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Exposures: Nancy and Heidegger on Community

the prey of ideology by virtue of the fact that the philosophical presuppositions defining their meaning ... have succumbed to the nihilism that inhabits them." (ix). 5. See BT § 26, 122, where we read about this kind of solicitude that it "takes over for the other that with which he is to concern himself. The Other is thus thrown out of his own position; he steps back so that afterwards, when the matter has been attended to, he can either take it over as something finished and at his disposal, or disburden himself of it completely." 6. A quite separate reason why this is redundant arises from the fact that Fynsk's Foreword to IC provides such a masterful, insightful, and finely judged reconstruction of these moves, and is therefore so much more than an Introduction to Nancy's text, that a less adept reader of Nancy (and of Heidegger and Blanchot) would end up cruelly exposed. 7. If such a broad characterisation as 'the thoughts of difference' may be applied to a trajectory within Western thought which encompassesif not exclusively sothe writings of Heidegger, Blanchot, Bataille and Derrida, as well as other exponents of contemporary 'French' philosophy, where it is not a matter of a language, much less of a nationality, but of SOf!ething like a philosophical sensibility. Many of the finest practitioners of 'French' philosophy belong geographically elsewhere. 8. For a more extensive discussion of the issues which concern us here, one would also, minimally, have to take into account Heidegger's later essays 'What is Metaphysics?' (1929), 'Of the Essence of Truth' (1930), and 'The Thing' (1950). But the present paper can only present these issues in a preliminary manner and leave the inclusion of these and other works into the discussion for another time. 9. Or, to give it its full title, 'Preliminary Sketch of the Existential-ontological Structure of Death'. This is the heading for BT §50, 249. 10. Both the translations by Macquarrie and Robinson and by Stambaugh render 'uniiberholbar' in a manner which seems unnecessarily ponderous to me, given the unusually 'straightforward' German term chosen by Heidegger. This is why I propose 'unovertakeable' instead of 'not to be outstripped' (Macquarrie and Robinson) and 'not-tobe-bypassed' (Stambaugh), although I use the less inelegant 'insurmountable' in less technical contexts. II. This is why the translation of Befindlichkeit as. 'state-of-mind' (Macquarrie and Robinson) has to be rejected out of hand. Stambaugh's translation of it as 'attunement' has the most unfortunate effect of eradicating the difference between Be.findlichkeit and Gestimmtsein, which is similarly unacceptable. 12. To be precise, it should be pointed out, as Werner Marx does, that 'the nothing' (das Nichts) does not explicitly appear in Heidegger's oeuvre until after BT, namely in 'What is