Central Bank Digital Currencies:

'Digital Currencies and Bank Competition'.


This article examines how the issuance of a Digital Currency by a non-bank operator impacts competition between banks in a cashless society. I analyze how the fee charged for the digital currency impacts the interest rates on loans and the fees charged by banks to depositors for paying by card and opening an account in a bank. I derive the conditions under which consumers use the digital currency to pay.

'Bank-Platform Competition in the Credit Market', with Sara Biancini (Thema, Université de Cergy-Pontoise).


The paper analyzes the equilibrium on the credit market when a bank and a platform compete to offer credit to borrowers. The platform does not manage deposit accounts, but acts as an intermediary between the borrower and the investor, offering a risky contract such that the investor is only reimbursed if the borrower is successful. We first characterize the optimal contracts proposed by the platform, depending on the two-sided structure of the market. Then, we study the impact of bank-platform competition on the average risk of bank loans and the relative level of interest rates.

Competition and Welfare Effects of Bailout Policies:
'Bailout Policies when Banks Compete with Switching Costs', with Noé Ciet (Université Paris 2).

In this paper, we analyze the welfare effects of bailout policies when banks compete with switching costs. We compare no-bailout policies to systematic bailouts. We argue that no-bailout policies increase the interest rates paid by borrowers ex ante (i.e., before a shock), whereas they may reduce the interest rates paid by consumers who are not credit constrained. Such policies increase social welfare ex post if borrowers can easily switch banks and if the credit constraints are not too severe.