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Who Gets What: Domestic Influences on International Negotiations Allocating Shared Resources (review)

In Who Gets What, Aslaug Asgeirsdottir takes on an important and challenging issue in international relations: once states have agreed to cooperatively manage shared resources, how do they determine national allocations? Basing her answer in game-theoretic wisdom—particularly Putnam’s concept of two-level games—the author argues that powerful domestic interests constrain win sets, providing their governments with leverage over less-constrained counterparts. Her in-depth case studies test the hypothesis that Norway will increasingly lose out to Iceland in negotiations for access to straddling ash stocks because the Norwegian ashing interests have become less powerful, while the Icelandic ashers have maintained considerable political inouence. Asgeirsdottir sets the context for her analysis by describing the evolution of the United Nations Law of the Sea Regime, including the extension of coastal jurisdiction to 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and the subsequent addition of an agreement for managing ash stocks that either range across one or more zones (straddling stocks) or are only found on the high seas (highly migratory stocks). She then provides a detailed description of the political inouence of domestic ashing interests in her two focal countries. It is clear from her evidence that Norwegian ashers wielded considerable political power in the 1970s and early 1980s but that their effectiveness has declined with their numbers. In addition, the rise of petroleum production and the end of the Cold War reduced the relative importance of asheries in the Norwegian economy. In contrast, Icelandic ashers have been and remain a powerful political force due to their role as the major export industry in the Icelandic economy. Having supported her underlying assumptions with these useful reviews of domestic ashing interests, Asgeirsdottir goes on to relate the results of seven distributive agreements that cover four species of ash: capelin, herring, cod, and oceanic redash. The capelin case in particular supports her hypothesis. Negotiations in 1980, when Norwegian ashers were still powerful, were quite equitable, while subsequent negotiations from 1986–1989 and in 1998 resulted in smaller and smaller catch allocations to Norway as the inouence of Norwegian ashing interests waned. Negotiations over herring in 1996 and 1997 and for cod from 1993–1999 favored Iceland over Norway in spite of the fact that much