{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.03515263644773358, 'fraction_numerical': 0.005550416281221091, 'mean_word_length': 5.638036809815951, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Teleology in Spinoza and Early Modern Rationalism

This chapter argues that (1) Spinoza accepts the legitimacy of many teleological explanations; (2) in two important respects, Leibniz’s view of teleology is not more Aristotelian than Descartes’s; and (3) among Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, Spinoza holds the view of teleology closest to Aristotle’s. The arguments for (1) draw on Spinoza’s treatment of conatus; a critical analysis of Jonathan Bennett’s arguments that Spinoza denies all teleology; and the application Spinoza’s distinction of three kinds of cognition to the distinction between mechanistic and teleological explanation. The arguments for (2) and (3) are based on an examination of the answers given by Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza to four basic questions about the nature and range of teleology and teleological explanation. These questions concern the dependence of teleology on thought, the relation of teleology to divine will or purpose, the existence of “subhuman” teleology, and the role of teleological explanation in natural philosophy.