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Grasping the process of implicit mentalization

Mentalization has developed through different waves and its definition has gradually changed. Through this process mentalization theorists have not taken a particular position on the philosophical underpinnings of the understanding of others, except that Theory of Mind (ToM) is referred to as a commonsense and underlying theoretical basis. It is apparent that ToM does not explain all dimensions of Mentalization Theory (MT), especially implicit mentalization, and theorists do not account for how implicit mentalization can be captured in interaction. In this article we explain the divergence between MT and ToM and the lack of a philosophical basis for the process of understanding others in MT. We show that conversation analysis (CA) can be used to capture implicit mentalization in interaction. We argue that MT needs a theoretical and philosophical formulation about what constitutes intersubjectivity and the process of understanding others. We suggest that phenomenology could inhabit this space.