled
‘Dynamics of Religions Reform Movements in Africa’. The forum
gave junior scholars an opportunity to share their preliminary findings
and benefit from discussions and criticism from the work-group
The first issue of BIGSAS Works titled “Women’s Life World ‘inbetween’ ’’ raised, through insightful articles, critical gender questions
concerning women in Africa. How, for example, do African women
perceive themselves since their understanding of gender roles differs
from that of Western feminism? How and to what extent do African
women change their life worlds when they feel disadvantaged or
discontented? To what extent are African women expanding their
involvement in the social, political or economic realm? Does this
Africa deal with gendered hierarchies and authority? Are there
conflicts or ‘in-betweens’ among ‘traditional roles’ and the behaviour
of women? What do we learn from the empirical data and
experiences gained within our various research projects? ‘Inbetween-ness’ is hence seen as referring to a situation when the life
worlds of women transform, resulting from social, political, economic
or environmental changes or uncertainties. In such a situation
women negotiate between conflicting or contradictory assumed
norms, roles, social practices or orders. Opportunities for women
may change, expand or become limited (BIGSAS Works, 1).
The articles in the second issue though dealing with different
religious traditions and from varying disciplinary backgrounds are
closely interconnected. As mentioned earlier, the three main themes,
namely religious trends, cultural discourses and representation, are
more all less represented in all the papers.. The papers ‘Stocktacking
in a Transnational Islamic Movement: Accounting for Growth of
Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya’ by Halkano Abdi Wario: ‘The Fragmented
Entity: Conflict and the Emerging Faces of Jos’ by Timothy O.
Baiyewu; and ‘Politics of Islamic Banking: A Hindrance on the
National Unity of Sudan?’ by Ahmed Elhassab Omer, concern
localization of transnational Islamic movements, embededness of
religious and ethnic conflicts, and recent developments in Islamic
economics, respectively, and fall under the theme of religious trends.
Meron Zeleke’s article titled ‘Unity in Diversity: Local Accounts on
Pilgrimage and Religious Boundary Crossing at Islamic Sufi Shrines
in north-central Ethiopia’ and Serawit Bekele’s paper ‘Traditional
Religious Practices in Axum Town, a Sacred Christian Center:
Ethiopia’ expound on the theme of cultural discourses by exploring
the multiplicity of religious practices that compete, complement and
contrast as religious groups and individuals appropriate different
traditions to renew their faith. These articles also demonstrate how
issues of representation come to the forefront in matters pertaining to
debates of religious orthodoxy, hence interlinking two of the three
central themes of this issue (representation and cultural discourses).
Under the theme of representation, the paper, ‘Moulding and Shaping
Space: Editorial Cartoons, Terrorism and Islamic Space in Kenya’, by
Dan Omanga, insightfully analyses how editorial cartoons in Kenyan
newspapers depict the terrorism and various actors engaged in and
targeted by the global ‘war on terror’ while Magdaline Wafula’s ‘Faith
versus Reason: The Place of Religion in the Socialization Process as
Depicted in Two Kiswahili Novels: Kufa Kuzikana &Unaitwa Nani?’
expounds the portrayal of religious beliefs, behaviours and
socialization in two Kiswahili novels.
As a way of linking to the first issue of BIGSAS works on gender, the
themes raised in some of the articles in this issue touch on gender
related themes. The paper Unity in Diversity by Meron Zeleke shows
how gender comes to the forefront in the discursive gendering
strategy of the Sufis’ counter-narrative. Halkano Abdi’s work on the
Tablīghī Jamāʿat in its discussion of the profile of the members
shows the different duties assigned along gender lines. Serawit
Bekele’s work on the traditional beliefs and rituals in Axum shows
how some religious congregations are defined along gender lines.
The discussions of the respective contributions included in this
volume raise a variety of issues that are ripe for further investigation.
As the discussions suggest, the dynamic elements related to religion
in contemporary Africa are an intriguing development that should be
explored in further research.
Meron Zeleke Eresso and Halkano Abdi Wario
Moulding and Shaping Space: Editorial
Cartoons, Terrorism and Islamic Space in
Duncan Omanga
Following the terror attacks in Nairobi on 7th August 1998, the 9/11 Attacks in
New York and the Kikambala hotel bombings in November 2002, editorial
cartoons in the Kenyan press have come under close scrutiny for their ability to
capture the dominant discourses on ‘the war on terror.’ As expected, Islam,
already seeking to assert itself across the country, has found itself at the core
of a (spatial) discourse on terrorism. Using Lefebvre’s concept of the
production of space (complemented by elements of semiotics) this paper
interrogates the relationship between (social) space in Kenya on one hand and
Islam, the media and terrorism on the other.
Key Words: Islam, Space, Kenya, Editorial Cartoons
On 7th August 1998, terrorism made its entry into Kenya. 1 Two men
allegedly acting on behalf of terror master mind Osama bin Laden
packed a 2000 pound bomb behind a truck, following an all night
assembling of the bomb at a posh Nairobi estate. The consignment
was to be driven to the basement of the United States embassy, then
located at the centre of Nairobi and detonated. After driving through
the treacherous Nairobi traffic, the two men were forced to stop at the
embassies gate for routine security checks. Claiming they had an
important appointment with embassy officials, the two got into a
As I will show later, this was not the first terror incident, but perhaps the most
conspicuous. This study defines ‘terrorism’ as an ideologically inspired form of
acquiring or seeking to change or affect policy and political space through violence.
fierce altercation with the security officials. 2 Panicking, and his
patience wearing thin, one of the terrorists who had already
disembarked from the truck pulled out a pistol and shouting allahu
akbar (Arabic for God is great), fired shots at the security man before
hurling a hand grenade inside the basement. His equally agitated
colleague hurriedly stepped on the gas, ramming through the gates
and detonating the massive bomb just several meters from the
intended spot. The neighbouring Ufundi Cooperative, an eight storied
building was reduced to a pile of rubble. The US embassy itself was
badly damaged and later demolished. One of the terrorists survived
the suicide mission and was later arrested. The men, of Arabic
descent and “purporting to be acting on God’s behalf” were all
Muslims. For the first time, Kenyans came face to face with what has
become known as international terrorism.
Although not the first terror attack in Kenya, and also not the last, the
attack on the 7th of August was the most horrific in the country’s
history. Much earlier, in the late 70s, Palestinians took hostage a
jetliner carrying mainly Israeli passengers and demanded the release
of Palestinian prisoners. Having already found favour with the then
Ugandan dictator Idi Amin Dada, the hostage takers landed the plane
in Entebbe, Uganda. Shortly after, with the logistical help of the
Kenyan government, Israeli commandos staged a covert raid and
rescued all hostages. This act of perceived complicity between the
Kenyan and the Israeli government inspired a terror attack in the
heart of Nairobi, this time targeting the Israeli owned Norfolk Hotel a
few years later. About sixteen people lost their lives in the first
‘international terror’ attack on Kenyan soil.
In 2002, as President Moi’s term was coming to an end and the
country deeply immersed in the presidential campaign, terrorism
asserted its presence in the region again. In coordinated attacks, two
men drove a truck loaded with explosives into the reception area of
Paradise Hotel; a popular Israeli owned hotel, while a second pair
Author Samuel Katz (2002) records how guard Benson Okuku Bwaku engaged
in an altercation with the truck driver, Azzam and his colleague Mohamed Daoud
Al-Owhali shortly before the blast. Al Owhali survived what was supposed to be a
suicide mission. He was arrested when he sought treatment for injuries sustained
from falling debris. Okuku survived too, and still works as a security guard. His
version of the events that day is recorded at the bomb blast Mausoleum in Nairobi.
with shoulder guided missiles, attempted to down an Israeli jetliner
taking off from Mombasa International Airport and carrying over 250
passengers. While the later attack missed the intended target by a
whisker, the former claimed about 14 lives and injured several more.
Again, terrorists espousing Islamic inspiration claimed responsibility. 3
Not surprising, when terrorists attacked New York on 11th September
200, those suspected to have masterminded the attacks were linked
to the Nairobi attacks. Shortly after, Kenya with the help from the
U.S. government, stepped up its own local efforts in the “war against
terror”, a government policy that included measures ranging from
legislative, logistical and political support for the fight against
international terrorism.
Shortly after, Islam became the inevitable focus of news stories,
editorials and even editorial cartoons both locally and internationally.
Years earlier, between the 10th and the 9th century, Islamic traders
from the Persian Gulf settled along the coast and intermarried with
the local Bantu people, resulting in the Swahili people. Most of them
converted to Islam. Swahili, structurally a Bantu Language with large
borrowings from Arabic, was born; it is currently the most widely
spoken language in East and Central Africa. Muslim traders
introduced Islam to the western region between 1870 and 1885 4. The
chief Mumia of Nabongo accorded the Swahili traders a warm
welcome. During an inter-tribal war, the Muslims assisted Chief
Mumia to overcome his enemies. In return, one Idd day, Chief
Mumia, his family and officials of his court converted to Islam.
Henceforth, Islam spread to the surrounding areas of Kakamega,
Kisumu, Kisii and Bungoma 5. Today, Islam is the faith of
approximately ten percent of Kenyans6.
This attack was allegedly carried out by Al Qaeda operatives who had recruited
local Kenyan men for the mission. However, the little known Army of Palestine,
based in Lebanon claimed responsibility saying the attack was to accentuate ‘the
voice of the refugee’. The attack was meant to coincide with the 1947 November
55 anniversary of the partitioning of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state.
For details See Kim, Caleb Chul-soo (2004): Islam among the Swahili in East Africa.
Nairobi, Kenya: Acton Publishers.
See Mwakimako, Hassan (2007): Mosques in Kenya. Berlin: Schwarz. Oded,
Arye (2000): Islam and politics in Kenya. Boulder [u.a.: Rienner.
Islam, in its symbols and presence is now almost ubiquitous in both
public and social spaces. Islamic schools dot the country especially
at the coast and the northern part of the country. A vibrant media
comprised of several FM stations such as Iqra FM, Radio Rahma,
and Frontier FM as well as several print media now narrowcast to
Muslim faithful in Kenya. Besides, plenty of Islamic banking
institutions and charities have opened shop in Nairobi and Mombasa
targeting this growing niche. The Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
(SUPKEM), an Islamic organization meant to safeguard the interests
of Muslims at a national level, forms the link between the faith and
the government of Kenya. It is comprised of mostly professionals in
its leadership and is perceived to be liberal and genial, as opposed to
the more conservative Council of Imams and the Muslim rights
organization, Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI).
Broadly, this article examines how social space in Kenya, with
specific reference to aspects of Islam, has changed since the onset
of religious terrorism in the country. Using Lefebvre’s theory of the
production of space, which holds that social space is not static but
produced through practice and representational space, the paper
reveals how Islam’s social space has been produced and redefined
through representational moments. In doing so, I specifically focus on
editorial cartoons in Kenya’s two leading newspapers, The Daily
Nation and the East African Standard. With this introductory part, the
next part of the paper looks closely at Lefebvre’s theory of the
production of space, and how this relates to how editorial cartoons
represent a particular space. Specifically, comments will be made on
the extent to which the space occupied by Islam in Kenya is
represented in editorial cartoons in an epoch of terror related attacks
linked to Islamist groups.
The production of Space
In The Production of Space (originally published in 1974), Lefebvre
starts from the observation that ‘so great is the sway still held by the
idea that empty space is prior to whatever ends up filling it’(Lefebvre,
1991 p.15). Contrary to that, Lefebvre argues that social space does
not exist on its own but is part of everyday social interactions, and
works as a network between many spaces, and the subjects who
inhibit such spaces. To perceive space on its own would be to ignore
all the complexities which go into the history of producing space. It is
a social product which holds historical significance. Furthermore,
Lefebvre’s theory asserts that, “space is not only produced materially,
but also through imagination” where the material world is shaped.
The imagination lends itself through among several ways, the
deployment of symbols, which in modern times can be seen through
the media.
For Lefebvre, space is socially constructed and society constructs
space. Lefebvre argues that space in society is produced through a
relationship between spatial practice, representations of space and
representational spaces. Through spatial practice, Lefebvre explains
that space is given meaning to by the daily, everyday activities which
play out within that space. In other words, the way space is used
socially defines how it is perceived and interpreted by those who live
in this space.
Representations of space refer to how space is constructed by urban
planners and other dominant figures in society. “It is representations
of space that act as the material producers – mapping, planning and
then constructing material space.” (Lefebvre, p.38) Representations
of space can also be interpreted as the extension of the state’s
hegemony into the spatial sphere. The way a space is conceived and
labelled by the state reflects power dynamics.
The third moment in which space is produced is through
representational spaces or the direct lived space of everyday
experience as it is represented through images (or editorial
cartoons). This form of representation is done through the
imagination and expressed through vernacular language, symbols
and images. Eugene McCann (1999) gives the example of editorial
cartoons as one form of representational spaces. McCann goes on to
argue that images of representational spaces do not have to be
accurate. Their accuracy or inaccuracy does not diminish the power
of the image as a representational space. In this study, editorial
cartoons were seen to have played a dominant role in the production
of space in relation to Islam and terrorism in Kenya.
While Lefebvre’s theory on space and its production attempts to
explain the genesis of socially phenomena spatially, it becomes
inadequate on its own to explain the signs and symbols inherent in
editorial cartoons, themselves representational spaces. Thus, the
study incorporates aspects of semiotic thought in the analysis of how
the editorial cartoons acted as representational spaces of a
perceived Islamic social space at a time of increased terrorism.
Representational Spaces (Editorial Cartoons), Islam and
One of the key issues that emerged from the terror attacks in Kenya
and the United States was the role and effects of mass media
coverage on terrorism. Specifically, a series of cartoons appearing in
the local dailies appeared to ‘elicit’ varying passions among readers.
At one point, the Muslim community swarmed Nairobi Streets
claiming that some of the cartoons had ‘tried and condemned’ Islam
of terrorism. Here, one begins to appreciate the genre of editorial
cartoons as a powerful form of communication and the
immortalization of key events, just as any effective communication
Danjoux, (2005) argues that editorial cartoons are effective in their
ability to reduce complex events into an intelligible clash of
opposites. By reducing events to a clash of opposites, cartoons
provide a unique insight into the actors involved. Also, the satirical
nature of cartoons makes them effective conveyers of the group
paranoia and revealers of deep-seated suspicion and public mood
that underpin conflict. It is therefore not surprising that the fears,
aspirations and prejudices of a people are clearly revealed in the
content of their Editorial cartoons. Also, cartoons portray a rare ability
to sum up the public’s impression and opinion of a conflictual
situation by a simple reductionism of ‘good’ or ‘evil’. Not only is the
visual metaphor and caricature effective in explaining complicated
political situations, but are effective in exposing deceit and offering
criticism of key actors in events. Editorial cartoons have for a long
time questioned and supported policies, legitimized values and
illegitimatized other oppositional ‘values’, and more significantly
‘naturalized’ ideology. As satire, cartoons can also excuse opinions
too offensive, socially unacceptable or politically dangerous to be
voiced in conventional discourse, or printed in prose. Further, its
strength appears to surpass that of the written editorial for the simple
reason that it is a picture. In the Kenyan scene, the identity of the
actors was represented using cultural stereotypes. As
representational spaces, the editorial cartoons rely heavily on an
audience’s social and cultural memory and the native understanding
of symbols to successfully deliver both humour and meaning. In other
words he or she appropriates and recreates spatial practice as
understood by his or her audience. Years after the August 8
bombings and the September 11 attacks, editorial cartoons have
become effective in the production of space in relation to Islam in
Kenya. Chronologically, the following selected editorial cartoons
show how the media, through cartoons, acted as representational
Figure 1: The Standard, Aug. 11, 1998. Reprinted with permission
The Editorial cartoon above was drawn by John Khamirwa 7 and
published in The Standard on 11th August 1998. The cartoon
attempts to show the forces and actors behind the August attacks in
Nairobi. From the onset, the bold inscription “in the name of
god…indeed!” gives us hints of a religious motivation to the attacks.
The hooded, perhaps skeletal figure, armed with a scythe, draws on
the image of the grim reaper, a powerful symbol of evil and death
from the middle ages of the religious space in Europe. This symbol
was appropriated in Kenya in more forceful form at the high noon of
John Khamirwa is The Standard’s editorial cartoonist. The paper is the second best
selling newspaper in Kenya. The Daily Nation is the first.
HIVAIDs campaigns. It is possible that part of the huge stigma that
accompanied the disease in the 80s and early 90s might have had
something to do with this image. Not surprising, the sign later
vanished from AIDS campaigns only to emerge as a fitting metaphor
of terrorism in the late 90s and early 2000. Behind the grim reaper
stands the supposedly masterminds of the attacks, curiously
watching the mediated (binoculars) events at a safe distance while
hiding behind religiously hinged ideologies. At this point the artist
questions the identity of the god behind these motivations, drawing a
religious binarism in the interpretation of these events. Given the
context in which the editorial cartoon is produced, it is instructive to
note that a subtle comparison between Islam and other faiths, most
probably Christianity is implied. The syntagm of religion (implied by
the words) and terrorism (by the images) are all spatially motivated,
and likewise reproduce a cultural and social space that feed
particular myths and stereotypes. The next day on 12th August 1998,
this construction was developed further.
Figure 2: The Standard, Aug., 12, 1998. Reprinted with permission
The cartoon shows a camel laden with explosives under a scorching
sun while nonchalantly standing next to a man of “Arabic extraction”,
who appears deeply engrossed in petitioning “god” for help in killing
and maiming (the innocent). The epithet of terror etched in the words
terrorist camp and a bemused mouse completes the picture. The
camel is an indexical symbol of the desert life. A man kneeling is
indexical of supplication and prayer. However, when all the signs are
taken corporately in a single syntagm, a man on a Persian mat
praying, a camel beside him, and oriental looks, it becomes obvious
to the reader that this is a Muslim engaged in supplication. The
geographical space implied correlates strongly with the one currently
occupied by Kenyan Muslims in the northern part of the country, and
where the mode of transport is predominantly the camel. Although
the denotative message appears to ridicule those who kill in God’s
name, the connotative message is equally clear: Islam is to blame for
the senseless (denoted by the idea of killing innocent women and
children) attacks in Nairobi. The use of ‘women and children’ is
pivotal in revealing the absurdity and heinousness of this particular
terror attack, and also the character of terrorism, directed at innocent
and vulnerable non-combatants. While many may have seen a
correlation between fundamental Islam and the attacks, few
journalists had the audacity to give it the treatment Khamirwa gave.
The cartoon not only ridicules terrorists, but also explicitly
demarcates the ‘other’ as the enemy, in this case the Muslim. The
cartoon elicited sharp reactions from Muslims in Kenya. Sheikh Ali
Shee, the then head of Islamic preachers in Kenya, had this to say
about the cartoon: "The media have already tried and found Islam as
the cause of the car bomb blast … without taking into consideration
the implications of such insinuations” (Ngunjiri, 1998) The
spokesman of the Supreme council of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM),
Even before the identities of the terrorist and their motives have been
determined by local and international investigators now working on the
case, there have been concerted efforts by some sections of the mass
media to make it look as if Islam was to blame for the unfortunate event
(Ngunjiri, 1998).
In the same article cited above, Muslims were reportedly enraged
following then President Daniel arap Moi's televised remark shortly
after that the perpetrators of the bomb would not have done the deed
if they were Christians. The editorial cartoon, it appears, merely
captured in a symbolic form the dominant discourses at the time and
the unuttered thoughts among sections of Kenyans; by acting as
representational space. This discourse was to gain momentum
following the attacks in New York on September 11th 2001. The lack
of sufficient closure following the Nairobi Embassy bombings in 1998
in which most Kenyans anticipated the arrest and eventual conviction
of Bin Laden, meant the 8/7 narrative played out in the 9/11
understanding of events, especially in the Kenyan media. Shortly
after the 9/11 attacks, the media, perhaps picking on dominant
international discourse on terrorism, began constructing two binary
forces, one evil and one good. The same played out in editorial
cartoons appearing at the time. Below, entitled ‘The War Today’, one
of these cartoons provides a fitting invitation for the reader to identify
with one of the sides.
Figure 3: The Daily Nation, Oct. 23, 2001. Reprinted with permission
The piece above drawn by Gado 8 constructs an evaluative theme
that privileges a particular interpretation. Symmetrically balanced on
the top right corner of the pictorial frame, the two dominant aspects in
the cartoon are the feuding birds and the planets cast in outer space.
Planet earth is fore grounded, perhaps symbolizing its interlocked
fate with the outcome of this cosmic war. A transcendental
Gado, whose real name is Godffrey Mwampebwa is the editorial cartoonist for
The Daily Nation, East and Central Africa’s leading newspaper in terms of
interpretation is churned as the stretched heavens witness the fight
of good versus evil. While the 9/11 terrorists claimed to be fighting on
god’s behalf, likewise the fight against terror appears to tap on the
inspiration of a transcendental force. The casting of this war in outer
space also adds an apocalyptic dimension to it. The cartoon draws
on a Judeo Christian interpretation, where the dove symbolizes the
essence of godliness and God’s presence-the very gentleness of the
Holy Spirit and the olive branch on its beak, drawn from an episode
in The Biblical epic of the flood, is a now a staid symbol of peace and
The vulture, a sign mostly linked with widely held notions of
scavenge and opportunism is a common cultural symbol of evil in
most of Africa. To a vast majority of Kenyans, the symbolism
resonates well as the vulture is feared as an indexical sign of death
and bad omen while the dove was appreciated and domesticated as
a ‘friend of man’. The horned head of the vulture is an obvious
exaggeration that accentuates visual monstrosity designed to
foreground an oppositional Manichean reduction of 9/11 as a conflict
between good and evil. The thorny twig, deliberately hurled at the
dove’s neck, apportions the blame on the vulture, which is seen as
the unprovoked aggressor. It is not lost to the keen observer that
black, often a sign symbolising evil is contrasted to white, a sign
embodied by the ‘good’ dove. The resulting syntagm reveals a
binarism paired along oppositional structural categories of both evil
and good (a mostly religious interpretation) or alternatively the
aggressor and peacemaker (a political-military interpretation). The
paradigmatic interpretation suggests that variously the terrorists were
seen to be the aggressors, acting with malevolent intent and hence
the villains.
While the pairing of good versus evil in the media is common in
virtually all political, social and human interest stories, such binarism
at the onset legitimized the war against terror as it cast the war
against terrorism as a God sanctioned operation. However tenuous
the connotation, at the receiving end must have stood Islam in its
varied expressions, (especially when the previous editorial cartoons
are considered) and the consequences, whether directly or indirectly,
profoundly affected the social space occupied by Islam in Kenya.
Mahmood Mamdani (2004: 257) in his book Good Muslim, Bad
Muslim argues that the binarism of good and evil, which was
extensively used during the Bush administration, closes the door for
any kind of negotiation and contains ideological language which
justifies the use of power and impunity. He argues,
The consequence of bringing home-wherever home may be-the
language of the war on terror should be clear: it will create a license to
demonize adversaries as terrorists, clearing the ground for a fight to
finish, for with terrorists there can be no compromise. The result will be
to displace attention from issues to loyalties, to criminalize dissent, and
to invite domestic ruin. Worse still, if the struggle against (political)
enemies is defined as a struggle against evil, it will turn into a holy war.
And in holy war, there can be no compromise. Evil cannot be
converted; it must be eliminated (Mamdani, p.254).
In launching the ‘war on terror’9 shortly after the 9/11 attacks,
President Bush frequently employed rhetoric that constructed a
binarism of ‘us’ and ‘them’; cautioning the international community of
being either ‘with us or against us’ and terming the US response as
‘crusades.’ In journalism however, such binarism is almost always
hard to resist in practice. This is because conflict of whatever nature
is newsworthy, whether in sports, politics or war it is the essence of
news. And more so when the feuding pair brings out a ‘David and
Goliath’ confrontation where a strong actor comes against a weak
foe, or the privileged versus the deprived, and of course, the good
versus the bad.
‘War on Terror’ becomes a problematic term, since terror is not an entity but a tactic.
War is waged on a country or a defined group, and not on a method of engagement.
Figure 4: The Daily Nation, Oct. 25, 2001. Reprinted with permission
Following the onset of the ‘war on terror’ after the invasion of
Afghanistan by coalition troops, Osama Bin Laden, now the epitome
of evil was targeted for capture and a price of hundreds of millions of
dollars was placed on his head. However, as the search dragged and
hopes of his capture began dimming, the despair found expression in
editorial cartoons. Above, a mean faced CIA agent is perplexed at the
many ‘Osama look alikes’ in his search for the enemy. The ‘Lilliputian’
makes a long distance call to his superiors mumbling something
about the mounting difficulty in the search. The difficulty is blamed on
the facial, cultural and social similarity among men of Middle Eastern
origin, While this is denotatively true, the underneath ideology
excuses the lumping of all men of such looks together and further
legitimizes widespread suspicion of men professing an Islamic
persuasion, having long beards and those leading similar lifestyles.
While such depiction can be rightly considered to stereotype men of
Islamic faith, the following cartoon does the same to women of the
same faith. Published on the 30th of November in The Daily Nation,
the cartoon mainly dwells on the now fruitless search for Osama. Still
hot on his heels, a CIA agent (indexical of the US, also a metonymy
of the West) informs his bosses that no sign of Osama is
forthcoming. Meanwhile a man dressed as an Islamic woman
intermingles with other women dressed in similar fashion, while
shooting a curious glance at the black suit clad CIA agent. All the
while, his long beard partly showing underneath and his clumsy mien
attract suspicious glances from the women. In a backdrop of
dramatic irony, the ‘Lilliputians’ joke that having run out of options,
Osama can still suicide bomb himself. While pouring scorn on the
fruitless search, the cartoon also loops in women, symbolized by the
burqa clad women as objects of our collective suspicion. In most
parts of Kenya, the burqa, known by its Swahili term ‘buibui’ often
has connotations of mystic, secrecy and malevolent intent especially
among the non Islamic populations. For the average Kenyan growing
up in the non Islamic parts of the country, mythologies of men gone
mad or completely disappearing without trace after rendezvous with
buibui10 clad women still abound. The metaphor taps into an easily
identifiable cultural notion.
Although according to media reports the search for Osama was in
the mountainous terrain between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the
cartoon below, using Arabic architecture (providing connotations of
Islam) as its background situates the search in an urban space. As a
representational space, the dominant impression secreted appears
more to highlight the social space than the physical space portrayed.
Swahili word for the dress worn by Muslim women meant to cover one from head to
toe with only a slight opening for the eyes.
Figure 5: The Daily Nation, Nov. 30, 2001. Reprinted with permission
Shortly after the US launched the war on terror with the invasion of
Afghanistan and later Iraq, Kenya was ‘coerced’ into supporting the
war against terror. Much earlier, in 1998, then President Moi had led
a street demonstration in Nairobi against terrorism, a first in the
history of the country by a head of state. In 2001, when New York
was hit, Kenya’s foreign policy began to take a more proactive role in
the so called war against terror. As a geographical space considered
as harbouring active terror cells, and equally on the receiving end of
numerous terror attacks, Kenya began to fight terror locally. In close
cooperation with Western Powers, for instance the U.S., - the
establishment of the National Security Intelligence Service , the AntiTerrorism Assistance (ATA) Program, the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
(ATPU) in1998, a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and the National
Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) in 2003 were realised. The ATPU
was provided with broad powers, and was exempt from the standard
use of due process in the event they suspected an individual of terror
links. They were allowed to make arbitrary arrests and hold suspects
incommunicado for up to two weeks. And so, to give it the legal
platform to work from, the government was again coerced to pass the
‘suppression of terrorism’ bill. Apart from its provisions, the bill was
vague and broad in its definition of “terrorism” or a “terrorist” act or
action. Also, its provisions gave extensive powers to the police and
customs officers to stop search and seize, detain and arrest;
making detention the rule and bail the exception. (Amnesty
International, 2004). The lack of safeguards and due process in
decisions to extradite equally raised a furore among civil society
groups in the country. However, this did not stop the harassment,
arbitrary arrests and prosecution of hundreds of Kenyan Muslims
especially in the Coast, North eastern and parts of Nairobi.
The following cartoon (see Figure 6) appeared in The Daily Nation on
the 15th of December 2001, a few months after 9/11. As a
representational space, the cartoon captures spatial practice of an
ordinary Muslim in Kenya following the country’s resolve to contain
terror locally. Two policemen on a routine patrol possessing a picture
of a wanted ‘terrorist’ stop a potential suspect. After assaulting and
thoroughly pounding him to pulp they realize he is not the man they
wanted. Their gut instincts and reliance on generalizations had failed
them. One ‘Lilliputian’ suggests suing them, and another retorts
‘where?’ a veiled attack on the ineffective judicial system in Kenya
and ridicule on the broad powers vested on the terrorist police. While
this is an accurate picture of police conduct, the representational and
spatial practices as elements of the production of space are seen to
show interdependence in the eventual secreted space. Here, one
can understand how the ‘war against terror’ (or more accurately the
apprehension of terror suspects) is partly executed locally;
haphazard, stereotyped and brutal on those at its receiving end. The
denotative message is one of a mistaken identity in what may
perhaps be an honest pursuit of terror suspects. However, the
connotative message reveals that in the wake of the so called ‘war
on terror’, perhaps more harm has been meted on the imagined than
on the real enemy.
Figure 6: The Daily Nation, Dec. 24th, 2001. Reprinted with
The day before Christmas, as is the norm in Kenya’s print media,
Christmas symbolism is heavily appropriated to capture the
prevailing yet dominant social and political discourses in the country
through the use of editorial cartoons.
Almost like a sequel to the cartoon above, on the 24th of December
2001 the editorial cartoon in the next page was published in The
Daily Nation. It carries on the framing of the ‘war on terror’ from a
local perspective, satirizing its methodology that is largely based on
blunt stereotyping and generalizations. While the narrative of the
proverbial wise men who visited the baby Jesus draws inspiration
form the Christian text, the apparel, mien and physical looks of the
‘wise men’, when placed in the contemporary Kenyan context, tell
more about Muslims than what is denotatively implied. Although the
terrorism bill was not made into law in the state that it was originally,
it paved the way for the justified profiling based on religion in actual
social space.
Figure 7: The Daily Nation, Dec. 24th, 2001. Reprinted with
It is worth noting that the controversial suppression of the terrorism
bill also made references to dress as one way in which suspected
terrorists or their associates could be identified. For instance, a
particular clause made it an offence for people to dress in such a way
‘as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a member of a declared
terrorist organization’, (Republic of Kenya, 2003). Needless to say,
this clause caused particular concern amongst Muslim communities,
who have their own distinct way of dressing. The bill also granted the
minister responsible for national security the power to make
exclusion orders but only against individuals with dual citizenship.
According to Howell & Lind (2010) this was perceived as directly
targeting Muslims, many of whom descend from immigrants from
Somalia, the Arabian Peninsula and South Asia. The editorial cartoon
above appears to capture the discourse of the possible execution
and abuse of this piece of this legislation should it become law 11. In
response to the bill, the Kenya National Commission on Human
Rights, the governmental human rights watchdog, stated ‘[l]aws or
policies must not target or appear selective by community or group’
(KNCHR, 2003: 8).
The suppression of terrorism bill was eventually passed into law in august 2012 after
extensive consultations with stakeholders key among them Muslim rights groups.
Incidences of police profiling and arrests on suspicion of being a
terrorist were widely reported in Mombasa and other coastal cities.
The same was reported in North Eastern province and the Somali
enclave of Eastleigh, Nairobi. In November 2001 over 50
businessmen in Mombasa were rounded up for alleged links with Al
Qaeda. Most were however released without charges being
preferred. Just recently, over 300 youths were arrested in Eastleigh
in January 2010 and charged with being in the country illegally. It is
not a coincidence that these spaces are mostly wholly or mostly
occupied by Muslims. However, while police action appears targeting
the cultural and material space occupied by Muslims; spatial practice,
which Lefebvre argues can be empirically determined through history
and practice, has equally helped in producing the resultant lived
space. According to the Kenyan authorities, materials used for the
construction of the 800kg bomb that shook Nairobi was smuggled
into East Africa disguised as relief aid with the help of some Islamic
relief agencies (Achieng 1998). Further, with regard to the political
and social space, of all the countries in the Horn of Africa, Kenya
boasts the most stable, most effective, and most democratic
government. As a result, terrorists take the advantage and continue
to move in and out the country freely, establishing businesses in
Mombasa, the Islamic dominated places of Nairobi, Lamu and parts
of North Eastern province like Garissa. Indeed most operate Islamic
charities, find local brides, rent light aircraft to come and go from
Somalia, hold meetings, communicate with terror financiers outside
the country, transfer money, stockpile weapons and engage in
undetected reconnoitring of possible targets.
Based on the foregoing spatial practice, the nett effect is a growing
perception of Islam’s complicity with terror. Also, comments by a few
Islamic leaders appearing to sympathize with terror masterminds
have not helped matters. Still, Islamic leaders have consistently
come out to denounce the terrorists as criminals especially when
Kenyans and targets on Kenyan soil are involved. Despite counter
claims, Whitaker (2008) argues that there is little evidence that
Islamic radicalism has gained much support among Kenyan Muslims
(Haynes 2005; Rosenau 2005). She comments that the recent
mobilization of the Muslim community in Kenya is motivated primarily
by local concerns (mostly political inclusion, economic development,
etc.), and not by global issues (Seesemann 2005). Further Muslim
activism should not automatically be interpreted as radicalism. This is
not to deny that a small number of Kenyans have been involved in
extremist groups, a fact that Kenyan officials are reluctant to admit.
On the whole, however, Kenyan Muslims have largely rejected
militant methods and extremist ideology.
As for the media, being purveyors of news, these ambiguities are
never fully expressed in the time bound news bulletin, or the space
bound column or news report. The dominant and easily churned
frame from the media has been largely replete with generalizations
and reductionism that has subtly reproduced in the Kenya’s social
space, an image of Islam as a purveyor and accomplice of terror. And
as this study illustrates, the editorial cartoons have been sharp, if not
brutal, in capturing the rapidly changing space, as representational
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Duncan Omanga
Duncan Omanga is a junior fellow at the Bayreuth International
Graduate School of International studies (BIGSAS), at the University
of Bayreuth. His research interests are in Media (both old and the
new media) and its relationship to Terrorism and the ‘war on terror’
particularly in the East Africa region and the Horn. Email Contacts:
Politics of Islamic Banking: A Hindrance on
the National Unity of Sudan?
Ahmed Elhassab Omer
Islamic banking in Sudan which has become dominant in the banking sector
since 1990s, might pose a direct threat to the unity of the country by the end of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) interim period in 2011. The
anxiety expressed in this paper is based on the feeling that the issue of
Islamizing the economy is not an unintended policy as thought by the masses.
It rather, goes hand and foot with the development of the identity crisis, which
divides the country along the Arabism-Islamized and Africanism-Christian
dichotomy. The way by which politicians tackled the issue of identity, over the
last 54 years, has left too many issues still swept under the rug of this
dichotomy, one of which is the Islamization of the banking sector. These two
mutually exclusive views have been at the heart of the socioeconomic and
political turmoil, which underlies the current problems facing the Sudanese
Key words: Islamic banking, national identity, Arabism, Africanism
The period around the 1970s saw Muslim communities in the Middle
East witnessing the appearance and rapid expansion of interest-free
banks, later known as Islamic banks. Such developments were later
on initiated in countries outside the Islamic world with sizable
presence of Muslims. Since then, Islamic banks have become an
essential component of everyday Muslim business life, and a cornerstone of Islamization of economic policies. It would be reasonable,
before heading on, to explain what we mean by Islamizing the
economy? Generally speaking, the term 'Islamization' refers to ‘the
process of restructuring the prevailing socioeconomic set-up in the
Muslim societies according to Islamic injunctions’ (Igbal, M., 2002, p.
68). The banking system as the beating heart of the modern
economy has been the focal point on which the pioneers of Islamic
banking theory drew their thoughts about what they envisaged as
Islamic economy. They perceived Islamic banks as institutions that
provide investment and financing facilities for Muslims who are keen
in implementing the Islamic law in their business transactions. They
believe that goals of Islamizing the banking sector, are not of
materialistic side only, but are based also on the concepts of
improving the well-being of humans and the overall achievement of a
good life. Hence, Islamic banking theory tends to emphasize Islamic
values, socioeconomic justice and a balance between the material
and spiritual needs of its followers (Khan, M. and Bhatti, M., 2008,
pp. 7-10)
Islamization of the banking system therefore, indicates a situation
whereby all the existing banks, nation-wide, should, by law, operate
under and subscribe to the principles of Islamic law in their business
transactions. This argument entails four essential points that should
be observed: 1) prohibition of charging (taking or receiving) interest
being glossed as Ribā (usury) 12. Financial transactions should be
free from interest, and should also be linked directly or indirectly, to a
real economic deal. Interest, as a price of capital in conventional
banks, should then be replaced by the arrangement of profit/loss
sharing in Islamic banks. Profit/loss sharing demonstrates a case in
which the investor and the bank will share in the risks and profits
generated from the deal, an asset or a project 13 2) not undertaking
Ribā literally, means increase or addition or growth. Technically, it refers to the
'premium' that must be paid by the borrower to the lender along with the principal
amount as a condition for the loan or an extension in its maturity. Interest as commonly
known today is regarded by a consensus of the majority of fuqahā (Islamic jurists) to be
equivalent to Ribā. (Igbal, Munawar and Molyneux, 2005, pp. 7-11. Also, Khan, M., and
Bhatti, M., 2008, pp. 20-25).
As stated by the Islamic principles of financing, any positive, fixed or predetermined
rate of return related to the maturity or amount of principal is prohibited. Instead, the
principle of profit/loss sharing should be in action. Basically, on profit/loss sharing
modes of financing, borrowers and lenders should share the rewards of the deal as
much as the loss incurred out of the deal, if any. The main idea is that borrowing
households will pay back the principal of their loans along with the portion of their profit
to the bank. The principle therefore, means that, no person is ever allowed to invest his
property, in a way that generates profit without exposing him to the risk of loss. Rather,
transactions that are considered to be unlawful (harām) by Sharī‫؛‬a.
Financial transactions should not be directed toward economic
sectors considered unlawful such as investment in business dealing
with tobacco, gambling activities, drugs, alcoholic beverages, pork
process and sale industry, and any activity that might be deemed
harmful to the community or, being not congruent to the Islamic
values. 3) Prohibition of carrying out operations with unknown
outcomes because of the risks they might involve. Examples of such
transactions include, among others, lottery, speculation, and
gambling associated activities. 4) Finally, Islamic banks are required
to pay zakāt (a religious tax) as an obligatory duty. The objective of
paying zakāt is to enhance brotherhood among members of the
Muslim community and to achieve social development goals 14
In addition, Islamic banks have one distinct feature, namely, the
existence of the so-called Sharī‫؛‬a Supervisory Board. A Sharī‫؛‬a
Supervisory Board is assigned, in any Islamic bank, the task of
monitoring work of the bank to ensure that every new transaction that
seems questionable or doubtful from a Sharī‫؛‬a standpoint is
disallowed or made to comply with the dictates of the Muslim law.
Membership of the board is drawn from among the ulamā (Muslim
scholars). The opinions of the board are expressed in forms of
rulings and verdicts over different banking issues, and they are
considered binding to the banks, as well as to the clients. The
rationale underlying the existence of such a board is to act as an
independent audit unit to assure the shareholders that the bank fully
complies in its business transactions with the principles of Sharī‫؛‬a.
However, the implementation of a financing system based on the
religious affiliation of the majority of the population who subscribe to
Islam might not seem reasonable, in a country like Sudan, where the
non-Muslims, especially in the south of the country and who
it exposes both parties to the outcome of their deal, be a profit or loss. (Igbal, Munawar
and Molyneux, 2005, pp. 20-23. Also, Khan, M., and Bhatti, M., 2008, pp. 45-54).
Zakāt is an obligatory financial religious levy on all non-working capital, surplus
wealth and agricultural income of the Muslims. It is charged at varying rates and can be
collected by the state and is determined annually (normally based on lunar year). The
rate of zakāt on commercial merchandise is 2.5% .The assets subject to zakāt must
meet specific conditions. In particular they should be owned for at least one lunar year.
According to the majority of Islamic scholars, only tradable assets are subject to zakāt:
fixed assets are not subject to zakāt. These tradable assets should be valued at their
cash equivalent. (AAOIFI, 1999, p. 308)
constitute a considerable size of the population, may harbour feelings
of discrimination and suppression of their fundamental rights as
Sudanese citizens. More seriously, is whether the anticipated system
of Islamic banking is flexible enough to accommodate the financial
interests of the non-Muslim citizens, or is, well immunized not to
violate their rights to access the banking services on the same
footing with their Muslims counterparts?. For instance, will nonMuslims be compelled to pay zakāt when banking with Islamic
This paper attempts critique the Islamic banking system in Sudan
using an economic approach as an essential instrument in
addressing the identity crisis between the Muslim-Arab in the north
and Christian-African in the south. The paper will try reading the
politics of Islamic banks not as resultant of two different sociopolitical views, rather including also, a new dimension from economic
perspective. The paper argues that politics of Islamic banking, might
share responsibility, besides other factors, if the country falls apart by
the end of the CPA six-year interim period in 2011 15.
Emergence and Development of Islamic Banks in Sudan
Emergence of the Islamic banks in Sudan cannot be read in isolation
from controversy over the contested identity of the country. Since the
dawn of independence, the question of identity has been sharply, and
in the most cases, violently, debated. This question has presented an
outstanding challenge that, unfortunately, has not yet wisely been
handled by various Sudanese governments and other regional and
global players.
The author agrees that Sudan suffers from what Mazrui (1985) called
multiple marginality and that the country is seen as Africa’s ‘sick
Southern Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011, in the end of the sixyear interim period of the CPA. Unfortunately, the split of the country into two separate
parts had been the concern of this paper. It became clear to many observers from the
onset that the divisive nature of the CPA, combined with the deep mistrust between the
two signers factions, would only lead to an out-right loss of the national unity of Sudan.
However, even though, it might not seem easily manageable dissolving the two
monetary systems over night; many difficulties will be encountered; and this is out
scope of this paper.
man’. Because of that judgment, the author advocates the idea that
the problem of Sudanese identity has been mismanaged between
the two hostile factions – northerner and southern elite in a tragic
manner. Assal (2009) agrees with Mazrui, pointing out that ‘the
multiple marginality of the Sudan is brutally reflected in the internal
politics of the Sudan, where its dominant northern elite desires it to
be Muslim and Arab and its southern elite desires it to be African and
de-Arabized.’ (Ibid, p. 3) These two contradictory, even mutually
exclusive visions have been at the very heart of the violent political
conflict that colored the post independence Sudanese State. Harir
(1994), maintains that “In the continuous and relentless pursuit of
making Sudan an appendage to 'something' Arab, African or Islam,
both parties have failed to build 'something' Sudanese as its
uniqueness expressed in being Arab and African at the same time,
required” (Harir 1994, p. 11). However, the political dimension might
not be the purpose of this article, rather as Assal envisages, the way,
by which the question of identity was tackled by politicians left many
issues that were/are still swept under the rug of Muslim-Arabs and
Christian-Africans dichotomy. The economic arena in general, and
the banking sector in particular, is taken in this paper as one of the
areas that require urgent address and fixing if Sudan is to remain
The first Islamic bank in Sudan emerged in 1975, as a direct result of
the cooperation between the Arab World and the Islamic Movement
Faction, the most radical political group, which later, succeeded in
taking-over power in June 1989. The Islamization of the banking
sector may be a pointer on Sudan’s earnest quest of championing
the course of Islam. Sudan is the sole country in the continent, where
a government sponsored full-flagged Islamic banking system has
been in action for more than two decades.
The slogan of Islamizing all aspects of Sudanese life had been the
corner-stone by which Arabian countries were invited to penetrate the
national economy under the guise of Islamic banking. Historically,
many reasons worked together to give rise to the emergence of
Islamic banks in Sudan in the second half of 1970s. Although political
and economical factors played a role, it had been the religious factor
which played a key-role in fueling the aspirations of the pioneers who
were fascinated by idea of the Islamic banks (Abdeen, Yasin Al-Hajj.
Field Interview, Khartoum, 2007). Politics and religion had been the
two factors, which played crucial role to the inception of Islamic
banks in Sudan. Whereas politics had been used as fuel, religion
was the vehicle by which idea of Islamic banking transmitted and
entrenched into the Sudanese financial environment. Having seized
the opportunity of political reconciliation with the then president
Nimeri, the Islamic Movement succeeded to move with their Islamic
slogans and agendas to unprecedented levels
The inception of an Islamic oriented bank – Faisal Islamic Bank of
Sudan in 1976 – was the political price that Nimeri's regime had to
offer for reconciliation with the Islamic movement, the most active
faction against his rule before 1975. The success and viability of
Faisal Islamic bank paved the way for the establishment of several
other Islamic banks, notably, Tadamon Islamic Bank of Sudan
established in November 1981, and the Sudanese Islamic Bank in
1982. By the year 1985, Al-Baraka Group, the rapidly expanding
Islamic banking system established a branch in Khartoum. Three
others followed soon after; the Islamic Bank for the Western Sudan,
the Islamic Cooperative Bank for Development and Al-Shamal
Islamic Bank in 1990 (J. Millard Burr and Robert O, Collins, 2006,
pp.106-107). In less than five years course of operation, Islamic
banks in Sudan not only proved to be effective, but also took a large
share of the banking market. Their total ‘paid-up’ capital increased to
168 million Sudanese pounds compared to 158 million for the fifteen
non-Islamic banks (Anwar Mohamed, 1987, p.13). It was observable
that, the rapid expansion of Islamic banks in Sudan was achieved at
the cost of the conventional banking existence.
Islamization process of the banking system in Sudan had passed
through four stages, before it reached the apex in 1990:
Stage One: 1982/1983: The Islamic banking system was conceived
as an idea that firstly fostered by the declaration of the famous
September Laws, which were adopted by ex-president Nimeri, as
Islamic Sharī‫؛‬a law in 1983. Many observers considered that step of
applying Sharī‫؛‬a law was not taken for the sake of Islam, but to
rescue the swaying regime of president Nimeri from the definite
collapse. Among the many aspects of life, directly be affected by
September law, was the banking sector. Soon afterward, the
application of the law, a presidential decree was issued declaring
intention of the regime to adopt a complete interest-free financial
system. Accordingly, all operating banks, by then, were oriented to
assist in the transition from interest-bearing to interest-free banking
(World Street Journal, 12th December 1984, p.39). Usually, upon
such big economic turning-point, preparatory measures are
supposed to be done, before the transition is applied. Surprisingly,
that had not been the case; because the orientation did not consider
any transitional measures. Nor did it care about other non-Muslims
stakeholders who were not necessarily, concerned with Islam
anyhow, or even Muslims citizens, those who were not in favor of that
Islamization policies. Another problem associated with that
presidential decree, was pertaining to the non-availability of the welltrained cadres, who were supposed to carry out the new policies
efficiently. As a result, a wave of turmoil in the banking sector was
observed. Many banks were not able to satisfy the new
requirements, with their funding abilities being seriously reduced.
Stage Two: 1983/1985: that period was marked by the declaration of
the so-called September Islamic Law of 1983. In December 1984, the
government of Sudan under president Nimeri ‘ordered all banks in
the country to stop paying or charging interest 16. A presidential
degree was issued to make interest payments unenforceable in
Sudanese Law Courts. That decision affected 27 banks, including
nine foreign banks 17. The Agricultural Banks of Sudan had been the
first bank to adjust itself shortly after. As a result, many Islamic
modes of financing were designed to replace the usurious rates.
Murābaha sale replaced the medium term finance for the bank's
owned commodities and trucks. In addition, the bank started
accepting deposits (demand deposits, saving deposits, and
investment deposits) according to the newly Islamic modes of
financing. Short-run loans were replaced by agricultural contracts
under the so-called cost-service 18.
Stage Three: 1985/1990: during this period, the Sudan was being
ruled by a democratically elected government, which happened not
to be in conformity with the National Islamic Front and its Islamization
slogans. Because of that a clear fluctuation of Islamic banking
policies was observed. This included the dissolvability of Sharī‫؛‬a
Wall Street Journal, op. cit., p.13
Anwar, Mohammad, op. cit., p. 13.
Gism Al-seed, Hago, op. cit
Supervisory Board and postponement of its functions. Due to the
conflicting views of the Sudanese political parties during that period
on the issue of Sharī‫؛‬a law, a partial implementation of Islamic
banking principles was made, while the whole issue of Islamizing the
banking sector was made open for further debate. In September
1995, the Minister of Finance and the National Economy, introduced
what came to be known the 'Law of Compensatory Rate' under which
the banks were allowed to deal in compensatory rates, and of
determining the a rate of compensation for credits balances, debts
balances, saving accounts and loans. The compensatory rate was
considered by the National Islamic Front a real interest rate
concealed in a new terminology. 19
Stage Four: 1990/2005: this period of time represents the biggest
leap of Islamic banking development in Sudan ever happened, when
a comprehensive Islamization of the economy was set up. That was
in early 1990s, one year later, after the National Islamic Front
attained power through a military coup. A series of decisions
concerning Islamic banking were taken to make it in conformity with
Sharī‫؛‬a, following the declaration by the new government leaders to
make Sharī‫؛‬a the sole source of law and legislation in the country.
Based on the ministerial decision No. 69/1990, related to the
abolition of usurious deals in the state circles, a Higher Sharī‫؛‬a
Supervisory Board for Banking and Financial Institutions (HSSBBFI)
was formed from a number of Sharī‫؛‬a specialist scholars (Gism Alsaed Hajoo, Field interview Khartoum, 2007) 20. To officiate the new
modes of finance, the Sharī‫؛‬a board, was assignedtasked by the
Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS), the duty offor drafting verdicts,
‘fatwās’, advising banks, and replying questions from the public, on
Elhassan, Sabir Mohammad: The Management of Monetary Policy within the
Experience of the Sudanese Islamic Banking, p. 12
Sharī‫؛‬a Supervisory Boards (SSBs) are “in-house religious advisers and they
issue a report to the users of financial statements, which certifies that the bank has
adhered to Islamic principles” (Karim, 1990, p.34). In addition, they undertake other
duties like providing advices and give fatwas (verdicts) to the banks in non-Islamic
clear transactions. In Sudan, the central bank has formed what is called: higher
Sharī‫؛‬a Supervisory Board for Banks and Financial Institutions (HSSBBFI)
the legal difficulties associated with workability of these new modes
of Islamic financing (Ibid). You have not exhausted the 4 stages, only
Sudanese Islamic banks and non-Muslims
Islamic banks are those banks, which follow Islamic Sharī‫؛‬a in their
business transactions. Abolishing interest from their dealings is the
fundamental principle on which Islamic banks are based. Islam’s
strict ban on dealing with interest seems to have social roots. Mirza
and Baydoun (2000, p. 36) argue that the use of Ribā (usury) violates
the principle of social justice, which is very important in Islam,
because it leads to rewarding people without them making an effort.
Those who lend money on interest do not make an effort, nor do they
participate in the risks of the project financed, and such behavior is
rejected by the teaching of Islam. Talip and Phay (1998, p. 65)
suggest that the most apparent reason for the ban of Ribā is to
‘enforce the spirit of brotherhood between Muslims’.
If such argument of social justice, and the enhancement of
brotherhood, were the theoretical and moral basis of Islamic banking
industry, then why did non-Muslims Sudanese citizens resist and
oppose it? The answer to this question may be related to the
question of identity and the way it has been reflected in the economic
field. The totally biased socio-economic policies carried out by Ingāz
government, during the first days in power, under the radical slogan
‘al-mashro al-hadāri’ (Civilizational Project) had left no options for
non-Muslims Sudanese citizens. The Civilizational Project was the
socio-economic engineering program designed by the Islamic
Movement, for to restructuring the Sudanese community, as to bring
it back to the pristine era of the Islamic state. of the Prophet
Mohammad. Under that project, the entire aspects of life were
subdued to radical changes, in favor of the Arab-Islamic identity,
which deliberately intended, to excluding exclude other cultural
components of the Sudanese social fabrics.
The divisive identity politics launched by the regime in the early
1990s; in all aspects of life, and the holy war as perceived by the
regime (jihād) as perceived by the regime (it is imperative to give the
full meaning of jihad in footnote and how it is used in a narrow sense
for ‘holy’ war if at all there is anything holy in the Sudan political
calculations by the state) against the southerner rebel movement and
the Christian Sudanese citizens in the north, had coloured their
relation and feelings of national belongingness, with a thick fog of
suspicion 21. Southerners elite and other Christians in the north
looked at the Islamic banks with suspicious eyes, and perceived
them with much doubt. It was an aspect of the identity game politics,
which the regime, as they saw guess it, was striving to impose on
them by virtue of force and coercion. So it was nothing, but an ArabMuslim device, used by the regime to crowd them out economically
after they had been crowded out culturally and politically. In one of
his weekly broadcasting speech John Grang, the leader of the rebel
movement in the South SPLM/SPLA, said:
The junta in Khartoum has decided to impose an Islamic identity over
the whole country! The state is an object that can neither be Muslim,
nor be Christian, and that is why, we in SPLM/LA refuse giving the state
a religious identity! The state is a human created object that has no
religion! Have you ever seen a state going to the mosque on Friday or
to the church on Sunday? Has someone of you ever heard about a
state gone to Mekka for pilgrimage? It is human beings who do that, not
the state! Let us differentiate between the personal religiosity and the
state, because it is the only way by which we can keep up our country
Therefore, all political and financial institutions that resulted out from
the Civilizational Project, in all aspects of life, and particularly, the
banking sector, were considered as devices, designed to favor an
Jihād literally is an Arabic derivative of the word “jahd” which basically means
strive struggle, and endeavor. In Islam, such struggle is of two types; one is internal
and the other is external. However, both of them have the same purpose that is to
change a situation, which seems as not in conformity with God will, or not in
conformity with nature as such; and thus, may cause unrest or disturbance for the
Muslims nation. (Encyclopedia of Islam: ). In the context of this paper, the term
jihād has a political and religious connotation of the “holy war” in the Sudanese
government circles. A war that is based on, and fueled by religious manipulation
agenda. It has been used by the 1989 government of Sudan to demonstrate an
allegation of taking up arms in defense of Islam and Sudanese nation against the
secular-oriented rebel movement 'Sudanese People Liberation Movement/Army'
(SPLM/SPLA), during the period 1989-2005.
Arab-Islamic identity at the cost of other Sudanese components. The
resultant output of that sentiment, was a real doubt that rights of
Christians and other non-Muslims are conserved within the new
banking system. Such a doubt, towards Islamic banks was not felt
out of nothing; many aspects of Islamic banks could make Christians
and other non-Muslim clients feel doubtful. Their suspicion was
confounded when they recognized that the new banking system,
might not position them in the same footing with Muslim citizens, with
whom they are sharing the same space. Below is an account on
some of the aspects that made the non-Muslim citizens to reject
Islamic banks.
1. Prohibition of charging interest
While the prohibition of Ribā is binding on Muslims, the same cannot
be said of non-Muslims, who are allowed to deal with interest-based
institutions. Thus, imposing interest-free banking means depriving all
non-Muslims from revenue gains they could, otherwise, be
generating. Moreover, in the Sudan, the non-Muslims are not allowed
to access funds from any interest-based institution while the national
banks are by law, not allowed to serve their demands. In essence the
economic fate of the non-Muslims had been sealed by Islamic banks.
In addition, while interest-based banks provide people with
consumption loans as well as overdraft facilities, Islamic banks do
not recognize such loans, or facilities. Provisions of consumption
loans and overdraft facilities, in any form in an Islamic banking setup, for those who may need it are outlawed. Moreover, no bank
is/was permitted to work on an interest-based system in the northern
part or even in the south before the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) of January 2005. In this way, during the entire
period extended between 1989 and 2005, a considerable size of the
population was deprived from enjoying an important civil right of
rational choice. In fact, it was a clear constitutional violation, since
citizenship is the only constitutional criteria by which rights and duties
are determined. However, according to that course of action taken by
the Sudanese state, constitutionality of citizenship was nothing more
than a nominal written clause, that could easily, be dropped a side,
whenever it goes against the Arab-Muslim identity. Because of that
many Christians southern citizens were feeling economically
marginalized, which boosted up their political and cultural grievance
to unprecedented levels. It should be pointed out that, whereas the
regulations of the CBOS forbid conventional banks to operate in the
North, it nevertheless, allowed Islamic banks to operate in the South.
Available statistics reveals that, eight Islamic banks with 18 branches
were operating in the South; before the Government of Southern
Sudan required them to turn their operations interest-based or
otherwise stop their operations in the region (Annual Report 2007,
Central Bank of Sudan, p. 50) 22 These banks, however, refused to
comply and had to close their businessshop in the region. The action
was in fact a clear signal that the two banking system arranged under
the CPA, was undergoing serious intricacies.
2. Religious-based shareholding
According to the recognized nature of Sudan as a multi-cultural,
multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual country, it
has been confirmed that religion shall not be used as a divisive
factor23. Based on this, eligibility for public office, public service,
including the presidency and the enjoyment of all rights and duties
shall be based on citizenship and not on religion, belief or customs 24.
In spite of the clear emphasis by the CPA that religion should not be
taken as a basis for political, cultural and economical entitlement,
however, Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan limits, by law, the rights of
share-holding's ownership and exchange to Muslim citizens only. It
has been stated by the principal law of the bank that ‘all shares of the
bank are nominal; owned and exchanged by Muslims.’ 25
It deserved mentioning that in 2007, the Ivory Bank’s branch in the south has
opened an Islamic window, alongside the conventional system (Annual Report
2007, the Central Bank of Sudan, p. 50). It is a paradox, that such a rational view is
not at all, possible in the north.
23 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 5 January 2005, Chapter 1, Part B, article
24 Ibid., 6.2
Accordingly, non-Muslim citizens are not entitled to hold a share in
the bank as a public limited company.
3. Prohibition of unlawful transactions
Islamic banks are by Sharī‫؛‬a law, not permitted getting into any
transaction that violates Islamic principles. The umbrella of such
transactions covers a wide array of business, which is forbidden
according to Islamic context. All business that are deemed unlawful
and the related activities, like manufacture, transportation and sale of
all sort of alcohol beverage, tobacco, night clubs and all activities of
unknown outcome; like lottery businesses all of them are not eligible
for getting Islamic financing opportunities. (Awad, Mohammed
Hashim, an interview, in Khartoum, 2007)26. If all these businesses
were permissible to non-Muslim citizens before the introduction of
Islamic banking system, so the kind of resentment generated with the
Sharī‫؛‬a based banks was rather somewhat expected. Before signing
the CPA it was not permissible in the southern region for one to
undertake any investment on such taboo businesses.
4. Payment of zakāt
Conceptually, zakāt is supposed to be a major instrument for
providing social security, eradicating poverty, curbing excessive
economic disparities, and stimulating economic activity by
transferring substantial purchasing power from the haves to the
have-nots. Although zakāt is obligatory for all Muslims, there is
controversy in the Islamic literature as to whether Islamic businesses
are obliged to pay this tax, or whether it is obligatory only for
individuals. Gambling (is this a name of an author?) and Karim
(1991, p. 103) have argued that zakāt levied on individuals who are
Muslims individuals and that entities are not liable to it. The Islamic
Documentation of Sudan Experience in the Field of Islamic Banks and Financial
Institutions, Part 2 (Laws associated with the experience), Central Bank of Sudan,
Khartoum, 2006, p. 70
He was the Prof. Chair of Economics, Faculty of Economics, U of K, a
permanent member of the (HSSBBFI), since it has been initiated in 2 of March
Fiqh Academy, in its first zakāt conference held in Kuwait in 1984,
reached the conclusion that businesses are not required to pay
zakāt, unless such a requirement is imposed by law or agreed on by
their shareholders (Shihaddeh, 1987, p. 32). In Sudan, all the banks
operating in the country before the CPA were required, by law, to pay
zakāt. The computation of zakāt is however, inclusive for all clients
regardless of their religious affiliation. Hence, many Christian clients
who deal with Islamic banks and pay zakāt feel that they are obliged
by force of law, to pay a religious tax, which they are not entitled to
by Islam itself. In addition, the way by which zakāt funds are
channeled to the designated recipients is somehow ambiguous and
segregative. Many Christians are not eligible to receive zakāt funding
except when they are recently converted to Islam under the name
(Al-Muā`lafatu qulūbahum) – those hearts have been (recently)
reconciled to the truth of Islam. Only then they deserve being given
zakāt to make them feeling the brotherhood and solidarity of the
Muslim community. So while Christians are forced to pay zakāt, they
are not allowed to enjoy one cent out of it. Some observers believe
that many of those funds did not find its way even to the targeted
groups of the Muslims community. The regime was accused by using
the fund of zakāt to fuel the holy war (jihād) against Christian
southern citizens during their revolt against the government in
Khartoum (J. Millard Burr and Robert, O. Collins, 2006, pp. 106-107).
However, such allegation may need more investigation. The
concluding remark of this point is that, non-Muslims became victims
twice, namely they are forced to pay zakāt, and that their money may
be used to fight against them.
5. Sharī‫؛‬a Supervisory Board Membership
All banks that were operating in Sudan, before the signing of the
CPA, were required by law to have a Sharī‫؛‬a Supervisory Board. The
board has the duty of examining the bank’s transactions to ascertain
if there is any breach of Sharī‫؛‬a rules. It assures the investors about
congruence of Islamic banks performance with Islamic laws and
principles. In addition to that, the board advices the banks, on some
transactions those seem to be of ambiguous nature, (Haniffa, R.
2005, p. 15). Membership to Higher Sharī‫؛‬a Supervisory Board of the
CBOS has been confined to Sharī‫؛‬a specialists and to professionals
who are knowledgeable on the field of Islamic law and banking
business. It is composed of 10-persons; none of them was/is a
Christian. Every individual bank has been required to establish its
own three to four member Sharī‫؛‬a boards, whom are usually
nominated by the bank's board of directors. It should be noted that
within the 26 banks operating in the country in 2008, none of their
Sharī‫؛‬a Board posts, was filled by a Christian citizen. The Christians
are still being excluded by definition of law to satisfy conditions of
such task. The investigation I did, on the membership of Sharī‫؛‬a
Supervisory boards in 24 banks out of 26 banks operating in Sudan
in 2008, gave astonishing results. Out of 100 people who represent
the population size of all the boards, none of them is a southerner or
a Christian. The membership is totally confined to the knowledgeable
Sharī‫؛‬a scholars.
The Issue of Banking System at the Heart of the CPA
It was not surprising then, the economic identity, so to say, was a
conflicting point, while negotiating the CPA in 2005. Discussions on
wealth sharing agreement, reflects, the parties conflicts over the
contested identity (Emerik Rogier, 2006, p. 38). The hard line
followed by the rebels, reflects their anxiety over the best way to
promote unity on an equal and fair economic footing. Accordingly, the
rebels movement (SPLM/A) claims that it is now, necessary, to
correct past historical mistakes, of which the banking sector was the
utmost priority. Therefore, the restructuring of the banking system
was at the heart of the wealth sharing agreement for its imperative
function and its key role in supporting the political stability and the
national unity of the country. However, instead of reaching one
unitary banking system, the two parties agreed to establish two
different banking systems. It was clear that the insistence of the
National Congress Party (NCP) to keep up the Islamic identity of the
banking system drove SPLAM/A negotiators to counteract it, and
clamoured for a secular or conventional banking system. The
pragmatic negotiation tactics of the two hostile factions resulted in a
sharp divisive identity politics upon which the option of the two
different banking systems has been integrated in the CPA.
Two-Headed Banking System
The two factions– NCP and SPLM/A – agreed to establish dual
banking systems, albeit not ones that are fully separated as SPLM/A
had hoped (Ibid, p. 40). It has been agreed that conventional banking
facilities are urgently needed in Southern Sudan. Therefore, the view
was to establish, during the -interim period, the Bank of Southern
Sudan (Dau, Stephen Dhieu, 2006, pp. 2-3). Demonstrating more
suspicion, SPLM/A, insist restructuring; during the interim period, the
CBOS inasmuch to reflect the duality of the banking system in the
country. CBOS shall therefore, use and develop two sets of banking
instruments, one is Islamic and the other is conventional, to regulate
and supervise the implementation of a single monetary policy
through: 1) an Islamic window in Northern part of the country under a
deputy Governor of CBOS using Islamic financing instrument to
implement the national monetary policy in Northern Sudan, and 2)
the Bank of Southern Sudan headed by a deputy governor of CBOS
to manage the conventional window using conventional instruments
in implementing the national monetary policy in Southern Sudan 27
Unfortunately, four years after signing the CPA and now approaching
the deadline of the interim period, it has been clearly proved that
theories are always failed by practical realities. The noble objective
upon which the dual banking system had been proposed – to
promote the fragile national unity – has been aborted. Instead of, at
least having a peaceful co-existence, and harmonious co-operation,
the opposite scenario has been encountered. The gap between the
two systems has widened, with no spark of hope, in the corridor of
the national unity. Each of the parties started developing an exclusive
and independent economical identity. The decision taken by the
Government of Southern Sudan to chase out the branches of the
Islamic banks that were operating in the South for their failure to
convert to conventional system, left no doubts that two independent
economic identities were taking shape in the country. It has been the
anxiety of the author that, the huge technical difficulties associated
with such kind of hybrid financial system will finally lead to the
appearance of two different banking systems.
Agreement on Wealth Sharing, Naivasha, Kenya: Wednesday, January 7 , 2004.
In the end, what has been hoped by the CPA to be the way out of
such divisive economical identity appeared the most fragile part of
the CPA. The two headed banking system, instead of serving as a
lubricant to promote the national unity, turned out to become a
divisive factor, which will tear-up the already withering national unity.
As the paper shows, the arrangement of a dual separated system is
not relevant to enhance the missing ring of the national unity; it will
rather accelerate it to fall apart. It will in fact, serve as a dividing
instrument, if much concern is not given to re-correct it.
The way forward
The debate over identity question represents an outstanding
challenge for all Sudanese intellectual elite, those who are seeking a
safe harbor to the issue of national unity. One may opine that
economic identity is one aspect of the macro identity crisis that has
come very late, yet, contributed a lot to the chronic nature of the
crisis. The approach suggested in this paper looks to the identity
politics by adding a new dimension based on economic perspective.
The economic aspect has not been given much care in the identity
debate. It is time to consider this aspect if we seriously seek an
inclusive solution to the problem of identity. The CPA was the first
endeavor ever tried to include the economic aspect of identity to
readdress it, but the outcome has not been promising so far. This
could mainly be attributed to the paradox of Arabism-Islamized and
Africanism-secularized dichotomy in which the CPA has been
trapped. Even though, it might not be fair to rule out that the dual
banking system was the wrong option, I believe, it is one step in the
right direction, if applied properly. Therefore, for the system to be
more meaningful in resolving the identity crisis, this paper proposes
that the dual banking system must be allowed to function
simultaneously all through the country. The banking system should
be a unified system, with two different windows (conventional and
Islamic) both of them operate simultaneously to satisfy the needs of
all citizens regardless of religious affiliation.
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Case Study of Pakistan. Palgrave: Macmillan.
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Banking: History, Performance and Prospects. Palgrave:
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Africa, (undated), eds., Yousif Fadl Hassan, 140-255, Khartoum:
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Economy: A Study in Macro-economic and Development, (1987),
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Thought: U.S.A.
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Ahmed Elhassab
Ahmed Elhassab, is PhD-candidate in BIGSAS, University of
Bayreuth since 2008. Main field of specialization is in economics
theory. Since 2006 his area of interest is in the field of Islamic
banking theory.
Faith versus Reason: The Place of Religion
in the Socialization Process as Depicted in
two Kiswahili Novels: Kufa Kuzikana and
Unaitwa Nani?
Magdaline Wafula
This paper focuses on the role of Christian religion in the socialization of the
youth in East African communities as represented in two Kiswahili novels; Kufa
Kuzikana (True Friendship) and Unaitwa Nani? (What is Your Name?). From a
Postmodern perspective, one can argue that in the present era where
reflectivity is of paramount importance, the younger generation is more inclined
towards a logical as opposed to a theological approach in tackling sociopolitical and economic challenges. Reflexivity, a tendency to positively question
reality, is opposed to passive acceptance of socio-cultural establishments as
the absolute norm. Drawing on critical review of the two novels, this paper
examines how young people shift away their gaze from the theological
approach in tackling socio-political and economic challenges to advocating
logical discourse in their dealings on daily basis. In this sense, the hegemonic
control of Christianity is challenged as new options become the norm
especially by the younger generation in the contemporary society.
Key terms: Missocializing agent, postmodernism, reflexivity, implied author,
focalization and narrative voice
Colonialism in Africa took not only the form of political dominance
over the colonized people but also exerted considerable influence
over their cultural and religious beliefs (Ngugi, 1986; Mlacha,
1988:45-46). Ngugi wa Thiong’o observes that it was not easy to
differentiate between the missionary and the British administrator.
This is because the missionaries were charged with the conversion
of Africans to Christianity as well as being responsible for their basic
education to equip them for the service of their colonial master. It is
at mission schools that Africans were encouraged to embrace the
white man’s culture. They had to denounce their African ‘traditional’
values such as rites of passage, traditional forms of medication,
naming systems among many others. They were encouraged to drop
their African names but instead to take pride in the ‘Christian’ names
acquired after conversion. African names remained as family names;
for instance, people began calling themselves, John Kamau, James
Onyango, Mary Wafula, etc. This trend has continued to date, albeit
with some critical reassessment by some leading African
personalities such as Jomo Kenyatta, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Wangari
Maathai, Raila Odinga, Koigi wa Wamwere (in Kenya), Kwame
Nkrumah and Kofi Anan (in Ghana), Namdi Azikiwe, Wole Sonyinka
and Chinua Achebe (in Nigeria).
However, today some African Christians prefer to retain their
indigenous or tribal names even after baptism. They argue that their
African names are loaded with meaning and reflect their African
identity. This in itself is a pointer to a generational shift in the attitude
to the Christian faith. Christian doctrine is seen as a camouflage of
Western culture. Ngugi wa Thiong’o has championed this drift by
abandoning the name ‘James’ preferring to use only his African name
‘Ngugi wa Thiong’o’ (Theodore Pelton, 1993; Shelton, 1978:12-13).
He contends that although colonial establishment and administration
were important in the change of social groups in Africa, they mainly
strived to effect social and cultural changes in the individual.
Alterations in the African’s personality, the Europeans naively felt,
could easily be made through missionary activity and education.
Christian activity was often less “Christian” than European and thus,
unlike Islam, tended to bring widespread overt change to Africa.
Consequently, Western formal education and Christianity became the
basic means of socializing young people in most of the colonized
African countries. Even to date when African states have achieved
political independence, the trend still lingers on. For instance, most
national and provincial (now county) schools in Kenya are associated
with certain Christian denominations. This is because different
missionary groups tended to concentrate their activities in specific
geographical regions. For example, in Nyanza region we have
Maseno School (Anglican Church); Central Kenya is associated with
Alliance High School (Presbyterians), while Western region has St
Peters Mumias (Roman Catholics) and Friends School Kamusinga
(Friends Church).Although the government oversees the running of
these schools by supplying them with teachers and other subsidies,
the respective denominations still have an influence on the spiritual
matters. For example, they insist on having a representative of the
church in the Board of Governors or even have a chaplaincy in the
Consistent with critical postmodern perspective, it is argued that the
dominant culture tries to remain dominant by imposing and
universalizing its own culture through indoctrination and ideological
manipulation. It does this most effectively through ideological
hegemonic control of educational institutions, the mass media, and
through religion and other cultural agents - a subtle process of
incorporating persons into particular patterns of belief and behaviour
(Nicol, 2008:4-5). These realities are well captured in the Kiswahili
novel especially from the 1970s to the present (Mlacha, 1988).
African writers use literature as a means of addressing social ills
(Mazrui & Syambo (1992). Elena Bertoncini (2009:2) affirms that
Kiswahili literature has tended to develop in parallel with the changes
in the East African society. Therefore, Kiswahili novelists have
always used their works as a platform to engage with socio-political
and economic issues in their society. For instance, the influence of
religion as a socializing agent in East Africa was and still is so great
that many Kiswahili literary works have featured it as a theme in its
own right. Alamin Mazrui (2007: 37-38) observes that most of the
earlier Kiswahili literary writings pitted Christianity against Indigenous
African religions, as in Samuel Sehoza’s Mwaka Katika Minyororo (A
Year in Chains, 1921).
Religion as a theme is not just prevalent in the earlier Kiswahili
literary works. A quick survey of some of the contemporary Kiswahili
novels reveals that Christianity is portrayed as one of the catalysts of
social conflicts in post-colonial Africa. This is well captured in
Kezilahabi’s Rosa Mistika (1979), John Habwe’s Paradiso (Paradise,
2005) as well as of Wamitila’s Nguvu ya Sala (Power of Prayer,
1999). In all these works, Christianity is portrayed as a
“missocializing” agent especially when the youth are unable to cope
with challenges outside the home environment where Christian
values are upheld. Could this scenario be an indication of the waning
power of missionary religions as socializing agents in the postmodern
I argue that the younger generation is tending towards a logical
approach in tackling social issues as opposed to faith. Examples to
support my argument will be drawn from two Kiswahili novels; Kufa
Kuzikana (Walibora, 2003) and Unaitwa Nani? (Wamitila, 2008).
These novels vividly capture how the older and younger generations
are coping with socio-political and economic challenges prevalent in
the present society. Kufa Kuzikana is authored by Ken Walibora while
Kenneth Wadi Wamitila is the writer of Unaitwa Nani?
Kennedy Walibora and Kenneth Wamitila are among the upcoming
Kiswahili novelists only marched by their predecessors like Said
Khamis, Kezilahabi and Shafi Adam Shafi who belong to the older
generation (Bertoncini, 2009). Ernest Waititu (2005) describes
Walibora as one of the best Kiswahili writers and broadcasters in
Kenya. Wamitila’s Nguvu ya Sala (The Power of Prayer) (2001) and
Musaleo (2005) have won the Jomo Kenyatta Prize for Literature. In
2006, Wamitila was also awarded by the Institute of Kiswahili
Research (TUKI) (now TATAKI) as the best East African Kiswahili
literature scholar (Wamitila, 2006). Walibora’s Ndoto ya Amerika (The
American Dream) won the 2003 Jomo Kenyatta Prize for Literature
(in the children category).
A Summary of the Novels
The story in Kufa Kuzikana takes place in a fictional country,
Kiwachema, where two antagonist ethnic groups, the Wakorosho and
the Wakanju live next to each other in Korosho district. Two young
characters (Akida a Mkanju and Tom a Mkorosho) are faced with the
challenge of negative ethnicity 28 that almost breaks their friendship
but they withstand it. The story is mainly narrated by a homodiegetic
Negative ethnicity here refers to the tendency to discriminate an individual on
racial or ethnic grounds. This is what is commonly referred to as tribalism in Kenya.
narrative voice (Akida) who is also a character in the story. He relates
how he travels by bus from his village to Tandika the capital city of
Kiwachema. He is to be rewarded by the Minister for Education as
one of the three best primary school leavers of the country. While in
the city, he hopes to stay at Tim’s place for a short time. However,
when an ethnic clash suddenly breaks out in Baraki his village, he is
unable return home.
The government chooses not to give any news about the massacres
in the media, pretending that all is well. Neither of the two friends has
any news of his family until Tim’s sister Tamari, after a narrow escape
from death, manages to reach her brother’s place. After looking in
vain for their relatives in the mortuary and in hospital, they decide to
ask for help from Tom, a young and influential man from their village.
They call at his luxurious residence when he has just learnt that his
father has been killed in the ethnic clashes. In spite of the risk, Tom
decides to bury his father in accordance with his customs. Akida
volunteers to join him and his four bodyguards in this dangerous
journey. Akida takes this chance to go to his home only to find that it
has been burnt down. When he returns to the others, he finds Tom’s
body lying in the mud. He was stabbed by Korosho policemen. Tom’s
colleagues and his bodyguards did not lift a finger to protect him.
Akida does not want to return to town before burying Tom’s body
although the others urge him to leave at once. He remains with his
friend only to discover that he is not dead after all. With great
difficulties he carries him to the hospital and stays with him until Tom
slowly recovers. In the meantime, Tim has lost his job because his
uncle accuses him for siding with the Wakanju.
Akida finds Tim living with Tamari in a slum in utmost poverty and is
invited to settle with them, living on casual labours like Tim. One day,
Akida strikes a Korosho man who boasts of having killed hundreds of
Wakanju. Convinced that he had killed the man, Akida flees to
another region where a local farmer hires him as his servant.
Nevertheless, three years later he returns to the capital city and gives
himself up to the police for the murder he thinks he committed. After
the trial he is released because the man did not die, he was only
injured. Tim reveals to Akida that his own father (Mzee Zablon)
indeed killed Akida’s father. Akida weeps bitterly but he comes to
terms with it and is ready to stay with Tim. However, the relatives of
the man he injured try to take their revenge and Akida has a narrow
escape disguised as a woman. In the end, Tom, who has moved to
Canada, arranges for Akida to join him there.
Unaitwa Nani? has an interesting plot in the sense that it is
subdivided in two sections on gender basis. Both sections begin with
the question ‘Unaitwa Nani?’ We are then presented with
unconscious nameless characters in a hospital. When they come to
their senses, they can only recall their gender. What follows
thereafter is a chronology of episodes that are entertaining,
saddening and thought provoking since they involve the two
characters’ efforts to understand themselves as well as their society.
The first section features stories about a woman who in a way
represents various female characters who suffer under patriarchal
systems. Different episodes are narrated from the point of view of
this female character. On regaining consciousness, the woman is
shocked to see several men gazing and making fun of her naked
body. She is disgusted but in spite of her efforts to respond to them
she is unable to utter a single word. When she is asked to mention
her name, all she says is ‘mwanamke’ (woman). They insist that she
should give a name that reveals her real identity for example as Mr
X’s daughter or wife. The section ends with several episodes
featuring female characters that are oppressed on account of their
gender. Notably, the younger female characters are determined to
combat social structures that are oppressive to the female folk.
Acquisition of Western form of education becomes the key to their
The second section is narrated from the perspective of a male
character who also speaks for various male voices. Male characters
are equally victims of the female characters who have found leverage
in the institutions of marriage and religion. However, like their female
counterparts, young characters break loose of the oppressive
establishments in their society. Kaminda (a pastor’s son), is tricked
into marriage by Sasi. Apparently, Sasi is out to revenge on pastor’s
children after Katiwa (another pastor’s son) abandoned her after
impregnating her. Seemingly, Kaminda is unable to handle marriage
issues due to poor socialization by his Christian father. 29 There is
Unaitwa Nani? pp.161-176
also the story of Wamae, a young man who fakes lameness in a
‘Christian’ crusade in order to obtain money to start a business30.In
both novels, the authors are engaged with social-cultural, political
and economic challenges facing the present Kenyan society. Some
of the themes that cut across the two novels include: hypocrisy on
the part of the religious leaders, corruption, demerits of the free
market economy and oppressive cultural practices such as wife
inheritance and forced early marriages for girls.
In this paper I foreground religion as a socializing agent as depicted
in the novels. In both novels, the Christian faith is predominant. For
instance. In Unaitwa Nani? only one episode (Vuta n’kuvute) 31 refers
to a Muslim teacher who abuses his pupil. However, several
episodes as we shall see later refer to Christian pastors who misuse
their position. They are unable to serve as role models to the
younger generation. The older members of society who are entrusted
with the duty of socializing the youth fall way below the expected
moral standards. As a result, the youth turn to education and their
talents as the way out of their social challenges. Seen against the
postmodern era in which the depicted communities live, it can be
argued that religion as a socializing agent may be losing power or
need a revision if it is to be relevant in the contemporary society.
As a basis of my discussion, I shall highlight some fundamental
viewpoints about the postmodern ideas which in my opinion attempt
to explain the tendency to drift from religion to reason or rationality in
the contemporary society. Simon Malpas observes that the term
‘postmodernism’ tends to be used in critical writing in two key ways:
either as ‘postmodernism’ or ‘Postmodernity’ (Malpas (2005:9).
Generally, postmodernism has tended to focus on questions of style
and artistic representation, and Postmodernity has been employed to
designate a specific cultural context or historical epoch. However, as
Unaitwa Nani? p.183
Unatiwa Nani? P.82
Simon has rightly noted, a clear cut distinction between
postmodernism as a style and postmodernity as a period is
impossible. The social context in which a literary work is produced
and read has a bearing on the litrary devices that the author deploys.
According to Anthony Giddens (2001:680) for instance, asserts that
postmodernism describes a historical era marked with major changes
affecting the global society due to a set of economic, social, and
political forces that circulate across continents and national
boundaries. It is an ideology that challenges the idealistic and
universalistic tendencies of its predecessor, modernism, which are
dissolving with the changing world. Bran Nicol (2008:2) also affirms
that postmodernism is characterised by fluidity in social concepts,
reflexivity of social members and a diversity and plurality of systems
that give human beings a chance to choose the most suitable one.
Nicol (2008:4-5) further points out that postmodernism is an attitude
that underscores our culture and refers to a heightened degree of
self-consciousness, indicating that our experience of reality has
changed. Reality is no longer something that we take for granted, but
is something that we suspect is continually organised and
constructed for us by the apparatus of the mass media and the global
capitalist economy.
Subsquently, the suspicion of the ‘created reality’ is what propels the
postmodern men and women to actively engage in its recreation.
People (especially the youth) in the twenty-first century no longer
accept the present establishments as the ideal but rather as
provisional structures that need continuous reassessment in the ever
changing society. This is the kind of society that is depicted in Kufa
Kuzikana and Unaitwa Nani?
In the two novels, the authors depict intergenerational conflicts
involving the older and younger members of society emanating from
their varied outlook on various social issues. For instance, while the
older generation appears to be passive and conservative towards on
the established social structures, the younger generation is reflexive;
it is inclined towards self reflection and self referral (Steve, 1988). It
actively re-evaluates the cultural heritage handed down to it by the
parent generation. Various cultural practices, Christian religion
included, have come under strong criticism by the younger
generation which is more inclined to reason as opposed to faith.
David Kinnaman observes that for the younger generation, the lines
between right and wrong, between truth and error, between Christian
influences and cultural accommodation is increasingly blurred
(Kinnaman, 2011:12). In the present internet era, the youth can
readily access information thus making them more informed and
more critical of their social environment. As Erdmute Alber (2008:3)
informs us, the youth in contemporary societies are no longer
passive in their societies. They are actively involved in the social
structures that affect their daily life. It is on this premise that we see
some young characters challenging Christianity as a valid socializing
institution as represented in the two novels.
Christianity in Kufa Kuzikana and Unaitwa Nani?
For the white missionaries, Christian religion was seen as a means of
enlightenment and moral uprightness to the Africans who were
considered to be uncivilized. It was part of modernization and
consequently, an ideal form of life (Shelton, 1978:13). However, in
the postmodern era the “authenticity” of the Christian faith is
increasingly being challenged. This is especially so when those who
are entrusted with its propagation fall short of the moral standards
that they purport to advance. In Kufa Kuzikana and Unaitwa Nani?
Christian leaders are represented as hypocrites who manipulate their
congregation for their own interests. Mere profession of the Christian
faith is therefore not a surety of morality in the contemporary society.
In Kufa Kuzikana (Walibora, 2003), Christianity is less appealing to
the youth as a moralizing agent. This can be inferred from the
behaviour of characters like Akida, Jerumani and Tim, Jerumani, a
young man who had won a scholarship to pursue a Bachelor’s
degree in engineering in Germany scoffs at Akida’s suggestion that
religion is a plausible means of revolutionizingl their society. He
accuses Christian leaders like John Njalala for fuelling ethnic clashes
by inciting their congregations to attack each other and even
supplying weapons used in the clashes in Baraki (Kufa Kuzikana,
156, 160). Moreover, the same pastor pleads guilty in a court where
he is accused of sexually abusing young girls (Kufa Kuzikana,189).
Akida is shocked that the pastor could be accused of such an
offence. However, Jerumani is not surprised and he cites the
Rwandan genocide which to him clearly reveals how Christian
leaders were partisan in the ethnic clashes (Kufa Kuzikana156). This
scenario is similar to what happened in Kenya where during the PostElection Violence in 2008, the Church was silent about the contested
presidential results and burning of members of an ethnic group in a
church in Eldoret town.
When we consider that literary works are cultural artefacts of a given
community, it is no surprise that the author draws his themes from his
own experiences. Elena Bertoncini (1989: 2) notes that Kiswahili
literature has tended to develop in parallel with the socio-political and
economic changes in East Africa. Kufa Kuzikana vividly captures the
political mood that characterized the Kenyan society in the early
1990s during the onset of multiparty politics. The novel was
published in 2003 meaning that it could have been written between
1992 and 2002. At this point in time, multiparty system was taking
root in Kenya and the single party system was declining in power.
The ruling party known as Kenya African Union (KANU) had become
very unpopular after being in power since Kenya’s independence in
1963. This appeared to suggest that all those who had benefited
from the KANU regime feared losing their economic and political
grips in the country. Therefore, to safeguard their interests, they
resorted to ethnic manipulation by exploiting the existing latent social
and economic cleavages between citizens from different ethnic
groups. In 1992 and 2002 respectively, Kenya experienced major
ethnic clashes following the country’s general elections. Therefore, in
view of the historical context of the novel, it can be understood why
ethnicity features as a major theme in the novel.
The fictional country of Kiwachema can easily be associated with
Kenya; the birth place of the author. Some of the places mentioned in
the novel have a bearing with actual features and roads in the
country. A case in point is River Kibisi which is located in the western
part of Kenya while Lumumba, Mandela and Nkrumah are names
given to some of the roads in Nairobi; the capital city of Kenya.
These names also depict great African luminaries whose political
ideals were to form the basis of African renaissance.
Therefore, a reader who is conversant with the geography and
history of Kenya can easily figure out that the fictional city of Tandika
represents Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya (KK.31). During this
period in the Kenyan history, Christian principles were put on the
scale. Communities from varied ethnic backgrounds who lived
together were faced with the challenge of either submitting to ethnic
loyalty or religious allegiance. As captured in the novel, some
Christian leaders reclined to ethnic prejudice and attacked fellow
Christians. Furthermore, the failure by a section of the Church to
marshal support against the new constitution during the 2010
referendum may also be indicative of the declining fortunes of the
Church in postmodern era. Could we say that these are indicators
that Christianity (the predominant faith of the majority of Kenyans) is
losing the moral ground to guide the masses given that grand
corruption are abound perpetuated by leaders who bear Christian
Within the framework of narrative theory, narrative voice and
focalization are the key narrative strategies that reveal the ideology
of the implied author in a literary text. Narrative voice designates the
agent that tells the story and focalization refers to the angle from
which the story is related (Rimmon-Kenan, 2002.88). These two
strategies are usually lodged in the narrator who may or may not be
part of the narrated story in the form of character(s). In most cases
the main character is the one that reveals the implied author’s
ideology in a narrative text. However, sometimes minor or incidental
characters may communicate this ideology (Uspensky, 1973:8-9).
The implied author is a textual entity that is an ‘implied version’ of the
real author who establishes the norms of the narrative (Booth
1961:67-71). For Jacob Lothe (2000:19), the implied author is
practically a synonym for the ideological value system that a text,
indirectly and by combining all its resources, presents and
represents. In Kufa Kuzikana, Akida the protagonist, Jerumani and
Tim are characters in which the implied author’s stance on
Christianity is lodged. These young characters are opposed to the
idea that religion can enhance moral standards in their society. They
have lost confidence in their ‘Christian’ elders whom they regard to
be corrupt and immoral. Through Jerumani, the author suggests that
Kiwachemans need a change of heart and traditions to realize true
social revolution. This view finds expression in the following excerpt:
Hii nchi yetu inahitaji mapinduzi,” (Jerumani)alisema… “Sio mapinduzi
ya serikali. Hata kidogo. Tunachohitaji ni mapinduzi ya mioyo.
Mapinduzi ya ada na mila. Mapinduzi ya mitazamo, misimamo na
mikabala.” (154)
Tim too acknowledges that mere profession of the Christianity faith
may not be the solution to the socio-political and economic problems
in their society. This is indeed in line with the teachings of Jesus.
Those who merely call Him Lord shall not inherit the Kingdom of God
(Matthew 7:21). Like Akida, Tim is disappointed that Pastor Njalala
does not live what he preaches in his sermons. This is well captured
in the following conversation:
Na Kasisi John, mtu wa Mungu alifanya makosa anayodaiwa kufanya
kweli?”“Hii dunia ina maajabu.Umdhaniaye siye kumbe ndiye …Sitaki
kuizungumzia mada hiyo (dini) kwa sasa…nimeacha dini hadi niwapate
watu wanaoishi kulingana na wanavyohubiri…”(199-201)
Evidently, Christianity no longer appeals to the younger generation
especially because some of the ‘Christian’ leaders are not moral
models. The same scenario is depicted in Unaitwa Nani (UN
hereafter)? In this novel, several episodes featuring hypocritical
“Christian” leaders out to manipulate believers for selfish gains
abound. Through characters such as Kaminda’s father (UN.165), the
implied author shows that Christianity is no longer valued. Kaminda’s
father is portrayed as a hypocritical pastor. Pastoring is to him a
source of income rather than a calling. Moreover, Kaminda, his only
child who appears to embrace his Christian doctrine is poorly
socialized to cope with the challenges outside the home environment
(UN.161). He is easily tricked into marriage by Sasi. Sasi is out to
revenge on pastor’s children since Katiwa (another pastor’s son)
abandoned her after impregnating her (UN.165, 175). The same
pastor is reported to be intimately involved with a member of the
church choir (UN.151-3).
Kiwachema people need a revolution. Not a revolution in the government but in
their attitude. They need to change their customs and traditions as well their
worldviews, perspectives and positions on issues.
Is it true that Pastor John Njalala, a man of God, is guilty of what he is accused
of? This world is full of wonders. He whom you least expect turns out to be the
guilty one…I have resolved to abandon religion until I come across people who live
out what they preach.
The impression that one gets from these episodes is that some of the
Christian leaders are wanting morally. One therefore wonders if they
can be relied on to inculcate good morals in the younger generation.
Such observations confirm Erving Goffman’s (1990)34 assertion that
in society people act within an overall frame of reference. This frame
of reference works like a theatrical play in which everyone has taken
a part within the scene. In this perspective, the scene works only
when people keep faith with their part and avoid acting in ways which
may contradict what has been accepted as one’s part. Thus in the
perspective of the young people as depicted in the novels, the
Christian leadership messes up their role-playing – a situation which
is unacceptable especially to the youth of the twenty-first century
because it breaks up the scene.
To some extent this reveals the weaknesses of Christianity as
propagated by the white missionaries. They presented the clergy as
a ‘holier than thou’ category; a concept that was foreign to the African
belief system. In the African religious beliefs, the obligation to uphold
good deeds fell on each individual and reward and punishment,
though may have effects on subsequent offspring, is often meted in
real time here on earth on the offenders (Mbiti, 1989).This is
illustrated in the episode of Mizimu ya Marehemu. 35 In the story,
Nyalgondho, a male character miraculously becomes rich after
marrying a mysterious woman from the lake. However, when he
mistreats the woman later on, she vanishes with all the accumulated
wealth leaving him impoverished. Here we witness recompense for
the offender in the here and now.
It can also be argued that the money economy and the struggle to
make a living characteristic of the contemporary society could
account for these dissonances between telling people to uphold high
moral standards and being moral. This is implied in the episode of
the unfaithful pastor captured in Siasa ya Soko Huria. 36 Christianity
is portrayed as a money making business for making money. It is no
Erving Goffman, The presentation of Self in Everyday Life. 1990, Anchor Books,
ew York.
The Spirits of the Dead. Unaitwa Nani?, p.72.
The Politics of the Free Market. Unaitwa Nani? p.145.
surprise that the pastor resorts to threats of hell fire for those who do
not buy his religion (UN.162). However, with time, the ‘hell fire’ tactics
lose power as people realize that the Christian religion offers no
practical solution to their day to day challenges. See the following
Akawatishia kuwa huo moto usemwao si wa kuyapasha moto maungo
yao… Wakamwambia kuwa shida za maisha yao ni moto wa kutosha.
Kuna moto mwingine mkali kuliko tanuri la maisha ambako
wametumbukia? Mhubiri akawa analemewa (UN.162).
Here the implied author insinuates that while Biblical teachings pacify
the deprived with a false hope in the future, the poor also see that
there is such a huge dissonance between what the clergy say and
what they actually do. Hence one wonders if hell fire is losing power
to scare or is hell demystified?
The efficacy of Christian doctrines in bringing about morality in highly
unequal societies like the one portrayed in Unaitwa Nani? is highly
challenged. We see characters who have amassed resources with
no fear of retribution while those without them would do anything to
better their lives. What is the place of Biblical teachings that
discourage covetousness and seeking first the kingdom of God? 38
In the episode entitled Utamlaumu? 39, some Christian leaders are
portrayed as liars who use Biblical narratives to manipulate people
for material gains. Benny Hinn; a famous television evangelist is cited
as one of the religious leaders who conduct crusades in which
people receive miraculous healing. However, when a character by
the name Wamae fakes healing, doubt is cast on the authenticity of
some of the Biblical narratives. The implied author seems to justify
Wamae as an innovative young man. He ceases the opportunity to
overcome the economic challenges brought about by the politics of a
liberal market in the present society.
In such circumstances one is bound to question the validity of
Western religion in the first place. Is Christianity a kind of trade that
He threatened them with hell fire if they do not repent. But they told him that the
problems they were facing were already hell for them.
Matthew 6:33
Literally translated as “Will You Blame Him”? Unaitwa Nani?p.177
was and is still used by its crusaders to impoverish those who blindly
buy into it? They see the need to convince the poor who suffer from
myriad social and health problems and their desire to get quick
solutions as a fertile ground for their gimmicks. Consequently, stagemanaged miracles are organized to hoodwink the poor and deprive
them of even the little resource they may have. The begging question
is why do people buy into such gimmicks? Are they fulfilling the
prophecy that those who have will be given more while those who
lack will lose even the little that they have? 40
As a matter of fact, the hollowness of some of the works of Church
leaders resonates with actual events in East Africa and elsewhere.
For example, the Kanungu massacre in Uganda, the failure by some
pastors to resurrect their colleagues who had died in a road accident
(2011) and the end of the world prophecy that did not materialize by
a USA based Church leader in 2011. When events do not happen as
predicted, what will stop the congregation from feeling cheated,
disillusioned and to lose hope in their religious leaders?
In the postmodern era, the younger generation in particular is
reverting to the use of reason and exploiting their talents to tackle
socio-economic problems. Young (female) characters in Unaitwa
Nani? (Mwanamka or Pandora (UN.62), Nyakor (UN.72) and
Kamene (UN.89) strive to overcome cultural inhibitions based on
gender. They are opposed to the traditional practices such as forced
marriages and wife inheritance. Instead, they have embraced
modern culture like the Western form of education as an avenue for
their emancipation.
Young men like Pipo use their talents to acquire capital and venture
into the world of business as illustrated in the story; Kichwa cha Lori
. Subsequently, in the twenty-first century characterized with
globalization in all spheres of life, religious crusaders may have to
devise better ways to persuade especially the youth into buying into
their religion. As Kinnaman (2011:91) points out, the impulses toward
creativity and cultural engagement are some of the defining
characteristics of the young generation today. They want to re40
For to everyone who has, more shall be given, and he will have abundance; but
Matthew 25:29)
The Head of a Lorry. Unaitwa Nani? p.194
imagine, re-create, rethink, and be entrepreneurs, innovators and
Kinnaman thus suggests that the Church needs new architects to
design interconnected approaches to faith transference. To rethink its
assumptions and come up with new forms of catechism and
confirmations that will utilize the potentials of the young generation.
This is the only way to produce young people of deep abiding faith
(Kinnaman 2011: 12-13). Hence for Christianity to stand the test of
time, the younger generation should be given a chance to participate
in the establishment of Church structures to enhance the
transference of faith from generation to generation. Moreover, the
elders should walk the talk and not the other way round.
From the examples cited in the two novels, one notices an
intergenerational conflict between the younger generation and the
older one on their outlook on religion as a feasible means of solving
social problems. The younger generation is inclined to a more
pragmatic approach based on logic rather than relying on divine
intervention. They differ from the older generation which seems to
take the Christian doctrine passively. Indeed the youth in both the
novels question the efficacy of some cultural practices and traditions
including Christianity in tackling real life challenges in the
contemporary society.
Probably it is high time Africans went back to their roots to reflexively
and reflectively consider their traditional systems to cope with their
daily challenges. While globalization inevitably brings in myriad
alternatives, one has no choice but to appreciate the past. We need
to look to our past, sieve out what is noble and synthesize it with the
decent from other cultures and weave out homemade structures that
are more adapted to our own environment. This is the only way faith
and reason will emancipate Africans from global dominance and
exploitation by the global giants. Religion does not necessarily
negate reason as demonstrated by young characters like Tim and
Jerumani. The unknown, as much as it could be in the hands of the
divine creator, it is equally in the hands of the created. Human beings
are made in the creator’s image and likeness to be a co-creators in
making the world a better place (Genesis, 1:26).
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Transaction Publishers.
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University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London. 1989.
Goffman, Erving (1990) The presentation of Self in Everyday Life.
Anchor Books New York,
Kezilahabi Euphrase (1980) Rosa Mistika, Kenya Literature Bureau.
Kinnaman David (2011) You Lost Me: Why Young Christians Are
Leaving Church and Rethinking Faith: Baker Books, Grand
Rapids, Michigan.
Habwe John (2005) Paradiso: Jomo Kenyatta Foundation. Nairobi.
Loethe, Jacob (2000) Narrative in Fiction and Film. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Mazrui, Alamin. M (2007) Swahili Beyond the Boundaries: Ohio
University Press, Athens.
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African Educational
Publishers. Nairobi .
Malpas, Simon. (2005) The Postmodernism: The New Critical Idiom.
Routledge, Taylor &
Francis Group, London & New York.
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Edition, Heinemann Publishers.London.
Mlacha, S.A.K. (1988) The Effects of Foreign Culture to the Younger
Generation in Kiswahili. Journal of the Institute of Kiswahili
Research Vol. 55/1&55/2.
Language in African Literature, London, Curry u.a.
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Edinburgh University Press.
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Accent Series, Rout ledge, London& New York.
Sehoza, Samuel (1921) Mwaka Katika Minyororo. Dar es Salaam.
Shelton, A. J. (1978) The African Assertion: A Critical Anthology of
African Literature. Bobs-Merrill Publishing. Indianapolis.
The Holy Bible (1985) New King James Version, Thomas Nelson
Publishers, Nashville.
Uspensky, Boris. (1973) A Poetics of Composition. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Waititu Ernest (2005) Walibora Away from TV Fame Daily Nation.
( on 3/20/2005.
Walibora, K. (2003) Kufa Kuzikana. Nairobi: Longhorn Publishers.
Wamitila, K. W (2008) Unaitwa Nani? Vide Muwa Publishers, Nairobi:
Walibora Ken: Kufa
Kuzikana, Longhorn Publishers.
_______ (1999) Nguvu ya Sala, Longhorn Publishers.
_______(2008)Unaitwa Nani? Vide-Muwa Publishers.
Magdaline Wafula
Magdaline Wafula is currently pursuing a PhD in African Literature at
Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS).
The main focus of her research is contemporary Kiswahili novel
spanning the decade between 1999 and 2009. Her PhD project is
entitled: “Deployment of Narrative Voice and Focalization in the
Narration of Generational Conflicts in Selected Swahili Novels”.She
studied at Egerton and Moi Universities where she obtained her BA
in Sociology, Religious Studies and Kiswahili and a Master of
Philosophy degree in Kiswahili in 1991 and 1997 respectively. She
also holds a Post Graduate Diploma in Education from Egerton
University. Other research interests include Sociolinguistics and
Onomastics. Before embarking on her PhD, she taught at Moi Girls’
High School in Eldoret- Kenya.
Stock taking in a Transnational Islamic
movement: Accounting for growth of
Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya
Halkano Abdi Wario
Tablīghī Jamāʿat, a transnational apolitical lay missionary movement is
undoubtedly one of the most widespread Muslim groups in the contemporary
world (Masud 2000; Sikand 2002, 2006). Conservative estimates put the
number of active members of this movement in millions and note of its
presence in almost all countries of the world (Marloes 2005; Moosa 2000; Tozy
2000; Marc 2000). The rapid growth of the movement has been attributed to its
apolitical stand, its focus on individual and collective re-spiritualization, its
ability to mobilize ordinary Muslims as active preachers and its strategies to
build its growth on religious mobility and border crossing that guarantees its
germination in fertile Muslim areas. This paper focuses on one of the least
observed feature of the transnational movement: self-appraisals and reviews. It
explores the theme of growth from the perspective of the Tablīghīs themselves.
Hence, it asks, how do the Tablīghīs evaluate their growth? What mechanism
do they put in place to sustain exponential rise in membership? What
institutional and individual structures bolster their competitiveness, relevance
and resilience in highly diverse Muslim societies? Is the stock taking done
collectively, individually or regionally? How often do they meet to evaluate past
activities and plan for the future one? It is only by exploring these themes can
one state with certainty and account for growth of the globalizing but highly
reclusive Muslim movement. The paper is based on extensive ethnographic
field research done between April 2009 to January 2012 among the Tablīghīs in
Kenya, a country that has over the years emerged as the nexus of the lay
movement in East and Central Africa.
Key words: Tablīghī Jamāʿat, Kenya, ahwāl, evaluation
Tablīghī Jamāʿat: A historical background
The fall of the Mughal Empire and the establishment of the British
colonialism in India in the 19th Century had unprecedented impact on
reform movements in the Indian subcontinent (Haq 1973). The loss
of political dominance by the minority Muslims triggers a wave of
religious revivalism that manifested itself in Islamic revivalism and
extensive investment in madrasa education. Chief among the
emerging centres of Islamic learning and revivalism was Darul Uloom
Deoband in the town of Deoband in north India (Sikand 2002). Here,
led by prominent scholars of the time such as Muhammad Qasim
Nanotvi, Muhammad Yaqub Nanautawi, Shah Rafi al-Din, Sayyid
Muhammad Abid, Zulfiqar Ali, Fadhl al-Rahman 'Usmani and Rashid
Ahmad Gangohi, Deobandi madrasas trained a number of Muslims
scholars that were to impact on revivalism in the later years. Tablīghī
Jamāʽat grew out of such an environment of religious reform. It was
founded by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, a Deoband educated Muslim
scholar in 1927 in Mewat, near New Delhi. Mewatis or Meos, were by
then, characterized by religious illiteracy and non-observance of
Islamically ordained duties such as prayers, fasting and zakat. The
movement was also established as a counter to Hindu reform
movements such as Arya Samaj that targeted to ‘revert’ the nominal
Meos back to Hindu religion. (Haq 1972) Ilyas mobilize ordinary
Meos in small groups to travel within their own regions and major
centres of Islamic learning as lay missionaries. The essence of such
travels, as envisioned by the founders, was not primarily to preach
but to inculcate religious observance and discipline among the lay
missionaries. In the heightened days of socio-political activism in the
British India that ignite religious and ethnic rivalries, the Tablīghī
Jamāʿat , unlike movements such as the Jamāʿat -e-Islami, stayed
clear of political discourses and agitations. This strategy allowed the
movement to focus on individual and collective re-spiritualization of
everyday life, to build consensus and return to the fundamentals of
the faith in spite of political and sectarian divisions and mitigated
backlash from state actors bent on proscribing politically influential
movements. This strategy, would in the later expansion of the
movement, allow for its establishment and growth in East Africa,
Arabian Peninsula, South East Asia and the United Kingdom.
Central to the ideology of the Jamaat is the role of travel as the most
effective tool of personal reform. (Masud 2000) The main teachings
of the movement are summarized under six principles: One, article of
faith (shahada); two, five daily ritual prayers (salat); three, knowledge
(ilm) and remembrance of God (dhikr); four, respect for every Muslim
(ikram-I Muslim); five, emendation of intention and sincerity (ikhlas-i
niyat) and six, spare time (tafriq-i waqt). (Sikand 2002) The last
principle is the hallmark of the movement. It is also known as khuruj fi
sabillilah (going out for the sake of God) and involves volunteers
sparing time and resources to travel away from home for different
durations such as 3 days, 10 days, 40 days, 4 months and even a
year. Members are expected to set aside at least 3 days every
month, 40 days every year and 4 months in a lifetime for the sole
purpose of missionary journeys. 42
Notes on Data collection
The data used in the paper are sourced primarily from field work
done Kenya in April, 2009, August-October 2009, April-August 2010
and December 2011- February 2012. Ethnographic data were
collected through attendance of transnational Tablīghī gatherings in
Nairobi, Isiolo and Moyale, formal and informal interviews with
members of the movement and religious leaders and followers drawn
from mainstream Salafi and Sufi traditions. Observations and field
notes from travel experiences with Tablīghīs enriched the research. 43
Tablīghī Topography in Kenya
Tablīghī Jamāʿat came into Kenya in 1956, largely through contacts
with Kenya’s Asian Muslim communities from Indian Subcontinent. 44
Personal interviews with Mohammed Aero (2009), Abdi Rashid
(2010), Mzee Sule (2011) in Moyale.
In total 35 face to face interviews were conducted in the period stated above of
which about 7 were focus group interviews. The respondents included novices,
active leaders Tablīghī s and members and local and national non- Tablīghī
religious leaders. The author also attended eight national gatherings of Tablīghī s in
different parts of Kenya as well as 10 day travel with the missionary group. Most
interviews were conducted in Swahili and Borana.
Naushad, a sermon at Bait ul Maal, Nairobi, 18.04.2009. Mercantile Indian
Ocean trade brought traders of various origins to the coast of East Africa. Among
early settlers included Indians of various religious persuasions (Salvadori 1984,
2000). British Colonial administration also brought large Indians of diverse religious
(Hasani 1967) It has immense presence in most parts of Kenya
especially in Northern Kenya, the Coast, Nairobi and major towns in
Central and Western Kenya. The North is home to Cushitic speakers
of Borana, Gabbra, Burji, Garre and Somali. Among the Borana
community of Isiolo and Moyale, the Jamāʿat has a history of about
15 years. 45 Of Kenya’s 40 million people, slightly more than 11% are
Muslims (Population and Housing Census Report 2009). Kenyan
Muslims are a diverse group with varying doctrinal and sectarian
affiliations. Large sections ascribed to moderate Sunni traditions with
strong affiliation to Shafiʾi School of jurisprudence. Members of
Tablīghī Jamāʿat constitute a minority missionary group but with high
visibility in Muslim public spaces due to frequent itinerary and
upsurge in membership.
Distinctive and pragmatic ‘faith bureaucracy’ accounts for the
success of self-organization and growth of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in
most parts of the world. Kenya is not an exception. Deitrich Reetz
(2008) observes that despite the fact that Tablīghīs forcefully assert
that the movement has no specialized organization or administration
and that it is purely lay and voluntary, its internal administration is
strong and robust and highly hierarchical. Reetz describes many
features that resemble functioning of a bureaucracy with clear in- and
out-group distinction. While the movement knows no formal
membership it is marked by a distinct internal culture, which
influences all members and their mutual relations.
The country’s national administrative council referred to as Kenya
Shūrā divided the country into three major zones called ḥalqas,
namely: Nairobi, Mombasa and Garissa ḥalqas. The ḥalqas are
named after the central and most populous town in the zone. Kenya
Shūrā is composed of about a dozen senior Tablīghīs largely drawn
from Kenyan Muslims of Asian origin but also selected committed
persuasions as indentured railway labourers to construct Kenya-Uganda Railway
from Mombasa to the shores of Lake Victoria at the turn of 20 Century. A number
of the labourers went back home while others made Kenya their home.
Subsequent migration increased the population of this diasporic and
heterogeneous community. The Kenyans of Asian origin are relatively wealthy due
to trade. Various Muslim communities are represented within them including
Ismailis, Ithna Asharis, Memmons, and Ahmadis among others. It is among the
Sunni groups from the Kenyan Asian community that the Tablighi Jamaat found a
viable connection.
Hussein Dima, personal interview Isiolo, 14.04.2009
members of the movement from other communities. Each ḥalqa is
further subdivided into sub-ḥalqa. All the three major ḥalqas have
about 10 sub-ḥalqas. 46 Three or four qarias constitute a sub-ḥalqa. A
qaria is composed of four to five mosque jurisdictions. Tablīghīs who
frequent a specific local mosque organized themselves into a
mosque-based unit that regularly meet, preach, recruit members,
receive foreign and local lay preachers and consult on matters of
faith. These mosque-based units also called maqamis are the
cornerstone of the re-territorialization strategy, occupation of sacred
spaces and resilience of the movement in the country. At the lowest
level of the Tablīghī bureaucracy is the household unit where the
ethos of the movement are re-enacted and inculcated through
regularly text reading and consultative meetings. In essence, an
adherent is expected to bring the movement home and revive the
adherence to the faith by his family members.
Isiolo and Waso sub-ḥalqas fall under the Nairobi ḥalqa which is also the
largest and most active ḥalqa in Kenya. Moyale and Marsabit sub-ḥalqas fall
under Garissa ḥalqa.
Figure 8: Tablīghī territorial and administrative structure
Map 1: A map of Kenya showing the three Tablīghī zones of
At each level an amir (leader) heads a unit on rotational base. The
amir is selected from among the regular Tablīghīs in an area. The
level of commitment and organizational skills are some of the
requirements that boost one’s rise in the leadership structure of the
movement. A man is considered as the amir of his household. A
travelling group also has an amir as the head. He is often selected by
a regional or local consultative council to lead based on his vast
travels and knowledge of Tablīghī practices.
In each ḥalqa and sub-ḥalqa the Tablīghīs have designated mosques
that serves as coordination centre for movement’s events and regular
activities. Such a centre is called markaz. Baitul Maal is the Nairobi
ḥalqa markaz and the national headquarters of the movement.
Masjid Ali is Mombasa ḥalqa markaz while Masjid Quba is Garissa
ḥalqa’s administrative seat. In areas where the Tablīghīs do not
possess their own sacred space, a ‘Tablighi-friendly’ mosque is
identified and utilized as an operational base. Mosques not only
serve as venues to preach and recruit new members but also act as
seat for consultative meetings (shūrā), spaces for congregational
gatherings (ijtimāʿ and jor), places for reception and accommodation
of visiting fellow lay preachers and classes to teach and learn about
various Tablīghī practices in customized educational programmes
Evaluating Tabligh: Ahwāl Giving as Progress Review
The highly structured ‘faith bureaucracy’ described above accounts
for smooth flow of directives and a clear chain of command among
these lay preachers in Kenya. However it reveals little if any concrete
data as to how the movement grew and continuously strategizes to
evaluate the past events and activities, coordinate present
programmes and plan future undertaking. A glimpse into the
movement self-appraisal mechanism undoubtedly shed a clear
picture on this under-researched theme of the transnational
movement. The questions worth asking are: how do the Tablīghīs
appraise their activities? Are such evaluative measures oral or
written? Are they done on individual or collective basis? Does each
level of Tablīghī bureaucracy evaluate activities within its jurisdiction?
What are the variables that are used in the evaluation process? How
do such evaluative measures impact on the commitment of individual
Tablīghī to the various mobility related practices that has bearing on
their finance? The case studies below and the subsequent analysis
shall be used to explore the theme of growth and self-evaluation of
the movement.
Tablīghī practices can roughly be divided into individual (amal ifradi)
and collective (amal ijtimāʿ) deeds. Individuals are expected to carry
out the following daily practices without supervision, namely, recite at
least a juzu (1/30th part of the Quran), recite at least 300 adhkar
(sing. dhikr) (supplication for remembrance of God), greet a certain
number of individuals with proper Islamic pleasantries, visit a few
fellow Tablīghīs, do supplementary recommended prayers aside from
obligatory prayers and read some texts from Tablīghī prescribed
books such as Faza’il-e-A’amaal and Muntakhab Ahadith for
guidance. In sum, a committed Tablīghī is expected to set aside 2 ½
to 8 hours daily for uninterrupted amal ifradi. Aside from that, a
Tablīghī who is also often an integral member of mosque-based
maqami unit is expected to attend on daily basis a consultative forum
(shūrā fil masjid). He is also expected to accompany fellow Tablīghīs
from his mosque in a weekly neighbourhood missionary patrol called
jowla between Asr (late afternoon prayer) and Maghrib (early evening
prayer). The excursion often gathers local Muslims to attend evening
prayers at the mosque. After jowla, the local maqami team motivates
the mosque attendants to volunteer to be part of a preaching team to
be sent to other areas. A Tablīghī also participates in a collective
weekly practice called fikrudīn, an evaluative session that brings
maqami units from a number of mosques in an area to a central
mosque so as to gauge the success of the previous week’s activities,
plan the present activities and set target for the coming week.
Collectively a maqami team is expected to inculcate the culture of
text readings in the local mosque. The reading and discussions are
called taʿlīm fil masjid. As a collectivity, the members of a maqami
team conducts visits (ziarat) to religious elites (ūlama), fellow inactive
Tablīghīs and pay courtesy calls to barber shops, meat shops,
markets, schools and hospitals. They are also expected to organize
panch amal monthly 3 day excursions (khuruj shahri) for local
missionary purpose. On quarterly, semi-annual and annual basis,
they are expected to organize teams to attend local, regional, zonal
and national three days congregational gatherings called jors and
ijtimāʿs. At home, each Tablīghī is expected to initiate daily
consultative forum (shūrā fil bayt) and text reading (taʿlīm fil bayt).
The maqami team, the most fundamental unit of Tablīghī Jamāʿat at
the grassroot level, is expected to contest for sacred space use and
own it by conducting corpus of practices called panch amal.
Implementation of (five practices) is believed to make the local
mosque gain the noble characteristics of the sacred spaces of the
pristine Islam. These practices, some already mentioned, include
mashwera (consultative meetings), taʿlīm (text reading and religious
instructions), jowla (neighbourhood missionary patrol), fikrudīn
(deliberations on faith matters) and khuruj shahri (3 days monthly
missionary excursions).
The question is, with all these expectations and obligations, how
does such lay missionary movement take stock of its progress and
challenges? The obligations required of an individual Tablīghī tasks
him in various capacities, namely, as individual, as a family man, as a
member of a mosque-based maqami team, and a member of local,
regional and national Tablīghī Jamāʿat. To facilitate detailed
evaluation at various levels, Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Kenya has
immensely invested in culture of individual and collective appraisal
and report mechanism called ahwāl giving. Ahwāl can be given
formally in maqami, qaria, sub-ḥalqa, ḥalqa and national ḥalqa levels
or informally between individual Tablīghīs.
A maqami team is expected to hand in written or oral report of its
activities every week in the weekly gatherings (fikrudīn) that bring a
number of maqami teams from a number of local mosques. The team
also picks the set targets for coming week. A maqami team, in sense,
attempts to give an ‘accurate’ report of how many people attend its
daily shūrā, bi-weekly taʿlīm, weekly jowla, how many volunteered for
various travel durations, how many members conduct home-based
family consultative meetings and text reading and even how many
members set aside 2 ½ hours on daily basis. The sum of the maqami
reports in a sub-ḥalqa is discussed in monthly sub-ḥalqa shūrā sent
to the markaz shūrā of the ḥalqa in Nairobi, Mombasa or Garissa.
Quarterly or semi-annually, the markaz shūrā consults with various
sub-ḥalqas and identify a mosque in which to conduct zonal
congregational gathering of jor. Jor is held on rotational basis in all
areas of the ḥalqa. For three days, the Tablīghīs and non-Tablīghīs,
attend preaching and learning sessions that ends with recruitment
drive to constitute as many travel teams as possible. Months before
jors and ijtimāʿs, each sub-ḥalqa is given targets to mobilize and
bring to the gatherings in terms of 40 days and 4 months teams from
their area. Often the jor does not end without a specific time set aside
to discuss the ahwāl of each sub-ḥalqa. Figure 1 is a summary of
such session at Isiolo jor in 2009. Annually, a few days before
national ijtimāʿs are held, representatives of each ḥalqa and subḥalqa attend a consultative shūrā for qudamah (senior regulars) and
they submit the details cumulative progress of their ḥalqas orally in
front of others and national Kenya shūrā members. 47 This is done
from a standard form distributed among the amirs. A sample of these
reports, also called karguzari. 48 Karguzari plays an important role of
informing, educating and updating each other on current challenges
and development. The reports from the three ḥalqas are summarized
and a representative of the Kenya chapter of Tablīghī Jamāʿat
presents it in an annual gathering of country representatives at the
auspicious headquarters of the movement in Nizamuddin, New Delhi,
Ahwāl giving session, especially the formal congregational type, is a
tense environment. Barbara Metcalf notes that at the conclusion of a
tour, participants report back, orally or in writing, their experiences to
the mosque-based group (local, regional, or national) from which
they set out. Ahwāl giving’ in ijtimāʿ and jor is a sort of peer review
session in which the representatives of masjids, sub-ḥalqas and
ḥalqas participating in the event attempt to give a true account of
daʿwa activities in areas under their jurisdiction. Members of unit
giving ahwāl at any moment are expected not only to be truthful but
also avail extra information about how they conduct certain
recommended deeds and practices. The sessions are often chaired
by invited members of national consultative council, the Kenya
Shūrā. These evaluators are thorough in their interrogation of the
local and regional amirs appointed to orally submit the reports. The
sessions depending on nature of the congregational gathering may
be attended by fifty to three thousand Tablīghīs and non-Tablīghīs.
New directives are often given. The members are encouraged to do
better. Past efforts though not belittled are often summed up as not
enough. The members are motivated to believe that they have
greater potential to do much better and to take the revivalism of the
faith to greater heights. In the following section, two case studies
have been chosen to highlight the practice of karguzari. In the first
progress report was submitted by a representative of Waso subhalqa in a joint Isiolo-Meru-Waso sub-halqa jor. The second report
In April 2010, I attended the national qudamah shūrā. Approximately 300
persons gathered at Baitul Maal for the meeting. Representatives from various
sub-ḥalqas such as Waso, Isiolo, Moyale, Marsabit, Wajir, Garissa, Tana River,
Kisumu, Nakuru, Kajiado, Mombasa, Malindi, Kwale, and Nairobi are among the
congregation. Few representatives from Tanzania and Uganda presented
karguzari of their country ḥalqas. The two day meeting coming days before the
national ijtimais discussed logistics and other necessary preparations.
Barbara Metcalf ‘Travellers’ Tales in Tablighi Jamāʿat
was a cumulative summary of the national progress report indicating
how each of the three halqas of Mombasa, Nairobi and Garissa
Case Study I: Ahwāl Giving at Isiolo Jor
From 10th – 12th April 2009, I attended 3 days Isiolo jor. The total
number of attendants was approximately 500 hundred. There were
Sudanese, Indian, Swahili speaking group from the Coast, Somali
speaking group from North Eastern, groups from Merti, Kinna, Garba
Tulla, Sericho, Meru, Nairobi and Isiolo (the host). The congregation
was held at Isiolo Jamia Mosque. Adjacent to the mosque is the
prominent educational institution called Al Falah Islamic Educational
Complex. It has a modern Islamic school and a health unit. Missing
from the gathering were the prominent sheikhs of the mosque and
the ūlama from Al Falah. Presumably the sheikhs do not necessarily
share the zeal and methods used by the movement as appropriate
daʿwa techniques. The visiting Tablīghīs were accommodated at the
Centre. They cooked, ate and slept at the Centre and attended the
jor programme at the mosque. The classrooms were utilized for this
purpose. The accommodation was arranged on basis of the places of
the origin of the group, for instance, Merti, Kinna, Meru, India, Sudan,
Coast, North Eastern and so on. Each group contributed towards the
khidma (catering) and harasa (security) and other collective duties.
Each group had its own amir. About 5 leading Kenya shūrā members
were in attendance. For three days, after the five daily prayers,
sermons (bayans) were delivered given by the visiting Sudanese,
Indian, Swahili and Somali travelling groups. Translations were done
rotationally by a group of local Tablīghīs into Borana. Every morning
session had language-based learning circles for taʿlīm. In the taʿlīm,
apart from preaching on the need to volunteering for daʿwa, the
congregants listened to selected hadith and Quranic verses from
Faza’il-e-A’amaal and Muntakhab Ahadith, taught the six
fundamentals of the movement and made to spontaneously group
themselves in bands of 2 to 3 persons to recite short verses of the
Quran. The session ended with a recruitment drive to form travelling
The ahwāl giving session was held on the afternoon of 11th April
2009. This was done shortly after the Asr prayers. Representatives of
Waso, Isiolo, and Meru sub-ḥalqa that falls under Nairobi ḥalqa
submitted their karguzari reports from a standardized form. The
representatives were taken to task why certain practices were not
performed, for instance, house-hold taʿlīm in Isiolo. Meru
representative was particularly asked why very few people
volunteered to travel for Tablīghī missionary tours. Waso
representative was asked to account for falling number of Tablīghī
volunteers in the area. The karguzari report covered the period from
October 2007 to May 2009. The form contains set of parameters to
gauge success or failure of each unit and give approximate picture of
the organizational strength, weaknesses and potentialities. In a
sense, with periodical reviews of their practices, the adherents in an
area make a personal effort to reach targets, own the process and
commit themselves to the objective of reforming the self and the
others to a different level. The categories for review can be roughly
classified into six namely: Ulama; Brothers (active Tablīghīs); Ladies
(women); Mosques; Household: and Jamāʿat (a travelling group).
The first three are about human beings while the last three are of
institutional nature. The form is roughly subdivided into two sections.
The upper sections deals with details of commitment to the
recommended travel regimes such as I year, 4 months, 40 days, 10
days by ūlama, brothers and women and also the statistical details
on number of mosques (masajid and musala) in the area. The
second part has 19 entries and each of the entry is subjected to
review on basis of its previous status (past), present situation and
intentional expectations (future). Below is a replica of the Waso subḥalqa karguzari report.
State/Area: Waso Sub-ḥalqa
Date: Since October 2007-May 2009
Ulama who have
spent 1 year
Ulama who have
spent 4 months
and 40 days
No. of Active
No. of Active
No. of 4 month
No. of Active
No. of 40 days
brothers only
No. of ladies
spent 40 days
have spent 10
No. of ladies
No. of Masajid +
No. of Active
Ladies who have
spent 3 days
No. of places for
Ladies weekly taʿlīm
No. of ladies who
have spent 40 days
with Tartīb
3 days Jamāʿat per
Brothers spending 2 ½
Hrs Daily
No. of Houses doing
daily taʿlīm with muzakra
of six siffat
spending 4 months
Brothers spending 10
days monthly
Brothers spending 8
hours daily
No. of 4 months
Jamāʿat s
No. of 4 months
Jamāʿat s on foot
Masajid with 5 A’maal
No. of Masajid doing
daily Abadi of the Masjid
Jamāʿat s
Jamāʿat s on foot
Jamāʿat s sent to other
40 days Jamāʿat s with
10 days Jamāʿat s with
3 days Jamāʿat s with
Brothers who have
spent two months in
Bangle Wali Masjid
No. of remote locations
and karguzari of the
Table 1: Waso area karguzari report
Though the movement recruits ordinary Muslims for preaching tours,
the participation of the religious scholars is highly appreciated even if
minimal. It was one of the first categories under review in the report.
The number of women (denoted as ladies in the form) who spent 10
days and 3 days masturat tours are also noted. Mosques form
central sacred space for enactment of reform agenda as envisioned
in the Tablīghī ethos and hence the importance of its exact number,
location and nature of its custodians for its future and present
success. The Tablighis are among the few Islamic groups who have a
consistently accurate number of all the mosques in Kenya. In each
local mosque they attend, members are asked to formulate maqami
units to carry out some recommended communal practices.
The Tablīghī Jamāʿat envisages that all mosques adopted what they
call panch amaal (five practices). These practices strengthen the
bond of network between the Tablīghīs and also build their religious
capital. Hence the first three items on the second section of the
report were on in how many mosques that all the five practices are
carried out, how many uphold some practices and how many
exercise the daily daʿwa effort within such as daʿwa, taʿlīm and
istiqbāl. Commitments of ordinary Tablīghīs were also gauged as an
indicator of the performance of the movement in the area. The
regulars are expected to set aside time for individualized activities
such as few hours for dhikr and Quran reading and communal
practices approved by the movement like spending 40 days and 4
months on missionary tours within and outside the country.
The core target of Tablīghī self reform is household unit and hence its
review. It is believed that the practices learnt by a Tablīghī man at the
local mosque and on travel can have a lasting impact once the
household-based practices such as text readings on the core
teachings of the movement are firmly established. The evaluation
places emphasis on the means of transport used by the Tablīghīs on
missionary journeys, for instance bus or other motorized means or on
foot. Missionary travel on foot (paidal Jamāʿat) is especially revered
as it involves not only greater sacrifice and risks but also closer in
experience to the idea of travel for faith as done during the pristine
period of Islam. Tablīghīs in Kenya are increasingly encouraged to
visit the Bangle Wali Masjid in Nizamuddin, India for advanced
training on ways of the movement.
Case Study II: Purana Saathi Jor, 29th December 2011-1st
January 2012
The Tablīghīs in Kenya have two national gatherings. One is held in
early May and the other in late December. The former is open to all
Tablīghīs and non-Tablīghīs from Kenya and neighbouring countries
and the latter is open mainly to the active members of the movement
from all parts of Kenya. The former attracts up to 15,000 people while
the latter is attended by about 3000-4000 persons. The former is
called ijtimāʿ al-aam (general congregational gathering) while the
latter is called purana saathi jor/majma jor/qudamah jor (specialized
gatherings for active Tablīghīs).
I arrived on the 29th December shortly before the Maghrib prayers.
Each attendee was required to report to the istiqbāl (reception) tent
to register. Details about name, place of origin, mosque of origin, the
highest number of travel days or months volunteered in the past,
expected number of days or months to be volunteered at the end of
the gathering and remarks were entered into a big black register
book. I was number 807 on the register. The atmosphere was more
cordial and animated. Most of the congregants are regular
acquaintance due to missionary travels and such conventions. The
bayan and taʿlīm, just like in the general ijtimāʿ, took into
consideration linguistic diversity and had translation circles for the
Borana, the Somali, the Amharic, the Swahili, the Arabic and the
Baganda Tablīghīs.
The evaluation session was held on the 31st December, first by
Mombasa ḥalqa started then Garissa ḥalqa and finally Nairobi ḥalqa.
It is important to note that prior to giving of ahwāl, an invited scholar
give motivational talk in Urdu about the need for accuracy and
importance of such reports in the consolidation of faith revivalism.
The speeches were translated into Swahili by one of the local Muslim
of Asian descent. The invited speakers play down any tendency of
inter-ḥalqa rivalry and emphasized that such reports are not for
record keeping but a basis for setting better targets for tangible
Each of the ḥalqa representatives gave cumulative summary of
Tablīghī activities and achievements for the period between MayDecember 2012. Apart from general summary, the ḥalqa
representative was asked to invite a representative from one of the
mosque within his jurisdiction to give more detailed grassroot ahwāl
report. Both the general and grassroot reports from each ḥalqa were
subjected to rigorous interrogations by a band of invited ‘elders’ of
the movement from the Indian subcontinent. The speakers were at
times asked to clarify how they go about some of the Tablīghī
practices and advices and new directives were given on the best way
to go about it. It is important to note that a number of congregants
took notes of the statistical data and new directives for their own
record keeping and implementation upon return. Finally, the reports
from the three ḥalqas are summarized into one form by the members
of the national consultative council as indicated below. The table
below is a replica of the original. It was slightly modified for better
analysis. While all the rows are as in the original, the column on
totals is my analytical addition.
Purana Saathi Jor
Karguzari Halqa:-Kenya
Purana Saathi
Jor Date:- Dec. 2011
No. of 4 months brothers
No. of 4 months active
No. of (only) 40 days
No. of 40 days active
No. of Ulama having spent
1 year
No. of active 1 year spent
No. of Ulama having spent
4 months /40days
No. of active
4months/40days spent
No. of Shab guzari
place(weekly programme)
No. of places having
Hayatus sahaba taʿlīm
No. of ladies having spent
40 days
No. of ladies having spent
10 days
No. of places having ladies
weekly taʿlīm
No. of ladies spending 40
days with Tartīb
No. of ladies spending 3
days with Tartīb
No. of dwellings (villages,
towns etc.)
No. of zones (collection of
about 20 dwellings)
No. of Masajid
No. of Masjids with 5
No. of Masjids with some
No. of average 3 days
Jamāʿat s per month
No. of brothers participating 350
in 2 ½ hrs efforts daily
No. of masajid doing daily
efforts with abadi
No. of houses doing daily
No. of houses doing daily
taʿlīm and six siffat
No. of brothers spending 4
months yearly
No. of brothers spending 10 5
days monthly
No. of brothers spending 8
hrs daily
No. of 4 months Jamāʿat s
No. of 4 months Jamāʿat s
on foot
No of 40 days Jamāʿat s
No of 40 days Jamāʿat s on 20
No. of Masjids who sent
4Mcomplete Jamāʿat in the
No. of Masjids who sent
4Mcomplete Jamāʿat to
No. of Jamāʿat s sent to
No. of 10 days Jamāʿat s
with ladies
No. of 40 days Jamāʿat s
with ladies
No. of 10 days Jamāʿat s
with ladies to foreign
No. of 3 days Jamāʿat s
with ladies
No. of brothers who gave 2
months at Nizamuddin
No. of localities where work started
- 9
Table 2: Kenya country Karguzari report
Participation of ūlama, religious scholars, though encouraged is so
far insignificant. Tablīghīs take great care not to mobilize Ulama for
their daʿwa travels as they do with ordinary people. 49 Because the
ūlama are in charge of management of mosques and religious
schools, they are respected as custodians of knowledge. The ūlama
are to be acknowledged and their support sought. However when
they opt to take part in the travels with them, they are highly
appreciated and honoured as men of knowledge. Their travels with
ordinary Tablīghīs guarantee the movement legitimacy and a sense
of religious orthodoxy in the public sphere. Tablīghīs hence take
great pride and interests to document and evaluate the participation
of these scholars in the regular appraisal sessions. As with other
evaluative measures, they divide the participation of the ūlama into
stipulated categories of travel periods and their regularity in these
travels, namely, how many have spent 1 year, 4 months and 40 days
and how many are active participants in these travels. In total 141
religious scholars partook in Tablīghī travels with Garissa, Mombasa
and Nairobi ḥalqas contributing 29 %, 23%, and 48% respectively.
5292 Kenyan Tablīghīs participated in 40 days and 4 months travels
during the evaluation period. Of this, 2227 are active Tablīghīs. Of
the three ḥalqas in Kenya, Mombasa has the smallest number of
Tablīghīs volunteering for 40 days and 4 months travels. 694
Tablīghīs and 14 Tablīghīs spend 2 ½ hours and 8 hours daily on
movement’s individualized practices. There are 183 and 19 active
Tablīghīs spending 4 months yearly and 10 days monthly on
preaching tours. Only two Tablīghīs, one from Mombasa and Nairobi
ḥalqa respectively, spent 2 months at Nizamuddin centre during the
evaluation period under focus. However at the end of the jor, I met at
least five Tablīghīs from Moyale and Waso sub-ḥalqas who were
about to leave for 2-4 months stay at the Nizamuddin global
headquarters.229 women have so far spent 10 and 40 days on
Tablīghī travels. Garissa had the lowest entry with 41. There are
about 50 places in Kenya where weekly taʿlīm for women are held.
No tashkeel only ziarat
While no women travel team has been sent to foreign countries for
daʿwa, 24 teams were sent locally for 3 days missionary tours. The
report depicts a gradual growth in popularity of women Jamāʿat s in
Nairobi and Garissa ḥalqas.
According to the report, out of 3671 mosques in Kenya, 226 have
mosque-based maqami units that carry out all the panch amal such
as taʿlīm, jowla, fikrudīn, khuruj shahri, and shūrā. Mombasa ḥalqa
has the lowest number of Tablighi-affiliated mosques despite the
large number of mosques in the zone. 439 mosques have Tablīghī
teams that execute partial panch amal. There 777 household that
conduct taʿlīm session on daily basis, of which 306 are from Nairobi
ḥalqa. 226 households have taʿlīm combined with teaching on the six
fundamentals of the movement. No household in the Mombasa ḥalqa
carry out the latter.
During the period under evaluation, 121 groups were dispatched for
4 months missionary tours. If each group is, on average, composed
of 12 individuals, then 1452 persons undertook this kind of travel.
227 groups were dispatched for 40 days preaching tours. This means
approximately 3324 persons volunteered for the stipulated tours
within the country. While there were no new areas of growth in
Nairobi ḥalqa, Mombasa and Garissa ḥalqas registered 9 and 12
places respectively.
This statistical data helps the national and regional Tablīghī units to
plan on how to boost dwindling numbers of active members and
consolidate gains made over time. The national shūrā subjects the
cumulative data to detailed analysis, compare with previous records
and set targets for each of the three ḥalqas in the coming period. The
practice of allocating quotas for each zone is called takaza. The
leaders from each ḥalqa redistribute targets for the next six to one
year to respective constituent sub-ḥalqas, qarias and mosque-based
maqami unit. This loose flow of information, directives and targets in
combination with thorough peer-to-peer collective evaluation
accounts for the phenomenal growth of the movement in Kenya.
Every human organization is interested in its growth and expansion.
Because organizations are interested in growth, they are also
interested in evaluation of their programmes. Organizations appraise
their past activities, execute present plan and set targets to be
achieved in the future. Some reviews of past activities and future
plans may be done formally or informally and may be public or open
only to core members. Religious movements are not an exception.
Scholars who study transnational social and religious movements are
fascinated by not only the bureaucratic structures that these
organizations construct but also the means through which
establishment and consolidation is gained in increasing globalizing
world. However unless due attention is given to the way the
members of the organizations and movements evaluate their past,
present and future activities, most studies about their growth remain
shallow. Tablīghī Jamāʿat, one of the fastest growing lay Muslim
missionary movement in the world, has invested immensely not only
in religious bureaucracy ran by bands of committed members but
also an elaborate oral and written mechanism for review of its
activities. However, its phenomenal growth in East and Central Africa
has gone unnoticed due its avoidance of publicity, doctrinal debates
and socio-political activism, its focus on spiritual matters and its
popularity among the ordinary Muslims rather than religious scholars.
Tablīghīs look to the past, precisely to the world of pristine Islam for
guidance and revivalism but they also pragmatically appropriate
modern evaluative measures for the success of its programme and
consolidation of its growth.
Gaborieau, Marc (2000) ‘The Transformation of Tablīghī
into a Transnational Movement.’ In M. K. Masud (ed.), Travellers
in Faith: Studies of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat as a Transnational
Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal. Leiden: Brill.
Haq, M. A. (1972) The Faith movement of Mawlānā Muhammad
Ilyās. 1. publ. London: Allen & Unwin.
Hasani, Sayyid Muhammad Thani (1967) Sawanih Hadrat Mawlana
MuhammadYusuf Kandhalawi, Lucknow: Maktaba Islam Queen’s
A. (1979) Savanna Town: Rural Ties and Urban
Opportunities in Northern Kenya, Stockholm: Stockholm
Studies of Social Anthropology.
Janson, Marloes (2005) ‘Roaming about for God’s Sake: The
Upsurge of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in the Gambia’, Journal of
Religion in Africa, 35, 4.
Horstmann, Alexander (2009) ‘Transnational Ideologies and
Actors at the Level of Society in South and Southeast Asia.’ in
P. Mandaville et al (eds.) Transnational Islam in South and
Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks, and Conflict Dynamics.
Washington: NBR Project April, 2009.
Kandhlawi, Muhammad Yusuf (1997) Muntakhab Ahadith: A
Selection of Ahadith Relating to the Six Qualities of Daʿwa t and
Tabligh. Karachi: Annayyar.
Kandhlawi, Muhammad Zakariyya (2000) Faza’il-e-A’amaal.
Revised Translation of Tabligh Nisab. 5th South African
Impression. Johannesburg: Waterval Islamic Institute.
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Tablīghī Jamā'at as a transnational Islamic movement for faith
renewal. Leiden: Brill.
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Bayreuth African Studies Online, No. 2 July 2005.
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Jamāʿat as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal,
Leiden: Brill.
Metcalf, Barbara D. (2002) ‘Traditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoband,
Tablīghīs and Talibs’ Leiden: ISIM.
Reetz, Dietrich (2008) ‘The Faith Bureaucracy of Tablīghī Jamāʿat:
An Insight into their System of Self-organization (Intizam).’
Gwilym Beckerlegge (ed.): Colonialism,
Religious Identities: Religious Reform Movements in South Asia.
Oxford, Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Salvadori, Cynthia (2000) We Came in Dhows. Nairobi: Paperchase
______(1989) Through open doors: A view of Asian cultures in
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Halkano Abdi Wario
studies in April 2012. His research project was titled ‘Networking the
Nomads: A Study of Tablīghī Jamāʿat among the Borana of Northern
Kenya’. He did Bachelor and MPhil degrees at Moi University in
Kenya. His research interests include transnational Islamic
movements, religion and spatiality, religious reformism among
pastoralist communities of the Horn of Africa, Muslim personal law
courts and religion and media. Halkano has also been a cocoordinator of the work group of Religion in Contemporary Africa.
Pilgrimage at Islamic Sufi Shrines in North
Eastern Ethiopia
Meron Zeleke
According to the dominant academic discourse in post 1991 Ethiopia, the shift
of the political structure at the macro level is believed to have had a trickling
down effect on the nature of social relationships between members of the
different ethnic and religious groups in the country. The effect is described
mostly as a type of relationship characterized by growing tensions and conflicts
represented either as inter-ethnic and/or inter-religious conflict (Abbink 1998;
Afewerik 2009). Religious identification and religious practices at the region
under discussion as to be presented in this paper are starkly different from the
dominant discourse on the escalation of interfaith tension often described as
one of the major characteristic features of post 1991 Ethiopia (Medhane 2003).
This paper presents a case of pilgrimage at an Islamic shrine in Northern
Ethiopia a case, which contradicts with the main discourse of tightening of
Ethno-religious boundaries in post 1991 Ethiopia. It addresses the factors that
facilitate this act of crossing a religious boundary.
Key words: Pilgrimage, Sufi, Religious boundary, Saint Veneration
At the very first glance the contemporary religious practices
commonly practiced at the Islamic Sufi shrines in North Eastern
Ethiopia gives for an outsider an impression of blurred and thinned
out religious boundaries. The presence of Christians, Muslims, spirit
possession cult adepts and adherents of Oromo traditional belief as
pilgrims in the biannual pilgrimages to the Islamic Sufi shrine – which
otherwise is defined as an Islamic shrine– poses to one the question
of how the adherents and leaders of the shrine make meanings and
account for this act of crossing the seemingly dense religious
boundary? Growing up in the political environment of post-1991
Ethiopia where the multiculturalism that is generated by ethnic
federalism has made ethnicity the main organizing principle in
forming, framing, and contesting different identity and resource
claims in the country (Vaughan 2003; Turton 2006), the author’s
experience during the biannual pilgrimages at the shrine of Teru Sina
during the PhD research field work (between November 2008 and
March 2010) was a ‘category crashing’ one 50.
The first encounters during the biannual pilgrimages to the shrine,
corroborated by the findings of the study afterward, challenge the
dominant thesis of the social bordering process in two ways. First, it
challenges the definition of the social situation of the country by the
ruling Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)
primarily as ‘ethnic’, which starkly contrasts with local realities such
as in Teru Sina. Many of the people coming to attend the different
religious rituals at the shrine, apparently an Islamic institution located
in the Oromo nationality zone of the Amhara national regional state, ,
are mostly Christian Amharas coming from the districts of EphrataGidim and Ansokiya-Gemza both situated in the northern Shewa
zone. This double boundary-crossing at the shrine - ethnic and
religious - thus poses a formidable empirical challenge to the
representation of the Ethiopian social landscape primarily as ethnic.
Secondly, the continued vitality of integrative social institutions such
as the Sufi shrines in post 1991 Ethiopia also challenges the
detractors of ethnic federalism who accent the hardening of ethnic
and religious boundaries and escalation of inter-ethnic and interreligious tension throughout the country. The article explores and
explains how pilgrims from different religious background come
together to an Islamic shrine and how the different actors at the
shrine (the pilgrims and religious leaders) define crossing the
religious boundary and hencechallenges this dominant thesis of the
social boundary forming process drawing on the field encounters and
drawing on fieldwork data.
Academic works on pilgrimage have argued that pilgrimage needs to
be understood as a double boundary-crossing phenomenon whereby
pilgrims tend to not only cross religious but also ethnic boundaries
(Levine 1974, Pankhurst 1994; Gibbs 1997). Such works draw on the
widely received Turnerian paradigm of ‘communitas’ which
In his book Amhara traditions of Knowledge: spirit mediums and their clients, the
Norwegian anthropologist Harold Aspen used the expression of category crashing
experience to describe the “odd” and dramatic field experiences that challenge our
“normal” expectations.
emphasizes the argument that pilgrimages blur the diverse religious
and ethnic boundaries of adherents and create a sense of
communality among the pilgrims (Turner 1995). This paper aims to
contend this analysis by emphasizing the need to seriously engage
with the agency of local actors not only in terms of emphasizing
“crossing” religious boundary but also in relation to the questions of
how they conceive these boundaries in the first place and how they
account for the act which appears, at least from the outside, as
crossing a boundary. As such, this article calls for a
phenomenological approach that moves beyond the mere description
of the social interaction as a ‘mechanical mixing’ between Christians,
possession cult adherents, and Muslims or as a ‘thinning out’
(loosening) of religious boundaries. It analyzes the cultural worlds of
interlocutors who insist on emphasizing the salience of the religious
boundary despite the pervasive crossing of it. It also seeks to
discuss, on the basis of emic accounts, the factors which account for
the participation of pilgrims of diverse religious backgrounds. While
addressing this, the paper identifies factors which facilitate the
attraction of pilgrims from different religious backgrounds despite the
dominant bordering processes generated by the new political order in
Ethiopia, i.e., institutionalization of identity in the form of ethnic
federalism. Before moving to the main arguments, brief background
information on Sufism in the region and cursory information about the
shrine will be presented to readers.
The Sufi Shrine of Teru Sina and the Biannual Pilgrimages
The name Ye shaykoch madad (place of the shaykhs) in north
eastern and north central Ethiopia refers to a number of Sufi shrines
established between the eighteenth and the twentieth century on the
region. North central Ethiopia, especially the area around Wallo, is
well known for the presence of numerous Islamic shrines that have
central place in the history of the emergence and dissemination of
Islam in the region and in Ethiopia. The shrines in fact played a
crucial role in serving as first centers of Islamic learning that attracted
students from different parts of Ethiopia and other neighboring
countries such as Djibouti, Somalia and today’s Eritrea. Scholars
have debated the origin and nature of Sufism in Ethiopia. Sufism was
first introduced to Ethiopia from Yemen in the 16thcentury; the oldest
and the most widespread Sufi order in Ethiopia being the Qadiriyya.
The Qadiriyya order was first introduced to Harar and then spread
throughout the country. Other Sufi orders in Ethiopia include the
Tijaniyya, the Shadhiliyya, the Sammaniyya and the Mirghaniyya
(Muhammad 1994). Trimingham (1952) has mentioned the type of
Sufism in Northeast Africa was “vulgarized” to suit into local realities.
He has explained this phenomenon as,
Thaumaturgy is exulted at the expense of theosophy; mystical
exercises degenerated into orgiastic dances; no real apprenticeship is
required before initiation; initiation is simplified to the taking of a solemn
oath of allegiance to the shaykhs; less rigorous discipline from the
neophytes; dhikr song and dance are exercised immodestly to produce
psycho-social effects, and the local shaykhs of the order are venerated
to a degree little short of deification. (Trimingham 1952:233-234),
Yet Hussein Ahmed, the foremost scholar on regional histories of
Ethiopian Islam, has painted Sufism in Ethiopia in a more positive
light, even though he too recognized the ‘bizarre’ form it has taken in
some areas and among some followers (Hussein 2001: 70).
According to him,
Under the repressive political structure of Christian hegemony, Islam in
Ethiopia was indebted to Sufi centers for its very survival: it was the
expansion of the Sufi orders, the various centers of local pilgrimage
which recruited converts to Islam, and laid the basis for the emergence
of viable and prosperous Muslim communities in the countryside and
towns of Ethiopian interior. ( Hussein 2001:71).
Sufi centers of learning in different parts of the country such as the
one of shaykh Muhammad Shafi in Wallo (Jamma Negus); shaykh
Abadir of Harar, and shaykh Hussein of Bale have played an
important role as centers of Islamic learning (Østebo 2011). As such,
the shrines of these famous shaykhs serve as nodes in a local
network, creating congregating points for Islamic education and for
other spiritual rituals.
The shrine of Teru Sina is one of these ye shaykoch madads founded
by shaykh Siraj Muhammad Awel who belonged to the Qadiriyya
order, the dominant Sufi order around Wallo and Shewa located in
north eastern part of Ethiopia. Shaykh Siraj Muhammad Awel was
born around 1875 at Dana, a place well known in the history of
Sufism in Ethiopia. Siraj studied in famous Islamic schools in Wallo
and Shewa and established his own Islamic learning center (zawiya)
of Teru Sina around 1949 to provide Islamic education for students
coming from the countries of the Horn of Africa, such as Somalia,
Djibouti and Eritrea, as well as for those darsas (students) from
different parts of Ethiopia.
Before the establishment of the shrine at Teru Sina, the area was a
hot spot for ethnic conflict and land disputes between the two
neighbouring ethnic groups; the Oromo and the Amhara. Governors
in the area have tried at different times to end the conflicts using
various measures ranging from harsh penalties to co-opting local
religious leaders as a way of convincing the local community to come
to terms. In a pragmatic move towards succeeding in ending the
deadly conflicts of early 1930s and mid-1940s, local government
officials approached Siraj who had earned a reputation for his
extraordinary spiritual power of performing miracles and healing 51
and used him as a mediator between two conflicting groups. He
collaborated with government officials in the attempts to end the
protracted inter-ethnic conflicts of the 1930s in Mekdessa, and later
on in Teru Sina in the 1950s. Shaykh Siraj’s settlement at the hot
spot of the deadly conflict and the amicable relations that he
established with the local government officials had opened up a new
horizon to his relationship with the Ethiopian state. Shaykh Siraj had
managed to forge ties with the imperial family as much by his own
efforts as it was a reflection of the political weakness of the imperial
regime in the immediate post-liberation period throughout the 1930s
and 1940s. Haile Selassie became emperor in 1930 after a
protracted power struggle; not least a formidable challenge from the
Mammadoch dynasty of Wallo to which Lij Iyasu, the grandson of
Emperor Menelik II, belonged. Emperor Haile Selassie was barely
five years in power when he was ousted by the Italians in 1936. The
military support that he got from the British during the Second World
War enabled him to regain his throne. But this came with a British
political baggage. The British sought to reduce Ethiopia to a
protectorate after liberation from the Italians in 1941 until the end of
After his initiation as a Sufi shaykh in 1924 informants account narrates his
religious piety, his life as a Sufi mystic , his large scale prosleytization missions and
that he has performed number of miracles.
the Second World War in 1945 (Erlich 2010). A politically insecure
imperial regime thus had every incentive to work with and through
traditional authorities to re-establish its own legitimacy, more so in
regions such as Wallo where memories of political resistance against
his rule were still fresh.
The alliance between the Christian Emperor Haile Selassie and a
Muslim shaykh by the time sounds anomalous, given the former's
orthodox background and the underlying Christian authenticity
discourse. The imperial regime of Haile Selassie claims a decent
from Solomonic dynasty and it was a regime where by the church
and state were closely intertwined (Erlich 2010). Emperor Haile
Selassie had similar strong ties with some Sufi shaykhs in different
parts of Ethiopia (Østebo 2011). In this favorable political context
shaykh Siraj had sought to expand his base. The network that
shaykh Siraj built with the Ethiopian state and his reputation as a
religious leader had enabled him to be rewarded in different forms
as; in land grants, sponsorship of his pilgrimage to Mecca,
sponsorship of his construction of number of mosques, etc.
Shaykh Siraj died in 1972. In recognition of the closer political ties he
made with the imperial family and local government officials, shaykh
Siraj was given a state funeral. A dori (sanctuary) was built within the
compound of the zawiya (local Islamic learning center) where his
body still lies. Many of his adherents present that upon his death, his
soul ascended to heaven while his spirit remained in Teru Sina where
he has continued to be the guardian of the local community. Hence,
informants mention that by going to this tomb, they visit shaykh Siraj
in person. After his death thousands of pilgrims started flocking to his
dory at the shrine of Teru, as a visit to his shrine is believed to reward
one with a baraka (locally often defined as grace).
The tradition of making pilgrimages to visit a living or dead Sufi is a
widely spread practices among the Sufis around the world such as in
Asia (Werbner 2003) and in Africa (Gellner 1983; Lewis 1999). In
Ethiopia, pilgrimage to holy places in general is so extensive that
Levine called it one of the ‘pan-Ethiopian traits’ (Levine 1974:50).
Like the Sufi shrines in different parts of the world, pilgrimage is one
of the religious rituals associated with Sufi shrines in Ethiopia such
as shrines in eastern Ethiopia (Gibb 1998; Desplat 2005); western
Ethiopia (Ishihara 2009); northern Ethiopia (Kelkilachew 1997), and
in southern Ethiopia (Braukämper 2004). Pilgrimage to the shrine of
Sufi shaykhs, on the other hand, is unanimously condemned as
bida’h by Islamic reform movements around the globe (Werbner
2003). Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the orthodoxy of
the pilgrimage to the shrines of Sufi shaykhs as a legitimate Islamic
religious practice, it is continued to be widely practiced at Sufi
centers throughout Ethiopia.
There are biannual pilgrimages to the shrine of Teru Sina held on
August 15th and October 15th every year. Pilgrims of diverse socio
economic profile attend the biannual pilgrimage to the shrine of Teru
Picture 1: Pilgrims singing on their way to the Shrine (Photo: Meron
Despite the location of the shrine of Teru Sina in Oromo Nationality
Zone, the majority of the pilgrims, over seventy percent, were
Amhara. Similarly, regarding the religious profile of the pilgrim’s, sixty
five percent of them were Ethiopian Orthodox Christians and the rest
were Muslims and traditional believers. The record on the ethno
religious profile of the pilgrims at the contemporary shrine of Teru
Sina contradicts with the main discourse of the narrowing down of
the religious and ethnic boundary in post 1991 Ethiopia mentioned in
the introductory note above. The majority of adherents of this Islamic
shrine are mostly Ethiopian Orthodox Christians. Close to two
thousand pilgrims came to the shrine on the night of October 14,
2009. These were from different parts of Ethiopia and few were from
the diaspora mainly from Jeddah and Qatar. The ethnic and religious
composition of the pilgrims was quiet diverse. The following table
presents the socio- economic profile of two hundred pilgrims
randomly picked on October 14, 2009
Religious profile of
Place of
< 20
Kara Kore
Business Men
Teru Sina
> 45
College Student
Kara Kore
Table 3: Profile of Male Pilgrims (Source: Author ’s field Note)
of Origin
< 20
Kara Kore
20 - 30
Spirit Mediums
Addis Abeba
Above 45
Teru Sina
Health officer
Table 4: Profile of Female Pilgrims (Source, field Note)
In addition to the biannual pilgrimages, religious rituals regularly
taking place at the shrine such as the weekly zar hadra (zar spirit
appeasement sessions), the weekly wadaja (group prayer) ritual, the
annual ritual of Telema (annual thanks giving ritual for harvest
season) and the annual Atete rituals are all attended by people from
different ethnic and religious backgrounds. This creates a sense of
confusion for external observers and forces one to raise a legitimate
question on what accounts for such element of attraction between
adherents of different religious traditions. The following section
presents the emic account on the factors that are described as
facilitating such boundary crossing religious practices.
Conceptual Compatibility as a pull factor to the Islamic shrines
In the context of ever hardening of religious and ethnic boundaries in
contemporary Ethiopia, extensive religious syncretism and profound
local socio-cultural integration appears anomalous. In the following
sections based on the emic accounts the factors that explain this
‘anomaly’, i.e., conceptual compatibility will be discussed.
During the informal talks and interviews conducted with most
Christian and spirit possession cult adherents of shaykh Siraj, a
common pattern of justification for their presence at an Islamic shrine
has been observed. Emic accounts contest the very idea of crossing
a religious boundary, for in their perspective there is a fundamental
similarity at the conceptual level – the notion of sainthood and the
Igziabiher/God/Allah. The recurrent theme and that which is shared
among Orthodox Christians; the leaders of the shrine, adherents of
the spirit possession cult, and Sufi Muslims is the concept of holy
men. They often tend to over emphasize the points of similarity or
some crosscutting concepts in the different religious traditions.
According to Rogers (1983), the foremost authority in popularizing
compatibility as a factor in diffusion of innovation, compatibility is
described as one of the characteristic features of innovation. In his
theory of diffusion of innovation, Rogers (1983) has stated five
characteristic features of innovation that are said to greatly shape the
overall degree of acceptability or rejection of a certain innovation in a
given society. These are relative advantage; compatibility;
complexity; tribaility, and observability.
Compatibility according to Rogers (1983:223) is the degree to which
an innovation is perceived as consistent with the existing values, past
experiences, and needs of potential adopters. An idea that is more
compatible is less uncertain to the potential adopter. An innovation
can be compatible or incompatible with socio cultural values and
beliefs; with previously introduced ideas, or with client needs of
innovations. According to Rogers, the greater the compatibility the
faster its adoption becomes. I draw on Rogers’s idea of compatibility
and expand it further while applying it in the field of religious
syncretism. The notion of compatibility that I refer to in making sense
of religious syncretism at the shrine of Teru Sina also relates to the
major works in the study of syncretism such as the notion of
‘tolerable variation’(Stewart 2004: 265); commonality (Droogers
2008:49), or the finding of one’s own in the other (Schenk 1989).
Leopold and Jensen (2004: 93) emphasize the point that
‘compatibility between foreign beliefs is just as good a starting point
for syncretism’. Following the lead of these authors, I argue that
conceptual compatibility across religious boundaries is one of the
major factors that have shaped the process of religious syncretism at
the shrine of Teru Sina in general and participation in different rituals
as the biannual pilgrimage in particular.
Concepts such as saint veneration, saint intercession, belief in the
extraordinary spiritual power of saints and their power in performing
miracles are cross cutting notions that exist in the different religious
traditions in Teru Sina. Veneration of saints is a common religious
practice among the Sufi Muslims in various parts of the world
(Baldock 2004). This is one of the major contentious issues between
Sufis and members of Islamic reform movements that question the
orthodoxy of this religious practice, for whom it is an aspect of, shirk
(polytheism). Veneration of saints is a common religious practice
among Orthodox Christians, (Anderson 2007). Saint veneration is in
fact one of the major contentions between the Ethiopian Orthodox
Church and the various Protestant denominations in the country
(Tibebe 2009). Many Christian interlocutors who come to the shrine
of Teru Sina at different occasions during the biannual pilgrimage, for
the weekly wadaja (group prayer), healing and other rituals put
emphasis on the ‘compatible concepts ‘existing both at the EOC and
Sufi Islam. The strong tradition of venerating saints in the Ethiopian
Orthodox Church goes to the extent of dedicating each day of the
month to different saints venerated at the churches.
This cross cutting concept of saint veneration comes over and over
again in the various narratives provided by Christian interlocutors. In
the following sections, two examples will be provided to show the
centrality of saint veneration among Sufi Muslims and Orthodox
Christians. One of the key interlocutors, Mebratu Baye, is a deacon
at the Ethiopian Orthodox Church of Majate Medihanialem. He
described his participation in religious rituals at the Islamic shrine of
Teru Sina despite his Christian background in the following manner:
There is nothing wrong in coming to Teru Sina for the weekly group
prayer or to attend the biannual pilgrimage. I am a Christian. I am even
a deacon [At this stage Mebratu proudly pointed at his identification
card which states that he works at the Church]. The Muslims at Teru
Sina also have their own qidusan (saints) like us the Orthodox
Christians. They call them wali which in Amharic means qidusan. Wali
is an Arabic term. Arabic is the holy language of the Muslims just like
Geez is for us, Orthodox Christians. Thus, to come to the place of the
qidusan is not wrong at all. What will be wrong is going to the pentes’
(Protestants‟) churches. Unlike the pentes, the Muslims here at Teru
Sina know and revere the qidusan. On the other hand, the pentes, who
claim to be Christians, do not know anything about the qidusan. But
today we also have new Christians (pentes 52) and new Muslims (the
wahhabiyas or pentes of the Muslim) respectively . The old Muslims
know the qidusan. So they are like us the Orthodox Christians.
(Mebratu Baye. September 17, 2009; Teru Sina).
In Mebratu’s parlance, the conceptual link is maintained without
collapsing the religious boundary between the ‘old Christianity’ and
the ‘old Islam’. Mebratu’s negative reference to the Protestants
(pentes), on the other hand, suggests the greater salience of an
intra-religious boundary, i.e., between Orthodox Christians and
Protestants, than between Orthodox Christians and Sufi Muslims.
Mebratu also referred to the intra-Muslim religious boundary and he
likened the ‘Wahhabiyas’ (Salafis) with the Pente (Protestants).
Interestingly, this is not considered by the reformers as something
derogatory. In an interview conducted with Dr Jeylan Geleta, the
defacto leader of the Salafiyya movement in Ethiopia, he also
referred to the same distinction between pentes and the Orthodox
Church while explaining the boundary between Sufi and Salafi
versions of Islam. He even felt more comfortable with the comparison
with the pentes than the derogatory term Wahhabiyas, ‘we are like
the pentes’, was how he explained to me about the reformist
missions of the Salafis in general.
Another Muslim pilgrim shares the Christian interlocutor Mebratus
account presented above. He also mentioned the similarity regarding
the practice of venerating saints between Sufis and Orthodox
Christians as follows:
The Orthodox and we, the suffaya, venerate saints. We are cultured
people who pay due respect to those who have dedicated their lives to
their respective religion. We are obliged to do so for Allah himself has
Pente is a word locally used interchangeably with “Pentecostal”. It is used as a
derogatory term by Orthodox Christians as a gloss to the various denominations of the
Protestant Churches. The three major Protestant denominations in Ethiopia are
MekaneIyesus (Lutheran); Qale Hiwot (established by the Sudan Interior Mission,
international, interdenominational Christian mission organization), and Mulu Wengel
(Full Gospel), an independent Pentecostal Church (Tibebeu 2009).
In the study area and in most parts of Ethiopia, there is a great tendency of
referring to all the different Islamic reformist movements as Wahhabiyas that rather
has a derogatory connotation of hinting at extremism. It does not as such reflect
on the doctrinal differences between wahhabism and the Salafiyya Islamic
reformist movements founded in Saudi Arabia and Egypt respectively.
privileged those people who served him with his baraka. They have
been granted baraka to perform karama (miracle) to heal the sick, to
bless others, to preach, to live their whole life as pious individuals.
These are qualities that only few measure up to. As such, they need to
be revered and respected. The Wahhabiyas and the Christian petnes
are sirat yalelachew (undisciplined) people who treat everyone the
same as if they were equal. The wahabiyas are uncultured as the
pentes of the Christians who do not pay respect to their saints and holy
figures (Bakri Arba. September 13, 2009; Teru Sina).
Bakris understanding of monotheism echoes Orthodox Christians’
notion, which, despite the critic by the reformers – Pentes and Salafis
– is not deviation from Orthodoxy but is recognition and affirmation of
the sacredness of God/Allah; access to which is not as ‘easy’ as the
reformers would put it.
To sum up, the cult of Saint Mary and a myriad of saints by the
followers of the Orthodox Church have softened the apparent
religious boundary between Islam and Christianity at the Islamic
shrine of Teru Sina and in the wider region of Wallo/North Shewa.
While participating in the Sufi shrine rituals the Orthodox Christians
do not feel crossing a religious boundary for this entails only a switch
of personal references for instance, from Saint Mary to shaykh Siraj.
The pilgrimage to the shrine is described by many Christians as part
of venerating saints. In doing so, they selectively draw on a repertoire
of the Orthodox Church tradition which recognizes saints and saint
veneration. On the other hand, crossing an intra-religious boundary –
such as reformers visiting the shrine – is rather considered as an act
of crossing the religious boundary because of the strong emphasis
they put on monotheism by the reformer, which is conceptually
incompatible with saint veneration, less with saint intercession.
Although both Muslims and Christians draw on the compatible
concept of saint veneration and intercession in sense-making of the
religious participation across the religious boundary none of them
mentioned even a single time that it is an act of crossing a religious
As the discussion in this paper clearly shows there is inconsistency
between the dominant discourse on the tightening of religious and
ethnic boundary in post 1991 Ethiopia and the lived reality at
grassroots level which rather shows the fuzziness of religious
boundaries in northeastern Ethiopia.
Academic discourses surrounding pilgrimage and how pilgrimages
enhance senses of commuitas among pilgrims mainly limits their
arguments to the functionalist explanation without engaging much
with the local accounts of maintaining differences a gap this paper
has anticipated to contribute to. However, in discussing the
multifaceted elements related to pilgrimage as issues of boundary
crossing the local account needs to be equally represented in order
to get a clear and holistic perspective of what crossing the religious
boundary in a given context entails. As it has been stated in the
introductory remarks of the paper, studies dealing with pilgrimage
should go beyond giving a descriptive account of the ritual. The
context and the local meanings attached to the practices vary
tremendously and such variation can be understood only if due
attention is given to emic accounts. This allows us to simultaneously
engage with boundary - crossing and boundary maintenance in local
terms. The discussion in this paper has clearly shown how
conceptual compatibility is emphasized by pilgrims as being a factor
facilitating the participation at the biannual pilgrimage at the Islamic
shrine and other religious rituals hosted at the shrine.
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Meron Zeleke
Meron Zeleke is a Social Anthropologist who completed her PhD
study in BIGSAS in June 2012. Her dissertation ‘Faith at the
Crossroads: Religious Syncretism and Dispute Settlement in
Northern Ethiopia’ is under publication. She obtained her MA degree
in Social Anthropology from Addis Ababa University and BA degree in
history from the same university. Her areas of expertise are Gender,
Traditional Institutions of conflict resolution, Religion and peace.
Meron has worked for three years as coordinator of the work group of
Religion in Contemporary Africa in BIGSAS and has co-organized
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articles and and book chapters on themes related to religion and
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The Fragmented Entity: Conflict and the
Emerging Faces of Jos
Timothy O. Baiyewu
The spate of bombing in Jos is quite worrisome to average Nigerian residents
in Jos and its environs. The seeming unending cycle of explosions that destroy
human lives mostly in worship centers, market place, and relaxation centres
have consequential effects. The reasons for this ugly situation in a metropolitan
city that was for decades an epitome of beauty, hospitality, commerce, peace
and tourism have attracted divergent analyses. This paper argues that the
conflict in Jos is ethno-religious. The Hausa/Fulani extractions who contest
ownership of Jos, particularly Jos North, with the indigenous tribes of Afizere,
Anaguta and Berom are predominantly Muslims while the later tribes are
largely Christians. The seeming inseparability of the ethnic identity struggle and
the religious leanings of the two opposing actors have consequentially played
out in the relocation of many victims of the lingering conflict. The unending
cycle of conflict in Jos and its emerging dimensions greatly influence the
changing pattern of human settlement as residents relocate to safe havens
where residents practice the same religion. The paper posits that the emergent
settlement pattern in Jos has a wide range of implications on the future trend of
conflict in the entire Plateau State. By extension, the conflict is consequential
on the political, economic and social development of the state and increases
human agony that impedes the wellbeing of victims and the general public.
Key words: ethno-religious conflicts, Jos, indigenes, settlers
The bomb blasts which occurred on the 24th of December, 2010 at
three strategic places around Sacred Heart Catholic Church, Gada
Biu and Angwan Rukuba areas remain a worrying indicator of the
new dimensions ethno-religious conflicts have attained in Jos,
Nigeria (Shobayo 2010). The blasts, in fact demonstrated a seeming
affinity with the mode of operations by Muslim extremists in the Arab
world of Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, often operating under
the banner of fundamentalist groups such as Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and
Al-Shabaab. Initiated by suicide bombers, the blasts marked yet
another level of ethno-religious violence in Jos in particular and
Nigeria in general. One quite easily tends to compare the blasts in
Jos with the anti-Christian terrorist attack by an Al-Qaeda group on
worshippers in Our Lady of Salvation Catholic Church, Baghdad, Iraq
which killed 58 people on the 31st of October, 2010, and the
murderous terrorist attack of 31st December of the same year that
was carried out on worshippers in a Coptic Orthodox Church, All
Saints Church in Alexandria, Egypt. While the above examples of
suicide bombing do not explain conflict engendered by indigen-settler
sour relationship, the Jos conflict presents a situation where owners
of the land and migrants once lived next to each others’ doors,
exchanged gifts and ideas but were later fragmented by ethnic and
religious boundaries that exist among them. Most residents of Jos
live along ethno-religious grouping. Yet some live along religious
grouping. Some Yoruba Muslims, for example, feel safer to live in
Hausa-Fulani dominated areas of Jos, but many of them (the Yoruba
Muslims) live among the owners of the land who are predominantly
The conflict in Jos over the years has remained visibly ethnoreligious. It has often been mainly between the Christian dominated
ethnic groups- Berom, Afizere, and Anaguta, and the predominantly
Muslim Hausa and Fulani groups. Although Aapengnuo (2010) and
Kwaja (2011) see the conflict in Jos as ethnic identity problem that is
often used to open up structural deficiencies in governance, it is
difficult to separate Islam from the Hausa and Fulani groups who are
predominantly Muslims; neither can Christianity be separated from
the Berom, Afizere, and Anaguta indigenous groups that are
predominantly Christians. More so, the destruction of churches and
Mosques, and the relocation of people within Jos along ethnic and
religious cleavages are evident. The actors are polarized along
ethnic and religious differences. Other tribes include the Yoruba,
Igbo, Urhobo, Hausa-Fulani and other migrant communities.
Mohammed (2011) in his x-ray of the frosty relationship between the
Hausa and Fulani groups, and the Berom, Anaguta, and the Afizere
acknowledges the presence of the latter in the caves and on the hills,
and their initial failure to take part in the mining business in their
environment. This seeming pre-existence of the Berom, Afizere, and
Anaguta in the mining environment called Jos before the business
adventure and later settlement of the Hausa and Fulani groups in
same area has often been used to determine the ownership status of
the predominantly Christian tribes in Jos. In agreement with SlocumBradley (2008:1) that people naturally form some perceptions of
themselves and others’ and also express “the construction of a
certain perception of one’s own group and that of the ‘other’” helps
our understanding of the creation of a ‘indigene’ - ‘non-indigene’
demarcation between the ‘people of the caves and the hills’ and the
Tin mining traders of Hausa and Fulani extractions. Such age long
distinction which Abimbola and Alao (2009:153) describe as “fixed
and unchanging notions of ethnic identity or indigeneity” has been
deepened by the indigeneity policies of the Nigerian government
(Human Rights Watch, April 25, 2006; January 27, 2011). Of all the
tribes that met the earliest occupiers-Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere of
the mining area, the Hausa’s and Fulani’s more seeming resilience in
the quest for identity in their new found abode of living and survival
seems to be echoed by their incessant conflicts with the other three
tribes who seem to have more access to the instruments of
governance and who are more favoured by other tribes in the State.
Conflicts between the former and the latter are usually understood
along ethno-religious line due to the overlapping between the ethnic
and religious identities of the groups in question.
Ethno-religious conflicts remain a marked feature of Nigeria, a
country where ethnic, religious, political, economic and ideological
cleavages have constantly shaped policy formulation, decision
making, access to political and economic opportunities, and
interpersonal relationships. Conflicts usually arise from differences in
needs, aspirations and ideas that abound among individuals and
groups. Ethnicity and religion are examples. If properly managed,
conflicts can influence some positive change. Gunther Schlee
(2008:4) argues that ethnicity is a recurrent factor that stirs up conflict
through cultural differences. Conflict is necessary for growth and
social change. Research has shown that violent conflict, in spite of its
destructive and painful outcome can lead to some form of adjustment
mechanism on the parts of the actors in terms of policy and decision
making (Lewis Coser, 1957). The emerging faces of incessant ethno-
religious conflict in Jos present a city that is fragmented along ethnic,
religious and economic structures. If conflict truly can bring about
social change, its perceived benefits are yet to be in sight in the case
of Jos. The main concern of this paper is to bring to the fore the
emerging cleavage settlement pattern of Jos and the implications it is
likely to bring on the people, the city, the State, and the unity of the
Nigerian state.
Map 2: Map of Jos showing different administrative divisions
Jos in Retrospect
As a heterogeneous settlement, the ethno-religious conflict in Jos
has placed the city among the most deadly trouble spots on the
Nigerian map. Recent happenings have shown that some form of
harsh argument that may ensue in public between people of
opposing faiths could lead to stabbing, shooting and burning of
properties, catching innocent people, traders and workers from
different backgrounds unawares. This perhaps stems from
accumulated agonies of previous violent conflicts and tendency for
vengeance. As a ‘melting pot’ where people of different origin, colour
or race have found solace in commerce and peaceful settlement, the
city has remained a test case for the ‘one Nigeria’ question. Mining
and other trading activities that attracted a lot of people from various
parts of Nigeria have turned out to be a blessing in disguise for a city
that was known as ‘home of peace and tourism’. The work of
Leonard Plotnicov (1967), Shadrach Best (2007), Sen Luka
Zangabadt (1983), Billy Dudley (1968), Samuel Nwabara (1963), Sati
Fwatshak (2010) and the Plateau State website capture much about
the historical antecedents, geographical location and features, ethnoreligious composition, and commerce and political development of
Jos, which between its inception in about 1920 and 2001 had
metamorphosed from one of the most healthiest and safest places in
Africa to a cosmopolitan city that is recently threatened by political
intrigues and ethno-religious violence. Most historical accounts on
Jos are written by insiders, but Manu Isah’s (2010), an outsider
seems contentious. Isah avers history supports that all the tribes on
the Jos Plateau are emigrants from various geographical locations,
but he lacks historical document to substantiate this claim.
The seeming cordial relationship between the ‘natives’ and the
‘settlers’ got affected at the wake of violence of September 7, 2001
(Ezekiel Gomos, 2011). As a resident of Jos for over two decades,
oral evidence gathered from some of the children and grand children
of some key actors indicate that there was some form of cordiality
through exchange for desired property between the ‘natives’ and the
‘settlers’. The willingness and the good spirit with which farmlands
were sold by the former to the latter underscore the hospitality of the
former. B. W. Hodder’s (1959) work on tin mining in Jos reveals that
mining activities might have begun in Jos then known as Bauchi
Plateau earlier than 1884 when European travelers and traders found
that straws of tin were being used by the Hausa in their brass work
and that there was smelting and trading of tin around Kano extending
to the Nile, Tripoli and Ashanti. Hodder (1959) further reveals that the
mineral survey of Northern Nigeria by the colonial government from
1904 to 1909 confirmed tin mining activities and also proved the
large deposit of tin over a wide area of the Plateau. By 1943 Tin
mining had reached its peak of production which was put at 15,842
tons but which dropped to 1,264 tons by 1984 (Michael Alexander
1990). Natasha Cooper (n.d.) seemingly attributes this decline to the
substitution of tin for rubber and other products that do not corrode in
the international market. The decline forced the locals to go back to
their farms while the migrants decided to settle on the Jos Plateau
and took up other commercial activities. Most of the migrant traders
occupied great part of what is today known as Jos North. They
settled along ethnic cleavages. The Igbos are predominant in Apata
and West of Mines areas, the Yoruba occupy vast area of Nasarawa
Gwong, Eto Baba and part of Dilimi areas, while the majority of
Hausa settlers are found along Bauchi road, Dilimi, Gangare, and
Rikos areas of the city.
As a civil servant resident in Jos, observations reveal that the HausaFulani have to a great extent enjoyed freedom of religious worship,
association, economic and social activities. The establishment of
Jama’atu Izalatul Bidi’ah Wa Iqamatu Sunnah (JIBWIS), an Islamic
sect by Sheikh Isma’ila Idris in Jos in 1978 has made Islam more
socially visible in the city. They have created for themselves some
market niches that have made them more formidable in the economic
sphere of Jos. They trade on textile materials, foodstuff, jewelries,
wrist watches to name a few. The Yoruba trade on textiles and plastic
material. They are also in to commercial transport business, furniture
works, auto repairs to mention a few, while auto spare parts,
electronics and drug sales have remained largely the preserve of the
Igbos. The indigenes are predominantly government civil servants.
They also engage in mason and other lucrative businesses. It is
important at this juncture to examine how the above socio-economic
and religious freedom and interaction among various people in Jos
has developed into aggressive struggle for identity and violent
Ethno-Religious Identity Struggle and the Peculiarity of Jos
Ethnic identity struggle is a common phenomenon in most developed
and developing pluralistic societies. Some countries outside Africa
that readily come to mind are Albania, Bulgaria, Afghanistan and
China, Serbia and other countries in the Balkans. In Africa, Burundi,
Rwanda, the Congos, Mauritania, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire have
continued to have their share of the negative effects of ethnic identity
struggles. In Nigeria, the phenomenon is widespread and is often
associated with religion; ‘indigene’ and ‘outsider’, which in Hausa
language means ‘dan gida’ da ‘dan ci rani’; in Yoruba language, the
indigent-settler concept is referred to as ‘omo’le’ ati ‘at’ohunrinwa’. In
fact, a person’s ethnic identity has great influence on the safety of his
or her life and property, upward mobility in the work place, access to
political, social and economic opportunities. Viewed from physical
evidence and group conceptions, ethnicity is the idea of common
place of origin, kinship, distinctiveness or uniqueness of cultural
traits. John and Jean Comaroff (2009) observe that this tendency has
refused to recede even with globalization and transmigration of
people, objects and ideas, and that it has assumed a commodity with
its copy rights law in such a way that a culture and its cultural
products are highly protected by its people by enactment of law and
other human strategies. One may be right to assume here that
ethnicity is a social identity formation which when protected or
commodificated by a group in disfavour of another may trigger up
conflict of latent or violent nature.
Every human society, homogeneous or heterogeneous, consists of
individuals or groups with varying degree of identity, and unequal
natural elements. Conflict emanating from their interaction is
unavoidable especially when there is discordance in interest and
ideas. Similarly such interaction over time, especially when it involves
host and migrant, will enable the groups to be more conscious of
their differences which can considerably fuel conflicts (Karin Norman
2004). Norman avers that the dynamics of identity can generate
group distinctions such as ‘exclusion’ versus ‘inclusion’, ‘us’ versus
‘them’, ‘original inhabitants’ versus ‘sojourners’. While we cannot rule
out the relative size and abundant opportunities of a group against
others as a great indicator for conflicts, distance that exists among
various groups, or the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ can further polarize groups
and deepen conflicts. Although the largest group is more likely to
demonstrate more opportunities and strength over others in
resources and size as is the case in Jos, colonialism in Africa,
apartheid in South Africa, and Tutsi minority in Rwanda have proved
otherwise. Such social construction and the interaction of various
constructed communities is captured by Benedict Anderson (1983)
who sees a nation or community as a social construction resulting
from the mental mind of people but holds that an imagined
community differs from an actual community because members of
such imagined community tend to retain the mental image of their
similarity in their minds as against other communities in the
nationhood. Anderson asserts that such construction is a product of
modernity which has its political, social, and economic advantages.
However, the conflict in Jos presents a vivid picture of the weakness
of such an imagined structure.
Although latent conflict over
hegemony persists among the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom as well,
the trio has latently and confrontationally aligned themselves against
the resilience of the predominantly Muslim Hausa-Fulani for identity
recognition. This has constantly diminished the peace that the city is
known for.
The peculiarity of Jos ethno-religious identity struggle is the
resilience of the predominantly Muslim Hausa-Fulani migrants’ quest
for recognition and right of indigeneship of Jos. Jude Onwuamanam
(2010) captures the resilience of the Hausa-Fulani Muslim migrants
in Jos as he avers ‘the desire of the largely Hausa/Fulani settler
community to be accorded full rights as indigenes of Plateau State’.
The natives of Jos likened this situation to a friend who is invited to
table but holds up the hand of the host in order to eat to his
satisfaction before the host could eat. The Nigerian constitution in
sec 23(3) (a) and 135(3) seems to support the indigenous status of
an individual or group, thereby promoting discrimination against non
members of an indigenous community. While the natives of Jos seem
to draw strength from the position of the constitution, the
Hausa/Fulani migrants also feel empowered by 27(1) of 1960
constitution which is incorporated in sec 42 of 1999 constitution. The
complicity of the 1999 constitution can be seen in 42(3) which
reinstate discrimination on the grounds of place of origin and ethnic
strain. This legal ambiguity is, to a large extent, exploited by
stakeholders in various tiers of government in Nigeria to
systematically preserve privileges and opportunities for indigent sons
and daughters. Basically in Nigeria, every state, local government,
ward and ethnic community determines who its indigenes are. This is
done in a sense, to systematically edge out the ‘outsiders’ from job
opportunities and other welfare facilities that are either inadequate or
not readily available but which are regarded as exclusive preserves
of the sons and daughters of the community. This scenario can make
one to ask where the spirit of Nigerian nationalism of the 1940s and
1950s has gone to. The spate of ethnic conflicts and demands in
Nigeria, particularly the case of Jos are examples of where, in the
words of Yasemin Soya (1994:13) ‘cultural identity of citizens’, and its
recognition and protection seem to have overwhelming claims above
nationalism. In this case, the identity and rights of the ‘indigenes’ of
Jos seem to be entrenched and protected against probable influence
of the ‘settlers’ in the spheres of life.
Femi Omotoso (2000) and Samuel Oguche (2008) independently
express their opinions over the entrenchment of distinctions on the
grounds of ethnic affiliation and place of origin in the Nigerian
constitution. They also bear their minds on its inadequacies in taking
care of the anxiety, rights and privileges of Nigerians outside their
respective home of origin, and non implementation of some sections
and clauses that promote peace and integration of citizens. The
inadequacies in the constitution seem to trigger off ethno-religious
conflicts and mayhem. Similarly, Olusegun Osoba and Yusuf Bala
Usman (1976) express concern that no matter the length of time you
spend as a resident in a town or village or state which is not your
place of origin, you cannot enjoy the right of full participation in the
political, social and other spheres of that geographical space. While
identity protection remains a marked feature of interaction and
citizenship in almost every community in Nigeria, the abuse of the
hospitality of the ‘natives’ of Jos by the Hausa-Fulani ‘settlers’ should
not be overlooked.
The Hausa-Fulani seeming political intrigues to wrest Jos from the
hands of the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta, started first with the
creation of Jos North Local Government during Ibrahim Babangida
Military regime in 1991, and then through the appointment of a
Muslim Military administrator for the state who in turn appointed a
Muslim Care-taker chairman for the newly created local government
council. Jos East Local Government was later carved out of Jos
South, while Jos North is largely populated by the Migrant
Hausa/Fulani. Second, the absence of local elections in the local
government since 2002 has shut the Hausa/Fulani migrants from
taking control of its administration which can be achieved through
elections. The migrant community often assures governorship
aspirants of various political parties of their electoral votes. This is
often done with a long list of demands by the migrant Hausa-Fulani
which the governorship aspirants are expected to meet. This includes
identity recognition, local elections to be conducted in Jos North local
government, and the creation of an Emirate council. There seemed
to be indications that the crises that have made a lot of Christian
Landlords to sell up their houses located in the Migrant Hausa-Fulani
dominated areas was one of the master-strategies employed to
expand the Hausa-Fulani frontier in Jos North Local Government.
Although there are no demographic data to substantiate the claim
that the destitute children popularly called Almajiri in Nigeria are used
for infiltrating Jos to increase migrant Hausa-Fulani population, the
increasing number of Hausa-Fulani youths used as instruments for
attacking Christians is glaring. It is very glaring that the Hausa-Fulani
community employs various intrigues because the constitution does
not adequately address the “indigene-settler” question. The
expressions of some Nigerians over the indigeneity concept in the
constitution have laid bare their irrelevance to current realities being
faced by many Nigerians including the Hausa-Fulani migrants
outside their respective towns of origin. If Awolowo’s (1947)
description of the Nigerian state as a mere geographical expression
or what Anderson (2006:7) calls ‘imagined community’ is to be
understood in the light of the identity question, indigeneity remains a
biological concept which only assumes socio-political meaning. It
then implies that the original inhabitants of a geographical entity shall
ever remain indigenes or native sons and daughters of that place
while the settlers remain non indigenes. How do the Hausa-Fulani
settlers respond to this unending struggle for identity?
Basically, people of different civilizations have different worldviews
which seem to be more fundamental than some form of acquired
socio-political thoughts or construction. The Hausa-Fulani migrants’
somewhat worldview about human relationship with God; migration,
integration and neighborliness seem to play out in their approach to
their unending struggle for indigenship of Jos. In this regard, Moses
Ochonu (2008:5) examines the Islamisation of the Hausa-Fulani and
concludes that the post-Jihad identity of the Hausa-Fulani ‘became
synonymous with assimilation into an Islamic consciousness that was
packaged, consecrated, and policed by the Jihad leaders and the
inheritors of their authority’. The term sabon gari aptly captures the
Hausa-Fulani conception of human migration and integration. Sabon
Gari is a new settlement predominantly occupied by settlers in cities
and towns. In the southern and eastern parts of Nigeria, it is
predominantly occupied by Hausa-Fulani settlers and this
considerably alienates their integration into their host community.
They are also associated with Almajiri phenomenon. Emanating from
the Arabic al-muhajirin (the emigrant), it depicts Prophet
Mohammed’s migration from Mecca to Medina. Originally in Hausa
land, the almajiri are male children of ages seven to eighteen who
are being taught the Quran by wrote by Quranic teachers but who
are allowed to stray along the streets begging for food, money and
cloth. In Nigeria, it has become a syndrome synonymous with
destitute, street beggars regardless of age or gender, aggressive and
violent jobless males who easily succumb to political thuggery and
religious violence. There are insinuations that their sabon gari
settlement often serves as a conduit pipe through which the almajiri
breed and infiltrate the streets of their host community for arms
begin. Marriage of their daughters to their Christian neighbours is
restricted on religious ground. Such culture has not really helped to
dissolve some form of primordial difference that abound between the
Hausa-Fulani and their host community. By this dispensation, one
may be right to suggest a slogan: Jos the home of crisis, where the
‘indigens’ and the ‘settlers’ make life unbearable for themselves. This
unending struggle for identity requires us to examine its effect on the
settlement pattern of residents of Jos. How have the people faired
within the dynamic nature of the crisis ridden city of Jos?
The Changing Faces
Contrary to what Jos used to be before the outbreak of the violence
of September 7, 2001, when the relationship between the ‘indigens’
and the ‘settlers’ was relatively peaceful and friendly, and when the
city had comparatively low violent cases, the cosmopolitan city has
assumed a worrying situation. Before now, the positive attributes of
simplicity, hospitality and relatively violent-free and tourist sites which
nature has bestowed on the city probably earned it ‘the home of
peace and tourism’ but these have been lost to ethno-religious
conflicts and mayhem. Debra Fieguth says Jos has turned to a city
that had been known for its peaceful atmosphere, but where trust has
been replaced by anger and fear on both sides. The identity
difference which seems to polarise the people of Jos probably drew
the attention of Olusegun Obasanjo and Akin Mabogunje (1992) who
emphasise the inability of the Nigerian constitutional provisions to
cement or modify ethnic, regional preferences and geographical
dichotomies that the colonial government constructed as what is
today called Nigeria.
The victory of Samaila Mohammed, a Hausa-Fulani at the
chairmanship election in Jos North local government council in 1991
and the appointment in 1994 of Aminu Mato of Hausa-Fulani
extraction seemed to have brewed the subsequent violent conflicts in
Jos (Ostein 2009, Gwamna 2010). Between 1994 and 2011, Jos has
witnessed numerous major crises. The crises have led to the death
of at least ten thousand people and about eight hundred thousand
internally displaced (Global IDP Project 2005). The state witnesses
an alarming upsurge in the level of violence and displacement. In
Global IDP 2005 report, the total number of people displaced by the
2004 Jos crisis was put at a range between 40,000 to 258,000. While
some traced back their ancestral roots in various parts of Nigeria and
have failed or refused to integrate back into local communities in
Plateau state, others did come back but reintegrated along ethnoreligious line.
Today, human settlement pattern in Jos is pocket-like, largely on
ethnic and religious affiliations. The dangerous trend in the crises in
Jos which gave rise to speculation that the Yoruba migrant Muslims
have become one of the targets of the Hausa-Fulani migrants have
made the former to find peaceful settlement among their Christian
brothers and sisters. Most residents of Jos live in segregation.
Persons or groups with particular traits are spatially located in close
proximity to others who share similar traits and are separated from
others who do not share those traits. The ethno-religious conflict and
residential segregation in Jos remind us of similar conflict and
settlement pattern in Northern Ireland. While the Jos case presents
an inter-ethno-religious segregation, that of the Northern Ireland
presents an intra-religious segregation. The works of Singleton
(1981, 1985), Wilson (1989), and Coulter (1994) amplify cases of
ethno-religious residential segregation in Northern Ireland made
possible by ethno-religiously motivated terrorism.
The 2010 Christmas Eve bomb blasts, which resulted into a bloody
crisis, had its negative impact on the pattern of settlement in Jos city.
There are strong indications that the attack on the Igbo traders on
Dilimi Street during the crisis forced the Igbo merchants to relocate
their businesses to satellite markets in the predominantly Christian
settlements in Gada Biu, West of Mines, Apata, and Gyel-Bukuru.
The Igbo community in Jos claimed it lost forty members to Saturday,
January 8, 2011 mayhem while several others were missing (Taye
Obateru and Chris Ochayi 2011). Similarly, the crisis had forced the
Christian traders in Bukuru market to relocate to Gyel-Bukuru market
that is in a predominantly Christian area (Yiro Abari). Besides the
pattern of business relocation, Christian primary and secondary
school teachers who are posted to schools sited in the Hausa-Fulani
dominated areas have always expressed fear of losing their lives in
the course of carrying out their primary assignment. Similarly, most
parents have relocated their children to schools sited in environments
mostly populated by people of the same faith (Onoja Audu 2010).
Mahmud Lalo (2010) and I. Shobayo and I. Samuel (2010) report that
there are public claims that the December 2010 multiple bomb blast
and crisis might have been masterminded by unidentified Muslim
fundamentalists, however it marked a new phase in the
metamorphosis of Jos. This new phase refreshes one’s memory of
the metamorphosis of the Niger Delta crisis which went from protest
writing to mass street protest in the days of Ken Saro Wiwa to
kidnapping of expatriate oil workers, then to bomb-blasting of oil pipe
lines and other installations. In this regard, Michael Watts (2004)
argues that the ecological degradation, insecurity, deplorable
conditions, and the spate of kidnapping of oil workers and the
bombing of oil installations have been largely due to insensitivity of
the stake holders to the cause of the oil producing communities and
the need to nip the problem from its bud. The current development
places one on a platform to predict the spate of suicide bombing in
few years to come. It is probably going to be ‘a no-go entity’ existing
within a larger entity. The areas of Jos dominated by Hausa-Fulani
Muslims that have currently become ‘no-go areas’ for non Muslims
may witness a gradual underdevelopment in terms of good road
network and other basic social amenities which are exclusive
responsibility of the state government that the ‘natives’ seem to
largely control its machinery.
The conflict in Jos and its changing faces demonstrate the difficulty
involved in deconstructing the barriers that exist among the people of
Jos. Identity formation and protection seem to be on the increase
among members of the various tribes in Jos. The heterogeneity of
Jos which has been made possible by identity differentiation seems
to engender ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ slogan. Such construction of slogan
tends to widen the natural dichotomies that abound between the
‘natives’ and the ‘settlers’. The ‘natives’ feel challenged by the
struggles put up by the ‘settlers’. By this development, the former
employ all available intrigues, strategies to protect its identity and
rights associated with it; edge out the ‘settlers’ from the mainstream
of governance and other opportunities. By extension, the claim by the
migrant Hausa/Fulani Muslims of their ownership of Jos, and their
demand for other rights and privileges have spurred the dominant
indigents-Afizere, Anaguta and Berom into constant designing and
redesigning their master-strategies in order to maintain their
hegemonic control of Jos.
More importantly, the Jos crises tend to lend credence to what
(Thomas Eriksen 2001) rightly points out that ethnicity is a biological
concept that has assumed social and political expression and that
ethnic, religion and culture are critical to integration of various levels
of the society. By extension it supports the wide opinion that Nigeria
is a mere geographical expression of faultily ‘integrated’ entities
whose people and their respective ethnic loyalty and marked natural
boundaries influence their vision and mission as they partake in
societal development.
The emerging new pattern of settlement in Jos affects a market
economy in a cosmopolitan city operating along ethno-religious line.
It also implies a lopsided infrastructural development. In order to
protect and sustain their hegemonic control over their land, the
indigent groups are likely to neglect or systematically edge out the
Hausa-Fulani migrants from the mainstream socio-political
development of Jos. A case that readily comes to mind is the
relocation of the local government Secretariat from the migrants
dominated area of Dogo Agogo to Jos Township, a settlement that is
densely populated by the indigenous tribes and migrants from the
southern part of Nigeria. An empirical study carried out by Marta
Reynal-Querol and Jose Montalvo (2000) though on the continent of
Africa, points to the dynamic implications of ethno-religious crisis on
the growth of human society. Reynal-Querol and Montalvo argue that
the ethnicity and other differences, and the inability of constitutional
provisions of respective African countries to dissolve these
dichotomies are responsible for Africa’s growth tragedy. Significantly,
the incessant mayhem in Jos has gradual but steady negative
implications for its growth in the area of uncertainty and dwindling
investment rate. Although there are no available concrete data to
support this claim, the resultant human displacement and its publicity
in the media remains a worrying indicator. The loss of human capital
through killings of able-bodied men and women from all sectors of
the economy and the use of public expenditure by the government as
a mitigation device, especially for the provision of security,
significantly slows down the economic growth of Jos. Another
dimension of the negative implications of the Jos crises on its human
capital has been researched on by Rose Obilom and Tom Thacher
(2008) who in their study on stress disorder arising from ethnoreligious conflict in Jos, reveal a great deal of effects of traumatic
stress arising from personal attacks, loss of possessions, death of
close and distant persons and displacement, on the psychological
health of victims. One can as well imagine the number of Jos
residents, visitors and passerby who have either directly or indirectly
had contact with death and stress of various kinds. The above
incidents require responsiveness of and interventions by the
government, individuals, nongovernmental organizations, ethnic
leaders, cleric and other stake-holders.
The Way Forward
Basically, conflict is inevitable in human society. More so, conflict
may not necessarily be violent. Some latent conflicts may develop
into violence. Conflict and change are synonymous. Hence it is
necessary for social change and development of the society. Growth
and positive social change are possible when conflicts are properly
directed and managed. The ethno-religious conflict in Jos has
become endemic. The extreme positions which the conflicting groups
take have not helped to transform the conflicts into peaceful and
positive social change and growth.
It requires that the government of Plateau State takes a deep
understanding of the dynamics of the factors responsible for the
conflicts in Jos; should be flexible enough to accept some innovative
suggestions from stake-holders, and should be willing to compare
and share ideas with the Hausa-Fulani community. Through this
approach, a common mutual ground may be reached without the
‘natives’ losing out their hegemony and without the migrant HausaFulani group losing out completely.
Through dialogue, renegotiation for the lost mutual social
relationships that existed between the indigent tribes and the migrant
Hausa-Fulani may be achieved. This will offer a golden opportunity
for the warring parties to recognize their pains and loses, and
apologize to one another. This can go a long way in healing their
The Federal government on its part should set up a machinery of
Constitutional law experts that will critically examine the ethnicity,
indigeneity, and citizenship questions, bearing in mind the disparate
access of Nigerians to scarce resources, and people’s age-long
loyalty and protection of their respective ethnic, religious and cultural
backgrounds. This is not to foreclose the current effort of the nation’s
national assembly where amendments to the Nigeria’s 1999
constitution are being made. The understanding of most Nigerians
that indigeneity or ethnicity has a biological meaning rather than
social and political expression should be well articulated in order to
address the identity question in the constitution. The protection,
rights and privileges of a ‘migrant’ or a ‘settler’ should be clear and
not ambiguously duplicated in other sections of the constitution. The
ambiguity of a law opens it to conflicting interpretations.
Adequate number of security men should be deployed to every flash
point of crisis. Security reports should be looked into and prompt
actions should be taken accordingly. This will go a long way in
nipping any security problem from its bud.
The catalogue of ethnic and religious conflicts, which are a hallmark
in Nigeria’s history, begs for proactive approaches. While conflict can
be seen as a descriptive and prescriptive tool for a better human life,
it requires unflinching determination to implement recommendations.
Conflict itself describes, reveals the fundamental reasons for its
manifestation. Its self-description serves as a good frame for
prescription of appropriate measure. Hence, it is an instrument of
change that is inevitable in human society. The distance between the
indigenes and Hausa-Fulani settlers rendered
uncontrollable, leading to negative change.
The Jos ethno-religious conflict, between 1994 when it started with a
peaceful protest and December 2011, has assumed different faces.
The current level of its dynamism is a worrying indicator of future
spates of suicide bombing in Jos. In order to guide against future
catastrophe where Jos becomes a haven of bomb blasts, rampant
cases of kidnappings and spontaneous mayhem, it is high time that
stake-holders take bold proactive measures to restore lasting peace
and stable growth of Jos and its environs.
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Timothy Baiyewu
Timothy Baiyewu is a PhD student at the Bayreuth International
Graduate School of African Studies, University of Bayreuth,
Germany. He is researching on Aladura Christianity in Nigeria, with
special focus on three major strands: Cherubim and Seraphim,
Church of the Lord Aladura, and Celestial Church of Christ. His other
interests include African Religions and Christian Education. Baiyewu
lectures National Certificate of Education (NCE) and undergraduate
students at the department of Christian Religious Studies, Federal
College of Education, Pankshin, Nigeria.
Traditional Religious Practices in Axum
Town, a Sacred Christian Center: Ethiopia
Serawit Bekele
This article describes and analyses some aspects of traditional religious
practices in Axum town, an ancient city accorded with a status of sacredness.
The main focus is on the analysis of a ritual that is held on the first day of every
month in the town with particular reference to what is practiced on Ginbot
Lideta (May 9). In doing so, an attempt to show the multiplicity of religious
practices within the dominant orthodox Christian frame work is made. The
official narrative of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo Church posits the town as
a ‘sacred’ Christian center where the history of Ethiopian orthodox Christianity
starts. ‘Sacred’, 54 according to the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo Christian
institution, describes a condition of holiness separateness and cleanness as
opposed to ‘impure’ which results from a mixing of different religious practices
with an orthodox religious practice. By drawing on the ethnographic accounts
obtained from informants,55 the paper describes and analyses the ritual. The
main objective of this paper is then to show and analyze another dimension of
religiosity which is downplayed by the official narratives of ‘sacredness’. The
argument is that the empirical condition of Axum and the rhetoric of its ‘purity’
should be re-read in context of local lived realities in order to be able to
understand the conditions of religious practice at the local level against the
back ground of the taken for granted narration of ‘sacredness’ by the institution.
Key words: Appropriation, Tradition, Ginbot Lideta, Religion, Prosaic
The Ge’ez (local language used for church service) version of Sacred is Qidus
which translates as holy, sacred, pure.
In addition to the conversations held with informants, personal observations also
constitute the data used here to describe and analyze the ritual.
The history of the introduction of Christianity in to the Axumite
kingdom is one of the contested subjects in the study of religious
dynamics in Ethiopian history. This is mainly due to the fact that the
church scholars and scholars on Ethiopian history present two
distinct assumptions. Sources coming from the Ethiopian Orthodox
Church trace the introduction back to the first century AD while
scholars of Ethiopian history trace it to the fourth century AD. Below, I
will give an over view of each of the account as it lies the foundation
for the discussion about the construction of Axum as a sacred center
of the Ethiopian orthodox Christian religious institution. According to
the narrative of the church, Christianity was brought to the kingdom
in the first century AD (Sergew and Tadesse 1970; Church History
2000EC). 56 During the time when Christianity was expanding in the
Middle East, the religion was brought to the Axumite kingdom by an
Ethiopian Eunuch. According to Sergew,
Although Christianity became the official religion of the Aksumite
kingdom in the fourth century, the religion had been known in Ethiopia
since a much earlier time. In the Acts of the Apostles, VIII: 26-40, we
are told of a certain Eunuch, the treasurer of Queen Candace of
Ethiopia, who went to Jerusalem to worship the God of Israel. There he
met Philip the Deacon and was baptized by him. Ethiopian tradition
asserts that he returned home and evangelized the people. In his
Homily on Pentecost, St. John Chrysostom mentions that the
Ethiopians were present in the Holy City on the day of Pentecost. Later,
when the Apostles went out to preach the Gospel, Matthew was allotted
the task of carrying the good news to Ethiopia.
Despite the fact that the religion was introduced to the kingdom much
earlier, Christianity began to have a strong hold in the kingdom since
c.336 AD after its endorsement as an official state religion. Thus, this
account asserts that Christianity was in Ethiopia long before its
endorsement as an official state religion. What makes the year 336
AD unique is not that the religion was introduced for the first time but
the fact that it assumed the status as an official state religion
EC means Ethiopian Calendar, which is eight years behind the Gregorian
following the king’s conversion (Church history 2000 EC). On the
other hand, scholars of Ethiopian history argue that Christianity was
introduced to the kingdom in 336 AD when the two Syrian monks
came to Ethiopia and converted the then king called Ezana and it
expanded further down to the south of the kingdom with the coming
of the nine saints in the 6th century. They are indifferent to the claims
made by the scholars from the church and assert that the religion
was introduced in the year 336 AD (cf. Taddese 1972; Levine 1974;
Tekletsadik 1981; Teshale 1995; Mesay 1999).
The main interest of this paper is not however the debate on the
introduction of Christianity to the kingdom but rather the
developments that followed orthodox Christianity’s declaration as the
official religion i.e, the declaration of Axum as sacred Christian center
and the banning of previous beliefs and practices because they were
regarded as ‘pagan’ practices. The local religious practices were
sidelined as a result of the newly introduced religionto the kingdom
centered in Axum. Although these local practices were sidelined,
theywere not abandoned and even in contemporary Axum they are
practiced with more elements and justifications added from the
church’s teachings. According to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church,
Axum’s status as a holy and chosen religious center goes back to the
first Millennium BC when it was decided that the Ark of the Covenant
should be placed in Axum after the legendary King Menelik I brought
it from Israel. The church’s legend informs us that the king went to
see his father, King Solomon of Israel, and managed to bring the Ark
of the Covenant with him. Axum, the then capital city of the kingdom,
was chosen as the abode for the ark and thus proclaimed a sacred
city. Its acclaimed sacredness continued after the kingdom accepted
Christianity in the 4th century AD and the city has remained the center
for Ethiopian Christianity even to date (Kibra Nagast 1995; Ethiopian
Orthodox Tewahdo Church; 2000 EC). According to the Kibra
Nagast 58 (glory of kings) not only Axum was nominated as sacred but
the people of the kingdom were also chosen as holy. The following
statement from the book explains this: ‘These things we have
declared unto you in order that ye may keep and perform the Law of
God so that ye may be blessed in this country, which God hath given
unto you because of the heavenly Zion, the Tabernacle of the law of
Kibra Nagast (glory of kings) is a book written in Ge’ez in which stories about the
Queen of Sheba, Christianity, Ethiopian emperors and all related accounts are found.
BIGSAS Working Papers 2/2012: Trends, Discourses and Representations in Religions in Africa is because of Zion that they have been chosen and our
fathers rejected’ (Kibra Nagast, 1995:123).
The contemporary Axum is a town in the Tigray national regional
state of the federal democratic republic of Ethiopia. It was the center
of the ancient Axumite kingdom. It is a town in which about 44647
people live. More than 88 percent of the number of population living
in the city is practicing orthodox Christian while about 11 percent are
Muslims. The rest is composed of followers of Protestant (locally
called pente) religion according to the local statistics office.
Ethnically, it is mainly resided by Tigrigna speaking people except a
handful of Amharas and Gurages who are involved in trade activities.
Being the center of ancient Ethiopian civilization and Christianity, it is
a very busy tourist center. It is also center of pilgrimage for many
followers of Ethiopian orthodox Christianity from all over the country
and the Diaspora. November 28 is an annual celebration where by
followers of Ethiopian orthodox Christianity flock from all over the
country and even from the Diaspora. The fact that it is believed that
the Ark of the Covenant is stored in Axum St. Mary church of Zion
adds to Axum’s sacredness and also attraction to tourists.
The Literature on Christianity and Local Religions
Talking about the adaptation or syncretization of the Ethiopian
orthodox Christianity after its introduction in the 4th AD up until the
time when it reached most of the inhabitants of the Christian empire
in the 19th century, scholars have shown that the Ethiopian orthodox
church is characterized by syncretic traits which came as a result of
its contact with local practices (Mesay 1999; Teshale 1995; Tadess
1972; Trimingham 1952; Levin 1974; Daniel 1984). According to
Mesay (1999:2), ‘Judaism and Christianity exist in a form no longer
current in their country of origin’ but rather they are ‘naturalized.’
Teshale (1995) also maintains the same stance and asserts that
Orthodox Christianity has adopted elements from the then religious
practices and Judaism up on its introduction to Ethiopia. Trimingham
(1952) asserts that the Ethiopian Christianity is not authentic enough
since it has been intertwined with indigenous belief systems and
practices. Tadesse (1972) stresses on the same issue by discussing
the mixing up of Ethiopian orthodox Christianity with indigenous
beliefs especially when it was expanding to the center and south.
Concerning specific works which have been done so far about
Christianity and local practices among different groups of people, a
lot of studies can be found on spirits possession cults and their
intermingling with orthodox Christianity in different parts of Ethiopia.
For instance, in the southern part of Ethiopia, Braukämper, (1992),
Shack (1969), among the Oromo (Knutson; Lewis 1989; Lewis 1983;
Bartles 1983; Serawit 2009; Negaso and Crummy 1972) among the
Amhara Yoftahie (1958) Aspen (2001), Setargew (2000). The works
by these scholars describe and analyze interactions of Christianity
with the indigenous belief systems and their syncretic features. They
state that the introduction of Christianity has transformed the
practices and has also been transformed in the process.
However, less or no attention has been given to the Tigray region in
general and to Axum in particular to study the belief systems that are
practiced side by side with Christianity by the people in their
everyday lives. Moreover, the above works deal basically with
possessing spirits which are different from the spirits appeased
during the time of the Lideta ritual. Yoftahe’s work which describes
and analyses the guardian spirits celebrated on the birth day of St.
Marry among the Amhara of Begemidr is an exception in this regard.
The main contribution of this article is therefore the description and
analysis of a ritual as it is practiced in the acclaimed sacred town of
Axum. It also contributes to the literature concerning Lideta ritual in
which the guardian spirits are appeased.
In order to analyze the ritual, I take two main concepts. The first is
the concept of prosaic religion as defined by Grieve. Although I take
the definition and the concepts of prosaic religion from Greive (2006),
I opt to use ‘everyday religion’ instead of prosaic for, according to the
online Oxford dictionary quoted in Iltis (2008), prosaic means ‘dull or
common place, mundane, consisting of written in prose, unpoetic
unromantic unexting, flat’ and it is reductionist to name the creative
and exiting as well as colorful religious ritual as such. Everyday
religion ‘Indicates a strategy that is not confined to scripture but that
consists of a ‘pragmatic ritual repertoire’. That is, it exists as a form of
flexible, innovative, body-focused, hybrid praxis. [It] includes
ceremonies, rites of passage, and religious processions to name a
few of the most important practices’ (Grieve 2006:3). Secondly I
employ Meyer’s (1994) concept of appropriation in which she
expounds how African Christians are active agents in historical
process and how they translate Christianity in their own terms.
Appropriation according to Meyer is ‘the process of making
Christianity one’s own’ (ibid: 44).
The church claims that people used to practice ‘pure’ worship of God
since the endorsement of Christianity and all religions which were
hitherto practiced by the society are abandoned in favor of
Christianity (Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo Church 2000 EC; Sergew
2003). However, as opposed to the church’s dogma and teachings
about the kind of worship Ethiopians practice, empirical experiences
suggest otherwise. Even in the sacred city of Axum, whose
sacredness goes as far as the belief that the community living in
Axum is also holy by default, there are practices which are not in line
with the teachings and the dogma of the church. This is attributable
to the history of the kind of religion practiced before the introduction
of Christianity and people’s determination not to abandon it since it is
as meaningful and important as orthodox Christianity. Sergew has
the following to say on the belief systems that existed before the
coming of Christianity,
The Sabaean migrants who crossed the Red Sea in the first millennium
B.C and settled in Ethiopia brought with them their own religion. They
were polytheists, and worshipped different gods of heaven, the earth
and the sea. Almouqah (Elmouqah), for example, was the principal god
of the south Arabian pantheon, and was retained as such in Ethiopia.
Other Sabaean gods, like Astar (Astarte), corresponding to Aphrodite
and Venus of the Greek and Roman world, sin the moon god shams
the sun god, were widely worshipped in Ethiopia. Later, with the
introduction of Greek culture into Ethiopia, worship of the Greek
pantheon became widespread.
Therefore, the pre Christian religious dynamics of the Axumite
kingdom, as explained by Sergew, is that there were polytheistic
religious practices even by the royal family until Christianity was
introduced and adopted by the kingdom in the 4th Century AD. This
line of argument which draws on works of scholars in the field of
Ethiopian history informs us of dynamic traditional religious practices
before the making of Christianity as a state religion. Scholars agree
that the introduction of Christianity in the 4th century AD did not come
to fill a religious vacuum. Rather, it came in a context of polytheistic
religious practices (Kobishanov, 1981) and Jewish practices
(Teshale, 1995). As a result of its early contact with the polytheistic
as well as Judaic religions, Christianity had mingled and the people
have not given up their previous practices even after conversion.
Levine (1974) and Messay (1999) assert that Christianity has
significantly changed after it was introduced due to the fact that it
adapted itself to the indigenous and Judaic religious practices and in
as much as Christianity has undergone some changes, so has been
the case with practices before Christianity. According to Levin (1974),
Ethiopians reception of foreign religious elements is creative as a
result of which they take the new elements and ‘incorporate them in
such a way that the resulting belief systems strongly reflect on
indigenous traditions’ (ibid: 67). Thus, it can be argued that since the
very introduction of Christianity in the kingdom of Axum it was mixed
with other practices which were there before the coming of
Christianity to the kingdom. This would then challenge the church’s
claim of the abandonment of the old practices and shift to purity after
Local Realities of Religious Practice in Contemporary Axum
Town: The Ritual on the Day of Ginbot Lideta
According to the Ethiopian calendar, which derives its origin from the
Ethiopian Orthodox Church, a month has thirty days and each day is
devoted to the commemoration of specific religious figures. And once
or twice a year, an annual feast is held to remember the religious
figure. Accordingly, the first day of every month is celebrated in
remembrance of of St. Mary’s birthday. The day is called Lideta
lemaryam which literally translates to birthday for st. Mary. The
annual celebration is held on the 1st of Ginbot according to the
Ethiopian calendar (9th of May) every year. The day is celebrated as
st. Mary’s birthday and the church teaches that this day is exactly
when she was born even though every first day of each month is
devoted to memorize her birthday. During this day, the institution
instructs followers to come to church for service and spend some
time in the compound engaging in activities of honoring the saint in
whose name the annual feast is held (Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo
Church 2000 EC). For those who can afford to travel where there is a
church in the name of st. Mary, it is believed that they get more
blessings. Moreover, the celebration is more colorful if it is held in the
church of st. Mary. On the day of the annual celebration, the ark is
brought outside to the public from its bode for procession inside the
church compound. A large number of people also gather around to
share the blessing and honor the saint 60. After the church service
ends, people go back to their homes and the celebration continues.
During the celebration at home, more rituals are added to give the
holiday more symbolic meaning and more color. The extended
celebration and the rituals that accompany the celebration are not
part of what the church instructs as to how a religious holiday should
be celebrated. It is rather something the church strongly opposes for
it is mixing the religious with superstitions. On the other hand, the
community members who participate in the extended ritual explain
why they practice the ritual based on stories they claim to have
learned from their forefathers about God, how the evil and good
spirits are created, how they should be tamed and appeased and
although the main frame is thest. Mary’s birthday. The main interest
of this paper is therefore to show the celebration of the in the name
of st. Mary. It starts by describing the ritual below.
The main ingredients required for the day are; freshly cut grass,
coffee, perfume, incense, peas or beans, wheat, pop corn, goat or
sheep, locally prepared beer known as tella 61 bread, kitta (a thin flat
pan cake made from wheat flour). Some of these items like bread
and tella, are prepared ahead of time as their preparation takes
longer than the others. The celebration starts early in the morning
around 6:00 AM as people go to the church of st. Mary of Zion which
is situated in the heart of the old part of the city of Axum. In the
church, there is mass and chanting accompanied by church dance.
This takes about two to three hours. Then the priest in charge of the
celebration teaches some words from the Bible and says a farewell
blessing to the attendants. On their way back they buy some of the
necessary items mentioned above to make the celebration as colorful
“Feast days of Ethiopian Orthodox Church” an article accessed from
Tella is not a must requirment, some families prepare it some do not. It also depends
on the status of a family. Usually the poor do not prepare tella as it is more expensive.
as it should be. From the gate of the church they buy freshly cut
grass and incense. From the near buy kiosk, they buy the coffee
beans, popcorn and the grains.
The ceremony starts around mid day with what is called nifro kikela
which literally translates as boiling of grains. First, the woman in
charge of the family looks for an appropriate place where to prepare
a temporary stove for the grain boiling and the following activities. It
should be an area which is convenient for people to sit around. Once
the right place is chosen, a big pot is prepared for the grain and the
fire is now set. Depending on the order of boiling she puts first the
bean or peas then after a while the wheat is added so that they are
cooked properly. While the nifro kekela is taking place, the family
members are engaged in different activities. Tiding the place for the
ritual, preparing the coffee ceremony, baking the kitta and inviting
neighbors are the main activities. The first task is left for the men
while the rest are of the mother and children. The mother takes care
of the coffee ceremony and the kitta baking while children are sent
out to tell the neighbors that they are invited. 62
The mother is observed running here and there trying to follow up the
boiling of the grain and preparing the coffee ceremony. Once she
made sure the grain is well cooked, then it is possible to start the
next step. The food items prepared for the day are taken outside, the
coffee ceremony is ready to start family members and invited guests
are present, then it is time to start the ritual. Everything is arranged in
order. The coffee tray is put on the freshly cut grass which is spread
on the floor. In front of the coffee tray, the kitta, the boiled grain, the
bread, the popcorn, the gadget for burning incense are put. No one is
allowed to eat anything until they are told to start. The temporary
stove on which the grain was boiled should have fire on it because
there is one more frying it is needed for. So, before everything starts,
the sheep or goat 63 prepared for the day will be slaughtered by the
head of the family, in this case the man. Then the meat is chopped by
Invitation depends on the size of the family, usually if it is a big family, they do not
invite neighbors. Moreover, if the time of the celebration by the other neighbor also
coincides there is no need to come around as they are busy with their own celebration.
If the family preparing the feast is wealthy, it is a moral obligation to invite those who
don’t have the capacity to do so.
Sheep or goat is not obligatory, but if a family can afford it is done. Black colour
is usually preferred.
the mother and girls. And a big metal plate will be put on the
temporary stove and the meat is fried. Once the fried meat, locally
called tibis, is ready everybody sits making circles by the side of the
coffee. Now it is time to start the celebration of st. Mary’s birthday,
Ginbot Lideta. It all starts by first taking a small amount of each of the
food item and the drink and throwing it in all directions spelling some
words of prayer. This is done by the oldest man in the family. The
prayers read as follows,
Our father’s and mother’s Wuqabi we are grateful for you have
protected us through the year. Amen!
We are thankful for you have kept your eyes on our country, on us, on
our children, our cattle, on everything we have. Amen!
We hope and pray for your protection for the years to come. Amen!
We beg you to give us peace, love, health, productivity, fertility to our
mothers, success to our children. Amen!
We ask for your apologies if we have been out of the right way and we
ask you to help us in the future. Amen!
We ask you accept our offering, to test and bless the food we have
prepared and also be with us tonight. Amen!
God of Abraham and Sarah we give you honor and thanks for making
us see this day. Amen!
Mother of God [st. Mary] we give you honor for being with us all the
year and for enabling us celebrate your birthday. Amen!
It is not allowed to take anything from the food and drink before it is
thrown to the spirits (Wuqabis) and the explanation for this is, since
the items are mainly prepared to appease the spirits, they should be
the ones who first test it or otherwise it will have a drastic
consequence on the person who ate or drunk anything before its
thrown for them. It might cause the person a serious affliction as the
disappointed sprits may take revenge on who did an act of
transgressing their authority. Thus, it is only after all participants said
amen to the prayers and thanks giving, can start participants eat and
drink what is served.. Finally the celebration gets to a closing session
when all say blessings and prayers asking for their well being once
again and asking for more blessings and protection until next year. At
Wuqabi “is a guardian sprit of an individual or a family” (Yoftahie 1958:78). It is
not a possessing sprit like the zar.
Prayer made by Gebremedihn Tadesse on May 9, 2010.
the end, no leftovers will be taken back to the house. Everything
except the containers will be thrown in different directions as it was
done at the very beginning of the ritual for the sprits themselves.
According to one of my informants on the issue, the idea of
celebrating st. Mary’s birthday in this manner has its origin from the
very time she was born and there is nothing superstitious about it
since what they are doing now is what st. Mary’s parents have done
up on child birth. Leaving the leftovers out there for the spirits,
throwing some amount for the sprits, appeasing them are also
nothing unchristian or superstitious but rather have their roots in the
bible and church stories they have been taught by the priests. He
We are thought in the church that on this day Hana, mother of our lady
and Eyaqem her father did the things we are doing here now except
that they did not have coffee and that they did not slaughter a sheep or
a goat. We are taught in the church that few days before Hana gave
birth to st. Mary, she and her husband climbed a small hill in search of a
nice place where she can rest and deliver the baby. On the top of the
hill they settled at, they were staying in a small hut and they did not
have a proper house. So when people in the surrounding area heard
the news of a child born on top of the hill, they all went to see them.
They also took food stuffs with them according to the tradition of the
day. So as they reached and saw Hana with her newborn baby girl,
they greeted her and congratulated her. They set fire outside and put a
small pot on the fire to boil the grains they brought with them. They
celebrated the coming of the long awaited St. Mary with it. They ate and
they did not take the leftovers with them, as you can see, that is what
we are doing now. We fed ourselves and we have to also feed the
spirits who guard as because they don’t have any means to feed
themselves unless we do. If we do not do, they attack us. They eat us
because they will be starved. So that is the reason.
Bantalem’s (2010) assumption about the celebration of the day
agrees with what the informant told me except that Bantalem argues
differently about the leftovers. He says, the leftovers left by the
visitors of Hana were not intended to feed the spirits since that is not
in line with the teachings of the Orthodox church but rather, it was
Conversations with Gebremedihn Tadesse
meant to feed the birds. Yoftahie on the other hand, has another
perspective about the boiling of grains and leftovers which connects
it to what Jesus has done to save human kind. Accordingly, he says
The popular belief for boiling nifro is that, before Christ was born to die
on the cross and save mankind from Hell, sinners were thrown into
boiling water and fire. But st. Mary was born; she gave birth to Christ
and He, through His death and Resurrection, took all those sinners out
of the unbearable boiling water and fire. Thus the boiling of nifro is in
remembrance of that suffering and to show how the birth of St. Mary
contributed to the redemption of our souls Yoftahie (1958 :78).
He also adds that why leftovers are not taken back to the house is
because it is believed that since the sufferings are symbolized by the
boiled grain, taking them back to the house would mean calling the
suffering once again to the house (ibid. 1958). However, both
Bantalem and Yoftahie agree that the animal slaughter and coffee
are not supported by the church. Bantalem and Yoftahie go in line
with the church’s teachings and do not accept the assertion that the
leftovers should be left for the sprits. Rather, says Yoftahie (1958:78),
the religious significance of the celebration of St. Mary’s birthday has
‘decreased in importance and the practice has become modified in its
performance to include other elements apart from what is recognized
by the church’ (italics mine). He thus believes that the ritual is
extended to include some elements which are not from the church’s
teachings but rather brought in from the previous practices. It can be
argued that these extended practices are continuations of the old
practices which were performed by the people before they were
converted to Christianity but at this time they are mingled to make
more meaning and be expressive of the love for st. Mary, and their
relationship with the guardian sprits. In addition, both Bantalem and
Yoftahie do not give any explanations about throwing the food items
to the sprits before anyone eats and drinks although priests with
whom I have discussed the issue say it is superstition and that is it
strongly opposed by the church.
A priest informant from the church explains the inclusion of
appeasing the sprits while celebrating st. Mary’s birthday as a total
superstition which is against the teachings of the church and he even
believes that it is embarrassing to see this practice in Axum among
other places given its long history of Christian tradition and while it is
a sacred city chosen by God as an abode of the Ark of the
covenant. 67 He says that after all this long established tradition of
Christianity the old traditions of this superstition should have been
abandoned, but it is rather surprising how they found their way to be
celebrated together with the birthday of our Mother, st. Mary. What he
calls superstition is the inclusion of the killing and the coffee together
with throwing food items for the spirits.
However, an old woman who has been doing this for many years
says that she cannot be without this practice since it is one of the
bases of her well being in the day to day activities. She believes that
if she stops it anytime that the sprits will take out right revenge either
on herself or her family or her property. She says ‘the church men
themselves tell us that we have guardian spirits. Like the guardian
spirits, there are also evil spirits which we need to handle carefully if
we don’t want any troubles to befall us.’68
Talking about the guardian spirits, my pries informants quoted a
verse from the Psalms 91:1-16 and admitted that there are both bad
and good spirits. However, he says, ‘there is no place in the Bible
that says they should be handled the way these people are treating
them. They do not need any appeasement and offering by people
because their creator God himself takes care of the sprits and his
people too. The people are just making this up to justify their bad
practices which are impurifying our long lived Christian tradition.’ 69
This is an interesting point where we can see how creative and
innovative people are to interpreted and appropriate their knowledge
from the church about the good and bad spirits and devised their own
way of dealing with them.
Meyer’s concept of appropriation captures the whole scenario here
very well. According to Meyer, discourses on syncretism in Africa,
although they are being challenged recently, down play the role of
actors in the process and strip their agency off and also not gives
attention to Africans understanding of Christianity. By using the term
appropriation she argues, an ‘understanding of African Christians as
active agents in a historical process’ (Meyer 1994) can be achieved.
Conversation with Gebru Gebrehawaria.
Conversation with Ade Atsede Tesfaye.
Conversaition with Zegebreyesus Lemma.
Appropriation is one of the ways through which the people under
discussion make use of Christianity to explain their relationship to the
sprits. It is stated above that informants go back to the church’s
teachings itself to show that what they are doing derives its roots
from the bible and what the church teaches its followers. This way,
they make Christianity their own as Meyer (1994) says and
synthesize it with their old practice before the introduction of
Christianity. It has been shown above in the introduction that the
people long before were practitioners of local belief systems and that
they were polytheists. They did not need to abandon their old belief
for the new one for it has always served them a purpose to be in
good terms with the spirits. However, they have to also negotiate
some elements with the church. So instead of abandoning the whole
thing, they borrowed some stories from the church to justify their
practice of appeasing the sprits. Moreover, the concept of
multidimensionality also must be taken in to account. Local practices
which were and are believed by the practitioners, to be important,
tend to find ways to deal with the hegemonic institution by being
rather flexible and creative. What they do is not standing against it or
resisting it, rather, appropriating it and as we saw from the above
ritual borrowing some elements and bring some Christian elements in
Reading in to the prayer above, it is not difficult to infer that this
practice is more concerned with the pragmatic issues such kind of a
practice is believed to deal with. It is a practice which is in John
Cort’s (2001: 187-200) quoted in Greive’s (2006) expression
concerned with ‘the realm of well-being, health, wealth and mental
peace emotional contentment, and satisfaction in one’s worldly
endeavors.’ It is not much about the transcendental or the life after
death but the well being of life while living on this earth. It is part and
parcel of the effort of bringing well being and stability to the socially
constructed everyday life of practitioners (Greive 2006). As such, the
practice does not contradict with the teachings of the church in the
eyes of the practitioners but rather compliments one another. They
celebrate st. Mary’s birthday and in the same event they appease the
sprits. While the former is in line with responding to their
transcendental life the later replies to their pragmatic everyday life
and this way they are seen complimenting each other (Greive 2006).
In doing so, they appropriate Christianity in a meaningful manner and
also deal with the sprits which are responsible for their everyday life.
This is more explained by Greive (2006:3) as follows. ‘The
transcendental and the prosaic complexes do not collide or compete,
nor are they in mere accidental association. Rather, each is a
response to specific needs. They complement each other as they are
utilized in what are essentially distinct and complementary contexts
of application’.
Historically, before the introduction of Christianity, it has been said
above that the people in the Axumite kingdom were practicing
polytheistic religions and they were also used to giving sacrifices to
the sprits they adhered to. The introduction of Christianity however
came with teachings which ban the practice of offering sacrifices and
worshiping the spirits at all. This did not get much weight in the eyes
of the society and it was not also something they could afford to stop
for they have been connected with the practice for a long time and
they have found it legitimate so far. But they were also faced with the
influential institution which was attempting to impose the new
teachings. At this point, they had to devise ways of negotiating the
two, the former practice and the teachings by the new religion. Thus,
they had to translate Christianity into ways which were
understandable and applicable to their situation which is what makes
it appropriation. And as Meyer (1994) argues, the church’s role to
control the followers ways of practicing the religion in as much as it
wanted is very much limited among the Christians in Axum for they
have appropriated some elements from Christianity that are
meaningful and related to their practices and relations with the spirits.
Concluding remark
If, according to Mary Douglas (2002), purity never gets along with
ambiguities and compromises, the very time the religion was
introduced to the Axumite kingdom purity could never be the case
due to its interaction with Judaism and local practices which must
have led to the ambiguity or conditions of ‘impurity’. The practitioners
in this ritual have become actively innovative to the extent that they
appropriate the Christian religious myths for negotiating their
conditions in relation to the spirits and their institutional base which is
the ‘pure’ Orthodox tewahdo Christian institution.
According to Nurnberger ‘in the current spiritual situation, you find a
diverse spectrum of combinations, interactions, inter-penetrations,
adjustments, new developments, deconstructions and simple decay.
Local and detailed analyses would be necessary to know exactly
what happens at grass roots level in specific communities’
(Nurnberger 2007: 20-21). Hence, there should be ways to go
beyond idealized purity discourses in order to see the lived realities
which are very much expressed by dynamic and creative practices.
To this end, I analyzed a ritualized Christian religious practice which
is appropriated by adherents to appeal to the non-Christian spirits as
celebrated once in a year on the 9th of May which is Ginbot 1
according to Ethiopian calendar. This day is the actual day when st.
Mary was born and it is a day of big celebration although the
Christian people actually continue to commemorate every first day of
the twelve months.
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Serawit Bekele
Serawit B. Debele is a PhD student at the University of Bayreuth
department of religious studies. She is perusing her research on
religion and state in contemporary Ethiopia. Other research interests
include traditional religious practices and their mixture with
institutional religions like Christianity and Islam in Ethiopia.
Final Word: The Religious Situation in
Contemporary Africa
Kupakwashe Mtata
Religion, as witnessed in such an extended geographical region as
Africa, expectedly exhibits much diversity. Both inter-religious and
intra-religious diversity are evident on the African religious landscape.
Intra-religious diversity arises from the fact that ‘[religion] is not just a
matter of belief, of internal commitment to the notion of existence of
some transcendent power’ (Firth 1996:168). Rather, whether it has
any ‘purely religious’ origin or not, religion as it is lived out has other
stimuli than transcendental or metaphysical ones. Human interests,
economics, social organization, historical developments, politics,
charismatic personalities, psychological conditions and many other
historical (as opposed to transcendental) realities shape religious
beliefs and practices. The multiplicity of these motivations and factors
unavoidably gives rise to diversity in the shades in which religions
In the same vein, common influences may give rise to noticeable
parallels in the religious practices of different communities. Common
historical conditions in much of Africa result in comparable forms of
religious practices. In addition, comparability of religious
manifestations across the different religious situations presented in
this issue may partly be accounted for by reference to the similarity in
the characters or types of religions.
This essay will adumbrate the contours of a typology that will
illuminate some aspects of the cases presented in this issue which
are significant for comparison’s sake. A seemingly superficial meta-
level observation is that all the cases examined are instances of
religious grouping. What is more insightful and to be considered here
is the nature of solidarities and boundaries that characterise the
groupings. That is, what are the bases upon which groups of people
cooperate or differ in, or even fight over matters of a religious nature?
Religious groups are influenced by both by the religious contents of
their religions and the non-religious aspects of their environment.
What are those religious and non-religious elements that have an
effect on the complexion of religious solidarity or divergence in the
cases under investigation? And what complexions of religious
solidarity and divergence can be observed?
Typology of religions
Religions have certain qualities which generally define how their
adherents are mobilised. A number of proposals have been made
regarding how to categorise religions. 70 Reference is made here first
and foremost, to the typology proffered by Jan Assman (2010).
Assmann’s is not precisely a typology of religions in general. It is
rather particularly a classification of monotheisms into exclusive and
non-exclusive religious discourses. Assmann perceives in Egyptian
history two paths to monotheism which lead to two types of
One, the evolutionary path, leads to an inclusive monotheism, a
monotheism that is nothing other than a mature stage of polytheism.
The other, the revolutionary path, leads to an exclusive monotheism, a
monotheism that cannot be arrived at through any developmental
process but only through a revolutionary break with all that went before
it. The distinction between true and false religion pertains solely to this
exclusive monotheism. (2010:36)
Assmann borrows from Karl Jaspers the notion that the Axial Period,
a period encompassing c. 800 – 200 BCE, saw the rise of novelties
of a religious and non-religious nature. For Jaspers, the Axial Period,
Since religion, like all other cultural phenomena, is in an on-going process of
reproduction it should be expected that new variations continue to arise which do not
necessarily fall neatly within any suggested categories. However, broad categories
organise data into manageable sets before complexity may be introduced.
a period of acute cultural transformation in global history, was the
time in which humanity became conscious of consciousness, started
to strive for redemption, attempted to convince each other through
communication of thoughts, reasoned discussions and essayed
arguments, a development which led to the formation of parties and
the rise of religious conflicts. In religion, ethics attained priority over
myth. The former period, what Jaspers regards as the mythical age,
an age of tranquil unconscious acceptance of ideas and customs,
gave way to an age of the conscious rational examination and
demolition of what hitherto had been accepted without question.
Additionally, in its relation to the world, humanity adopted a new
disposition, namely spiritualisation. That is, asceticism, philosophy,
and speculative mysticism gained currency. (Jaspers 1953:1-8)
For Assmann therefore, it is in the Axial Period that religions with
exclusive monotheistic theology, which he also labels counterreligion
or secondary religions, came into existence. The emergence of these
self-conscious and exclusive religions whose gods are unique and
cannot be translated to those of other cultures happened in the same
period as the rise of other cultural and intellectual aspects, viz: the
judgement of the dead, personal piety, separation of state and
religion, writing and literacy, the canonization of scriptures, violent
self-exclusion, violent exclusion of others, martyrdom, and
conversion. (Assmann 2010:8-30, 2008)
The main feature of exclusive monotheism as is seen in the Torah is
the demand for exclusive contractual loyalty to a god. To worship any
other gods attracts jealousy and retribution from the god. Inclusive
monotheism on the other hand is an idea of a god who is manifest or
concealed in multiple images which complement, offset and
illuminate one another. Inclusive monotheistic religions affirm the
world as a divine world, and their divinities participate in worldly
affairs of politics, economics, and health. Rulers are identified with
divinities and intercede with the divinities to ensure the health and
wellbeing of the territory under their jurisdiction. They are the
representatives of the gods to their people. On the contrary, the
exclusive monotheistic god is a transcendent individual who is
removed from the world and negates it. The god and the world are
set apart; his kingdom is not of this world. 71 Redemption from this
world is a major feature of exclusive monotheism. Religions with a
theology of exclusive monotheism also usually require personal piety
which involves a temporary detachment from the world in order to
commune with the god (Assmann 2010:31-56).
Another important feature of exclusive monotheism is an emphasis
on law, morality and justice as integral aspects of religion. Moral
stipulations that require care for the poor and the powerless, as well
as following other given moral behaviours or prohibitions, are an
important element of exclusive monotheistic religions. In societies
with inclusive monotheism, such moral stipulations are usually not
aspects of religion but of the profane wisdom of rulers in their duty as
patrons and protectors. The gods of inclusive monotheism generally
do not give laws of an ethical nature. Exclusive monotheistic religions
therefore tend to attribute lawlessness and indecency to nonadherents. (ibid.)
The turn from inclusive monotheism to exclusive monotheism
correlates with the turn from ritual to text or from orality to
scripturality. In inclusive monotheistic religions, ritual is believed to be
necessary to keep the world going, while in exclusive monotheism it
is not ritual performance but the will and action of a transcendent god
which ensures world continuity. The priest type is the key religious
specialist in those religions in which ritual is the main medium,
whereas the scholar, exegete or preacher is prominent in book
religions. While what is required in the former is ritual performance
involving the proper handling of sacred objects and appropriate
behaviour in sacred spaces, in the latter reading, reciting and
exegesis take precedence. When emphasis is on ritual performance
the observance of purity rules that govern the ritual is critical, and
when the text is what is fundamental remembering and obeying
scriptural guidelines and ethical rules assume most significance. The
transcendent god of exclusive monotheism reveals his will through
scriptures, and the gods of inclusive monotheism manifest in nature
and other worldly media. (ibid.)
This is not to say that there have not been many times when exclusive monotheistic
religions have colluded with politics.
The typology of religions as primary and secondary is borrowed by
Assmann from Theo Sundermeier. This typological classification of
religions is widespread. In a lecture delivered at the University of
Bayreuth on 12th January 2011, Michael Pye, spoke of primal
religion, critical religion and civil religion. He characterized primal
religion as that religion not formally recognised as religion by its
adherents. It is taken for granted as the customary practice of the
natural community. Primal religion, therefore, has no formal name.
The great majority of participants in primal religions are not
reflectively aware of participating in a religion. Critical religions, on
the other hand, are reflective, self-critical, and critical of society or
culture. Their teachings are disseminated by teachers or preachers,
but their survival and growth ultimately depend on people’s decision
to accept or reject them. Pye defines critical religion as ‘a voluntary
system of symbolic concepts and ritual behaviour which enables
individuals to determine meaning independently of a natural
community’, and civil religion as ‘a complex of symbols, concepts,
and values accompanied by ritual activities and calling forth feelings
such as historical nostalgia, national loyalty, and commitment to a
common future’ (Pye 2011).
Along the same lines as Sundermeier, Assmann, and Pye, Raymond
Firth makes reference, on the one hand, to small scale particularistic
religious systems, and, on the other, to religious systems that make
claim to universality. The former can be said to have the following
characteristics: emphasis on honourable conduct and proper ritual
performance rather than adherence to a clearly articulated set of
beliefs; no need for proselytizing; rarity of sceptics, who in any case
have doubt limited only to specific rites, priests or divinities. There is
no need to mention the characteristics of the universalistic religious
systems as they are just the reverse side of those of small scale
particularistic religious systems. (1996:157-158)
Of importance at this point is to note that once spiritual
consciousness or self-reflectivity enters into the history of a people,
religion among those people can assume many different forms
depending on how elements from different religions are associated
and blended, and on how other historical factors impinge on religion.
Different emphases lead to different designs of religion. The arrival of
critical religions did not lead to a perfect retreat of non-reflective
forms of religion. Rather, in some case the old forms gained
consciousness and became defensive. The gaining of consciousness
was already an adoption of a characteristic of critical forms of
religion. Likewise, the new critical religions more often than not
adopted elements of the primal forms of religion, and had to do so if
they were to survive.
The unreflective-reflective dichotomy dominant in all the typologies
above is only a broad typology which ignores intermediate or
different forms which are so rife in reality. Only Pye refers to one
such instance, namely civil religion. Different emphases may lead us
to more types with different or more refined nuances, such as
popular religion in contrast to official or elite.
Types of religion in Africa
In Africa the two most proselytizing religions, Christianity and Islam,
are distributed in such a way that the north is largely Muslim while
the south is largely Christian. Nigeria is one of the religious
borderlands of this demarcation. These self-reflective and
missionizing religions collide at the frontier, but the nature of the
collision depends on other extenuating circumstances. In the
particular case of Jos, as presented by Baiyewu in this issue,
religious conflict merely provides a superstructure to conflict that is
already simmering on socio-economic grounds. Difference in
religious affiliation coincides with ethnic and economic disputes
thereby heightening the conflict. Is it not possible though that the
perceptions of global conflict between the Christian and the Muslim
world, especially as dramatized since 11th September 2001, have
similarly contributed to accentuating imaginations of violent conflict
on the basis of religion? In any case, religious affiliation in exclusive
monotheistic religions has the effect of creating religion-based group
identities, or, where other identity markers were already in existence,
of intensifying exclusive identities.
Like Nigeria, Sudan before 9th July 2011 was one of Africa’s
Christian-Muslim borderlands. The case presented by Omer in this
issue is one in which a dominant exclusive monotheistic religion
unjustly imposes its ethical rules of just wealth-creation and
distribution on minority groups. Non-Muslims are required to pay
zakāt and thereby contribute to the social welfare pool, but they are
not entitled to benefit from it. Non-Muslims are required to follow the
Islamic rules of banking. Again in Sudan, like in Jos, Nigeria, the
religious difference coincided with ethnic identity and economic
issues. Where it has its way exclusive monotheism is likely to crush
difference and to disregard the rights of minorities.
The same can be noticed in the media representations in Kenya
whose wholesale demonization of Muslims in the face of terrorist
attacks in Kenya and beyond is due to a Christian majority taking
advantage of its dominancy of the social and cultural space. The
binary opposition of good and peaceful Christianity versus evil and
violent Islam is the exaggerated and stereotypical belief that already
existed in embryonic form in the antagonistic attitude between selfconscious, competing, and aggressively self-propagating religions.
The type of monotheistic religion emerging in the Axial Period is well
illustrated by the case of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat, an apolitical, fastgrowing, lay missionary movement in Kenya. Wario tells us that
Tablīghī Jamāʿat’s principal method is the missionary journey upon
which members are expected to embark frequently, a strategy
calculated to swell membership through sending out a great number
of preachers. The preacher and the teacher are therefore the
principal actors. To be noted is the emphasis on reading of the
Qur’an and other texts. Texts and sermons, typical of exclusive
monotheism, and not the ritual of primal religions, are prominent in
this case. The preoccupation of Wario in this issue is to draw the
reader’s attention to the bureaucratic support system behind Tablīghī
Jamāʿat’s core activities. This movement demonstrates a high sense
of self-reflectivity through its evaluation and planning sessions.
However, from Omanga’s essay, it seems that the Kenyan mass
media landscape is more attuned to an atypical violent Islam in
Kenya, and oblivious to the positive, successful, peaceful and more
authentically Kenyan Islamic movement, the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. A
general latent hostility between competing faiths predisposes even
newspaper editors’ representation of the religions.
In the essay by Wafula we get another verdict on religion in Kenya.
Wafula argues that Christianity in Kenya is losing grip of young
generations because of pastors and priests’ failure to consistently
demonstrate the ethical standards they preach to their
congregations. Christianity is one of the religions arising from the
Axial Period with a set of moral imperatives to be followed. However,
in practice religious communities have never managed to fully uphold
the moral injunctions they teach. If the youth in Kenya are beginning
to be conscious of the disparity between what is taught and what real
happens in practice then what is to be investigated is how the new
critical consciousness came about. Even the white missionaries were
not consistent in their ethical behaviour. For instance, according to
Wafula, the white missionaries worked in cohorts with the coloniser.
In Ethiopia, the terms ‘Christianity’ and ‘Islam’ may hide more than
they reveal the forms of religion there. There are varieties of
Christianity and Islam which may have more affinity with each other
than with other kinds of Christianity and Islam respectively. The
indigenisation of Christianity and Islam in Ethiopia gives these
exclusive monotheistic religions an inclusive character. The argument
given by Mebratu Baye, a deacon of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church,
in Zeleke’s essay above, demonstrates how inclusive monotheistic
types of Islam and Christianity can harmoniously live together and
even cooperate while they feel far removed from and cannot
collaborate with the exclusivist varieties of their respective religious
The essays by Bekele and Zeleke give evidence to the fact that the
evolution of religions is not unilinear. Former secondary religions may
assume a primary nature so that the relevance of the terms ‘primary’
and ‘secondary’ is put into question. In the case of both the Ginbot
Lideta and the Sufi shrine of Teru Sina, as presented by Bekele and
Zeleke respectively, the ordinary people put emphasis not on the one
true god or on correct belief or conformity to scriptures but instead on
ritual observance and devotion to intermediary divinities. In light of
the theoretical outline in this essay it is no surprise that the Islamic
reform movements complain that the ritual practice of paying tribute
at the shrine of Teru Sina is shirk (polytheism). From the Islamic
reform movements’ perspective, given that there is no God but Allah
and his prophet is Mohammed, veneration of saints is shirk and
therefore erroneous.
When we categorize Sufis, Orthodox, Salafis and Protestants under
the inclusivist-exclusivist dichotomy it becomes clear that at the
shrine of Teru Sina there is hardly any boundary to cross. Rather this
is a case of inclusive monotheistic religious forms translating their
gods with concordance. Even though they part when it comes to
eating, they remain one joint community that venerates shaykh Siraj
Muhammad Awel together. It is notable that they did not set apart
different days for Christians and Muslims for the veneration. They
come together at the same time and, apart from eating, they do
everything together. Inclusive monotheism is more inclined to
demolish borders rather than erect them, except in reaction to the
violence of exclusive monotheism.
The typology reviewed in this essay is a heuristic device by which to
understand the state of affairs of religion in Africa today. Religious
behaviour tends towards inclusive monotheism or exclusive
monotheism. In some contexts even typically exclusivist religions
may don an inclusive monotheistic nature. Exclusivist religions tend
to accentuate exclusivist identities and to erect boundaries. They
compete with and attract competition from other exclusivist religions.
Assmann, Jan. (2010) The Price of Monotheism. Translated by
Robert Savage. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Assmann, Jan. (2008) Of God and Gods: Egypt, Israel, and the Rise
of Monotheism. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Assmann, Jan. (1996) Translating Gods: Religion as a Factor of
Cultural (Un)Translatability. In: Sanford Budick and Wolfgang Iser
(eds.). The Translatability of Cultures: Figurations of the Space
Between. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp.25-36.
Firth, Raymond. (1996) Religion: A Humanist Interpretation. London:
Jaspers, Karl. (1953) The Origin and Goal of History. Translated by
Michael Bullock. London: Yale University Press.
Pye, Michael. (2004) The Structure of Religious Systems in
Contemporary Japan: Variations on Shinto Buddhist Pilgrimage.
Occasional Papers No. 30. Centre for Japanese Studies:
University of Marburg, pp. 3-15.
_______ (2011) Lecture on 12 January 2011 on ‘Shinto, Primal
Religion, and Civil Religion’. University of Bayreuth.
Kupakwashe Mtata
Kupakwashe Mtata holds an M.A. in Religious Studies from the
University of Bayreuth. He is currently a BIGSAS Junior Fellow
pursuing a PhD on religion and nature conservation in African
contexts with a case study on the Zimbabwe Institute of Religious
Research and Ecological Conservation (ZIRRCON). His research
interests include cultural encounters and the history of ideas, with a
particular focus on the religious field.