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Why File? Organized Interests and Amicus Briefs in State Courts of Last Resort

ABSTRACT Why do organized interests lobby state supreme courts? Much of the extant research on interest group activity in the judiciary focuses on the U.S. federal courts, with comparatively little analysis of interest group participation in state courts. However, prior work does note interest group engagement in state supreme courts by filing amicus briefs, yet it is unclear why organized interests do so. This study analyzes interest group participation as amicus curiae in all state courts of last resort from 1995–1998 to examine what factors motivate organized interests to turn to these courts. A theoretical framework explaining amicus participation as a function of facilitating both policy and organizational maintenance goals is presented and tested using a zero-inflated negative binomial regression. The results lend support to the theoretical framework and suggest that interest groups are motivated by their policy goals in deciding which cases to file amicus briefs in, but that they also consider the long-term viability of their organization as well. This research provides insight into interest group behavior, state courts, and the role organized interests play in shaping legal outcomes in the American states.