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Justifying Constituent Power in an Age of Populism

In a time of contentious politics, it becomes conspicuous that studies of populism and of constituent power rarely mention one another. This is true despite the fact that “the people” are regularly asserted as the preferred political subject for populism and constituent power alike, pitting them against elites and even the constitution. But if opponents of populism are right that its appeal to the people’s will is normatively suspect, how do we ensure that their will—as the foundation of modern politics—is not undercut completely? I claim that the theory of constituent power can solve this dilemma through a comparison with populism that assesses their respective positions on political subjectivity and identity, political temporality, political will, and the appropriate kind of rule. Critics are wrong to depict either approach as intrinsically cynical and unprincipled. However, comparing their ontological assumptions confirms that constituent power offers a theoretically rich and complex frame for contentious politics, one that is superior to and reinforces concerns about populism, especially the kind of authoritarian populism—and its democratic masquerade—that is dominant today.