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Taking it Personally

Chapter 4 challenges a common dogma of the literature on forgiveness: that forgiveness is the exclusive prerogative of victims. Attacks on third-party forgiveness generally come in two forms. One form of attack suggests that third-party forgiveness is conceptually incoherent (and so impossible). Another form of attack suggests that it is always morally inappropriate for third parties to forgive. This chapter argues against both of these claims; third-party forgiveness is possible, and in some cases it is morally appropriate for third parties to forgive (or refuse to forgive) wrongdoers for wrongs done to victims. The chapter also proposes an explanation of third-parties’ standing to forgive. Third parties have the standing to forgive when it is appropriate for them to take ‘personally’ wrongs done to victims, and this occurs primarily in the context of close relationships. Thus, while the standing to forgive is not grounded exclusively in having been wronged, the prerogative to forgive is normally limited to victims and their loved ones. Once we recognize the importance of third-party forgiveness in our moral lives and the norms that govern it, we can more easily adjudicate between competing accounts of the nature of forgiveness.