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Credit rationing and firms in oligopoly

This paper develops a theory of the firm, and equilibrium credit rationing mechanisms in oligopoly with R&D-product market competition. Credit rationing arises from a hold-up problem between wealth-constrained entrepreneurs and external investors. Underinvestment occurs if entrepreneurial wealth constraint is binding, even though the equilibrium corporate governance structure addresses the hold-up problem optimally. In a symmetric equilibrium outcome all firms face equitable credit-size rationing. In contrast the asymmetric equilibrium outcome sees some firms (the 'preys') denied external credits entirely while the others (the 'predators') receiving more favorable finances, which turns out to increase market concentration and overall R&D investments.