TY - JOUR T1 - A cooperative game-based mechanism for allocating ancillary service costs associated with wind power integration in China JF - Utilities Policy Y1 - 2019/06// SP - 120 EP - 127 A1 - Hu, Junfeng A1 - Yan, Qingyou A1 - Li, Xingmei A1 - Jiang, Zhong-Zhong A1 - Kahrl, Fredrich A1 - Jiang Lin A1 - Wang, Peng AB - Wind power in China is developing rapidly. However, wind power curtailment has become increasingly severe, reaching 15% in 2015. The root cause of wind power curtailment in China is that its power system has insufficient flexibility. We analyze how to achieve a reasonable allocation of ancillary service costs for wind power plants, using a cooperative game approach. The analysis shows that, while the current allocation approach in the Beijing, Tianjin, and Tangshan power grid is based only on wind feed-in tariffs, an allocation method based on both the feed-in tariff and the capacity credit of wind would be more reasonable. VL - 58 JO - Utilities Policy DO - 10.1016/j.jup.2019.05.008 ER -