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Turnover and Ownership Structure in Turkey

Recently, Turkey has attracted investors' attention as one of the emerging countries like Asian or Latin American countries, and its high economic growth is expected to continue in the future. It is supported by the activity of private companies, and such enterprises have been listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) market since the 1990's. In this paper, we examine the role of corporate governance in top executive turnover in Turkey. We focus on the impact of the family company corporate system. As for the features of Turkish firms, we highlight the following three points; the ownership structure is remarkably concentrated, ownership and management is not separate but in many cases the founder family participates in management as for board members, the existence of a business group with bank where the founder family is positioned at the top of the pyramidal structure. As a result, we find that the corporate governance system works by top executive turnover in Turkey. We also see that the probability of turnover rises when a member of the founder family participates in management. However, the probability of turnover rises when ROE is negative for two years. This suggests the advantage of efficient family management.