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Power Sharing in Politics

After a brief description of a representative selection of power indices and a discussion of the notion of power in collective decision making, the paper discusses the modeling of power of an individual or collective agent as identified with the potential or factual effect the decision of this agent has on the outcome. It demonstrates that the distribution of power is crucially dependent on the procedures resorted to, and not just on the distribution of resources and the majority threshold as captured by the standard power measures. Similarly, it is shown that the selection and formulation of the questions to analyze can be highly relevant when we link power and power measures to causality. The concluding section discusses whether power indices are measures that represent power and ratios of power, or whether they are indicators that point out properties of the cooperative game and the underlying decision situation.